

**WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#3 cable</del>	<del>Kabul 4981</del> <del>C</del> 1 p. <i>open 11-10-09</i>	<del>6/16/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#3c memcon</del>	<del>with the President, Maiwandwal, etc.</del> <del>C</del> 2 pp. <i>open 12-15-04 FRUS #539</i> [dup. #32, NSF, CF, "Afghanistan, Vol. 1," Box 116]	<del>3/28/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#4a memo</del>	<del>Rostow to the President</del> <i>open 5-13-93 NLS 92-4</i> <del>C</del> 1 p. [dup. #64, NSF, Memos to the Pres., "Rostow, Vol. 30," Box 17]	<del>6/7/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#4b memo</del>	<del>Schultze to the President</del> <i>open 5-13-93 NLS 92-4</i> <del>C</del> 2 pp. [dup. #64a, NSF, Memos to the Pres., "Rostow, Vol. 30," Box 17]	<del>5/29/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#5 memo</del>	<del>Saunders to Rostow</del> <del>S</del> 1 p. <i>open 11-10-09</i>	<del>5/2/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#7 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to the President</del> <i>open 12-15-04 FRUS #541</i> <del>S</del> 1 p. [dup. #29a, NSF, CF, "Afghanistan, Vol. 1," Box 116 & #128, Memos to the Pres., "Rostow, Vol. 26," Box 15]	<del>4/17/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#8 letter</del>	<del>Robert Neumann to Wriggins</del> <del>S</del> 1 p. <i>open 11-10-09</i>	<del>4/17/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#8a letter</del>	<del>Neumann to Rostow</del> <del>S</del> 3 pp. <i>open 8-11-10 NLS 1094</i>	<del>4/15/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#8b cable</del>	<del>Kabul 4295</del> <del>C</del> 2 pp. <i>open 11-10-09</i>	<del>4/24/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#8c cable</del>	<del>Kabul 4275</del> <del>S</del> 2 pp. <i>open 11-10-09</i>	<del>4/22/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#9 memcon</del>	<del>with Maiwandwal and Spain</del> <i>open 12-15-04 FRUS #540</i> <del>S</del> 2 pp. [dup. #35, NSF, CF, "Afghanistan, Vol. 1," Box 116]	<del>3/29/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#12 charts</del>	<del>Afghanistan: Trade and Aid</del> <del>S</del> 4 pp. <i>open 8/29/18 per RAC</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Files of Howard Wriggins, "Afghanistan June 1966-July 1967," Box 1

**RESTRICTION CODES**

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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

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ORIGIN NEA 15

INFO CPR 02, GPM 04, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SS 20, USIA 12, SCI 05, NASA 04,

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DRAFTED BY: NEA/PAF: WGRAMSAY  
APPROVED BY: NEA/PAF: F. C. PRESCOTT  
NEA: MR. PRECHT S/S: J. HAWLEY  
66635

*Afghanistan 31/12/68*

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R 312015Z DEC 68  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY KABUL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 294024

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO KING:  
BEGIN QUOTE YOUR MAJESTY: ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE I  
THANK YOUR MAJESTY FOR YOUR MESSAGE ON THE OCCASION OF THE  
COMPLETION OF THE APOLLO VIII MISSION.

THE ACHIEVEMENT OF APOLLO VIII AND ITS GALLANT CREW IS AN  
HISTORIC STEP IN MAN'S SEARCH FOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE UNIVERSE IN  
WHICH HE LIVES, AND HERALDS A BRIGHT NEW ERA OF EXPLORATION AND  
SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION. COL. BORMAN, CAPT. LOVELL AND LT.  
COL. ANDERS JOIN ME IN THIS EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION FOR  
YOUR KIND WORDS. SINCERELY, LYNDON B. JOHNSON END QUOTE.

2. FYI TEXT OF KING'S CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE WAS: QUOTE THE  
SINGULAR AND MAGNIFICENT APOLLO FLIGHT HAS EXPANDED THE HUMAN  
KNOWLEDGE OF THE UNIVERSE, A KNOWLEDGE WHICH ALL TRUST WILL  
FURTHER THE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN MEN ON EARTH. PLEASE ACCEPT  
OUR CONGRATULATIONS AND EXTEND TO THE THREE COURAGEOUS  
ASTRONAUTS THE FELICITATIONS OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. MOHAMMAD  
ZAHIR KING OF AFGHANISTAN END QUOTE END FYI.

3. WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT PLAN RELEASE BUT HAS NO OBJECTION  
SHOULD RGA WISH TO DO SO. IF RGA PLANS RELEASE, WOULD  
APPRECIATE TWENTY-FOUR HOURS NOTICE SO WHITE HOUSE MAY  
ARRANGE JOINT RELEASE IF DESIRED. RUSK

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*Afghanistan 2/*

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July 8, 1967

WWR:

Here is a proposed Presidential reply to Prime Minister Maiwandwal's letter sent on his departure from the UN Special Session.

The prose isn't great but the main points of our message get through. While the issue of ending belligerency is important to us, I doubt that the President should himself get into that thicket.

HW

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*approved 7/11/67  
llw*

Att: WWR memo for the President, 7/8/67,  
att. Read to Rostow memo, 7/7/67,  
enc. telegram to Kabul for clearance (WH-2605)

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

July 8, 1967

**SUBJECT: Letter to You from Prime Minister Maiwandwal and  
State's Proposed Reply**

Before leaving the UNGA for Kabul, Prime Minister Maiwandwal wrote you the attached letter. He thanks you for your friendly hospitality when he was here and expresses his peoples' desire to promote friendly relations with us. As was to be expected of the head of a Muslim country, he hopes our position at the UN will be in accordance with our traditional friendship with Arab and Afro-Asian peoples.

State's proposed draft reply to be sent by cable thanks him for his letter and restates our position--sustain the cease-fire, promote a climate in which the states of the area themselves can achieve a settlement, retain friendly relations with all the Arab nations and reaffirm an interest in the territorial and political integrity of all the states in the area.

I recommend you approve the attached message.

W. W. Rostow

Att: Read to Rostow memo, 7/7/67,  
enc. telegram to Kabul for clearance (WH-2605)

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



**Dear Mr. President:**

Upon leaving New York, I should like to address myself to Your Excellency while recalling with gratitude the friendly hospitality you accorded me during my visit to the United States of America three months ago.

My current visit was in connection with the emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly and being therefore confined to New York, I should like to take the opportunity, through this letter, to convey once again to Your Excellency the desire of my people to promote the friendly relations which so happily exist between our two countries.

We are deeply grieved by the grave situation in the Middle East characterized by the Israeli military occupation of territories belonging to Jordan, the United Arab Republic and Syria.

We hope that the stand to be taken by the United States Government on the present debate in the General Assembly will be not only in accordance with its traditional friendship with Arab and Afro-Asian peoples, but also in support of the principles for which it stands.

I take this opportunity to extend to Your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

**Prime Minister Maiwandwal**



11516

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON


June 30, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to the President from  
the Afghan Prime Minister

The enclosed unsealed letter to the President from Prime Minister Maiwandwal was delivered by the Afghan Ambassador during a call in the Department today. In it the Prime Minister expressed gratitude for the hospitality accorded him during his recent visit to the United States and reiterated the desire of the Afghan people to promote friendly relations between our two countries. He also expressed the hope that the United States Government will take a position in the U. N. General Assembly debate on the Middle East situation in accordance with its traditional friendship with the Arabs and Afro-Asians and in support of American principles.

