

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#40 cable	State secret <i>Exempt</i> for Vance from Rusk 3 p	STATE letter MAY 7 1979 undated	A
#41 cable	State secret <i>Exempt</i> 110828 to Seoul 3 p	02/06/68	A
#43 report	state secret <i>open 7-18-79</i> draft instruction for emissary to Saigon 2 p	undated	A
#63a cable	state top secret para 7 from Abm. Bunker's cable Saigon 21733 1 p	03/11/68	A
#72 cable	state secret Saigon 23069 from Amb. Bunker 3 p	03/26/68	A
#75a letter	state top secret to president from Henry Cabot Lodge 3 p	03/27/68	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, NSC History
March 31st Speech, vol. 7

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#15 memo	ICS secret <i>QCS 6-29-78 letter</i> to the President from Gen. Wheeler 7p	03/04/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	OSD letter JUL 25 1979		
#6 report	OSD top secret <i>open 10-19-79 ip</i> re: forces in Vietnam	16 p 03/03/68	A
#7 report	OSD top secret " Proposal	7 p 03/03/68	A
#8 report	OSD top secret " re: Vietnam	3 p 03/03/68	A
#9 memo	OSD top secret " to president	10 p 03/04/68	A
#10 report	OSD top secret " troop in vietnam	9 p 02/03/68	A
#17 memo	OSD top secret " strategic guidance	3 p 03/03/68	A
#18 memo	OSD top secret " strategic guidance	2 p 03/03/68	A
#20 memo	OSD top secret " for the president	3 p 03/04/68	A
#21 report	OSD top secret " Tab A	2 p undated	A
#22 report	OSD top secret " Tab B	7 p undated	A
#23 report	OSD top secret " Tab C	3 p undated	A
#24 report	OSD top secret " Tab D	3 p undated	A
#25 report	OSD top secret <i>open 7-28-80 ip</i> Tab E	13 p undated	A
#26 report	OSD top secret <i>open 10-19-79 ip</i> Tab F	12 p undated	A
#27 report	OSD top secret " Tab F-2	4 p undated	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#28 report	OSD top secret <i>open 10-19-79</i> Tab G 3 p	undated	A
#29 report	OSD top secret " Tab H 4 p	undated	A
#35 report	OSD secret " re: military situation in Vietnam 1 p	02/08/68	A
#42 cable	OSD secret " text of cable sent by Gen. Westmoreland 2 p	02/11/68	A
#45 document memo	OSD top secret " re: Vietnam 6 p	undated	A
#66 memo	OSD top secret " to president from Clifford 6 p	03/15/68	A
#69a memo	OSD top secret " interudetary memorandum 2 p	03/25/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#74 memo	CIA on letter R-17-36-89 top secret 11-13-85 SANITIZED 11-13-85 same sanitization 2-9-95 to Rostow from Carver dup. #24, NSF, File of Walt Rostow, "Meeting w/ the President Jan-April 1968" Box 1	4 p 03/26/68	A appeal
#82 memo	CIA top secret [redacted] Intelligence memorandum	10 p 03/13/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#81 memo	GIA secret (gp 1) <i>again 7-23-80 if</i> to Director from Abbot Smith 7 p	02/26/68	A
#83 memo	GIA top secret <i>again 7-23-80 if</i> to director from Abbot Smith 13 p	03/13/68	A

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March 31st Speech, vol. 7

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March 31st Speech, vol. 7

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#77 memo	state top secret [State Letter 1-24-79] introductory memorandum 2 p	03/25/68	A
#78 report	state secret report to the president from Amb. Bunker 3 p (partial duplicate of #14a in NSC History, March 31st Speech, Vol. 6)	03/06/68	A
#79 report	state secret report to the president from Amb. Bunker 3 p (partial duplicate of #16a in NSC History, March 31st Speech, Vol. 6)	03/14/68	A
#80 report	state secret sitrep to president from Amb. Bunker 5 p (partial duplicate of #18 in NSC History, March 31st Speech, Vol. 6)	03/20/68	A
#84 report	state top secret [State Letter 1-24-79] re: Vietnamese troops 12 p	undated	A
#91 report	state secret [State Letter 1-24-79] re: Vietnam 2 p	undated	A
#93 report	state secret [State Letter 1-24-79] negotiating options 1 p	undated	A
#94 report	state top secret [State Letter 1-24-79] Option A 6 p	undated	A
#95 report	state secret [State Letter 1-24-79] negotiating posture options 12 p	undated	A

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9/8/4

#12 memo	Treasury	top secret	open 8-20-79		
	Economic and Financial Problems and Measures	3 p	03/03/68		A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	WH TO STATE DEPT. FOR CONSULTATION		
#5 report	top secret <i>agen 7-23-80 ip</i> Public Affairs 9 p	03/03/68	A
#13 memo	top secret " to secState & SecDef from LBJ	02/28/68	A
#14 memo	top secret " to SecState & SecDef from	02/28/68	A
#31 agenda	secret " Luncheon with the President	01/30/68	A
#32 memo	conf " to Sec Rusk from Rostow	01/31/68	A
#33 memo	top secret " List agenda lunch with president	02/03/68	A
#34 list	top secret " agenda lunch meeting with president	02/06/68	A
#36 list	secret " agenda meeting with president	02/09/68	A
#37 memo	top secret " topx president from Tom Johnson	02/09/68	A
#38 notes	top secret <i>sanitized 7-23-80 ip</i> notes of president's meeting with Senior Policy Advisers <i>Open NLJ 89-159 2-11-00</i>	02/09/68	A
#39 list	top secret <i>agen 7-23-80 ip</i> agenda meeting with president	02/11/68	A
#46 list	secret " agenda meeting with president	02/12/68	A
#53 list	secret " agenda luncheon with president	02/20/68	A
#62 list	secret " agenda lunch meeting with president	03/05/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSC History
March 31st Speech, vol. 7

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	WH TO STATE DEPT. FOR CONSULTATION		
#63 list	top secret <i>agm 7-23-80 ip</i> Agenda luncheon with president 1 p	03/12/68	A
#68 memo	secret " to president from Rostow 1 p	03/25/68	A
#69 memo	top secret " to president from Rostow 1 p	03/25/68	A
#75 memo	top secret " to president from Rostow 1 p	03/27/68	A

FILE LOCATION

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#76 memo	NSC secret <i>sanitized 7-23-88 ip</i> <i>Open</i> memo for record, 583rd NSC Meeting	4-24-01 3 p 04/04/68	A

FILE LOCATION

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	WH TO OSD FOR CONSULTATION		
#3 memo	top secret open 7-8-85 NLS 84-235 to president from Rostow	3 p 03/04/68	A
#4 memo	top secret open RAC Agenda meeting with president	2 p 03/04/68	A
#48 agenda	secret open RAC luncheon with president	1 p 02/13/68	A
#59 agenda	top secret meeting with the president (duplicates #4)	2 p 03/04/68	A
#60 memo	top secret to president from Rostow (duplicates #3)	3 p 03/04/68	A
#64 memo	top secret open 6/95 to president from Rostow	2 p 03/15/68	A
#67 agenda	secret lunch with president open RAC	2 p 03/19/68	A
#65 memo	top secret open 8/1/96 NY 95-208 to president from Rostow	1 p 03/15/68	A
#71 memo	secret open 6/95 to president from Rostow	1 p 03/26/68	A

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NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, NSC History
March 31st Speech, vol. 7

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	WH TO JCS FOR CONSULTATION		
#54 memo	Secret to president from Rostow	1 p 02/20/68	A
#55 memo	secret to president from MDT	2 p 02/19/68	A
#56 list	top secret Agenda-breakfast with president	2 p 02/28/68	A
#58 memo	top secret <i>OPEN 8/1/90 NY 95-208</i> for the record by Rostow	3 p 02/29/68	A

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MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT

DRAFT MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT - 4 March 1968

MEETING NOTES

PAPERS FOR ADVISORY GROUP MEETING
March 25, 1968

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT

Rostow Memo, The Clifford Committee -----	A
Agenda -----	B
First Draft Public Affairs -----	C
Case Against troop increases -----	D
Alternative 2 -----	E
Bombing campaign, our objectives -----	F
Memo for the President -----	G
Habib draft, Vietnamese efforts -----	H
Rusk, Clifford propose a statement -----	I
SecTreasury memo, economic, financial problems -----	J
White House memo to State, Defense -----	K
Wheeler memo, civilian engineering capability -----	L
Attendees with President, 4 March -----	M
Defense memo, strategic guidance -----	N

Meeting w/President

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~Monday, March 4, 1968
1:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: The Clifford Committee

1. After much debate, ~~there should be before you at 5:30 this afternoon~~
~~an agreed paper.~~

2. The essence of the agreement is:

-- ~~We should send to Westy in, say, the next three months, whatever~~
~~we can send him that would be helpful in the tense battle he may face before~~
~~the weather changes; but the condition of our Reserves does not permit us~~
~~to get much to him in this time interval (perhaps 30,000).~~

-- ~~We should call up Reserves sufficient to meet the rest of his~~
~~requirement if it is later judged that the rest of his request must and should~~
~~be met;~~

-- ~~These two actions require that we reconstitute the U.S. strategic~~
~~Reserve. The exact scale of this reconstitution has not been agreed in the group~~
~~nor the exact recommended combination of increased draft call and Reserve~~
~~call-up. All hands agree, however, that our basic national security position~~
~~requires the reconstitution of our Reserve position if we are not to temp~~
~~aggressors in various parts of the world.~~

3. ~~It was agreed that we should make a maximum effort to encourage and~~
~~induce improved Vietnamese military and political performance.~~ The particular
headings for discussion with and pressure on the GVN are pretty well worked
out.

As part of this effort ~~there should be a program for improving the~~
~~equipment of the ARVN;~~ and a rough package has been worked out for that
purpose of, say, \$400 million.

4. ~~It was agreed that there should be a fresh review of our strategy in~~
~~Viet Nam;~~ that this should be urgently conducted and ~~completed before you~~
~~are asked to make a commitment to send Westy forces beyond the tranche~~
~~recommended for the next three months.~~

5. On the economic side, Joe Fowler would propose that the increased
~~budgetary outlay for Fiscal 68-69 be offset dollar for dollar mainly by a tax~~
~~increase,~~ but he believes a ~~program reduction of civilian outlays in Fiscal 69~~

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 84-235
By isp, NARS, Date 7-8-85

A

March 4, 1968

~~will be required in the \$2-\$3 billion range.~~ He has further recommendations in the field of manpower policy and administration and wage/price policy, but does not recommend formal wage and price controls. Since the recommended package is only now beginning to take shape, Secretary Fowler has not discussed it with Okun, Zwick, or Califano.

Discussion

You should know that the discussion we have had in these days has been colored by ~~one major uncertainty~~ and a ~~widely shared reservation~~. The uncertainty is: ~~what are enemy capabilities, and what are U.S. and ARVN capabilities in the days, weeks, and several months ahead?~~

~~We all have the feeling that the battle is likely to be pretty close.~~ If the enemy brings in additional North Vietnamese forces, it could become dangerous for our side; and it will go badly for our side unless we can induce the ARVN to go out and fight in the countryside. On the other hand, if we and the ARVN prove capable of taking the offensive along the lines in Westy's latest cable, we could make 1968 the year of decision. Thus, the performance of the Vietnamese and the ARVN is critical and the exact state of the enemy which we won't know until we engage him or he engages us. Therefore, in looking ahead over the next months and considering Westy's request, ~~we don't know whether we are being asked to send forces to prevent a radical deterioration in our side's position, or to permit him to conduct in the second half of the year a vigorous offensive.~~

The reservation, which goes deep in State and Defense, is ~~that the additional forces would constitute a gross over-commitment of U.S. military resources to Viet Nam without bringing us closer to a resolution of the problem.~~ Behind that judgment, in turn, is a feeling that we can only attain our objectives in Viet Nam by a negotiation which brings the Viet Cong into the political process, and this negotiation, in turn, may not be much advanced by putting additional U.S. forces into the country. Secretary Rusk, for example, is thinking in terms of sending the absolute limit on U.S. forces and then leaving the rest of the job up to the South Vietnamese.

The group ~~did not address itself to an extremely important question, which is precisely how this package would be presented to the Congress and the country.~~

I have some ideas about this; and I am sure others do also.

As for the Congress, there was a general feeling that ~~this will be a difficult matter, probably possible, but we might confront some extremely ugly and determined opposition from Fulbright, Gore, etc. -- perhaps including a filibuster.~~

March 4, 1968

The differences of view about ~~bombing~~ and mining Haiphong were so profound within the group, and other issues so urgently required resolution, that the bombing question ~~was put to one side for separate and later treatment~~

W. A. T. Rostow

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

4

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Meeting with the President
Monday, March 4, 1968, 5:30 P. M.

AGENDA

1. Presentation of report by Sect. Clifford and explanation by him of its substance.
2. General comments

You may wish to go around the table and ask for observations by Sect. Rusk, Sect. Fowler, Gen. Wheeler, and others.

Key questions: You may then wish to ask the following questions:

-- (Gen. Wheeler) What is the likelihood of Gen. Westmoreland finding himself in a desperate military situation in the course of the next three months?

-- (Gen. Wheeler) Are there any measures that we might take at such a time to assist him if such a situation could arise?

-- (Gen. Wheeler) Have we contingency plans prepared for such an occasion? What particular forces are you recommending that we dispatch immediately, and in what ways might they help Gen. Westmoreland in the next three months?

-- (Sect. Rusk) How soon could we formulate what we want from the South Vietnamese and get an assessment from Bunker and Westmoreland as to the likelihood of their performance?

-- (Gen. Wheeler) Is there a lower level at which we could reconstitute our Reserves and meet the general objectives of Sect. Clifford's recommendation?

-- (Gen. Wheeler and Mr. Helms) If Westy and the South Vietnamese turn back the winter-spring offensive, what are the odds on our making 1968 a favorable year of decision; what role would the additional forces Westy has requested play in such an offensive operation?

-- (Sect. Rusk) What negotiating stance should we and the South Vietnamese adopt if we come through in good shape with some forward momentum in May or June?

-- (Sect. Clifford and Gen. Wheeler) What difficulties do you perceive with these recommendations in the Armed Services Committee?

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-- (Sect. Fowler) ~~What difficulties do you perceive with the financial committees?~~

-- (Sect. Rusk) ~~How would we handle the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees and, in particular, cope with the anti-Vietnam group in the Senate?~~

-- (Sects. Rusk and Clifford) ~~How would we present the justification for this program to the Congress and to our people? What consultations do you recommend before we move?~~

3. Depending on your own judgment at the end of the session, you may wish either to:

-- ~~postpone a decision~~ until you can talk alone with a smaller group, including particularly Secretaries Rusk and Clifford; or

-- ~~direct Secretary Clifford and General Wheeler to undertake the consultations~~ which were yesterday postponed; that is, with Senators Russell and Dirksen; Congressman Rivers; and, via General Goodpaster, with General Eisenhower.

4. Once you have come to a decision, you will need urgent refinement of military, diplomatic, and financial staff work.

W. W. Rostow

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Authority State 3-13-79; NSC 3-27-80

By ip, NARS, Date 7-23-80

10
FIRST DRAFT 5

March 3, 1968

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

I. The assignment is to draft a "plan to rally the homefront," to "mobilize the will and determination of the people," to "point out the steps required to organize public opinion."

There is an apparent feeling within the group that, despite several years of war, a commitment that has risen to 500,000 Americans and more than 18,000 American dead, no successful plan to rally the people has been executed.

We concur. The people have not been "rallied." In fact, little effort has been expended on a "people rallying" program. A tremendous number of officials in government information are concerned with moving information about the war. A few persons, working on a part-time basis, have consciously tried to "sell the war" by one means or another -- by proving that the ARVN are effective and that revolutionary development is working, or by pushing the formation of a committee of intellectuals-for-the-war. Personnel at the Assistant Secretary level from both the public affairs and the operational sides of both State and Defense have been meeting with counterparts at the White House for several years on a weekly basis to "sell the war." Mac Bundy chaired one such group; Walt Rostow chairs one today. Various individuals have been given the sole mission of explaining the war:

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

2

Bill Jorden at one time; Harold Kaplan at another. All are familiar with the consistent efforts of the McNaughtons, Bundys, Ungers and Habibs; the Deputy/Under Secretaries; the Secretaries themselves; the White House people; the Maxwell Taylors and the President.

This history is important to restate, for it would be folly to undertake a brand new effort without realizing that a large number of people have spent extensive time and effort trying to tell the story of the war. But relatively little effort has been spent trying to rally the people, and almost none by persons working full time on this objective alone. Defense does some work with veterans organizations, State has its programs, movie makers have been given a little co-operation. But the "people rallying" effort, as opposed to the "tell the war story effort," has been minimal.

Before recommending a specific new structure for people-rallying, we suggest a look at the problem from another direction.

Why have none of the information programs rallied the people? Why is there such opposition in the country? Why have the normal public affairs efforts of public affairs experts failed, at home and abroad? Are vital substantive pieces missing that must be supplied?

We think that such pieces are missing and we believe that the skeleton outline which follows will produce no significant results beyond those already achieved unless these pieces are supplied.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

3

If the people are to accept the war, the government must:

1. Prove that it is in our national interest.
2. Prove that we have a plan to win it.
3. Tell the people what resources are required to carry out that plan.

In our opinion, we have not supplied effectively those three critical answers. Without them, the people cannot be rallied.

If the war is in our national interest, it is less important whether the ARVN are effective or not, or whether the government is corrupt or not, or whether a Vietnamese general is barbaric or not, or whether it is a civil war or an external aggression. It is less important whether reporters write about the Korean or Australian troops, or whether the refugees are homeless, or how much defoliant is dropped or how many civilian casualties we cause. All of those points are extremely important if we are in the war for any number of other reasons, but we can ride with any of them if the war is in our national interest -- and if the people believe it.

If we have a plan to win, it is less important whether it takes two more years or four more, whether the Tet offensive was a victory or defeat, whether pacification is lagging or how many crew-served weapons have been seized. It is less important whether the plan includes or excludes

~~TOP SECRET~~

Haiphong, whether Khe Sanh can or cannot be over-run, whether the ARVN are in the cities or in the countryside. The people will accept reverses and defeats -- if a workable plan is spelled out to them.

If the government lays out the required resources, the people will pay the price. It is less important whether the field commander gets every man he requests (what field commander ever did?). If the war is in our interest, and if there is a plan to win, the people will accept the taxes and the domestic hardships.

Unless we can prove that the war is in our national interest and that we have a plan to win it and that we have identified the resources required to carry out that plan, neither an information program nor a "people rallying" program is going to mobilize the will of the people as we want to see it mobilized.

Clearly, the price to be paid for convincing America that the war is essential to our national interest would be the increased difficulty of withdrawing short of "victory." This price should be weighed before a people-rallying program is launched.

II. It was suggested Saturday that an intelligent "people rallying" plan could not be drafted until the decisions had been made on the various papers before the group. Differences around the table existed on several major points -- even on such a basic issue as whether a new look at strategic guidelines should include a new look at national objectives.

