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WESTERN UNION

1201

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NAW8 51 GOVT DL=SN WASHINGTON DC APR 23 1141A

HON CHARLES MARSH=
PLAZA HOTEL=

CALLED YOU TO VISIT YOU THIS MORNING JUST AFTER YOU HAD LEFT.

YOU NO DOUBT KNEW WE SUCCEEDED YESTERDAY IN MAKING DR
LAMB CHIEF OF STAFF OF SMALL BUSINESS COMMITTEE LEARNED FROM
YOUR RESIDENCE YOU WERE TO BE BACK MONDAY. ANXIOUS TO PAY
YOU A VISIT UPON YOUR RETURN. KINDEST REGARDS=

CLAUDE PEPPER.

223P

THE COMPANY WILL APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS FROM ITS PATRONS CONCERNING ITS SERVICE

Address by Senator Claude Pepper of Florida
The American-Soviet Friendship Meeting
In Celebration of the 10th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations
between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.

Academy of Music, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, November 4, 1943

On June 22, 1941, Adolph Hitler, after due consultation with his intuitions, took the plunge into the deepest military quagmire known to modern man. It was a proud army which he sent on that day into Soviet Russia--though not too proud to follow the prescribed Axis pattern of the treacherous sneak-punch in violation of past agreements.

At that time we in America heard the prediction of certain home-grown experts on international affairs--the prediction that Hitler's war machine would crush the Red Army--and I quote--within two months. Unquote.

It has been a long two months.

I am not one of those experts. But I welcome, along with millions of other Americans, the opportunity which this occasion offers, just after the most triumphant of all missions to Moscow, to look back over the inspiring record of our gallant ally in war, and to look ahead to the no less inspiring certainty that she will be our ally in peace.

The tradition of friendship between these two great nations, the U. S. and the U. S. S. R., dates back years beyond the attacks which have made us warring allies. And events of the last few days, the signal victories that have been achieved both on the battlefield and at the council table, are enough in themselves to fill our hearts with gratitude to our own national leadership which, a decade ago, committed our country to the recognition of and establishment of firm friendship with the Soviet Union.

The character of that recognition was realistic, as has been the character of dealings between these two nations ever since--and as we feel both confident and gratified that they will continue to be. For realism, which has never sat well among the myths of Berchtesgaden nor attended the hemispheric pipedreams of Tokio, is the very substance and lifeblood of a lasting friendship among nations.

For its own good reasons--especially collective security and aid in its own industrialization, the Soviet Union sought collaboration with us. And for our own reasons--our foresighted suspicion of possible trouble with Japan and also for the give and take of commerce in prospect, we welcomed that collaboration.

On November 18, 1933, two days after the reestablishment of diplomatic relations, President Roosevelt surmised it up by declaring that the impelling motive of the Soviet-American conversations was--I quote--"the desire of both countries for peace and for the strengthening of the peaceful purposes of the civilized world."

That desire still lives. Through the ordeal of fire, through the hour of mounting doubt as the aggressor made his terrible bid for supremacy, it turned from desire to an unshakable resolve. Today, as the armies of four great powers score triumph after triumph over the breaking ranks of that same enemy, it turns from resolve to certainty.

As one of the terms under which diplomatic relationship was reestablished, the Soviet government undertook to "respect scrupulously the indisputable right of the United States to order its own life within its own jurisdiction in its own way." Among other promises, both parties to the agreement were pledged to refrain from any act tending to incite or encourage armed intervention. This latter has been regarded by many specialists in international law as equivalent to a pledge of non-aggression.

Both nations have lived up to their word. And the accord which was entered ten years ago by men and peoples of good will has, in peace and in war, brought forth a harvest in these intervening years many times richer than either party could have foreseen.

2-

What momentous years they have been! They have brought us, here in America, through the passing of an old, an outworn set of traditions and practices, and into the path that leads our people toward a greater share in the four freedoms. We have witnessed, in those years, a vast resurgence of the democratic spirit, a renaissance so insistent that total war, world war, cannot permanently hold it in check.

