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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 memo	NSC Action 2473 Secret <i>open 4-5-92 NLJ 90-195</i>	12/5/63	A
#4 report	re: 12/5/63 meeting <i>open 2-14-92 NLJ 90-279</i> top secret <i>sanitized per NSC</i> <i>letter 10/24/80</i>	12/5/63	A
#5 #5 report	#08217/63 top secret <i>sanitized 8-30-94 NLJ 94-88</i>	12/05/63	A
#8 thru #20	Special maps and charts top secret <i>sanitized 8-30-94 NLJ 94-88</i>	undated	A
#21 chart	Soviet military expenditures Secret <i>open 9/19/11 NLJ 10-194</i>	undated	A
#22 chart	GIF Confidential <i>open 9/19/11 NLJ 10-194</i>	undated	A
#23 chart	GIF Secret <i>open 9/19/11 NLJ 10-194</i>	undated	A
#24 chart	agricultural production Secret <i>open 9/19/11 NLJ 10-194</i>	undated	A
#7 list	list of graphics 1 p. possible classified information <i>sanitized 8-30-94 NLJ 94-88</i>	12-5-63 undated	A
#13 chart	re launchers TS <i>open 9/19/11 NLJ 10-194</i>	[1963]	
#16 chart	re submarines TS <i>open 9/19/11 NLJ 10-194</i>	[1963]	
#17 chart	re aviation TS <i>open 9/19/11 NLJ 10-194</i>	[1963]	

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, National Security Council File
 NSC Meetings, vol. 1, Tab 1, 12/5/63, Soviet Military Capabilities

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

RECORD OF ACTIONS

NSC
Action

2473. SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES

- a. Noted a briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence of the United States Intelligence Board's current estimate of Soviet Military Capabilities and a summary of Soviet economic problems.

- b. Noted the President's informal statement on national security problems.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 90-195

By llj NARA. Date 3-27-92

December 5, 1963
520th NSC Meeting
NSC Action 2473

ATTENDANCE LIST FOR THE 520TH NSC MEETING
HELD ON THURSDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1963, AT 3:00 PM
IN THE CABINET ROOM OF THE WHITE HOUSE

The President of the United States, Presiding
The Speaker of the House of Representatives

ACDA

William C. Foster, Director

AEC

Glenn Seaborg, Chairman

AID

David E. Bell, Administrator

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

Kermit Gordon, Director

CIA

John A. McCone, Director (Statutory Adviser)
Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, Deputy Director, plus
three assistants (Clinton Conger, Chester Cooper, R. Jack Smith)

DEFENSE

Robert S. McNamara, Secretary
Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary
William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary for
International Security Affairs
Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, Director,
Defense Intelligence Agency

Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of the Army
Paul H. Nitze, Secretary of the Navy
Eugene M. Zuckert, Secretary of the Air Force

JCS

General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman (Statutory Adviser)
General Earle G. Wheeler, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army
Admiral David L. McDonald, Chief of Naval Operations
✓ General Curtis LeMay, Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force
General David M. Shoup, Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps

me/Key

NASA

James E. Webb, Administrator

OEP

Edward A. McDermott, Director (Statutory Member)

STATE

Dean Rusk, Secretary (Statutory Member)

George W. Ball, Under Secretary

W. Averell Harriman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

Walt W. Rostow, Chairman, Policy Planning Council

Thomas L. Hughes, Director of Intelligence and Research

TREASURY

C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary

Henry H. Fowler, Under Secretary

USIA

Donald M. Wilson, Acting Director

WHITE HOUSE

McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Dr. Jerome Wiesner, Special Assistant to the
President for Science and Technology

Theodore C. Sorensen, Special Counsel to the President
Walter Jenkins

Bill D. Moyers

Maj. Gen. Chester V. Clifton, Military Aide to the President

Pierre E. G. Salinger, Press Secretary to the President

Bromley Smith, Executive Secretary, National Security Council

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 90-279

By NARA, Date 2-14-92

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CODEWORD ATTACHMENT~~

Summary Record of National Security Council Meeting, December 5, 1963, 3:00 PM -- Subject: Soviet Military Capabilities

The President opened the meeting with a summary of his views. He followed more or less the draft prepared at his request by Mr. Bundy (copy attached).

At the conclusion, the President asked Director McCone to present his briefing. The reading copy of Mr. McCone's comments and the accompanying charts which were displayed to the Council members are attached.

The President asked several times at appropriate points in the briefing for comparable U.S. figures. Secretary McNamara responded each time, giving comparative figures on missiles, bombers, etc.

At the conclusion of the briefing, the President asked Secretary Rusk to comment. The Secretary emphasized that despite the problems which the Soviet Union is having in the economic field, and despite our nuclear superiority, the Russians are making a tremendous effort. We cannot reduce our effort in any way -- military, space, economic assistance, etc. We have a full agenda ahead of us. We should concentrate on those factors which make people pull the nuclear trigger. We should be ready to explore agreements with the Soviets which are based on our current military strength.

Secretary McNamara commented on the relative military strength of the U.S. and the USSR. As regards a first-strike capability, we have a 2-1/2 to 3 advantage over the USSR. In the air defense field, the USSR has a 3 advantage over us. During the decade of the '60s, our advantage over the USSR in the nuclear area will not fall below two times. In a nuclear exchange, there would be no winner, even though after such an exchange the U.S. would retain a superior capability than that remaining to the Russians. A nuclear exchange involves the loss on each side of from 50 to 100 million lives. Thus, any rational use of nuclear weapons is deterred. However, the nuclear situation does not deter other uses of military force, such as halting convoys on the Berlin autobahn. Neither side now has a deployed anti-ballistic missile system. It would cost \$15 billion to give 30% of our population protection. As of now, neither side can blunt an attack by the other.

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~~CODEWORD ATTACHMENT~~

In response to the President's request, NASA Director Webb made a comparison between Soviet and U.S. space capabilities. During the next few years, we will be firing much larger payloads into orbit although there will not be manned space projects during this period. The Soviets will be conducting manned space projects during this period, but we have no evidence that they are building delivery vehicles of the size we will soon be firing.

Secretary Dillon responded to the President's request for a review of the domestic economic situation by giving an optimistic report. He said economists had feared that our economy would run out of steam in the next few months. However, better prospects for the tax cut bill have stimulated business and especially the stock market.