~~TOP SECRET~~

If we deploy more than 200,000 additional troops, call up nearly a quarter of a million reserves and increase the end-strength by nearly a half-million persons, one line should be followed. If we deploy 50,000 and deny Westmoreland the others, a different line would be followed. If you give Westy everything he wants, do you mine Haiphong or not?

The approach to Congress would be different under the different circumstances. Once these decisions are made, great care should be given the means of presentation. But there can be no public affairs "presentation" plan until the choices have been narrowed.

III. The point was made that we do not hate the enemy and that emotions have not been aroused as they were in earlier wars. The limited application of force for a limited objective has demanded that we avoid the emotion-rousing steps taken by governments in earlier wars. Consider that:

We cannot talk about bombing Laos;

We scrupulously avoid killing the enemy at home, and brag about it;

We do not mine his harbor or blockade his coast;

We boast of the unique efforts taken to destroy only "military targets;"

We apologize and regret the possible accidental overflight of one of his two major supply allies;

We go to great extremes to avoid a confrontation of any nature with the second of his two major supply allies;

~~TOP SECRET~~

We come near panic at the very suggestion of the conceivable use under any circumstances of the weapon which ended World War II;

We conceal the possible torture of Americans held captive;

Etc.

All could add many other points to the list. We clearly cannot unleash the emotions of the people and continue to leash the military who are fighting. One of the prices of this kind of war must be restraint on the public opinion front. Some of the above restraints are going to be far more difficult to apply if another 200,000 troops are deployed and 250,000 reservists are called. These steps would mean added public affairs actions designed to hold down the people, not to arouse them.

IV. While we cannot present a specific government-wide public affairs plan for rallying the people, we do propose a new public affairs structure that could operate under any set of decisions:

1. A new special assistant in the White House with a staff of perhaps eight persons, including two or three secretaries.
2. The special assistant should be nominated by George Christian, Dixon Donnelley and Phil Goulding. (Someone has suggested Horace Busby as a possibility.)
3. He should not be such a "big name" that he would consider himself an unofficial member of the Cabinet. Since there is no time for

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on-the-job training, he should be familiar with Washington, the war, the press, the Congress and the public.

4. His mandate should come from the President.

He would devise and administer a master national "rally" plan.

In so doing, he would ensure that the public affairs people of each agency -- not merely State and Defense -- were making an optimum effort to mobilize support for the war by rallying the people. He would ensure that those efforts were co-ordinated -- that Agriculture was telling Defense how to reach the farmers; that VA and Defense were together on what to do about the next American Legion convention.

This is what he would not do:

1. Make information policy on the war. He has nothing to do with how Saigon handles announcements on the Tet offensive.
2. Meet the press, the public or the Congress. He will not give briefings or make speeches.
3. Involve himself in crisis handling. His job is not to meet with George Christian and the Assistant Secretaries of Public Affairs on the Hainan overflight or the Tonkin Gulf probe.
4. React to the story on the UPI printer about the boy with no M16.

The major point is that the man is a sales manager -- not a press officer, a legislative liaison man or a top-level government source for

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the columnists. His mission is to rally the people; it is not to make information available. What is taking place at Khe Sanh is none of his concern. What he is concerned about is that a doctor who was at Khe Sanh is presented to the AMA convention in Chicago.

He is concerned about Gold Star mothers, about seeing that DoD has a Marine Band on national television for the All-Star game, about someone working with the mayor of Indianapolis on a returning hero, about whether 4-H Clubs are included or should be in a State Department program on Vietnam.

We realize that there is now a contact point in the White House for cabinet speaking programs. He would not replace this contact point, but he would make certain that the speeches include the three themes listed earlier.

While there have been previous efforts to single out one person in the White House for "Vietnam public affairs," that person has always been engaged in crisis handling, operational matters and backgrounders. This man must stay out of those areas.

Creation of this office would lead to news stories discussing the new propaganda agency in the White House. Many of those stories would be rough. Fulbright would also attack. But if this man can help arouse the

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country around the three points listed above, we should not be deterred from that objective by either news stories or Congressional criticism.

This mission can be accomplished only from and in the White House. But it must not be part of George Christian's operation. George must stay in the information business. His value to the President would be destroyed if he were running a national people-rallying program.

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THE CASE AGAINST FURTHER SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN U.S. FORCES IN VIETNAM

The reinforcements requested by General Westmoreland would bring the total of Americans fighting in Vietnam to almost three-quarters of a million. This would be more than double the total of the South Vietnamese regular forces and would roughly match the aggregate number of South Vietnamese under arms. The thesis of this paper is that the commitment of this number of U.S. forces would not significantly improve our military operations, would only add to the already heavy human and economic costs of our efforts and would in fact make less likely the accomplishment of our objective in Vietnam.

The objective of the United States in South Vietnam is to achieve an honorable peace that will leave the people of South Vietnam free to fashion their own political and economic institutions without fear of terror and intimidation from the North. The only way in which this objective can be attained is to create conditions under which the South Vietnamese themselves can develop the kind of political organization and military strength that will enable them to survive and overcome the challenges with which they will be faced once the American military presence is substantially withdrawn. The objective cannot be achieved if the United States virtually takes over the entire defense of South Vietnam and, by its military predominance, overshadows South Vietnam's own efforts and stunts, or at least retards, the growth that must occur if our political aims are to be realized.

The past 2-1/2 years, and particularly the last several weeks, have made clear the fact that there is no quick military solution to the problems

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of South Vietnam. No military power that we can bring to bear will be adequate to make the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong give up their goal of taking over in South Vietnam. No military strategy can succeed in substantially destroying the NVA/VC forces or driving them from the country. A military campaign directed primarily toward this objective should not be undertaken and a level of U.S. forces designed to this end should not be furnished.

Equally clear is the fact that to reach our political objective we will have to provide a level of security high enough for long enough to enable the Government of South Vietnam to become strong enough politically and militarily to ensure its own survival when we leave. This security role will have to be maintained for a period of years. It is therefore necessary that we put ourselves into a military posture which the people of the United States will be willing to support for the long haul.

Our objective in Vietnam is worth a high price. Like any other objective, however, it must be viewed in the context of our overall foreign policy. There is a point at which the price can become so high as to impair our ability to achieve other, and equally important, foreign policy objectives. There is thus a limit to the number of American troops we can wisely commit to the struggle in South Vietnam. There is no reason to believe that three-quarters of a million American fighting men can achieve more there than one-half a million will be able to do. There is no reason to think that sending 200,000 this year will find us a year from now in any better military situation and not faced with a further demand that would bring our forces beyond the million mark. This could leave us ill prepared to

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cope with contingencies elsewhere in the world or to maintain in Europe a level of military preparedness sufficient to deter Soviet adventurism. It could also leave the American people unwilling to respond in Asia and elsewhere with an American commitment that they would fear would become comparably costly.

No matter what the result in South Vietnam itself, we will have failed in our purposes if:

- a. The war in Vietnam spreads to the point where it is a major conflict leading to direct military confrontation with the USSR and/or China;
- b. The war in Vietnam spreads to the point where we are so committed in resources that our other world-wide commitments -- especially NATO -- are no longer credible;
- c. The attitudes of the American people towards "more Vietnams" are such that our other commitments are brought into question as a matter of US will;
- d. Other countries no longer wish the US commitment for fear of the consequences to themselves as a battlefield between the East and the West.

The time has come to stabilize the level of US involvement in South Vietnam and to begin to adjust the relative roles of the Americans and the South Vietnamese. We are not in danger of military defeat. The North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong are not able to drive us from the country. The presence of 500,000 to 600,000 American troops is more than adequate to demonstrate to Hanoi our determination to persist in seeking our goals.

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Indeed, at least one North Vietnamese assessment reviewed by CIA indicates that: "Hanoi sees every step in the strengthening of US forces as a vindication of Communist strategy, and points to its success in keeping pace with the build-up."

A decision should be made to send as soon as possible the forces immediately available to meet the immediate military situation. There is some reason to believe that our adversaries may continue their present abnormally high level of military activity during the next two months in an attempt to win military and morale victories that will result in the collapse of the GVN and the disintegration of ARVN. The added strength we can supply now will be of some importance in defeating this enemy thrust.

We should also decide, however, to level off US force commitments at this point and to study intensively ways in which we can operate militarily in a fashion which will provide the maximum degree of security for the maximum portion of the South Vietnamese population. Our purpose should be to adopt a military posture consistent with the most rapid development of South Vietnamese political and military capability and one which the American people will be willing to maintain for a sufficient period so that this growth can be accomplished.

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RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. In view of the adverse consequences of deploying an additional 205,000 troops and the great likelihood that the enemy would respond with an offsetting increase, postpone making or announcing any decision to deploy large numbers of additional forces.
2. Deploy those forces immediately available (10,500) to meet General Westmoreland's urgent request and call up reserves necessary to maintain our strategic reserve (4th Marine Division, supporting Naval forces, and two Army National Guard brigades.)
3. Do not decide now to approve the remainder of MACV's request. Take steps to shorten lead times, by ordering equipment and ammunition, readying reserves and, if necessary, calling them up, so that the forces can be deployed on the schedule requested by General Westmoreland if we decide to do so. This will require an additional \$2.5 billion to the \$2.5 billion supplemental already needed. Justify these steps as a hedge against possible crisis in Korea or Laos, as well as a massive North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam (Details at Tab A).
4. Revise MACV's strategic guidance.
5. Warn the GVN that ARVN effectiveness must be increased and that the GVN must move to gain the support of a broader segment of the Vietnamese population.

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Alternatives to the MACV Request

General Westmoreland has requested a large increase in the forces available to him in order to achieve the military objectives he has been pursuing. It is argued here that it is unlikely that he will be able to achieve these objectives even with an increase in force levels substantially greater than that requested, and that, on the other hand, the forces already at his disposal (with a small increase) are sufficient for the achievement of more modest military objectives wholly consonant with our political objective in Vietnam. This political objective is:

"... an honorable peace, that will leave the people of South Vietnam free to fashion their own political and economic institutions without fear of terror or intimidation from the North."

It is worth considering briefly how our strategy for employing ground forces evolved.

When U.S. forces were committed to South Vietnam in 1965 in increasingly larger numbers, the military situation improved significantly. U.S. forces wrested the initiative from VC/NVN main force units; ARVN forces were being oriented to the RD mission. Thus, by the end of 1966 our initial military objective of denying to the NVN/VC forces the seizure of political control force had been achieved. No longer was it possible for NVN to impose its will upon SVN by force.

By this time, however, our military objectives had been expanded. In the absence of political directives from civilian officials in Washington limiting the goals to be attained by U.S. military forces, our military objectives became to defeat or to destroy enemy forces and to eject the NVA invasion forces and to assist the GVN to extend its control over all of SVN.

It is now clear that no change in directive to General Westmoreland and no reinforcements we are capable of sending can prevent all further setbacks in the short run. We could avoid some possible disasters by pulling out of exposed static positions in I Corps and in the highlands, but cannot prevent a major enemy offensive against the Quang Tri-Hue area, or further deterioration in the Delta.

No level of U.S. forces in Vietnam and no U.S. ground strategy can, by themselves, accomplish our objective in SVN. We can obtain our objective only if the GVN begins to take the steps necessary to gain the confidence of the people and to provide effective leadership for the diverse groups in the population. ARVN must also be turned into an effective fighting force. If we fail in these objectives, a military victory over the NVN/VC main forces, followed by a U.S. withdrawal, would only pave the way for an NLF takeover.

Our military forces in SVN are fighting to provide the time during which ARVN and the GVN can develop confidence in their strength to survive a non-military resolution of the internal conflict.

General Wheeler notes that forces currently authorized for MACV are inadequate to carry out the current strategy and notes MACV's request for 206,700 new spaces for a total of 731,700 with all forces in place by the end of CY-68.

What can we hope to accomplish with these increased force levels in pursuit of our current strategy of seeking to attrite the enemy or drive him from South Vietnam?

The 200,000 additional forces requested by MACV will not put us in a position to drive the enemy from SVN or to destroy his forces. To achieve these objectives would require substantial additional forces and many years. Even before the TET offensive the enemy was initiating more than 2/3 of the clashes and could in response to our build-up adopt a casualty-limiting posture if he was concerned about attrition. There is nothing to indicate that he is. Although the Joint Staff estimate of the value of adding 205,000 men assumes that the enemy will not respond with its own build-up, it acknowledges that he has the ability to offset our augmentation. The intelligence community estimates that Hanoi not only can but will do so.

This more likely enemy response is that with which he has responded to previous increases in our force levels. Hanoi has maintained a constant ratio of 1 maneuver battalion to 1.5 US maneuver battalions and has without a doubt the capacity to match MACV's requested increase of 27 maneuver battalions from his reserve in NVN of from 45 - 70 maneuver battalions. Based on previous ratios of total combat manpower in US force increments, Hanoi could neutralize MACV's requested ground combat augmentation with 25,000 men.

If the enemy augments, disperses his troops and fights as he did before TET, we will, by the end of the year, be spread just as thin and be suffering 40,000 more casualties annually, including an additional 5,000 KIA. The results, moreover, can only be disappointment in terms of attriting his capability.

Over the past year, the US has been killing between 70 and 100 VC/NVA per month per United States combat battalions in theater. The return per combat battalion deployed has been falling off, but even

assuming that with the additional deployments the kill-ratios will remain constant, we could expect enemy deaths at most on the order of magnitude of 20,000 per month. The infiltration system from North Vietnam alone can supply and support 13,000 - 16,000 per month, regardless of our bombing pattern, and the remainder can be recruited in South Vietnam.

North Vietnam has a present force level of about 480,000, or about 3% of the population. About 65,000 of this army has been infiltrated into SVN. This contrasts with GVN forces of about 750,000 or 7% of the population under their control. Less than 20% of NVN's draft age men have been mobilized into the regular forces. About 120,000 physically fit North Vietnamese males are estimated to reach the present draft age each year. Thus the North Vietnamese have the capability to sustain a substantial increase over the estimated 1967 infiltration rate of about 7,000 per month.

Thus, even with the requested 205,000 augmentation there can be no early military resolution of the conflict. We cannot attrite the enemy, drive him from the country or destroy his will to fight. It is likely to require considerably more than 750,000 men to attain a military victory and even with this force level we would have to stay in Vietnam for many years. General Westmoreland and the Joint Staff explicitly assume that we maintain the military objective of destroying the enemy and driving him out of SVN. Unless we change that objective, we will have to provide MACV not only with his request, but some thereafter, with additional forces. Even if we do this, we can expect to suffer severe reverses over the next six months, since no more than 10,500 troops can arrive before mid-summer.

Hanoi no longer can doubt that the United States will not permit it to gain military victory in South Vietnam. Even if Hanoi should learn that General Westmoreland's request for substantial additional reinforcements

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has been refused, the enemy would have no basis upon which to believe that we were abandoning the struggle. Rather, he would have to assume that we had concluded that we already had enough forces in South Vietnam to prevent a defeat and that we believed we had the key to the eventual attainment of our political objective. Hanoi has welcomed rather than feared our build-up. Based on captured documents the CIA concludes: "Hanoi sees every step in the strengthening of US forces as a vindication of Communist strategy, and points to its success in keeping pace with the buildup."

Moreover, the proposed augmentation would entail substantial costs in SVN, in the US, and in the rest of the world.

South Vietnam. The presence of more than 700,000 US military in SVN means a virtually complete Americanization of the war. There is no sign that ARVN effectiveness will increase and there will be no pressure for ARVN to shape up if the US appears willing to increase its force levels to make up their deficiencies.

The effect on the GVN would be even more unfortunate. The Saigon leadership has not yet shown an awareness of the need -- let alone

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an ability -- to attract the necessary loyalty or support of the people. It is true that the GVN did not collapse during Tet, but there is not yet anything like an urgent sense of national unity and purpose. A large influx of additional U.S. forces will intensify the belief of the ruling elite that the U.S. will continue to fight its war while it continues to alienate large segments of the Vietnamese people, engages in backroom politics and permits wide-spread corruption. The proposed actions will also generate increased inflation, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the GVN and making corruption harder to control. Reform of the GVN will come only when and if they believe that our continued presence in South Vietnam depends on what the GVN does. Certainly a U.S. commitment to a substantial troop increase before the GVN commits itself to reform and action can only be counterproductive. Whatever our success on the battlefield, our chances of leaving behind an effective functioning and viable national government when we at last withdraw will be sharply diminished.

United States. Providing 200,000 additional men to MACV in the next twelve months will have a profound impact in the United States. We will have to mobilize 250,000 reserves (including 2 National Guard and 1 Marine Reserve Divisions), increase draft calls, increase our budget by \$2.5 billion in FY 1968 and \$10 billion in FY 1969 (to a total cost for Vietnam of \$35 billion), and see U.S. KIA climb to 1,300 - 1,400 per month. (See Annex 3.) Our balance of payments will be worsened by \$500/^{million} or more per year, and we will need a larger tax increase -- explicitly justified as a war tax -- and/or wage and price controls. The effect on our economy would be comparable to that which the Council of Economic Advisors noted took place in 1966: "The spurt of demand -- partly real, partly

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psychological -- that followed the step-up of our Vietnam effort in mid-1965 simply exceeded the speed limits on the economy's ability to adjust. Our resources were sufficient for the task; but the sheer speed of the advance strained the ability of industrial management to mobilize resources at the required pace."

These actions and the public education campaign which would need to accompany them would put us on a war footing.

Critics of our Vietnam involvement will violently oppose the move. Many Congressmen will demand, as the price of their support, that we eliminate all restrictions on our bombing of the North and mine Haiphong Harbor. This action would run grave risks of greater Chinese and Soviet involvement in the war without affecting enemy capability to support current or increased force levels in the South. There will also be pressures to expand the war into Laos and Cambodia; actions which also can be of little value but which will expand the area of military operations and run grave risks of Soviet or Chinese reaction.

It will be difficult to convince critics that we are not simply destroying South Vietnam in order to "save" it, or that we genuinely want peace talks. This growing disaffection accompanied, as it certainly will be, by increased defiance of the draft and growing unrest in the cities because of the belief that we are neglecting domestic problems runs great risks of provoking a domestic crisis of unprecedented proportions. Deployment of the forces requested by MACV would, in U.S. and world opinion, be a significant escalation of our commitment in Vietnam. The public would believe that the Administration is striving solely for a "military victory" and has foreclosed a possible political settlement as being in the framework of U.S. objectives.

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Other Reactions. The Soviets would probably respond by stepping up their level of materiel support to Hanoi; they may qualitatively increase their support by supplying Hanoi with SAM-III's, surface-to-surface missiles for attacks on ships or air bases, improved air-to-ground capability against helicopters, etc. If, as may well be necessary, we accompany the troop increase with expanded bombing and the mining of Haiphong we will almost certainly force a confrontation with the Soviets and Chinese. The Soviets would then find it difficult to continue business-as-usual in such matters as the NPT. Nor could we exclude a more aggressive Soviet posture in Europe or elsewhere. Enemy use of Laos and Cambodia for bases and logistic support would be increased to counter our troop build up.