In that renewal of hope for the common man, the Soviet Union and the United States have worked and marched side by side. Today, with Great Britain, China and their other allies, they are fighting side by side. Lest anyone doubt the program of action of our Soviet ally, let me quote from an address by the Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin, given on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the October Revolution. I quote:

"The program of action of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition is: Abolition of racial exclusiveness; equality of nations and integrity of their territories; liberation of the enslaved nations and the restoration of their sovereign rights; the right of every nation to manage its affairs in its own way; economic aid to nations that have suffered and assistance in establishing their material welfare; restoration of democratic liberties; and destruction of the Hitler regime."

During the ten years of our good-neighborhood with the Soviet Union we have mutually lived up to other obligations. Long before the inception of the lend-lease program--before there was need of that--American was supplying goods and services and the skills of men to help speed our neighbor's tremendous program of industrialization. Our engineers helped to build the great dams and power projects and factories, helped set up the originals after which others, dotting the vast experience of the Soviet Union, were modeled. And in business as in political commitments, the Russians have kept their word. No nation's credit has been better than that of Soviet Russia.

It was fitting that there should have evolved this meeting of minds, this recognition of mutual purposes, between the United States and the Soviet Union. Behind it there had been a long tradition of friendship--again based solidly on the realism that some care to call self-interest, but which, among nations, is the only tradition of friendship which has any real insurance value.

There are many of these practical, down-to-earth common denominators, the most striking, of course, being the fact that these great powers are the world's two dominant continental nations. There is more in this than geography. For this kind of geography overlaps into and vitally affects the thinking, the planning of these nations for the future of their peoples. The Russians, like us, must do everything in a big way. They have gone into the vast stretches of Siberia, through the forests, their great mountains and long rivers, much as we swashbuckled into the frontier of our great west. Even when they stage a Stalingrad, they stage a good big one, begging Nazi troops by the hundreds of thousands, and not failing to come home with everybody from the generals on down.

This way of thinking, of doing, draws us together. It is no mere coincidence that in every great international crisis that we Americans have had to face over the past hundred years, the Russians have always turned up at our side.

It was no accident of history, therefore, that during the Civil War, at a time when relationships of the Union with powers outside its borders were in a particularly shaky state, the Russian fleet appeared in New York Harbor. It was no accident that when other powers were reaching out for the Hawaiian Islands toward the close of the last century, Russia, through instructions sent to her ambassador at Washington, advised our government that she would look with favor on American acquisition of the islands, and in giving us this assurance of her attitude, strengthened our own determination to add this vital defense outpost.

When Russia sold Alaska to us--not for love but for money and for common sense practicality--she knew that in relinquishing her only territory in the western hemisphere she would be in no way endangering herself, but, on the contrary, adding to her own and our safety. It is ten minutes by air from American territory to Soviet Russia. On a clear summer day an American, standing on the shore of the Bering Straits, can see the faint blue outlines of Russian mountains on the Asiatic continent.

Across that narrow strip of water the bond has been one of good living-together, cooperation in respect to the business and commerce of the North Pacific, peaceful conduct of the fishery and the sealing industry, and the building up of a long tradition of good will.

The recognition of Russia in 1933 was a wholesome and fitting revival of that tradition. Within ten years we have seen it grow, until, under stress of attack by a common enemy, it has come to magnificent fruition in a relationship that goes deeper than the ties of geography or commerce, more meaningful than the mere coexistence of neighbors at peace. This newer, more intimate relationship is certain to continue and to grow. The Moscow Conference is only one expression of it. There will be others--in action as well as in words.

Of course, this growth has not been free of opposition, of setbacks, of all sorts of hazards. All along the way, it has run into the constant need of public education. And we have among us today--particularly in the remaining hard cores of isolationism--those who cling to their suspicions, their prejudices, their frayed and shoddy weave of outworn fears, their tall tales of the red bogeyman,

Herr Guebbels is not unaware of the presence among us of this bogey brigade. Up until a few days ago, he believed the game was still worth playing--the effort to reach them with anguished warnings of the "coming bolshevization of Europe." When the results of the Moscow Conference were made known, that game was up.

But while diplomatic missions can act in good faith and act quickly, divisive fear and studied hate do not vanish overnight. The minorities that have nursed these fears, this bias, have been at work a long time. In his book, "Mission to Moscow," Ambassador Joseph Davies said:

"What if Stalin defeats Hitler? Will not communism then sweep Europe? . . . Hitler stooges have been trying to frighten us into the belief that communism will destroy our form of government if the Soviet Union defeats Hitler. That is just plain bunk. It is bad medicine. It is as unintelligent as it is unpatriotic and un-American."

