

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#6a memo	<i>Declassified per JCS 10-2-78 letter</i> JCS top secret to Chairman, JCS 2 p	03/01/68	A
#8 report	JCS top secret re: Troops 74 p	03/01/68	A
#30a memo	JCS secret to president from Gen. Taylor 4 p	03/09/68	A
#32 report	JCS conf by Gen. Taylor 3 p	02/09/68	A
#33 memo	JCS secret to president from Gen. Taylor 3 p	02/10/68	A
#34 memo	JCS top secret to president from Gen. Taylor 2 p	02/12/68	A
#35 memo	JCS secret to president from from Gen. Taylor 2 p	02/14/68	A
#36 memo	JCS secret to president from Gen. Taylor 2 p	02/19/68	A
#29 report	JCS top secret XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Vietnam Alternatives 12 p	03/02/68	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, NSC History
March 31st Speech, vol. 8

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#7d report	state top secret re: Vietnam	03/02/68	A
#40 cable	state conf 108715 to Saigon	02/01/68	A
#41c cable	state secret (gp 1) 445 from Bunker in Saigon	02/04/68	A
#51 cable	state secret (gp 1) 650 from Bunker in Saigon	02/15/68	A
#52a cable	state secret 7280 from Saigon	02/23/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	WH TO OSD FOR CONSULTATION		
#3 memo	top secret <i>open RAC</i> to president from Rostow 1 p	03/12/68	A
#31 memo	secret <i>open RAC 9/2000</i> military situation in Vietnam 1 p	02/08/68	A
#39a aable	secret <i>SAN RAC 9/2000</i> for Bunker and Westmoreland from Christian 2 p	01/31/68	A
#39b cable	secret draft of #39a 2 p	01/31/68	A
#49 memo	Secret <i>open RAC</i> to president from Rostow 1 p	02/17/68	A

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NSF, NSC History
March 31st Speech, vol. 8

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#30 memo	WH TO JCS FOR CONSULTATION secret JCS 6-26-78 letter to president from Rostow 1 p	03/09/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSC History
March 31st Speech, vol. 8

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<i>decisions per State 7-5-78 and NSC 11-24-78 letters</i> WH TO STATE DEPT FOR CONSULTATION		
#41 cable	secret <i>sanitized</i> for Amb. Bunker from Walt Rostow	1 p 02/08/63	A
#41a cable	secret <i>JAN 9/1000</i> to Amb. Bunker from Walt Rostow (duplicates #41)	1 p 02/08/68	A
#52 memo	secret for president from Walt Rostow	1 p 02/23/68	A
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FILE LOCATION National Security File, NSC History
March 31st Speech, vol. 8

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#14 memo	OSD Top secret <i>open 6-25-79 isg</i> report cover memo <i>per OSD 11-28-78</i>	1 p 03/01/68	A
#6 report	OSD top secret <i>open 6-3-80 isg</i> Alternative Strategies in Vietnam 57 p	1968	A
#7 report	OSD top secret <i>Exempt - NSC 8-23-79</i> Alternatives Back-Up Material 44 p	1968	A
<i>Open NY 19.21, R/6/22</i>			

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National Security File, NSC History
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#7a memo	CIA secret (gp 1) re: Vietnam 11 p	03/01/68	A
#7b memo	CIA secret (gp 1) re: Vietnam 5 p	02/29/68	A
#7c memo	CIA secret (gp 1) to Director from Smith 7 p	02/26/68	A

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National Security File, NSC History
March 31st Speech, vol. 8

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DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES IN VIETNAM
3d Draft, 1 March

EXCERPTS FROM WEEKLY COMPILATION
OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS

GENERAL TAYLOR'S MEMOS

PUBLIC AFFAIRS PAPERS

Draft Memorandum
for the President

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Tuesday, March 12, 1968
6:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

These Defense Dept. working papers, which were laid on the table as we began work on the Clifford Committee, represents the line of argument against increasing our forces in South Vietnam, which was the basis for some of the newspaper stories.

W. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority RHC 018-49-2-2
By SPN WARA Date 11-2-15

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Mr. Rostow

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DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES IN VIETNAM

1 MARCH 1968

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DSD 11-28-78 letter

By is p., NARS, Date 6-25-79

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III -- Negotiations

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B. Additional Deployment of 10,500 Troops

C. Equipment of ARVN (Not included)

D. Draft TOR for Discussions With the GVN (Not included)

E. Draft Presidential Statement

APPENDICIES

1. Population Control Strategy: Problems of Interior Province Capitals and Analysis by Corps
2. Projected Combat Deaths -- Alternate Strategy
3. MACV Request (Units, Deployment Dates, Cost)
4. Enemy Casualties and Force Ratios
5. Maps of Vietnam Showing Force Disposition
6. Hamlet Evaluation -- 1967 Changes

(Back-up material listed on BACK-UP Tab)

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Authority OSD 11-28-78, State 6-19-79 NSC
By inf, NARS, Date 6-3-80 8-23-79

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3d Draft/1 Mar 68

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Alternative Strategies in SVN

This memorandum examines the situation in SVN in light of U.S. political objectives and General Westmoreland's request for additional troops, as stated in General Wheeler's report. It considers alternatives to the current directives to General Westmoreland. Our assessment of the situation is that:

1. The ARVN and the GVN, while not near collapse, have been greatly weakened and cannot make any substantial contribution to progress in SVN over the next few months. - 1 - Thang
- 1 - Ives

2. The NVN/VC forces in SVN, despite their heavy casualties, maintain the capability for offensive operations and for protracted conflict. The enemy can and almost certainly will, as he has in the past, offset any increase in U.S. combat forces in the South. [not at present rate] (P)

3. General Westmoreland and U.S. military forces have been asked to carry more of the burden of securing our political objectives in Vietnam than can be borne by military power. The current strategy of destroying the enemy or driving him out of SVN would require at least a doubling of U.S. force levels; this would result in complete Americanization of the war and the total frustration of any prospects of developing the political and military strength of the South Vietnamese. It would thus make impossible the attainment of our political objectives. NVN
VC

4. We face an immediate threat to U.S. forces in the DMZ area and throughout I Corps. There is a real danger of a greater GVN collapse in the Delta; the VC could seize some provincial capitals and set up a government. yes

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Based on these assessments our recommendations are:

1. Approve a NSAM stating that our political objective is a peace which will leave the people of South Vietnam free to fashion their own political institutions. The NSAM should state that the primary role of U.S. military forces is to provide security in the populated areas of South Vietnam rather than to destroy the VC/NVA or drive them out of the country (Tab A). We should plan on maintaining the posture necessary to accomplish this objective for a considerable period.

2. Approve the immediate dispatch of an additional 10,500 military personnel to South Vietnam (Forces and Readiness at Tab N).

3. Approve an accelerated and expanded program of increased fire power and mobility for ARVN and other elements of the GVN Armed Forces (Equipment and delivery dates at Tab C).

4. Send General Taylor to Saigon to explain the NSAM to MACV and the GVN and to request General Westmoreland to develop a strategy and force requirements to implement the military objectives stated in the NSAM.

5. Dispatch one or two high-level civilians to Saigon with General Taylor to warn the GVN that it must broaden their base of political support, end its internal bickering, purge corrupt officers and officials and move to develop efficient administration and effective forces. They should also begin a discussion of negotiations while informing the GVN of the increased support to be provided for ARVN (TOR at Tab D).

6. Deliver a Presidential address to the American public explaining our new strategy in light of the enemy's new tactics (Draft text at Tab E).

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Not sure
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I. Current Situation in South Vietnam and the Prospects over the Next Ten Months

Even though a month has elapsed since the beginning of the VC/NVA TET offensive, our knowledge of the main components of the situation in South Vietnam remains fragmentary. The very fact that we do not have good information on ARVNAF or enemy strengths or the situation in the countryside illustrates the almost complete disruption of the apparent status quo ante by the enemy offensive. The current situation in South Vietnam appears to be as follows:

The Countryside

About 80% of the people of South Vietnam (13.7 of 17.2 million) live outside of the principal cities and the Province and District capitals. Primary influence over this population is required for any political system to have a chance of survival (without support of US arms) and has been a highest priority goal of both the GVN and the Viet Cong.

At the end of 1967, "control" of this population was judged (through our Hamlet Evaluation System) as follows:

	A	B	C	D	E	VC	Non-Evaluated	Total
Hamlet Population	695	3481	4279	2158	319	2749	68	13,749
% of Hamlet Population	5.05	25.32	31.12	15.70	2.32	19.99	0.49	

Although for public consumption we have been including "C" rated hamlets (31% of the rural population) as GVN "controlled" all evaluators recognize that these hamlets have minimal government presence and are

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subject to considerable VC influence. Thus at the end of 1967, the GVN actually had dominant influence over only about 30% of the rural population. Moreover, during the last six months of 1967, there was a net decline of 10,000 people under GVN "control" in hamlets which had been rated in the first half of the year and in which there was not a population estimate revision during the second half of the year. Accordingly, as was well recognized in the field, although the U.S. organization for "pacification" had been greatly strengthened during 1967, the success of GVN efforts was still in the future and actual GVN dominance or presence in the countryside was on a tenuous and fragile footing and almost wholly dependent upon the physical presence of GVN forces.

The VC winter-spring offensive undoubtedly has several major goals, but probably none is more important than that of the takeover of the countryside. Attacks on the cities are a compelling diversion, drawing RVNAF (and some U.S.) forces toward the towns and cities, away from the hamlets and outlying regions; e.g., the threat to Khe Sanh and the borders has served, so far, mainly to distract U.S. attention and to some extent resources away from the rest of the country. General Wheeler reports that "to a large extent the VC now control the countryside...and is operating (there) with relative freedom." Nevertheless, the "main event" is still to come, not in a one-night offensive but in a week-by-week expulsion of GVN presence and influence from the rural areas, and showing up on the pacification maps as a "red tide" flowing up to the edges of the province and district towns, and over some of them.

ARVN forces are now in a defensive posture around towns and cities. About 23 of 51 ARVN battalions directly supporting RD areas have been

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diverted from this duty. At least half of the RD cadres have been withdrawn to assist in the defense of towns or cities. The status of the RF and PF posts outside of cities and towns is mostly unknown -- an ominous fact in itself -- but there are many scattered reports of units withdrawing to towns or cities or being overrun by the enemy. In short, at the moment GVN forces appear generally to have been forced out of the countryside and when, where, or at what strength they will be able to return remains in question.

One thing is certain. In those areas (and there appear to be many) where the VC/NVA have had access to populations formerly under GVN "control" they will have destroyed the structure of the GVN by eliminating those individuals identified as being servants of the GVN. Establishing any real commitment to the GVN in those areas will at best take many months and probably cannot be done in less than several years.

Enemy Forces

The enemy has suffered large numbers of casualties in the recent offensive. Many of his units have been severely cut up and he certainly has had losses in his leadership personnel. Nevertheless, his recovery is likely to be rapid as he has lost only a relatively small percentage of his "insurgency base."

Our order of battle figures have emphasized only NVA units known to be in South Vietnam and VC main force and local forces. However, when people over whom the VC have a degree of discipline and NVA units on the borders capable of rapid reenforcement are included in the enemy manpower base, his total readily available resources climb to about 500,000.

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ESTIMATED VC/NVA STRENGTH (PRE-TET)

COMBAT	NVA -----	85,000	118,000
	VC -----	60,000	
		<u>145,000</u>	
SUB TOTAL VC/NVA COMBAT -----		145,000	
GUERRILLA -----		72,000 - 100,000	
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES -----		40,000	
SUB TOTAL MILITARY THREAT -----		257,000 - 285,000	
INFRASTRUCTURE -----		80,000	
(SD, SSD, ASSAULT YOUTH, ETC.) -----		100,000 - 150,000	
TOTAL INSURGENCY BASE -----		437,000 - 515,000	
		(Estimated 1/2 million)	
ESTIMATED COMMITMENT -----		77,000	
PERCENT COMMITTED -----		500,000/77,000 -- 15%	

The above table is based on estimated strengths before the TET offensive. It thus does not consider subsequent enemy losses. However it also does not include additions to VC forces accomplished by recruiting or impressment immediately prior to TET or in the ensuing month when the VC have had access to a greatly increased proportion of the rural and urban population.

In addition to the above, in the past few days there have been clear indications that the enemy is moving south two fresh NVA divisions and long range missile and increased number of armored vehicles.

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General Wheeler warns that if the enemy synchronizes an attack against Khe Sanh/Hue-Quang Tri with an offensive in the Highlands and around Saigon while keeping the pressure on throughout the remainder of the country, MACV will be hard pressed to meet adequately all threats. Under these circumstances, we must be prepared to accept some reverses. These reverses would probably include significantly increased U.S. losses, should the enemy elect to attack at Khe Sanh and South of the DMZ, and, as a minimum, losses of provincial capitals in the Delta as well as continued attacks on urban areas.

GVN Forces

At year end the GVN had about 754,800 men under arms. (Regular Forces - 342,900, RF/PF - 300,200, Police - 73,400, irregulars - 38,300.) Present strength figures are not accurately known, although MACV estimates that present regular forces are only slightly below the pre-TET level. However, General Wheeler judges that "ARVN should recover strength at the pre-TET levels in 3-6 months if there are no more major losses and no collapse of administrative machinery throughout the country."

The main problem with GVN forces is not their size or composition, but their leadership and morale. A secondary but important problem concerns their firepower and mobility. As noted earlier, GVN forces have mostly withdrawn to static positions in defense of base camps or cities or towns. Although they have fought well in defense of these positions, there is concern about how well they will bear up under sustained pressure. However, GVN forces must get back into the countryside if it is not to be forfeited to the enemy. MACV estimates that this will not happen "in

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a number of places" unless US forces are present to "encourage" the move.

Lack of adequate firepower and mobility will inhibit GVN forces from undertaking to reenter the countryside. In past months, the enemy has successfully reequipped his forces in all parts of the country, including low level guerrillas and raw recruits, with AK-47s and modern rockets and mortars.

MACV believes that the enemy has adequate munitions, stockpiled in-country and available through the DMZ, Laos, and Cambodia to support major attacks and country-wide pressure. This improved firepower and supply of munitions have resulted in the enemy's being able to outgun GVN forces, particularly the RF/PF and the irregular forces which still are equipped with World War II weapons.

In addition to this firepower problem, assignment of higher priority to US requirements and in-country helicopter attrition has resulted in ARVN forces not receiving the mobility support required for their most efficient employment.

MACV estimates that ARVN units require 48 aircraft days per battalion per month. In April 1965, they were provided 33; in the 1st half of CY 67, 10; in September 1967 (the last month for which figures are available), 9. Program 5, which is planned through December 1970, projects an increase to 39 aircraft days per battalion per month.

The GVN

General Wheeler states that "the structure of the government was not shattered and continues to function but at greatly reduced effectiveness." The CIA goes further:

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"The overall position of the Government has been weakened. Its prestige has suffered from the shock of the Tet offensive; its control over the countryside has been greatly reduced. Popular attitudes are confused and contradictory; the Viet Cong received virtually no popular support, but neither was there a rallying to the government side. Passivity is likely to continue as the dominant attitude in most of the population, but further military defeats could cause a sudden swing away from the government. While the central authority in Saigon is unlikely to collapse, its ability to provide energetic leadership throughout the country and all levels is in serious doubt. It is possible that over the next few months certain provinces...will be lost to Saigon's effective authority."

It is unlikely that the GVN will rise to the challenge. It will not move toward a Government of National Union. Current arrests of oppositionists further isolate and discredit it, and possibly foreshadow the emasculation of the Assembly and the undoing of all promising political developments of the past year. Furthermore, it is possible that the recent offensive was facilitated by a newly friendly or apathetic urban environment, and a broad low-level cooperative organization that had not existed on the same scale before. If, in fact, the attacks reflect new VC opportunities and capability in the cities, then the impact of the attacks themselves, the overall military response, and the ineffective GVN political response may still further improve the VC cause in the cities, as well as in the countryside. Even if the political make-up of the GVN should change for the better, it may well be that VC penetration in the cities has now gone or will soon go too far for real non-communist political mobilization to develop.

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II. Alternate Courses of Military Action

We examine here our current military strategy and an alternative emphasizing population security. We consider the current strategy with currently authorized force levels and with increments of 50,000, 100,000, and 200,000, and the alternative strategy with currently authorized force levels, in relation to our political objective in South Vietnam which is taken to be:

"... an honorable peace, that will leave the people of South Vietnam free to fashion their own political and economic institutions without fear of terror or intimidation from the North."

A. The Current Strategy

It is worth considering briefly how our strategy for employing ground forces evolved.

In contrast to the present, the security situation in SVN at the time U.S. forces were committed in early 1965 was a desperate one. Almost 40% of SVN was under VC control; there was imminent danger of a North Vietnamese controlled seizure of power in SVN and the imposition of a communist regime by force. The immediate military objective for U.S. forces thus was to arrest this trend and to deny to the NVN/VC forces the seizure of political control by force. The corollary military objective was to protect the population of South Vietnam from NVN/VC forces.

Once U.S. forces were committed in increasingly larger numbers, the military situation began to improve significantly. U.S. forces wrested the initiative from VC/NVN main force units; ARVN forces were being oriented to the RD mission. Thus, by the end of 1966 our initial military objectives had been achieved. No longer was it possible for NVN to impose its will upon SVN by force.

By this time, however, our military objectives had been expanded. We now believed that we could, by military action, accomplish our political objective in South Vietnam. In the absence of political directives from civilian officials in Washington limiting the goals to be attained by U.S. military force, our objectives became, as MACV describes them:

- First, to counter the enemy offensive and to destroy or eject the NVA invasion force in the north.
- Second, to restore security in the cities and towns.
- Third, to restore security in the heavily populated areas of the countryside.
- Fourth, to regain the initiative through offensive operations.

General Wheeler notes that MACV accepts the fact that first priority must be security of the GVN and provincial capitals. He describes the current tasks as follows:

- a. Security of Cities and Government
- b. Security in the Countryside
- c. Defense of the Borders, the DMZ and the Northern Provinces
- d. Offensive Operations

General Wheeler notes that forces currently authorized for MACV are inadequate to carry out the current strategy and notes MACV's request for 206,756 new spaces for a total of 731,756 with all forces in place by the end of CY-68.

What can we hope to accomplish with these increased force levels in pursuit of our current strategy?

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MACV does not clearly specify how he would use the additional forces he requests, except to indicate that they would provide him with a theater reserve and an offensive capability. MACV's description of his key problems suggests that the additional forces would be used to secure Route 1 north of Danang, support ARVN units, particularly in the Delta, and to maintain a reserve against enemy offensives. Even with the 200,000 additional troops requested by MACV, we will not be in a position to drive the enemy from SVN or to destroy his forces. Even before the Tet offensive the enemy was initiating ^{than} more/ 2/3 of the clashes and could in response to our build-up adopt a casualty-limiting posture if he was concerned about attrition. There is nothing to indicate that he is.

The more likely enemy response, however, is that with which he has responded to previous increases in our force levels, viz., a matching increase on his part. Hanoi has maintained a constant ratio of 1 maneuver battalion to 1.5 U.S. maneuver battalions and has without a doubt the capacity to match MACV's requested increase of 27 maneuver battalions from his reserve in NVN of from 45 - 70 maneuver battalions.

Based on previous ratios of total combat manpower, Hanoi could neutralize our 205,000 man augmentation with 25,000 men.

If the enemy augments and stands and fights as he did before Tet, we will, by the end of the year, ^{be} spread just as thin and be suffering 40% more casualties. The results, moreover, can only be disappointing in terms of attriting his capability.

Over the past year the United States has been killing between 70 and 100 VC/NVA per month per U.S. combat battalion in theater. The return per combat battalion deployed has been falling off, but even

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Assuming that with the additional deployments the kill-ratios will remain constant, we could expect enemy deaths at most on the order of magnitude of 20,000 per month. The infiltration system from North Vietnam alone can supply and support 13,000 - 16,000 per month, regardless of our bombing pattern, and the remainder can be recruited in South Vietnam.

North Vietnam has a present force level of about 480,000, or about 3 percent of the population. About 65,000 of this army has been infiltrated into South Vietnam. This contrasts with GVN forces of about 750,000 or 7 percent of the population under their control. Less than 20% of North Vietnam's draft age men have been mobilized into the regular forces. About 120,000 physically fit North Vietnamese males are estimated to reach the present draft age each year. Thus the North Vietnamese have the capability to sustain a substantial increase over the estimated 1967 infiltration rate of about 7,000 per month.

Thus, even with the requested 205,000 augmentation there can be no early military resolution of the conflict. We cannot attrite the enemy, drive him from the country or destroy his will to fight. Moreover, the proposed augmentation would entail substantial costs in South Vietnam, in the United States, and in the rest of the world.

South Vietnam. The presence of more than 700,000 U.S. military in SVN means the total Americanization of the war. There is no sign that ARVN effectiveness will increase and there will be no pressure for ARVN to shape up if the U.S. appears willing to increase its force levels to make up their deficiencies.

The effect on the GVN would be even more unfortunate. The Saigon leadership has not yet shown signs of a willingness -- let alone

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ability -- to attract the necessary loyalty or support of the people. It is true that the GVN did not totally collapse during Tet, but there is not yet anything like an urgent sense of national unity and purpose. A large influx of additional U.S. forces will intensify the belief of the ruling elite that the U.S. will continue to fight its war while it continues to alienate large segments of the Vietnamese people, engages in backroom politics and permits wide-spread corruption. The proposed actions will also generate increased inflation, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the GVN and making corruption harder to control. Reform of the GVN will come only when and if they come to believe that our continued presence in South Vietnam depends on what the GVN does. Certainly a U.S. commitment to a substantial troop increase before the GVN commits itself to reform and action can only be counterproductive. Whatever our success on the battlefield, our chances of leaving behind an effective functioning national government when we at last withdraw will be sharply diminished.

United States. Providing 200,000 additional men to MACV in the next twelve months will have a profound impact in the United States. We will have to mobilize 250,000 reserves (including 2 National Guard and 1 Marine Reserve Divisions), increase draft calls, increase our budget by 25 billion in FY 1968 and \$10 billion in FY 1969 (to a total cost for Vietnam of \$35 billion), and see U.S. KIA climb to 1,300 - 1,400 per month. (See Annex 3.) Our balance of payments will be worsened considerably and we will need a larger tax increase -- justified as a war tax -- and/or wage and price controls. The effect on our economy would be comparable to that which occurred in 1966: "The spurt of demand -- partly real, partly psychological -- that followed the step-up of our Vietnam

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effort in mid-1965 simply exceeded the speed limits on the economy's ability to adjust. Our resources were sufficient for the task; but the sheer speed of the advance strained the ability of industrial management to mobilize resources at the required pace."

These actions and the public education campaign which would need to accompany them would put us on a war footing.

All critics of current policy will oppose the move. Many Senators will demand, as the price of their support, that we eliminate all restrictions on our bombing of the North and mine Haiphong Harbor. This action would run grave risks of greater Chinese and Soviet involvement in the war without affecting enemy capability to support current or increased force levels in the South. There will also be pressures to expand the war into Laos and Cambodia; actions which also can be of little value but which will expand the area of military operations and run grave risks of Soviet or Chinese reaction.

It will be difficult to convince critics that we are not simply destroying South Vietnam in order to "save" it, or that we genuinely want peace talks. This growing disaffection accompanied, as it certainly will be, by increased defiance of the draft and growing unrest in the cities because of the belief that we are neglecting domestic problems, runs great risks of provoking a domestic crisis of unprecedented proportions.

Other Reactions. We cannot assume that the Soviets will not react strongly to our further expansion of the war. They are almost certain to step up their level of materiel support to Hanoi; they may qualitatively increase their support by supplying Hanoi with SAM-III's, surface-

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to-surface missiles for attacks on ships or air bases, improved air-to-ground capability against helicopters, etc. The Soviets may find it difficult to continue business-as-usual in such matters as the NPT. Nor can we exclude a more aggressive Soviet posture in Europe or elsewhere. Enemy use of Laos and Cambodia for bases and logistic support will be increased, and the enemy may expand his military operations in these countries threatening to overrun Laos. If, as may well be necessary, we accompany the troop increase with expanded bombing and the mining of Haiphong we will almost certainly force a confrontation with the Soviets and Chinese.

Reactions elsewhere in Asia and Europe are likely to be adverse and require careful analysis.

B. Population Security

No level of US forces in Vietnam and no US ground strategy can, by themselves, accomplish our objective in South Vietnam. We can obtain our objective only if the GVN begins to take the steps necessary to gain the confidence of the people and to provide effective leadership for the diverse groups in the population. ARVN must also be turned into an effective fighting force. If we fail in these objectives, a military victory over the NVN/VC main forces, followed by a US withdrawal, would only pave the way for an NLF takeover.

Our military presence in South Vietnam should be designed to buy the time during which ARVN and the GVN can develop effective capability. In order to do this, we must deny the enemy access to the populated areas

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of the country and prevent him from achieving his objectives of controlling the population and destroying the GVN.

To suggest this is not to challenge the military judgment of General Westmoreland. In view of the change in the enemy's tactics, his willingness to commit substantially increased forces, and the demonstrated strength of the Viet Cong infrastructure, we are presently asking General Westmoreland to bear an impossible burden. The changed circumstances require an offsetting change in the mission we ask our military to perform.

Thus, MACV should be provided with a political directive stating that his mission is to provide security to populated areas and to deny the enemy access to the major population centers. The directive should indicate that MACV should not sacrifice population security or incur heavy casualties in an attempt to attrite the enemy or to drive him completely out of the country.

Large numbers of US forces should not be committed to the Delta. The Mekong Delta region is the only region of SVN in which the burden of the war is still borne chiefly by RVNAF and where the enemy is the VC and not NVN regulars. Here, above all, US strategy should eschew Americanizing the conflict there. However, since the Mekong Delta contains 40% of the South Vietnamese population, and produces virtually all of its staple foods, its retention is a sine qua non for GVN survival. Accordingly, US strategy should aim at catalyzing increased RVNAF efforts there in an effort to hold the Provincial capitals and then move into the countryside.

MACV should be asked to recommend an appropriate strategy and to determine his force requirements necessary to implement this directive

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with minimum possible US casualties and costs. We should be able to pursue this strategy without substantially increasing our level of forces in South Vietnam, to the detriment of our objective in South Vietnam. It would also avoid the adverse domestic and foreign consequences sketched above, and should permit a gradual phasing down of our military effort in South Vietnam.

One possible strategy to pursue this objective is sketched below.

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The Advantages of the Demographic Strategy of Population Security.