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CONCLUSIONS

For the above reasons, the MACV troop requests should not now be granted. In view of the TET offensive and the immediate threat we should now decide to deploy 10,500 troops and to call up sufficient forces to fill out our training base and strategic reserve. (This might include the Fourth Marine Division, supporting Naval forces, and two National Army Guard brigades, a total of 75,000 men.) In view of the possibility of a massive further North Vietnamese effort, and uncertainties in Korea and Laos, we should take actions to prepare for additional substantial deployments. We should expand procurement of equipment, move additional reserve divisions to a higher state of readiness and add \$2.5 billion to the fiscal year 1968 Supplement. We should also undertake a program of accelerated improvement of the fire power and mobility of GVN forces and consider the possible serious degradation of this program if equipment must be furnished now for very substantial additional US forces. These priorities should be assessed before further decisions are made. It would be possible to characterize the immediate small deployment, the call up of reserves and increased procurement as prudent action to put us in a state of readiness to deal with possible contingencies in Korea, and Laos, as well as possible developments in South Vietnam, without impairment of our ability to discharge our commitments elsewhere in the world.

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DECISIONS ON CALL-UP AND READINESS

<u>Decision Date</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Cost (\$ Millions)</u>	
		<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 69</u>
Now	Call-up 4th Marine Division 1 Army Ntl Grd Mech. Bde. 9000 Navy personnel	(200)	(750)
	Increase April and May Draft Calls	(20)	-
	Open 2 Army Training Bases	(25)	-
	Take steps to raise readiness of Key Army Reserve and Guard Units	(300)	-
	Request FY 68 Supplemental Budget	2,500*	-
	Request Legislative Authority for Individual Reservist Recall and Extension of Terms of Service	NA	-
1 April	Call-up 3 Army National Guard Brigades (70,000 men)	(120)	(700)
1 May	Call-up 3000 Navy Men	(3)	(30)
	1 F-84 Sqd and 6000 Air Reservists	(5)	(60)
1 June	Call-up 1 Army Ntl Grd Div. (80,000 men)	(-)	(800)
1 July	Propose FY 69 Budget Amendment	-	6,000*
1 August	Call-up 3 F-84 Sqds and 11,000 Air Reservists		
1 January 1969	Propose FY 69 Supplemental	-	4,000*

* If units not deployed, about two-thirds of the funds requested could offset future needs.

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RESERVE CALL-UP

	<u>Additional Reserve Personnel*</u>
<u>Army</u>	160,000
4 Brigades	
1 Division	
<u>Navy</u>	12,000
5 Construction Battalions	
<u>Marines</u>	56,000
4th Marine Division/Wing Team	
<u>Air Force</u>	17,000
13 Fighter Squadrons	
5 Tactical Airlift Groups	
	<u>245,000*</u>

* Plus added draft calls to increase total force by about 400,000 men.

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ALTERNATIVE 2

I. PROPOSAL

This proposal would involve

Commit the forces called for
(a) Dispatch a further six maneuver
from now thru the next 3 or 4 months.
~~battalions to South Vietnam as soon as possible;~~

(b) Call up of reserve and increased draft
calls identical with Alternative 1;

(c) Planning and preparation to meet all
with decisions
of Westmoreland's package but deferral of any decisions

dispatch
beyond initial ~~six~~ ⁹ battalions; *to be taken at appropriate*
calendar dates unless changes in situation in the intervening period

(d) Appropriation request either sufficient
to dispatch the whole of Westmoreland's package *and*
necessary steps to maintain Strategic Reserve
~~sufficient to take substantial steps in that direction.~~

This would require substantial Vietnam contingency funding
in anticipation of the need for ~~some further~~ ^{the} troops in
accordance with his requests.

This alternative involves real differences from
Alternative 1 because it ~~does not publicly or privately~~
~~commit the United States to a particular course of action~~

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~~over the remainder of the year.~~ It thus permits continuous examination in the light of events in South Vietnam, ARVN performance, GVN political performance, and the extent to which the VC/NVA continue to reinforce and re-equip. Yet it puts the United States in a position to do everything Westmoreland has requested if this proves to be the correct and necessary action. No time would be lost.

II. PRESENTATION

This proposal would be presented with emphasis upon the worldwide picture and the need to improve and increase our strategic reserve. This would include the situation in the Middle East with particular emphasis on Korea, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia. (This justification will be necessary in any event if the total callup is presented.)

We would state we are putting ourselves in a position to give Westmoreland what he has requested but that we intend to review this step by step in the light of GVN performance, enemy action and the concrete needs of a situation which, as the Tet offensive indicated,

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final and irrevocable
could be quite fluid. We see no need to make decisions now with respect to troops which would be deployed over a period of several months, but we do feel the situation in Vietnam warrants our preparedness for this event.

Emphasis should be put upon the fact that additional forces are not needed by Westmoreland in order to protect existing U. S. forces. If needed, their purpose would be to strengthen our ability to protect population centers, to hold territory and to regain the initiative with respect to military operations.

What is needed for these purposes can be given more refined judgment as we see the performance of ARVN and are put in a position to evaluate the recovery of enemy forces, particularly after the close of the winter-spring offensive. We should also tell the Congress frankly

2 ||| (~~but privately~~) that further commitment of U. S. forces to Vietnam is explicitly being made dependent on GVN/ARVN performance, and that we intend to use further U. S. commitment as leverage on the GVN.

• Westmoreland should be told that the absence

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of decision with respect to his request does not imply a rejection of those requests and that we are taking major steps to put ourselves in a position to honor them if the situation warrants sending further troops.

But he should be told candidly that the decision has not been made and that we wish to keep a close look at the situation as it continues to unfold.

III. DISCUSSION

This alternative has the following advantages:

1. The absence of firm and final decisions with respect to troops for Vietnam permits a more honest emphasis on the total picture in Southeast Asia, and elsewhere, and tends to make the legislative actions *responsive to our overall security needs as well as* somewhat less directly related to the situation in Vietnam. ~~This should be helpful in gaining perspective on the relationship of Vietnam to our Southeast Asia objectives.~~

2. This proposal emphasizes the need to put us in a posture of strength as against what would appear to be a posture of automatic military response

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in Vietnam. To commit now additional forces over a period of several months implies that we have a much better picture of what is going to happen in the future than we in fact, do. In the absence of being able to paint that picture accurately, firm commitment on troops subjects us to criticism that we seek a purely military solution in a situation where it is increasingly clear that a purely military solution is not feasible.

3. This approach gives a public and Congressional impression of will and determination with respect to Vietnam without the disadvantages of telling the enemy precisely what we intend to do and of giving a domestic picture of precipitant response. The fact that further decisions would be subject to continuing review blunts the more vicious attacks which we would otherwise suffer in Congress.

4. By telling Congress that just what we do and when we do it depends in part upon GVN/ARVN performance helps with that segment of Congressional and public opinion which is becoming more and more critical of the GVN and

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their willingness and capacity to govern and fight.

Furthermore, it permits us a political flexibility which is desirable and which does not raise a major target for the opposition. It is much easier to attack a firm decision to deploy troops than it is a firm decision to put oneself in a state of readiness.

which is required in the event of an emergency
5. It must be candidly recognized that there is nothing in Westmoreland's proposal or its justification

that provides any real or satisfactory answer to the problem in Vietnam. All that can be said is that additional troops would provide more security and enable us to kill more of the enemy. There is no indication that this policy will bring about a quick solution in Vietnam and, in the absence of better GVN performance, the increased destruction and the increased Americanization of the war could, in fact, be counterproductive.

6. Those people who have confidence that more troops are an answer to the problem could scarcely complain about a program which puts us in a position to meet Westmoreland's request.

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This proposal has the following disadvantages:

1. It makes Westmoreland's planning job somewhat more difficult since he would have to plan without firm increments to U. S. forces.

2. It could look like indecision on the part of the Administration or, possibly, hesitation about our determination in Vietnam. (This can be overcome by proper presentation.)

3. It could be taken by Westmoreland as a rebuff to his strategy and proposals.

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SIGNIFICANCE OF BOMBING CAMPAIGN IN NORTH TO OUR OBJECTIVES IN VIETNAM

The bombing of North Vietnam was undertaken to limit and/or make more difficult the infiltration of men and supplies in the South, to show them they would have to pay a price for their continued aggression and to raise the morale in South Vietnam. The last two purposes obviously have been achieved.

It has become abundantly clear that no level of bombing can prevent the North Vietnamese from supplying the necessary forces and materiel necessary to maintain their military operations in the South. The recent Tet offensive has shown that the bombing cannot even prevent a significant increase in these military operations, at least on an intermittent basis.

The shrinking of the circles around Hanoi and Haiphong will add to North Vietnam's costs and difficulty in supplying the NVA/VC forces. It will not destroy their capability to support their present level of military activity. Greater concentration on the infiltration routes in Laos and in the area immediately North of the DMZ might prove effective from the standpoint of interdiction.

Strikes within 10 miles of the center of Hanoi and within four miles of the center of Haiphong have required initial approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and, finally, the President. This requirement has enabled the highest level of government to maintain some control over the attacks against targets located in the populous and most politically sensitive areas of North Vietnam. Other than the Haiphong Port, no single target

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within these areas has any appreciable significance for North Vietnam's ability to supply men and material to the South. If these areas of control were reduced to circles having a radii of 3 miles from the center of Hanoi and 1-1/2 miles of the center of Haiphong, some minor fixed targets not previously authorized would be released for strike. More significant is the fact that the lines of communication lying within the area previously requiring Washington approval would be open for attack by shrinking the control areas around Hanoi and Haiphong. The question would simply be whether it is worth the increase in airplane and pilot losses to attack these lines of communication in the most heavily defended part of North Vietnam where our airplane loss ratio is highest.

The remaining issue on interdiction of supplies has to do with the closing of the Port of Haiphong. Although this is the route by which some 80% of North Vietnamese imports come into the country, it is not the point of entry for most of the military supplies and ammunition. These materials predominantly enter via the rail routes from China.

Moreover, if the Port of Haiphong were to be closed effectively, the supplies that now enter Haiphong could, albeit with considerable difficulty, arrive either over the land routes or by lighterage, which has been so successful in the continued POL supply. Under these circumstances, the closing of Haiphong Port would not prevent the continued supply of sufficient materials to maintain North Vietnamese military operations in the South.

Accordingly, the only purpose of intensification of the bombing campaign in the North and the addition of further targets would be to endeavor to break the will of the North Vietnamese leaders. CIA forecasts indicate little if any chance that this would result even

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from a protracted bombing campaign directed at population centers.

A change in our bombing policy to include deliberate strikes on population centers and attacks on the agricultural population through the destruction of dikes would further alienate domestic and foreign sentiment and might well lose us the support of those European countries which now support our effort in Vietnam. It could cost us Australian and New Zealand participation in the fighting.

Although the North Vietnamese do not mark the camps where American prisoners are kept or reveal their locations, we know from intelligence sources that most of these facilities are located in or near Hanoi. Our intelligence also indicates that many more than the approximately 200 pilots officially classified by us as prisoners of war may, in fact, be held by North Vietnam in these camps. On the basis of the debriefing of the three pilots recently released by Hanoi, we were able to identify over 40 additional American prisoners despite the fact that they were kept in relative isolation. Heavy and indiscriminate attacks in the Hanoi area would jeopardize the lives of these prisoners and alarm their wives and parents into vocal opposition. Reprisals could be taken against them and the idea of war crimes trials would find considerable acceptance in countries outside the Communist bloc.


Finally, the steady and accelerating bombing of the North has not brought North Vietnam closer to any real move toward peace. Apprehensions about bombing attacks that would destroy Hanoi and Haiphong may at some time help move them toward productive negotiations. Actual destruction of these areas would eliminate a threat that could influence them to seek a political settlement on terms acceptable to us.

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Xerox
DRAFT - 4 Mar 68



9

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

General Westmoreland has requested an additional 205,000 troops (beyond the 525,000 personnel now authorized). He asks for the deployment in three packages, by May 1, September 1 and December 31.

General Wheeler believes we should make ourselves ready to meet the request for the additional 205,000. *An initial staff estimate to meet indicates that following action would be* He recommends a Reserve call-up of approximately 280,000, an increased draft call and extension of *term of service* ~~courses~~ to produce a total increase in end strength in the armed forces of approximately 480,000 by June 30, 1969. *insert objectives*

This build-up would enable us to meet the Westmoreland request and, in any event, would reconstitute the strategic reserve in the United States.

We recommend:

1. Meeting General Westmoreland's request by deploying as close to May 1 as practical 20,000 additional troops (approximately 1/2 of which would be combat).
2. Approval of a Reserve call-up and an increased end strength adequate to meet the balance of the request and to restore a strategic reserve in the United States, adequate for possible contingencies.
- 3.
4. Reservation of the decision to deploy the balance of General Westmoreland's new request. While we would be in a position to make these additional deployments, the future decision to do so would be contingent upon:

DECLASSIFIED
Authority OSD letter JUL 25 1979
By isb, NARS; Date 10-19-79

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- a. Reexamination on a week-by-week basis of the desirability of further deployments as the situation develops;
- b. Improved political performance by the GVN and increased contribution in effective military action by the ARVN;
- c. The results of a study in depth, to be initiated immediately, of possible new political and strategic guidance for the conduct of US operations in South Vietnam, and of our Vietnamese policy in the context of our world-wide politico-military strategy.

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Five or six
minimum objectives
in Asia attainable
without 3 V.N.

The Context in Which Additional Troop Commitments
to Vietnam Should be Examined

It should be recognized that there is nothing in General Westmoreland's proposal or its justification that provides any really satisfactory answer to the problem in Vietnam. There is no assurance that this very substantial additional deployment would leave us a year from today in any different military position. All that can be said is that the additional troops could provide more security and would enable us to kill more of the enemy. There is no indication that they would bring about a quick solution in Vietnam and, in the absence of better performance by the GVN and the ARVN, the increased destruction and increased Americanization of the war could, in fact, be counter-productive.

1968
turn point

no assurance
but
possibility

Better
way
perhaps

Our objective has been to guarantee the continued existence of a "Free and Independent South Vietnam". The relationship of this objective to other national objectives, and to the means we are prepared to devote to it over time have not been defined. It is not an unlimited objective to be equated with that of preservation of the United States.

A number of questions arise. (a) Are circumstances conceivable under which it would become an unrealistic or even impossible objective? If a substantial majority of the South Vietnamese people were to turn against the GVN and ourselves or if the GVN itself were to request or demand our withdrawal, the answer would have to be affirmative.

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(b) Are there means, the use of which we would wish to avoid even if their use appeared essential to preserving our objective? The answer is clearly in the affirmative. (c) Are there limits to the magnitude of forces and the time of deployment of those forces which we do not propose to exceed, or cannot exceed, in maintaining support for the objective? Again the answer is in principle affirmative. (d) Are there other foreign policy, defense and possibly economic objectives which are more important to the survival of the United States? Again the answer is affirmative.

It is quite true that the Vietnamese struggle has become a focal point of the more general conflict between the East and the West, and that it is therefore no longer possible to look at our objective in South Vietnam in isolation. There is a valid strategic principle that cautions against reinforcing weakness. The history of our involvement in Vietnam has been the recurring issue of reinforcing weakness versus the humiliation of settling for less than our original objective.

By June, if not earlier, this same question will arise again. At that time the GVN, the ARVN and South Vietnamese populace may have picked themselves up more successfully than the VC and NVN have replaced their material and psychological losses. The reverse may turn out to be true.

In any event, we should now be sorting out our own basic strategic views.

Is it possible through air attack on the North not only to break the will of Hanoi but of the Communist Bloc which supports it? We believe not.

*no but increase
cost*

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Should we view the Vietnamese struggle as a Southeast Asian struggle and expand the concept of operations to include Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and North Vietnam as one front with no intervening frontiers? The political consequences, the realistic force requirements, and our capability to sustain those force requirements have not been recently reviewed. Indigenous weakness makes it appear doubtful we could put together a high confidence winning combination.

Should we view the Vietnamese war as only one facet of our general confrontation with the Soviet Union and move to the offensive worldwide? Again, it is doubtful that the correlation of forces both military and political permit us realistically to do so.

No matter what the result in South Vietnam itself, we will have failed in our purposes if:

- a. The war in Vietnam spreads to the point where it is a major conflict leading to direct military confrontation with the USSR and/or China;
- b. The war in Vietnam spreads to the point where we are so committed in resources that our other world-wide commitments -- especially NATO -- are no longer credible;
- c. The attitudes of the American people towards "more Vietnams" are such that our other commitments are brought into question as a matter of US will;
- d. Other countries no longer wish the US commitment for fear of the consequences to themselves as a battlefield between the East and the West.

It is for these reasons that we have recommended a study of our Vietnamese policy in the context of our world-wide politico-military strategy.

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SE Asian
Hawaii
Center

The Present Situation in South Vietnam

Prior to January 29, 1968, we had reason to believe that we were making slow but steady progress in Vietnam on both the military and political fronts. The heavy offensive mounted by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong throughout the country, though it achieved no permanent military successes, unquestionably set back our efforts in pacification and in the creation of a political and social fabric that can withstand our eventual withdrawal.

not clear

The enemy has obviously resolved to increase his efforts in an attempt to bring down the GVN and effect the total disintegration of the ARVN. He has demonstrated an ability to mount virtually a country-wide effort and, for the first time, has brought the cities of South Vietnam under attack.

Although both the GVN and its military arm have survived, the former lost some part of the confidence which it had established among the people and the latter lost some part of its combat effectiveness.

The restoration and steady growth of both the political and military institutions of South Vietnam are pivotal to the accomplishment of our objective. The decision on the steps that we should not take must focus on this paramount factor.

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10 July 1968
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Basis for Our Recommendations

As an emergency matter, to meet the prospect of continued abnormal levels of enemy activity, we believe you should decide now to provide the first increment requested by General Westmoreland. This would, by July 1st, furnish him 20,000 troops, 10,500 of whom would be in combat units. (These troops would augment the six battalions deployed last month that were not among the approved total of 525,000, and the four battalions to be deployed in April that are part of the 525,000.) Because of the possibility that the North Vietnamese leaders may decide to launch a larger-scale invasion by Main Force units, we should put ourselves in a position to provide the other 185,000 ground, sea and air forces involved in General Westmoreland's request. This would require a substantial Reserve call-up, the exact dimensions of which remain to be worked out. It must be anticipated, however, that this could be in the nature of 200,000 or more (it should be noted that General Wheeler's recommendation of 280,000 includes 31,000 additional troops for South Korea). Moreover, the necessary end strength to sustain these added deployments would approximate 400,000. The difference would be made up by extension of tours of duty and increased draft calls.

We do not believe, however, that you should at this time decide to deploy these additional forces. In view of the timetable in General Westmoreland's request, no decision on actual dispatch of further forces beyond the 20,000 by July 1st is now required. Moreover, we

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believe that it would be undesirable to decide on this very substantial increase until we have an opportunity to see how the situation in South Vietnam develops. A continuing and intensive review should focus not only on future enemy activity but also on the demonstrated ability of the GVN and the ARVN to pull themselves together, to get back into business, and to demonstrate significant improvements both in their ability to win popular support and their willingness to fight aggressively for their own security. Unless these qualities are evidenced there can be no real hope for the accomplishment of our political aims.