A suggested reply will be forwarded in the near future.

  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

As stated.

*Letter sent  
p. 65 reading  
when answer  
readied  
July 10, 67  
Haw*

*F-12*

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*2c*

*12/11/67  
2 Ret  
Huggins*





PREMIER MINISTRE

Dear Mr. President,

Upon leaving New York, I should like to address myself to Your Excellency while recalling with gratitude the friendly hospitality you accorded me during my visit to the United States of America three months ago.

My current visit was in connection with the emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly and being therefore confined to New York, I should like to take the opportunity, through this letter, to convey once again to Your Excellency the desire of my people to promote the friendly relations which so happily exist between our two countries.

We are deeply grieved by the grave situation in the Middle East characterized by the Israeli military occupation of territories belonging to Jordan, the United Arab Republic and Syria.

We hope that the stand to be taken by the United States Government on the present debate in the General Assembly will be not only in accordance with its traditional friendship with Arab and Afro-Asian peoples, but also in support of the principles for which it stands.

I take this opportunity to extend to Your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

New York, 29 June 1967

Yours sincerely,

  
Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal

His Excellency  
Lyndon Baines Johnson  
President of the United States of America  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.



# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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11

Action

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ KABUL 4981

REF: BANGKOK 15741

SUBJ: PROPOSED HIGHWAY HERAT-KABUL VIA HAZARAJAT

1. BELIEVE UNDP STUDY SEVERAL YEARS OLD. NEITHER EMBASSY NOR USAID/A HAS COPY. NO US COMMENTS ON FILE HERE.

2. GENERAL VIEW EMBASSY/USAID IS THAT HIGH COST OF HIGHWAY DESIRED BY AFGHANS COULD NEVER BE MATCHED BY ECONOMIC BENEFITS WITHIN REASONABLE PERIOD. NEEDS ASIAN HIGHWAY AMPLY SERVED BY EXISTING HIGHWAY KABUL-KANDAHAR-HERAT. WHEREAS CASE MAY BE DEVELOPED BY RGA FOR PAVING ROADS AT EITHER END FOR CERTAIN DISTANCES, TOTAL PROJECT WOULD AND SHOULD NOT QUALIFY FOR US FINANCING.

3. PROPOSED FULL-LENGTH PROJECT IS POLITICALLY ATTRACTIVE TO RGA FOR PURPOSES GETTING REMOTE INNER AREAS MORE INVOLVED IN

PAGE 2 RUQTKB 4981 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NATIONAL SCENE. HOWEVER, US SHARE THIS INTEREST IS NO WAY COMPARABLE TO COST OF PROJECT, AND IS VERY LOW IN PRIORITY COMPARED TO OTHER US INTERESTS AND TO US VIEW OF BEST USE EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE FUNDS.

4. IF ECAFE WISHES SEND WHIPPLE TO CONSULT AFGHAN AUTHORITIES OR UN RPT UN MISSION HERE, WE GLAD SEE HIM WHILE HERE. HOWEVER IF, AS INDICATED REFTL, WHIPPLE'S SOLE PURPOSE WOULD BE CONSULT EMBASSY AND USAID, WE STRONGLY ADVISE AGAINST TRIP.

GP-3. NEUMANN.

*Hal, Is this the  
highway Kandahar  
asked the LST & help  
on? I thought it was  
Herat - Kabul.*

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By ebm/jc, NARA, Date 11-6-09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

#5515

May 11, 1967

TO: Mr. Richard Moose  
The White House

FROM: Jeanne Davis  
Director  
Secretariat Staff

The enclosed memcon of the President's conversation with Prime Minister Maiwandwal was prepared on March 28. Through an administrative mix-up it was not, however, sent to the White House for clearance.



30  
1815  
1 Douglas  
2 RPH  
~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

#5515

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Executive Secretariat

May 11, 1967

TO: Mr. Walt W. Rostow  
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Memorandum of Conversation between  
the President and Afghan Prime Minister  
Maiwandwal, March 28, 1967

For approval prior to distribution.

The President's remarks are sidelined  
in blue.

This memorandum was drafted by  
NEA/PAF - Mr. Spain and cleared by  
the Secretary and NEA - Acting Assistant  
Secretary Handley.

Attachment:

Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

1813  
36

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: March 28, 1967  
PLACE: The White House

SUBJECT: The President's Conversation with  
Afghan Prime Minister Maiwandwal

PARTICIPANTS: United States

The President  
Secretary of State Dean Rusk  
Mr. Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President  
Mr. Howard Wiggins, Executive Office of the President  
Ambassador Symington, Chief of Protocol  
Acting Assistant Secretary William J. Handley, NEA ~~MA~~  
Ambassador Robert G. Neumann, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan  
Country Director James W. Spain, Pakistan-Afghanistan Affairs

Afghanistan

His Excellency Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal, Prime Minister  
His Excellency Abdullah Malikiyar, Ambassador of Afghanistan  
His Excellency Nur Ali, Minister of Commerce  
Secretary Farhadi, Council of Ministers

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After the President and the Prime Minister joined the other members of the party, the Prime Minister thanked the President for the opportunity which his visit to the United States provided to renew old friendships.

Secretary Rusk noted that the Secretary General of the United Nations had just made public his proposal on Vietnam and that the USG had commented favorably on it. He added that he understood Hanoi's reaction was negative.

The President said he had discussed the announcement with the Prime Minister and told him of our disappointment at Hanoi's negative reaction. He said we had earlier consulted with our allies on the proposal and responded affirmatively. We had done this a dozen or so times in the past on other proposals. However, Hanoi's reaction to the Secretary General was that this was none of his business.

War is everybody's business, the President said, and the U.S. is prepared to consider anybody's suggestion for ending it. He said he had asked Mr. Rostow to check the time and manner of our consultations on U-Thant's latest proposal and that he wanted to show this data to the Prime Minister.

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FO 13292, Sec. 3.5

Auth. by ~~FRUS~~ FRUS 64-68, Vol. 25 #539  
By J.E./io, NARA, Date 12-15-04

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

The President added that he felt more strongly than ever that the people of Vietnam should be allowed to have free elections and that after that, if they wanted us out, we would be happy to leave. The money we are spending for bullets we would be happy to spend instead for bread. We would even be willing to help Ho Chi Minh.

He stressed, however, that we were not going to surrender or pull out of Vietnam, saying that if agreements were no good there, they were no good anywhere. He said we are still ready to go toward peace. Our answer is Yes. Hanoi's is still No.

The Prime Minister observed that the Secretary General is going abroad again and suggested that perhaps he would be having further consultations on Vietnam during his trip.

Secretary Rusk noted that U Thant had seen two North Vietnamese diplomats in Rangoon and thought it possible that those discussions had been taken into account in the Secretary General's present proposal. The Secretary told the Prime Minister that we knew of his interest in the cause of peace in Vietnam. He added he did not know whether or not the Prime Minister had any way to explore privately further moves; he remarked that he thought public approaches were not likely to get very far at the present time.