Over and above its value as an instrument of common accord, I believe and hope the Moscow Conference will prove of needful service in speeding along this public education. I do not expect the career isolationists to give up their unsavory work as a result of it. But I do not see how they can well answer the compact point if they are confronted with it. Their fears all look to the future and ignore the past. Certainly none of the nations signatory to that compact can present a more convincing exhibit of evidence of good intention, based on the record since Hitler went on the march, or even since the last world war, than can Soviet Russia.

Let us glance back, then, over that record, and examine the basis of the Soviet Union's claim to good faith in once again espousing the cause of collective security against aggression. This nation, which, we must remember, was not admitted to the League of Nations until Germany withdrew in 1934, sent Maxim Litvinoff as its representative in the council of the League. On March 17, 1936, Litvinoff told the council:

"We are for international agreement which would not only fortify the present mainstays of peace, but would if possible set up new ones. We are for participation in such an agreement of all countries desirous of doing so. But we are opposed to granting to a state withdrawing from the League of Nations, grossly violating international treaties and engaged in sword-rattling, the privilege of dictating to all Europe its conditions of negotiation. . . . I declare on behalf of my government that it is ready to take part in all measures that may be proposed to the Council of the League by the Locarno Powers and will be acceptable to the other members of the Council."

In July of 1936, Litvinoff told the League:

"If I say all this in the interest of strengthening peace, I cannot do otherwise than mention the measure which the Soviet Union has always considered the maximum guarantee of peace, I mean complete disarmament. . . . But while this radical measure is in abeyance, all we can do is to strengthen the League of Nations as an instrument of peace. To strengthen the League of Nations is to abide by the principle of collective security. . . ."

We must recognize that at the present time there is not one state, large or small, that is not open to aggression, and that even if the next war spares one state or another, she must, sooner or later, attract the longing eyes of the victorious aggressor."

On March 17, 1938, after Austria had been invaded and while Czechoslovakia was threatened, the Litvinoff told the foreign press correspondents:

"I can say on behalf of the Government that, on its part, it is ready as before to join in collective actions which, decided jointly with it, would have the purpose of arresting further development of aggression...It agrees to proceed immediately to discuss practical measures, dictated by circumstances, with other powers in the League of Nations or outside it. Tomorrow may be too late, but today there is time yet, if all States, particularly great States, take up a firm, unambiguous standpoint on the problem of the collective salvation of peace."

Of such does the record consist. Can we show a better one? Can any other nation on earth now come forward with the record of its efforts to avert war, and offer better proof of its intentions for the future, in the form of actions of the past? In the preface to his biography of Litvinoff, Arthur Upham Pope includes this paragraph:

"One thing is clear--the statesmanship of the last thirty years is bankrupt. It was powerless to stay the disaster that all feared. The Foreign Offices which demanded to be let alone to arrange affairs as they saw fit can no longer request, 'Leave it to us.' Their policy of appeasement led straight to catastrophe, a lesson too slowly learned."

When the foreign policy of Russia, under the stress of threatened attacks from two sides, took on the color of isolation, it was hardly the becoming part for American accusers to point out the beam in her eye. Surely we had a visible note in our own.

What was the character of that involuntary isolation into which the Soviet Union took last resort after her best efforts at collaboration and collective security were coolly set at nothing by her reluctant neighbors? Why did her foreign policy take a new direction from Munich?

Suppose that where the Pacific washes the shores of California, there was more dry land, enough land to support a compact nation of some eighty million people. Suppose that nation was made up of people who despised us, regarded us as barbarians, and--last but not least--would like very much to grab our land and enslave our people. Suppose that nation began preparing itself to do just that.

Then suppose, off the shores of our Atlantic States, there lay a string of islands, on which lived other millions, another compact nation, with pretty much the same ideas about us, and with a record of past treachery matching perfectly the attack on Pearl Harbor. Suppose this nation was also getting ready.

I suspect that under those circumstances we would be the world's greatest advocates of collective security. And I suspect further that if our appeals for collective security were to fall on the deaf ears of Soviet Russia on the one side and Britain and Continental Europe on the other, we, too, would begin the display a certain noticeable degree of defensive isolation.