Finally, we believe that the striking change in the enemy's tactics, the willingness to commit at least two additional divisions to the fighting in the South over the past few weeks, the obvious and not wholly anticipated strength of the Viet Cong infrastructure, there can be no prospect of a quick military solution to the aggression in South Vietnam. Under these circumstances, we should give intensive study to the development of new strategic guidance to General Westmoreland. This guidance should make clear the fact that he cannot be expected either to destroy the enemy forces or to rout them completely from South Vietnam. The kind of American commitment that would be required to achieve these military objectives cannot even be estimated. There is no reason to believe that it could be done by an additional 200,000 American troops or double or triple that quantity.

Furthermore, an increase of the size presently requested would amount virtually to the Americanization of the war effort. US Regular Forces would be double those of the ARVN. They would approximately

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equal the total number of South Vietnamese now under arms. Under these circumstances, accomplishment of the primary goal of building a strong and viable South Vietnamese Government and military arm would be frustrated rather than furthered.

The exact nature of the strategic guidance which should be adopted cannot now be predicted. It should be the subject of a detailed inter-agency study over the next several weeks. During the progress of the study, discussions of the appropriate strategic guidance and its nature and implications for the extent of our military commitment in South Vietnam should be undertaken with both General Westmoreland and Ambassador Bunker.

In order to reach the end strength necessary under this recommendation, Congressional action would be required. Congress would have to authorize the extension of tours and the call-up of certain individual Reservists that would be necessary. In addition, the authorization and appropriation of about \$5 billion over the \$2-1/2 billion increase already indicated for the present fiscal year and \$10 billion for FY 69 would also be necessary.

In presenting this proposal to Congress, and to the American public, emphasis should be placed upon the uncertain picture world-wide and the need to improve and increase our strategic reserve.

We would state we are putting ourselves in a position to give Westmoreland what he has requested but that we intend to review this step-by-step in the light of GVN performance, enemy action and the concrete needs of a situation which, as the Tet offensive indicated,


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could be quite fluid. We see no need to make deployment decisions now with respect to troops which would be deployed over a period of several months, but we do feel the situation in Vietnam warrants our preparedness for this event.

Emphasis should be put upon the fact that some additional forces may be needed by General Westmoreland to strengthen our ability to provide the security that will allow growth of South Vietnamese political and military capability. What is needed for these purposes can be given more refined judgment as we see the performance of ARVN and are put in a position to evaluate the recovery of enemy forces, particularly after the close of the winter-spring offensive. We should also tell

the Congress frankly that further commitment of US forces to Vietnam is explicitly being made dependent on GVN/ARVN performance, and that we intend to use further US commitment as leverage on the GVN.



Authority OSD letter JUL 25 1979
By isg, NARS, Date 10-19-79

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P. Habib
DRAFT 2/3/68

Increasing the Effectiveness of Vietnamese Efforts in Conjunction
with a U.S. Troop Increase

1. Deployment of additional US troops would probably stiffen the GVN's will at a time when the tasks it faces are rather monumental. The reaffirmation of the US commitment will be welcomed and the additional strength to meet the danger from VC/NVA forces will add to the feeling of confidence.
2. On the other hand, there is ~~always~~ the danger that the Vietnamese would be tempted to relax, taking refuge behind American power. The sense of anxiety and urgency which came over the Government as a result of the Tet offensive, and which has moved them to act initially with somewhat greater effectiveness, could suffer.
3. Throughout our planning documents there runs an assumption (sometimes explicitly stated) that the ARVN and GVN are so weakened that they can not be expected to make any substantial contribution to progress in South Viet-Nam in the near to medium term future. If this assumption is indeed correct, then virtually no level of US Force input will hold any reasonable prospect of attaining present US objectives. If, however, this assumption is exaggerated, the picture with respect to needed additional US Forces and support is materially altered.
4. We believe this assumption is not correct, that the GVN has the capacity - even if its leadership may not now be displaying the will - to take civil and military actions which can materially improve both the security and the political climate in a manner that can be exploited to diminish the absolute level of US support required and maximize the efficient utilization of such US support as is committed.

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5. We should, therefore, couple our readiness to strengthen our effort in Viet-Nam with specific demands on the Vietnamese Government which must be made more effective. This involves getting the GVN to take a wide range of decisions and actions. The occasion must be seized to develop unity and imaginative leadership. The demands we make should be designed to push the GVN as hard as we can to get their forces out into the countryside, to counter-attack the enemy, to accelerate civil recovery, to mobilize resources, and to rally the people in a policy of national unity in support of honest and effective government. |

6. The requirements we levy upon the Vietnamese must be feasible, bearing in mind the human and institutional resources we have to work with, but they must also assure a maximum effort by the Vietnamese. We should do what we can to support their effort, making clear that what we are willing to do is dependent upon Vietnamese accomplishment.

7. The GVN should undertake certain priority measures with a greater degree of urgency. The list below is considered essential and feasible. It should be submitted to Ambassador Bunker for review and then become a check-list for judging Vietnamese accomplishment against a given time schedule - say thirty days as appropriate. It should be put to the Vietnamese leadership as forcefully as possible, making clear our need for action and better performance. We should also be prepared to utilize whatever leverage we can to assure that things that need to be done are not lost in words.

8. We recommend that a high-level mission be sent to Saigon to emphasize that we consider improved GVN performance essential and

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that any further US support must be matched by GVN action in spheres that are critical. This mission should engage the GVN in a full review of where we stand, what we are prepared to do on our part, and what we look for on their part. We suggest the Secretary of Defense be designated for the task and that he go to Saigon as soon as possible. Alternatively, we might consider a Presidential meeting at Guam, but on balance we believe that a special mission to Saigon is preferable and sufficient.

Specific Demands on the GVN.

9. Mobilization - The Vietnamese Armed Forces should be increased to the maximum. As a first step, present plans to increase Vietnamese forces by 65,000 men should be amended to provide for an additional 30,000 men under arms by the end of 1968. The draft of 18 and 19 year olds should proceed as presently scheduled. We should not set any final limit on the number of men under arms. This should be consistent with the ability to train and supply the forces, but avoid undercutting the need for key civilians in other governmental functions by diversion of skilled personnel.

10. The Thieu-Ky Relationship and Unity of Leadership - We can no longer accept the disunity and lack of cohesive action that has continued to plague the top levels of the Vietnamese Government. The failure of Thieu and Ky to cooperate fully and apply their individual talents to the needs of the situation has continued to plague the effective management of the Vietnamese effort. In turn this has had ramifications down the line in both the military and civilian chain of command. It

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has also complicated the chances of rallying the various elements in the society, as the rivalry translates itself into interference with attempts at forming a national anti-communist front.

11. Thieu and Ky and their followers as well as other elements in the society not associated directly with them, must be brought to realize that we are no longer prepared to put up with anything but the maximum effort on their part. There is a role for each of them and those roles must be played without the bickering and backbiting that has been all too common. A clear and precise role for Ky should be defined. Thieu and Ky must bring their followers into line. The government should be prepared to engage the services of people with administrative and executive talent who are now not participating in the common task. Our expectations in this regard have to be made crystal clear to each and every Vietnamese leader in and out of Government. We must find some way to break the bottleneck of personal rivalry and governmental inaction that has plagued us for the past six months. Without this fundamental change in the attitude and dedication of the leadership the necessary reforms and the necessary inspiration of the Vietnamese people will not be forthcoming quickly or sufficiently.

12. Getting the Government Back into the Countryside - We must win the race to the countryside, go on the offensive, re-establish security in the rural areas, and restore the government's presence in the villages. The ARVN and other security forces must deploy aggressively, the RD cadre must return to their tasks, and governmental services reach out from the province capitals.

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13. In the final analysis rural security, the sine qua non of popular identification with the GVN, must be provided by the Vietnamese themselves. The two keys here are (1) the calibre and role of the ⁴⁴⁴~~444~~ province chiefs (and their supporting staffs) and (2) a properly offensive sense of mission on the part of ARVN units - and their commanders - assigned to rural security support missions. In every area (village, district, province, DTZ and corps) the RVNAF unit commanders responsible for security in that area must be graded (i.e. promoted, commended or sacked) primarily on their ability to find, fix and eradicate the VC Force indigenous to that area. They must also be graded (with commensurate affect on their careers) with respect to the behavior of their troops vis-a-vis the populace in that area.

14. Drive on the Viet Cong Infrastructure. In our concern over the behavior of our allies, we must not neglect our enemies and the present opportunity to compound and exasperate communist problems. Operation Phoenix which is targetted against the Viet Cong must be pursued more vigorously in closer liaison with the US. Vietnamese armed forces should be devoted to anti-infrastructure activities on a priority basis. The Tet offensive surfaced a good deal of the infrastructure and the opportunity to damage it has never been better. This would force the VC on the defensive and head off the establishment of local VC administrative organizations and VC attempts to set up provisional governmental committees.

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15. US-ARVN Command Relationships - While we accept the Mission's reluctance to create a joint command, we believe that alternative arrangements which give the US a greater role in ARVN employment are necessary. This can be done at the Corps level and below. It would involve US participation in the planning and control of ARVN operations. It might even call for the prior approval by US advisors of ARVN operational plans -- this now exists in certain cases depending upon individual advisor relationships. We should request MACV to study the matter and come up with a specific plan to meet the requirement.

16. Government Reform and Anti-Corruption Campaign - The beginning steps at administrative reform which President Thieu has announced must be accelerated. This should be directly associated with a new deal on corruption which must be dealt with by relief of a specified list of corrupt officials now and the promise of severe action in the future. A capable inspectorate should be established. Incompetent ARVN officers must be removed, beginning with a specific list that should be made available by MACV. Incompetent province chiefs who have plagued our efforts in the past must be removed. The removal of incompetent commanders and officials is now more feasible in the light of performance during the Tet offensive. We should not hesitate to make our desires known and back them up by refusing to provide support for the incompetent. For key commanders, we should require the right of prior approval on a secret and discreet basis. The precise tools of leverage to be applied in this regard should be left to the US Mission, but could include withholding advice and assistance at local levels in extreme cases.

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17. The Prime Minister - We should solicit Ambassador Bunker's views on the desirability of replacing the Prime Minister. If he is to be replaced we should agree on his successor beforehand, in consultation with Thieu and Ky.

18. The United Front - A nationalist spirit of cooperation and unity came to the fore in the immediate wake of the Tet offensive. It is being manifested incompletely in attempts to organize groups in support of the national task. Despite the personal misgivings of old antagonists there has been some success. This is now threatened by personal rivalries, and most significantly by differences between Thieu and Ky. We need to find a formula for joint efforts. Ambassador Bunker suggests that the optimum result would be a "super front" of the anti-communist groups. Although not directly tied to the government, such a front could serve to rally the people broadly and emotionally against the Viet Cong. To succeed it must be backed by the leadership of the government - both Thieu and Ky - but not appear to compete with the National Assembly. It should encompass all elements in the society, but not be the vehicle for any one power group.

19. Economic Measures - There will be increased inflation in Viet-Nam this year, and additional US troops will make it more severe. Steps need to be taken now to counter the threat of inflation, if we are not to be faced with a severe crisis next fall and winter. The GVN needs to move on tax increases and U.S. and GVN expenditures for non-essential programs in Viet-Nam should be restrained. On the other hand, wage increases for civil and military personnel in the GVN are needed if inflation is not to weaken their will and support.

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20. Additionally, we must demand of the GVN some measure of action on their part to compensate for the effect of additional US troops on the US balance of payments. This can be done by having the GVN provide to the US at no cost the additional piaster costs incurred by our troop increase. We should also insist that GVN reserves be reduced to \$250 million from the present maximum reserve level of \$300 million and that a significant portion of the reserve be invested in medium and long term US securities. The details of these economic measures cannot be discussed in this paper, but a comprehensive economic package should be prepared and presented to the GVN - to include what the US is prepared to do in the way of increased financing of commercial imports.

21. Resource Allocation - Non-essential use of resources should be eliminated. Present government programs to eliminate new luxury construction must be tightened and continued. Bars and night clubs should remain closed. Austerity should be fostered.

Support of Modernization of ARVN

22. As the US demands more of the GVN we should do what we can to improve the capability of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. MACV reports that the ARVN are now frequently faced with superior weapons and fire-power in the hands of the enemy. To re-dress the balance requires a substantial modernization and increase in arms for the Vietnamese. This ranges from provision of M-16 rifles to the supply of trucks, tanks and helicopters. On the basis of current planning estimates this would involve additional expenditure of about \$475 million over a period of 18 months. Details of what is involved are available in the DOD back-up papers.

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23. If we approve the call-up of reserves, the strengthening of US forces, and the deployment of additional forces to Viet-Nam, we run into direct competition between US needs and the planned modernization of ARVN. In other words, we will face the need to slow down modernization of the ARVN to meet the requirements of equipping US forces, or we will have to add to our procurement capacity.

3/13/68
Herewith Sect. Rush and Sect. Chaffin
propose a statement on San Antonio
They feel strongly it should not be applied, with some

11.
Last September I said in San Antonio that we would stop all
aerial and naval bombardment of North Viet-Nam when this would
lead promptly to productive discussions. I added that we, of course,
assumed that while discussions proceed, North Viet-Nam would not
take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation.

Last September that seemed to me to be about as reasonable and
fair an approach to peace in Viet-Nam as anyone could possibly find.
Events since September have made it clear that the San Antonio formula
has met the same fate as have dozens upon dozens of other proposals
made in many quarters over the past few years looking toward peace
in Southeast Asia.

Hanoi has categorically rejected what I suggested at San Antonio
both in words and in deeds. Private explorations have produced
negative result. North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces in South
Viet-Nam launched a broad offensive during the Tet holidays against
the cities and their civilian populations. Since September ^{additionally} major
North Vietnamese units have been concentrated in South Viet-Nam,
particularly in the area near the DMZ. The purpose of the attacks
on the cities was not peace in accordance with existing international
agreements but the subjection of South Viet-Nam by force. The ^{initial}
effort failed and no one of the cities or towns which they attacked
remains in their hands. But they appear determined
to maintain ~~the~~ what they call their
winter - spring offensive.

These events require us to take the longest and hardest look at the basis for peace in Southeast Asia. Surely it must include respect for the political independence and neutrality of Cambodia. Surely it must include complete compliance by all parties with the Geneva Accords of 1962 on Laos. Surely it must include the absence of hostilities between North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam, the restoration of the demilitarization of the DMZ and the settlement of any outstanding problems by peaceful means. ^{Surely it must include} We would welcome any effort by any government or group of governments to help move Southeast Asia toward peace. The obstacle will not be the United States nor the South Vietnamese, nor the Laotians, nor the Cambodians. We call upon the authorities in Hanoi to recognize the responsibility they bear for the present violence in Southeast Asia and to take serious steps toward peace in the interest of their own people and in accordance with the concern of the rest of the world.

In answer to a specific question: Does this mean the withdrawal of the San Antonio formula? - It is suggested that the following reply be given:

We are not withdrawing any of the many proposals we have made nor our acceptances of proposals made by others. We must report that Hanoi has rejected them and that what they say must be weighed against what they do.

the right of
the people of
South Viet-Nam
peacefully
to decide
their future
or
self-
determination



March 3, 1968

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Authority Memorandum 1-26-79, OSD 5-31-79

By ing, NARS, Date 8-20-79

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Economic and Financial Problems and Measures

This memorandum examines the economic and financial problems and measures that should be staffed out in detail as a part of any decision to expand the defense program beyond the levels set forth in the President's Budget Message on January 29.

It examines specifically only one of many hypothetical alternatives, namely, that specified defense measures responsive to the situation in the Pacific and the need to maintain an adequate strategic reserve would be taken entailing an increase in budgetary outlays of \$2½ billion in fiscal 1968, \$10 billion in fiscal 1969, with an additional adverse balance of payments impact of \$500 million, adding to the total complement of our military forces through reserve call-ups, reenlistments and other measures between 400,000 and 500,000 personnel over the next nine to twelve months.

In summary, the adoption of a modified defense program of this nature and in this scale would call for the following:

(1) A new fiscal program that would offset the increased budgetary outlays for fiscal '68 and '69 dollar for dollar. This new fiscal program should call for an increase in the President's tax proposals and a reduction in civilian and other defense budgetary outlays set out in the January Budget. The reduction in these outlays should be specified in terms of specific programs and specific amounts or a combination of specified program cuts and an "across the board" formula along the lines of the measure in the Continuing Appropriation Act of December 1967."

In effect, the President's Message on the new defense measures should explicitly provide for presentation by the Budget Director of amendments to the civilian programs submitted in the January document. The proportion of the increased outlays, which should be borne by increased taxes and reduced civilian government outlays, should take into account the need to maintain a

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- 2 -

structural base for these programs in the event of conclusion of hostilities and, therefore, should weigh more heavily on the tax increase. However, some substantial revision in the civilian outlay request and program should be accepted and pushed hard as a part of the price to be paid. My own view is that anything less than a program reduction of civilian outlays in fiscal '69 than a \$2 to \$3 billion range would make for increased difficulties in gaining Congressional acceptance of the proposals.

(2) A mutual security package should be developed, separate in concept from traditional foreign aid, covering all existing and projected military and civilian assistance for South Vietnam, Thailand, and South Korea. This should be coupled with new specific agreements on reserve management in these countries which provide for the investment of a substantial portion of their reserves on a long term basis (3 to 4 years) in U. S. agency paper or special bonds.

(3) The establishment of new and special machinery for manpower policy and administration should be created, designed to relate existing and projected programs for manpower training and placement more directly and specifically to the replacement of reservists and the meeting of civilian labor shortages, real or prospective, by skill or area, that could result from the call-ups and any expanded areas of military production or reactivation of facilities required.

(4) Judgments must be made as to the desirability or the availability of temporary economic stabilization measures to supplement appropriate fiscal and monetary policy. In view of the recent disturbing trends in the field of prices and wages and the threat of a continuing wage-price spiral, the past and current outlook for increasing personal disposable income, the abnormally high savings rate which could change overnight, it is desirable that these judgments be made in conjunction with any decisions for a substantially enlarged defense program. The questions presented are:

(a) whether standby credit controls should be requested or encouraged to meet any potential enlargement of civilian demand that would press hard on capacity, and

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- 3 -

(b) whether, under the President's existing emergency authorities, a temporary freeze of wages, salaries and prices could be instituted for three to six months to deal with any inflationary explosion of the type which characterized the June 17-January 1, 1950 period. It is my strong personal view that a return to formal wage and price controls is both unnecessary and undesirable, but this is a topic on which others in the Administration should be consulted.

(5) The Department of Defense should be requested to spell out a specific assessment of new material and facility needs which are a consequence of any new program, including the time sequence and magnitude and where, if any, new orders are likely to result in pressures on available capacity or limitations on civilian supply. Should this assessment indicate that production and supply difficulties could emerge, specific arrangements for a coordinated handling of these problems should be developed through appropriate machinery that would involve the Departments of Defense, Commerce and Labor and possibly the Office of Emergency Planning.