The Prime Minister agreed that public approaches were not apt to be effective and said that the rigid public stands which both sides have taken makes this difficult. He noted that Afghanistan has always stood by the April, 1964 recommendations of the seventeen non-aligned countries. In response to a question from Secretary Rusk as to how much attention the Vietnam problem attracted in Afghanistan, the Prime Minister said that it attracted a good deal of attention and now that there is democracy in the country it was sometimes used by the politicians for their own purposes. He expressed his concern over the problem describing it as an explosive situation which he feared might escalate into a bigger danger.

COPIES TO: S/S            NEA            Amembassy KABUL  
             S/P            EA  
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             INR/OD  
             WH  
             CIA

NEA/PAF:JWSpain:atm  
3/28/67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4

June 7, 1967

WALT -

Here at last is the request to the President on Kajakai. The President promised Maiwandwal that it would be processed through the bureaucracy within a month.

AID is much interested, and I hope this can go up promptly.

Howard Wriggins

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

40  
June 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Afghanistan - Loan for Kajakai Hydroelectric Plant

Here is the request for your formal approval of a \$12 million loan to Afghanistan to finance the installation of additional generating equipment at the Kajakai dam in the Helmand Valley, with which we've been associated for many years. When Ambassador Maiwandwal was here in early April, you advised him we would decide on the loan within thirty days, but AID has given it a most thorough going over.

After careful review, they concur that it is economically sound. If you approve this loan, actual construction will not be started until satisfactory progress is made toward improving accounting procedures, the rate structure and the collection of payments in their electrical industry.

Secretary Fowler agrees the balance of payments effects of the loan are minimal.

It would create a political problem if we turned it down now. We have done three feasibility studies and already in 1965 told them we "agreed in principle" to finance it.

Charlie Schultz agrees with Bill Gaud we should go ahead. I recommend you approve.

Approve Kajakai \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ See me \_\_\_\_\_

AID has also been holding off on a \$4.5 million equipment loan for earth-moving machinery to be used in building irrigation works in the Helmand Valley. This small a loan would not normally come to you, but AID has held it up ever since you put a freeze on all Afghan aid. They would like to go ahead now. I recommend we proceed.

Yes on small loan \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ See me \_\_\_\_\_

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-4

By mg, NARA, Date 5-12-93

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



7b

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 92-4  
By iso, NARA, Date 5-12-93

MAY 29 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Afghanistan - Loan for Kajakai Hydroelectric Plant

Attached for your consideration is a request from Bill Gaud that you approve a \$12 million power project loan in Afghanistan. The project involves installation of generating equipment at an existing dam and the associated transmission system.

The project would supply power to the Helmand Valley, where the U.S. has invested over \$60 million since 1950. So far we have little to show for our investment. AID is hopeful, however, that agricultural output in the Valley can be increased over the next ten years by two to four times present levels.

The Kajakai loan has a long history. Since 1964, the U.S. has done three feasibility studies, all of which concluded that the project is feasible. In 1965, AID informed the Afghanistan Government that it "agreed in principle" to financing the project. You advised Prime Minister Maiwandwal last month that we would decide on this loan in about thirty days.

In AID's judgment, this loan is economically sound. There were some serious problems with the project which had to be cleared up:

- The feasibility of the project depends upon substantial increases in per capita power consumption and decided improvement in collections.
- The Afghans have only limited ability to staff, maintain, and operate complex projects.
- The Afghan Electric Authority has a very poor performance record, receiving payment for only about half of the power they generate.

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2

As part of the proposed loan, therefore, AID will finance technical training to develop local management and operating skills. In addition, AID has agreed that construction will not be started until satisfactory progress is made towards accounting improvements, adequate rates, and a collection system which assures costs will be met from revenues.

#### Domestic Revenue Problems

The World Bank, AID, and the IMF have pointed out the need for greater domestic revenues if Afghanistan's development goals are to be realized. In order to assure that this power project will not draw resources from other important programs, AID has agreed to negotiate for measures to increase revenues in order to assure domestic financing of an increasing share of development expenditures.

O.S.  
Hitt  
The funds will be used to purchase goods and services in the U.S. Secretary Fowler agrees that the balance of payments effects of the loan will be minimal.

There would be a serious political problem in turning this project down. The history of the U.S. involvement in this project and in the Helmand Valley and the 1965 agreement "in principle" to finance the project have given it special significance in our relations with Afghanistan.

In view of

- . the political problem involved in rejecting the loan,
- . the fact that AID will condition the project on the Afghans taking the steps necessary to make the project pay off, and
- . the project's contribution to meeting the long-run growth in power demand,

I recommend that you authorize the loan as set forth above.

*Charles L. Schultze*  
Charles L. Schultze  
Director

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_



4c

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

OFFICE OF  
THE ADMINISTRATOR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAY 12 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Afghanistan - \$12 Million Kajakai Hydroelectric Project Loan

Recommendation: That you authorize us to inform the Royal Government of Afghanistan that we are prepared to negotiate a \$12 million Development Loan to finance the foreign exchange costs of the Kajakai Hydroelectric Project.

Background: During Prime Minister Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal's recent visit, you informed him that our review of the proposal was nearing completion and that his Government could expect our decision in approximately thirty days.

We have completed the necessary review and find the project to be economically feasible. There is an unsatisfied and growing demand in the Helmand Valley for power. Present power facilities are inadequate to meet this demand and the installation of generating equipment in the existing Kajakai Dam would provide adequate amounts of dependable and economic power for the first time.

The Project: The loan will finance the foreign exchange costs for the construction of a two 16,500 Kilowatt units hydroelectric generating plant, other attendant physical facilities in the Kandahar-Girishk area of the Helmand Valley, and the furnishing of technical, supervisory and training services for the Afghan electric authorities responsible for the construction and operation of the Project. Repayment terms of our loan will be 40 years; with a 10 years grace period; and with interest at one percent during the grace period and two and one-half percent thereafter.

U.S. Interest in the Helmand Valley: U.S. involvement in the Valley began in the early 1950's with Export-Import Bank assistance totaling \$39.5 million and was supplemented with U.S. technical assistance commencing in 1953. Afghan and U.S. investment in the Valley now totals about \$115 million which have been expended for an extensive irrigation and drainage system, dams, agricultural institutions, roads, and other related facilities. The objectives of the Afghan and U.S. governments in this region are to increase benefits from existing investments, accelerate agricultural production, and encourage development of industry.

Balance of Payments Effect: These loan funds will be used to finance commodities and services from the United States. Exports financed under this loan are additional to commercial exports for which Afghanistan authorizes foreign exchange.

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Authority NLS 92-1  
By Julian, NARA, Date 4-29-93



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-2-

Self-Help Criteria: The U.S. is pressing to maximize the commitment of Afghan resources to the overall development program outlined in the proposed Third Five Year Plan (1967-71), which is now in the final stages of preparation. Commitments to electric power development in the Third Plan total 3.0 billion afghanis (\$40 million equivalent) or approximately 10 percent of the Plan total.


The Kajakai project has been assigned a high priority within the Helmand Valley section of the Plan. The Afghan government has allocated \$3.4 million equivalent to cover local costs of this power facility, the input to be made through annual budgets over a three-four year period. We will require evidence of the amount of funds appropriated for the initial year of the project and will monitor the Afghan government's annual commitment to see that sufficient funds are budgeted in subsequent fiscal years to carry out the project.