The President concluded the meeting by repeating a sentence which he had read at the beginning, i. e.: "The greatest single requirement is that we find a way to ensure the survival of civilization in the nuclear age. A nuclear war would be the death of all our hopes and it is our task to see that it does not happen.

NOTE: There is attached a copy of the transcript of Press Secretary Salinger's press briefing which was authorized by the President following the meeting.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-88
By [Signature], NARA, Date 8-17-94

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NSC BRIEFING

5 December 1963

SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH

- I. Our sources of information on Soviet military strength are many and diverse.
- A. They include the classical clandestine methods. We have gained valuable information through penetrations and defections.
1. From these sources we have learned a great deal about Soviet military doctrine, but the classical methods have not yielded hard numbers, or many specifics on plants and military facilities.

[REDACTED] Map)

- B. We also obtain valuable intelligence from [REDACTED] derived from the [REDACTED] which, as you can see, extends pretty much around the perimeter of the Communist orbit. There are, for example, important [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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1. There are [REDACTED] installations which do not show on this map.

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2. In addition to these fixed sites, we use a great deal of [REDACTED]

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II. By far our best source, however, is reconnaissance satellite photography. We have an extensive program of such photography, providing solid information which otherwise has not been available to us with the single exception of U-2 photography.

(U-2 [REDACTED] Map)

2

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A. U-2 photography of the USSR stopped on 1 May 1960. The satellite photography we have obtained since then has good and improving resolution, but it does not match the resolution we got from the U-2.

1. As a measure of our increasing area coverage, however, you can see here the totality of coverage of the Soviet Union gained during the entire life span of the U-2 program.

(Flip Overlay)

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2. By comparison, our photographic reconnaissance satellite this year alone has covered [REDACTED] percent of the Soviet Union.

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3. Altogether the program since its inception has covered more than [REDACTED] percent of the Soviet Union, and more than [REDACTED] percent of Communist China.

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III. The useable satellite photography--that is, photography with [REDACTED] percent or less of cloud cover--now enables us to look at [REDACTED] percent, or about [REDACTED] square miles, of the Soviet Union.

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A. More important is the fact that this useable photography has given us solid coverage of all of the large cities, all but one of the key submarine bases, all of the heavy bomber bases, and [REDACTED] percent of the rail network of the USSR.

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(ICBM Deployment Map)

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B. The coverage of the rail network is of special importance, and has been subjected to the most careful analysis.

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1. The Soviets rely on rail transportation for intercontinental missiles and related equipment. The railroads thus lead us to the ICBM launching complexes.
2. The launchers and other facilities inside each complex may be supplied by road, but in each complex there is a central supply point which is rail-served.
3. By this means we have located [REDACTED] ICBM complexes. We cannot exclude the possibility that there might be [REDACTED] more, but we believe we have identified all of them.

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Ha+b

(ICBM complex photos)

- a. Within the past six months we have obtained complete cloud-free photo coverage of good quality on [REDACTED] complexes.
- b. Each has a number of launch sites, and large support facilities. They are readily recognizable in good photography after several months of construction.

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4. The continuity we derive from repeated photographic coverage enables us to estimate with a high degree of confidence the scale and pace of most Soviet strategic weapons programs.

IV. The satellite photography is, of course, supplemented by all of our other sources, which often provide unique details, and in any event afford cross-checks and confirmation of our conclusions.

A. I should mention the nuclear test detection system. This, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has given us a valuable insight into the progress of Soviet nuclear technology.

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B. Agent reporting has played a somewhat reduced role in recent estimates.

1. Tightened Soviet security procedures in the wake of the Penkovskiy affair have made agent operations extremely difficult.
2. I might note, however, that the estimates still reflect the excellent insight Penkovskiy gave us into Soviet military

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debate and doctrine, and that continuing study gives us no indication that his information was not bonafide.

- C. Satellite photography is not a complete answer to all of our intelligence problems.
 - 1. For one thing, we must be and are always alert for any effort to deceive the cameras by dummy installations or camouflage. So far we have detected no major effort of this nature.
 - 2. Even the best photography so far has failed to answer certain questions, such as [REDACTED] [REDACTED] or the types of radar to be used in the Soviet anti-missile system.
 - 3. In consequence, we keep bringing all possible intelligence assets to bear on the critical uncertainties.

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SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK

I. In October we completed our latest National Intelligence Estimate of Soviet capabilities for nuclear strikes against Eurasia and North America. The period of the estimate is through 1969.

A. We have considerable evidence and considerable agreement in the intelligence community on Soviet strategic strength over the next couple of years.

1. Beyond that, we have to widen the range of uncertainty to allow for changes in Soviet policy, decisions which have yet to be made, and possible new developments not yet susceptible to our detection.

II. In the past two years the Soviets have expanded their ICBM force by adding launch sites at the [REDACTED] existing major complexes, all begun before December, 1961, rather than by adding new complexes.

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(ICBM Launchers Chart)

A. There are more than [REDACTED] launchers in various stages of construction. Allowing for the possibility that we have missed a few, we estimate that [REDACTED] ICBM launchers were

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1.3(a)(4)

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operational on 1 October. We expect that by mid-1965 this will increase to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] launchers for present types of missiles.

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1. In addition there are some [REDACTED] pads at the Tyuratam test rangehead which must be counted as available for operational use.

B. We believe that each of the soft sites probably has [REDACTED] missiles, to permit a [REDACTED] salvo,

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C. There were about [REDACTED] hardened silos on 1 October. By mid-1965 we expect perhaps a third of the launchers-[REDACTED]- will be hardened.

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1. The Soviet pattern for hardened sites has the possible weakness of grouping three silos so that they constitute a single target.

D. The Air Force believes there now may be about [REDACTED] [REDACTED] operational ^{15 more} launchers, ~~than the consensus~~, and favors the high-range figure of [REDACTED] for mid-1965.

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III. The principal Soviet ICBM system is the SS-7, comparable to our TITAN II, with storable fuel and inertial guidance.