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It is recommended that these economic and financial problems and measures designed to deal with them on any range of assumptions that emerge from a meeting with the President be the subject of a review and report by a committee that includes the Quadriad (Director of the Budget, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers or his designee, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, and the Secretary of the Treasury) and Secretary Anthony or Secretary Nitze of the Department of Defense. It is further recommended that when any defense expansion program under consideration moves from the study stage to the preparation for action stage, that this group be enlarged to include the Secretaries of Commerce and Labor.

Henry H. Fowler

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February 28, 1968

MEMORANDUM TO: Secretary of State
 Secretary of Defense

As I indicated at breakfast this morning, I wish you to develop by Monday morning, March 4, recommendations in response to the situation presented to us by General Wheeler and his preliminary proposals.

I wish alternatives examined and, if possible, agreed recommendations to emerge which reconcile the military, diplomatic, economic, Congressional, and public opinion problems involved.

In particular, I wish you to consider, among others, the following specific issues:

- What military and other objectives in Viet Nam are additional U. S. forces designed to advance?
- What specific dangers is their dispatch designed to avoid, and what specific goals would the increment of force, if recommended by you, aim to achieve: in the next six months; over the next year?
- What probable Communist reactions do you anticipate in connection with each of the alternatives examined, and your recommended course of action?
- What problems would we confront with respect to appropriations and the budget; and what measures would you propose to deal with those problems?
- What problems would we confront with respect to balance of payments; and what measures would you propose to deal with those problems?
- Should we go forward with an increment of U. S. forces; what negotiating posture should we strike, in general; and what modifications, if any, would you recommend with respect to the San Antonio formula?

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Authority State 3-13-79, NSC 3-27-80By if, NARS, Date 7-23-80

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-- Aside from the question of negotiations, what other diplomatic problems would we confront, and how should they be dealt with?

-- What special effort can we and should we take at this time with respect to improving the political and military performance of the South Vietnamese?


-- How should we frame our proposals for the Congress with respect to: objectives; legislation required (e.g., selective call-up); appropriations?

-- What major Congressional problems can be anticipated, and how should they be met?

-- Aside from your recommendations on the dispatch of forces and reconstitution of reserves, what steps are required to build up a production base for our over-all military effort?

-- What problems can we anticipate in U. S. public opinion, and how should they be dealt with?

You should feel free in making this report to call on the best minds in the Government to work on specific aspects of the problem; but you should assure the highest possible degree of security up to the moment when the President's decision on these matters is announced.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Lyndon B. Johnson", followed by a long horizontal line extending to the right.

DRAFT

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

February 28, 1968

14

MEMORANDUM TO:

Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense

As I indicated at breakfast this morning, I wish you to develop by Monday morning, March 4, recommendations in response to the situation presented to us by General Wheeler and his preliminary proposals.

I wish alternatives examined and, if possible, agreed recommendations to emerge which reconcile the military, diplomatic, economic, Congressional, and public opinion problems involved.

In particular, I wish you to consider, among others, the following specific issues:

-- What military and other objectives in Viet Nam are additional U. S. forces designed to advance?

- avoid major mil. R & A
in W-S. Affairs
- System parallel to
the - R & A & R
- advantageous for
negotiation

-- What specific dangers is their dispatch designed to avoid, and what specific goals would the increment of force, if recommended by you, aim to achieve: in the next six months; over the next year?

-- *every sector* - *to overcome & action*

-- What problems would we confront with respect to appropriations and the budget; and what measures would you propose to deal with those problems?

-- What problems would we confront with respect to balance of payments; and what measures would you propose to deal with those problems?

-- Should we go forward with an increment of U. S. forces; what negotiating posture should we strike, in general; and what modifications, if any, would you recommend with respect to the San Antonio formula?

-- Aside from the question of negotiations, what other diplomatic problems would we confront, and how should they be dealt with?

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~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Authority *State 3-13-79, NSC 3-27-80*

By *if*, NARS, Date *7-23-80*

-- What special effort can we and should we take at this time with respect to improving the political and military performance of the South Vietnamese?

-- How should we frame our proposals for the Congress with respect to: objectives; legislation required (e.g., selective call-up); appropriations?

-- What major Congressional problems can be anticipated, and how should they be met?

-- Aside from your recommendations on the dispatch of forces and reconstitution of reserves, what steps are required to build up a production base for our over-all military effort?

-- What problems can we anticipate in U. S. public opinion, and how should they be dealt with?

You should feel free in making this report to call on the best minds in the Government to work on specific aspects of the problem; but you should assure the highest possible degree of security up to the moment when the President's decision on these matters is announced.



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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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CM-3083-68
4 March 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Civilian Engineering Capability in South Vietnam

1. In order to reply to your query regarding the possibility of using civilian engineering effort to build bridges and otherwise rehabilitate LOCs in South Vietnam, I requested comments from General Westmoreland and Admiral Sharp. General Westmoreland's comments, with which I fully agree, are contained in the enclosure.

2. Admiral Sharp points out the relative lack of flexibility in the civilian contractor effort when compared with troop labor. For efficient operation, the civilian contractor should have a programmed work backlog with adequate and assured funding. If he is required to undertake short term or relatively small-scale projects, his capability to mobilize for the larger sustained operations is degraded. His effort is also complicated by management problems and is subject to extensive turbulence and interruption as illustrated during the Tet offensive. Admiral Sharp also emphasizes the funding problem discussed in General Westmoreland's message.

3. I would add only one further comment. With the present in-country plant, a 25,000-man work force appears to be the maximum supportable contractor effort in South Vietnam. As pointed out by General Westmoreland, even this level of effort may require some minor increases in construction equipment.

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Authority JCS 6-29-78 letter
By is, NARS, Date 4-4-79

Enclosure
A/S

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GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S COMMENTS ON
CIVILIAN ENGINEERING CAPABILITIES

1. Civilian engineering construction effort has been and will be used in forward areas. Work is assigned on a selective basis, depending on the security situation, type and nature of work and location. Examples of such use presently include Tan My Port, bridge repair at Hue, road upgrading Qui Nhon to Pleiku, road repair Saigon to My Tho.

2. Most efficient use of civilian contractor effort is in secure base areas of Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay and Saigon, and other selected locations. Troop work in these areas will be reviewed further for transfer to contractor. Substantial switch of construction from troops to contractor will free troop units for work in less secure areas and also permit faster accomplishment of specific projects in secure areas.

3. Present civilian contractor effort is being fully utilized. An increase of 50 percent to the present work force of 17,000 is feasible and desirable. The Office in Charge of Construction (OICC), RVN and Raymond, Morrisson, Knudson-Brown, Root, Jones (RMK-BRJ) estimate that 90 days will be required to build contractor work force to 22,000 with an additional 60 days to 25,000. These increases will require a significant addition of third country nationals and a relaxation of the current GVN restrictions on work visas and entrance permits. Only minor increase in construction equipment is needed. During build-up continuing study will be given to further increase of contractor capability depending on tactical situation and amount of work required.

4. Additional MilCon funds will be needed. With a 25,000-man work force, the contractor will place work at a rate of \$25-30 million per month against \$18-20 million at present. Approximately \$75 million in additional funds required within the next several months, including those for procurement of equipment and material.

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Possible Reductions In 1969 Outlays
For Civilian Programs

A reduction of \$3 billion in 1969 outlays for civilian programs appears feasible, though it would be quite painful. It could be achieved by (1) a selective approach, e.g., by making reductions in specific programs; (2) an across-the-board reduction, e.g., last year's 2%/10% cut in personnel and other objects for controllable programs; or (3) a combination of the two.

There is attached a list of specific program reduction possibilities. It focuses mainly on the increases proposed for 1969 and the new legislative proposals. Notable exceptions are the reductions possible in construction programs, supersonic transport, space, FNMA secondary market operations, and the July 1, 1968 increment of the military and civilian pay increase. Most of these reductions could be accomplished by a combination of administrative and appropriation actions, some by withdrawing from new legislative proposals, but the reduction in the next pay increase increment would require enactment of a new legislative authorization.

A formula approach, applied to controllable civilian programs, using the same personnel vs. other objects method (limitation on obligations) used last fall, would give us reductions as follows:

	Billions	
	Obligations	Outlays
1% personnel/5% other objects.....	\$2.6	\$1.3
2% personnel/10% other objects.....	5.1	2.6
3% personnel/12% other objects.....	6.2	3.1
4% personnel/15% other objects.....	7.7	3.9

If a reduction were sought for Defense non-Vietnam outlays, the application of varying percentage cuts in non-Vietnam NOA (the same method used last fall) would produce the following results:

	Billions	
	NOA	Outlays
5%.....	\$2.7	\$1.0
10%.....	5.5	2.0
15%.....	8.2	3.2

Achievement of these reductions, or any reductions, in an efficient manner would require that decisions be made in time to be passed on to the agencies by April 1, 1968. Delay beyond

April 1 would reduce the magnitude of some of the specific program reductions which could be effected and would certainly make the cuts much more difficult and painful.

We should seriously consider transmitting budget amendments to the Congress and thus make them share in the burden. (If a formula approach were chosen we could ask Congress to enact a provision similar to that in the last Continuing Resolution.) Speed is urgent, because once Congress starts cutting appropriations we will get resistance from all sides -- those who want credit for the cuts they have made, those who want a firm expenditure limitation, and those who want no cuts or want to somehow make the cuts less painful.

Attachment

February 14, 1968

Specific Program Reduction Possibilities

(In addition to the Program Reductions and Reforms set forth on pages 20-22 of 1969 budget.)

	<u>Millions</u>	
<u>Requiring new legislation:</u>	<u>Program</u>	<u>Outlays</u>
Civilian and military pay increase -- defer July 1, 1968 increment until Jan. 1, 1969, or go only one-fourth of the way toward full comparability..	\$800	\$800
<u>New legislative program in 1969 budget -- forego or defer:</u>		
Food stamp expansion.....	20	15
Defense -- Federal employee status for) technicians.....)	52	47
Increased travel allowance) for military.....)		
HEW -- Higher educational activities....	23	--
Juvenile delinquency.....	25	20
Public broadcasting.....	20	20
HUD -- solve new urban problems (new towns, etc.).....	30	14
Safe streets.....	80	39
Highway beautification.....	85	20
Intergovernmental personnel assistance..	20	12
Others.....	42	41
Subtotal legislative programs.....	397	228
<u>Reductions requiring appropriation and administrative actions:</u>		
<u>Appalachian regional development -- hold to 1968 obligational level.....</u>	26	5
<u>Economic assistance -- hold to 1968 effective program level.....</u>	565	125
<u>OEO -- eliminate proposed increase in manpower programs.....</u>	254	106
eliminate proposed increase in Community Action programs not included in above.....	27	11
<u>Agriculture:</u>		
School lunch and food stamp programs -- hold to 1968 level.....	61	54
Agricultural credit insurance fund -- hold to 1968 level.....	63	63

	<u>Millions</u>	
<u>Reductions requiring appropriation and administrative actions--Continued:</u>	<u>Program</u>	<u>Outlays</u>
<u>HEW:</u>		
Education--impacted areas--hold to 1968 obligational level....	\$22	\$20
education professions development--defer initiation of new teacher training program.....	52	13
higher education--hold student aid to 1968 obligational level.....	103	51
research and training--hold to 1968 obligational level.....	<u>82</u>	<u>54</u>
Subtotal, education.....	<u>259</u>	<u>138</u>
 Health--comprehensive health planning--hold to 1968 obligational level.....		
health professions education--hold to 1968 obligational level.....	55	15
air pollution research--hold to 1968 obligational level....	39	8
NIH--hold to 1968 obligational level.....	40	16
NIMH, research and services--hold to 1968 obligational level.....	76	26
	<u>31</u>	<u>10</u>
Subtotal, health.....	<u>241</u>	<u>75</u>
 Work incentive activities--defer initiation (may have to go for a small program, however).....		
Maternal and child health and welfare--hold to 1968 obligational level.....	95	104
	62	40
<u>HUD:</u>		
Model cities--limit program to half of the 63 cities--those with best plans.....	250	100
FNMA special assistance--hold moderate income housing to current year level.	100	20
FNMA secondary market operations--withdraw from market (not done since 1954).....	500+	500

	Millions	
	<u>Program</u>	<u>Outlays</u>
<u>Reductions requiring appropriation and administrative actions--Continued:</u>		
<u>Interior:</u>		
Recreation projects--hold at current year level.....	\$65	\$58
Water pollution--hold research and grants to current year level.....	77	15
Construction programs (Corps, Reclamation, PO, etc.)--adopt "very restrictive policy"	300	250
Manpower programs--hold to current year level:		
Total program.....	(442)	(231)
Portion not included in detail above...	88	45
<u>Supersonic transport:</u>		
Stop further work on project.....	223	101
Slow down rate of progress--likely to occur in any event.....	(30)	(30)
Treasury--hold IRS compliance activities to current level.....	50	45
AEC--shut down two more reactors.....	30	30
NASA--hold Apollo applications program to approximately current year level--Webb will protest vehemently.....	240	160
VA--hold medical care and research to current year levels.....	60	55
Smithsonian--defer construction of Hirschhorn Museum.....	13	1
WMA Transit Authority--withhold funds for initiation of construction of subway.	55	14
Grand total.....	4,901	3,143

5:30 p.m., Monday, March 4, 1968

Meeting with the President in the Cabinet Room

V. PRESIDENT

Sec. Rusk

Sec. Clifford

Gen. Earle Wheeler

Director Richard Helms

General Maxwell D. Taylor

George Christian

Tom Johnson

W. W. Rostow

SEC. FOWLER





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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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3 March 1968

DECLASSIFIED
Authority OSD letter JUL 25 1979
By isg, NARS, Date 10-19-79

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MEMORANDUM ON STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

Assuming it is decided to reconstitute and create strategic reserves in the United States adequate to permit us to deploy the forces to Vietnam General Westmoreland has requested by December 1968 and to deploy such forces as can be made available prior to June 1st, the question arises as to whether a clarification of strategic guidance to General Westmoreland would be useful.

The crucial issue is which side can succeed in picking itself up out of the dust resulting from the TET offensive most quickly and successfully. It is quite possible that developments in the period between now and June could be decisive in both Hanoi's and in our decisions as to how best to carry on from that point. It would seem appropriate, therefore, to concentrate on the strategic guidance we might wish to give General Westmoreland for the period between now and mid-year.

The following is a rough cut at such strategic guidance for General Westmoreland:

1. The first and highest priority is for the GVN to recover from the shock of the TET offensive, for RVNAF to recover its pre-TET effectiveness and beyond, and to provide maximum security to the heavily populated areas in South Vietnam.

You will accord to the government of ARVN a priority equal to the conduct of US operations
2. All plans developed to accomplish this objective shall be based on the assumption that no additional forces will be deployed to South Vietnam over and above those which you have requested for CY 1968.

3. It is fully understood that the forces already deployed by the enemy plus those which he may deploy in the future may make it impossible for you to defend all of the area or all of the governmental centers at all times.

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4. Therefore, you will consider the following as strategic guidance for the employment of U.S. troops, and in governing the US-RVNAF advisory relationship:

- a. You will assist the GVN in maintaining the security of Saigon and those provincial and district capitals which you and the GVN consider to be the most important.
- b. Additionally, conduct your operations with the objective of providing security to the greatest mass of population which your resources permit. This may require a reduction in the emphasis and resources allocated for frontier defense and search and destroy operations in remote areas.
- c. Secure GVN agreement to permit MACV to make strategic plans for the use of the RVNAF, and for MACV advisors to approve tactical operations plans. In order to secure this agreement, we are prepared to arm the ARVN maneuver battalion with the better weapons which they desire as rapidly as they can be made available.
- d. With an increase in the resources devoted to the defense of the populated areas, every effort should be made to get the ARVN, if necessary supported by U.S. forces, to seek out and engage enemy units threatening the security of the populated areas. In other words, the attempt should be made to regain the initiative even if the strategic scope is somewhat reduced.
- e. Air and artillery fire in populated areas should be concentrated on the destruction of identified enemy units in an effort to minimize destruction.
- f. A revised campaign for the use of newly developed sensors, long-range patrols, observers, etc., plus expanded tactical air should be directed toward imposing attrition on enemy forces in the non-populated areas.
- g. Given greater MACV influence over the performance and conduct of the RVNAF, looting and other actions detrimental to the basic task of restoring popular support for the GVN should be strictly controlled.

h, IV and I Corps present special problems. In IV Corps, it would seem appropriate to supply the necessary stiffening to the GVN's efforts to right the present dangerous imbalance between GVN and VC forces. In I Corps the threat appears so serious that further diversions from other Corps areas may be appropriate.

5. In summary, the tasks which you face will be accorded the following priority:

- a. Defend the GVN and the most important of its provincial and district elements.
- b. Defend the most heavily populated areas together with the major concentrations of wealth and industry and the most critical LOC's.
- c. Undertake offensive operations as and when you are capable of so doing.



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

3 March 1968

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18

FURTHER MEMORANDUM ON STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

The first paper restricts itself to the short term-rapid recovery from the shock of the TET offensive. There remains the problem of longer range strategy.

Our past guidance has been to guarantee the continued existence of a "Free and Independent South Vietnam". The relationship of this objective to other national objectives, and to the means we are prepared to devote to it over time have not been defined. It is not an unlimited objective to be equated with that of preservation of the United States.

A number of questions arise. (a) Are circumstances conceivable under which it would become an unrealistic or even impossible objective? If a substantial majority of the South Vietnamese people were to turn against the GVN and ourselves or if the GVN itself were to request or demand our withdrawal, the answer would have to be affirmative. (b) Are there means, the use of which we would wish to avoid even if their use appeared essential to preserving our objective? The answer is clearly in the affirmative. (c) Are there limits to the magnitude of forces and the time of deployment of those forces which we do not propose to exceed, or cannot exceed, in maintaining support for the objective? Again the answer is in principle affirmative. (d) Are there other foreign policy, defense and possibly economic objectives which are more important to the survival of the United States? Again the answer is affirmative.

It is quite true that the Vietnamese struggle has become a focal point of the more general conflict between the East and the West, and that it is therefore no longer possible to look at our objective in South Vietnam in isolation. There is a valid strategic principle that cautions against reinforcing weakness. The history of our involvement in Vietnam has been the recurring issue of reinforcing weakness versus the humiliation of settling for less than our original objective.

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Authority OSD letter JUL 25 1979
By isp, NARS, Date 10-19-79

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By June, if not earlier, this same question will arise again. At that time the GVN, the ARVN and South Vietnamese populace may have picked themselves up more successfully than the VC and NVN have replaced their material and psychological losses. The reverse may turn out to be true.

In any event, we should now be sorting out our own basic strategic views.

Is it possible through air attack on the North not only to break the will of Hanoi but of the Communist Bloc which supports it? I believe not.

Should we view the Vietnamese struggle as a Southeast Asian struggle and expand the concept of operations to include Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and North Vietnam as one front with no intervening frontiers? The political consequences, the realistic force requirements, and our capability to sustain those force requirements have not been recently reviewed. Indigenous weakness makes it appear doubtful we could put together a high confidence winning combination.