We will also require the Afghan government to establish a competently staffed regulatory and administrative agency. To this end, we propose to require satisfactory evidence that an effective rate schedule will be developed, an appropriate time schedule for the introduction of the new rates will be prepared and approved by the Afghan government, and improved revenue collection and accounting procedures will be installed in a timely manner. Further, we will specify that a portion of the loan will be used to contract with a U.S. public utility or private firm for advisory services to the national regulatory agency in the areas of utility regulation, management and fiscal responsibility.

Trained Afghan management and operating personnel are vital to the success of the project. To safeguard this major investment, we will specify that the U.S. contract will include provision for the necessary training and supervision of adequate numbers of Afghan personnel to operate the completed facility.

The Department of State concurs in this recommendation.

Action Requested: That you authorize negotiation of the \$12 million Development Loan for Kajakai Hydroelectric Project.

  
William S. Gaud

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

May 2, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR WWR

SUBJECT: Further Aid for Afghanistan

Now that we have broken loose the PL 480 for Afghanistan, we ought to look forward to the two remaining aid items on the Afghanistan agenda:

1. The big one, of course, is the Kajakai Dam loan. This has now worked its way almost all the way through the AID loan machinery and will come to us sometime in the next week or two.
2. There is also a \$4.6 million loan for earthmoving equipment to be used in the Helmand Valley, largely for irrigation works. This is already to go and would not normally come to the President because it is less than \$10 million. However, in view of the President's general freeze on Afghanistan aid, AID is asking whether it can go ahead on its own. I agreed to sound you out since you have talked recently with the President.

If the President does not feel strongly about this any longer, you may want me to give AID a go-ahead on the small loan. The Kajakai loan will have to come to the President later anyway. If you feel the President would not like anything to go ahead without his knowing, we can hold the small loan a week or two until we are ready to check the Kajakai project with him and simply make the smaller one a paragraph in that memo.

Hal Saunders

Go ahead with the equipment loan \_\_\_\_\_

We'd better check it with the  
President later \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By etm/jc, NARA, Date 11-6-09~~SECRET~~

April 19, 1967

WALT -

I gather the President wants to chat about Afghanistan PL 480 wheat and oil.

Ambassador Neumann has come in several times since his return. The price situation in Kabul continues to worsen and Neumann urges immediate action if at all possible. He argues that a prompt decision by us will help roll back flour prices, which have reached record highs in Kabul. Some holders of stocks can't be persuaded to release their holdings until a firm U. S. commitment is made public as a source of eventual replenishment of the national supply.

BoB reviewed Agriculture's self-help measures with care before approving the AID/Agriculture memorandum.

I think it puts the President in a bad light if he appears to hold up food because a Prime Minister from a little country up against the Soviet Union answers Press Club queries in a way to annoy us.

Howard Wriggins



~~SECRET~~

7  
April 17, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Afghan PL 480 Agreement

Secretary Freeman is ready to go ahead with the \$4.4 million wheat and oil agreement you mentioned to Prime Minister Maiwandwal. Sharply rising food prices have triggered demonstrations in Afghanistan over the past two weeks, and Ambassador Neumann recommends we go ahead as soon as possible. Maiwandwal has just returned and can make good political use of a go-ahead to dampen fears of shortages.

His one comment under pressure at the Press Club remains an isolated incident. His public statements on the rest of his tour were quite moderate. Now that a couple of weeks have elapsed, we should probably go ahead now unless you are strongly opposed.

Charlie Schultze's economic analysis is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13202, Sec. 3.5

Authority ~~SECRET~~ FRUS 64-68, Vol. 25 #541

By JLC/ia, NARA, Date 12-15-04

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

file

7a

To: The President

Subject: Public Law 480 Program with Afghanistan

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate a PL 480 agreement with Afghanistan to provide approximately 40,000 tons of wheat and 4,000 tons of vegetable oil, of which the current market value is \$4.4 million. Payment would be made in convertible local currency over 40 years with 1 percent interest during the 10-year grace period and 2½ percent thereafter. The Department of State concurs in this recommendation.

#### Afghanistan's Food Situation

Afghanistan is experiencing seriously reduced food supplies, especially in the urban sector, as a result of drought last summer. Precipitation in the mountains during the winter was late and inadequate, and the outlook for grain production this year is uncertain. The wheat crop harvested last summer was approximately 10 percent below the normal 2.2 million ton level. In the urban sector market supplies of wheat decreased to about 10,000 tons per month beginning last October, as compared with the normal average level of 11,000 tons monthly. Wheat prices country-wide have risen 30 percent since November, and in some urban areas these prices have doubled since last year.

Domestic production of animal and vegetable oils does not meet present market demand. The supply of edible animal fats has decreased because of the loss of animals resulting from drought conditions during the past two years. Consumer demand is also shifting to edible vegetable oils as a result of experience with U.S. oils imported under the 1965 sales agreement.

#### Self-Help

In 1965 the Afghan Government initiated an accelerated agricultural production program designed to achieve self-sufficiency in wheat by 1972. In supporting this program the Government has taken some important steps in the past year. It increased the Agriculture Ministry's FY 1967 development budget by 69 percent and tentatively approved a 25-30 percent shift of development resources during the Third Plan from agricultural capital projects to production programs. Additional budget funds were provided to support 43 agricultural students abroad during the next five years and to train in Afghanistan 250 additional extension workers.

Following last August's discussions with Secretary Freeman on the need for increasing production, an intensified wheat growing program was

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Authority NLS 91-412  
By Julian, NARA, Date 4-29-93

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

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launched with the object of rapidly boosting production in FY's 1967 and 1968. In carrying out this program the Ministry of Agriculture has imported 620 tons of improved seeds from Pakistan and Mexico and has obtained authority to import an additional 225 tons under an existing U.S. loan. 6,660 acres were planted with improved varieties last fall for seed harvest this summer. Fertilizer is a vital part of this program and last fall over 800 wheat/fertilizer demonstrations were made on farmers' lands. The Government has imported 10,500 tons of fertilizer for use during the 1966-67 planting season and is ordering 10,000 tons for use during next fall's planting. This contrasts with average annual fertilizer imports of only 4,000 tons from 1960 through 1965.

In this agreement we will require that the Government of Afghanistan:


- (1) Give highest priority to the development of agriculture during the Third Five Year Plan;
- (2) Continue the accelerated wheat production program which is designed to achieve self-sufficiency by 1972;
- (3) Give special attention to the findings of the proposed U.S. Agricultural Survey Team;
- (4) Press ahead in expanding adaptive research in the application of fertilizers and in the use of improved seeds;
- (5) Give special attention to the forthcoming recommendations of the TVA fertilizer survey team concerning use and distribution of fertilizer and consider ways of rapidly expanding domestic fertilizer consumption as preparation for the full exploitation of planned fertilizer production facilities;
- (6) Take steps to significantly increase the number and quality of students in agriculture at Kabul University;
- (7) Continue its present program to become self-sufficient in edible oil production by 1970.