Against one of her enemies, the one on her western frontier, Hitler, the whole world knows and honors the magnificent victories of the Russians and their unrelenting determination with us to destroy utterly the military and war-making power of that enemy. That will free one Russian frontier from the ever constant menace of another sneak attack.

But some ask, what about Russia's enemy on her eastern boundary? Will she help when Hitler is crushed Britain, China, the Dutch, and us to destroy the evil common enemy Tojo and his international bandit gang? Remember that it was the Japanese Navy, which on February 8, 1904, without a declaration of war, without offense or justification, opened fire upon the Russian Navy at Port Arthur and began the Russo-Japanese war by the same dastardly kind of an attack with which she launched this war upon us at Pearl Harbor. You would not suppose that Russia has forgotten that. Nor would one believe that when Russia with us has an opportunity

to eliminate that ever constant menace to her security in the East that she will pass it by. It is safe always to read national policy in terms of national interest. Japan and Russia have been enemies at least through this century. They still are enemies, and I have no doubt that when Russia feels that when one frontier is safe, that she will turn her mighty strength toward establishing an equal safety and security for the other in the East. For none of us, you know, and that includes the Germans as well as the British and ourselves, like to fight a war on two fronts at the same time when we can help it. It is almost always necessary, at least, to concentrate and to emphasize war on one front, if it is to be well fought.

Now from Moscow comes one of the greatest and heartening declarations of our time. We cannot suppress a great pride in what our aged but active and honorable Secretary of State has accomplished in the name of our country. He comes home to read gratitude in a Nation's admiring eyes. And he brings to his fellow countrymen assurances and solemn promises about a great many things which have been the occasion of honest concern to some, and the fuel for prejudicial and partisan fire for others. Nobody can read the Moscow declaration without a new certainty in victory for the United Nation's cause, without new confidence that the victory we win this time shall not go with the wind. Listen to this joint declaration of Russia, Britain, China and ourselves:

"1. That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security.

"2. That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy.

"3. That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy.

"4. That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peaceloving states, and open to membership by all such states, states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

"5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the reestablishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.

"6. That after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation.

"7. That they will confer and cooperate with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period."

While we are fighting the war we are laying the structural foundations of the peace for which we fight. These four national cornerstones are great enough and mighty enough, indeed, to hold up like a new atlas, a new world.

We in the Senate by the accord of all who are not still chained by the sentiment of isolation, have agreed upon a Senate declaration which specifically incorporates point number 4 of the Moscow declaration, which of the seven points is the pivotal one on post-war organization. It is the intention of the Senate speaking, to echo the sentiments of the Moscow declaration, to give assurance to our co-signers of that new charter of a new world that America has at last rid and purged itself of the virus of isolation and it stands today a stalwart protector of world peace, one who will do its honorable and great part to provide for the common defense and to promote the general welfare of mankind.

Yet my fellow Americans, this pledge of the Senate can be kept only if it is guaranteed by a public opinion which will never allow it once to waiver. Our constitutional requirement that treaties be ratified by two-third vote of the Senators present and voting in the Senate when the vote is had, in a country like ours of many religions, many races, of intense political partisanship, of many emotional and economic stresses and strains, is a precarious foundation for any sustained and forthright foreign policy by our government. It would seem only fair to say that if the Senate is to insist upon its prerogative, which the Constitution clearly gives it, to be the final arbiter of American foreign policy, that that prerogative must be exercised before treaties are made as well as afterward. Surely the Senate can ill-afford to say that however many nations may gather together in common counsel, however momentous may be the issues that they decide, however delicate may be the equilibrium which wise statesmanship and commonsense comprise may bring about, however great the need for haste in reaching international accord may be, that the Senate may comfortably sit by and see all of such a great drama relatively unmoved, and then in due course when the document is presented as a formal instrument, as the curtain of the conference falls, bring it under the dissecting scrutiny of the Senate and subject it to the legislative technique in the Senate which provides for leisurely consideration, protracted hearings, unlimited debate, and finally the requirement of a two-thirds majority for ratification, without taking very great and dangerous responsibility.