Should we view the Vietnamese war as only one facet of our general confrontation with the Soviet Union and move to the offensive world wide? Again, it is doubtful that the correlation of forces both military and political permit us realistically to do so.

Under these circumstances, I suggest that under the leadership of the State Department, with the assistance of the Department of Defense, the JCS, and the Treasury, a review of our Vietnamese policy in the context of our global politico-military strategy be undertaken with a due date of May 15.

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TABS -- DRAFT MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

The Justification for Immediate Additional Forces in South Vietnam -----	A
Increasing the Effectiveness of Vietnamese Efforts in Conjunction with a U. S. Troop Increase -----	B
Justification for Increasing the Strategic Reserve -----	C
Necessity for In-Depth Study of Vietnam Policy and Strategic Guidance -	D
Negotiating Posture Options, and Possible Diplomatic Actions -----	E
Military Action Against North Vietnam -----	F
The Campaign Against North Vietnam: A Different View -----	F-2
Difficulties and Negative Factors in the Course of Action -----	G
Problems We Can Anticipate in U. S. Public Opinion -----	H

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

4 March 1968

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DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

General Westmoreland has requested an additional 205,000 troops (beyond the 525,000 personnel now authorized). He asks for the deployment in three packages, by May 1, September 1 and December 31.

General Wheeler believes we should prepare ourselves to meet the request for an additional 205,000 personnel and should act to increase and improve our strategic reserve in the United States. An initial staff examination of requirements indicates that to achieve both will require:

- a. A call-up of reserve units and individuals totaling approximately 262,000 (194,000 in units, 68,000 as individuals).
- b. Increased draft calls.
- c. Extension of terms of service. These actions would produce a total increase in end strength in the Armed Forces of approximately 511,000 by June 30, 1969. (The staff examination referred to above included spaces to add 31,500 troops in South Korea and a US naval proposal to add two cruisers and fifteen destroyers to the naval forces in Southeast Asia. If these proposals are disapproved in their entirety, the figures above will be decreased to approximately 242,000 and 454,000 respectively.)

A build-up of roughly these dimensions would enable us to meet the Westmoreland request and, in any event, would reconstitute the strategic reserve in the United States.

We recommend:

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By ing, NARS, Date 10-19-79

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1. An immediate decision to deploy to Vietnam an estimated total of 22,000 additional personnel (approximately 60% of which would be combat). An immediate decision to deploy the three tactical fighter squadrons deferred from Program 5 (about 1,000 men). This would be over and above the four battalions (about 3700 men) already planned for deployment in April which in themselves would bring us slightly above the 525,000 authorized level. The argument for this immediate action, and detailed schedules of availability is contained in Tab A.

2. Either through Ambassador Bunker or through an early visit by Secretary Clifford, a highly forceful approach to the GVN (Thieu and Ky) to get certain key commitments for improvement, tied to our own increased effort and to increased US support for the ARVN. Details are in Tab B.

3. Early approval of a Reserve call-up and an increased end strength adequate to meet the balance of the Westmoreland request and to restore a strategic reserve in the United States, adequate for possible contingencies world-wide. Supporting discussion and details are in Tab C.

4. Reservation of the decision to meet the Westmoreland request in full. While we would be putting ourselves in a position to make these additional deployments, the future decision to do so would be contingent upon:

a. Reexamination on a week-by-week basis of the desirability of further deployments as the situation develops;

b. Improved political performance by the GVN and increased

contribution in effective military action by the ARVN;

c. The results of a study in depth, to be initiated immediately, of possible new political and strategic guidance for the conduct of US operations in South Vietnam, and of our Vietnamese policy in the context of our world-wide politico-military strategy. Supporting discussion is in Tab D.

5. No new peace initiative on Vietnam. Re-statement of our terms for peace and certain limited diplomatic actions to dramatize Laos and to focus attention on the total threat to Southeast Asia. Details in Tab E.

6. A general decision on bombing policy, not excluding future change, but adequate to form a basis for discussion with the Congress on this key aspect. Here your advisers are divided:

a. General Wheeler and others would advocate a substantial extension of targets and authority in and near Hanoi and Haiphong, mining of Haiphong, and naval gunfire up to a Chinese Buffer Zone;

b. Others would advocate a seasonal step-up through the spring, but without these added elements.

The opposing arguments are in Tab F.

In proposing this course of action, we recognize that there are certain difficulties and negative factors, outlined in Tab G. Additional problems we can anticipate in US public opinion are at Tab H. Nevertheless, we believe that this course of action, in its essential outline at least, is urgently required to meet the immediate situation in Vietnam as well as wider possible contingencies there and elsewhere.

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TAB A

The Justification for Immediate Additional Forces in South Vietnam

21

Prior to January 29, 1968, we had reason to believe that we were making slow but steady progress in Vietnam on both the military and political fronts. The heavy offensive mounted by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong throughout the country, though it achieved no permanent military successes, unquestionably set back our efforts in pacification and in the creation of a political and social fabric that can withstand our eventual withdrawal.

Hanoi has made a basic change in its strategy and scale of operations. Perhaps because they thought they were losing as the war and pacification were going, Hanoi is pressing hard for decisive results over the next few months. They are committing a high proportion of their assets, although it appears likely that they would retain both the capability and will to keep up the pressure next year if this effort does not succeed. There is hope that, if this year's effort could be thwarted, Hanoi and Viet Cong morale would be sufficiently affected to open up possibilities of peace, but this cannot be assessed as likely.

Within South Vietnam, there are key variables that could move the situation sharply, one way or the other, in the coming months. Specifically:

- a. The degree to which Hanoi and the VC are able to keep pressing, and how effectively they are countered in the military sphere.
- b. The degree to which the VC are able to extend their control in the countryside and recoup their losses -- or whether conversely the South Vietnamese can take the initiative and either neutralize such recoupment or set in motion a new favorable trend.

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c. The degree to which the GVN improves its performance and galvanizes potentially greater popular support than it can now have.

Moreover, there is at least some chance that Hanoi will further step up its military pressures particularly in the northern areas during the summer season there.

In terms of US military forces, we believe this situation creates an urgent practical and psychological need to decide now to send such forces as can be effective in the next 4 to 5 months. The following additional forces of about 22,000 men could be deployed by June 15 in accordance with the schedule set forth below:

Six Tactical Fighter Squadrons	-	3,000 men
2 Squadrons by	-	1 April
3 Squadrons by	-	1 May
1 Squadron by	-	1 June
4th Marine Expeditionary Force (minus)	-	18,100 men
by	-	15 June
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion	-	700 men
by	-	1 May

In addition, we believe that an urgent effort is required to improve and modernize the equipment of the SVN armed forces. This need is being urgently studied, to see what can be done and with what impact on our other plans for increased basic US force levels and the strategic reserve.

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Increasing the Effectiveness of Vietnamese Efforts in Conjunction
with a U.S. Troop Increase

Deployment of additional US troops would probably stiffen the GVN's will at a time when the tasks it faces are rather monumental. The reaffirmation of the US commitment will be welcomed and the additional strength to meet the danger from VC/NVA forces will add to the feeling of confidence.

On the other hand, there is always the danger that the Vietnamese would be tempted to relax, taking refuge behind American power. The sense of anxiety and urgency which came over the Government as a result of the Tet offensive, and which has moved them to act initially with somewhat greater effectiveness, could suffer.

We believe that the GVN has the capacity - even if its leadership may not now be displaying the will - to take civil and military actions which can materially improve both the security and the political climate, as well as the crucial image of the GVN in the US.

We should, therefore, couple our readiness to strengthen our effort in Vietnam with specific demands on the Vietnamese Government. This involves getting the GVN to take a wide range of decisions and actions. The list below is considered essential and feasible. It should be submitted to Ambassador Bunker for review, then put to the Vietnamese leadership as forcefully as possible, and then become a check-list for judging Vietnamese accomplishment against a given time schedule - say thirty days as appropriate.

We recommend consideration of a high-level mission to Saigon to emphasize that we consider improved GVN performance essential and that any

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further US support must be matched by GVN action in spheres that are critical. This mission should engage the GVN in a full review of where we stand, what we are prepared to do on our part, and what we look for on their part. We suggest that the Secretary of Defense might be designated for the task, to go to Saigon as soon as possible. Alternatively, Ambassador Bunker should take on the job.

Specific Demands on the GVN.

1. Mobilization - The Vietnamese Armed Forces should be increased to the maximum. As a first step, present plans to increase Vietnamese forces by 65,000 men should be amended to provide for an additional 30,000 men under arms by the end of 1968. The draft of 18 and 19 year olds should proceed as presently scheduled. This should be consistent with the ability to train and supply the forces, but avoid undercutting the need for key civilians in other governmental functions by diversion of skilled personnel.
2. The Thieu-Ky Relationship and Unity of Leadership - The failure of Thieu and Ky to cooperate fully and apply their individual talents to the needs of the situation has continued to plague the effective management of the Vietnamese effort. In turn this has had ramifications down the line in both the military and civilian chain of command. It has also complicated the chances of rallying the various elements in the society, as the rivalry translates itself into interference with attempts at forming a national anti-communist front.

Thieu and Ky and their followers, as well as other elements in the society not associated directly with them, must be brought to realize that

we are no longer prepared to put up with anything but the maximum effort on their part. A clear and precise role for Ky should be defined. Thieu and Ky must bring their followers into line. The government should be prepared to engage the services of people with administrative and executive talent who are now not participating in the common task. Our expectations in this regard have to be made crystal clear to each and every Vietnamese leader in and out of Government. Without this fundamental change in the attitude and dedication of the leadership, the necessary reforms and the necessary inspiration of the Vietnamese people will not be forthcoming quickly or sufficiently.

3. Getting the Government Back into the Countryside - We must win the race to the countryside, go on the offensive, re-establish security in the rural areas, and restore the government's presence in the villages. The ARVN and other security forces must deploy aggressively, the RD cadre must return to their tasks, and governmental services reach out from the province capitals.

In the final analysis rural security, the sine qua non of popular identification with the GVN, must be provided by the Vietnamese themselves. The two keys here are (1) the calibre and role of the 44 province chiefs (and their supporting staffs) and (2) a properly offensive sense of mission on the part of ARVN units - and their commanders - assigned to rural security support missions. In every area (village, district, province, DTZ and corps) the RVNAF unit commanders responsible for security in that area must be graded (i.e. promoted, commended or sacked) primarily on their

ability to find, fix and eradicate the VC Force indigenous to that area. They must also be graded (with commensurate effect on their careers) with respect to the behavior of their troops vis-a-vis the populace in that area.

4. Drive on the Viet Cong Infrastructure - In our concern over the behavior of our allies, we must not neglect our enemies and the present opportunity to compound and exacerbate communist problems. Operation Phoenix which is targetted against the Viet Cong must be pursued more vigorously in closer liaison with the US. Vietnamese armed forces should be devoted to anti-infrastructure activities on a priority basis. The Tet offensive surfaced a good deal of the infrastructure and the opportunity to damage it has never been better. This would force the VC on the defensive and head off the establishment of local VC administrative organizations and VC attempts to set up provisional governmental committees.

5. US-ARVN Command Relationships - While we accept the Mission's reluctance to create a joint command, we believe that alternative arrangements which give the US a greater role in ARVN employment are necessary. This can be done at the Corps level and below. It would involve US participation in the planning and control of ARVN operations. It might even call for the prior approval by US advisors of ARVN operational plans -- this now exists in certain cases depending upon individual advisor relationships. We should request MACV to study the matter and come up with a specific plan to meet the requirement.

6. Government Reform and Anti-Corruption Campaign - The beginning steps at administrative reform which President Thieu has announced must be accelerated. This should be directly associated with a new deal on corruption, which must be dealt with by relief of a specified list of corrupt

officials now and the promise of severe action in the future. A capable Inspectorate should be established. Incompetent ARVN officers must be removed, beginning with a specific list that should be made available by MACV. Incompetent province chiefs who have plagued our efforts in the past must be removed. The removal of incompetent commanders and officials is now more feasible in the light of performance during the Tet offensive. We should not hesitate to make our desires known and back them up by refusing to provide support for the incompetent. For key commanders, we should require the right of prior approval on a secret and discreet basis. The precise tools of leverage to be applied in this regard should be left to the US Mission, but could include withholding advice and assistance at local levels in extreme cases.

7. The Prime Minister - We should solicit Ambassador Bunker's views on the desirability of replacing the Prime Minister. If he is to be replaced we should agree on his successor beforehand, in consultation with Thieu and Ky.

8. The United Front - A nationalist spirit of cooperation and unity came to the fore in the immediate wake of the Tet offensive. It is being manifested incompletely in attempts to organize groups in support of the national task. Despite the personal misgivings of old antagonists there has been some success. This is now threatened by personal rivalries, and most significantly by differences between Thieu and Ky. We need to find a formula for joint efforts. Ambassador Bunker suggests that the optimum result would be a "super front" of the anti-communist groups. Although not directly tied to the government, such a front could serve to rally the people broadly and emotionally against the Viet Cong. To succeed

it must be backed by the leadership of the government - both Thieu and Ky - but not appear to compete with the National Assembly. It should encompass all elements in the society, but not be the vehicle for any one power group..

9. Economic Measures - There will be increased inflation in Vietnam this year, and additional US troops will make it more severe. Steps need to be taken now to counter the threat of inflation, if we are not to be faced with a severe crisis next fall and winter. The GVN needs to move on tax increases, and U.S. and GVN expenditures for non-essential programs in Vietnam should be restrained. On the other hand, wage increases for civil and military personnel in the GVN are needed if inflation is not to weaken their will and support.

Additionally, we must demand of the GVN some measure of action on their part to compensate for the effect of additional US troops on the US balance of payments. This can be done by having the GVN provide to the US at no cost the additional piaster costs incurred by our troop increase. We should also insist that GVN reserves be reduced to \$250 million from the present maximum reserve level of \$300 million and that a significant portion of the reserve be invested in medium and long term US securities. The details of these economic measures cannot be discussed in this paper, but a comprehensive economic package should be prepared and presented to the GVN - to include what the US is prepared to do in the way of increased financing of commercial imports.

10. Resource Allocation - Non-essential use of resources should be eliminated. Present government programs to eliminate new luxury construction

must be tightened and continued. Bars and night clubs should remain closed. Austerity should be fostered.

US Actions and Leverage

As the US demands more of the GVN we should do what we can to improve the capability of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. MACV reports that the ARVN are now frequently faced with superior weapons and fire-power in the hands of the enemy. To re-dress the balance requires a substantial modernization and increase in arms for the Vietnamese. This ranges from provision of M-16 rifles to the supply of trucks, tanks and helicopters. On the basis of current planning estimates this would involve additional expenditure of about \$475 million over a period of 18 months.

If we approve the call-up of reserves, the strengthening of US forces, and the deployment of additional forces to Vietnam, we run into direct competition between US needs and the planned modernization of ARVN. In other words, we will face the need to slow down modernization of the ARVN to meet the requirements of equipping US forces, or we will have to add to our procurement capacity.

US equipment and force actions will supply specific leverage, and equipment can be used on a continuing basis. More basically, we believe the approach should stress that unless major and early improvements are made, the US public and even the President and the Administration cannot continue to support the war.

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TAB C

Justification for Increasing the Strategic Reserve

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Because of the possibility that the North Vietnamese leaders may decide to launch a larger-scale invasion by Main Force units, we should put ourselves in a position to provide the other ground, sea and air forces involved in General Westmoreland's request. This would require a substantial Reserve call-up, the exact dimensions of which remain to be worked out. It must be anticipated, however, that this would be around 245,000 (it should be noted that the Joint Staff estimate of 280,000 includes 31,000 additional troops for South Korea). Moreover, the necessary end strength to sustain these added deployments would approximate 450,000. The difference would be made up by extension of tours of duty and increased draft calls.

In order to reach the end strength necessary under this recommendation, Congressional action would be required. Congress would have to authorize the extension of terms of service and the call-up of certain individual Reservists that would be necessary. In addition, the authorization and appropriation of about \$5 billion over the \$2-1/2 billion increase already indicated for the present fiscal year and \$10 billion for FY 69 would also be necessary.

In presenting this proposal to Congress, and to the American public, emphasis should be placed upon the uncertain picture world-wide and the need to improve and increase our strategic reserve.

This increase in the strategic reserve here in the United States would make it possible to deploy to South Vietnam the additional forces

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involved in General Westmoreland's request if our continuing review and determinations with respect to possible change in the political and strategic guidance should warrant this action. The particular units and dates of such possible deployments are shown on the attached schedule.

If these additional forces are not deployed to Vietnam, our action in thus reconstituting the strategic reserve would nevertheless be fully warranted. Our strategic reserve has been appreciably depleted because of Vietnam demands. At present, the active division forces in the Continental United States, Hawaii and Okinawa, and including the Marine units in the Caribbean and Mediterranean, consist of 4-2/3 Army divisions and 1-1/3 Marine divisions. This compares with the 9 Army divisions and 3 Marine divisions in our strategic reserve on 30 June 1965. A call-up of 242,000, with no deployments to South Vietnam in excess of the 22,000 now recommended, would yield a strategic reserve of 7 Army divisions and 2 Marine divisions. The unsettled situations in many parts of the world make this build-up a prudent action entirely apart from possible Vietnam contingencies.

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DEPLOYMENT DECISIONS *

<u>Decision Date</u>	<u>Deployment Date</u>	<u>Arrival Date</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Men</u>
Now	1 Jun	15 Jun	5th Marine Div (-)(3 Bns)	10,000
Now	15 May	15 Jun	Miscellaneous Navy	1,300
Now	1 Jun	15 Jun	4 AF F-100 Sqds (ANG active)	3,000
Now	1 Jun	15 Jun	Bde 5th Mech. Div.	9,700
1 Apr	1 Jun	30 Jun	4th Marine Div/Wg	(Replace 5th Marine Div.)
1 Jun	1 Aug	31 Aug	1 Army Ntl Grd-Mech Bde	(Replace 5th Mech. Bde)
1 Jun	1 Aug	31 Aug	1 Army Ntl Grd Inf Bde	(Replace 82nd Abn. Bde)
1 Jun	1 Aug	31 Aug	2 Army Ntl Grd Inf Bde & Support	66,300
1 Jun	1 Aug	15 Aug	4 AF Tac Ftr Sqds	11,700
1 Jun	1 Aug	31 Aug	Navy Construction & Support	11,200
1 Jun	1 Aug	15 Aug	4 Marine Fighter/Attack Sqdns	7,000
1 Jun	1 Jul	31 Jul	Marine Support Units	20,000
1 Jul	1 Sep	Oct-Dec	Navy Support	8,000
1 Jul	1 Sep	15 Sep	3 AF Tac Ftr Sqds & Support	5,000
1 Aug	1 Oct	31 Oct	1 Army Ntl Grd Div.	26,000
1 Aug	1 Oct	31 Oct	Marine Combined Action Companies	2,000
1 Aug	1 Oct	31 Oct	Air Force Support	2,500
Later			Army Aviation Units	30,000
				<u>206,500</u>

*Would be adjusted based on any decision to deploy difference forces in the initial deployment.