1. It would become possible to keep the VC/NVA off balance in their present zone of movement on both sides of the demographic frontier. This area is now largely available to them for maneuver and massing, no more than a day's march from any of the major cities north of Saigon.

2. It would remove the value to the enemy of short LOC's from their sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia which now support attacks on our forces in border areas.

3. We could attack those base areas and LOC's threatening us. These would now have to be within SVN, and we could operate against them without extending the war to neighboring countries.

4. RVNAF, knowing the availability of support from U.S. reaction forces, would perform more aggressively thus permitting the patrolling and securing of populated areas to be accomplished primarily by Vietnamese forces while our forces operate close-by along the demographic frontier. Our own LOC's would be shorter. Garrisoning U.S. forces closer to RVNAF would facilitate joint operations at the maneuver level (battalion, company), increasing RVNAF aggressiveness.

Attaining the Initiative Along the Demographic Frontier (An Illustrative Strategy)

In response to the immediate threat our forces might be deployed as follows: Those forces currently in or near the heavily populated areas along the coast would remain in place. Those forces currently bordering on the demographic frontier* would continue to operate from those

*This frontier runs along the eastern foothills of the Annamite chain, from Quang-Tri Province to Phan Thiet in Binh Thuan, cuts across SVN along the Northern edge of the Delta from Phuc Tuy to the Cambodian Border in Tay Ninh. Garrisons would be established as at Bong Son and An Khe.

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positions; they would however switch from long-search-and-destroy missions to support of the frontier. Eight to ten battalions from the DMZ areas would be redeployed and become strategic reserve in I Corps; six battalions from the interior of II Corps would be redeployed to Dien Binh province as a strategic reserve for defense of provincial capitals in the highlands. As security is restored in the previously neglected populated areas of coastal Vietnam, additional U.S. battalions would move forward to the demographic frontier.

Based just beyond the populated areas, the forces on the demographic frontiers would conduct spoiling raids, long-range reconnaissance patrols and, when appropriate targets are located, search and destroy operations into the enemy's zone of movement in the unpopulated areas between the demographic and the political frontiers. They would be available as a quick reaction force to support RVNAF when it was attacked within the populated areas. Where RVNAF patrolling in the populated areas is inadequate, U.S. forces would be in a position to assist.

5. Except for a few Provincial Capitals, defense of U.S. positions could now be accomplished along relatively short land LOC's passing through territory domiciled by US/GVN forces.

6. The increased patrolling of the populated areas by RVNAF combined with the availability of U.S. reserves and U.S. actions in the zone of movement would make it harder for the enemy to mass against and attack targets within the populated areas. U.S., ARVN and civilian casualties will depend in part on enemy tactics. If the enemy chooses to concentrate his activities in the areas from which we are pulling back, U.S. and

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Vietnamese casualties would decline. If the enemy attacks the populated areas, U.S. casualties will remain proportionate to the level of U.S. combat forces. Thus if adoption of this strategy enables us to maintain current force levels expected U.S. casualties would decline.

Details of the strategy, province by province, and the problem of provincial capitals in the interior are treated in Appendix One.

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

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Persons per square mile

- URBAN POPULATION

Attopeu • Other populated places

Scale 1:3,500,000



III. Negotiations

The present situation in Vietnam -- with the GVN and RVNAF in disarray and US troops spread too thin for their assigned missions -- is an unattractive backdrop for negotiations. Furthermore, the Communists have given no sign they regard negotiations as other than a procedure for accepting US surrender. Yet, it might prove impossible to refuse to enter some form of negotiations during the next few months in the light of previous US statements.

The Communists have publicly rejected the San Antonio formula, but they are waging an active peace offensive with two main audiences: Free World governments and personages; and the SVN populace.

- They seek to persuade the first group that our war effort is hopeless and the dangers of escalation great. With General de Gaulle's help, they would like to see a united front of our friends, trying to "save us from ourselves" by demanding negotiations, for which the precondition is a bombing halt.
- With the second group, they work on fears that the US will abandon SVN or force it to accept a coalition government. They would hope that this group would see a bombing halt as such a decision by the US.

Because the San Antonio formula is such a reasonable offer on our part, present pressures to accept the Communists' negotiating conditions can be resisted. The Communists' public rejection of the formula is difficult to understand, unless they fear their own people would interpret acceptance as a sign of weakness. If their confidence and morale rose in

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the near future, e.g., if Khe Sanh or Dakto were overrun or if GVN and RVNAF performance declined dramatically -- the Communists might be tempted to make a public statement of acceptance of the formula specifying their willingness to remain at "normal" rates of infiltration and supply as evidenced by levels of recent months. The US would be under strong pressure to stop bombing and, in addition, to avoid "intensifying" the war by building its force levels.

The US would find it difficult to refuse such an overture on the grounds that the friendly situation in SVN was too perilous. It might be turned off by other means:

-- Bombing of the North can be intensified. It is no longer clear, however, that the Communists are especially sensitive to our target selection. If they feel confident enough to accept the San Antonio formula, they may well feel confident enough to ask for a bombing halt even in the midst of intensification.

-- The San Antonio formula can be spelled out to include conditions that would indicate Communist weakness, such as foreswearing further attacks on Saigon or across the DMZ. This elaboration of the formula would draw hostile criticism here and abroad. Furthermore, it would leave the Communists many options within the San Antonio formula even if they accepted.

-- A major US force build-up can be quickly announced, including a Reserve callup. However, this step, too, would run into difficulty if the Communists declared their acceptance of San Antonio, calling on us to reciprocate by holding up on force augmentation. Once the Reserve callup was begun, they would lose nothing by entering talks on this basis, even if

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we refused reciprocity.

How the US should respond to a specific Communist negotiating overture can only be determined when all the surrounding circumstances are known. Rejection may be preferable. It may be necessary to enter for tactical reasons, even though no prospect of fruitful results is in sight. Or the situation on the ground in SEAsia may have developed (or revealed itself) in such a way that a negotiated termination is desirable. It would be better, therefore, to get into a posture from which it would be possible to conduct protracted military operations if the present impasse over negotiations continues, or to enter negotiations on a trial basis if the situation demands. Should the Communists escalate during the talks, appropriate adjustments could be adopted. If they did not escalate, the interval could be used to consolidate our position and prepare to reinforce it.

Politically, the most difficult problem will be that of managing the GVN while talks are tried. Some officials may panic and others will try to sabotage the negotiating process. Since the overthrow of Diem, however, it has been possible to find Vietnamese of about equal capability willing to go along with virtually any policy firmly supported by the US. No Vietnamese of rank can expect a good reception from the NLF, should he defect. The rank and file will largely follow their leadership. Both groups can be expected largely to adopt a wait-and-see attitude, if the total scenario is properly managed.

We should begin discussions now with the GVN laying the groundwork for possible negotiations in three or four months.

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TAB A

1. The objective of the United States in South Vietnam is an honorable peace, that will leave the people of South Vietnam free to fashion their own political and economic institutions without fear of terror or intimidation from the North.
2. US military forces should provide security in populated areas of South Vietnam and insofar as possible deny the enemy access to the population; this objective should be sought at the minimum possible cost in US lives and resources; it should not be sacrificed in pursuit of other military objectives, viz. attrition of the enemy or driving him completely out of the country.
3. The President does not expect to authorize US ground operations in Laos, Cambodia or North Vietnam (including the northern half of DMA), nor to change the present ground rules for the bombing of North Vietnam, nor to approve the mining of Haiphong Harbor.

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TAB B

IMMEDIATE DEPLOYMENT OF 10,500 SPACES

A Vietnam force increment of 10,500 men for immediate deployment to Vietnam would consist of the following forces:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Maneuver Battalions</u>	<u>Structure Spaces</u>	<u>Date in Vietnam</u>
5th Marine Div (-)	3	5800	Jun 68
Bde, 5th Mech Div	3	4700	Jun 68

To support these deployments mobilization of the following Reserve Components forces will be required: *

4th Marine Division (to replace in FY 69 the 5th Marine Division in Vietnam).

Two Army National Guard brigades (to replace in FY69 82nd Airborne and 5th Mechanized divisional brigades in Vietnam).

The approximate incremental cost of this deployment would be:

<u>TOA (\$ Millions)</u>	
<u>FY68</u>	<u>FY69</u>
150	200

*Assuming that the President would decide to reconstitute the active strategic reserve at 5 Army and 2 Marine Corps Divisions.

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EQUIPMENT - MODERNIZATION FOR THE RVNAF
FY 68 MACV ORIGINAL PROGRAM

<u>Critical Items</u>	<u>Qty</u>	<u>Date Req'd</u>	<u>Cost to Army (\$ mil)</u>	<u>Status</u>
1/4T Utility Truck M606	200	Jun 68	0.4	None shipped.
2 1/2 T Truck M602	1702	Jun 68	14.5	None shipped.
M-16 Rifle	108710	Sep 68	9.6	60,275 shipped as of 27 Feb 68.
M-79 Grenade Launcher	4183	Jun 68	1.0	3,732 shipped as of 27 Feb 68.
105mm Howitzer (Towed)	108	Dec 68	0.6 ^{a/}	26 approved; none shipped.
155mm Howitzer (Towed)	72	b/		Study for inclusion FY 69 Force Structure.
AN/PRC-25	6000	Jun 68	0	1,000 as of 27 Feb 68
M60 Machine Gun	2489	Jul-Dec 68	1.4	1,000 shipped as of 27 Feb 68.
105 HE Ammo w/fuses	1,577,000		54.0	Issued from USARV stock
81mm Mortar: M29	824	Jun-Dec 68	2.8	Only 275 made available. Army recommends equipping reserve if call up with remainder of Army is preparing a request to withdraw remainder from reserve. 25 shipped as of 27 Feb 68.
ML13APC	143	ASAP	4.3	29 airlifted into country; 64 left port of Mobile on 25 Feb, ETA 27 Mar; 50 left Mobile on 28 Feb, ETA 25 March.
Total additional Army funding required:			88.6	

a/ (for 36)
b/ None approved for FY 68.

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March 1, 1968

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RVNAF MODERNIZATION

OASD/SA Estimated Requirement for Full Modernization

<u>Major Items</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>When Needed</u>	<u>Purpose</u>	<u>Est. Cost (\$ Millions)</u>
1/4 Ton Utility Truck M606	3150	Now	Mtg previous short- ages	6.3
2-1/2 Truck M602	2270	Now	Mtg previous short- ages & replacement of combat losses	18.5
M-16 Rifle	360,500	ASAP	Complete equipping of RVNAF combat units to* include RF and PF	31.9
M-79 Grenade Launcher	16,811	ASAP	Complete equipping of RVNAF combat units to** include RF and PF	4.1
105mm Howitzer (Towed)	519	FY 69, FY 70	To provide RVNAF Div- ision parity with US Division, make up shortage	20.8
55mm Howitzer (Towed)	72	FY 69	Provide ARVN medium artillery	5.4
AN/PRC-25	4,000	FY 69	Improve RF/PF commu- nication	4.9
M60 Machine Gun	1,500	FY 69	Provide to RF/PF	.9
105 HE Ammunition With Fuses	3,000,000	FY 69	Give RVNAF improved artillery support	108
81mm Mortar: M29	400	FY 69	Re-equip RF	1.3
M113APC	500	FY 69	Replace combat losses, meet previous shortages, reorganize ARVN Cav Sqdns to US standard	15.0
M48A2C Tanks	225	FY 69	Replace combat losses, reorganize ARVN Cav Sqdns to US standard	27.0

COMUSMACV has noted a need for 268,000 to re-equip RF/PF.

** COMUSMACV has noted a need for 11,156 to re-equip RF/PF.

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RVNAF MODERNIZATION

OASD/SA Estimated Requirement for Full Modernization

<u>Major Items</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>When Needed</u>	<u>Purpose</u>	<u>Est. Cost (\$ Millions)</u>
Helicopter, Lt Utility	100	ASAP	To provide RVNAF lift within their air crew capability	72
V-100 Commando Cars	234	ASAP	Route Security	10.8
Full Tracked Cargo Carries	1,000	FY 69	To improve logistic capability in forward areas	32
ATC (C+C-LCM)	104	FY 69	Equip 4 River Assault Squadron	62.4
Monitors	20	"	To give ARVN 2 Bde Riverine Capability	
Refueler (LCU)	4	"	"	
ASPB (Asst Spt P+1 Boat)	64	"	"	
CCB (LCM 8)	8	"	"	
PPRs	100	"	Improve ARVN effective- ness in the Delta	13.0
Helo Gun Ships	20	"	"	
APB (Barrack Ship)	4	"	To float bases to support River Assault Squadron	39.4
YTB (Tub)	4	"	"	
ALL (Eng Repair)	4	"	"	
AN (Net Tender)	4	"	"	
LLC (Lite Lift)	4	"	"	
100 Ton Float Dry Dock	4	"	"	

TOTAL COST OF OASD/SA PROPOSAL: 473.7

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PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT TO ACCOMPANY A STRATEGY OF POPULATION SECURITY

The past six weeks have been a time of testing in Vietnam. Unable to defeat us in the battlefields along the DMZ and in the highlands, the enemy has turned his fire towards the cities of South Vietnam -- against unarmed men, women, and children. This is a new development.

In the past, there had been isolated acts of terror in the cities; at Tet there was systematic terror from main-force units. In the northern part of South Vietnam, enemy infiltration has now become full-scale invasion by large conventional troop concentrations. In addition to sizable forces already in the area, the enemy is now believed to be sending two more divisions against the cities of Quang Tri and Hue. If there were any illusions about the nature of the enemy we are facing in Vietnam -- about the participation of North Vietnamese forces and about the methods they employ -- there should now be none, nowhere in the world. The enemy's utter ruthlessness must be apparent to anyone with the will to see it. To him the lives of the peaceful people of South Vietnam are as nothing.

Even against cities far to the south, like Saigon, the enemy needed no very remarkable military skills to be able to inflict his terror. South Vietnam is not a closed, totalitarian society like North Vietnam. People come and go virtually as they please. At Tet, and in the weeks thereafter, murder, arson, and pillage came and went.

The Tet offensive demonstrated two things. First is that the enemy, contrary to his own expectations, does not have the military power or the political support sufficient to enable him to seize control of the cities, or to destroy the constitutional processes which the South Vietnamese have

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so painfully and patiently put together over the last twelve months. He seems to have reckoned that the people of South Vietnam, sorely tried by two decades of war, would give way beneath the weight of his terror. But he did not reckon on the strength of the resolve of free men fighting to preserve their homes and families. Although the deeds of our own forces during these trying weeks have been heroic, the brunt of the enemy's offensive has fallen on our South Vietnamese allies. They have met the enemy's challenge and have forced him to pay dearly for it. Since the beginning of the Tet period, the enemy has lost 43,000 killed and another 7,000 captured. This, surely, is a staggering price.

Yet the second thing the Tet offensive has demonstrated is that the enemy is willing to pay such a heavy price and to pay it again in the hopes that he will break our resolve. Now that he has struck hard at the cities we can only assume that he will do so again. And although he has suffered great losses he has opened for himself new sources of recruitment. In order to defend the cities many elements of the South Vietnamese armed forces have had to abandon their efforts of Revolutionary Development among the rural populations, thus enabling the enemy to extend his control over whole districts formerly either contested or predominantly under Government control. The costs to our joint effort of pacification and Revolutionary Development have been heavy.

Through these six weeks of trial and testing we have remained closely in touch with General Westmoreland and Ambassador Bunker. They have told us of the heroism and the resolve of our own men and of the Vietnamese people. As on so many occasions in the past, they have given us objective

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advice and wise counsel. But all of the marvels of modern communications are no substitute for a first-hand look. Therefore we asked General Wheeler, the distinguished Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to go to Vietnam, to talk with General Westmoreland, Ambassador Bunker, and senior commanders throughout the country, and with President Thieu and his associates. General Wheeler has now returned and has given us the benefit of his analysis and reflection. His report confirmed our estimate that the war in Vietnam has entered a new phase, and that for the first time the enemy went all out for a general offensive and a general uprising in the hope of bringing the war to an early successful conclusion. It also confirmed our belief that while the enemy failed to achieve his initial objective, and while many of his units were badly hurt, he has the will and the capability, the determination and the morale, to continue his campaign.

General Wheeler reported that the structure of government in South Vietnam held up against the enemy's assault, but that its effectiveness has suffered. Similarly, the South Vietnamese armed forces acquitted themselves gratifyingly well in the crisis. But they have now assumed a defensive posture around the towns and cities, and we must inevitably be concerned about how well they will be able to bear up under sustained pressure. Finally, General Wheeler reported that our own forces have lost none of the capability that they had before the Tet offensive. But he also made clear that a very large proportion of our forces have been tied down in operations in the remote, unpopulated areas of South Vietnam and have therefore been unable to lend the South Vietnamese forces the support they will now require in the populated areas.

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We here in Washington have carefully studied General Wheeler's report and we have listened to his reflections. And we have come to the conclusion that we must adapt our own strategy to meet the challenge of the new war which the enemy now seeks to present us with. Previously our aim has been to seek out and engage the enemy's main-force units in the unpopulated areas south of the DMZ and in the central highlands. We have been able to do so because the South Vietnamese armed forces were able, for the most part, to provide for the security of the populated areas. Now that the nature of the war has changed, however, it would only play into the enemy's hands to allow him to continue to tie down some of our most capable forces away from those areas where they are most urgently needed. Our aim, after all, is to protect people, not mere territory.

In response to the enemy's stepped-up campaign of vicious terror against the cities and towns, General Westmoreland has already moved many of his units away from search-and-destroy missions in relatively unpopulated areas, and has placed them in positions to bolster the South Vietnamese effort to defend the populous regions. We have decided, in consultation with the Government of Vietnam, to carry further these redeployments of American forces, so long as the enemy's principal objective is the intimidation of the unarmed civilian population of South Vietnam. In the near future we will move to the vicinity of more populated regions some of the forces which are now located along the DMZ and in the central highlands. This will temporarily allow the enemy access to some relatively unpopulated areas. But he will not be allowed to occupy even these areas as undisturbed sanctuaries which we have heretofore denied him. the critical point is that we and the South Vietnamese armed forces will be able to do a more effective job of providing protection to the South Vietnamese people against the enemy's

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intensified terror campaign, and thereby promote the security of the population -- a security that will permit the people and Government of Vietnam to develop the free institutions they have so carefully nurtured.

Our goal for the immediate future must be the provision of a secure the political institutions and protective screen behind which the armed forces of South Vietnam can continue to grow in capability and effectiveness. During the Tet offensive the Vietnamese armed forces bore the brunt of the fighting in the cities. Our aim, and the aim of the Government of Vietnam, is that in the future their forces will also bear the brunt of the fighting in the countryside. We are working vigorously with the Government of Vietnam to enhance the effectiveness of their armed forces at every level from the high command to the soldiers in the paddy fields. We are prepared to contribute equipment which will add significantly to the firepower and the mobility of these Vietnamese forces. Over the past three years, while our own forces have taken on the bulk of the enemy's main-force units, the capability of our Vietnamese partners has increased dramatically. We now look forward to the time when they will take on an increasingly larger proportion of the main-force ground fighting.

Just as we expect that the South Vietnamese armed forces will grow in effectiveness as we devote more of our forces to providing a protective screen for the populated areas, so also do we expect that the Government of Vietnam will grow in the vitality of its democratic processes and in its ability to respond to the wishes and needs of all of the people of South Vietnam. We are confident that the present Government of Vietnam will grow stronger in its adherence to democratic practices as its confidence

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in its own security increases. We are prepared to continue to stand at its side -- let there be no mistake about this -- so long as its members demonstrate a willingness to take effective measures of a progressive nature. One of our chief purposes now in redeploying some of our own forces is to help them to do so.

General Westmoreland has already carried through much of this planned redeployment of American forces. He will initiate the remaining measures in the near future. Not until they are completed, and the redeployed troops are engaged in their new missions, will we be able to judge accurately our future force requirements in Vietnam. Our hope -- and the considered opinion of our advisors -- is that we will _____ be able to effect this partial redeployment of our forces, and thus increase their capacity to help promote the defense of the populated areas, without significantly increasing the number of Americans who are fighting in Vietnam already. Nevertheless, to meet urgent operational requirements, we are ordering the immediate despatch to Vietnam of additional units, comprising some 10,500 men in all, similar in composition to the units we despatched a short time ago.

Finally, our revised posture should also remove any doubts the enemy may still have that we are prepared to retain our forces in Vietnam for the long haul, until he is prepared to negotiate an honorable settlement. One thing should be crystal clear to him: we will not take part in negotiations that are, in fact, a veiled surrender. Our goal in Vietnam is a simple one. Let me state it once again. It is the achievement of an honorable peace that will leave all of the people of South Vietnam free to fashion their own political and economic institutions without fear of

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terror or intimidation from the North. We seek no more; we can seek
no less.

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APPENDICIES

1. Populated Control Strategy
2. Projected Combat Deaths -- Alternate Strategies
3. MACV Request (Units, Deployment Dates, Cost)
4. Enemy Casualties and Force Ratios
5. Maps of Vietnam Showing Force Dispositions
6. Hamlet Evaluation -- 1967 Development

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APPENDIX 2

Effects of Strategy on Interior Provinces

The necessity for yielding certain towns, including interior Province Capitals, is a decision which should be weighed in terms of the political effect obtained by the enemy. In this context, it would be desirable to maintain all interior Province Capitals and garrison those points with ARVN units drawn from the 23rd and 22nd Divisions and, at least initially, some U.S. units. Those units would have as their mission the holding of that town for a minimum of four days, giving time for arrival of an allied strike force. Maintenance of all Province Capitals is desirable because the political consequence of withdrawal from whole Provinces would be to recreate the atmosphere of 1954 or 1965, and while the situation may be that grim, we should at least strive to make it appear otherwise.

If we hold all of the Province Capitals, other provincial town/camp complexes could be evacuated, such as the frontier series running from Bu Dop to Dak To and the interior but vulnerable points like Vo Dat, and Vinh Thanh. Although these points are not held by allied main force units, they do tie down other assets, such as Special Forces, CIDG, PF and RF. Furthermore, their combined existence represents a potential strain for the limited reaction ability currently available, since we must respond, as we did at Dak To, when the enemy masses for an attack. If a presence is required in some of these areas, it should be in the form of a mobile striking unit and not a garrison.

We should with this posture be able to hold all interior provincial capitals. However, we could, if necessary, establish priorities. Some

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capitals should be held at all cost; these include Pleiku (H.Q. of II Corps), Ban Me Thuot (rallying point of FULRO and probable site of NLF sponsored autonomous area if lost), and Dalat. Another determination should be made of those capitals which could be lost with the least political impact. Only two come to mind immediately. These are Gia Nghia (of Quang Duc Province) and Cheo Reo (of Phu Bon Province). Both Provinces are generally considered to have been arbitrary and tactical creation of the Diem government and their loss would not rank in significance with that of other traditional area centers. Administratively the area formerly covered by those capitals could revert to other Provinces. This was done in 1965 to the "artificial" province of Phuoc Thanh and administratively the area reverted to Binh Duong, Bien Hoa and Phuoc Long Provinces.

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STRATEGY BY CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

I CTZ: More than half of available US maneuver battalions are presently allocated to the northernmost CTZ, together with about one-quarter of RVNAF. While U.S. forces have more than doubled there over the past year, enemy force structure remained virtually constant.

COMBAT BATTALIONS IN I CTZ

By Quarter, 1967

	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>Present</u>
Total Enemy	45	51	52	48	52
Total Allied	59	72	75	79	93
US	20	33	34	39	53

The NVA has posed a serious threat over the past year in I CTZ, particularly in the DMZ, and presently possesses the capability to launch attacks anywhere in I CTZ with forces ranging from 4 battalions in the Quang-Tri City area to 16 battalions at Khe Sanh. CJCS estimates that the allied position in I CTZ precarious. Were MACV to be provided guidance to forego position defense in areas remote from population centers and concentrate upon mobile offensive operations in and contiguous to the coastal plain, one division equivalent -- 8-10 U.S. maneuver battalions -- could eventually be relieved from operations in or related to defense of Khe Sanh. Undoubtedly, however, these 8-10 battalions would be required to restore tactical flexibility to, and

insure logistical sufficiency for, the forces presently disposed in the Quang-Tri-Bue-Danang area. MACV presently is planning operations in the Aeschau Valley lafter April, 1968; the new guidance would preclude these.

II CTZ. U.S. and ARVN forces in central Vietnam have been drawn down to meet the enemy threat in I CTZ.

Combat Battalions in II CTZ
(By Quarter 1967)

	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>Present</u>
US	22	19	20	23	16
Total Allied	70	69	66	74	60
Enemy	45	43	43	45	45

Presently, the equivalent of a reinforced U.S. division is deployed with ARVN in the Kontum-Pleiku region, while chiefly ROK and ARVN forces secure the coastal regions.

Guidance to MACV should counsel continued economy of force in II CTZ, and should specifically exclude determined defense of all but province capitals in the highlands. Permission to withdraw from Special Forces camps (e.g., Dak To), and other exposed positions remote from the coastal plain should be included. Under this guidance six U.S. battalions could be withdrawn from border defense operations in the highlands for use as a mobile reserve, or for operations on the coastal plain.

III. CTZ. GVN control of the Saigon area dominates all other military and political considerations in South Vietnam. Force levels have remained fairly constant there over the past year:

Combat Battalions in III CTZ
(By Quarter 1967)

	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>Present</u>
US	40	29	30	37	31
Total Allied	91	84	89	93	93
Enemy	43	43	43	48	48

However, the enemy has maneuvered boldly within IIICTZ, drawing substantial US and ARVN deployments in last quarter '67 to the LOC NINH-SONG BE area, and then a sudden redeployment from the border to the Saigon area in reaction to the Tet offensive. Over a third of available US forces are now concentrated in the immediate environs of Saigon. No redeployments from present positions should be envisaged. The guidance to MACV should be to concentrate on offensive operations in and around the densely populated portions of III CTZ. MACV should maintain a mobile strike force for defense of remote province capitals, but he should otherwise forego long range or regional search and destroy operations. Withdrawals from Special Forces camps should be authorized.