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- A. The earlier SS-6 could carry a heavier payload, but was deployed to only four launchers. Another second-generation system, the SS-8, is believed operational at a few sites, but was cut back last year after poor test results.
- B. The SS-7 now carries a ■ MT warhead. The nose-cone can be fitted with a ■ MT warhead beginning in 1964, and some SS-7 missiles could be modified to carry as much as ■ by 1965. Soviet Nuclear testing in 1961 and 1962 gave evidence that the Soviets have the nuclear technology for these improvements.
1. We believe the SS-8 carries a similar payload, although there is still some uncertainty in the intelligence community.
- C. We believe the SS-7 system has an overall reliability of about 65 percent, and a "Circular Error Probable," or accuracy, of one to two nautical miles from target. By mid-1965 this accuracy margin can probably be cut down to one mile, and to as little as half a mile for some portion of the force.

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- D. Research and Development activities at the Tyuratam missile test range, particularly the construction of new launch areas, indicate that the Soviets will continue to improve and expand their ICBM force in the period beyond 1965.
1. Current activity almost certainly includes improvement of existing ICBM systems and development of new ones. It also suggests the development of new space vehicles.
- E. After 1965, we expect to see an improved SS-7, or a somewhat smaller missile, possibly deployed in single-silo hardened sites. We also expect the Soviets to develop a large vehicle with a thrust of a million pounds or more.
1. The large vehicle would increase either the range or the payload, carrying warheads up to [REDACTED] MT. It would also afford a booster for space launchings.
 2. If it is tested in the next few months, it could be operational as early as mid-1965.

3. We have no evidence that the Soviets are developing a solid-fuel ICBM.

(Pacific Impact Area Map)

4. The USSR last week warned shipping to avoid the Pacific missile impact areas from now to 25 January. Three Soviet instrumentation ships are already on station at the southern impact area. This means a new series of ICBM firings to the Pacific is imminent.
5. During the previous series in May, June and July, [REDACTED] SS-7 missiles were fired from Tyuratam to the Pacific.
6. The new series could involve further testing, or it may include launches from operational ICBM complexes. The complex at Plesetsk, for instance, fired a missile into the Kamchatka impact area on 22 October.

(Repeat ICBM Launchers Chart)

- IV. At the extreme range of the estimate, in 1969, we expect the Soviet Union to have an ICBM force of some [REDACTED] launchers.

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- A. About half of these would be hardened. There could be a few, perhaps 25 to 50, of the very large ICBMs, and a considerable number of either improved SS-7's or a new, somewhat smaller system.
- B. The low range of [REDACTED] with deployment tapering off before mid-1969, allows for a possible Soviet decision to devote more resources to space, an anti-missile program, or the civilian economy. The high range postulates early Soviet success in developing improved systems, and increased investment in the ICBM force.
- C. The intelligence community is agreed on the estimate of [REDACTED] launchers in mid-1969 with two reservations: The Navy favors the lower range; the Air Force considers the upper range more likely. The Air Force also believes that if the Soviets develop a reliable small missile similar to MINUTEMAN, there could be as many as [REDACTED] launchers in 1969.

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(IRBM/MRBM Sites Map)

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V. The missile force arrayed against Western Europe is enormous. We have identified about [REDACTED] soft and [REDACTED] hardened launch positions for the 1,050-mile MRBM and the 2,200-mile IRBM. (These are the types the Soviets intended to deploy in Cuba.) Maximum warhead yields are in the low megaton range.

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A. All of these sites are on Soviet territory. More than 90 percent of them are deployed in a broad belt in the western USSR stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

1. We believe that deployment will level off at [REDACTED] launchers. In other words, it is about complete, although the proportion of hardened silos may be increased.

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(IRBM/MRBM Target Map)

8

B. The existing deployment reflects a very carefully thought-out plan with ominous implications for Western Europe.

1. About two thirds of the sites are directed at Western Europe. We calculate that the primary direction of fire of about ²⁰⁰~~190~~ pads is toward the United

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Kingdom, with another ¹⁶⁰ ~~160~~ aimed toward West Germany and France.

2. You will note that Alaska, Greenland, and the approaches to the St. Lawrence are also within range.

(Missile sub chart)

VI. The strategic threat from Soviet submarines at present is limited to missiles fired from surfaced submarines, with only a few missiles per submarine.

- A. About 70 submarines in all have been built or refitted to fire ballistic or cruise missiles to about 350 miles. Some 17 of these submarines are nuclear-powered, but but have had a history of difficulty with both operation and safety of the power plant.
- B. Recently the Soviets have acquired greater confidence in their nuclear propulsion system, and have started out-of-area patrols with their nuclear-powered submarines. One was under the Arctic ice cap in October.
- C. We estimate that by 1969 there may be 105 to 140 of these surface-launching missile

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subs, with 40 to 50 percent nuclear-powered.

- D. We do not, however, estimate when the Soviet Union will have an operational system for submerged launching of ballistic missiles. Development is well advanced on a 700-mile missile for this purpose, and we assume work is under way on the submarine to carry it. We don't have enough evidence to arrive at a probable operational date for the system.

(Aircraft Chart)

VII. Soviet Long Range Aviation now has about 200 heavy bombers and tankers, and nearly 1,000 mediums.

- A. The only strategic bomber known to be in production is the BLINDER, a medium bomber with supersonic dash. About 50 of these are in operational units.
- B. About half of the heavy bombers are the turboprop BEAR. Many of these have been rigged to carry 350-mile stand-off air-to-surface missiles. Some have been used for maritime reconnaissance.

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- C. We anticipate a gradual decline in Long Range Aviation. We estimate that by 1969 it will be down to about 130 to 175 heavy bombers, and 400 to 600 mediums, half of them BLINDERS.
1. Research and Development is under way on heavy aircraft, but no follow-on bomber program can be identified.
 2. A supersonic prototype, BOUNDER, which is heavy by size but medium in range, is apparently being used as a testbed, and we doubt that it will enter the inventory as an operational bomber.
 3. The Soviets could put a new heavy bomber into service in the 1966 to 1969 period, but the majority of the community considers this unlikely.
 4. The Air Force believes both the present and future threat to be higher. It expects the force level to remain about constant, and without estimating the specific type, believes that a follow-on heavy bomber will probably be introduced by 1966.

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VIII. To summarize our estimates on the Soviet strategic capability in 1969, they conclude that the Soviet Union does not contemplate forces designed to neutralize our strike forces in an initial blow, and is not trying to match us in numbers of delivery vehicles.