I might as well say, my friends, that I do not believe that the present Senatorial power of ratification is consistent with the national safety or world peace. A technique which might well have applied to bi-lateral treaties of moment only to the contracting parties is no longer adequate or effective as was proved in what the Senate did to the Treaty of Versailles, to treaties signed by one or two score of nations, which set up world settlement and which alone are the vehicles of world welfare and world peace. Surely the requirements of our system of checks and balances would give the people adequate safeguard against executive action in the making of treaties, if the power of ratification were given to a majority of the Senate and a majority of the House of Representatives, and if each body by a majority vote had authority to fix the time when the final vote upon ratification or not should occur. This would take away from 17 Senators in the Senate a theoretical power to shatter the hope of the world. It would take away from 12 Senators, constituting a majority of the Foreign Relations Committee, the power to thwart the plaintive appeal of the nation and the mute call of the dead. It would deprive perhaps a lesser number, who might constitute a sub-committee, of the clutch which might choke world hope and aspiration.

In this great Nation where democracy stands, thank God, still secure against every onslaught and attack, where the people are sovereign in power, the people must also bear the heavy weight of responsibility for the conduct and the course of their country. We must not only will the kind of a world which our gallant fighting men and all who have sacrificed deserve, we must in the democratic way find the means through which to build that world. It is not enough to profess democracy. It is not enough even to save it. We must make democracy work at home and abroad.

Let the people, therefore, search out every danger to the kind of a world they want, whether it be prejudice, ignorance, shortsightedness, or whether it be techniques of moded and outworn which might deprive the victors of their just gains, might make futile and vain all that they have given, whether of treasure or of blood.

My fellow Americans, as you have today commemorated a great friendship with a great people, go out to make that opinion which shall keep that friendship and, better, deserve it; and go out, my fellow Americans, to your other great tasks which beckon and challenge you; and walk firmly and thoughtfully as you go, for you must know that it is history which follows after you.

* * * * *

2136 R Street, N.W.
Washington 8, D.C.
November 6, 1943

Dear Claude:

Reading the details of the 85 to 5 vote this morning, I feel that you should have the largest individual credit.

The technical position was that somebody had to hit the line hard from our side and then hold the line until somebody from Moscow reported. Then, of course, the rest was easy and our team had a walk-away.

Looking ahead, I think it most important that you take absolutely chance with 1944. I believe I can help you here--the sooner the better. Name your time. I may ride to Florida with you on your next trip.

Sincerely,

Charles E. Marsh

Senator Claude Pepper,
The Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

ADDRESS OF SENATOR CLAUDE PEPPER OF FLORIDA AT THE
AMERICAN-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP, INC. TENTH ANNIVERSARY
OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, MADISON SQUARE
GARDEN, NEW YORK CITY, MONDAY EVENING, NOVEMBER 8, 1943
9:15 P.M.

Ten years ago the governments of two great nations, both born in the struggle for man's freedom and each dedicated to the attainment of a better life for its people, clasped hands in friendship.

Ten years ago we were proud to call Russia friend. Today we are prouder still to call her honored ally.

In that resumption of trust and good-will, we in America gave recognition, under our flag; to a nation of heroes. Tonight, in saluting Soviet Russia, I am proud so to describe, so to identify, that nation and her valiant people.

For today the United States and Soviet Russia are more than friendly members of a world community, neighbors who have found a way of living in good grace together. Today those hands that reach across the sea are closed in more than a gesture. Together they are tightening in a death-grip on the throat of a common foe. They are crushing out the life of an aggressor who knows not the meaning of freedom, who speaks not the language of trust and good-will.

This winter, on the white reaches of western Russia, the forces of that aggressor will be driven nearer, day by day, to the scene of their full and proper retribution. General Franco of Spain, we are told, is withdrawing his Blue Division. But in the months ahead, over those bitter, war-scarred plains, will go others, their Swastika in tatters, their armies crushed. This winter in Russia there will be many very blue divisions.

Meanwhile, to the roar of the victory guns of Moscow, a new triumph, a new step towards a victorious future, has been taken together by these two nations and their other mighty allies, Great Britain and China. At Stalingrad the military effort of fascism met its supreme test and failed. At Moscow the political and economic effort of anti-fascism met its supreme test and won.

The solid reality that emerges from the Moscow conference - four great powers molded into a mighty modern Atlas, bearing upon its shoulders a new world - is steady, stable, strong.