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TAB D

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Necessity for In-Depth Study of Vietnam
Policy and Strategic Guidance

It should be recognized that General Westmoreland's proposal does not purport to provide any really satisfactory answer to the problem in Vietnam. There can be no assurance that this very substantial additional deployment would leave us a year from today in any more favorable military position. All that can be said is that the additional troops would enable us to kill more of the enemy and would provide more security if the enemy does not offset them by lesser reinforcements of his own. There is no indication that they would bring about a quick solution in Vietnam and, in the absence of better performance by the GVN and the ARVN, the increased destruction and increased Americanization of the war could, in fact, be counter-productive.

No matter what the result in South Vietnam itself, we will have failed in our purposes if:

a. The war in Vietnam spreads to the point where it is a major conflict leading to direct military confrontation with the USSR and/or China;

b. The war in Vietnam spreads to the point where we are so committed in resources that our other world-wide commitments -- especially NATO -- are no longer credible;

c. The attitudes of the American people towards "more Vietnams" are such that our other commitments are brought into question as a matter of US will;

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d. Other countries no longer wish the US commitment for fear of the consequences to themselves as a battlefield between the East and the West.

It is for these reasons that we have recommended a study of our Vietnamese policy in the context of our world-wide politico-military strategy.

In addition, we believe that it would be undesirable to decide to make the very substantial increase proposed by General Westmoreland until more information is obtained on the development of the situation in South Vietnam. A continuing and intensive review should focus not only on future enemy activity but also on the demonstrated ability of the GVN and the ARVN to pull themselves together, to get back into business, and to demonstrate significant improvements both in their ability to win popular support and their willingness to fight aggressively for their own security. Unless these qualities are evidenced there can be no real hope for the accomplishment of our political aims.

Finally, we believe that the striking change in the enemy's tactics, his willingness to commit at least two additional divisions to the fighting in the South over the past few weeks and the obvious and not wholly anticipated strength of the Viet Cong infrastructure, shows that there can be no prospect of a quick military solution to the aggression in South Vietnam. Under these circumstances, we should give intensive study to the development of new strategic guidance to General Westmoreland. This study may show that he should not be expected either to destroy the

enemy forces or to rout them completely from South Vietnam. The kind of American commitment that might be required to achieve these military objectives cannot even be estimated. There is no reason to believe that it could be done by an additional 200,000 American troops or double or triple that quantity.

Furthermore, an increase of the size presently requested would amount virtually to the Americanization of the war effort. US Regular Forces would be double those of the ARVN. They would approximately equal the total number of South Vietnamese now under arms. Under these circumstances, accomplishment of the primary goal of building a strong and viable South Vietnamese Government and military arm might be frustrated rather than furthered.

The exact nature of the strategic guidance which should be adopted cannot now be predicted. It should be the subject of a detailed inter-agency study over the next several weeks. During the progress of the study, discussions of the appropriate strategic guidance and its nature and implications for the extent of our military commitment in South Vietnam should be undertaken with both General Westmoreland and Ambassador Bunker.

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Negotiating Posture Options, and Possible
Diplomatic Actions

Whatever military or other courses of action we now adopt, we need to consider what posture to take on negotiations concerning Vietnam, and whether there are additional diplomatic actions we could take or encourage -- concerning Vietnam itself or the Southeast Asia situation generally.

Vietnam Negotiating Posture

We have three broad options:

1. Stand pat on the San Antonio formula and on our basic position toward the terms of a negotiated settlement -- the Geneva Accords plus free choice in the South, rejecting a coalition or any special position for the NLF.
2. Take some new initiative, either privately or publicly, that might involve a change in our position on the San Antonio formula and/or a change in our position on the elements of a settlement.
3. No change in our position for the present, but pitching our course of action toward a strong move for negotiations when and if we have countered Hanoi's offensive -- i.e., in a matter of four months or so perhaps.

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The difference between 1 and 3 is essentially one of posture and presentation. The crucial question is to examine what we could conceivably do by way of a new initiative under 2.

We must make certain basic judgments concerning the present situation.

First, it seems most doubtful that Hanoi will be prepared for a serious move toward peace, except on its own terms, for the immediate future. They are obviously confident and determined to press their current strategy in the hope of further gains. If we sat down at the table with them now, the odds are overwhelming that their position would be totally stiff and unyielding.

Second, while Hanoi may continue to play public and diplomatic games to give the impression of a peace posture, it seems unlikely that they would give us anything convincing on the "no advantage" assumption in the San Antonio formula. They could encourage the kind of "impressions" that they would not take advantage that have already been put out by U Thant and Sainteny, but they are most unlikely to take a public and identifiable position on this key point. They could drop "half a shoe" by a firm statement that talks would follow in a matter of days after the bombing stopped, and this would somewhat

increase public pressures for peace, particularly in Europe and other more susceptible countries. But they are unlikely to do anything that would give us a real basis for convincing the GVN and our Vietnam allies that there would be the prospect of serious military restraints by Hanoi if we stopped the bombing.

Third, South Vietnamese officials and public opinion seems to have three strands: (a) a firm belief that any early negotiations in present circumstances would be disastrous; (b) continued fear in some quarters that the US may negotiate without regard to South Vietnamese interests -- in present circumstances this would compound the critical adverse effect that any entry into negotiations would have, and the danger would be even greater if we were to change our position on coalition government or any other aspect of the internal political structure in the South; (c) an underlying trend toward greater receptivity toward peace at the right time -- this seems clearly evident in the posture of the new political alliance, and is implicit in the comments of Tran Van Do and even Thieu. In sum, the South Vietnamese would be highly sensitive to any immediate move, but sentiment is moving in the direction of accepting some form of negotiations if the situation can be righted at all.

Fourth, the Soviets continue to appear completely passive. This undoubtedly reflects their judgment that Hanoi would not move seriously no matter what the Soviets might urge them to do under the present circumstances. At the same time, if we engage in significant military increases, the Soviets might become more interested in the over-all prospects for peace in Southeast Asia, even though they might remain helpless as to Vietnam itself.

Fifth, certain key Asian countries -- notably Japan -- are plainly getting more and more worried over the trends in Vietnam, and would like to make some effort themselves in Vietnam. Moreover, they too could become more interested in wider possibilities for a settlement in Southeast Asia.

In the light of this assessment, we believe that any change in our position on the terms of a peaceful settlement would be extremely unwise at the present time. We may well wish to work on opening up channels to the NLF, but this must be done in the utmost secrecy and in full consultation with the GVN. We do not know what the possibilities may be in this direction, but any public stress on this avenue would feed the fires of a VC propaganda line that has already had significant disturbing effect in South Vietnam.

As to our conditions for stopping the bombing and entering into talks, we continue to believe that the San Antonio formula is "rock bottom." The South Vietnamese are in fact talking about much stiffer conditions, such as stopping the infiltration entirely. Any move by us to modify the San Antonio formula downward would be extremely disturbing in South Vietnam, and would have no significant offsetting gains in US public opinion or in key third countries. On the contrary, we should continue to take the line that the San Antonio/laid out conditions under which there was a reasonable prospect that talks would get somewhere and be conducted in good faith. Hanoi's major offensive has injected a new factor, in which we are bound to conclude that there is no such prospect for the present.

Moreover, we should at the appropriate time -- probably not in a major statement, but rather in response to a question -- make the point that "normal" infiltration of men and equipment from the North cannot mean the much increased levels that have prevailed since October. We do not need to define exactly what we would mean by "normal" but we should make clear that we do not mean the levels since San Antonio was set out.

Apart from this point on our public posture, we should be prepared -- in the unlikely event that Hanoi makes an affirmative noise on the "no advantage" assumption -- to go back at them

through some channel and make this same point quite explicit.

In short, our public posture and our private actions should be designed to:

a. Maintain San Antonio and our general public willingness for negotiations.

b. Add this new and justified interpretation of San Antonio so that in fact we would not be put on the spot over the next 2-4 months.

c. Keep sufficient flexibility so that, if the situation should improve, we could move during the summer if we then judged it wise.

This being said, we believe that it would strengthen our over-all posture, and involve no significant risks in Vietnam, if we were to reiterate our basic position on our terms of settlement in South Vietnam. A systematic restatement of our position on the Geneva Accords and free choice in the South could be a vital part of selling our whole course of action to the public, to Congress, and the world. Although we have stated all the elements at different times, we have not pulled them together for a long time and we could get a considerable impression of freshness, even novelty, and certainly reasonableness by indentifying more precisely the elements of the Geneva Accords, our position on free choice, and perhaps adding something on

external guarantees, which have always been a generalized part of our position and that of the South Vietnamese. We should prepare a draft in this sense in any case.

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The point/is that, partly through our own emphasis, attention at home and abroad has been focussed too heavily on getting into negotiations as if this were an objective in itself.

We need to bring out more clearly that our position on the elements of the settlement is reasonable, and drastically different from the Hanoi/NLF position.

Finally, whatever the possibility of our getting into negotiations over the next six months may be, we need to sit down fairly soon with the South Vietnamese go to over our whole negotiating position. We have had exchanges with Bunker, and have supplied him with materials. We should authorize him to start quiet discussions, again in the utmost secrecy, to clarify thinking and to ease any fears they may have concerning our views. These discussions should be general in character, and not attempting to nail down everything in what might later appear too categorical a fashion.

Diplomatic Actions Related to Southeast Asia

Current Communist pressures in Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Burma make it both essential and useful for us to consider diplomatic actions that would dramatize these threats and at

least *PILLORY* the other side, eventhough they might not have much prospect of changing the situation in the short term.

This suggests, first, that the restatement of our position on South Vietnam include substantial emphasis on restoration of the Laos Accords of 1962 and on the preservation of the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia under the 1954 Accords.

Indeed, we could go still further and take the occasion to talk in terms of an over-all settlement for Southeast Asia that would specifically provide that each nation was free to assume whatever neutral or other international posture it wished to take. We could explicitly state that we were prepared to accept a Southeast Asia that was "neutral" in the sense of not adhering to any power bloc or forming a part of any alliance directed at others.

We could say a favorable word about regional arrangements in Southeast Asia consistent with the concept, and could indicate our willingness to join with other outside nations to consider what kind of general assurances of support could be given to such a Southeast Asia. (This last needs careful thought, as it might be taken to foreshadow a new and broad US "commitment";

thus, this element might not fit into our basic Congressional and public strategy).

Second, there are strong diplomatic steps that could be taken to dramatize the situation in Laos. We could encourage Souvanna to take the case to the UN where Laos and Souvanna have strong appeal. Concurrently, but we believe less effective in practice, Souvanna could press the British and Soviets to take action or even to reconvene the Geneva Conference of 1962.

Third, we could attempt similar action for Cambodia. This might be through the Australians, to get Sihanouk to take his case also to the UN. Even if he made some accusations against us in the process, he would be likely at the present time to highlight his internal Chinese-backed threat, and the net result could be useful.

A further possibility would be to seek to enlist India more deeply in the Cambodian situation. This is worth trying, but the Indians are a weak reed for action or for effective diplomatic dramatization.

Fourth, we could consider getting the ^{Thai} ~~Thia~~ into dramatize their situation more than they have done. This takes careful thought, since they do not wish to alarm their own people.

Nonetheless, the threat in Laos might at any time confront us with a need to consult with ^{THE THAI} ~~them~~ over our existing commitments

applicable to a threat near the Mekong, and if this happened we would certainly wish to try to enlist SEATO (through consultation under Article IV, Section 2, of the Treaty), and to play up the situation. The chances are not great that SEATO would do much, but there is at least the chance that the Thai would be induced to make a greater effort. (Here again we have to weigh getting them so excited that they call off their 10,000 additional men in Vietnam.)

Efforts To Enlist Other Asian Nations

Another possibility would be the enlisting of Asian nations in the search for peace in Vietnam, and perhaps more broadly in the formulation of terms for a basic Southeast Asian settlement.

We already have one overture -- by Iran -- in the direction of creating an Asian group to consider peace in Vietnam. The membership of the Iranian group (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Cambodia, Iran, and Japan) is diffuse, however, and includes only Cambodia from within Southeast Asia itself. At the very least, we would seek to see such a group include nations such as Indonesia, and hopefully Malaysia and Singapore -- if we assume that Thailand and the Philippines would be excluded by their direct involvement in the Vietnam conflict. (Burma looks like a very remote hope for any such public association.)

We shall know in the near future whether the Iranian suggestion has any response by North Vietnam. But however it turns out we could well consider turning to the Japanese -- or better the Indonesians -- to form a grouping to examine this issue. It might not take much urging to get these nations to look at the thing from the standpoint of Southeast Asia as a whole.

Discussions with the Soviets

We continue to assume that the Soviet Union will back North Vietnam pretty much to the hilt on any reasonable requests for equipment related to the war in Vietnam. We continue to believe, moreover, that whatever Soviet desires there may be to get peace in Vietnam will remain as they have been -- subordinated to Hanoi's own desires and position. Hence, there seems less prospect that the Soviets can be usefully engaged at the present time in the direction of peace in Vietnam itself.

Yet this leaves the possibility that we might start quiet talks with the Soviets in the near future -- not in any sense public -- that would be designed to probe them a lot harder on the elements of a settlement in Southeast Asia as a whole. For we continue to believe that the Soviet Union does not wish to see Communist China expand into Southeast Asia.

One place to start might be discussions of the situation in Laos after the Vietnam conflict. It seems clear that the Soviets will remain negative on any present action both in Laos and in Cambodia, for the obvious reason that actions there tend to inhibit North Vietnam's effectiveness against South Vietnam. Yet, if the Soviet Union is looking down the pike at the possibility that the North will win, it must realize that -- if Hanoi takes over Laos and Cambodia as well -- the effect on Thailand would be drastic and would tend to redound to Communist China's benefit and conceivably against the Soviet view of Soviet interest.

Hence, the talks would have the job of impressing upon the Soviets the need for maintaining a Laos settlement in the future, no matter what happens in Vietnam. We could be trying to lay a foundation ^{for} ~~for~~ Soviet influence on Hanoi that would cause Hanoi to lay off Laos, with Soviet leverage being supplied at this point by Hanoi's need for Soviet help in reconstruction and by Hanoi's strong desire for a continuing guarantee from the Soviets against Communist China.

The major difficulty is that any such explorations might convey to the Soviets that we envisage defeat in South Vietnam,

and that they in turn might pass this on to Hanoi and thus disturb whatever prospects for peace there may be in South Vietnam. This needs careful weighing and an assessment of whether we could get enough possible gain from the approach to offset this clear risk.

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TAB F

Military Action Against North Vietnam

26

In order to present the two somewhat divergent views on military action against North Vietnam, this Tab includes two papers:

Tab F-1 is submitted by General Wheeler. It outlines and explains certain extensions of bombing authority in North Vietnam, particularly in relation to Hanoi and Haiphong, together with extension of SEA DRAGON naval operations and new authority for the use of surface-to-air missiles. This paper is entitled "The Campaign Against North Vietnam."

In addition, General Wheeler would favor action to close the Port of Haiphong through mining or otherwise. Since this matter has been repeatedly presented to the President, General Wheeler has not added a specific paper on this proposal.

Tab F-2 presents the argument for a more limited extension of the bombing campaign, which would not include narrowing of the present restricted areas around Hanoi and Haiphong, and would oppose the mining of Haiphong, the extension of naval gunfire operations (SEA DRAGON) and the requested authority for surface-to-air missiles.

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By isg, NARS, Date 10-19-79

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Subject: The Campaign Against North Vietnam (U)

1. The air campaign against North Vietnam is now entering the fourth year of operations. Only during the latter part of the past favorable weather season of April through October 1967, however, has a significant weight of effort been applied against the major target systems. During this period, even though hampered by continuous and temporarily imposed constraints, the air campaign made a marked impact on the capability of North Vietnam to prosecute the war. Unfortunately, this impact was rapidly overcome. The constraints on operations and the change in the monsoon weather provided North Vietnam with numerous opportunities to recuperate from the effects of the air strikes. Facilities were rebuilt and reconstituted and dispersal of the massive material aid from communist countries continued.

2. There is a distinct difference between the North Vietnam that existed in early 1965 and the North Vietnam of today. The difference is a direct result of the material aid received from external sources and the ability to accommodate to limited and sporadic air strikes. The Hanoi regime throughout the air campaign has not shown a change in national will, but outwardly displays a determination to continue the war. The viability of the North Vietnam military posture results from the availability of adequate assets received from communist countries which permits defense of the homeland and support of insurgency in the South.

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3. Throughout the air campaign, the North Vietnam and Viet Cong enemy forces in South Vietnam demonstrated a continuous disregard for national boundaries, announcements of holiday ceasefires, and the lives of the civilian population. Wholesale destruction has been inflicted upon urban areas. Friendly forces are committed to fighting the enemy in South Vietnam where he has the capability to inflict military and civilian casualties and to continue urban destruction for as long as adequate support is provided through North Vietnam from the communist countries.

4. A coordinated and sustained air campaign could hamper severely the North Vietnam war effort and the continued support of aggression throughout Southeast Asia. An integrated interdiction campaign should be undertaken against the road, rail and waterway lines of communication with the objective of isolating the logistics base of Hanoi and Haiphong from each other and from the rest of North Vietnam. To achieve this objective, the following tasks must be performed employing a properly balanced weight of effort:

a. Destroy war supporting facilities as well as those producing items vital to the economy.

b. Attack enemy defenses in order to protect our strike forces, destroy enemy gun crews and weapons, and force the expenditure of munitions.

c. Conduct air attacks throughout as large an area and as continuously as possible in order to destroy lines of communication targets and associated facilities, dispersed material and supplies and to exert maximum suppression of normal activities because of the threat.

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d. Attack and destroy railroad rolling stock, vehicles and waterborne logistics craft throughout as large an area as possible, permitting minimum sanctuaries.

5. Targeting criteria for the effective accomplishment of a systematic air campaign would continue to preclude the attack of population as a target, but accept greater risks of civilian casualties in order to achieve the stated objective. The initial changes in operating authorities necessary to the initiation of an effective air campaign are:

a. Delete the 30/10NM Hanoi Restricted/Prohibited Area and establish a 3NM Hanoi Control Area (Map, TAB).

b. Delete the 10/4NM Haiphong Restricted/Prohibited Area and establish a 1.5NM Haiphong Control Area (Map, TAB).

c. Delete the Special Northeast Coastal Armed Reconnaissance Area.