- A. The Soviet forces we estimate for 1969 fall far short of what would be needed for any pre-emptive attack that would reduce US retaliation to an acceptable level.
- B. Even now, however, Soviet forces are capable of delivering devastating blows at Europe and North America.
- C. As the Soviet Union continues to harden missile sites and increases its mobile maritime weapons, this capability will grow both in absolute terms and in terms of the striking power that would remain after the Soviet Union itself had been struck.
 1. We have recently examined evidence on the hardening of Soviet missile sites, and have considered the possibility of "super-hardening" to withstand pressures of 800 to 900 psi. Such a degree

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of hardening, of course, would greatly increase our requirements in terms of the number or accuracy of weapons we would need to neutralize such a site.

2. On the basis of present evidence and analysis, we believe that Soviet ^{hardened} ICBM sites can probably withstand overpressures up to 100 to 300 psi. This subject, however, will remain under continuing examination by the United States Intelligence Board.

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~~RESTRICTED DATA~~ANTI-MISSILE AND AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

Turning to Soviet defensive strength,

- I. The Soviet Union since the mid-1950's has assigned a high priority to research and development for an anti-ballistic-missile or ABM system.

(Locator Map)

- A. The principal ABM center is a range of 8,500 square miles near Sary Shagan in Central Asia, with housing for about 40,000 persons. (Pointer)
- B. Since mid-1957, more than 300 ballistic missiles have been fired into this range. We believe that more than 40 of these missiles, with ranges up to 1,000 miles, have served as targets for attempted intercepts by anti-missile missiles.
- C. We believe the Soviets are investigating the re-entry characteristics of the ICBMs they fire to their instrumented impact area on Kamchatka, but we cannot determine whether they have tried to intercept any of them.

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(Leningrad ABM Map & Photo)

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- II. At Leningrad, the Soviets are deploying what we believe to be an ABM system. We have identified three launch complexes, under construction since late 1960.
- A. One complex may be operational soon, but we estimate the full system will not be operational before 1965.
- B. We cannot determine the precise characteristics of the Leningrad system.
1. It probably will be able to engage both intercontinental and intermediate ballistic missiles.
 2. It will, however, have little capability against saturation attacks, decoys, or other penetration techniques.
- III. We suspect an ABM system is also being deployed in the Moscow area.
- A. So far, we have spotted some suspect facilities near four SAM sites, but we have found no launch positions.
- B. We estimate a Moscow system could be operational by mid-1967 on the basis of what we have seen so far.

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IV. Our conclusion is that after eight years of R&D and a major investment, the Soviet Union has not developed an effective and reliable ABM system.

- A. We believe that Soviet leaders will not approve the large expenditures that would be needed for a widespread ABM deployment until they have a system good enough to justify the expenditure both in terms of military defense and deterrent effect. We have no basis for judging when such an acceptable system might be developed.

As for the more conventional air defense,

V. We estimate that there are about 7,000 fighters now in service. More than 4,500 are in air defense units, with the rest assigned to Tactical Aviation.

- A. Only about 1,800 have all-weather capabilities, and we estimate that about one-third of these are of pre-1959 vintage.
- B. The retirement of older aircraft will probably reduce the operational fighter force considerably during the next few years, but we estimate that about half of this smaller

interceptor force will consist of

(SAM Sites Map) all-weather fighters.

12

VI. Surface-to-air missiles already defend nearly all of the 100 cities of more than 200,000 population.

A. We have identified more than ⁹⁰⁰~~800~~ sites in the USSR and East Europe for the medium and high-altitude SA-2 system (which is also in Cuba). The basic SA-2 program, probably 1,000 or more sites, should be completed by the end of 1964.

B. Recent information has confirmed our previous estimate that the Soviets have also developed a new system to engage targets at low altitudes, ~~such as 1,000 feet.~~

1. We have identified at least 80 sites for this new system, and believe that several hundred will be deployed to supplement the SA-2.

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KHRUSHCHEV'S RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROBLEMS

- I. As Khrushchev surveys the state of the Soviet economy today, he must find little to please him in the view.
 - A. For the past few years his objectives have centered on an aggressive foreign policy featuring the arms race with the US; his goals of matching and passing US production; and improvement of the Soviet standard of living.
 - B. The events of the past year have given him little comfort for any of these hopes.
 1. With our hardened intercontinental missile force coming rapidly into being, the US numerical superiority in strategic weapons must be evident to Khrushchev.
 2. Industrial production has slowed down because other priorities have cut into the high annual investment increases of the 1950's.
 3. As for consumer hopes, the housing program is far behind schedule, and agriculture is in serious trouble.

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II. How did it all happen?

A. The first four years of Khrushchev's leadership, through 1959, were a great success. The New Lands and corn programs gave agriculture its first real lift since 1937, and industry grew reasonably well.

1. This was the period in which Khrushchev began making those promises about catching up with the US in meat, milk, consumer goods and industrial production.
2. The growth was facilitated by a reduction in military spending and in armed forces personnel.

B. But after 1958, industrial growth slowed down. More ominously, investment growth began to slow.

1. Even industrial investment, which had been growing at nearly 15 percent a year, slowed to around four to five percent. The volume of industrial projects completed and brought into operation probably declined absolutely in 1960-61.
2. This failure to complete projects was especially bad in the chemicals industry.

C. We think the blame falls on defense spending.

(Chart on military expenditures)

13

1. The two sets of statistics are Soviet defense expenditures, first as announced by them, and secondly as recalculated by us. (You can see that the Soviet definition of "defense spending" is much narrower than the one commonly used in the West.) We calculate their actual outlays to run about one-third higher than official budget figures.
2. Between 1959 and 1963, Soviet defense spending increased by about a third, or by 4.2 billion rubles.

D. However, the problem centers less on total spending than on the key critical resources.

1. Our estimates of the ruble value of defense do not take into account the factor of quality of resources.
2. A homely example may illustrate this point.
 - a. The military and civilian industry use many of the same types of

trucks. When the finished trucks are inspected, those without defects go to the military. The rest go to the civilian economy.

- b. The same goes for the best scientists and engineers, and also the best welders, electricians, and technicians of all kinds--the best cement, stainless steel, and electronics components.

III. The competition between investment and defense for scarce resources has had a marked effect on the growth of the Soviet economy. Slower growth, in turn, has affected everything else by complicating the resource allocation problems. (

(Chart on US and USSR growth of GNP)

A. Throughout the decade of the 1950's, the USSR grew roughly twice as fast as did the United States. While year-to-year fluctuations were great, the long-run ^{Soviet} average was close to 6 percent a year.