The architects of the peace that is to come know this well. They know that only through the good offices of realistic leadership can the confidence of nations survive. They know also the firm base of mutual trust and confidence upon which rests the abiding friendship of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Let us examine that base. Of what stuff is it made? Why should we in America trust the Soviet Union and join her in the commitment to a lasting peace? Why should we not listen rather to the haters and baiters, the Christian Fronters and their unchristian backers, to the counsels of fear and suspicion, some of them emanating from high places? Why should we not be frightened by the wail of the lonely isolationist growing lonelier?

For an answer, I turn first to the Russian people themselves and the magnificent fight they are making. I do not have to tell you much about that. The world knows of the Red Army, of the guerillas of the matchless sacrifices of the people. Those stories have found their way into American hearts. They have blended with the epics of the ages.

Secondly, I turn for my answer to Russian leadership. I borrow the words of Premier Joseph Stalin, from an address given on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the October Revolution. I quote:

"The program of action of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition is: Abolition of racial exclusiveness; equality of nations and integrity of their territories; liberation of the enslaved nations and the restoration of their sovereign rights; the right of every nation to manage its affairs in its own way; economic aid to nations that have suffered and assistance in establishing their material welfare; restoration of democratic liberties; and destruction of the Hitler regime."

There, my fellow Americans, is another charter of aim and aspirations to which we proudly subscribe, as we did to the Atlantic charter to which the Soviet Union has pledged herself. Those words express no new sentiments for the Soviet Union. From the time the League of Nations admitted Russia only, mind you, after the exit of Germany, the League had no more faithful friend or eloquent defender than the Soviet Union. The same League, mind you, which we did not join. And we will never forget Munich, ignoble Munich, from which the Soviet Union was excluded. The same Munich, remember, from which we were as absent as from the League of Nations. What did Russia do as the sword of Hitler was raised over the head of Czechoslovakia? Russia stood up to her enemy and her obligation. I quote from the speech, the memorable speech, of Maxim Litvinoff in the assembly of the League of Nations, September 21, 1938:

"It was only two days ago that the Czechoslovak Government for the first time addressed a formal inquiry to my government, whether the U. S. S. R. is prepared, in accordance with the Soviet-Czech pact, to render to Czechoslovakia immediate and effective aid if France remains loyal to her obligation and renders similar assistance, and to this inquiry my government gave a clear answer in the affirmative." End quote.

Those words--"immediate and effective aid"--meant one thing: Fight. Among the major powers, Soviet Russia alone was ready and willing to do just that, in the showdown against the aggressor. And time and again, through those fateful years that led to Hitler's march, Russia alone kept the faith. Therefore I say, my friends, if past performance be the measure of fitness for high trust, let the nation with a better record than this cast the first stone!

But what of Japan? When we shall have finished with Hitler, some ask, will Russia help us do the other job of needed extermination. Why is she not pitching in there now against Tojo and his bandit gang? What assurance have we? Give us a sign!

The sign, fellow Americans, is written in the irrevocable pages of history. Russia has a Pearl Harbor of her own to remember, thirty-seven years older than ours. Without declaration of war, without offense or justification, Japan, on February 8, 1904, struck and destroyed the major part of the Russian fleet at Port Arthur. It was the same dastardly kind of attack as she loosed upon us in 1941. And Russia remembers. Russia knows the practical, down-to-earth reasons why she may expect the stab in the back from Japan--if ever she is caught off guard--just as she knows the hard, practical reasons why she can place her full trust in America.

If you want the key to national policy, seek it in national interest. The reasons that lay behind Port Arthur have marked Japan and Russia as enemies at least through this century. They are still enemies. I have no doubt that when Russia feels safe on one frontier, she will give due attention--complete with ships, planes and men of the Red Army and Navy--to the other. And do not be deceived, Premier Hideki Tojo himself knows that on the books of Russia, he and his worried little colleagues in crime are a piece of unfinished business. It is the old story of war strategy. Nobody, ourselves included, invites a defensive war on two fronts at the same time.