Recommendation

That you authorize us to proceed with the PL 480 sales agreement as described above.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Administrator

Agency for International Development

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Secretary

Department of Agriculture

APR 7 1967

cc: J.Schnittker, D.Jacobson, C.Eskildsen, SEC

L.Brown, E.Ransom, IADS

T.Street, R.Gibb, FAS Export Prog.Approve: \_\_\_\_\_

G.Parks, H.Dunkleberger, F.Jack, \_\_\_\_\_

R.Euler, FAS-GSM

M.Wichser, MR-FFP-AID

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
Disapprove: \_\_\_\_\_

FAS/AID-TWHulscher, NESAS/SA (typed IADS:LBrown:FAS:GSM:RSEuler/kw 4-3-67)



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8

Kabul, Afghanistan

April 17, 1967

Honorable Howard Wriggins  
Assistant to the President  
The White House

Dear Mr. Wriggins:

I enjoyed very much working with you and I hope that we may see you here before you leave for the Elysian field. I think that things have gone pretty well and while we had that awful faux pas it certainly got into our friends' bones and they have acted manfully to correct it, including even withstanding very considerable French pressure.

Thus, in the long run we may be better off because of it, although there must be an easier way of achieving results.

Very sincerely yours,



Robert G. Neumann

Enclosure:

Copy of letter to  
W.W.Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NWJ-036-001-1-1  
By ebm/jc, NARA, Date 11-6-09

~~SECRET~~

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HW  
8a

Kabul, Afghanistan

April 15, 1967

Honorable W. W. Rostow  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House

Dear Walt:

I have now returned to my post and I want to express to you and to your associates my profound gratitude for all that has been done in connection with the visit of Prime Minister Maiwandval. While we are all glad that things went well on the whole, we are considerably irked by the events at the Press Club. There can of course be no excuse for the Prime Minister's response and I share fully the sense of disappointment and irritation over his ill-thought-out response. I thought it might be useful for you to have some background on the affair as well as its sequel.

Prior to the Prime Minister's departure I had repeated occasions to make him aware of the extreme sensitivity of the Viet Nam issue in the United States. He assured me that no statements on this question would be volunteered and in fact several references which had been in drafts of speeches were taken out during the preparatory work for the visit. He said, however, that if asked a specific question he would have to respond in some fashion along the line of Afghanistan's established policies although he intended to do so in a low key and in a manner that would be as inoffensive to us as possible.

As you know, a good deal of the time spent by the President with the Prime Minister was taken up by Viet Nam and this was also true of the meeting with Secretary Rusk. It would not be correct to say that the Prime Minister felt upset over this, but he did feel a sense of pressure, and sensed an urging, whether intended or not, that he should come out somehow in support of our position. He opined that to many Asian countries the presence of Western forces in Asia was in itself an objectionable event and that even a "balanced" statement on the issues in Viet Nam would be

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EO 12958, Sec. 3.6

10-94

Ex. 101, NARA, Date 7-27-10

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interpreted as "unbalanced" by his fellow Asians. He thought that this delicate part of his position was not fully appreciated in Washington.

Nevertheless he did get through the speeches all right and even through the first Viet Nam question at the Press Club. However, when at the very end he was asked that famous last question several impulses arose in him. As a former member of the Press Club he knew the last question was often a "funny" question. He also suspected apparently that this question came from one of the American officials present, which to the best of my knowledge was not the case. And he thought that this was an attempt at putting him on the spot and so his guard dropped and he leaped when should have looked.

As I said before, his conduct cannot be excused. However I will say at least that he and his companions knew immediately that he had made a mistake, an act of human frailty, if you will. The same afternoon in response to a question of the same nature by Senator Symington at an informal meeting with the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee he gave a perfectly balanced answer, following in effect the suggestions which I had made to him earlier. In subsequent meetings he also held the line and his farewell statement to the President, including his wishes for the success of the President's peace efforts, represent a very considerable deviation from Afghanistan's normal stand in our favor and is quite unprecedented. I am also glad to note that he held the line in Paris. I was informed that a paragraph on Viet Nam originally placed in his remarks at De Gaulle's luncheon had been removed. I should also add that stories of the Press Club flap have trickled back to Kabul via Afghan channels and are uniformly taken very seriously by those in government circles who are aware of these events. I believe that this unfortunate experience will help to make the government more cautious in the future. Hence the confrontation with Washington realities has probably been salutary and may benefit us in the long run. As a matter of fact the Prime Minister will find himself in considerable political trouble largely as a result of the Hotaki case whose repercussions are beginning to be felt here. The wheat crisis and his Press Club slip are not helping him either.

I know how very much you are aware of the fundamental factors on which relations between Afghanistan and the United States rest. None of these factors have been altered in the slightest and I cannot think of any way of "punishing" the Afghans without punishing our own interests at the same time and perhaps even more so. This is why I hope that the various projects discussed in Washington can be brought to their fruition in due time.

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Now to another but not unrelated item: As you may know from Howard Wriggins, we are inaugurating our new chancery building on May 16. We are looking to this event as an occasion to bring an important American delegation to Kabul at that time, to make the American presence demonstrably felt and to develop a "clientele" for Afghanistan, i.e. people who will take a continuing interest in Afghanistan and what we are trying to achieve here. We are in particular need of this because our Soviet bretheren inaugurate with the greatest of fanfare every ten miles of highway which they construct and it would materially aid our effort if we might use the inauguration of the chancery for a similar purpose. That has been all the more acute as we have just learned of the forthcoming visit of the titular head of the Soviet government, Podgorny, from May 30 to June 2. When I talked with Chief Justice Warren, the former governor of my state, he seemed very favorably inclined toward heading such a delegation and I hope that he will do so, but we also hope for some important congressional and administration figures. The Afghanistan government has promised every cooperation. Naturally our efforts would be greatly enhanced if a plane could be made available for that purpose. This would not only make possible a larger delegation but would also make it more comfortable for delegates of Warren's distinction who can spend only a relatively short time in this country. We would like the plane to arrive on Monday, May 14, in order to give the delegates an opportunity for some rest and sightseeing before the official inauguration on Tuesday, May 16. On May 17 we would like to take them on a tour emphasizing special USAID projects, and Thursday, May 18, would be the scheduled time of departure. Anything that can be done toward the furtherance of this aim would be very greatly appreciated by the entire Country Team and myself and would, I am certain, have a most favorable effect on our standing in this country.

With every best wish, I remain,

Very sincerely yours,

Robert G. Neumann

P.S. While accompanying the Prime Minister to the West Coast I took occasion to meet off the record with the editorial board of the LOS ANGELES TIMES, as you have once done, and held an informal seminar at UCLA. Both events convinced me that at least the academic expression of the anti-Viet Nam policy sentiments is clearly in decline and in disarray, as was confirmed to me by several of my former students who are still very much addicted to that point of view.

Copy to:  
Howard Wriggins

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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STATE GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ KABUL 4295

DELHI FOR AMBASSADOR NEUMANN

REF: KABUL 4293

PRIMIN EXPRESSES PIQUE TOWARD US

1. EDITOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS MAGAZINE HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG, CURRENTLY VISITING AFGHANISTAN, REPORTS PRIMIN MAIWANDWAL DISPLAYED SHARP IRRITATION WITH US IN PRIVATE INTERVIEW APRIL 23.