- 1. However, the average rate of growth over the last four years has been about 4 percent.

14

~~SECRET~~

2. For the past two years, the rate of growth has fallen below that of the United States.

IV. How do the Soviets now divide up the production pie? You can see that total Soviet output, or gross national product, was less than half ours in 1962.

(Chart on GNP by end use)

15

A. However, while our consumers enjoyed almost two thirds of the much larger American pie, the Soviet consumer's share of the Soviet total output was little more than one third. On a per capita basis, Soviet consumption was only about one fourth of ours, and what Ivan got was of poor quality at that.

1. You will remember that Soviet astronaut Gagarin was given an apartment of his own as a special honor. This is particularly revealing of how little has been done to house the Soviet consumer when you consider that even before his space flight, Gagarin must have been among the top one or two percent of Soviet wage and salary earners.

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- B. Total Soviet investment, on the other hand, was fairly close to our own in absolute terms, and a much higher percentage of GNP than ours. The big push is on industrial investment; in this category, Soviet outlays exceed our 20-billion-dollar outlay by another 15 billion dollars.
- C. Soviet outlays for the military establishment, when priced at what it would cost in the United States to provide similar material and maintain equally large forces, were equivalent to about four fifths of our own military spending. As a proportion of GNP, they were appreciably above the US allocation, *measured in dollars.*
1. Defense expenditures in the USSR remained relatively constant from 1955 to 1960. Because the economy was growing rapidly during that period, they dropped to about nine or ten percent of the GNP, measured in rubles.
 2. However, these expenditures began moving upward again in 1961 and 1962.

- D. On education, an investment in the future, the Soviets spend nearly four fifths as much as we do, or about eight percent of their GNP. I will skip the final item in the pie-charts, administration.
- V. The choices confronting the Soviet policymakers revolve around the allocation of key resources. ~~The question of which programs to maintain and which to cut back is one of the most difficult for the~~ Soviet resources are chronically over-committed, while our economy usually has some slack.
- A. One of the consequences of the economic squeeze has been a sharp cutback in the Soviet Union's economic aid program.
1. From 1954 through 1961, new extensions of aid tended to increase each year.
 2. In 1962, however, new economic aid amounted to only a little more than \$300 million--less than a third of the 1961 figure.
 3. Similarly new military assistance extended by the USSR fell from \$800 million in 1961 to about \$400 million in 1962.

- ~~SECRET~~
4. For total military and economic aid, this decline has continued in 1963, largely due to a sharp cutback in new Soviet military assistance.

VI. I turn now to the subject of Soviet agriculture.
(Agriculture Chart)

(16)

- A. When the Communists took over Russia, they found a most favorable agricultural situation.
 1. Russian farms not only produced enough foodstuffs for the Russian people, but also provided an export surplus, to pay for needed imports of machinery.
- B. That surplus is no more.
 1. In the rush to develop heavy industry, agriculture remained a stepchild in the distribution of investment funds.
 2. Khrushchev in the mid-1950's opened up the so-called New Lands, half in Kazakhstan and half in Siberia. The New Lands put more grain into Soviet stomachs, into livestock and into foreign markets.
 3. But now the originally available soil moisture and productivity have been

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used up. Output has been falling off. This year witnessed a severe drought in the traditional farming areas as well as in the New Lands. Consequently, the gains of the late 1950's have been wiped out, per capita food production this year is lower than it has been in recent history, and sizeable imports of grain became necessary.

VII. Soviet agriculture and Soviet industry have been unable to produce marketable exports in sufficient quantity to pay for needed imports of Western grain, machinery, equipment and industrial supplies. Hence the current major Soviet push for new foreign credits or extended repayment terms.

A. The continuous drain on gold reserves has been sharply accelerated in recent months because of the 1963 crop failure.

1. Furthermore, the urgent need to bolster agriculture is reflected in the new Soviet requirement for very substantial imports of chemical fertilizer plants over the next few years.

- B. The estimated gold stock has steadily declined from \$3 billion in 1955 to less than \$2 billion.
1. The Soviets appear to be drawing heavily on this reserve in 1963-64 to pay for wheat, but the reserve would seem to be reaching the minimum that the Soviets would insist on holding as an emergency fund.

C. We have reinforced our evidence on Soviet holdings of gold by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

Pointer
#3

(Map Location)

1. Moscow had already ordered a significant increase in gold production for 1964 and 1965, and now wanted yet another substantial increase in the plan.

2. [REDACTED]
the ground was already frozen, and nothing could be done to raise production until spring.

1.3(a)(4)

3. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

4.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

5.

Thus we derive the need for gold,
the shortage of bulldozers, and the
risk of [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

VIII. Khrushchev's statement that the "economic situation within our country is excellent today and in the future it will be still better" is belied by the failures of Soviet agriculture and the falling rate of industrial growth.

- A. In summary, we believe that the Soviet economy is in trouble, primarily because the concentration of a large percentage of the GNP on relatively sterile military spending has seriously affected all other goals and national requirements. It has created all kinds of pressures affecting not only consumers but industry as well.
- B. To date we have seen no signs of a military cutback. As possible courses of action are re-examined, however, the extent to which the economic problems will affect future arms and space programs remains to be seen.

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SERVICE SET

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH PIERRE SALINGER

DECEMBER 5, 1963

5:22 PM EST

THURSDAY

Q. Pierre, do you know whether Secretary Celebreeze will be available to us?

MR. SALINGER: I am sure he will be.

Q. Do those things usually run 30 minutes or 45 minutes?

MR. SALINGER: They hold them in the wings now until I get through.

Q. Not that I didn't come to see you, too.

MR. SALINGER: I know. I got that picture.

The President has signed three bills.

We have the text of the citation on the presentation of the Presidential Medal of Freedom. The text is for release, I point out, at 12 noon Eastern Standard Time tomorrow.

Q. Are some of these medals in a different category? In the picture there seems to be a certain larger type or some special award.

MR. SALINGER: I believe they are all the same.

Q. There are four for men and three for women.

MR. SALINGER: What?

Q. One looks like a tie clasp.

Q. Someone said they are different for men and women.

MR. SALINGER: Everybody is getting the same medal. The medal for the women may be physically different than the men's.

Q. Why?

MR. SALINGER: Because they are smaller.

Q. They can't carry all that weight around.

MR. SALINGER: Can we leave that. I will try to

MORE

get an answer for you.