IV CTZ. The Mekong Delta region [-- principally IV CTZ --] is the only region of SVN in which the burden of the war is still borne chiefly by *and where the main enemy is the VC and not ARVN regulars.* RVNAF. For historical and political reasons, US strategy should eschew Americanizing the conflict there. However, since the Mekong Delta contains 40% of the South Vietnamese population, and produces virtually all of its staple foods, its retention is a sine qua non for GVN survival. Accordingly, US strategy should aim at catalyzing increased RVNAF efforts there. Forces have remained virtually constant over the past year, and force ratios are favorable:

IV CTZ RESOURCES

<u>US</u>		<u>ARVN</u>		<u>RF/PF</u>	<u>FWMAF</u>		<u>VC/NVA</u>	
<u>Bns</u>	<u>Str(000)</u>	<u>Bns</u>	<u>Str(000)</u>	<u>Str (000)</u>	<u>Bns</u>	<u>Str(000)</u>	<u>Bns</u>	<u>Str(000)</u>
6	14.9	43	61.8	114.4	0	0	21	49.7

If RVNAF can be brought to exploit the better than 2-1 advantage it presently enjoys over the enemy, the enemy could be seriously discomfitted. While the VC maintain only 15% of their total maneuver battalions there, and while only 30% of their recognized strength is located there, the Delta is in effect the major VC base, furnishing manpower and food for VC/NVA units in III CTZ and elsewhere.

Guidance provided to MACV should be geared to galvanizing RVNAF by a strategy of:

1. Defending province capitals, major towns, principal communication centers, and commercially important routes.
2. Extending GVN control into the countryside, consistent with RVNAF capability to defend RD teams and other public administration there.]

3. Stimulating RVNAF operations by providing US forces on an occasional basis for combined operations against particularly promising targets, or in conjunction with key defensive operations. US forces in the Delta for this effort should draw on the existing Dong Tam and Saigon bases.


4. Providing limited assistance to RVNAF with sophisticated engineer equipment and reconnaissance apparatus where such would improve their ability to perform the missions sketched above.

5. Bringing serious pressure to bear on RVN leaders in Saigon and within IV CTZ to mount active, sustained, offensive operations consistent with the forgoing missions. Consideration should be given to:


Providing additional RVNAF battalions to IV CTZ on a temporary basis from III CTZ -- conceptually, battalions or regiments from the 5th or 18th ARVN divisions would be deployed to IV CTZ, minus dependents, for periods of 1 month or more of active operations.

APRIL - SEPTEMBER 1968 PROJECTED COMBAT DEATHS

CJCS PROPOSED FORCE (133 Maneuver Battalion - 725 Thousand)




PRESENTLY AUTHORIZED FORCE (112 Maneuver Battalion - 536 Thousand)




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12 MONTH PROJECTED COMBAT DEATHS

CJCS PROPOSED FORCE (133 Maneuver Battalion - 725 Thousand)



PRESENTLY AUTHORIZED FORCE (112 Maneuver Battalion - 536 Thousand)



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MACV REQUEST

Major Units

<u>ARMY</u>	5th Mech. Div. 6th Armored Cav. Regt. National Guard Div. 1400 Helicopters 18 Artillery Bns. 11 Engineer Bns.	132,000 personnel
<u>MARINE</u>	5th Marine Div. (-) (1 RLT already in SVN) 4 Artillery Battalions 2 Combat Engineer Battalions 72 Helicopters 4 Tactical Fighter Squadrons (1 F-4 and 3 A-4) 2000 Combined Action Company Personnel	39,100 personnel
<u>NAVY</u>	3 Mobile Construction Bns. (MMCBs) Support Personnel	13,300 personnel
<u>AIR FORCE</u>	7 F 100/F-84/A-1 Squadrons to SVN 4 F-100 Squadrons to Thailand (F-4s move to Thailand replaced by F-100s) 3 Heavy Repair Squadrons 1 F-4 Air Defense Squadron 10 A-1s to support GAME WARDEN 6 AC-47s	22,000 personnel
	TOTAL	206,000 personnel

Deployment Dates


All Army Combat Units by December 1968
 Army Helicopters - June 1969 to June 1971
 Marine Combat Units by May 1968
 Air Force Tac Ftr Sqds by December 1968

Costs

Budgetary Increase - FY 1968 - \$2.5 billion - FY 1969 - \$10 billion
 Annual Budgetary Cost - \$35 billion
 Balance of Payments (Estimate) - \$45 million
 Personnel End Strength Increase - Add


Reserve Recall - 250,000 personnel
 2 National Guard Divisions.
 2 Separate N.G. Brigades
 1 Marine Reserve Div.
 20 Air National Guard Sqds (10 already recalled)
 5 Navy Construction Battalions (MMCBs)
 Killed in Action 1,300-1,400/month

FORCE RATIO **Allied Maneuver Bns. / VC+NVA Maneuver Bns.**



COMBAT DEATHS

(Quarterly Totals in Thousands)




$$\frac{1}{11} \cdot \frac{1}{11} = \frac{1}{121}$$

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


FIELD

FIELD LOCATIONS

[illegible]

REF ID: A66000



Appendix 6

TABLE 1

1967 CHANGES IN HES A-B-C POPULATION a/
(SVN Totals - Population in Thousands)

	January-June	June-December	January-December
<u>Start of Period:</u>			
A-B-C hamlets plus secure non-hamlet population	10191.7 (62.1%)	11256.2 (65.6%)	10191.7 (62.1%)
Total SVN population	16401.8	17165.3	16401.8
<u>Changes in A-B-C Population During Period Due To:</u>			
End-of-period revision of population estimates for hamlets rated A-B-C at start and for secure non-hamlet population	+ 461.2	+ 41.0	+ 459.9 b/
New A-B-C hamlets "found" minus A-B-C hamlets dropped or no longer rated c/	+ 79.1	+ 227.7	+ 317.3 b/
Hamlets upgraded to A-B-C minus hamlets dropped to D-E-VC c/	+ 524.2	- 10.1	+ 545.9 b/
Total changes	+ 1064.5	+ 258.6	+ 1323.1
<u>End Of Period:</u>			
A-B-C hamlets plus secure non-hamlet population	11256.2 (65.6%)	11514.8 (66.9%)	11514.8 (66.9%)
Total SVN population	17165.3	17208.3	17208.3

a/ Based on HES total scores (nine security plus nine development factors).

b/ Jan - June and June - Dec figures do not add to Jan - Dec totals due to use of end-of-period population estimates, and turnover of A-B-C hamlets.

c/ Based on population in hamlets at end of period.



THE JOINT STAFF

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 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-2-78 letter
 By if, NARS, Date 3-19-79

File Date: 1 Mar 68

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Pre-Vietnam CONUS Strategic Reserve

1. Deployable Forces - Pre-Vietnam (as of 1 July 1964)

Army

- 4 Infantry Divisions
 (1st, 4th, 24th, 25th (Hawaii))
- 2 Armored Divisions
 (1st, 2nd)
- 1 Mechanized Division
 (5th mech)
- 2 Airborne Divisions
 (82nd, 101st)

Marine Corps

- 3 Div/Wing Teams
 (8/9 MEF LANTCOM - EAST COAST)
 (1/9 MEF EUCCOM - AFLOAT)
 (1 MEF PACOM - WEST COAST)
 (1 MEF PACOM - OKINAWA)

2. QUESTION - Why would the recall of ready reserves be required if all or a major portion of the proposed first increment is deployed to South Vietnam?

ANSWER - At the present time, the combat ready strategic reserve consists of 1-1/9 Marine Division which, under existing rotation criteria cannot be deployed to Southeast Asia, and 3 TFS of the Air National Guard recently recalled.

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- The Marines cannot sustain the 27th BLT already ~~unselected~~ deployed without the mobilization of some reserve assets.

- Some Army combat elements of the first increment (Brigade, 5th Division and 6th ARC) could be deployed without mobilization but could not be sustained without mobilization or a major modification of existing personnel policy.

- A serious shortage of skilled personnel, including pilots, exists in all Services. A combination of Reserve callup and extension of terms of service is necessary to ready and sustain any additional deployments to SEAble.

- General worldwide military posture has been seriously degraded by the continued drain of both personnel and equipment to support our Southeast Asian operations. The only significant improvement possible is through a recall of ready reserves, both units and individuals.

- Air Force reserve call-up is needed to meet and sustain MACV stated requirements since many of the required units are not available in the active force.

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Mr. W. Rostow

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VIETNAM ALTERNATIVES

BACK-UP MATERIAL

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 19-21
By CTS NARA, Date 11/29/22

File Date
1 Mar

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~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVEALTERNATIVE VIETNAM STRATEGIESBACK-UP MATERIAL

- I. Analyses of the Implications of the MACV Request and Alternatives
 - A. Possible Public Reaction
 - B. Possible Congressional Reaction
 - C. Asian Reaction
 - D. European and Other Non-Asian Reactions
 - E. Inflation in South Vietnam
 - F. Data for Analysis of Strategies
- II. CIA Analyses of the Situation
 - A. Questions Concerning the Situation in Vietnam
 - B. Communist Alternatives in Vietnam
 - C. The Outlook in Vietnam
- III. GVN and ARVN
 - A. Necessary Changes in the GVN

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Possible Public Reaction to Various Alternatives

Five military options for Vietnam have been examined. We have looked at them purely from the standpoint of possible public reaction from the hawks, the doves and the middle-of-the-roaders of the country, not from a standpoint of military reality, acceptance by the South Vietnamese, or in the light of what each contributes to our long-range military and political objectives.

The five options are these:

1. Increased mobilization and deployment. This includes sending General Westmoreland 50,000 to 200,000 more troops and the additional moves this would require at home -- calling reserves, extending enlistments, extra expenditures, bigger tax bill, etc.
2. Increased mobilization/deployment plus expanded bombing of North Vietnam.
3. Increased mobilization/deployment plus a bombing pause.
4. Denial of the Westmoreland requests and continuation of the war "as is" -- as it was being fought prior to the Tet offensive and Khe Sanh.
5. Denial of the Westmoreland requests and a change in war-fighting policy with greater concentration on defending populated areas and less on search-and-destroy in unpopulated areas. This would include an announced program to begin troop withdrawal at a fixed date.

One basic point is clear, although it cannot be proven. No course of action will be a "consensus" course. No action will unite the country, which is now fearfully divided. The question we are attacking from a Public Affairs point of view is which option will most coalesce the diverse supporters and most isolate the opposition.

To examine the options:

1. Increased mobilization and deployment.

This course will lose rather than gain popular support unless accompanied by additional military and/or diplomatic actions. The country will not unite behind the President and shed its doubts if we send more ground forces, pass a large tax bill, call Reserves, increase the draft, request a supplemental and extend enlistments -- unless these resource-strengthening moves are joined with other positive and "new"

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actions. Without new actions, the "mobilization" moves will make the doves unhappy because we become more and more enmeshed in the war. They will make the hawks unhappy because we still will be withholding our military strength, particularly in the North. And the middle-of-the-roads who basically support the President out of conviction or patriotism will be unhappy because they will see the ante going up in so many ways and still will not be given a victory date, a progress report they can believe or an argument they can accept that all of this is in the national interest. (Further, they will read in the dissent columns and editorials that 18 months from now, when the North Vietnamese have added 30,000 more troops, we will be right back where we started.)

I believe, then, that the public reaction will be severely negative if we go beyond our present 525,000 without either taking extra military steps in the North or without stopping the bombing and thus probing publicly for a negotiated settlement. Until a few weeks ago, the people were being told that we were moving toward victory. No one was suggesting extra troops, additional hardships, more spending, Reserve call-ups, high draft calls and increased casualties. Now, suddenly, the picture has changed and all of these emergency, hardship measures are required. I think the people will not willingly accept these steps under those circumstances. Further, I think the public objection will rise as the deployment numbers, the financial costs and the life-disrupting actions increase.

It has been suggested that the public would accept 50,000 extra troops more readily than 200,000, and, conversely, that the national belt-tightening and "war spirit" of 200,000 would make that larger number more easily acceptable than 50,000.

Inasmuch as either number means calling Reserves, extending enlistments, supplementals, etc., I cannot see a great public affairs difference. I do not believe we get a "consensus" from the larger figure. To deploy either number, without changing anything else, would be equally unpalatable.

The next two options should be considered together since, from a public affairs standpoint, the decision to deploy additional troops of any significant number must be accompanied by some "new" move. The two options are: increased mobilization and deployment plus expanded bombing of the North, and increased mobilization plus a bombing pause.

2. Increased mobilization/deployment plus expanded bombing of the North:

The additional action in the North could include mining

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Haiphong, bombing dikes, erasing restricted zones. I believe that the people will react strongly against the additional deployment of 50,000 or more unless we really "go to war" in the North. This course would clearly bring aboard more hawks and further isolate the doves. It would also make the war much easier to accept by the middle-of-the-roaders. It would help unite the country. Some fence sitters, however, would be added to those who already view the war as an unforgiveable sin. I think the campus and "liberal" reaction would surpass anything we have seen. The New York Times and St. Louis-Post Dispatch would react violently. One can only speculate on the total national reaction, but I believe that the country would support that course to a greater extent than it does the present course.

3. Increased mobilization plus a bombing pause:

This envisions continuing to fight as we are in the south, strengthening Westmoreland with part or all of his request, calling Reserves, etc., at home -- and coupling these moves with a visible "peace" campaign based upon a cessation of the bombing in the North.

Clearly, this would alienate those who take the hardest line. We would be adding much to our cost, both by the extra deployment and the military price paid for the pause, without receiving any immediate or concrete results. If the Communists took advantage of the bombing halt, the hawks and many of the military would react strongly. So would the families of all men in I Corps and of many other men in Vietnam. The New York Daily News and the Chicago Tribune would describe the pause as a criminal betrayal and a cowardly concession. They would invoke the Tet catastrophe. If the pause were to last beyond four weeks or so, they would clamor for resumption. The doves, of course, would enthusiastically endorse the pause and would immediately begin pleading and praying that it be continued long enough to explore every possible and conceivable corridor. The "spokesman" -- Fulbright or the New York Times -- would spend more effort fighting a resumption of bombing than praising the President for stopping. Additionally, the doves would deplore the extra deployments. They would complain that the pause was not unlimited or unconditional. They would argue that the deployments plus the failure to be "unconditional" detracted from the effort.

The middle-of-the-roaders -- Washington Star, Washington Post -- would be disturbed by the mobilization, but would view the pause as a ray of hope.

This two-pronged approach -- strengthen but seek negotiation --

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would give new confidence to the middle-of-the-roaders. They would applaud the government for doing "something" different, for seeking a way out of the quagmire. They would be more patient than the hawks to give the pause a chance, and less disturbed than the doves at the mobilization. For them, it could be a way out -- and even a "could be" is better than the frustration they now feel.

If the pause did not work, and bombing were resumed, they would still commend the attempt. Pressures from them for increased bombing would be felt, however, at that time.

The deploy/pause option would be more favorably received by the nation than the deploy/escalate North, since it would, in the public mind, offer more hope of an eventual solution to the war.

4. Denial of the Westmoreland requests and continue "as is."

There would be no additional troops of any significance, no callup, no new increase in spending rate. This course is far less palatable today than it was eight weeks ago. The public is now -- or soon will be -- aware of Westmoreland's requests. If those requests are denied, Washington will be refusing to give its commanders what they need to fight the war and protect their troops. The hawks and the military in the field will protest vehemently. Every colonel and master sergeant will have his interview with the press. The letters from the next-of-kin will mount. "Stretched-too-thin" and "military weakness" arguments will abound. Congressional inquiries will keep the fires burning. This would be an extremely dangerous course from a public opinion standpoint. The doves would be no more satisfied than they are today; the hawks would be less satisfied than they are today. But fewer people would be affected by this course than by Option One (deployments without other changes), and thus I consider this poor choice nonetheless preferable to that one.

5. Denial of Westmoreland's requests and a change in war-fighting policy in the South.

The advantages of this from a public affairs standpoint are overwhelming -- provided that it is presented properly. The pain of additional deployments, Reserve callups, increased draft calls, increased casualties, extended tours would be eliminated. The hazards of bombing escalation would be eliminated. The dangers of a bombing pause would be eliminated. The frustration of more-and-more-and-more into the endless pit would be eliminated. What the people want most of all is some sign that we are making progress, that there is, somewhere, an

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end. While this does not necessarily show progress, it does show change. It does show the search for new approaches -- and such a search is advocated by Senator Russell on the one hand and the New York Times on the other.

As opposed to any plan involving additional deployment/mobilization moves -- even one including a pause -- acceptance of this option would greatly reduce the threat of spring demonstrations on and from the campuses. It would ease the danger of an effective anti-war/anti-ghetto coalition. It would prevent the middle-of-the-roaders from joining the doves. While the doves want a pause, I would think they would prefer this to deployment-mobilization plus pause. While the hawks want to escalate in the North, most of them (not all) also want an end to increased ground strength in the South. I believe that we would be successful in getting members of Congress to make speeches in support of this.

Additionally, this would still leave open the bombing options, both ways -- from a public affairs standpoint.

There are, of course, problems. Charges would be made that we have been fighting the war the wrong way, that this is merely the enclave theory already rejected, that we had sacrificed lives in vain, that this was a total rejection of Westmoreland. But the pluses from the manpower peak having been reached would be well worth the minuses.

I emphasize that all options are being examined only from the public reaction viewpoint.

In summary, speaking strictly from that viewpoint, and without reference to the impact on our objectives, to the South Vietnamese government's position or to military realities, I would rate the choices this way:

Acceptable: Only #5 -- Denial of requests and a change in policy in the South.

Most acceptable of the others: #3 -- Deploy and pause.

Next most acceptable: #2 -- Deploy and expand Air War North.

Next most acceptable: #4 -- Deny Westmoreland and continue as is.

Most objectionable: #1 -- Deploy and continue as is, north and south.


Phil G. Goulding

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Possible Congressional reaction to the following alternative courses of action:

1. Send 100,000 troops by May and an additional 105,000 in the fall.
2. Send only 100,000 troops by May.
3. Send only 50,000 troops by May.
4. Do not send any additional troops but clarify instructions to clearly spell out those military objectives considered necessary and appropriate to meet our limited political objectives.

These reactions are based on an analysis of positions taken by Members of Congress in previous statements and conversations. It is understood that the carrying out of alternatives 1, 2 and 3 will require one or more of the following: Call up Reserve units; new legislation to extend enlistments and possibly the ordering of individual reservists to active duty; and budget supplements.

ALTERNATIVE ONE.

If it is determined to elect alternative one, it is reasonable to assume that a number of Members of Congress would move to the "Dove" column. This group is composed mainly of younger and more liberal minded members who have been, up to now, willing to see through our effort in Southeast Asia, and have used the 525,000

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strength figure as a symbol of the extent of their support. They feel that anything meaningfully over this would be a clear signal of open-ended escalation (more casualties, taxes, etc.) and would have an immediate direct result in cutbacks of what they consider essential domestic social programs.

Those who have argued for a more vigorous military campaign, and this includes the majority of both Armed Services Committees, would undoubtedly support such a move. However, coupled with their support, we must expect extreme pressure to remove restrictions on the military effort. These would include such actions as closing the Port of Haiphong; intensifying the bombing of North Vietnam; going after the enemy's sanctuaries, etc. This theme is beginning to take hold, and was expressed in the speech by Senator Stennis on February 28 in which he said ". . . I am convinced that our present policy must be fully reviewed that many of our major restrictions must be and should be removed, or drastically altered... Unless it be strictly to support and protect the men already there, why send more men if all are to continue under the old, restricted warfare formula?" I think it is reasonable to assume that this theme represents the thinking of the majority of the Senate Armed Services Committee. This speech

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followed closely on the heels of Senator Russell's interview on February 27 in which he indicated the war could be brought to a conclusion in a reasonably short period of time without the dispatch of troops if we imposed a tight air-sea quarantine.

In addition, a step of this magnitude will undoubtedly heighten demands for a full scale debate as to whether this is not so far beyond the contemplation of the Tonkin Resolution that our entire efforts in Southeast Asia should be given renewed Congressional sanction.

In short, if alternative one is pursued, we can look for some loss of support for our current position. On the other hand, we can also look for strong support from the "Hawks" but coupled with inordinate pressures to remove the restrictions on military actions. If these restrictions are not removed in timely fashion a number of this group will undoubtedly start talking in terms of "getting out". It is not inconceivable that some "Hawks" really want out and are demanding what they assume will be unacceptable military actions to lay a basis which would justify a future position of withdrawal. Needless to say, moving ahead on alternative one will place us much closer to a war-time footing and may trigger a number of collateral issues such as increased taxes, wage and price controls, etc.

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ALTERNATIVES TWO AND THREE.

For the purpose of Congressional reaction, I believe we can consider Alternatives Two and Three together. These alternatives share to a degree a number of the issues discussed in Alternative One. In addition, they may pose the dilemma of failing to satisfy not only those opposed to any escalation but those who would consider them inadequate in view of Westmoreland's request. It could thus have the net effect of narrowing the base of our support in Congress.

Should one decide that a request of this magnitude could be met by a draw down (or rotation) of our forces deployed to Europe, this might hold off for a time the call of reserves and the necessity of seeking legislation to extend enlistments. The extension of enlistments is a very sensitive area, not only from a political point of view, but because the Members of Congress feel that such action is highly inequitable. The use of troops in Europe would ostensibly satisfy the backers of the Mansfield Resolution (some 30 Senators) and be in line with the attitude expressed by Senator Symington the other day that "we should send the trained troops now stationed in Europe rather than hastily trained youth from this country".

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ALTERNATIVE FOUR.

If option four is selected, we can expect to hear strongly from the "Hawks" that this is a further indication of a "no win" policy and that the civilians are denying the military the resources required to fight the war. They may well say we ought to "get out" if we deny General Westmoreland what he says he needs, with the more extreme elements talking about selling out our men. At the other end of the spectrum, we could expect continued support of the Administration by those who do not want to escalate the conflict. It would attract a number of members who have called for a new look at the current strategy. If the revised concept receives a fair degree of acceptance our base of support could be broadened. Congressional reaction will depend in great part on the justification for this position and a clear understanding of what our military objective in Vietnam will be.

As was noted earlier, these views represent a synthesis of previously expressed attitudes. It is clear that many people on the Hill are re-examining their positions on Vietnam in view of the initial TET attacks and the possible second offensive. The TET offensive has raised serious questions and doubts in their minds regarding our intelligence and understanding of the enemy's resources, capabilities and intentions, and perhaps more importantly, whether we can "win" with

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our present strategy whether we employ 525,000 or 1,000,000 men.

In light of the above, it is strongly recommended that at the appropriate time, soundings be made with key Members of Congress in order to ascertain current thinking on these alternatives.

Regardless of the alternative decided upon, the Congressional leadership and key members of the Armed Services, Appropriations, Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees should be given a briefing on the Presidential decision before it is announced to the public. A clearly stated rationale for the decision must be given to Congress prior to public release. It is fundamental that, even if they do not agree, they understand why the decision was made and what the Administration intends to accomplish by it.

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The tabulation below provides an estimate of the opinion of Members of the Congressional Committees most directly concerned on the subject of a troop increase in Vietnam based on their public statements. Those who would support a troop increase are shown as "Yes" and those opposed as "No". Those shown as "Unknown" have not made statements which can be used as a basis for a reliable estimate.

<u>Committee</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Unknown</u>
Senate Foreign Relations*	5	11	2
House Foreign Affairs	18	12	7
Senate Armed Services	16	2	0
House Armed Services	27	6	7
Senate Appropriations, DoD Sub.*	6	2	2
House Appropriations, DoD Sub.	<u>9</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
	81**	35	19

* Committee Members who are also members of other Committees shown are not reflected here.

** It is estimated that most of this group would make their concurrence conditional upon removal of restrictions on military activity.

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EA:WPBundy:mk
March 1, 1968

FIRST DRAFT

Asian Reaction to a Major US Force Increase

The GVN reactions are assessed as part of the total appraisal of the impact of this course of action in South Viet-Nam. This paper covers the reactions of Asian nations, taking first the nations contributing forces in Viet-Nam, and then other significant reactions. ~~It then examines certain factors relative to our broad objective of holding the rest of Southeast Asia whatever happens in South Viet-Nam.~~

General

Asian nations generally are highly sensitive to whether we succeed in Viet-Nam, and whether we demonstrate our firmness behind the commitment in such a way as to show our continued will and ability to support other nations in Southeast Asia.

These are the key factors. Asian nations are decidedly less sensitive than European nations, or parts of US public, to a picture of large-scale destruction; their threshold of tolerance in this respect is decidedly higher than that in Europe or in substantial segments of US opinion. In particular, Asian nations would generally not be upset if we increased the level of violence against North Viet-Nam; they have never been

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particularly upset over the bombing (with the notable exception of Japan--and even there this factor has not grown over the past year), and they have not been upset at any implication that a great white nations was "beating up" a little Asian nation. Nonetheless, a picture of steadily rising destruction in Viet-Nam would hit several nations in Asia fairly hard--not for humanitarian reasons nearly so much as because it would appear to indicate to them that the full US military power could devastate their own societies if they ever got into the same position. While this may tend in part to stimulate them to greater efforts to avert such a situation, it could more substantially weaken their will to face up to any kind of threat in the future or to count on US assistance to meet it.

Troop-Contributing Nations.

These nations have in large degree committed themselves to the cause, and would certainly be appalled if we appeared to be dropping it. In this sense, and in view of their general knowledge of the needs of the situation, they would welcome and be stiffened by major US force increases.

On the other hand, both Thailand and Korea--key nations in their respective ways--would be highly sensitive to the

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nature of the debate and controversy that accompanied any new US decision. They would read substantial disagreement and dissent within the US on this action issue far more seriously than they have yet interpreted the dissent we have had to date. If the American debate over these actions resulted in only grudging approval and many expressions of great doubt, they would read this as an indication that the US could not be counted on to the same degree as in the past. Our over-all force increase would certainly have to be adequate to assure the Koreans that we remained in a position to meet any threat there.

A more specific question is whether a major US force increase could be used to obtain additional force contributions from the troop-contributing countries. This takes specific examination country by country, and the results are not promising. Specifically:

- a. Korea has put to one side the idea of an additional light division. It would take only a modest spring and summer increase in North Korean pressures--which we would regard as almost certain--to make it politically impossible

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for Park to resurrect the proposal. The likelihood is that they would be asking more from us in every respect, and we cannot always exclude their moving to withdraw some of their forces in Viet-Nam if the pressures really built up in Korea.

b. Thailand has done a reasonably good job on the Northeast insurgency, but now confronts a spread to the tribes in the north. Above all, North Vietnamese offensive actions in Laos have already brought the Thai to a very worried state, and what now appears to be the impending capture of major southern Laos towns, and of areas nearer the Mekong further north, will almost certainly mean a level of Thai concern such that we would have to hold their feet to the fire to get the presently planned 10,000 additional men--with no presently foreseeable hope of getting more.

c. Australia has already made a sharply negative public noise--since the offensive--about sending more forces. Gorton's position is not strong, although he might change his mind and produce a modest increase (1,000-2,000) if pressed.

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d. New Zealand is peanuts in any event.

e. The Philippines were already regarded as nearly hopeless for purposes of additional forces. We see no reason to change this assessment.