More than many of us might suspect the simple factors of the land, size and position have drawn us and Russia together in the past. It is no coincidence that in every international crisis America has faced in more than a century past, Russia has always turned up at her side. It was no historical accident that during the Civil War the appearance of the Russian fleet in New York Harbor offered relief to the Union from a perilous strain of its outside relationships. It was no accident that when other powers, toward the end of the last century, were reaching for Hawaii, Russia, through instructions

to her Ambassador at Washington, advised our government that she would look with favor upon American acquisition of this essential outpost in the Pacific,

Certainly it is no accident that today, marching together through the ordeal of fire, these two nations, through their accredited spokesmen, are able to announce that they see eye to eye in their first look at the world in prospect after military victory. It is not by chance that the part of each in that world will be large, nor that our cooperation will be close and cordial. It is not by chance that the Russian people are today intensely interested in America, in American culture and American science, nor that we here are listening to the songs of the Red Army, to the moving symphonies of great Russian composers past and present, and reading the deathless stories of Russian writers.

That dynamic interplay which springs from the heart of the people is already well on its way. Old fallacies and false labels fade before it. In pushing through our lend-lease program, we have cured ourselves of bookkeeper's cramps, and the Russians know that America is not measuring victory in dollars. In dollars, no nation has a better credit record than Soviet Russia. We in America believe that credit record will be as good in the priceless commodities of human understanding that dollars cannot buy.

Most of the people of the world are workers. Hence, no world organization which springs from the will of the people can fail to make one of its primary objectives--one of its most vital and real purposes--lifting up to new heights, raising to new standards, of skill and living, the men and women who wear the honored uniforms of labor.

No nation has made the welfare of the common man more her national objective than Russia. In the building of that magnificent edifice of a new world order, wherein shall reside a healthy, busy, happy and peaceful people, we know the Soviet Union will leave its own honored craftsman's mark.

The great words of the Moscow conference have found echo in a recent resolution of the United States Senate. Hardly less than the Moscow declaration has the utterance of a body which assumes to be the final arbiter of American foreign policy, a body which repudiated the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, given assurance and new hope to the world. If we keep the pledge of that resolution, there will be no World War Number Three. But shall we keep it? The vote had no more than been counted upon the resolution in the Senate, before a Senator was on his feet preventing the Majority Leader of the Senate from notifying the President of the adoption of the resolution, as being in the nature of advice to the President. This Senator was vigorously pointing out that it was not advice in the constitutional sense of the Senate but the mere expression of opinion, with the implication that it might change like the wind.

Remember that all the way through the debate on the resolution it was insisted that it not be regarded as binding the Senate to anything not subsequently to be ratified by a two-thirds majority of the Senate.

Can the people, therefore, assure that this pledge of cooperation and collaboration can be kept to our allies and our dead, if the present constitutional provision which gives one-third plus one of the voting Senators of the Senate not only the power of filibuster and of illimitable delay, but of defeating a treaty which, like the Treaty of Versailles, had the overwhelming support of a majority of the Senate and the country and the support of the hopes and the prayers of the world?

I have been forced to the conclusion that the retention of that power in such a minority in the face of experience and the many and varied stresses and strains of our population upon which play in Senators, as in other people, the normal human frailties in a world so complex as ours, is a danger to the security and the peace of the United States and the world.

The principle of checks and balances in our system of Government can be even better preserved and the menace of so great a power in the hands of so few removed by making the ratification of treaties to which we are a party depend rather upon a majority of the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives rather than two-thirds of the Senate. And, in the making of the change, the majority of the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives rather than two-thirds of the Senate. And, in the making of

the change, the majority in either body must have the unquestionable power, not only to vote but to avoid willful and purposeful obstruction of so vital a matter as a treaty.

Let us take away so dangerous a weapon from the hands of the isolationists. It is not enough to profess democracy. It is not even enough to save democracy. We have the harder task, to make democracy work, so that its machinery shall carry out the wills and the aspirations, may realize the dreams, of free peoples.

To those who gave their lives, to the Democracy which such a rule outrages before the God who gave them their lives, squandered in war, let us make the solemn pledge. We shall not repeat the sorry performance of 1920, the minority shall not rule.

Who of us in gazing upon this new and vast thing in the earth, the Soviet Nation, can fail to hear ringing back across three centuries, the words of John Milton.

"Methinks I see in my mind a noble and puissant nation,
rousing herself like a strong man after sleep, and shaking
her invincible locks. Methinks I see her as an eagle mowing
her mighty youth, and kindling her undazzled eyes at the full
midday beam; purging and unscaling her long-abused sight at
the fountain itself of heavenly radiance; while the whole noise
of timorous and flocking birds, with those also that love the
twilight, flutter about, amazed at what she means.."

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