* * * * * FOR BACKGROUND:

The President met for an hour with the National Security Council which was augmented in attendance. In other words, there were a number of additional people there in addition to the statutory people of the NSC.

Q. Did that include the Attorney General?

MR. SALINGER: The Attorney General was not present today.

Q. Who were the augmented people?

MR. SALINGER: We never give out the names of people attending the National Security Council.

Q. Except Speaker McCormack?

MR. SALINGER: Except Speaker McCormack.

I was going to say today's meeting was the first meeting attended by Speaker McCormack.

Q. This is the first meeting President Johnson has had with the NSC with Speaker McCormack in attendance?

MR. SALINGER: That is correct.

Q. Is this the first time a Speaker has attended an NSC meeting?

MR. SALINGER: I would have to check back on the record to see whether Speaker Rayburn attended when President Truman was in office.

Let me give you a little bit about the President's opening remarks at the National Security Council meeting. The President welcomed The Speaker and recalled to the members of the National Security Council that President Kennedy had given the United States improved military strength. He said that he had done this while showing the world that his number one concern was the ability to live with other peoples.

Q. Whose ability? His?

MR. SALINGER: The U. S.'s ability to live with other people.

President Johnson then said that his philosophy was going to be that the United States must continue to be strong and that we must also be just, temperate and patient. The meeting then went on to other matters.

At the State Department, the President expanded a great deal on that theme.

Q. Before you get to that, may I ask one question? I think this is a little ambiguous as far as I am concerned. Were those first words The Speaker's?

MORE

(FOR BACKGROUND continues:)

MR. SALINGER: No, the President.

Q. You are paraphrasing his remarks?

MR. SALINGER: That is right.

He welcomed The Speaker and then the President went on to say these things. ALL OF THIS IS BACKGROUND.

Q. That means we can say he said it?

MR. SALINGER: Yes -- White House sources said the President said. You don't have to use White House sources even.

Q. Pierre, this is a little bit new procedure it seems to me. Can we say White House sources said and put that in quotation marks? That would really get ambiguous then. I am just not quite clear.

MR. SALINGER: I have not said anything that I have any objection to your quoting. You can say the President said. I am giving the sense of what he said but not quoting it.

Q. We can say quote a White House source said?

MR. SALINGER: Yes. I think the easiest way to write the story is that the President is reported to have said to the National Security Council that.

Q. Are these phrases "just, temperate and patient," your words or his?

MR. SALINGER: Yes, he used those words. As I said, the President expanded on this theme in his address at the State Department.

Q. That was the Foreign Service Officers?

MR. SALINGER: Foreign Service Officers, Assistant Secretaries, and so on.

Q. How would you describe them?

MR. SALINGER: Senior Foreign Service Officers of the State Department.

Q. About how many?

MR. SALINGER: I believe the room was full -- about 800. I think we will stay with the designation Senior Officer.

Q. What is the lowest level?

MR. SALINGER: If we get into that, there might be some FSO-2 who wasn't invited.

MORE

(FOR BACKGROUND continues:)

Q. What did he say?

MR. SALINGER: I will tell you what he said if I can get away from this question of which FSO got in to see it.

First, the President expressed his great confidence in the Secretary of State.

Q. He was there?

MR. SALINGER: He was there. He used the words, "I have profound confidence in your Secretary."

Q. "In your Secretary" or my Secretary?

MR. SALINGER: "In your Secretary." I am your Secretary.

He said the fact that he had familiarity with foreign problems was due to the President and to Secretary Rusk, and he went on to say that no President in history had been more attentive or more thoughtful or more generous to his Vice President's role than President Kennedy.

Q. You are going too fast. Say that again.

MR. SALINGER: No President was ever more attentive, more thoughtful or more generous to his Vice President's role than President Kennedy.

He said that he doubted that any Secretary of State ever approached the interest, patience and understanding of Secretary Rusk in this same regard.

The President said he looked on the Department as the central force in the framing and execution of the foreign policy of this country under the President.

He said he would look to the Department for initiative in proposal, energy in action and frankness in advice.

Q. These, again, are his own words?

MR. SALINGER: They are his own words.

Q. Proposal singular?

MR. SALINGER: Proposal singular.

The President then went on to reiterate the theme that he had expressed to the National Security Council: (1) We must be strong; (2) We must be temperate and just. He said that the basic improvement in the balance of power which had taken place in the last three years is half the explanation for the sense of hope that was developing in President's Kennedy's last months. He said he had not

MORE

(FOR BACKGROUND continued:)

become President to give away this advantage.

Q. Can we put that in quotes?

MR. SALINGER: Yes, "I have not become President to give away this advantage."

The President then went on to say, "We must be temperate, too."

He strongly supported the limited test ban treaty.

He considered -- and this is a paraphrase -- the advances we have been making in working with the Soviet Union as also a basis for the hope that was developing during the President's last months.

Q. Is that the other half of something?

MR. SALINGER: Yes.

He mentioned several specific issues:

(1) The war in South Viet Nam in which he said there were 18,000 Americans involved -- and I will quote him directly on this--

Q. Currently involved?

MR. SALINGER: That is correct.

"We should, all of us, let no day go by without asking whether we are doing everything we can to win the struggle there."

Q. Was he referring in that regard to whether American officials were playing their role?

MR. SALINGER: Yes; we are talking about playing our role.

The President, also on the other specific subjects, said that we should see what more we can do, if anything, to combat Communist subversion in this hemisphere.

Q. Was that saying that he would see or asking them to see?

MR. SALINGER: I think, "We should not let a day go by" -- in other words, he and everyone else in Government.

Q. Is there any small quote you might offer with respect to that second point on Communist subversion?

MR. SALINGER: I think I will skip a quote on that.

Q. Could you tell us, Pierre, if this appearance before the Foreign Service Officers was at his suggestion?

MR. SALINGER: Yes, it was at his suggestion.

(FOR BACKGROUND continued:)

Q. Pierre, did he see anybody else at the State Department?

MR. SALINGER: Yes. He went up to the Secretary of State's office and met with eight Ambassadors and one former Ambassador -- just shook hands with them, really. These were all in for consultation of various kinds and they attended the meeting.

Ambassador Wymberley Coor, U. S. Ambassador to Uruguay.

Ambassador Julius Holmes, U. S. Ambassador to Iran.