2. MEETING PRIMIN BY APPOINTMENT, ARMSTRONG BEGAN WITH COMPLIMENTARY ACCOUNT OF PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS AFGHAN PROGRESS, THEN INVITED PRIMIN COMMENT ON CURRENT SITUATION AFGHANISTAN. TO STIMULATE DISCUSSION, ARMSTRONG ASKED IF RGA "SUFFERED FROM ANY FOREIGN PROPAGANDA" HERE, E.G. SOVIET, CHICOM, PAKISTANI.

PAGE 2 RUQTKB 4295 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. PRIMIN REPLIED FOREIGN COUNTRIES DISSEMINATED MUCH "INFORMATION" HERE ON THEIR ACTIVITIES AND POLICIES BUT GENERALLY AVOIDED PROPAGANDIZING AGAINST AFGHANISTAN. ONLY EXCEPTION WAS "MISLEADING PROPAGANDA" CURRENTLY EMANATING FROM US. PRIMIN WENT ON ASSERT AGENCIES LIKE AP AND UP HAVE MADE GREAT EFFORT BLOW UP "INCIDENTS" AND INTERPRET THEM IN MANNER HOSTILE TOWARD AFGHANISTAN.

4. WHEN ARMSTRONG ASKED IF PRIMIN HAD IN MIND UNFORTUNATE RECENT CASE OF ALLEGATIONS BY AFGHAN STUDENT IN US (HOTAKI, REFTTEL), PRIMIN AFFIRMED -- "THE ONE SAID TO HAVE BEEN APPROACHED BY CIA." PRIMIN THEN OBSERVED USG HAD ORIGINALLY INTENDED DEPORT HOTAKI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLT-036-DOL-1-1

By hja, NARA, Date 11-6-09

023660

1967 APR 24 AM 10:51

~~BOWDLER~~  
~~BUDGET~~  
~~DAVIS~~  
~~GINSBURGH~~  
~~HAMILTON~~  
~~JESSUP~~  
~~JOHNSON~~  
~~JORDEN~~  
~~KEENEY~~  
~~KOMER~~  
~~MOYERS~~  
~~TAYLOR~~  
~~WIGGINS~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-KABUL 4295, APRIL 24

BUT APPARENTLY CHANGED MIND WHEN HE BEGAN MAKING STATEMENTS AGAINST CIA, WHICH DIFFICULT FOR HIM (PRIMIN) UNDERSTAND. ARMSTRONG REPLIED THIS UNFORTUNATE AS IT GAVE APPEARANCE POSSIBLE TRUTH IN STUDENT'S STORY, THEN ASKED IF PRIMIN THOUGHT USG HAD CHANGED ITS POSITION IN ORDER AVOID FURTHER ADVERSE COMMENT BY STUDENT AGAINST CIA. PRIMIN REPLIED HE DID NOT KNOW, ADDED "WE HAVEN'T YET (PRIMIN'S EMPHASIS) ASKED FOR DIRECT STATEMENT BY USG."

5. ARMSTRONG THEN OBSERVED THIS TYPICAL JOURNALISTIC SENSATION WHICH NORMALLY LASTS FEW DAYS, THEN DIES DOWN. PRIMIN REPLIED

PAGE 3 RUQTKB 4295 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PESSIMISTICALLY THIS ONE WOULD LAST "LONG, LONG TIME", ASSERTED STORY BEING SPREAD BY AP THROUGHOUT WORLD AND TAKEN UP EVERYWHERE BY "ENEMIES." (PRIMIN DID NOT IDENTIFY "ENEMIES": IF INTERNATIONAL, COULD HAVE MEANT OURS OR AFGHANISTAN'S OCCASIONAL ANTAGONISTS IN PAKISTAN; IF DOMESTIC, WOULD HAVE REFERRED TO OWN ACTIVE POLITICAL OPPONENTS HERE.)

6. COMMENT: FOREGOING MANIFESTS PRIMIN'S DEEP ANXIETY OVER DOMESTIC REPERCUSSIONS HOTAKI CASE (REFTEL). ARMSTRONG OPINED PRIMIN'S IRRITATION WITH USG FOCUSSED MAINLY ON CHANGE IN OFFICIAL ATTITUDE TOWARD HOTAKI ABOUT WHICH HE APPARENTLY DUBIOUS. ARMSTRONG ATTACHED PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO PRIMIN'S REMARK ABOUT US STATEMENT WHICH, HE THOUGHT, PORTENDED POSSIBLE APPROACH BY RGA FOR OFFICIAL EXPLANATION BY US.

GP-3. BLOOD.  
BT

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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47

Action

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Info

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~~SECRET~~ KABUL 4275

LIMDIS

NVN APPROACH TO AFGHAN PRIMIN

022700

1967 APR 22 AM 9 34

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Authority NLT-036-001-1-1  
By abm/f, NARA, Date 11-6-09

1. I CALLED ON FONMIN ETEMADI THIS MORNING BY APPOINTMENT IN RESPONSE LOW-KEY SUGGESTION SEVERAL DAYS AGO WE MEET FOR TALK. (TP S WAS FIRST OPPORTUNITY FONMIN COULD RECEIVE ME DUE PRESS OF BUSINESS AND INTERVENING HOLIDAYS.) WHILE WE DISCUSSED SEVERAL SUBJECTS OF MUTUAL INTEREST (PRIMIN'S VISIT US, LOCAL WHEAT SITUATION), IT WAS EVIDENT FONMIN PRIMARILY INTENDED INFORM ME OF APPROACH MADE BY NVN CHIEF REP IN FRANCE TO PRIMIN MAIWANDVAL DURING LATTER'S RECENT VISIT PARIS. FONMIN STATED "NOTHING PARTICULARLY NEW" HAD EMERGED FROM EXCHANGE BUT PRIMIN WILLING PROVIDE FURTHER DETAILS IF DESIRED.

2. I IMMEDIATELY REQUESTED APOOINTMENT WITH PRIMIN WHO RECEIVED ME PROMPTLY, EVIDENTLY WELL BRIEFED BY MFA. PRIMIN READILY EXPLAINED NVN REP IN PARIS HAD ARRANGED THROUGH AFGHAN EMB CALL ON HIM DURING RECENT VISIT THERE. (PRIMIN COULD NOT RECALL REP'S NAME BUT UNDERSTOOD HE KNOWN TO BE "NVN QUASI-AMBASSADOR" IN FRANCE.)

3. RECEIVED BY PRIMIN AT LATTER'S HOTEL, NVN REP REQUESTED PRIMIN'S IMPRESSIONS DO OFFICIAL VISIT US, ESPECIALLY ATMOSPHERE PREVAILING IN US RE VIETNAM. PRIMIN STATED HE HAD MADE CANDID REPLY EMPHASIZING THAT PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY RUSK HAD STRESSED THAT NUMEROUS AMERICAN PEACE OFFERS HAD CONSISTENTLY BEEN REJECTED BY OTHER SIDE. NVN REP REPLIED THIS INCORRECT AND UNFAIR AS HIS GOVT HAD ACCEPTED SECY GEN U THANT'S FIRST PEACE PROPOSALS THOUGH REJECTING MORE RECENT ONES. OFFICIAL NVN VIEW REMAINED THAT NEGOTIATIONS COULD BEGIN IF ONLY US STOPPED BOMBING NORTH.