As to possibilities of peace, we think the line-up would remain roughly as it is now--Thailand and Korea hawkish and very skeptical, Australia and New Zealand in the middle and ready to follow our lead, and the Philippines inclined to ~~walky~~ woolly initiatives not carrying much weight.

In any event, whatever we think the reactions would be, it will be of great importance to inform all these nations in advance of any decision we announce, and to share our strategic assessment with them as fully as possible.

Other Asian Nations.

In Japan, the Government is very worried whether we can succeed, and the public is fully and generally bearishly informed. But our degree of progress is the crucial factor affecting these attitudes. In the short run, Japan would probably stay about as it is, but this includes the already existent possibility of serious and growing controversy over their use of Okinawa for B-52 operations in Viet-Nam.

Malaysia and Singapore would generally believe we were

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doing the right thing to do whatever we depicted as necessary. Both would be worried at this evidence that the situation had in fact significantly worsened, but they would not basically be affected in the short term.

Indonesia would be about the same and certainly hopes we will stand firm. Their specific concern would focus on whether our added effort cut across our meeting our economic aid commitments in Indonesia. And this includes the already visible and extremely difficult issue of whether we would act to meet any shortfall in raising the required ^{\$325}~~\$25~~ million for this year. If Japan and the others fall short, as they well may, Indonesia might in any event be sharply disturbed if we fail to make up the difference. Our general costs in Viet-Nam would be heavily blamed, but the new force commitment would be an additional element in this disturbance.

In relation to all these countries, there is the specific question whether we could get them to do more on the civilian side in Viet-Nam. One specific possibility would be to enlist Indonesia in this effort. This is certainly worth the attempt, but the results cannot be expected to be substantial. Japan could do significantly more, but in our priorities there we believe Indonesian aid should come first, and this is not yet in hand.

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W.P. Bundy:brm
March 1, 1968
D R A F T

European and Other Non-Asian Reactions to a
Major US Force Increase

General Present Picture

European nations generally are subjected to a flow of information on Vietnam that is weighted toward a black picture of any prospective success for us, and a great emphasis on destruction within South Vietnam. The bombing continues to be highly sensitive in key parts of Europe.

A second element in European reactions concerns the possibility of peace. The French and the Scandinavians have long been urging almost any possible move by us, and the Italians are under heavy domestic pressure. Yet the British and Italian Governments, among those most heard from, have not succumbed to wishful thinking over the recent months.

Third, and most specifically, there is strong sentiment in Europe that the stakes in Vietnam or even in Southeast Asia are not worth a tremendous expenditure of US effort -- and that such an effort may operate over time to dilute US support for its commitments in Europe. A lesser fear exists that we would be prevented from acting in the Middle East. In general, these concerns have come over time to counter-balance the argument that

we are fulfilling a commitment in Asia to show that we would meet our commitments in Europe.

European Reactions

Against this background, the announcement of a US decision for a major force increase would be unlikely to change the pessimistic picture now widely held in Europe, and would tend markedly to increase the concern that we are simply destroying a country in order to save it -- and even acting immorally in so doing. Some reports from such highly respected and pro-American observers as Jean Monnet stress ^{the} recent ^{growth} reports of this concern for sheer military destruction, whatever its responsibility and justification. (Monnet was not speaking of his own feelings, but of those he was encountering almost universally, as reported by Ambassador Cleveland.)

In short, the major reaction in Europe could well be grave doubt that we could accomplish anything by the increases, and a substantial rise in concern about the whole destructive effect of our whole military power in the area. This type of reaction would be compounded if -- as appears inevitable -- these same points were forcibly made by critics and dissenters in the US when the proposals were put forward; Europe listens closely to such spokesmen as the Kennedys and Walter Lippmann, and their reactions would receive

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disproportionate play, particularly if similar reactions lead to substantial adverse votes on the key issues.

As to peace pressures, the above reactions would tend in themselves to increase popular pressures for peace. Key European governments have regarded the San Antonio formula as reasonable, and would probably be able to stick to their position ^{of} endorsing this, without any further new initiative on our part. However, there would certainly be an increase in popular pressures on the Italian Government and to a lesser extent the German Government, as Fanfani has vividly described to us recently.

Finally, European opinion could be sharply agitated if our force increases involved a reduction in our forces in Europe. This would be disturbing not so much in itself, or because they would feel a Soviet response directed at Europe; ^(see 6/4/54) rather, it would be taken as an indication that the US was withdrawing its support in Europe to a far greater extent than the percentage of our forces involved would warrant.

Even if ~~we~~ we did not pull forces out of Europe to make the increases possible, the Mansfield line might find additional takers in the Congress, and this in itself would have disturbing effects in Europe.

All of this is an exceedingly irritating and indeed illogical reaction in view of the failure of the key NATO nations to raise their own forces in recent years. It leads to the question whether

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we could get anywhere by putting the heat on the Germans in particular to beef up European contributions to NATO. We believe such an effort should be attempted in any event, but we are far from hopeful that it would produce any concrete result in view of the basic German situation, obvious French opposition, Italian weakness, and the British financial position reflected in recent Defense ~~xxxx~~ budget decisions. In other words, it may be a straight political fact that Europe will not pick up the slack, but will preversely blame us at the same time!

Longer Term Reactions

Apart from the reactions to the decision and resulting debate in the US, longer term reactions in Europe will continue to depend, as they always have, on whether we continue to appear "bogged down" in a useless and now enlarged venture, whether at worst the Vietnamese simply fold and make our military power appear irrelevant, or whether at best we make progress toward security in Vietnam and an ultimate decent peace.

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
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NOTE

This paper does not assess the economic and financial reactions in Europe to the associated budgetary and balance of payments actions that would have to accompany our force increases. These could be a major element in themselves, are but ~~our~~ best assessed by Treasury.

ESTIMATED INFLATION

<u>Force Level</u>	<u>Present Strategy</u>		<u>Population Control Strategy</u>	
	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>
475,000	30-37%	26-32%	39-49	46-57
525,000	33-41	42-52	39-49	51-63
585,000	36-44	46-57	47-57	56-69
625,000	38-47	49-60	49-60	59-73
730,000	43-53	57-70	56-69	73-89



OASD(SA):EMF
March 1, 1968

Deploying additional U.S. forces with the present strategy will increase the price level by 1% per 20,000 additional troops. With a population control strategy, price will increase by $2\frac{1}{2}\%$ per 20,000 additional troops, because the forces will be deployed in more populated areas where they will spend more. A population control strategy will require significant increases in imports, local production and GVN tax revenues if the rate of inflation is to be held to around present rates; the extent and likelihood of success for such programs has not been estimated. However, increases in production and improved distribution of goods will accompany better security for the populated areas.

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II - F

DATA for
ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES

1. Build-up. Since the U.S. began to introduce forces in 2d Quarter, CY 1965, the enemy has matched the build-up of allied combat battalions with infiltrated NVA units and fillers, and by upgrading VC units. Broken lines on Chart A plot over time the total allied combat battalions, total enemy battalions, and total U.S. battalions. On Cht.A the bars display the total forces, enemy vs. allied; in the latter case, note should be taken that retrospective statistics on strengths are at best unreliable, particularly those relating to VC guerrilla and administrative services personnel reflected in the totals shown.

Table 1

STRENGTHS IN SVN
END QUARTER

	1965			1966				1967			
	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
RVN	626	661	692	700	700	715	735	720	732	724	755
US	60	132	184	231	268	313	385	421	449	461	487
FW	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>53</u>	<u>54</u>	<u>54</u>	<u>59</u>	<u>59</u>
	689	797	898	954	998	1075	1173	1195	1235	1244	1301
VC	188	197	196	216	219	228	232	214	193	182	168
NVA	<u>9</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>52</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>52</u>	<u>53</u>	<u>52</u>
	197	212	223	254	271	283	278	264	245	235	220
RATIO	3.5	3.8	4.0	3.8	3.7	3.8	4.3	4.5	5.0	5.3	5.9

DATA: SEA STATISTICAL SUMMARY, TABLE 2.

2. Force Ratios. Chart B is a depiction of how the enemy succeeded through 1967 in offsetting the allied build-up, and despite his own losses. The key observation is that the allies have not been able to influence their combat unit strength relative to enemy combat strength.

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Table 2

FORCE RATIOS & LOSSES

	1965			1966				1967			
	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
RATIO											
Allied Maneuver Bn	1.25	1.38	1.27	1.21	1.27	1.39	1.62	1.55	1.53	1.55	1.63
VC/NVA Maneuver Bn											
RATIO											
Total Allied Strength	3.5	3.8	4.0	3.8	3.7	3.8	4.3	4.5	5.0	5.3	5.9
Total VC/NVA Strength											
VC/NVA KIA (Thousands)	6.1	10.1	13.4	13.1	11.9	15.6	15.0	22.8	23.4	20.2	21.9

3. Options for U.S. In analyzing an alternative to the present MACV search and destroy strategy, we have considered five different levels of U.S. forces in Vietnam, each in three differing circumstances. As displayed in the following table, each force level reflects a change from the basic Program 5 approved force of 106 U.S. maneuver battalions and 525,000 men.

Table 3

U.S. Options	Strength Add-On to Program 5 (000)	Option #
133 Bns	+200.0	<u>1</u>
112 Bns	+ 10.5	<u>2</u>
118 Bns	+ 60.5	<u>3</u>
124 Bns	+100.0	<u>4</u>
106 Bns	- 39.5	<u>5</u>

Chart C displays quarterly casualty experience for VC/NVA and U.S. forces compared with the number of U.S. maneuver battalions in SVN at end quarter. The curves illustrate that fatalities are a function of maneuver forces deployed, and that:

a. Combat deaths vary with the monsoon, 1st and 2d Qtr experience being generally higher than 3d and 4th Qtr.

b. Enemy losses per U.S. bn deployed have been generally declining despite increasing U.S. offensive role.

c. U.S. losses per U.S. bn deployed have been generally rising, reflecting increasing intensity combat.

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d. The CJCS requested force for 1968, 133 bns, should experience:

VC/NVA kills of 200-300/Qtr/Bn

U.S. KIA of 36-30/Qtr/Bn

These curves indicate that U.S. monthly combat deaths experienced from April to September, 1968, with force levels building to 133 battalions, would compare with previous years as follows:

Table 4

<u>Average Monthly Deaths</u>			
<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>
100	400	740	1300

1967 experience would offer best comparisons:

Table 5

U.S. Fatalities, 1967

<u>CTZ</u>					
<u>QTR</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>	<u>TOT</u>
1	681	506	704	65	1956
2	1559	446	615	52	2672
3	1324	239	348	77	1988
4	953	533	688	84	2258
TOT	4517	1724	2355	278	8874

Table 6

I CTZ as % of Total Quarter Casualties

<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>Total</u>
35	58	67	42	51'

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Table 7

U.S. KIA/Bn/Qtr in I CTZ

<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>AVG</u>
34	46	39	24	36

To refine these data to assess costs for the several options, casualty rates, in terms of U.S. combat deaths per maneuver battalion per quarter, as shown in Table 8, were calculated from experience data as published in OSD Southeast Asia Statistical Summaries. The DMZ rates are self-explanatory. The "Hi" rates apply to the seasons when U.S. forces conduct most of their regional and provincial search and destroy operations. In all but the IV, CTZ, this is the dry season. In the IV CTZ the rainy season allows the U.S. riverine force a great deal more maneuverability than the dry season. The "Lo" rates apply to the seasons when U.S. forces conduct mostly local search and destroy operations and perform security missions. In all but the IV CTZ, this is the rainy season.

Enemy response to U.S. force build-up insures that regardless of the time of year, the combat is more intense. The rates reflect this.

Table 8

Expected U.S. Deaths Per Maneuver Battalion Per Quarter

		Oct '67	Option				
			<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
Maneuver Battalions							
In Country		90 Bns	133	112	118	124	106
I CTZ							
Hi Rate		22.2	32.8	27.7	29.1	30.6	24
Lo Rate		21.3	31.4	26.7	27.9	29.4	23
DMZ Rate		59.2	65.8	73.6	77.5	81.6	64
II CTZ							
Hi Rate		24.45	36	30.4	32.1	33.8	28.9
Lo Rate		22.68	33.3	28.2	29.7	31.3	27.8
III CTZ							
Hi Rate		20.4	30	25.3	27.7	28.1	25.1
Lo Rate		18.6	27.4	23.1	24.4	25.6	21.9
IV CTZ							
Hi Rate		20.1	29.6	24.9	26.3	27.8	23.7
Lo Rate		19.5	28.7	24.2	25.6	26.9	23.0

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The distribution of U.S. maneuver battalions by CTZ prior to the recent VC/NVA Tet offensive is shown in Table 9. That distribution generated the casualty data per CTZ and it is used to calculate a weighted casualty weight country-wide as reflect in Table 10.

Table 9 % of U.S. Maneuver Bns Prior to VC/NVA Winter-Spring Offensive, 1967-68

<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>
42	19	36	3

Table 10

Weighted Average of Casualty Rates

	<u>Oct '67</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
Hi Rate	21.93	32.34	27.28	29.08	30.20	25.36
Lo Rate	20.55	30.26	25.60	27.30	28.40	24.80
DMZ Rate	59.2	65.8	73.6	77.5	81.6	64.0

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In Table 11 are described three variants of strategy, the first being that being followed by MACV prior to the VC/NVA Tet offensive, and that which he proposes to resume. The other two treat different enemy reactions to a shift of US strategy from regional search and destroy and defending the political frontiers, to a strategy of defending the people.

Table 11

Variants on the Strategy -

- I - Continue with present Search and Destroy
Suffer casualties at Hi Rates for each size force
- II - Shift to defend demographic frontier; enemy moves back
to the borders
Suffer casualties at Oct '67 Lo Rate no matter what size
force because some units are underemployed
- III - Shift to defend demographic frontier; enemy presses current
offensive
Suffer casualties at Lo Rates for each size force

Table 12 illustrates the number of combat deaths the US could expect to suffer for each combination of variant and force through the first 6 months of the program. In some cases (options 1 and 4) not all of the programmed battalions can close within the 1st 3 months. Therefore, different rates are used for each quarter to reflect the changing size of the force. The number of battalions the US could expect to have in Vietnam through December 1968 on a month-by-month basis is reflected in Table 13.

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TABLE 12

U.S. CASUALTY EXPECTATIONS --

THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1968 (U.S. KIA)

<u>VARIANT</u>			<u>Options</u>				
			<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
I MACV Search & Destroy	Casualty Rate	1st Qtr	29.08	27.28	29.08	29.03	25.36
	--KIA/Bn/Qtr	2nd Qtr	32.34	27.28	29.08	30.20	25.36
	TOTAL KIA		8170	6100	6860	7360	5560
	Battalions		133	112	118	124	106
II US defend demographic frontier; VC move to geographic frontier.	Casualty Rate	1st Qtr	20.55	20.55	20.55	20.55	20.55
	--KIA/Bn/Qtr	2nd Qtr	20.55	20.55	20.55	20.55	20.55
	TOTAL KIA		5460	4590	4840	5080	4340
	Battalions		133	112	118	124	106
III US defend demographic frontier; VC press offensive.	Casualty Rate	1st Qtr	27.30	25.60	27.30	27.30	24.80
	--KIA/Bn/Qtr	2nd Qtr	30.26	25.60	27.30	28.40	24.80
	TOTAL KIA		7540	5720	6440	7010	5260
	Battalions		133	112	118	124	106

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TABLE 13

MAXIMUM CAPABILITY TO REINFORCE VIETNAM
(ARMY OPTION IIB CSM 68-72)

Forces Deployed in Vietnam - End of Month					
Month	Cumulative	Deployment Increment		Structure Spaces	Cumulative
	Maneuver Battalions	Unit	Maneuver Battalions		Structure Spaces
Jan 68	102				525000
		1st Bde, 82nd Abn	3	3700	
		27th RLT, 5th Mar	3	3400	
Feb 68	108				532100
Mar 68	108				532100
		ARCOV Bns (In Pgn 5)	4		
Apr 68	112				532100
May 68	112				532100
		Bde, 5th Mech Div	3	4700	
		5th Marine Div (-)	3	10000	
Jun 68	118				546800
		I CTZ Units		3700	
		3 SRF Bde Fcs	9	44000	
		Return Bde, 82nd	-3	-3700	
Jul 68	124				590800
		6th ACR	3	3600	
		5th Mech Div (-)	7	12200	
Aug 68	134				606600
		38th Inf Div	10	16000	
Sep 68	144				622600
* * *		Spt for 38th Div		30000	
* * *		Spt for 5th Div		32000	
Dec 68	144				684600

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If cost/force-strategy option is defined by US combat deaths, then output for the same parameters can be defined, as it has been traditionally, in terms of enemy killed. The rates are derived from historical data just as were those for US casualties. They vary from a "hi" per US Maneuver battalion per quarter of 260 VC/NVA killed to a "lo" of 200 VC/NVA killed. The "hi" rate is applied against variants I and III; the "lo" rate applies to variant II. Comparison of US and VC/NVA combat deaths per force-strategy option is reflected in Table 14.

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Table 14

U.S. & VC/NVA Combat Deaths Through September 1968

<u>Variant</u>		<u>Option</u>				
		<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
I	US	8170	6100	6860	7360	5560
MACV	VC/NVA	65300	58200	61400	63000	53500
Search & Destroy	Ratio	8:1	9.5:1	9:1	8.6:1	9.6:1
II	US	5460	4590	4840	5080	4340
U.S. defend demographic frontier; VC move to geo- graphic frontier	VC/NVA	50200	44800	47200	48400	42400
	Ratio	9.2:1	9.8:1	9.5:1	9.5:1	9.8:1
III	US	7540	5720	6440	7010	5260
US defend demographic frontier; VC press offensive	VC/NVA	65300	58200	61400	63000	53500
	Ratio	8.5:1	10.2:1	9.5:1	9:1	10.2:1

Chart offers historical data re U.S. and GVN losses through 1967 for comparison.


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A

Build-Up of Combat Forces

(Maneuver Battalions in SVA's Sak of Order)



10 X 10 TO THE INCH 47 0700
10 X 15 INCHES
MADE IN U.S.A.
KLEINFELDER & FISHER CO.

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A1

BUILD-UP of TOTAL FORCES (in thousands, End of Quarter)

1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0

KE 10 X 10 TO THE INCH 47 0700
10 X 15 INCHES
KEUFFEL & ESSER CO.
MADE IN U.S.A.

Total Allied

Total Soviet

2 3 4
QTR 1965

1 2 3 4
QTR 1966

1 2 3 4
QTR 1967

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FORCE RATIO

Force Ratio
 Allied Forces / VC/MLA Manpower Ratio



VC/MLA Combat Deaths
 (Quarterly Totals in Thousands)

47 0700
 MADE IN U.S.A.

10 X 10 TO THE INCH
 10 X 10 INCHES
 NEUFEL & EGOR

DEATHS
 (000)



DEC 64 MAR 65 JUN 65 SEP 65 DEC 65 MAR 66 JUN 66 SEP 66 DEC 66 MAR 67 JUN 67 SEP 67 DEC 67

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

COMBAT DATES 1964-1967

Model 10 X 10 TO THE INCH 40 - 112
Kruppel & Esser Co.

1600
1500
1400
1300
1200
1100
1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100

Dec 64 M J S Dec 65 M J S Dec 66 M J S Dec 67



PROJECTED COMBATEFFECTIVENESS

CIES Proposed Force (133 MANEUVER BN--725 THOUSAND)

	63.3		50.2		65.0
	VC/		VC/		VC/
	NVA		NVA		NVA
IN THE STATE					
	5.2		5.5		5.5
	U.S.		U.S.		U.S.

MACV STRATEGY

Enemy Withdraws

Enemy Attacks

POPULATION STRATEGIES

Proposed Force (112 MANEUVER BN--534 THOUSAND)

	50.2		44.0		50.0
	VC/		VC/		VC/
	NVA		NVA		NVA
IN THE STATE					
	6.1		4.5		5.7
	U.S.		U.S.		U.S.

MACV STRATEGY

Enemy Withdraws

Enemy Attacks

POPULATION STRATEGIES

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

DECEMBER 1965
PER U.S. MARINE CORPS
SECTION N 874

1 2 3 4


1965

1 2 3 4

1966

1 2 3 4

1967



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority CIA letter AUG 2 1979

By inf, NARS, Date 8-21-79

1 March 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

I. THE COMMUNIST POSITION

How does Hanoi view the present phase of the war; for example, has Hanoi concluded that a protracted conflict is impossible and that it must gain victory this year or collapse?

1. Hanoi's strategy of revolutionary warfare in South Vietnam has always embraced two propositions: to prepare for a protracted struggle and to seek victory in the shortest possible time. From the introduction of large US forces in 1965, through the summer of 1967 the emphasis was on the probability of a prolonged war of attrition. Some backing away from the protracted war theme became evident in captured documents and Hanoi's propaganda later in 1967. In our view the intensity of the Tet offensive and the exertions being made to sustain pressures confirms that Hanoi is now engaged in a major effort to achieve early and decisive results. Yet the Communists probably have no rigid timetable. They apparently have high hopes of achieving their objectives this year, but they will preserve considerable tactical flexibility.

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2. It is still not altogether clear why the Vietnamese Communists chose this course of action at this time. They certainly were not desperate or fearful of early collapse. A reconsideration of their capabilities to succeed in a long war may have been a contributing factor. And they probably regarded the balance of forces as sufficiently favorable to warrant a major and widespread offensive. The fact of Presidential elections in the US may have influenced their decision, and, of course, the tactical advantage of the Tet truce played a role in the immediate timing. In any case, it does not appear that they undertook the present offensive because they had concluded that protracted conflict was no longer feasible for them.

What are the capabilities of the NVA/VC forces to sustain their present offensive, and, if they choose to, continue a prolonged war thereafter?

3. There is no doubt that the Communists have already paid a high price in the present offensive phase. They have not only lost manpower, but also quality resources such as the special units employed in the Tet attacks. Nevertheless, prior to Tet there was apparently a strenuous drive to bring units up to strength with new recruits and upgraded guerrillas. Complete

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guerrilla units also were merged with Local forces to form larger elements. Infiltration of replacements and units from the North has probably been heavier than previously believed. A part of the Main Forces have been withheld from major combat. Finally, an intensive effort to raise new levies is underway in the rural areas, where the Communists now enjoy fuller access. Thus, it is conceivable that the enemy's gross strength is not significantly lower now than it was in the latter part of 1967.

4. The Communist supply position might be a factor limiting combat capabilities in the next few months. Many forces are now deployed away from their bases at the end of longer lines of supply. Expenditures of ammunition and losses of equipment have been relatively high. These factors will be offset in some degree by the extraordinary stockpiling that evidently took place before Tet and by the increased availability of manpower in the countryside which will permit the continued portering of military supplies and food to VC/NVA forces.

5. While not strictly a matter of physical capability, the Communist position is much enhanced, for the time being at least, by their possession of the strategic initiative. Within limits this permits them to choose the time and place of combat and to

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keep US/ARVN forces pinned down and dispersed in static defense of many potential targets.

6. Accordingly, we believe that the NVA/VC forces have the capability to sustain a relatively high level of combat and occasionally to intensify it over the next several months, including rocket and mortar attacks on urban areas and military installations, major battles with US forces and assaults on selected cities. At the same time, the Communists will have resources to consolidate their hold on formerly pacified and contested areas.

7. It is conceivable that the Communists regard the present campaign as so critical to the ultimate outcome of the war that they will commit their full resources to a maximum effort in the near term, even at risk of very high losses. But it is far more likely that they probably will not use their resources in such a reckless manner as to deny themselves the possibility of continuing the struggle well beyond the next several months.

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What is the Communist attitude toward negotiations: in particular how would Hanoi deal with an unconditional cessation of US bombing of NVN and what would be its terms for a settlement?

8. The Communists probably still expect the war to end eventually in some form of negotiations. Since they hope the present military effort will be decisive in destroying the GVN and ARVN, they are not likely to give any serious consideration to negotiations until this campaign has progressed far enough for its results to be fairly clear.

9. If, however, the US ceased the bombing of North Vietnam in the near future, Hanoi would probably respond more or less as indicated in its most recent statements. It would begin talks fairly soon, would accept a fairly wide ranging exploration of issues, but would not moderate its terms for a final settlement or stop fighting in the South.

10. In any talks, Communist terms would involve the establishment of a new "coalition" government, which would in fact if not in appearance be under the domination of the Communists. Secondly, they would insist on a guaranteed withdrawal of US forces within some precisely defined period. Their attitude toward other issues would be dictated by the degree of progress in achieving these two primary objectives, and the military-political situation then obtaining in South Vietnam.

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11. Cessation of bombing and opening of negotiations without significant Communist concessions would be deeply disturbing to the Saigon government. There would be a real risk that the Thieu-Ky regime would collapse, and this would in fact be part of Hanoi's calculation in accepting negotiations.

THE OUTLOOK

What is the likely course of events in South Vietnam over the next 10 months, assuming no change in US policy or force levels?

12. In the assumed circumstances a total military victory by the Allies or the Communists is highly unlikely in the next 10 months. It is manifestly impossible for the Communists to drive US forces out of the country. It is equally out of the question for US/GVN forces to clear South Vietnam of Communist forces. It is possible, however, that the overall situation in this period will take a decisive turn.

13. We think it unlikely that this turn could be in the US/GVN favor. To be sure, Communist forces are now exposed to aggressive counteraction, their supply lines are extended, and some base areas may be vulnerable. Morale may be poor in some of the units which have suffered heavy losses. But we see no

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evidence yet that the GVN/ARVN will be inspired to seize the initiative, go over to the attack, exploit the Communist vulnerabilities, and quickly regain the rural areas. We doubt they have the will and capability to make the effort.

14. Far more likely is an erosion of the ARVN's morale and effectiveness. We do not believe that the GVN will collapse, or that the ARVN will totally disintegrate. But there is a fairly good chance that Communist pressures will result in a serious weakening of the GVN/ARVN apparatus and an end to its effective functioning in parts of the country. In these circumstances, virtually the entire burden of the war would fall on US forces.

15. The Communists too will be weakened by further offensive efforts. Losses will be heavy, combat effectiveness will be lowered, and morale will be damaged by the failure to achieve a complete victory. Even though their situation vis-a-vis the ARVN will be strong, their forces will probably not be in a position to register decisive advances unless they radically escalate the war by an all-out invasion.

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16. In sum, there is a high risk that both the ARVN and GVN will be seriously weakened in the next months, and perhaps decisively so. Our best estimate is that in the assumed circumstances the overall situation 10 months hence will be no better than a standoff.