Ambassador Philip Kaiser, U. S. Ambassador to Senegal.

Ambassador James Lobe, U. S. Ambassador to Guinea.

Ambassador John Martin, U. S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic.

Ambassador Benson Timmons, U. S. Ambassador to Haiti.

Ambassador James Riddleberger, U. S. Ambassador to Austria.

Ambassador Murat Williams, U. S. Ambassador to El Salvador.

Former Ambassador Kenneth Young, U. S. Ambassador to Thailand. He was a friend of the President's.

Q. Did they listen?

MR. SALINGER: They were all in the auditorium.

Q. Was this sort of a half-hazard selection because they were in town?

MR. SALINGER: They happened to be in town and the President saw them. * * * * *

Q. Who was at the Security Council who is not ordinarily there?

MR. SALINGER: I never give out those names.

Q. Did the President see Attorney General Carr of Texas?

MR. SALINGER: No, he did not see him.

Q. Did you check on Mr. Jaworski?

MR. SALINGER: Yes, I checked. He did not see him either.

Q. On the speaker?



MR. SALINGER: The Speaker would have to resign.

Q. Did he agree to resign in this instance?

Q. What is the question? I didn't here it?

MR. SALINGER: You haven't been with us and, unfortunately, you are not up on it, and I will be glad to go back to it. We went into a long thing this morning about The Speaker. The question was whether The Speaker would have to resign in order to assume the powers of the Presidency. Isn't that the question? The answer to that question is yes.

Q. Would he resign?

MR. SALINGER: I am just answering that question.

Q. Resigning from the House?

MR. SALINGER: Yes.

Q. That is according to the succession statute?

MR. SALINGER: No, the Constitution. He would have to resign. I

I don't have the schedule for tomorrow yet.

Q. One further point on the succession there. So far as you know, the agreement between Mr. Johnson and Mr. McCormack does not go to that point at all. It is simply an agreement to follow, and if there came some question at that time, it would be up to Mr. McCormack?

MR. SALINGER: That is right. There is nothing written in this agreement.

Q. Will it be put in writing?

MR. SALINGER: I don't know if it will be or not.

Q. Did you check that thing about the undated resignations?

MR. SALINGER: I have not gotten a satisfactory answer back on that yet.

Q. Have you discussed yet with the President the holding of a press conference?

MR. SALINGER: No, but I hope to do it this weekend sometime.

Q. Will Mrs. Kennedy attend the Medal of Freedom Awards?

MR. SALINGER: I don't know.

MORE

Q. Anything on when she will move out of the White House?

MR. SALINGER: No.

Q. Would you expect the President to remain in town this weekend?

MR. SALINGER: I would.

Q. Do you have a schedule for tomorrow?

MR. SALINGER: I don't have it yet.

Q. This question of the three acres of land that the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense have decreed should be set aside for the Kennedy family in Arlington Cemetery, was that just the idea of the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense, or was that done at the request of Mrs. Kennedy?

MR. SALINGER: I have no idea. I am sure they could tell you better than I could. I was not involved in the negotiations.

Q. Pierre, with respect to that background material you gave us, you said there were several specific issues and you mentioned two.

MR. SALINGER: That is what I meant -- two.

Q. Were there other specific areas mentioned?

MR. SALINGER: No, those were the two.

Q. Was there any separate conversation between the President and the NSC meeting?

MR. SALINGER: They rode over to the State Department together. They may have talked on the way over there.

Q. Do you have anything on the Celebreeze thing?

MR. SALINGER: I expect to.

Q. Was that put back to 6:00?

MR. SALINGER: I believe it was put back to 5:30. I believe it is just starting now.

SCHEDULE FOR TOMORROW:

9:45 AM - Honorable John McCone

12:00 - The President will participate in presentation of Medal of Freedom Awards (State Dining Room - Mansion)

3:00 - Honorable Anthony Celebreeze

E N D

NSC BRIEFING

5 December 1963

List of graphics, keyed to numbers in text:

1. Fixed ██████████ sites
2. Map, U-2 coverage of the USSR
- 2a: Overlay, 1963 ██████████ coverage to date
3. Soviet rail network and ICBM complexes.
(Also locator for Tyuratam, Kapustin Yar, Yurya, Sary Shagan, and Magadan)
4. a) ICBM Complex support facility (photography)
b) ICBM Complex launch site (photography)
5. Estimated ICBM launchers through 1969, USSR (chart)
6. Pacific Impact Areas, Soviet ICBM tests. (map)
7. Soviet MRBM/IRBM launch sites. (map)
8. Soviet MRBM/IRBM Target Orientation. (map)
9. Estimated Soviet Missile Submarine Force. (chart)
10. Estimated Soviet Long Range Aviation. (Chart)
11. a) Leningrad ABM site. (Map and diagram)
b) Leningrad ABM site. (photography)
12. Soviet Bloc Identified Surface-to-air Missile Sites. (Map)
13. Soviet Announced and Probable Military Expenditures. (Chart)
14. Soviet and US Comparison of Annual GNP Growth. (Chart)
15. Soviet and US Comparison of GNP End Use, 1962. (Chart)
16. Fluctuation in Annual Rate of Increase, Soviet Agriculture. (Chart)

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
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

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SOVIET ICBM DEPLOYMENT COMPLEXES




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**ESTIMATED SOVIET OPERATIONAL
ICBM LAUNCHERS**

	10CT. 1963	MID 1965	MID '67	MID '69
DEPLOYED SOFT LAUNCHERS <i>(INCLUDING NEW, VERY LARGE ICBM'S)</i>	85-100	155-230 <i>(0 - A FEW)</i>	160-280 <i>(10-30)</i>	175-300 <i>(25-50)</i>
DEPLOYED HARD LAUNCHERS <i>(INCLUDING IMPROVED OR FOLLOW-ON ICBM'S)</i>	20	75-90 <i>(0)</i>	150-225 <i>(50-100)</i>	200-375 <i>(100-250)</i>
LAUNCHERS AT THE TEST RANGE	15	25	25	30
TOTALS <i>(ROUNDED)</i>	120-135	250-350	325-525	400-700

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SOVIET EXTENDED RANGE IMPACT AREAS



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
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KORAL

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PRIMARY TARGET AREAS
OF
SOVIET MRBM/IRBM FORCES

-  HEAVIEST MRBM COVERAGE
-  LESSER MRBM COVERAGE
-  IRBM COVERAGE



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ESTIMATED SOVIET MISSILE SUBMARINES