6. The present Restricted Areas around Hanoi and Haiphong have existed since 1965. The Prohibited Areas were created in December 1966. Numerous strikes, however, have been permitted in these areas over the past two and one-half years, e.g., dispersed POL, SAM and AAA sites, SAM support facilities, armed reconnaissance of selected LOC and attacks of LOC associated targets, and attack of approved fixed targets. The major political requirements for having established control areas in the vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong are to provide a measure of control of the intensity of effort applied in consonance with the national policy of graduated pressures and to assist in keeping civilian casualties to a minimum consistent with the importance of the target. These requirements can still be satisfied if the control

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areas are reduced to 3NM and 1.5NM around Hanoi and Haiphong, respectively. These new control areas will contain the population centers, but permit operational commanders the necessary flexibility to attack secondary, as well as primary, lines of communication to preclude NVN from accommodating to the interdiction of major routes. A reduction of the control areas would expose approximately 140 additional miles of primary road, rail and waterway lines of communication to armed reconnaissance, as well as hundreds of miles of secondary lines of communication, dependent upon NVN reactions and usage. Additional military targets would automatically become authorized for air strikes under armed reconnaissance operating authorities. ^{this would} ~~this~~ broaden^{ing} the target base, spreading the defenses, and adding to the cumulative effects of the interdiction program. ^{AS well AS Reducing Risk of Aircraft Loss.} At the present time, the air defense threat throughout all of the northeast area of NVN is formidable. It is not envisioned that aircraft will conduct classical low level armed reconnaissance up and down the newly exposed lines of communication until the air defense threat is fairly well neutralized. Attacks of LOC or LOC associated targets and moving targets in these areas will continue to be conducted for the time being using dive bombing, or "fixed target" tactics as is currently employed throughout the heavily defended northeast. Consequently, the risk to aircraft and crews will not be increased. In fact these new operating areas should assist in decreasing the risks. New targets within the control areas will continue to be approved in Washington.

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7. There have been repeated and reliable intelligence reports that indicate civilians not engaged in essential war supporting activities have been evacuated from the cities of Hanoi and Haiphong. Photographic intelligence, particularly of Haiphong, clearly shows that materials of war are stockpiled in all open storage areas and along the streets throughout almost one-half of the city. Rather than an area for urban living, the city has become an armed camp and a large logistics storage base. Consequently, air strikes in and around these cities endanger personnel primarily engaged directly or indirectly in support of the war effort.

8. The special coastal armed reconnaissance area in the Northeast has limited attacks on NVN craft to those within 3 NM of the NVN coast or coastal islands. This constraint has provided another sanctuary to assist NVN in accommodating to the interdiction effort. To preclude endangering foreign shipping the requirement is imposed on strike forces to ensure positive identification prior to attack. Identification can be accomplished beyond an arbitrary 3 NM line as well as within it, and deny the enemy a privileged area.

9. To complement the air strike program, there are additional measures that should be applied to provide interdiction in depth. During 1967, SEA DRAGON operations effectively reduced coastal water traffic in NVN south of 20°N latitude. Average daily sighting dropped from 30 in the first quarter to four in the fourth quarter. An estimated 80 percent of all coastal water traffic is located north of 20°N in NVN and includes such important carriers as maritime lighters, POL barges, and large

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coastal general cargo barges. SEA DRAGON operations can make an effective contribution to the campaign against NVN, by extension of the present operating area northward to the CHICOM Buffer Zone. Attacks would be prohibited against targets not authorized in the air strike program, such as watercraft engaged in purely civilian pursuits or located within heavily populated areas. Forces would also be prohibited from endangering foreign shipping.

10. Expansion of SEA DRAGON authorities to the CHICOM Buffer Zone as depicted on the map, TAB , would:

- a. Inhibit distribution of supplies which are imported through the principal NVN port of Haiphong by interdicting the coastal LOC.
- b. Expose additional coastal targets to naval gunfire, allowing air resources to be employed against other targets.
- c. Complicate NVN coastal defense problems and expose a larger portion of NVN air defenses in coastal areas to suppression.
- d. Provide for greater flexibility in the use of naval forces by permitting attack on enemy forces now immune from surface attack by being beyond an arbitrary line.

11. The risk to SEA DRAGON forces from coastal artillery will not significantly change from that which exists south of 20°N. The risk of attack by NVN air forces will increase due to ships

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operating closer to NVN bases. They could, however, conduct such attacks against SEA DRAGON ships now operating south of 20°N if they so desire. The risk of attack from NVN naval forces based at Cac Ba Island, Hanoi, Haiphong, Hon Gai and Port Wallut

will also increase due to ships operating closer to these bases. *On the other hand these actions provide favorable opportunities for destroying NVN naval inventory at present is: every min and sea forces.*

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>ARMAMENT</u>
13-16	Torpedo Boats	Torpedoes and 25MM guns
9	Gunboats	31MM guns
3	Fast Patrol Boats	57 or 37MM guns
2	Subchasers	25MM guns

There are no confirmed surface-to-surface missiles, such as STYX, FROGS or SAMLETS in NVN.


12. Surface-to-air missile use over North Vietnam against airborne hostile combat type aircraft is one additional measure which should be taken to reduce the NVN air threat. Naval forces now have authority to use SAMs for air defense in the Tonkin Gulf and over NVN south of 20°N latitude. Sea based missiles, principally the 100 nautical mile range TALOS can cover the known jet-capable airfields and much of the essential airspace over northeastern NVN as shown in TAB . Facilities available in the ships and aircraft over the Tonkin Gulf enable the firing ship to positively identify aircraft over NVN. On two recent occasions, when USAF aircraft were shot down by MIG 21s (the EB-66 lost on 14 January and the F-4C lost on 23 February), the TALOS equipped ship in the Tonkin Gulf had its missile fire control locked on the MIG before the MIG closed to fire on the US aircraft. Lack of authority prevented firing. On numerous occasions recently

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when the NVN IL-28s have been conducting training flights over NVN, they would have been engaged by TALOS. Expansion of the authority to use surface-to-air missiles over all of NVN with the exception of a 10NM radius circle around Hanoi and Haiphong will result in destruction of NVN aircraft, greater defenses for US aircraft and inhibit NVN air operations.


13. Authorization to conduct a campaign against North Vietnam employing air and naval forces under the proposed operating authorities should have a ~~decisive and~~ significant impact on the ability of NVN to continue to prosecute insurgency. It is not anticipated that this impact will be immediately apparent. Unfavorable weather, while partially offset by the expanded use of naval forces, will preclude air strike forces from applying the desired pressures at the most advantageous time and place. The cumulative effects of the air strikes and naval bombardment will gradually increase to significant proportions as erosion of the distribution system progresses. In addition to the material effects against NVN's capability to wage war, approval of the proposed operating authorities and execution of the campaign envisioned will signal to NVN and the remainder of the world the continued US resolve and determination to achieve our objectives in Southeast Asia.

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TAB F-2

27

The Campaign Against North Vietnam: A Different View

Bombing Policy

It is clear from the TET offensive that the air attack on the North and the interdiction campaign in Laos have not been successful in putting a low enough ceiling on infiltration of men and materials from the North to the South to prevent such a level of enemy action. We do not see the possibility of a campaign which could do more than make the enemy task more difficult. Bombing in Route Packages 6A and 6B is therefore primarily a political tool.

The J.C.S. recommend a substantial reduction in previous political control over the attacks in the Haiphong and Hanoi areas. Except for General Wheeler, we do not recommend such a reduction.

It is not until May that more than four good bombing days per month can be anticipated. The question arises as to how best to use those opportunities. We believe the political value of the attacks should be optimized. The effective destruction of clearly important military and economic targets without excessive population damage would seem indicated. Excessive losses in relation to results would have an adverse political effect. The air fields (perhaps including Gia Lam) would meet the criteria. The Hanoi power plant would probably meet the criteria. There are few other targets of sufficient importance, not already authorized, to do so.

In particular, this view opposes the proposal to define only 3-mile and 1-1/2-mile "closed areas" around Hanoi and Haiphong respectively.

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Authority OSD letter JUL 25 1979

By isg, NARS, Date 10-19-79

Individual targets within Hanoi and Haiphong and between the 10- and 3-mile circles for Hanoi and the 4 and 1-1/2-mile circles for Haiphong, should be considered on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the above criteria. However, blanket authority for operations up to the 3-mile and 1-1/2-mile circles respectively, appears to take in only small targets having no appreciable military significance; on the other hand, experience has indicated that systematic operations particularly against road and rail routes simply add slightly to the repair burdens, while at the same time involving substantial civilian casualties in the many suburban civilian areas located along these routes.

In addition, a picture of systematic and daily bombing this close to Hanoi and Haiphong seems to us to run significant risks of major adverse reactions in key third nations. There is certainly some kind of "flash point" in the ability of the British Government to maintain its support for our position, and we believe this "flash point" might well be crossed by the proposed operations, in contrast to operations against specified targets of the type that have been carried out in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas in the past.

Mining of Haiphong

We believe it to be agreed that substantial amounts of military-related supplies move through the Port of Haiphong at present. Nevertheless, it is also agreed that this flow of supplies could be made up through far greater use of the road and rail lines running through China, and through lightering and other emergency techniques at Haiphong

and other ports. In other words, even from a military standpoint the effect of closing the Port of Haiphong would be to impose an impediment only for a period of time, and to add to difficulties which Hanoi has shown in the past it can overcome. Politically, moreover, closing the Port of Haiphong continues to raise a serious question of Soviet reaction. Ambassador Thompson, Governor Harriman, and others believe that the Soviets would be compelled to react in some manner -- at a minimum through the use of minesweepers and possibly through protective naval action of some sort. Again, we continue to believe that there is some kind of "flash point" both in terms of these likely actions and their implications for our relation with the Soviets in other matters, and for such more remote -- but not inconceivable -- possibilities as Soviet compensating pressure elsewhere, for example against Berlin. Even a small risk of a significant confrontation with the Soviets must be given major weight against the limited military gains anticipated from this action.

Finally, by throwing the burden of supply onto the rail and road lines through China, the mining of Haiphong would tend to increase Chinese leverage in Hanoi and would force the Soviets and the Chinese to work out cooperative arrangements for their new and enlarged transit. We do not believe this would truly drive the Soviets and Chinese together, but it would force them to take a wider range of common positions that would certainly not be favorable to our basic interests.

Expanded Naval Operations (SEA DRAGON)

These operations, expanded north along the coast to Haiphong and

to other port areas, would include provision for avoiding ocean-going ships, while hitting coast-wise shipping assumed to be North Vietnamese.

We believe this distinction will not be easy to apply without error, and that therefore the course of action involves substantial risks of serious complications with Chinese and other shipping. In view of the extensive measures already authorized further south, we doubt if the gains to be achieved would warrant these risks.

Surface-to-Air Missiles

As in the past, we believe this action would involve substantial risk of triggering some new form of North Vietnamese military action against the ships involved. Moreover, another factor is whether we can be fully certain of target identification. The balance on this one is extremely close, but we continue to question whether expected gains would counter-balance the risks.

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TAB G

28

Difficulties and Negative Factors in the Course of Action

1. Presentation to the Congress and the Public

a. Will highlight that the rebuilding of the Strategic Reserve is in fact largely a deferred result of what we have already committed to Vietnam and not of what may now be required.

- the size of total strength increase will at once appear wholly disproportionate to any firm plans for Vietnam reinforcement.
- conversely, even though we say no decision is being made beyond 30,000, many will say this is just double talk and that we are not being candid.

b. Must be based largely on Vietnam:

- Korea is more tense, but we cannot depict conventional attack as likely nor can we argue US/ROK capabilities are inadequate (bearing in mind possible use of nuclear weapons in event of all-out attack).
- stress on threat to Laos/Thailand cannot now be made vivid in any case, and would compel reversal of our position that Thailand can handle insurgency and limited threat; prospect of a "second front" in Southeast Asia would arouse many new sources of opposition.
- Middle East threat has not increased since January and in any case has not been depicted as a matter for US force intervention; again, the prospect of such action would arouse opposition in many quarters.
- Western Europe does not appear to be under any new threat.
On the contrary the plan:

c. Could well lead to Congressional pressures to pull more forces out of Europe.

- we could try to get the Europeans to pick up the slack, but there is no real hope of success.
- effect of such pressures alone, even assuming we are not forced to yield to them, could weaken NATO and hurt our relations with key countries.

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Authority

By isg, NARS, Date 10-19-79

d. In Vietnam terms, is bound to highlight the fact that we cannot offer any clear prospect of a favorable outcome even with these forces sent in. At most

- we can offer a staving off of military defeat, a chance for the GVN to survive and get stronger, and possible later initiatives, plus the hope - no more - that a thwarted and pressured Hanoi might move toward peace. (If we put the case in stronger terms, as sure or even likely to produce major early results, we risk both present skepticism and future disillusionment such that the country could give up on the whole effort in 1969.)
- under these conditions, even present supporters of the war will ask whether we could not do this much for less.

e. Will in any event produce both "dove" and "hawk" pressures to "get it over."

- "dove" pressures would be contained in the sense that few believe their peace proposals make sense or mean anything but defeat; however, emotion and discouragement would add somewhat to this wing's strength.
- "hawk" pressures will grow more among the public than "dove" pressures; specific key members of Congress will demand present assurances of a really drastic bombing program against the North, including the mining of Haiphong and much greater civilian casualties, for military gains that appear limited. If such assurances were given, this would almost certainly become public through debate or otherwise.
- the result could be a whipsaw effect, weakening the center and strengthening both extremes.

f. Conclusion: Hence, the resulting debate is likely to be prolonged and divisive for these reasons alone, and apart from the impact on taxes and domestic programs discussed below.

2. The Implications for Taxes, and hence for Domestic Programs and other Foreign Programs.

a. Secretary Fowler is clear that increases in FY 1968 and FY 1969 expenditures must be met by 1-for-1 tax or Budget action proposals, to avoid serious effects on the domestic economy and the stability of the dollar.

b. He is equally clear that the tax-writing Committees will:

- on both sides, demand that at least 25-30% of the costs be met by cuts in domestic programs, other defense costs, and perhaps foreign aid.
- on the Senate side, include a total sabotage effort by a determined "dove" minority.

c. It is his further judgment that, even under these conditions, tax increases are doubtful of approval up to the 1-for-1 requirement. Thus there will be significant adverse effects on the economy and the dollar in any event.

d. Assuming the Administration accepts "25-30%-of-cost" cuts in other parts of the Budget, the Congress will not stop there.

- domestic programs would be further cut, and the exposed ones are those most central to the Great Society and the problem of poverty and the cities.
- defense budget would also be cut, though probably less.
- foreign aid, already in bad shape, could be virtually gutted by a cut of 50% or so. The result would include sharp damage to key programs related to Southeast Asia (the big stake in the Vietnam war) - Indonesia, Laos, Thailand, regional support, and Mr. Black's effort to get a new ADB Special Funds authorization. Korea economic aid would also be cut. Some of these might be cut out and saved, but not all.

e. Only an immense "Act of Will" - in an election year - could avert these results. The case, including the realistic prospects in Vietnam, seems unlikely to generate such an "Act of Will" however well it is handled.

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TAB H

PROBLEMS WE CAN ANTICIPATE IN U.S. PUBLIC OPINION

29

Problem areas:

- I. The deployment decisions.
- II. The callup/end strength decision.
- III. Additional spending resulting from I and II.
- IV. Credibility (embracing all of above).

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By NSG, NARS, Date 10-19-79

I. The Deployment Decisions

- A. Failure to meet the requests of the field commander.

The people have been told he would get all he required. Now his request is being turned down. Why is the President not supporting the soldiers he has in the field?

- B. Deployment of troops beyond the 525,000.

This has become regarded as a lid. Much was made of the fact that the recent deployment of 10,500 was within the 525,000, albeit the decision to raise the lid was held open. Now the lid is off and the same old bottomless pit is before us.

- C. What's the emergency?

There has been no buildup for an emergency. We won a military victory during the Tet offensive, even if suffering psychological/political defeats. We have emphasized the enemy's staggering losses. Why the sudden crisis?

- D. If a crisis exists, you are acting too late to meet it.

The people have heard much of the winter/spring offensive. They expect possible problems in March-April-May. Those have been trumpeted as the crucial months. But most of the reinforcements will not arrive until after that offensive has ended. What sense does that make?

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II. Callup/End Strength Decision

A. Shock.

There has been absolutely no foundation for a callup of 280,000. The rug will be pulled out from under the men and their families. There is no "national crisis" -- no Berlin, no Cuba. There is the war, but these people are not being rushed to war. Why the callup?

B. Crybaby News stories.

The shock will be general. The crybaby reaction will come from the individuals and their families. Equipment shortage and lack of readiness stories will be written.

C. I told you so.

All who have clamored for reserves and been told they were wrong will be heard from. If this had been done two years ago, the war would now be over. The President and Secretary McNamara have finally been proven wrong. At best they have misled the people; at worst they have deceived the people.

D. Dove reaction.

The President is destroying the country, all for the bottomless pit of this miserable war. It was bad enough to make the commitment. Now you are disrupting the lives of additional millions (including families). Vietnam cannot be worth this. It is the last straw.

E. Hawk Reaction.

You cannot disrupt the lives of these men and still refuse to use the weapons at your disposal in Vietnam. You must bomb Hanoi and Haiphong; you must mine the harbor; you must unleash the military. Hit the sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia. If necessary, invade. There is no longer an excuse for timidity.

F. Draft resistance.

Increased draft calls will accentuate demonstrations, on and off campuses. The draft problem has just been aggravated by the drafting of graduate students. Now it gets worse. Again, it was not anticipated. Letters to Congress will pour in.

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III. Additional Spending Resulting from I and II

A. Ghetto.

All hope for the bold actions demanded by the Kerner Commission is gone. Once again, the President has decided that the war in Vietnam is more important than the war in the cities. Civil rights and anti-war groups will coalesce to an unprecedented degree.

B. Tax increase.

Spending goes up and up, but there is still no clear-cut emergency action to justify a tax bill. The war goes on, but with only a small additional deployment -- arriving too late for the crisis. Yet the expensive callup must also be paid for, even though the men merely sit at their camps and are not rushed off to war.

C. Other.

The general impact on the business community, fear of inflation, fear of price and wage controls, fear of increased business taxes.

IV. Credibility (embracing all of the above)

(This cuts across the prior three problem areas, but is large enough to merit recognition as a separate problem)

- A. We were not stretched too thin. Suddenly we have no Strategic Reserve and the nation is in danger.
- B. We were handling the war without reserve callup or extension of terms of service. Suddenly -- without any clear emergency -- we can no longer do so.
- C. We were winning the war. Now we need emergency help.
- D. Draft calls were not going up this year. Now they are.
- E. We won the Tet Offensive. Now we haven't.
- F. There was talk of a "zero" supplemental. Now it must be huge.

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- G. The ARVN was improving every day. Now we need more Americans.
- H. We do not believe you when you say the men called up are not bound for Vietnam. Say anything you want. We simply do not believe you.

HOW PROBLEMS IN U.S. PUBLIC
OPINION SHOULD BE DEALT WITH

We cannot win by attempting to handle all of the areas listed above on a point-by-point basis. What is required is a logical, credible rationale explaining the decisions taken.

Beyond the basic points of establishing that the war is in the national interest, that there is a plan to end it satisfactorily and that we can identify the resources needed to carry out that plan, we must prove:

1. That General Westmoreland needs the additional troops being sent him.
2. That he does not need further additional troops at this time.
3. That the Strategic Reserve does need reconstitution at this time.
4. That the possible need of General Westmoreland for possible future reinforcement is sufficiently important to merit the callup.
5. That there is not a bottomless pit.
6. That the nation still has the resources for the ghetto fight.

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