REACTIONS TO US COURSES OF ACTION

What is the likely NVA/VC strategy over the next 10 months if US forces are increased by 50,000, by 100,000, or by 200,000?

17. We would expect the Communists to continue the war. They still have resources available in North Vietnam and within South Vietnam to increase their troop strength. Their strong logistical effort and their ability to organize and exploit the people under their control in the South enable them to counter US increases by smaller increases of their own. Over a ten-month period the Communists would probably be able to introduce sufficient new units into the South to offset the US maneuver battalion increments of the various force levels given above.

18. We cannot foresee the outcome of future combat resulting from the increase in US forces. The Communists would probably

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have to modify their current tactics, especially if the US increments were large enough to permit the formation of a strategic reserve as well as providing for the partial relief of the ARVN. In some places, they would retreat from the urban areas, trying to hold as much as possible of the countryside.

19. The prospect of heavy US reinforcements might persuade Hanoi to gamble on an all-out invasion from the North to seize Northern I Corps before reinforcements could be committed. It is also possible that the Communists would greatly expand their military pressures in Laos. The purpose of such a move would be to draw off US forces from South Vietnam, and to indicate that, unless the war was ended, the US faced a continued expansion of its commitment.

20. We would not expect the addition of any given number of US troops to change the policy or attitude of the USSR or China. Both would be willing to increase assistance in weaponry and Peking would offer more manpower for North Vietnam. Both would be concerned that the US would still be frustrated and would eventually be led to invade North Vietnam. But neither China nor the USSR would be likely to enter the war in response

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to a US buildup, and neither would be likely to take drastic diversionary moves outside of Vietnam.

21. The general international climate would certainly worsen for the US. There would be greater apprehension that the war in Vietnam would inevitably expand to the point of a US conflict with China, and perhaps even with the USSR. Many countries would blame the US for not trying to negotiate with Hanoi. International pressures for an end to the fighting would increase. At the same time, some US allies in Asia would be relieved that the US chose to reinforce rather than accept an unfavorable political settlement.

What is the likely Communist reaction to a change in US strategy toward greater control over population centers, with or without increased forces?

22. In general the Communists would view this move as a success for their strategy. Their tactical response in such circumstances would depend mainly on the nature of US enclaves. If these were fairly large and embraced much of the outlying countryside, the Communists would believe them to be porous enough to infiltrate and harass, much as they are doing now. If the defensive perimeters were fairly solid, however, the

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Communists would not try to overrun them in frontal assaults. Instead, they would concentrate for a time on consolidating the countryside and isolating the various defended enclaves, in particular interdicting supply lines and forcing the US to undertake expensive supply movements from out of country.

A Communist-controlled regime with a "coalition" facade would be set up in "liberated" areas and attempts at terrorist activity inside the enclaves would be undertaken. Hanoi would hope that a combination of military and political pressure, together with the dim prospect for achievement of the original US aims in the Vietnam struggle, would eventually persuade the US to extricate itself through negotiations.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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DECLASSIFIED
CIA letter AUG 2 1979

Authority
By ind, NARS, Date 8-20-79

29 February 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Communist Alternatives in Vietnam

1. Current Intentions. The Communists probably intend to maintain widespread military pressures in Vietnam for at least the next several months. A special effort will be made to harass urban areas and keep them under threat. They will probably calculate that the US/GVN will be forced to defend the towns and the countryside will be left more vulnerable to Communist domination. At some time, new Communist attacks will probably be launched to seize and hold certain cities and towns. Where conditions appear favorable they will engage US forces, seeking some significant local success which would have a major political return. The total result of their campaign, they hope, will be to so strain the resources of the US and the GVN/ARVN, that the Saigon government will lose control of much of the country and the US will have little choice but to settle the war on Communist terms.

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2. In support of this effort, the Communists are now introducing more new weapons with greater fire power, improving the capacity and security of their supply routes, maintaining a high rate of infiltration, and probably introducing additional NVA units. They are also raising new levies as rapidly as they can in the countryside of South Vietnam in order to sustain the momentum of the recent offensive.

3. Military Alternatives. The broad alternative to the course described above is for the Communists to increase the level of military pressures. For example:

a. The Communists could intensify their offensive by committing almost all of their reserves from North Vietnam. This would be tantamount to an all-out invasion to gain decisive results as quickly as possible. They might be tempted by the prospects of seizing most of I Corps, where a "revolutionary" government would be proclaimed. The prospect of heavy US reinforcements might persuade them to gamble in this way before such US reinforcement could be committed.

b. Short of this radical move, the Communists might believe that the commitment of two or three additional divisions would be

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decisive. They could use such forces in a general offensive in I Corps, which might be coordinated with a countrywide attack similar to 30-31 January. They might do something like this if they believed the situation was so precarious for the GVN that one last push would prove decisive.

The first of these alternatives would probably seem to them far too risky. While the Communists hope for a decisive outcome in their current efforts, we believe they will be careful to maintain reserves in North Vietnam to guard against an invasion and to enable them to continue the war if their offensive should prove indecisive. They could, of course, call on the Chinese to maintain the defense of NVN, but would almost certainly be reluctant to do this. The second alternative is more likely; it may indeed be a part of their plan in the current offensive.

c. Rather than maintaining steady pressures or radically escalating, the Communists might seek out one major battle which promised significant political gains, such as Khe Sanh, the western highlands, or in Saigon. They might believe that an isolated victory would have such profound political repercussions that the war would soon be terminated. The analogy with Dien

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Bien Phu would be uppermost in their minds. Such a move could, of course, be what they intend as the climax to their current campaign.

d. Finally, the Communists could hope to affect the outcome in Vietnam by putting pressures on the US in Laos, where they might expand their current efforts and threaten to overrun most of the country. The purpose of this move would be to persuade the US that the only alternative to ending the war in SVN was its continued expansion.

4. Political Options. Until the military campaign has run its course and the results are fairly clear, it is unlikely that Hanoi will be seriously disposed to consider negotiations with the US. A negotiating ploy is possible, however, at almost any point in the present military campaign. It would be intentionally designed to be difficult for the US to reject. The purpose, however, would not be a serious intent to settle the war, but rather to cause new anxieties in Saigon, which might cause a crisis and lead to the collapse of the Thieu-Ky government.

5. As of now Hanoi probably foresees two alternative sets of circumstances in which a serious move to negotiate a settlement might be entertained:

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a. Obviously, if the military campaign is producing significant successes and the GVN is in serious disarray at some point Hanoi would probably give the US the opportunity to end the war. This might take the form of offering a general ceasefire followed by negotiations on terms which would amount to registering a complete Communist political success.

b. If, on the other hand, the military campaign does not go well and the results are inconclusive, then Hanoi would probably change its military strategy to continue the struggle on a reduced level.

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III-C

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

26 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: The Outlook in Vietnam

DECLASSIFIED
CIA letter AUG 2 1979
Authority
By inf, NARS, Date 8-21-79

1. This Memorandum does not seek to explore all aspects of the situation in Vietnam, or its probable development over a long term. It is addressed only to the specific question put to us, i.e., whether developments in Vietnam are apt to involve a continuation of combat into the indefinite future at a level comparable or higher than current levels, or whether it is more probable that either the VC or the GVN will be unable to sustain such a level beyond a few months.

2. The current phase of combat will have a critical bearing on the further course of the war and may even prove to be decisive. We cannot be sure how long this phase will last, but it seems likely that by early summer the immediate results and the longer term implications will be fairly clear to Hanoi, Saigon, and Washington. At present, the key questions concern:

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(1) the capabilities of the Communist forces to sustain their current challenge, and whether they can continue the fighting thereafter, and (2) the capabilities of the South Vietnamese political and military establishment to cope with the tasks imposed by the present Communist offensive.

Communist Plans and Prospects

3. Hanoi's aims in the present offensive phase are: to register significant military successes against US and especially ARVN forces, and to inflict such heavy losses, physical destruction and disorganization on the GVN as to produce a total situation favorable to a negotiated settlement on Communist terms. The Communists are not likely to have a rigid timetable, but they probably hope to achieve decisive results during the course of the summer. The high importance which Hanoi now attaches to forcing the issue is evident from the risks and costs of the enterprise.

4. The toll on Communist forces has been considerable, even if reported casualties are greatly inflated by inclusion of low level recruits and impressed civilians. To some extent these losses have been offset by measures already taken. Heavy

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infiltration of both new units and replacements from the North is continuing. A strenuous, last minute recruitment effort was made prior to the Tet attacks. A significant part of the guerrilla and Main forces could still be committed. And, at present, the Communists enjoy fuller access to the rural areas, where they are recruiting heavily. They will probably be able to recoup their recent losses, though at some sacrifice in quality.

5. In any case, the Communists probably will maintain their offensive for the next several months and be prepared to accept the high losses this entails. They cannot accept such losses indefinitely, however, and they probably will not be capable soon again of launching repeated mass attacks of the magnitude and widespread scale of 30-31 January. But they are almost certainly capable of sustaining a high level of combat, including major battles with US forces, assaults on selected cities, and rocket and mortar attacks on urban areas and military installations.

6. It is possible that the Communists regard the present campaign as so critical to the outcome of the war that they will commit their full resources to a maximum effort in the near term. On balance, however, we think it likely that even if their present

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push falls short they will wish to be able to sustain a protracted struggle. Hence they will probably not exercise their capabilities in such a profligate manner as to deny themselves the possibility of continuing the struggle should the present phase fail to produce a decisive result.

GVN/ARVN Prospects

7. The will and capability of the GVN and its armed forces remain the keys to the eventual outcome.

8. In the main, the ARVN has acquitted itself fairly well since 30 January, though the record is uneven. Morale has held up on the whole, and we know of no unit defections. However, the ARVN is showing signs of fatigue and in many areas it has now lapsed into a static defensive posture. Security in the countryside has been sharply reduced. A long and costly effort would have to be undertaken to regain the pre-Tet position. It is highly unlikely that the ARVN will be inspired enough or strong enough to make such an effort -- certainly not in the near future.

9. The GVN also performed adequately in the immediate emergency, particularly in the Saigon area. There now appears

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to be a greater recognition of the need to push forward with additional measures, but the Communist challenge has not yet proved a catalyst in stimulating an urgent sense of national unity and purpose.

10. The overall position of the government has been weakened. Its prestige has suffered from the shock of the Tet offensive; its control over the countryside has been greatly reduced. Popular attitudes are confused and contradictory; the Viet Cong received virtually no popular support, but neither was there a rallying to the government side. Passivity is likely to continue as the dominant attitude in most of the population, but further military defeats could cause a sudden swing away from the government. While the central authority in Saigon is unlikely to collapse, its ability to provide energetic leadership throughout the country and all levels is in serious doubt. It is possible that over the next few months certain provinces, especially in I and IV Corps, will be lost to Saigon's effective authority.

11. The psychological factor is now critical for South Vietnam's whole political-military apparatus. The widespread rumors that the US conspired with the Communists are symptomatic

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of popular anxieties over the future course of the war and US attitudes toward a political settlement. As yet, however, there are no signs of a crisis of confidence within the government.

12. If major military reverses occur, the political and military apparatus could degenerate into general ineffectualness. If, on the other hand, US and ARVN regain the initiative and inflict some conspicuous setbacks on the Communists and the general offensive appears to be contained, then the GVN might manifest new energy and confidence and draw new support to itself. On balance, we judge that the chances are no better than even that the GVN/ARVN will emerge from the present phase without being still further weakened.

Alternative Outcomes of Present Phase

13. We believe that the Communists will sustain a high level of military activity for at least the next two or three months. It is difficult to forecast the situation which will then obtain, given the number of unknowable factors which will figure. Our best estimate is as follows:

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
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a. The least likely outcome of the present phase is that the Communist side will expend its resources to such an extent as to be incapable thereafter of preventing steady advances by the US/GVN.

b. Also unlikely, though considerably less so, is that the GVN/ARVN will be so critically weakened that it can play no further significant part in the military and political prosecution of the struggle.

c. More likely than either of the above is that the present push will be generally contained, but with severe losses to both the GVN and Communist forces, and that a period will set in during which neither will be capable of registering decisive gains.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:



ABBOT SMITH
Chairman

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority STATE letter MAR 14 1979
By if, NARS, Date 6-25-79

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IV-A

NECESSARY CHANGES IN THE GVN

- A. Mobilization for the War Effort in Vietnam. The Vietnamese Armed Forces should be increased to the maximum number consistent with ability to train and supply them. With the draft of 19 and 18 year olds and the retention of men under arms for longer periods it should be possible to increase substantially the number of Vietnamese under arms. We should not set any particular limit on this number but should be prepared to support the maximum possible. Given the sense of emergency that has gripped the Vietnamese over the past month it should be relatively easy to bring about a more rational use of manpower. Waste should be eliminated and it will be easier to avoid the use of resources for non-war purposes. Economic stabilization measures which will head off inflationary pressures must be taken, including increased taxes and improved fiscal management.
- B. Anti-Corruption Drive. A new drive affecting corrupt practices should be pushed with greater urgency than has been apparent to date.
- C. Drive on the Viet Cong Infrastructure. Operation Phoenix which is targetted against the Viet Cong must be pursued more vigorously in closer liaison with the US. Vietnamese armed forces should be devoted to anti-infrastructure activities on a priority basis. The Tet offensive surfaced a good deal of the infrastructure and the opportunity to damage it has never been better. This would force the VC on the defensive and head off the establishment of local VC administrative organizations and VC attempts to set up provisional governmental committees.
- D. Unity of Leadership and Political Effectiveness. We can no longer accept the disunity and lack of cohesive action that has continued to plague the top levels of the Vietnamese Government. The failure of

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State Dept/2 March 1968

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Thieu and Ky to cooperate fully and apply their individual talents to the needs of the situation has continued to plague the effective management of the Vietnamese effort. In turn this has had ramifications down the line in both the military and civilian chain of command. It has also complicated the chances of rallying the various elements in the society, as the rivalry translates itself into interference with attempts at forming a national anti-communist front.

To whatever extent we may or may not increase the level of US forces the requirement for unified effective Vietnamese actions remains. Thieu and Ky and their followers as well as other elements in the society not associated directly with them, must be brought to realize that we are no longer prepared to put up with anything but the maximum effort on their part. There is a role for each of them and those roles must be played without the bickering and backbiting that has been all too common. Our expectations in this regard have to be made crystal clear to each and every Vietnamese leader in and out of Government. This is a task for all elements of the US Mission, civilian and military. We must find some way to break the bottleneck of personal rivalry and governmental inaction that has plagued us for the past six months. Without this fundamental change in the attitude and dedication of the leadership the necessary reforms and the necessary inspiration of the Vietnamese people will not be forthcoming quickly or sufficiently.

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ANALYSIS OF COMUSMACV FORCE
REQUIREMENTS AND ALTERNATIVES (TS)

1 MARCH 1968

ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
PLANS AND POLICY DIRECTORATE
SHORT RANGE BRANCH, J-5

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-2-78 letter

By if, NARS, Date 3-19-79

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Appendix A	Detailed Threat Assessment	

FOREWORD

At the direction of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and under the supervision of the Director, Joint Staff the Short Range Branch, Plans and Policy Directorate, Joint Staff was directed to analyse the military implications of several military courses of action proposed to defeat the enemy offensive and regain the initiative in Vietnam.

Representatives of each of the Services, other organizations of the OJCS, and other Joint Staff Directorates were made available and provided inputs to the study.

This study has not been addressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or by any of the Military Services individually.

SECTION I - PURPOSE

A. The Problem. To provide military advice on the military implications of several courses of action to defeat the enemy offensive and to regain the initiative in Vietnam.

B. Study Objectives. The study examines five alternative military courses of action. Each is examined as to its ability to attain the following military objectives:

1. First, to counter the enemy offensive and to destroy or neutralize the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) invasion force in the north.

2. Second, to restore security in the cities and towns.

3. Third, to restore security in the heavily populated area of the countryside.

4. Fourth, to regain the initiative through offensive operations.

C. Examination of the Options. The following questions are posed which bring out the significance of each of the options examined:

5. What military objectives are advanced by the option (in six months; 12 months)?

6. What specific dangers is the option designed to avoid (in six months; 12 months)?

7. What specific goals does the option achieve (in six months; 12 months)?

8. Does it achieve the objectives? If not, where does it fall short? What modifications of strategy and/or objectives are indicated?

9. What personnel and procurement actions are required to support the option?

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I-1

I-1

10. What specific units will be deployed and what time
schedule? 1
2

11. How are these forces generated, and what combat forces
remain in the CONUS? 3
4

12. What are the estimated dollar costs? 5

D. Conclusion. After this examination (of the pros and cons), 6
the options are compared in order to provide a conclusion as to 7
which of the options is the most advantageous from the military 8
viewpoint. 9

SECTION II

SUMMARY

1. The enemy, since November, has increased his forces in South Vietnam by at least 41 maneuver battalions, some armored elements, a large number of rockets, and additional artillery. There are indications he is preparing for the use of limited air support, including logistical air drops and bombing missions.

2. In the MACV proposal (options 1 and 1A), the number of maneuver battalions provided roughly offsets the increase in enemy forces. In the lesser options, the enemy buildup is not matched. Furthermore, there are indications now that additional enemy forces are on the move to RVN.

3. The basic strategy which must be followed by MACV in any circumstances is to defeat the current enemy offensive both in Northern I Corps Tactical Zone where it is the most formidable, in the Highlands where it is highly dangerous, and throughout South Vietnam in defense of the government and the cities and towns. In many places, allied forces have lost the initiative to the enemy. They are meeting the threat in the I Corps Tactical Zone, are in a marginal position in II CTZ, and elsewhere are committing the bulk of the South Vietnamese forces to the defense of cities and towns. Allied forces are not conducting offensive operations of any great magnitude or frequency and therefore they are not wresting control of the countryside from the enemy.

4. Under the smaller options, that is the current force plus 6 battalions already deployed (Option 2), or Option 3 which provides an additional 6 battalions within the 50,000 strength add on, the capability to meet the enemy offensive is definitely

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increased; however, this added capability may well be required 1
in the II Corps Tactical Zone alone. It may permit MACV to 2
break loose a small airborne or air cavalry reserve to conduct 3
reaction or limited offensive operations. The intermediate 4
Option 4 of 100,000 additional troops should permit the con- 5
stitution of about a one-division reserve which could rein- 6
force in any threatened area such as Khe Sanh or the Highlands 7
or could undertake slightly expanded offensive operations. 8
As long as the enemy employs the forces now available to him 9
in synchronized attacks, it is not realistic to believe that 10
this size force can guarantee security throughout South 11
Vietnam's rural areas. However, the accomplishment of this 12
mission of providing security in the populated countryside 13
also depends very heavily on the speed with which Vietnamese 14
forces recover and the effectiveness with which they are able 15
to operate. 16

5. If the enemy offensive can be broken with sustained 17
heavy casualties, then, and only then, will the cities be 18
secure and the countryside reentered. Even with the largest 19
force contemplated (Option 1) it will not be possible to 20
perform adequately all of the tasks unless the current enemy 21
offensive is decisively defeated. This, therefore, is the 22
first and most important task upon which all else depends. 23
If the offensive can be broken, then all of the other tasks 24
become possible with the forces in Option 1. 25

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II-24

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6. It is not possible to predict whether the forces now 1
available in Vietnam will be able to break the offensive with- 2
out additional help, considering the magnitude of the enemy 3
buildup and his clear willingness to expend forces with small 4
regard for casualties. Military prudence requires that we 5
react and respond to his escalation and initiative. The 6
larger and faster our response the better. It is not possible 7
to draw clear and compelling distinctions between the effects 8
to be expected from the incremental differences in the various 9
options. 10

7. If the forces now in Vietnam or the forces under any of 11
the options prove to be inadequate to break the enemy offen- 12
sive, or if, conversely, the enemy sustained offensive breaks 13
the Vietnamese armed forces (even short of destroying the GVN), 14
then our objectives in South Vietnam and the tasks associated 15
with them will be unobtainable. Specifically, we would be 16
unable to regain the initiative, that is, we would not be 17
able to conduct offensive operations at the scope and pace 18
required either to prevent further enemy buildup or to reenter 19
the countryside. This would force US and allied forces into 20
a defensive posture around the major population centers. 21

8. The major risks involved in such circumstances are: 22

a. Enemy forces would retain the initiative and could 23
move a number of divisions now tied down along the borders 24
and around the Khe Sanh against the populated areas where 25
their attacks by fire would be demoralizing. 26

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II-3

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b. By holding the countryside, enemy (particularly VC) 1
strength would increase. 2

c. The enemy could consolidate both geographic areas and 3
segments of the population and probably could establish a 4
credible Revolutionary Government which, as a minimum, 5
would be a strong position for a negotiated settlement, but 6
more importantly might bring about the collapse of the GVN 7
and the removal of any reason for US troops to remain in 8
South Vietnam. 9

9. Therefore, immediate action to break the enemy's 10
current offensive is not only the first but the decisive 11
requirement. 12

10. In each of the options discussed in the following 13
sections, sizeable support forces are included which will 14
provide support not only for the additional combat troops 15
but also for those of the recent (Feb '68) emergency deploy- 16
ments and the additional light ROK division soon to be deployed 17

(NOTE: The analysis of each of the options assumed the 18
approval, by separate action, of deferral of the civiliani- 19
zation program as prescribed in Program 5. This provided 20
an authorized base-point strength level of 537,500 21
(525,000 Program 5 troop level PLUS an additional 12,500 22
spaces provided by deferral of the civilianization program). 23
Each of the force levels examined are additive to the 24
amended Program 5 force level of 537,500.) 25

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II-4

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SUMMARY OF PROPOSED OPTIONS

ACTION	PROGRAM/ OPTION	STRENGTH			MANEUVER BATTALIONS		TACTICAL FIGHTER SQ	
		Old Total	Add-On	New Total	Add-On	New Total	Add On	New Total
1. None	Program 5	525,000		525,000	-	106	-	32
2. Approve deferral of civilization program and amend Program 5 authorized levels.	Revised Program 5	525,000	12,500	537,500	-	-		
3. Emergency Deployment authorized on 12 Feb 68. Approve deployment of residual non-deployed Program 5 TFS.	Option 2	537,500	10,700	548,200	6	112	3	35
4. Deploy an additional 50,000 personnel above Option 2.	Option 3	548,200	50,000	598,200	6	118	3	38
5. Deploy an additional 100,000 personnel above Option 2.	Option 4	548,200	100,000	648,200	12	124	8	43
6. Deploy an additional 194,200 personnel above revised Program 5 (2 above)	Option 1	537,500	194,200	731,700	27	133	15	47

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SUMMARY OF ESTIMATED COSTS AND PERSONNEL STRENGTHS

OPTION	COSTS (MILLIONS)		RESERVE CALLUP	ACTIVE FORCE INCREASE	TOTAL END STRENGTH INCREASE
	FY 68	FY 69			
<u>ON I & IA</u>					
cy 194,200	A \$1,116.0	\$2,388.6	A 160,000	138,300	298,300 A
Bns	N 188.2	289.5	N 13,900	7,200	21,100 N
TFS	AF 689.4	943.4	AF 17,874	24,772	42,646 AF
	MC 206.9	670.0	MC 56,400	71,230	127,630 MC
TOTAL	\$2,200.5	\$4,291.5	248,174	241,502	489,676
<u>ON II</u>					
gency Deploy- of 12 Feb plus 5 TFS (3)	A \$ 356.7	\$ 351.3	A 32,000	104,173	136,173 A
	N 20.8	26.6	N 3,500	200	3,700 N
	AF 184.3	174.3	AF 3,495	16,682	20,177 AF
	MC 118.0	204.4	MC 25,200	25,247	50,447 MC
TOTAL	679.8	756.6	64,195	146,302	210,497
<u>ON III</u>					
cy 50,000	A \$ 455.5	\$ 686.0	A 45,000	107,194	152,194 A
Bns	N 42.0	96.6	N 6,700	2,130	8,830 N
TFS	AF 216.4	201.2	AF 3,595	18,407	22,002 AF
	MC 128.0	515.5	MC 32,854	42,594	75,448 MC
TOTAL	841.9	1,399.3	88,149	170,325	258,474
<u>ON IV</u>					
cy 100,000	A \$ 603.2	\$1,156.2	A 90,000	130,892	220,892 A
Bns	N 62.3	78.8	N 8,400	3,000	11,400 N
TFS	AF 339.7	568.5	AF 8,101	20,578	28,679 AF
	MC 201.5	644.0	MC 56,400	30,048	86,448 MC
TOTAL	1,206.7	2,447.5	162,901	184,518	347,419