4. PRIMIN STATED HE HAD POINTED OUT AMERICAN LINKED CESSATION OF BOMBING WITH RECIPROCAL CESSATION OF INFILTRATION SVN BY

~~SECRET~~

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-2- KABUL 4275, APRIL 22

NORTH. NVN REP HAD REPLIED THAT IF NVN STOPPED INFILTRATION, "THE SOUTH" (AS PRIMIN PUT IT) WOULD QUICKLY BECOME DEMORALIZED AND WOULD NO LONGER BE ABLE TO CARRY ON STRUGGLE. HENCE, THIS WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO SURRENDER. "AFTER ALL, US HAS LARGE FORCES IN SVN." NVN REP HAD ADDED ALL SUCH MATTERS, INCLUDING CESSATION NVN INFILTRATION, COULD BE RESOLVED AT CONFERENCE TABLE, BUT NVN COULD NOT AGREE TO CONFERENCE UNTIL BOMBING STOPPED ("WE CANNOT NEGOTIATE WHILE BOMBS ARE FALLING ON OUR HEADS.")

5. NVNFRP THEN ASSERTED TERMS FOR NEGOTIATED PEACE REMAIN SAME AS ENUNCIATED BY NVN FONMIN IN STATEMENT JANUARY 28 (SIGNIFICANCE UNCLEAR FROM INFO AVAILABLE HERE) AND NVN DESIRED ONLY (1) INDEPENDENCE, (2) NEUTRALITY, AND (3) COALITION GOVERNMENT FOR VN, AND FOURTH POINT PRIMIN COULD NOT REMEMBER. IN RESPONSE MY QUESTION, PRIMIN COULD NOT RECALL REP MENTIONING WITHDRAWAL OF US FORCES. PRIMIN ADDED NVN REP HAD NOT REFERRED TO U THANT OR UN PEACEMAKING EXCEPT IN CONNECTION WITH ALLEGED NVN ACCEPTANCE OF SECY GEN'S FIRST PROPOSALS.

6. PRIMIN THEN REVEALED HE HAD REPORTED FOREGOING TO U THANT DURING LATTER'S VISIT HERE LAST WEEK. THANT, WHILE MANIFESTLY INTERESTED IN DEVELOPMENT, HAD OBSERVED ONLY THAT HE CONVINCED FROM HIS RECENT EFFORTS THAT IF US STOPPED BOMBING NVN NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN "WITH FEW WEEKS."

7. PRIMIN STATED HE WISHED MAKE CLEAR CONTACT WITH NVN REP ENTIRELY UNSOLICITED AND AT INITIATIVE OF LATTER. WHILE ANXIOUS ASSIST ANY WAY POSSIBLE IN PROMOTING PEACE VIETNAM HE DID NOT WISH INJECT HIMSELF. PRIMIN VOLUNTEERED STRICTLY PERSONAL VIEW THAT BEST COURSE FOR PURSUING PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT NOW IS TO WORK THROUGH THANT AND UN.

GP1.

NEUMANN  
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## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 29, 1967

SUBJECT: Afghan Prime Minister's Comment on His Talk  
with the PresidentPARTICIPANTS: His Excellency Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal,  
Prime Minister of Afghanistan  
Mr. James W. Spain, Country Director, NEA/PAFCOPIES TO: Mr. Rostow (cc)-The White House  
Mr. Wriggins (cc)-The White House  
Mr. Handley (cc)-NEA  
Mr. Maurice Williams (cc) - AID/NESA  
Ambassador, Kabul (cc)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: FRUS 64-68 Vol. 25 #54D  
By JC/is. NARA, Date 12-15-84

Before Prime Minister Maiwandwal's departure from Blair House today for his luncheon with the Secretary of State, I had the opportunity to ask him for his understanding of his discussion with the President yesterday. My query was prompted by some remarks the Prime Minister made to me last evening which I thought suggested a possible misunderstanding. This turned out not to be the case.

The Prime Minister said that his discussion with the President had been thoroughly enjoyable and constructive. He felt that he and the President had come to grips with some major problems and understood each other very well indeed. He said that the point he had been trying to make in response to the President on Vietnam was that a number of other countries in the world, specifically including Afghanistan, did not see the Vietnam situation in exactly the same way we did. He said that he had tried to point out to the President that the United States had a tendency to be unduly concerned at different times with different problems; some years ago it had been organizing the northern tier into CENTO to defeat Communist aggression; earlier it had been the Marshal Plan and the Korean war; now it was Vietnam. The interests of Afghanistan and of other non-aligned Asian countries did not change as did those of the United States. This was the reason why they were not able to come as far as we would like them to at any given time on Vietnam, CENTO, the Korean war, etc.

On more specific subjects, the Prime Minister indicated that he had discussed the Ariana Airline request for a loan from the Export

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Import Bank and understood the situation as it had been explained to him by Ambassador Neuwann in New York and by the President. He was content and he would wait.

On Afghanistan's present food needs, he said that the President had told him that the U.S. would do what it could to help on as generous terms as possible, specifically that cost would be repayable in 40 years.

On the Kajakai project, he said that the President was sympathetic and had said that the papers were being prepared. He understood that the President had not made a commitment and that the President expected that he (Zaiwandwal) would not discuss the matter publicly at this time.

He said that the President had also mentioned the upcoming loan for land improvement equipment in the Helmand Valley and that they both understood that action on this was virtually completed.

I asked the Prime Minister for his views as to timing of any future steps on the Kajakai project. He said that he would very much like to be able to announce it together with the next food agreement shortly after his return to Kabul, April 15. He said that if the food agreement were to be ready sooner, he would like to withhold announcement until after his return. He added that the Kajakai loan was particularly important to him personally and that he deduced from his conversation with the President that an announcement shortly after his return home would probably be possible.

THURS 4 APR 1971

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AGREED JOINT STATEMENT  
PRIME MINISTER MAIWANDWAL  
AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON

At the invitation of President Johnson, Prime Minister Mohammed Hashim Maiwandwal of Afghanistan visited Washington from March 28-30, 1967. The President and Prime Minister met on March 28 and exchanged views on matters of mutual interest.

President Johnson took particular pleasure in welcoming the Prime Minister back to Washington, recalling his long and distinguished role as Ambassador from Afghanistan to the United States. The President also recalled the state visit to the United States in September 1963 of Their Majesties King Mohammed Zahir Shah and Queen Homaira, a visit which added substantially to the long record of close friendship between the United States and Afghanistan. He asked the Prime Minister to convey to His Majesty the King the warm affection and admiration of the American people for the Afghan people.

Prime Minister Maiwandwal described for the President Afghanistan's continuing efforts, under the leadership of His Majesty the King, to build and strengthen democratic institutions and to press economic and social progress. He outlined his government's intention, under the Third Five Year Plan, to intensify economic development efforts. The President assured the Prime Minister of the continuing desire of the United States to do its part in assisting Afghanistan's

efforts for implementing the Third Five Year Plan. The Prime Minister expressed to the President the deep appreciation of the Afghan people for United States economic assistance.

In this connection the President noted with special satisfaction cooperative efforts of long duration by the United States and Afghanistan in many fields of education.

The Prime Minister reviewed Afghanistan's foreign policy of non-alignment and friendship and cooperation with all Nations. He described the problems existing among the countries of the region to which Afghanistan belongs and reiterated Afghanistan's view that these problems can be solved through peaceful means and in an atmosphere of understanding, confidence and realism.