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SPREADSHEET SUMMARY OF OPTIONS
EFFECT ON MACV OBJECTIVES

OPTIONS	CONCEPT	SECURITY OF CITIES AND GVN	SECURITY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE	DEFENSE OF THE BORDERS, THE DMZ, AND NORTHERN I CTZ	OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS	CONCLUSIONS (To Defeat the VC/NVA in SVN)
<p>7. Add approximately 196,000 to the present MACV Program 5 authorized level (525,000) plus 6 additional bns already deployed (10,500). Relaxation of restrictions on operations in Cambodia/Laos/NVN.</p> <p>TOTAL - 133 maneuver bns</p>	<p>Priority of tasks for US forces:</p> <p>a. Prevent repetition of Tet offensive by insuring security of cities and thus guarantee the security of the GVN.</p> <p>b. Defeat the NVN invasion force and deny the northern provinces to enemy.</p> <p>c. Reestablish security of countryside.</p> <p>d. Establish theater reserve of approximately two divisions.</p>	<p>In 6 Mos. Scty of Saigon provincial capitals & GVN assured, periodic standoff attacks possible. Enemy major force attack still possible but enemy unable to seize and hold objectives.</p> <p>In 12 Mos. Threat to cities & GVN further reduced.</p>	<p>In 6 Mos. Enemy can still control large portions of countryside since additional forces probably used in higher priority tasks. Release of ARVN forces for use in countryside may provide some increased security.</p> <p>In 12 Mos. Expanded allied operations should provide favorable trends in security of countryside.</p>	<p>In 6 Mos. Present danger in ICTZ substantially reduced by increased troop strength theater reserve, improved LOC and operations into NVN, Cambodia, and Laos.</p> <p>In 12 Mos. Current enemy offensive broken although not necessarily a decisive defeat for enemy in ICTZ. LOC in I CTZ fully satisfactory.</p>	<p>In 6 Mos. Offensive operations infrequent and small-scale since additional forces applied to higher priority tasks.</p> <p>In 12 Mos. Arrival of remainder of forces permits increased tempo of offensive operations. These operations more productive due to removal of restraints resulting in reduced size and effectiveness of enemy forces encountered.</p>	<p>This Option would:</p> <p>a. Assuming no additional deployments break enemy offensive and permit early and sustained operations against the enemy.</p> <p>b. Permit simultaneous operations against enemy main force, base areas, and border sanctuaries.</p> <p>c. Permit resumption of program to develop effectiveness of RVNAF.</p> <p>d. Permit greater employment of air assets in conducting an expanded air campaign against NVN, Laos, Cambodia.</p>
<p>I-A</p> <p>Same additive forces as Option I.</p> <p>No relaxation of restrictions on operations.</p>	<p>Priority of tasks same as Option I but effectiveness US forces would be reduced by restrictions which permit enemy sanctuary resulting in larger better org'd, equipped & supported enemy forces. Would require larger US forces in ICTZ resulting in smaller or nonexistent theater reserve.</p>	<p>No appreciable difference from Option I.</p>	<p>Slower progress than in Option I due to greater effectiveness of enemy forces not subjected to expanded offensive operations against their LOC and sanctuaries in Cambodia, Laos, and NVN.</p>	<p>Same improved allied posture as in Option I but restriction on operations across borders prevents optimum offensive actions.</p>	<p>Essentially same as Option I except that restrictions against out-of-country LOC and border sanctuaries limit attrition against enemy forces and thus reduce allied forces effectiveness.</p>	<p>Essentially the same as Option I except:</p> <p>a. The rate of conducting operations would be reduced by higher military risk.</p> <p>b. The enemy would enjoy sanctuary across the Cambodian/Laotian/NVN borders.</p> <p>c. The rebuilding of the RVNAF would be at a slower pace.</p>
<p>II</p> <p>No change to present MACV Program 5 authorized level (525,000) plus 6 additional bns already deployed (10,500).</p> <p>TOTAL - 112 maneuver bns</p>	<p>Priority of tasks for US forces:</p> <p>a. Security of GVN in Saigon, provincial capitals, and northern I CTZ.</p> <p>b. Over 50 percent maneuver bns required in I CTZ.</p> <p>ARVN would be supported to the extent required to reduce the threat to the security of cities and GVN.</p>	<p>In 6 Mos. Allies control Saigon, GVN still exist occasional enemy maj atk periodic standoff fire. Poss temp loss some district & prov capitals.</p> <p>In 12 Mos. For isolation Cities, high prob enemy cont many prov capitals. Poss confinement GVN path to largest cities.</p>	<p>In 6 Mos. Enemy can retain present control, recruit and gain strength, could consolidate political control.</p> <p>In 12 Mos. Enemy can control majority of countryside. Allied presence and GVN control only in most populated areas.</p>	<p>In 6 Mos. Major battle may have been fought. Even if not, large allied forces may still be required. Without theater reserve, serious difficulty may arise in countering synchronized series of attacks.</p> <p>In 12 Mos. Enemy can reinforce further in I CTZ and other borders.</p>	<p>In 6 Mos. Allied forces lacking a theater Reserve would be able to conduct only infrequent and small-scale operations.</p> <p>In 12 Mos. Increased VC/NVN strength in countryside would make allied operations more difficult.</p>	<p>US objectives in SVN cannot be achieved as allied forces must remain in defensive posture.</p> <p>At present levels, allied forces can expect increasingly grave threats to their security with high casualty rates.</p>
<p>III</p> <p>Add 50,000 US troops to approximately 535,000 in Option II.</p> <p>TOTAL - 118 maneuver bns</p>	<p>Priority of tasks same as Option II except additional troops would:</p> <p>a. Reduce enemy threats to security of GVN.</p> <p>b. Increase allied capability to open and maintain LOC.</p> <p>c. Provide elements of air-borne or air cavalry units for use as contingency Reserve.</p> <p>Security of countryside would still be tenuous.</p>	<p>In 6 Mos. Allies in full control Saigon & Prov capitals, GVN in firmer control population areas. Rare enemy maj force atks periodic standoff fire. Enemy has capability to temporarily seize portions of maj cities.</p> <p>In 12 Mos. No change.</p>	<p>In 6 Mos. Enemy can still control large portion of countryside. Additional allied forces probably not employed in clearing countryside.</p> <p>In 12 Mos. No change from 6 Mos.</p>	<p>In 6 Mos. No capability to inflict major defeat on enemy in ICTZ but probably no serious allied reverse possible.</p> <p>In 12 Mos. No change from 6 Mos.</p>	<p>In 6 Mos. Only infrequent and small-scale offensive operations possible.</p> <p>In 12 Mos. Little change from the six months situation.</p>	<p>This option could probably secure the cities but would be insufficient to counter the current enemy offensive or to restore security in the countryside.</p>
<p>IV</p> <p>Add 100,000 to the approximately 535,000 in Option II.</p> <p>TOTAL - 124 maneuver bns</p>	<p>Highest priority tasks for US forces could be accomplished satisfactorily with 100,000 additional troops.</p> <p>Possible to constitute 1 division reserve for reaction force.</p> <p>Begin to reestablish security in the countryside.</p> <p>A measure of allied initiative would be restored.</p>	<p>In 6 Mos. Scty Saigon provin capitals & GVN assured, periodic standoff atks possible. Enemy major force attack still possible but enemy unable to seize & hold objectives.</p> <p>In 12 Mos. Threat to cities & GVN further reduced.</p>	<p>In 6 Mos. No change from Option I.</p> <p>In 12 Mos. Extension of security in the countryside will have commenced with favorable trends. Probably no large additional areas brought under GVN control yet.</p>	<p>In 6 Mos. Theater reserve and additional LOC support materially improves allied capability in ICTZ.</p> <p>In 12 Mos. Sound defensive posture for allied forces in ICTZ but still no capability to decisively defeat enemy.</p>	<p>In 6 Mos. Offensive operations still infrequent and small-scale since additional forces would be applied to higher priority tasks.</p> <p>In 12 Mos. Larger offensive operations would have been commenced but not at a level that would impact decisively on the enemy.</p>	<p>The results of this Option are essentially the same as Option I, except:</p> <p>a. The rate of progress would be slower.</p> <p>b. The enemy would retain the initiative in the border areas.</p>

SECTION III - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. It is concluded that: 1

1. Additional deployments to Southeast Asia should commence 2
as soon as possible in order to defeat the present enemy offen- 3
sive, improve the security of allied forces in South Vietnam, 4
and regain the initiative. 5

2. The larger forces of Option I and IA will greatly 6
reduce risks to Free World forces in SVN and will accomplish 7
US objectives more rapidly than the forces of the other 8
options. 9

3. Restrictions on military operations in Southeast Asia 10
have prevented the most effective application of allied 11
military power. 12

4. The current capability to respond appropriately to 13
additional force requirements is extremely limited. 14

5. Deficiencies in personnel, equipment, and facilities 15
cannot be overcome in time under present policies and pro- 16
cedures, and requires extraordinary measures to accelerate 17
procurement and production. 18

B. It is recommended that: 19

1. Immediate actions be taken to provide forces of Option 20
1; specifically: 21

a. Extension beyond 30 June 1968 of the authority to 22
order to active duty units of the Ready Reserve for a 23
period not to exceed 24 months; 24

b. Authority to order to active duty individual members 25
of the Ready Reserve for a period not to exceed 24 months. 26

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c. Authority to extend for a period not to exceed 12 months: enlistments, appointments, periods of active duty, periods of active duty for training, periods of obligated service, or other military status, in any component of the Armed Forces of the United States;

d. Obtain selective industrial mobilization as required to accomplish production of material necessary to equip and sustain forces for the prosecution of the war.

e. Immediately accelerate procurement, to include delegation of authority to the Services to negotiate non-competitive cost reimbursable contracts.

2. Restraints on military operations in Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam be removed.

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III.

SECTION IV - THE THREAT

Summary. Developments in the past month indicate that the communists have shifted to a more intensified level of military activity in South Vietnam and Laos designed to influence the outcome of the war. Indications are that a continuation of this high level of activity is planned in South Vietnam with complementary intensifications of military actions in North Vietnam and Laos.

Despite recent heavy losses, the VC/NVA is capable of conducting major attacks in widespread border areas of South Vietnam and continuing attacks against urban areas and district and provincial capitals, although probably on a more selective basis and reduced scale. It is estimated that the VC/NVA have adequate supplies to support major attacks and countrywide pressure.

At a maximum, within the next three to six months, the VC/NVA could capture and control some of the major cities or towns and cause a deterioration of GVN authority in the countryside and some urban areas. Apart from selective attacks on cities and towns, it appears that the VC/NVA plan to conduct sustained operations along more conventional lines throughout I CTZ, including Khe Sanh and other strong points along the DMZ. They will also be heavily engaged in consolidating their position in the countryside. Overall enemy actions appear designed to bring about the fall of the GVN and to create a situation in which US presence would be politically untenable.

Military actions in North Vietnam appear designed to 1
support the increased activity in the south, and possibly to 2
include aerial harassment in northern South Vietnam. In Laos, 3
the enemy expansion of activity appears designed to divert 4
attention from the main battlefield in South Vietnam and bring 5
increased pressure on US-Thai-Laotian relations, creating, 6
perhaps, a demand for US military support in Laos and Thailand. 7
(See Appendix A for detailed discussion of enemy capabilities 8
and probably future courses of action.) 9

SECTION IV - THE THREAT

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IV-1

SECTION V - OPTION 1

1. Option 1. Add approximately 196,000 troops to present total 1
authorized force level, i.e., Program 5 (525,000), plus the six 2
additional battalions already deployed (10,500). This gives 3
COMUSMACV 133 maneuver battalions - 25 more than now in country. 4
Under this option, restrictions currently imposed on air and ground 5
operations in Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam are relaxed to 6
permit destruction of the ports, mining of waterways, attack of 7
complete target system and offensive operations against Viet Cong/ 8
North Vietnamese Army forces which threaten South Vietnam. 9

2. Concept. The heart of the concept of operations is to defeat 10
the current enemy offensive throughout South Vietnam while taking 11
all necessary measures to keep the Government of Vietnam intact and 12
operating. Once this has been accomplished then the initiative can 13
be regained and the accomplishment of all necessary tasks will be 14
possible. In support of concept, forces are provided to match the 15
November - December buildup of North Vietnamese Army forces in 16
South Vietnam, to constitute a theater reserve of sufficient size 17
both to meet contingencies and take advantage of opportunities, and 18
to provide assistance and encouragement of ARVN forces to move out 19
from the population centers and reestablish security in the country-
side. Removal of restrictions under this option would permit the
attack of previously unauthorized target systems, including the 22
ports; the removal of geographical restrictions on the air/naval 23
campaign against North Vietnam; the destruction of all military 24
targets in North Vietnam regardless of location of proximity to 25
population centers. 26

3. Effect on MACV Objectives 27

a. Security of Cities and the Government of Vietnam 28

(1) In six months, sufficiently large portions of the 29
additional forces would have been in-country long enough 30

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V-1

VI

to have provided sufficient support to the RVNAF to substantially reduce the threat of major enemy attack on South Vietnam cities in the Tet pattern. The security of Saigon and provincial capitals and the Government of Vietnam would be virtually assured although periodic attacks by fire could be expected. The enemy would still have the capability of massing its forces for occasional attacks against key objectives, but would be unable to enter the cities in force. Standoff attacks by fire would continue to be made with regularity.

(2) In 12 months, with the entire additive force closed in-country and, assuming no additional enemy forces are deployed, the threat to the security of the cities and the Government of Vietnam would be further reduced as the extension of security into the countryside reduced the likelihood of standoff attacks by fire.

b. Security of the Countryside

(1) In six months, the enemy may still be in control of large portions of the South Vietnam countryside. Those additional forces which would be able to close within six months would be applied to higher priority tasks and therefore would not provide a capability to change appreciably the present situation with respect to Viet Cong contested and controlled areas. However, the arrival of additional US forces, even though not committed directly to the support of the pacification program, would encourage the ARVN to expand their operations in the countryside, thus providing a certain measure of increased security for pacification.

(2) In 12 months, the generally higher level of security provided by expanding US operations against Viet Cong/North Vietnam Army main forces would have made a more direct contribution to the extension of security in the countryside. It is likely, therefore, that markedly favorable trends would have been established by that time.

c. Defense of the Borders, the DMZ, and the Northern 1
Provinces 2

(1) In six months, the present danger to US/Government of 3
Vietnam/Free World Military Assistance Force in I CTZ would 4
be substantially reduced. This would be the result of increased 5
US combat strength there and also of expanded offensive opera- 6
tions against the enemy in North Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos; 7
the achievement of a fully satisfactory logistical posture 8
within I CTZ; and the constitution of a substantial theater 9
reserve. 10

(2) In 12 months, assuming no additional enemy deployments, 11
the current enemy offensive would have been broken. The 12
logistical situation, would have become fully satisfactory. 13
The higher allied force levels in I CTZ would not necessarily 14
lead to early decisive defeat of the substantial enemy forces 15
there, given the proximity of North Vietnam and major enemy 16
reinforcements. Allied forces should find it possible to take 17
the offensive in selected areas, particularly as they can be 18
reinforced by the theater reserve. However, the requirements 19
to reinforce in other threatened areas, as in the case of the 20
II CTZ at present, would tend to limit the availability of the 21
theater reserve. 22

d. Offensive Operations 23

(1) In six months, the additional forces which have arrived 24
in-country would have largely been applied to higher priority 25
tasks and, therefore, offensive operations would still be 26
relatively infrequent and on a relatively modest scale. 27

(2) In 12 months, the arrival in-country of the remainder 28
of additive forces under this option would have permitted an 29
increasing tempo of offensive operations. These operations, 30
providing an increasing measure of protection from attacks 31

by Viet Cong/North Vietnam Army main force units, would make an important contribution of the pacification program. The effect of removal of restraints on allied offensive operations in North Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos for periods approaching a year would be manifested in the reduced size and effectiveness of enemy forces encountered in South Vietnam. Offensive operations against these forces would therefore be increasingly productive.

4. Analysis

a. Advantages. This option offers a steady, and probably accelerating, rate of progress toward the achievement of US objectives in South Vietnam. It permits the support of the large additive US forces in South Vietnam by an expanded campaign of pressures against enemy forces and war-supporting facilities in North Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, thus further increasing their effectiveness as compared with that of the enemy forces they confront in South Vietnam.

b. Dangers. This option substantially reduces the dangers inherent in the present situation in Vietnam.

5. Strategic Modifications. If Option 1 is selected, no modification is required of the objectives of defeating the enemy offensive and destruction of security in the cities and in the more heavily populated areas of the countryside, and regaining of the initiative through offensive action. Authorities provided to attack enemy forces and base areas in Cambodia, Laos, and Southern North Vietnam under this option would permit a more rapid reduction in the enemy's offensive capability.

6. Conclusions. Provision of the forces and authorities envisaged under Option 1 would:

a. Assuming no additional enemy deployments, break enemy offensive, and permit early and sustained offensive operations against enemy forces depleted during recent operations.

b. Permit simultaneous operations against enemy main forces
and base areas in SVN and against sanctuary areas across the
NVN, Cambodia, and Laotian borders.

c. Permit rapid resumption of the program to develop a fully
effective RVNAF, thus hastening the time when RVNAF can as-
sume a more significant portion of the military load.

7. Required Personnel Actions

a. All Services

(1) Extend terms of service for a period not to exceed
12 months for all components.

(2) Authorize callup of Reserve component units.

(3) Authorize callup of individual reservists.

b. Army. More personnel will be deployed with only 90 days
ETS, and the base tour will fall well below 12 months for many
skills. USARV must be authorized additional military manpower
spaces (9,595) to compensate for absorbing cancellation of
civilianization program in the Republic of Vietnam. Additional
Reserves must be called up in FY 1969 to replace those deployed
and restore short-tour ratio for DFEs to 1:1. USAREUR and
STRAF will be further drawn down initially to support this
option.

Reserve Callup	160,000	
Active Army Increase	<u>138,300</u>	
TOTAL End Strength Increase	298,300	

c. Navy. To provide for the Navy share of the in-country
strength increase (13,311) will require other increases in out
of country forces to provide the sustaining base for this
increased deployment.

Reserve callup	12,000	
Defer release of Reserve and extend enlistments	4,300	
Increased recruiting	<u>5,000</u>	
TOTAL Increase	21,300	

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d. Air Force. The present undergraduate pilot/navigator training program is inadequate to meet Air Force needs. A program increase of 625 pilots and 200 navigators is needed beginning FY 1969. These levels will provide an annual output of 4,312 pilots and 1,059 navigators. Call to active duty from Reserve/ANG forces three tactical fighter wing headquarters, five tactical airlift groups, one aeromedical airlift wing headquarters, two aeromedical airlift groups, one air postal group, six aerial port squadrons, four aeromedical evacuation squadrons, five medical service squadrons and eight medical service flight.

e. Marine Corps

Reserve callup 56,400

Active Marine Corps Increase

Total strength increase

8. Force Generation. See spreadsheet.

9. Forces Remaining in CONUS

<u>Active</u>	<u>DFEs</u>	<u>TFS</u>
---------------	-------------	------------

Army	6-1/3	
------	-------	--

Marine Corps		
--------------	--	--

Air Force		
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<u>Reserve Component</u>		
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Army	4-1/3	
------	-------	--

Marine Corps	0	
--------------	---	--

Air Force		
-----------	--	--

10. Logistic Implications

a. Materiel availability is the most critical pacing factor related to Option I. In order to increase significantly the rate of military production to support forces required for this alternative, it will be necessary to obtain supplemental appropriations, accelerated production, and resort to selective industrial mobilization. Executive or Congressional action must be taken immediately if military production requirements are to be met on a timely basis.

b. The best index of the limitations imposed upon the military under the current rate of industrial production are the production lead times for major military end items.

(1) Helicopters - 12 to 18 Months. Without industrial mobilization, there is no "get-well" date for helicopter deliveries at this time.

(2) Ammunition - 6 to 19 Months. Longest lead-time ground-ammunition items are those now produced at the maximum rate with available facilities. To increase production significantly, facilities must be expanded.

(3) Communications/Electronic Equipment - 15 to 18 Months. There are significant shortages which will not be alleviated until the 1970-1971 time period at the present rate of production.

(4) Aircraft. Current aircraft production schedules result in lead times of 18 to 24 months for aircraft other than helicopters. Under mobilization, accelerated deliveries would commence in eight months for A-37 aircraft and 12 months for F-4E aircraft from commencement of maximum effort. Aircraft engines are one of the major pacing long lead-time items. The examples given above are illustrative of major logistic problem areas.

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c. The following are priority items for which increased production is considered necessary to sustain support of forces considered in this course of action:

- (1) Helicopters
- (2) Aircraft
- (3) Communications/Electronic Equipment
- (4) Ground Ammunition, Naval Gun Ammunition and Explosives
- (5) Earthmoving and Materials Handling Equipment
- (6) Spare Parts
- (7) Vehicles
- (8) Air-launched Missiles
- (9) Small Arms (M-16 Rifle)

d. Industrial mobilization is required not only to fill the materiel needs of the existing US Active and Reserve structure, but also to replenish stocks drawdown from other US forces to support these deployments and to provide the required industrial production capacity. Foremost in magnitude of the drawdowns are those associated with our war reserve operational projects and pre-positioned stocks. Restoration of the CONUS-sustaining base will be required. The mobilization reserves of clothing, construction items, and general supplies are below required levels. While the lead-times for these items are not as long as those associated with major equipment, funds should be made available to reconstitute these reserves.

e. The RVNAF Modernization Program must be supported. Delays have occurred in providing the RVNAF with quantities of M16 rifles and M79 grenade launchers required to meet requirements. COMUSMACV has indicated an immediate requirement for an additional 268,000 M16 rifles, and 11,200 M79 launchers. In addition, a shortage of M60 machine guns; M72 light anti-tank weapons, and M29 mortars exists.

f. To support additional planned force deployments 1
additional funds will be required to provide additional 2
facilities, battle damage repair in SVN, LOC and port 3
improvements. 4

g. As a consequence of the above, it is essential that 5
the four steps listed below be taken as soon as possible: 6

(1) Authorize limited or selective industrial 7
mobilization. 8

(2) Authorize the expenditure of funds to provide 9
additional facilities, tooling, and procurement of long lead- 10
time items required by manufacturers and related subcon- 11
tractors for accelerated production and to provide 12
additional industrial repair capacity. 13

(3) Establish and maintain increased production rates 14
until initial equipment requirements, drawdowns from 15
Reserve units, and pre-positioned war reserve stocks have 16
been brought up to the authorized levels worldwide. 17

(4) Provide additional funds for the Military 18
Construction Program in SVN. 19

h. Operations in areas other than SVN would require 20
an improvement and extension of the land LOC's. The magnitude 21
of the increased construction effort to provide the required 22
LOCs would be dependent upon the magnitude and duration of 23
proposed operations and the distance of those operations from 24
existing bases. 25

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12. Estimated Dollar Costs (Millions)

	<u>FY 1968</u>	<u>FY 1969</u>	
Army ^{2/}	540.6	1,904.1	3
Navy	188.2	289.5	4
Air Force	689.4	943.4	5
Marine Corps	<u>195.3^{1/}</u>	<u>897.0^{1/}</u>	6
TOTAL	1,613.5	4,034.0	7

^{1/} 16.8 in FY 1968 and 147.0 in FY 1969 for reconstitution of equipping Reserve squadrons with combat capable aircraft 8
^{2/} Does not reflect cost for civilian manpower spaces required 10
to support add-on forces. 11

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IIQ

OPTION 1 AND 1A FORCES

Provide an increase of approximately 194,000 spaces over that currently authorized under Program 5.

REQUIREMENT				SERVICE STAFF RECOMMENDATION					REMARKS
ITEM	No	Strength	Date Req	Item	No	Strength	Date Available to Deploy	Source	
<u>ARMY</u>	<u>Bns</u>								
Bde, 5th Mech	3	4,200	1 May 68	Bde, 5th Mech	3	4,200	21 June 68	Active Army	
6th Armd Cav Regt	3	3,600	1 May 68	SRF Mech Bde	3	5,000	31 July 68	Res Comp	6th Armd Cav Regt retained for use in civil disturbances
				Bde Support		11,000	31 July 68	Res Comp	
Corps Hq & Spt		3,700	1 May 68	I Corps Hq & Spt		3,700	31 July 68	Active & Res	
Additional Spt		38,800	1 May 68	Additional Spt		33,700	Jul 68-Jan 69	Active & Res	
5th Mec Div (-1 Bde)	6	12,000	1 Sep 68	SRF Inf Bde	3	5,000	31 July 68	Res Comp	5th Mech Div with Res Bde retained for NATO.
Support		19,600		Bde		11,000	31 July 68	Res Comp	Air Cav Sqdn not available for CONUS (Helicopters not available. Replaces Bde of 82d Abn Div, not included in total.
				SRF Inf Bde	3	(5,000)	31 July 68	Res Comp	
Inf Div	9	15,000	31 Dec 68	Bde Support		9,000	31 July 68	Res Comp	
Support		31,700	31 Dec 68	SRF Inf Div	9	15,000	30 Sep 68	Res Comp	
				Support		21,500	31 Dec 68	Res Comp	
TOTAL		<u>122,700</u>		TOTAL		<u>122,700</u>			
				COST:		FY 68 \$540.6 M FY 69 \$1904.1M			
NOTE: Deployment dates based on 1 Mar 68 decision date; corresponding slippage if decision date slips. Feasibility of converting Bde, 82d Abn Div in Vietnam to Inf Bde by 1 May 68 being studied by Army staff. An adjustment to this option will be required if the Bde of the 82d is retained in SVN. Feasibility of 1 June 68 deployment date for Bde 5th Mech being studied by Army staff.									

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OPTION 1 AND 1A FORCES (Continued)

Provide an increase of approximately 194,000 spaces over that currently authorized under Program 5.

REQUIREMENT				SERVICE STAFF RECOMMENDATION					REMARKS
ITEM	No	Strength	Date Req	Item	No	Strength	Date Available to Deploy	Source	
MARINE CORPS	Bns				Bns				
5th Mar Div(-)	3	29,800	1 May 68	4th Mar Div/ Wing Team(-)	3	29,800	1 June 68 (Assumes M-day of 1 Apr 68)	Reg/Res	(1) Reserve callup 56,400 (2) This is method preferred by USMC of meeting Marine Force needs. By using regular units, a Div/Wing Team (-) could be ready by 1 April to be provided: (a) Tours of duty in WESTPAC are extended approximately 18 months. (b) Terms of service involuntarily extended. (c) Deployment criteria revised to reduce 24 months between in SVN. (d) In order to sustain deployment it was necessary to call the 4th Marine Division Wing Team.
3d Air Wing (-)	3	7,000			3	7,000 1/			
	TFS			NOTE: Air Wing composed of both Reg & Res Units.	4				
CAP (Primarily Rifle Squads)	4	2,000	1 Dec 68	Augmentation		2,000	1 Dec 68	Reg/Res	
TOTAL		38,800		TOTAL COSTS		38,800			
					FY 68	\$205.9 M*			
					FY 69	\$670.0 M			
				*NOTE:	\$16.8 in FY 68 and \$147.0 in FY 69 for reconstitution of Reserve Squadrons.				
1/ These 3 Battalions will replace RLT 27									
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Option 1
Section V

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OPTIONS 1 AND 1A FORCES - (Continued)

REQUIREMENT				SERVICE STAFF RECOMMENDATION					REMARKS
ITEM	No	Strength	Date Req	Item	No	Strength	Date Available	Source 1/	
NAVY CTF 117 (MRF) Construction Forces (Pri. I)		552 1,312	1 May 68 1 May 68	CTF 117 (MRF)AUG Construction Forces (Pri. I)		497 1,312	Apr - Aug May - July	E-497 Active duty 2050 U-960 I-45 R-307	12 ASPB not available unt
Support Forces/ STAFFS (Pri 1)		2,766	1 May 68	Support Forces/ STAFFS (Pri 1)		2,778	May - Sep	I-1824 E-840 R-114	
USN With USMC		1,380	1 May 68	USN With USMC		1,772	May 68	U-356 I-1386 R-30	
CTF 116 AUG		240	1 Sep 68	CTF 116 AUG		301	Apr - May 68	E-301	20 ASPB not available unt 4 Helos availability date
Construction Forces (Pri 2)		3,305	1 Sep 68	Construction Forces (Pri 2)		3,305	Sep 68	I-2243 R-1062	
Support Forces/ STAFFS (Pri 2)		901	1 Sep 68	Support Forces/ STAFFS (Pri 2)		941	Sep - Oct 68	I-402 E-449 R-90	
Combat/Operational Elements (Pri 3)		387	31 Dec 68	Combat/Operational Elements (Pri 3)		405	Dec 68	Active Duty 225 I-145 R-35	
Support Forces/ STAFFS (Pri 3)		280	31 Dec 68	Support Forces/ STAFFS (Pri 3)		238	Dec 68	I-151 R-57 E-30	

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Option 1
Section V

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OPTION 1 AND-1A FORCES (Continued)

REQUIREMENT				SERVICE STAFF RECOMMENDATION					REMARKS
ITEM	No	Strength	Date Req	Item	No	Strength	Date Available	Source	
USN With USMC		138	31 Dec 68	USN With USMC		138	Dec 68	I-135 R-7	
TOTALS		11,261		TOTAL COST		11,687 FY 1968 \$ 94.0M FY 1969 \$ 120.3M			
1/ U - Unit Callup I - Individual Callup E - Extension of Terms of Service R - Increased Recruiting									

Option 1

OPTION 1 AND 1A (Continued)

REQUIREMENT				SERVICE STAFF RECOMMENDATION					REMARKS
Item	No	Strength	Date Req	Item	No	Strength	Date Available	Source	
AIR FORCE									
TFS (F-100)	TFS 2		NLT 1 May 68	TFS (F-100)	2	*	1 Apr 68	Active (ANG)	* 2 Sq replace Program 5 & strengths
TFS (F-4)	3		NLT 1 May 68	TFS (F-100)	3	1,037	1 May 68	Active (ANG)	
TFS (F-4)	1		NLT 1 Sep 68	TFS (F-100)	1	321	1 Sep 68	Active (ANG)	
TFS (F-4E)	1		NLT 1 Sep 68	TFS (F-4E)	1	525	1 Sep 68	TAC	
TFS (F-4)	1		NLT 1 Sep 68	TFS (F-84)***	1	284	1 Sep 68	ANG	*** F-4 TFS not available.
TFS (F-4)	2		NLT 31 Dec 68	TFS (F-84)***	2	568	31 Dec 68	ANG	
TFS (F-100)	1		NLT 31 Dec 68	TFS (F-84)***	1	284	31 Dec 68	ANG	
Arlft(Aug)(C130)			May & Sep 68	16 C-130s		326	Sep 68	Active	Deployment dates dependent on availability.
Arlft(Aug)(C130)			31 Dec 68	16 C-130s		326	Dec 68	Active	MACV facilities and defin of requirements.
FAC (Aug) 162 O-2s, 16 U-10s			1 May 68	162 O-2s		911	Commencing June 68	Active	Requires buy of 220 O-2s (includes 57 app. but not funded).
TAC (35 O-2s) & TACPs			May, Sep, Dec 68	FAC (35 O-2s) & TACPs		436	Close with Army/ 3d country units	Active	Requires buy of 75 O-2s (includes 57 app. but not funded).
3 CH-53s 20th Helo Sq (Aug) ACS (AC-119s)			1 May 68	3 CH-53s 20th Helo Sq (Aug) ACS (AC-119s)		48	May 1968	Active	
ACS (Aug) (8 AC- 130)				ACS (Aug) (8 AC- 130)		1,000	Commencing July 1968	Active	
Recce/Courier 10 U-10s			1 Sep 68	Recce/Courier 10 U-10s		370	Commencing July 1968	Active	
						40	1 Sep 68	Active	

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Option 1

OPTION 1 and 1A Continued

REQUIREMENT				SERVICE STAFF RECOMMENDATION					REMARKS
ITEM	No	Strength	Date Req	Item	No	Strength	Date Available	Source	
<u>Air Force (Cont)</u>									
ELAS HUNTER			-	ELAS HUNTER		233	Commencing 1	Active	
4 C-130s				4 C 130s			Jul 1968		
FAC (AUG)		1 May 68		FAC (AUG)		201	May 68	Active	
Maint/Supt.				Maint/Supt.					
New Base		1 May 68		New Base*		1,505	**	Active	*Open Nam Phong, AB, Thailand
Base Security		1 May 68		Base Security		1,130	May 68	Active	** 120 days after approval
Aerial Port (AUG)		1 May 68		Aerial Port (AUG)		712	May 68	Active	(Cost \$16.3 M)
Airlift (AUG)		1 May 68		Airlift (AUG)		1,000	May 68	Active	
Misc Support		1 May 68		Misc Support		3,016	May 68	Active	NOTE: Air Force Supports
Misc Support		1 Sept 68		Misc Support		1,782	May 68	Active	building one more new
Misc Support		31 Dec 68		Misc Support		2,966	Dec 68	Active	base in addition to
									Nam Phong (Cost \$60M)
									(Strength 1,505)
		TOTAL: 22,009				TOTAL: 19,051***			*** Manpower savings realized
						COST FY 68 \$ 689.4			by substituting F-84s for no
						FY 69 \$ 943.4			available F-4s, recomputatio
									and necessary out-of-country
									beddown to accommodate airlif
									force.
									Air Force proposes to deploy
									tional A-1 Sq to fulfill pre
									viously stated CINCPAC req to
									support Bde 82d Abn.

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SECTION VI - OPTION 1A

1. Option 1A. No change from Option 1 except that current
restrictions on ground and air operations in Cambodia, Laos
and NVN are maintained.

2. Concept. The 196,000 additional troops provided under
this Option would be applied to the same priority tasks
envisaged under Option 1, with highest priority to the security
of the GVN in Saigon and provincial capitals and to countering
and NVA invasion force in the north. The maintenance of
current restrictions on ground and air operations in Cambodia,
Laos, and NVN would prevent the application of increased
pressures against the enemy which could increase the threat
posed by NVA forces in SVA. As a consequence, a somewhat
larger portion of the additive US forces would be required
in I CTZ in order to counter to some degree the greater enemy
threat there. Offensive operations by allied forces in SVN
would be opposed by larger, better equipped and better
supported enemy forces. The threat to the security of the
cities would be relatively greater under this Option than
under Option 1 and, therefore, would be less effectively
countered by the same forces. However, the substantial
additions to US troop strength under this Option would make
it possible to support the extension of security and of GVN
control into the countryside. In addition, it would be possible
to conduct extensive offensive operations to maintain a steady
erosion of VC/NVA military strength in SVN.

3. Effective on MACV Objectives.

a. Security of Cities and GVN. Substantially the same
as with Option 1.

b. Security in the Countryside. Substantially the same
as with Option 1. To the extent that offensive operations
under Option 1A are less effective than under Option 1

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(because a stronger enemy is confronted under Option 1A),
pacification operations would have less effective protection
from enemy main force operations and thus proceed at a slower
pace. The difference would probably be appreciable principally
in the more remote areas.

c. Defense of the Borders, DMZ, and the Northern Provinces.

Restrictions on offensive operations into the border
sanctuaries provide the enemy the capability to reconstitute
his forces rapidly after operations and a safe facility to
stockpile weapons and munitions to refurbish his in-country
stocks at time and places of his own choosing. Retention
of these restrictions under this option adds to the time
required for US/GVN/FWNAF to accomplish the military objectives
and tasks and requires a larger and more responsive friendly
force to counter the options provided to the enemy by the
sanctuaries.

d. Offensive Operations. Because of the greater
effectiveness of the enemy to oppose the achievement of
US objectives under this Option as contrasted with
Option 1 (with its intensified offensive ground and air
operations in NVN, Cambodia, and Laos), somewhat larger US
forces would be required for the accomplishment of the
higher priority objectives. For this reason, allied offensive
operations would be conducted with smaller forces against
more effective enemy forces and would, consequently, be less
effective.

4. Analysis.

a. Advantages. Assuming that the current offensive is
decisively defeated this Option offers a basis for resum-
ing progress toward the achievement of US objectives in SVN.

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This Option is less effective than Option 1 in that it denies US forces in SVN the support of the expanded campaign of pressures against enemy forces and war-supporting facilities in NVN, Cambodia, and Laos envisaged in Option 1.

b. Dangers. This Option reduces the dangers inherent in the present situation in Vietnam, Although not so effectively as Option 1 with its greater attrition of enemy capabilities. The greatest difference lies in the greater danger inherent in the immunity of enemy forces in border sanctuary areas and perhaps more importantly the greater flow of munitions and other war supporting materials.

5. Strategic Modification. If Option 1a is selected, no modification is required of the objectives of defeating the enemy offensive and destruction or neutralization of the NVA invasion force in I Corps, restoration of security in the cities and in the more heavily populated areas of the country-side, and regaining of the initiative through offensive action. Withholding of authority to attack enemy forces and base areas in Cambodia, Laos and southern NVN, while not requiring modifications in strategy or objectives, would inhibit rapid reduction of the enemy's offensive capability and thereby reduce ability of friendly forces to attain the objectives.

6. Conclusions. Provision of the forces requested under Option 1A would:

a. Permit early and sustained offensive operations against enemy forces depleted during recent operations, although at a rate somewhat reduced and at military risk somewhat higher than under Option 1.

b. Permit simultaneous operations against enemy main forces and base areas in SVN but would grant the enemy recuperative capability by permitting him sanctuary areas across the Laos, Cambodia and NVN borders.

c. Permit resumption of the program to develop a fully effective RVNAF, although at a rate somewhat slower than under Option 1.

7. Required Personnel Actions. (See Option 1).

8. Force Generation. (See spread sheet)

9. Force Remaining in CONUS. (To be provided by each Service)

Army 61/3 DFE

Navy)

Marine Corps) To be provided

Air Force)

10. Estimated Dollar Cost FY68 FY69

Army

Navy 188.2 289.5

Marine Corps

Air Force

(To be provided by each Service)

TOTAL

12. Logistic Implications

This option is influenced by the same materiel and construction considerations as Option 1.

Under this alternative there is a requirement to improve LOCs and facilities to support those additional forces to be deployed to Thailand.

SECTION VII - OPTION 2

1. Option 2. No change to present total authorized force level, 1
i.e. Program 5 (525,000) plus the six additional battalions already 2
deployed (10,000) except to add three fighter squadrons requested 3
by CINCPAC and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This gives 4
COMUSMACV 112 maneuver battalions. The additional fighter squadrons 5
are within the 525,000 ceiling. 6

2. Concept. Priority for the use of US forces would be applied 7
to the essential tasks: first, to break the current enemy offensive; 8
the security of the Government of Vietnam in Saigon and the pro- 9
vincial capitals and the defense of the northern provinces. The 10
Army of Vietnam (ARVN) would continue to be supported to the extent 11
required to reduce to an acceptable risk, the threat to the security 12
of the cities and the Government of Vietnam. The enemy threat in 13
the I CTZ would continue to require over 50 percent of all US
maneuver battalions. The remaining US forces would be hard pressed
to withstand major enemy offensives elsewhere, and might suffer some 16
serious reverses. They cannot now provide adequately for the 17
security of the countryside, or conduct offensive operations on a 18
sufficiently broad scale to regain the initiative. 19

3. Effect on Military Objectives

 20

a. Security of Cities and the Government of Vietnam

 21

(1) In six months the US/Government of Vietnam/Free World 22
Military Assistance Force (FWMAF) would still be in full 23
control of Saigon and the provincial capitals and the Govern- 24
ment would still be in existence. Periodic enemy attacks on 25
the cities must be expected, principally by fire but occa- 26
sionally with enemy combat forces. If ARVN does not prove 27
to have the stamina to withstand sustained pressure at all 28
points, seizure and temporary holding of some district and 29
some province capitals would become increasingly probable as 30
the enemy completed his recovery from Tet losses. 31

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(2) If the enemy offensive is not broken in 12 months, the enemy could achieve the capability to so isolate many provincial capitals that his substantial control of a number of them would become increasingly probable. A continuation of this situation would lead to a confinement of the Government of Vietnam authority to the largest cities.

b. Security in the Countryside

(1) In six months, without a marked improvement in the size and effectiveness of RVNAF beyond pre-Tet levels, allied forces would lack the capability to substantially reduce Viet Cong controlled and contested areas. As long as these conditions exist the Viet Cong can recruit to offset losses, may gain in strength and could consolidate political control.

(2) In 12 months, the enemy would be in control of the major part of the South Vietnam countryside. Only in the most populated areas would a US/Government of Vietnam/FWMAF presence be maintained and the Government of Vietnam control effected.

c. Defense of the Borders, the DMZ, and the Northern Provinces.

(1) In six months, the present situation may still obtain, i.e., large allied ground forces may still be required to meet the threat of a major enemy force which however, avoids decisive combat. On the other hand, a major battle may have been fought. Regardless of the outcome of such a battle, the need to retain substantial Government of Vietnam/US/RVNAF forces in the I CTZ will remain. Without an in-country reserve MACV would be hard pressed to cope with a synchronized series of simultaneous attacks and might suffer some serious reverses.

(2) In 12 months, the enemy would have had additional time to creat new forces and reinforce his units in the I CTZ and along the Laotian/Cambodian borders increasing the risk to allied forces there.

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d. Offensive Operations

(1) In six months, allied forces, at present levels, and lacking an in-country reserve, would have been able to conduct only infrequent and small scale offensive operations.

(2) In 12 months, the increased strength of the enemy position in the countryside would make offensive operations increasingly more difficult and less productive.

4. Analysis

a. Advantages. There are no military advantages inherent in this option. In every respect, the situation would become increasingly disadvantageous for US/GVN/FWMAF, even if they were able to prevent the enemy from inflicting serious reverses on them.

b. Dangers

(1) In six months the enemy main force threat to US/GVN/FWMAF could be substantially increased, with allied forces suffering high casualties. The enemy could have strengthened his position in heretofore contested areas and enter areas previously under GVN control, thus gaining control of additional human and materiel resources and reducing GVN control. In these areas he may be able to organize some form of credible revolutionary front or even to foment in certain areas an uprising against the government. By major attacks on Saigon and other major cities and by encirclement and harassment of populated areas, the enemy could make increasingly obvious the inability of the GVN to provide security to its people, to gain their allegiance or to control them.

(2) In 12 months, it is likely that this trend would be substantially more apparent, with serious implications for the future of the GVN in SVN and of the United States in

5. Strategic Modifications. If Option 2 is selected, no modification would be desirable of the objectives of defeating the enemy offensive and enemy forces in I Corps, restoration of security in the cities and the countryside, and regaining of the initiative through offensive action. Selection of this option would not offset the recent enemy buildup, however, and if the enemy continues his buildup and his current strategy, the ability of friendly forces to attain the objectives of securing the countryside and regaining the initiative through offensive action would be severely restricted.

6. Conclusion. The US objective in SVN cannot be achieved in the foreseeable future by US forces at current levels if the Vietnamese government and armed forces remain in a defensive posture. Without additional US help they are unlikely to regain control of the countryside. Recent experience and the known capability of the enemy to reinforce his units in SVN, demonstrate that US forces at present levels are unable to accomplish all of the tasks necessary to the attainment of the US objective in SVN. At present levels, US forces can be expected to come under increasingly grave threats to their security, with a high probability of increased casualties, even though they cannot be driven from SVN by force.

7. Required Personnel Actions

a. Army. Six thousand airborne trained personnel are required to bring the 82nd Abn Div (-) to a deployable condition. These personnel must come from the Army training base. The following end strength add-on are required.

Reserve callup	32,000
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Active Army increase	136,173
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b. Navy. Recent deployment of a 12th NMCB to RVN necessitates either adding two regular NMCB to the Navy force structure, or calling two reserve NMCBs to active duty as units and filling out their shortages to make them capable of deployment by the addition of individually recalled reservists.*

c. Marine Corps. It is essential that a reserve regiment/air group team be called to active duty (NLT 1 April 1968) and sent to SVN to replace the 27th Regiment, who will return to CONUS/Hawaii. In addition the call up of about 12,000 reservists is required, to include about 950 individual reservists needed to fill key rank and skill shortages within organized units.

Reserve call up

End strength add-on

d. Air Force. Callup to active duty Reserve/ANG force consisting of one TFW Hq and four TF Groups providing an increase in end strength of _____ for FY 68 and _____ for FY 69.

9. Force Generation - See spreadsheet.

10. Forces Remaining in CONUS.

ARMY

NAVY

MARINE CORPS

AIR FORCE

5 TFS

3 TRS

3 TAS

* If Marine Corps Reserve units are called to active duty, the Navy personnel organic to these units must also be called. These would have to be filled by call up of individual Reservists since such units are currently far below authorized strength.

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OPTION 2 FORCES

No additions other than the six battalions already deployed as an emergency measure

UNIT	HNS/TFS	STRENGTH	AVAILABLE	SOURCE	REMARKS
<u>ARMY</u> 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div	3	3,702	In-country	Regular	Remain in-country under this option. Army studying feasibility of converting unit to Inf Bde by 1 May 68.
<u>MARINE CORPS</u> 27th RLT 1 VMA	3 1	7,036 259	In-country 1 May 68 COST: FY 1968 \$118.0 M FY 1969 \$154.4 M	Regular Regular	Remain in-country until relieved by Ready Reserve RLT/MAG in June 1968. 27th RLT cannot be sustained without callup and replacement by Reserve RLT/MAG or involuntary extensions of terms of service, extension of tours in WESTPAC and waiver of 24 months between repetitive tours in SVN.
<u>AIR FORCE</u> TFS (F-100)	2	1,078	1 Apr 68	Regular	Charged to 1 AF and 1 of 2 USMC Program deferred squadrons and therefore include in 525,000 ceiling.

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7-11-6

1. Option 3. Add 50,000 troops above the approximately 535,000 in Option 2. This gives COMUSMACV 118 maneuver battalions -- six more than the 112 under Option 2.

2. Concept. Priority for the use of US forces would continue to be applied to the essential tasks, the security of GVN in Saigon and provincial capitals and the defense of the northern provinces. The additional 50,000 troops would make it possible to reduce the risk of a major enemy success in the event of a recurrence of the Tet attacks against the cities. Most of the 50,000 troops would, however, be utilized in the I CTZ in order to augment US fighting strength there. These troops would increase the capability of the US commander to respond in accordance with the threats and opportunities which can be expected to develop, as well as to reduce the currently substantial danger to his lines of communication and resupply to his forces at Khe Sanh and along the DMZ. The deployment of additional Marine and Army armored and mechanized forces into the DMZ area might release elements of airborne or air cavalry divisions to constitute the beginnings of a contingency reserve. At the moment, these reserves are required in the II CTZ. This option would not provide enough additional forces to expand significantly security and GVN control in the countryside nor to conduct major offensive operations with any frequency outside the I CTZ.

3. Effect on MACV Objectives

a. Security of Cities and GVN

(1) In six months, the US/GVN/FWMAF would still be in full control of Saigon and the provincial capitals and the GVN would be more firmly in control in the populated areas. Periodic enemy attacks on the cities would be

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largely by fire and only rarely with combat forces, although the enemy retains the possibility to seize and hold for a period portions of major cities not defended by, or in the vicinity of, major allied units.

(2) In 12 months, the situation would be essentially the same as at six months, both with respect to continued GVN control in the populated areas and the capability of the enemy to concentrate for damaging attacks from time to time.

b. Security in the countryside.

(1) In six months, the enemy would still be in control of large portions of the SVN countryside. The additional forces provided under this option would not provide a capability to change appreciably the present situation with respect to VC contested and controlled areas.

(2) In 12 months, the situation would be essentially the same as in six months with little progress being made in the extension of GVN control.

c. Defense of the Borders, the DMZ and the Northern Provinces.

(1) In six months (approximately 4 months after the arrival of the 50,000 additional troops), the situation in I CTZ would be less dangerous for US/GVN/FWMAF. The enemy forces would be present in strength, possibly reinforced over present levels. Even with the additional troops, allied forces would lack the capability to inflict a major defeat on the very large forces now opposing them. On the other hand, the additional troops would reduce the risk of a major enemy attack resulting in a serious allied reverse.

(2) In 12 months the situation would be essentially the same as at six months, i.e. allied forces would be better able to defend themselves against an enemy attack but would still lack the capability to inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy in I CTZ. A large portion of allied military strength would, as at present, be tied down by the threat posed by large enemy forces.

d. Offensive Operations

(1) In six months, allied forces, at present levels, would have been able to conduct only infrequent and small scale offensive operations.

(2) In 12 months, the increased strength of the enemy position in the countryside would make offensive operations increasingly more difficult and less productive.

4. Analysis.

a. Advantages. An important advantage of this option is the possibility it offers of constituting the beginnings of a reserve needed now in view of an enemy buildup in the II CTZ. The additional forces would provide a measure of flexibility to allied operations and decrease the likelihood of substantial deterioration in the allied position in I CTZ and elsewhere. There would be a somewhat reduced risk to Saigon and the municipal capitals and hence to the existence of the GVN. However, the additional forces provided under this option would not permit substantial progress toward the extension of security and GVN control in the countryside and the decisive defeat of enemy forces in SVN.

b. Dangers

(1) In six months, the increase in US combat unit strength superimposed on a force whose logistical support was tenuous before their arrival, may well have resulted in a seriously

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deficient logistical situation. Under this option, the enemy would retain his control over certain areas in the countryside and we would begin to lose the contested areas.

(2) In 12 months, we would have largely lost control of the countryside and probably would have been reduced to an enclave concept around the major cities.

5. Strategic Modifications. If Option 3 is selected, no modification is desirable in the objective of defeating the enemy offensive and enemy forces in I Corps, restoration of security in the cities and the countryside, and regaining of the initiative through offensive action. The entire force deployed under this option would be required to offset the enemy build-up in I Corps, however, and although a small, brigade size theatre reserve might be developed from the deployed force, the ability of available forces to counter the enemy threat at the borders and at the same time provide forces to assist RVNAF forces to reenter the countryside, and to undertake offensive operations against enemy forces in SVN would be seriously restricted.

6. Conclusion. The additional 50,000 troops provided under this option are insufficient to counter the enemy offensive, to restore security in the countryside, and to regain the initiative. We probably could secure the cities, but these additional US forces may not even match additional North Vietnamese Army reinforcements apparently already on the move.

7. Required Personnel Actions

a. Selected unit and individual Reserve callup, extensions of terms of service, and end strength increases required for all services.

b. Army

(1) Reserve call up one Division 45,000

(2) Active Army increase

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- (3) Individual Reserves 1
- (4) Revise rotation criteria for repeat tours to SEA 2
- (5) Drawdowns on USAREUR and other forces will be 3
necessary if no reserve callup and no extension of terms 4
of service are obtained. 5
- c. Navy. Increased strength of 8,832 to support Navy 6
deployments. Additionally, if the 4th Marine Division/Wing 7
Team is called to active duty, the Navy personnel organic 8
to that unit would also be called up. They would have to 9
be filled out by the callup of individual Reservists to 10
bring the Navy support up to authorized strength. 11
- d. Air Force. Call up to active duty of Reserve/ANG 12
forces consisting of one TFW Hq, 4 TFG, one aerial port 13
squadron, one armored evac squadron, two medical service 14
squadrons, and two medical service flights. Increase in 15
military personnel end strengths of _____ for FY 68 and 16
_____ for FY 69. 17
- e. Marine Corps. Call up 4th Marine Division/Wing Team. 18
Plus _____ individual reserves. 19
9. Force Generation. See spreadsheet. 20
10. Major General Purpose Forces. Remaining in CONUS (To be 21
provided by each Service. 22
- a. Army 23
- b. Navy 24
- c. Air Force 5 TFS, 3 TRS, and ____ TAS. 25
- d. Marine Corps 26
11. Logistics Implications. The logistics requirements can 27
be met subject to the same constraints noted in Option 4. 28

12. Estimated Dollar Costs

	FY 68	FY 69
a. Army	113.0	463.8
b. Navy	42.0	96.6
c. Air Force	216.4	201.2
d. Marines	<u>207.5</u>	<u>897.0</u>
TOTALS	378.9	1,658.6

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2
3
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*OPTION 3 FORCES

Provides 50,000 additional

REQUIREMENT				SERVICE STAFF RECOMMENDATION					REMARKS
ITEM	No	Strength	Date Req	Item	No	Strength	Date Available	Source	
ARMY									
Bde, 5th Mech Div	3	4,200	1 May 68	Bde, 5th Mech	3	4,200	21 June 68	Active Army	
Corps Hq & Spt		3,700	1 May 68	I Corps & Spt		3,700	31 July 68	Active & Res	
Additional Spt		19,100	1 May 68	Additional Spt		19,100	July 68-Dec 68	Active & Res	
				SRF Inf Bde	3	(5,000)	31 July 68	Res Comp	Replaces Bde, 82d Abn Di not counted in total.
TOTAL		<u>27,000</u>		TOTAL		<u>27,000</u>			
				COST					
					FY 68	\$113.0 M			
					FY 69	\$463.8 M			
NOTE: Deployment dates based on 1 March 68 decision date; corresponding slippage if decision date slips. Feasibility of converting Bde, 82d Abn Div in Vietnam to Inf Bde by 1 May 68 being studied by Army Staff. An adjustment to this option would be required if the Bde of 82d is retained in SVN. Feasibility of 1 June 68 deployment date for Bde 5th Mech being studied by Army Staff.									

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Option 3
Section III

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Option 3
Section III

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OPTION 3 FORCES (Continued).