The two leaders talked about current developments elsewhere in Asia, particularly the urgent need for peace and stability in Southeast Asia. They outlined their respective positions on the problem of Vietnam and agreed that a peaceful and just settlement is urgently needed. The President described for the Prime Minister the many and persisting efforts of the United States to achieve a cessation of hostilities in Vietnam consistent with the freedom and independence of the people of South Vietnam. The Prime Minister stated that implementation of the 1954 Geneva accords is a sound basis for the settlement of the Vietnamese problem.



The President was delighted to know of the intention of the University of California at Santa Barbara to bestow an honorary degree on the Prime Minister during his current visit.



W. Howard Wriggins

## PROGRESS EXAMPLES


### EDUCATION

#### UNIVERSITY ENROLLMENT



### ELECTRIC POWER

#### CAPACITY 1,000 KW



### ROADS

#### TOTAL PAVED MILES



### EMANCIPATION OF WOMEN




1959 — GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGED WOMEN  
TO DISCARD SHADRI

1964 — NEW CONSTITUTION PROVIDES UNIVERSAL  
ADULT SUFFRAGE


1965 — WOMAN JOINS CABINET - 3 WOMEN  
ELECTED TO PARLIAMENT

# PROBLEMS EXAMPLES


## AGRICULTURE




### FOOD/GRAIN PRODUCTION MILLIONS OF TONS (EST.)



### PL 480- WHEAT IMPORTS THOUSANDS OF TONS



## COST OF LIVING 1961-62=100






12

# AFGHANISTAN: TRADE & AID

~~SECRET~~  
No Foreign Dissem

Millions US Dollars  
150



PL-480 Deliveries  
(Tons)


40,000

—

110,000

## CUMULATIVE AID TO AFGHANISTAN SINCE 1951

(Millions US Dollars)





NOTE: YEARS ARE FISCAL ENDING ON MARCH 20

\* Primarily exports to UK, Pakistan, India and imports from Fed. Rep. of Germany, Pakistan, India

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority RAC 361-1-1-0  
By JDL WARA Date 3-15-20


## AFGHANISTAN : GNP AND COST OF LIVING

### COMPOSITION of GNP




NOTE: YEARS ARE FISCAL YEARS ENDING ON MARCH 20

### COST of LIVING INDEX



## AFGHANISTAN:

### PRODUCTION OF SELECTED INDUSTRIES




NOTE: YEARS ARE FISCAL YEARS ENDING ON MARCH 20




## AFGHANISTAN:

### TRADE COMMODITIES

1966  
EXPORTS  
(Millions of US \$)



1966  
IMPORTS  
(Millions of US \$)



NOTE: YEARS ARE FISCAL YEARS ENDING ON MARCH 20

*afghan*

*13*

**February 27, 1967**

**WALT -**

**This request for the President's signature on a farewell letter to Ambassador Majid of Afghanistan is one of those human gestures which are appreciated out of all proportion to the time they take. I hope you can push it forward, because he leaves tonight, and it would be good to get the letter on its way as soon as possible.**

**Howard Wriggins**

13a

February 27, 1967

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Farewell letter for departing Afghan Ambassador**

The Department of State requests your signature on the attached farewell letter to Ambassador Dr. Abdul Majid, of Afghanistan. He is off to be Ambassador in London. He has done a good though inconspicuous job for his country here.

He will be going home to Kabul before taking up his position in London and will no doubt see P. M. Maiwandwal prior to his trip here.

Such gestures as this are appreciated out of all proportion to the time they take.

W. W. Rostow

Att: letter for signature

WWR:HW:lw



Return to H Wriggins  
when signed.

*P. res chon*  
*136*

FEB 27 1967

Dear Ambassador Majid:

My good wishes go with you on your new assignment. The three years you have spent here have seen close and cordial relations between our countries. This has been due in no small part to your sincerity and effectiveness. All of us will miss you.

Sincerely,

*LBJ*

Dr. Abdul Majid  
Ambassador of Afghanistan  
2341 Wyoming Avenue  
Washington, D. C.

WWR:HW:lw  
2/27/67

14

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 25, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Informal Working Visit of Prime Minister  
Maiwandwal of Afghanistan

You will recall that several months ago you agreed to an informal working visit for the Prime Minister of Afghanistan sometime in November of this year.

A few weeks ago the Prime Minister proposed a meeting in Washington for late October to fit with a visit he is making to Western Europe. We indicated that the election would make this date impossible.

We now propose a one or two-day visit during the period November 21-23. If you approve, we can firm up the arrangements here and the Prime Minister can fix his own plans.

W. W. R.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 87-200  
By Julian NARA, Date 4-29-93

15

June 28, 1966

**MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW**

**SUBJECT: A Visit to Afghanistan**

It is much in the U. S. interest to send a high-level representative to Afghanistan in mid-July for the ribbon-cutting ceremony on the Kabul-Kandahar Highway.

(a) Russian leaders flow in and out in droves, but very rarely does the U. S. appear to care.

(b) Being part of a traditional society, the Afghans attach great importance to a personal demonstration of attention.

(c) We have put a lot of money into the road, and we should get some political returns from this investment.

(d) There was hope that Secretary Freeman could fit it in, but his schedule is too tight; Udall is also out for scheduling reasons.

(e) John Walsh has talked to Hayes Redmon, and the President is being asked to appoint a senior official or close friend as his personal representative.

I recommend we support this request with a reasoned foreign policy justification.

Howard Wriggins

15a

June 28, 1966

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: A Presidential Representative to Afghanistan for the Ceremonial Opening of the Kandahar-Kabul Highway, July 18, 1966**

1. This famous highway, financed and engineered by U.S. money and skills, has finally been completed and will be dedicated on July 18. It is the last link in a complicated highway network we have been building. The Afghans have expressed the hope that we could send a senior official to participate in the ceremonies and dramatize, by his presence, the substantial U.S. contribution to this project which links the two main cities of the country.

2. The occasion presents an unusual opportunity which we should not miss.

(a) Sending a member of your Cabinet or prominent personal friend would underline for all to see your concern for constructive development in Asia.

(b) Russian leaders appear frequently. When a Russian segment of the highway was completed, they sent a Deputy Foreign Minister. Rarely have Americans above an Assistant Secretary gone to Kabul. Apart from Mr. Harriman in 1965, the last high official was President Eisenhower in 1959.

(c) We have invested nearly \$40 million in this particular road project; a visit at this time would be an inexpensive way of getting a significant political return in Afghanistan and thereby, indirectly in Iran and Pakistan.

(d) It would give the Afghans an opportunity to show their interest in affirming that they are not under the Soviet thumb. This would help to underline the fact that Americans are wanted and our efforts are appreciated in Asia.

3. Secretary Freeman will be on the sub-continent at the time. He already knows his Afghan counterpart. He can't make a July 18th date in Kabul. State believes the Afghans would change the date to accommodate a U.S. Cabinet member, if Freeman could be persuaded to add



- 2 -

two days for the Kabul detour. Secretary Udall would also be a natural.

Perhaps a personal friend would equally demonstrate your personal interest.

W. W. R.

LBJ:WWR:HW:lw