Provides 50,000 additional

REQUIREMENT				SERVICE STAFF RECOMMENDATION					REMARKS
Item	No	Strength	Date Req	Item	No	Strength	Date Available	Source	
MARINE CORPS									
RLT/MAG plus selected III MAF augmentation	Bns 3 TFS 1	15,000 ^{1/}	1 May 68	RLT/MAG plus selected III MAF augmentation	Bns 3 TFS 1 (3)	15,000 (7,000) ^{2/}	1 June 68 (Assuming M-day 1 April 68)	Reg/Res	Comments from Option 1 at
				TOTALS		15,000			
				TOTAL COST:	FY 1968 \$128.0 M*				
					FY 1969 \$515.5 M*				
				* \$16.8 M in FY 1968 and \$147.0 M in FY 1969 for reconstitution of deployed squadrons.					
^{1/} Does not provide 2 TFS requested by COMUSMACV. 2,000 Marines to expand the Combined Actions Program, and Command and Control elements of the Div/Wing.									
^{2/} Will permit redeployment of RLT 27 to CONUS (non-additive).									
</									

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OPTION 3 FORCES

REQUIRED				SERVICE STAFF RECOMMENDATION					REMARKS
Branch	No	Strength	Date Req	Item	Strength	Date Available	Source 1/		
Construction Forces		1,312	1 May 68	Construction Forces	1,312	May-Jun 68	U-960 I-45 R-307		
Support Forces/Staffs		2,085	1 May 68	Support Forces/Staff	2,085	May-Sep 68	E-550 R-75 I-1460		
USN with USMC		1,380	1 May 68	USN with USMC	590	May 68	U-115 R-10 I-465		
		4,777			3,987				
				COSTS:					
				FY 68	42.0M				
				FY 69	96.6M				
1/ U- Unit Callup I- Individual Reservist Callup R- Recruit Input Increase E- Extension of Active Duty									

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Option 3

Option 3
Section 1

SERVICE GRAFT RECOMMENDATION

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OPTION 3 FORCES (Cont'd)

REQUIREMENT				SERVICE STAFF RECOMMENDATION					REMARKS
ITEM	No	Strength	Date Req	Item	No	Strength	Date Available	Source	
<u>Air Force</u>	<u>TFS</u>								
TFS (F-100)	2		1 May 68	TFS (F-100)	2	*	Apr 68	Active (ANG)	* Replaces Program 5 Auth
FAC's (10 02s)			1 May 68	FAC's (10 02s)		72	Close with Army/ 3rd country units	Active	
FAC (60 02s)			1 May 68	FAC (60 02s)		215	Commencing Jul 68	Active	
ACS (Aug)				ACS (Aug)		370	Commencing Jul 68	Active	
(AC-130s)				(AC-130s)					
Base Security			1 May 68	Base Security		422	May 68	Active	
3 Ch-53's			1 May 68	3 Ch-53's		48	May 68	Active	
New Base			1 May 68	New Base**		1,505	**	Active	** Open Nam Phong AB, Thai.
Misc Support			1 May 68	Misc Support		268	May 68	Active	** 120 days after approval be ready for "bare base" operations.
2ACS (AC-119.)			-----	2ACS(AC-119.)		1,000			
				TOTAL		4,000			
				COSTS:	FY 68	\$ 216.4			
					FY 69	\$ 201.2			
Bias Hunter (4C-130)			July 68	Bias Hunter (4 C-130)		233	Jul 68	Active	
Aerial Port (AUG)			1 May 68	Aerial Port (AUG)		356	1 May 68		This requirement previousl and modification in progre requirement to support inc airlift

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Option 3

SECTION IX - OPTION 4

1. Option 4. Add 100,000 troops above the approximately 1
535,000 in Option 2. This gives COMUSMACV 124 maneuver battalions-- 2
12 more than the 112 under Option 2. 3

2. Concept. The 100,000 additional troops would make it 4
possible for the highest priority tasks (the security of GVN 5
in Saigon and provincial capitals and the defense of the northern 6
provinces) to be accomplished satisfactorily. In addition, they 7
would make it possible to constitute at least a one division 8
reserve for use as a reaction force; to begin to reestablish 9
security in the countryside; and to conduct some offensive opera- 10
tions against enemy main forces and base areas. The ability to 11
conduct some offensive operations would restore a measure of 12
initiative to allied commanders but the forces provided under this
option would not assure an early and decisive defeat of enemy
forces or the rapid extension of security to the countryside. 15
Considering the inadequacy of forces in II CTZ this reserve 16
force might well be totally committed in that area. In other 17
words, this level of additional force would not promise early 18
attainment of US objectives in SVN. 19

3. Effect on MACV Objectives 20

a. Security of Cities and GVN 21

(1) In six months, the security of Saigon and the 22
provincial capitals and the GVN would be virtually assured 23
although periodic enemy attacks by fire could be expected; 24
The enemy would retain the capability of massing his 25
forces for occasional attacks against key objectives, but 26
would not be able to seize and hold them for extended 27
periods as in the case of Hue during the recent Tet offensive. 28

(2) In 12 months, with the entire additive force closed 29
in-country, the threat to the security of the cities and 30
the GVN would be further reduced. 31

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b. Security in the Countryside

(1) In six months, the enemy would still be in control of large portions of the SVN countryside. Those additional forces which would be able to close within six months would not provide a capability to change appreciably the present situation with respect to VC contested and controlled areas.

(2) In 12 months, with all of the additional forces closed in-country, the extension of security in the countryside would have begun, with a concomitant extension of GVN control. It is unlikely that large additional areas would come under GVN control within 12 months but markedly favorable trends should be established.

c. Defense of the Borders, the DMZ, and the Northern Provinces

(1) In six months, the situation in I CTZ would be substantially less dangerous for US/GVN/FWMAF. The enemy forces would be present in strength, possibly reinforced over present levels. However, the additional US troops would make possible the establishment of an in-country reserve. Of particular importance, the additional units provided under this option include the combat service support units needed to correct the poor logistical situation of the forces in position at Khe Sanh and along the DMZ. For example, engineer units to restore surface LOC and transportation units to provide for adequate surface resupply would add substantially to the effectiveness of combat units in the area.

(2) In 12 months, the situation in the I CTZ, which would have had priority for the additional troops, would be essentially the same as at six months. A large portion of allied military strength would have achieved a sound defensive posture, but would still lack the capability to inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy in the I CTZ.

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d. Offensive Operations.

(1) In six months, the additional forces which had arrived in-country would have been applied to higher priority tasks, and therefore, any offensive operations would be infrequent and small-scale.

(2) In 12 months, the arrival in-country of all the additional forces provided by this option would permit offensive operations at higher levels but not at such a level as to have a decisive impact on enemy forces and base areas for some time.

4. Analysis

a. Advantages. The principal advantages of this option are in the provision of additional forces which could be employed to provide increased security for Saigon and municipal capitals and hence to the existence of the GVN; the additional combat strength and badly needed improvement of the logistical posture of the forces in I CTZ; and the capability to begin to conduct offensive operations and to extend GVN control in the countryside.

b. Dangers. This option offsets most but not all of the RVN buildup since November. The 100,000 additional forces do not provide the capability to inflict an early decisive defeat on the enemy. The danger inherent in this situation is not so much military as political: It subjects GVN and RVNAF to prolonged pressure and does not provide a basis for an early end to the war.

5. Strategic Modification. If Option 4 is selected, no modification is desirable in the objectives of defeating the enemy offensive and enemy forces in I Corps, restoration of security in the cities and the countryside, and regaining of the initiative through offensive action. Selection of this option would partially offset the enemy build-up since November and would permit development of a theatre reserve of two or three brigades to counter enemy offensive operations in II and III Corps. It would permit assistance

to RVNAF in accomplishing the objective of restoration of the pacification effort in the countryside, but would not guarantee the ability to undertake early and sustained offensive operations to inflict decisive defeat on enemy forces.

6. Conclusion. The additional 100,000 troops provided under this option will enable allied forces to deny the enemy major successes in South Vietnam and to resume some security operations in the countryside. These additional forces will not, however, enable allied forces soon to destroy the enemy in South Vietnam.

7. Required Personnel Actions

a. Army. Overall, the STRAF is drawn down to 60 percent full TOE (STRAF divisions to 42 percent full TOE). Callup of Reserves and extension of terms of service are required. With extension of terms of service, the trained strength recovers in September 1968. 90,000 Reserve personnel in units and as individuals are called to active duty. Additional Reserves must be mobilized in FY 1969 to replace those deployed and to restore the base to a short tour ratio for DFES to 1:1. USAREUR will also be drawn down to support this option plus 8,500 to Korea. Active Army increase will be 130,892 personnel. Total Army end-strength forces is 220,892 (which reflects the termination of RVN civilianization program).

b. Navy. All of the Navy requirements would be additional to the Navy's present force structure and would have to be provided for by Reserve call-up, extension of terms of service, etc. (11,723 personnel). Although there are NMCBs in the force structure not currently deployed, they deploy in rotation with those in-country and would have to be replaced by Reserve NMCBs if they deployed. Two Reserve NMCBs (1,700 personnel) would have to be called for each additional NMCB deployed to the Republic of Vietnam.

c. Marine Corps. As in Option I, this option can be filled by either the use of regular or reserve units, with the latter course of action being preferable. Callup of personnel is required, of which approximately are individual reservists.

d. Air Force. Callup of Reserve/ANG forces consisting of two TFW Headquarters, eight TFG, three aerial port squadrons, one aeromedical evacuation group, two aeromedical evacuation squadrons (crews), three medical service squadrons, and four medical service flights; and an increase in active force military personnel end strength of for FY 1968 and for 1969.

8. Force Generation. See attached spread sheet.

9. Forces Remaining in CONUS. After completion of the deployment of this package are 5-2/3 DFEs.

10. Logistics Implication

a. The materiel requirements to support deployments under this alternative can be supported. Most combat essential equipment shortages can be resolved through withdrawal of equipment from active and reserve units located within CONUS. However, significant shortages of M16 rifles cannot be resolved in this manner. Unless production is increased, forces may deploy with older type rifles.

b. Withdrawals and redistribution of critical assets would further deplete the combat essential materiel in the hands of the active and reserve forces. These withdrawals would have to be made up as a matter of urgency. Increased funding for procurement of replacement materiel would be necessary to return the remaining active and reserve to combat ready status and to maintain a CONUS sustaining base for logistic support.

c. The RVNAF Modernization Program must be supported. Delays have occurred in providing the RVNAF with quantities of M16 rifles and M79 grenade launchers required to meet requirements. COMUSMACV has indicated an immediate requirement for an additional 268,000 M16 rifles, and 11,200 M79 launchers. In addition, a shortage of M60 machine guns, M72 light anti-tank weapons, and M29 mortars exists.

d. The logistic system in SVN is providing adequate support for current US force levels in II, III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. However, the movement of support forces to I Corps from these Zones to support increased requirements in that area has resulted in a reduction in support capability which cannot be alleviated unless additional support troops are provided and the civilianization program is deferred as requested by COMUSMACV. In I Corps the land and sea LOCs and support personnel are not adequate to support increased troop strength and sustained offensive operations by the forces currently deployed.

e. To support present force deployments, additional funds will be required to provide additional facilities, battle damage repair in SVN, LOC and port improvements.

f. In view of the above, the following actions should be taken to assure adequate support for the force levels of Option 4:

(1) Provide additional funds for the military construction program in SVN.

(2) Authorize the expenditure of funds to provide additional facilities, tooling, and procurement of long lead-time items required by manufacturers and related subcontractors for accelerated production and to provide additional industrial production capacity.

(3) Establish and maintain increased production rates until initial equipment requirements, drawdowns from Reserve units, and pre-positioned war reserve stocks have been brought up to the authorized levels.

11. Estimated Dollar Costs

	<u>FY 1968</u>	<u>FY 1969</u>
Army <u>1/</u>	182.2 M	905.3 M
Navy	62.3 M	78.8 M
Marine Corps	207.5 M	897.0 M
Air Force	<u>339.7 M</u>	<u>568.5 M</u>
	731.7 M	2,449.6 M

1/ Does not reflect cost for civilian manpower spaces required to support add-on forces.

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OPTION 4
SECTION IX

OPTION 4 FORCES

Provides 100,000 additional

ARMY				I CORPS				TOTAL	
Unit	No	Strength	Date Req	Unit	No	Strength	Date Available	Source	
ARMY	Bns				Bns				
Bde, 5th Mech Div	3	4,200	1 May 68	Bde, 5th Mech	3	4,200	21 June 68	Active Army	6th Armd Cav Reg retained CONUS for use in civil disturbances.
6th Armd Cav Regt	3	3,600	1 May 68	SRF Mech Bde	3	5,000	31 July 68	Res Comp	
				Bde Support		11,000	31 July 68	Res Comp	
5th Mech Div (-1 Bde)	6	12,000	1 Sep 68	SRF Inf Bde	3	5,000	31 July 68	Res Comp	5th Mech Div retained in CONUS for NATO.
Support		19,000	1 Sep 68	Bde Support		11,000	31 July 68	Res Comp	Replaces Bde of 82d Abn I not included in total.
				SRF Inf Bde	3	(5,000)	31 July 68	Res Comp	
				Bde Support		9,000	31 July 68	Res Comp	
Additional Spt		18,600	1 Sep 68	Additional Spt		9,100	31 Dec 68	Active & Res	
				I Corps Combat Spt and Combat Svc Spt Units (Incl Corps Hq)		3,700	31 Dec 68		
TOTAL		58,000		TOTAL		58,000			
				COST	FY 68	\$182.2 M			
					FY 69	\$905.3 M			
NOTE: Deployment dates based on 1 March 68 decision date; corresponding slippage if decision date slips. Feasibility of converting Bde, 82d Abn Div in Vietnam to Inf Bde by 1 May 68 being studied by Army Staff. An adjustment to this option would be required if the Bde of 82d is retained in SVN. Feasibility of 1 June 68 deployment date for Bde 5th Mech being studied by Army Staff.									
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OPTION 4
SECTION IX

OPTION 4 FORCES (Continued)

Provides 100,000 additional

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				OPTION 4 FORCES (Continued)				REMARKS	
		Strength	Date Req	Force	TO	Strength	Date Available	Source	
MARINE CORPS									
5th Mar Div(-)	Bns 3	26,000 ^{1/}	1 May 68	4th Mar Div/Wing	Bns 3	26,000	1 June 68	Reg/Res	Remarks in Option 1
3d Air Wing(-)	TFS 4			Team (-)	TFS 4		(Assuming M-day		
Team					(3)	(7,000) ^{2/}	1 April 68)		
				TOTAL		<u>26,000</u>			
				COSTS:	FY 1968 \$201.5 M*				
					FY 1969 \$644.0 M*				
					* Includes \$16.8 M in FY 68 and \$147.0 M in FY 69 for reconstitution of Reserve Squadrons.				
^{1/} Does not provide 4,000 Marines required by III MAF to attain strength of presently deployed forces or 2,000 Marines to expand the Combined Active Program.									
^{2/} Will permit redeployment of RLTF 27 to CONUS (non-additive).									
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OPTION 4
SECTION IX

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OPTION 4 (Continued)

REQUIREMENT				SERVICE STAFF RECOMMENDATION					REMARKS
ITEM	No	Strength	Date Req	Item	No	Strength	Date Available	Source	
Air Force	TFS								
TFS (F-100)	2		1 May 68	TFS (F-100)	2	*	Apr 68	Active (ANG)	* Replaces Program 5 auth
TFS (F-100)	2		1 May 68	TFS (F-100)	2	982	Apr 68	Active (ANG)	
FAC's (20 0-2s) & TACPs			1 May 68	FACs (20 0-2s)		144	Close with Army/ 3d Country units	Active	
2 ACS (AC-119s)			-	2 ACS (AC-119s)		1,000	Commencing Jul 68	Active	
FAC (60 0-2s)			1 May 68	FAC (60 0-2s)		215	Commencing Jul 68	Active	
FAC (82 OV-10s)			1 May 68	FAC (82 0-1s/0-2s)		518	Commencing Jul 68	Active	
ACS(AUG)(AC-130s)			-	ACS(AUG)(AC-130s)		370	Commencing Jul 68	Active	
AIRLIFT (AUG)			1 May 68	AIRLIFT (AUG)		1,000	1 May 1968	Active	
20th Helo Sq			1 May 68	20th Helo sq		48	May 1968	Active	
3 CH-53s				3 CH-53s					
BASE SECURITY			1 May 68	BASE SECURITY		800	May 1968	Active	
New Base			1 May 68	New Base		1,505	**	Active	Opening Nam Phong, A.B. Th
Aerial Port (AUG)			1 May 68	Aerial Port (Aug)		712	May 1968	Active	
Misc Support			1 May 68	Misc Support		1,473	May 1968	Active	
BIAS HUNTER(4 C-130)			July 68	BIAS HUNTER(4 C-130)		233	July 1968	Active	
TOTAL		9,000		TOTAL		9,000			
				COSTS:		FY 68 \$ 339.7 FY 69 \$ 568.5			** 120 days after app can be ready for "base" operations.
					3				

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THE THREAT

A. ENEMY CAPABILITIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. The enemy was hurt badly by the Tet offensive in the populated lowlands, but is practically intact elsewhere. He committed over 67,000 combat maneuver forces plus perhaps 25% or 17,000 more impressed men and boys, for a total of about 84,000. He lost 40,000 killed, at least 3,000 detainees who would become PWs, and perhaps 5,000 disabled or died of wounds. He had peaked his force total to about 260,000 just before Tet, by hard recruiting, infiltration, civilian impressment, and draw-downs on service and guerrilla personnel. In the offensive he has lost about one-fifth of his total strength. About two-thirds of his trained, organized unit strength can continue offensive action. Infiltration is continuing and recruiting is being pressed in the countryside while Allied forces are securing the urban areas. The enemy appears to have adequate munitions, stockpiled in-country and available through the DMZ, Laos, and Cambodia, to support continued major attacks and countrywide pressure; food procurement may be a problem.

2. Despite losses, the enemy in South Vietnam is capable of conducting major attacks in the areas and with the force as follows:

- (1) Khe Sanh - 16 Combat effective equivalent battalions (CEEB)
- (2) DMZ - 9 CEEB
- (3) Quang Tri City - 4 CEEB
- (4) Hue - 8 CEEB
- (5) Da Nang/Hoi An - 8 CEEB

(6) Dak To - 7 CEEB

(7) Saigon - 10-11 CEEB

(8) Cai Lay/My Tho - 2 CEEB

(9) Can Tho - 2-3 CEEB

3. In addition, the Communists are capable of maintaining economic, psychological, and military pressure on the cities noted above as well as the following: Quang Ngai, Kontum, Pleiku, Ban Me Thuot, Qui Nhon, Tuy Hoa, Nha Trang, Dalat, Phan Thiet, Song Be, Xuan Loc, Bien Hoa, Vinh Long, and other provincial towns of political significance to the enemy.

B. ASSESSMENT OF FUTURE THREAT IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Developments during the past five weeks have made it clear that the Communists now plan to put extensive and sustained military pressure on the urban areas of South Vietnam. At a maximum, within the next three to six months, they could move in and control some of the major cities; failing this, they could attempt to bring about a deterioration of governmental authority in urban areas, as well as in the countryside, that eventually would be severe enough to force a political accommodation in the war on Communist terms.

2. There have also been a number of indications, apart from the attacks on the cities, that additional shifts in Communist war strategy are in process. Among these has been evidence of plans possibly to use the North Vietnamese air arm in a limited logistic or attack role in South Vietnam. New Communist weapons including tanks and possibly better artillery rockets have appeared in the DMZ area. Signs pointing to new troop infiltration to the South have been noted, while the flow of supplies to the DMZ and down the Lao corridor has continued at a stepped-up pace. Additional enemy road building has also been under way which will improve the Communists' ability to support military units

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in both the DMZ and the coastal area of the two northern provinces in South Vietnam.

3. The developments suggest that the enemy is trying to get in a position through 1st Corps which will permit him to conduct sustained offensive operations, probably along more conventional military lines than ever before in the war. Recently the bulk of one division of Communist troops from the DMZ area has slipped south into the coastal plains of Quang Tri and, along with NVA elements already in the sector, will probably attempt a campaign to erode and destroy friendly control over the rural population and the cities in the area. It appears that the Communists are going to make a major effort to invest or capture Quang Tri, and, if possible, gain de facto administrative control over Thua Thien and Quang Tri provinces.

4. Continued pressure on the Allied bastion at Khe Sanh is likely in the course of the Communist effort in the north. Whether Hanoi will make an all-out effort to overrun the base within the next 30-60 days remains to be seen. It is possible that he plans at present only to mount a long-term siege operation against the base. In any event, the enemy is seeking to tie down a substantial Allied reaction force.

5. We believe the most likely course of over-all enemy action in Vietnam during the next year will revolve around a major effort in the north and in the central highlands combined with selective pressure against the urban areas farther south. The pressure against the cities will probably include both limited ground probes and coordinated attacks by fire. We think it likely the enemy will make a special effort, both for political and psychological reasons, to harass and disrupt the city of Saigon.

6. The Communists will also be heavily engaged in trying to consolidate the gains they have made throughout the rural areas of the country since the government's withdrawal to defend the cities. In particular, the Communists will attempt to reverse much that has been achieved in the pacification/RD program, and will utilize renewed access to the rural population to intensify recruitment efforts and the collection of taxes and other forms of logistic support.

C. ENEMY CAPABILITIES IN LAOS

1. Enemy forces in Laos include:

<u>UNITS</u>	<u>TROOP STRENGTH</u>
21 NVA Infantry Battalions)	
1 NVA AA Bn)	8,500
NVA Cadre in Pl Units	5,000
NM Engr, Roadwork, Logistics	15,000
121 Pathet Lao Bns	29,475

2. The enemy has the capability to attack in the following locations:

Vientiane	10 Inf Bns
	1 Armored Bn
	2 Arty Bns
Luang Prabang	10 Inf Bns
	1 Armored Bn
	2 Arty Bns
Sayaboury	4 Inf Bns
	1 Arty Bn
Paksane	10 Inf Bns
Thakhek	10 Inf Bns
	1 Armored Bn
	1 Arty Bn

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Savanwakheth

10 Inf Bns

1

1 Armored Bn

2

1 Arty Bn

3

Saravane

3 Inf Bns

4

Attoupeu

3 Inf Bns

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D. ASSESSMENT OF FUTURE THREAT IN LAOS

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1. The movement of NVA forces southeastward in Quang Tri Province has been accompanied during the past three weeks by an expansion of North Vietnamese military pressure in a southwesterly direction within Laos. Little Communist effort has been expended elsewhere and it is unlikely they will attempt an all-out effort in the north. In the south, the Laotian provincial capital of Saravane, at the northern approach to the Bolovens plateau, has been surrounded and harassed by North Vietnamese troops. North-South Route 23 runs through Saravane, and the town also serves as a buffer for the rich, rice-producing Sedone valley which came under full Lao control only last year. According to one POW, the Communists plan to take the town and also the more important government base camps south of it at Lao Ngam and Ban Thateng. The Communist threat against Attoupeu has also been active and seizure of the town may be planned.

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2. It is possible that the North Vietnamese plan to expand the fighting in Laos, possibly in combination with an effort to spur further unrest in Cambodia and a new outbreak of insurgent activity in Thailand. They might hope to accomplish further thinning of US military resources in Vietnam by causing the US to deploy troops into Laos or Thailand. Even if the US did not react with troops, Hanoi might hope that the threat created in Laos would confuse and cloud the war issue and possibly deter or delay the US from some additional commitments in Vietnam.

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3. Hanoi doubtless would be pleased if its current efforts had a deterrent effect on US commitments in Vietnam, but we doubt that this is the primary goal of the North Vietnamese action around Saravane at present, or that Hanoi is prepared at the present stage of the war to commit very many resources to a major military campaign in Laos. We do not see any signs of North Vietnamese intent to expand hostilities elsewhere in Laos much beyond the normal level of dry-season fighting.

4. The Communists have not, for example, attempted to follow up on the recent government retreat from the Nam Bac valley in northern Laos. We believe they are probably interested primarily in reestablishing their presence in the Se Done valley west of Saravane and, when they have stripped out the area's rice stocks to support their Vietnam-oriented buildup in the infiltration corridor and in northern South Vietnam, will probably relax their pressure on the town. It is entirely possible that the Laotians will have deserted Saravane by that time, however, and that the city will come at least temporarily under enemy control.

5. Current anti-government activity by insurgents in Thailand may be viewed in Hanoi as helpful in deterring fuller US or Thai commitments in Vietnam. There is little evidence, however, that sufficient Communist assets are presently in place there to pose much more than a contributing terrorist threat to Thai security forces or the US air bases, assuming that the insurgents were ordered into an all-out effort by Hanoi and/or Peking.

E. ENEMY CAPABILITIES IN NORTH VIETNAM

1. Enemy units in North Vietnam are composed of:

10 Infantry Divisions,

1 Artillery Division

1 AAA Division

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2 Infantry Brigades	1
6 Independent Infantry Regiments	2
85 Independent AAA Regiments	3
1 Armored Command (2 Regiments)	4
25-30 SA-2 Battalions	5

2. These units are charged with defending North Vietnam against air and ground attacks, maintaining local internal security and providing training, cadre and replacements for NVA forces in South Vietnam and Laos.

F. ASSESSMENT OF FUTURE THREAT FROM NORTH VIETNAM

1. There have been many indications in recent weeks that the North Vietnamese may now plan to use their limited air arm in an offensive and/or logistic role to support the war in South Vietnam. Bomber and transport activity by Hanoi's air force has increased in recent weeks. Both AN-2 and IL-14 aircraft have carried out paratroops in northwestern South Vietnam and probably Laos, and IL-14s apparently attempted at least one abortive bombing mission somewhere in the DMZ/Quang Tri Province sector. A few of Hanoi's IL-28 bombers have been active over North Vietnam for the first time in over two years.

2. During the past two weeks there have been indications that another move of North Vietnamese manpower to South Vietnam probably is underway. At least battalion-size and regimental-size elements are believed involved. There are tenuous indications that some of the infiltration may funnel through the A Shau valley in northern South Vietnam. Units coming in via this route have usually filled up or augmented Communist forces in the northern provinces of the country.

3. Evidence of recent NVA activity, however, does not suggest that any plan for an all-out invasion is currently being implemented. We believe that there would be fairly

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good warning if a mass movement of NVA to South Vietnam were to get under way. The warning signals, however, might be less explicit were the movement to come directly across the DMZ rather than down the traditional Laotian route. Although there is evidence that infiltration into the South has again spurted, the pattern and pace so far are in line with "normal" NVA movements and are not suggestive of wholesale deployments. It does not appear, moreover, that the present scale of logistic support to the South is indicative of an all-out push. Rather, the level seems designed more to support sustained military operations by the forces now in place in the area.

4. Other evidence on the state of affairs within the NVN including the regime's domestic propaganda pitch, covert reporting on popular attitudes and activities, and the posture of Chinese military and logistic units within and near North Vietnam, also appear "normal" for the current wartime situation and do not suggest that any all-out push is coming. In fact, regime propaganda in the wake of the Tet offensive is again stressing the protracted nature of the conflict as if to prepare the people for a long road of sacrifice ahead.

G. ENEMY CAPABILITIES IN CAMBODIA

1. The enemy presence in Cambodia is fluid and no assessment of the current threat from area can be drawn. Nevertheless, it is probable that some units now threatening the friendly forces in the central highlands area are actually located in Cambodia or may maneuver through Cambodia against targets in South Vietnam.

2. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong primarily use Cambodia as a sanctuary, to infiltrate personnel and materiel into South Vietnam, and as a source of food and supplies.

3. Probably the most important Communist use of Cambodia is that of sanctuary. Shallow penetrations are the rule --

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usually not more than three kilometers -- although in one 1
instance the distance was more than 50 kilometers. The 2
frequency and nature vary by area. Eleven NVA regiments and 3
five battalions are known to have passed through Cambodia 4
en route to South Vietnam. 5

4. Vietnamese Communist base areas have been established 6
on or along the South Vietnamese border. These bases are in 7
part designed to handle supplies obtained from or through 8
Cambodian sources and also contain facilities for hospitalization, 9
rest, and training. 10

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