		1 OCT. 63	MID-65	MID-67	MID-69
EQUIPPED WITH BALLISTIC MISSILES (NUCLEAR PROPELLED)	350 NM 2.7 MT	49-51 (11)	56-65 (15-20)	60-73 (19-28)	64-81 (23-36)
EQUIPPED WITH CRUISE MISSILES (NUCLEAR PROPELLED)	300 NM	19 (6)	27-30 (10-12)	34-50 (14-20)	38-58 (18-28)
TOTAL MISSILE SUBMARINES (NUCLEAR PROPELLED)		68-70 (17)	83-97 (25-32)	94-123 (33-48)	102-131 (41-64)

**SURFACE - LAUNCHED
FEW MISSILES PER SUBMARINE
700 NM SUBMERGED LAUNCH BALLISTIC MISSILE IN R & D**

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
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF SOVIET LONG RANGE AVIATION

	OCT 1963	MID 1965	MID 1969
HEAVY BOMBERS AND TANKERS *	180-205	170-200	130-175
MEDIUM BOMBERS AND TANKERS * *	940-975	825-925	400-650

* *Subsonic BISON jet and BEAR turboprop types.*
 * * *Subsonic BADGER and supersonic-dash BLINDER jet types, the latter increasing from 40-50 at present to 200-350 in 1969.*

USAF believes totals will remain at least as high as at present, in part because USAF expects a new Soviet heavy bomber type in 1965-1968.


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
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MISSILE ACTIVITY IN LENINGRAD

- ROAD
- + RAILROAD
- SAM RING ROAD
- SA-2 SAM SITE
- SA-3 SAM SITE
- ☉ PROBABLE ABM COMPLEX



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
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SOVIET BLOC SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE DEFENSES



- DEFENDED CITIES
- SA-2 SITES AT OTHER LOCATIONS
- SA-3 SITES

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
NOTE: ALBANIA (NOT ON MAP) HAS 1 SA-2 SITE

13

ESTIMATED SOVIET MILITARY EXPENDITURES VERSUS ANNOUNCED SOVIET DEFENSE BUDGET 1955-1963

BILLION NEW
RUBLES

~~SECRET~~



YEARS
~~SECRET~~

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8-27-11

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14 US AND USSR: ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH IN GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT


1956-63

■ USSR
■ US

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

By *id* NARA Date *8-29-11*

(FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES)




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(15)

23


GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY END USE, 1962

(ADJUSTED VALUE ADDED, BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)



U.S. \$499.7 BILLION

■ CONSUMPTION
■ INVESTMENT
■ DEFENSE



U.S.S.R. 239.4 BILLION
(48% OF U.S.)

■ EDUCATION
■ ADMINISTRATION

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLI 10-194
NARA 8-29-11


~~SECRET~~

SERVICE SET

16

USSR: TOTAL AND PER CAPITA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

— = TOTAL (1956=100) — = PER CAPITA



DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
 NLJ 10-194
 By *id* NARA, Date 8-29-11

MEMORANDUM OR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Remarks to the National Security Council

25

The following is cast in the form of a short talk by you, but it is really intended only as a memorandum of what you said this morning for you to draw on as you please.

1. I want to say a word of welcome to the Speaker who will be with us from time to time when his very heavy duties permit it. I hope that all members of the Council will show the same readiness to keep him fully informed in this great field that they showed to me as Vice President.

And I want to welcome you all to the first NSC meeting of this Administration. Most of us have served together now for nearly three years; I know the quality of your work and place great reliance on all of you.

2. This Council is the formal meeting place for the men in the Executive Branch who have top responsibility for the safety of our nation. I want you to know that I look on these matters of security as the No. 1 business of the Government, and ~~that~~ I propose to run my own office and my own business with that priority. Not all the work of National Security can be done in meetings of this Council, and I expect to go on with special meetings for special purposes, but I do plan to use this Council from time to time as a

forum in which these matters can be examined. I welcome candid and open expression of views and differences of opinion, and I also welcome the opportunity which these meetings give for making my own positions clear.

As a beginning, I want to take a few minutes this afternoon to state the essentials of U. S. policy as I see it.

4. The greatest single requirement on the world's statesmen today is that we should find a way to ensure the survival of civilization in this nuclear age. This group knows better than most what a general nuclear war would be like, and my view is simple: such a war would be the death of all our hopes, and it is our task to see that it does not happen.

5. From this there follow two basic rules for U. S. policy: (1) we must be strong, and (2) we must be temperate.

6. On strength and the need for fully effective defenses I yield to no one. I have been concerned with the strength and effectiveness of our Armed Forces for 20 years, and I mean to continue with energy the great work which Bob McNamara and the Defense Department have carried forward in the last three years. He and I have reemphasized the need for economy in recent days and we mean it -- but we do not mean the kind of economy cuts

into the necessary strength of the Armed Forces. The basic improvement in the balance of power which has taken place in the last three years is one-half of the explanation for the sense of hope that was developing in President Kennedy's last months. I have not become President to give away this advantage.

7. But we must be temperate, too. One of my first concerns after the terrible event of November 22 was to make it clear to the Soviet Government and to Mr. Khrushchev personally that the U. S. will go its part of the way in every effort to make peace more secure. I do not agree with everything Walter Lippmann says, but I do agree with him on the importance of the progress we made in this area, too, in the last three years. I made this point forcefully to Mr. Mikoyan at the same time that I was emphasizing our continued and intense interest in the strength of our alliances to such men as Chancellor Erhard and Prime Minister Douglas-Home. I strongly supported the limited test ban treaty and I want Bill Foster to know that I look on his work as part of National Security, just as much as the work of Bob McNamara.

8. I won't take your time today to give views on all the major issues we will be working on together, but I do wish to signal my concern ~~in~~ two specific issues:

(1) We are heavily committed in South Vietnam with 18,000 Americans there, and we should all of us let no day go by without asking whether we are doing everything we can to win the struggle there.

(2) We have to live on the same world with the Soviet Union, but we do not have to accept Communist subversion in this Hemisphere -- or, indeed, in any free country that can use our help effectively. But especially in this Hemisphere I think we should let no day pass without asking what more we can do against Communist subversion and against the Castro government in particular.

I have scheduled separate meetings on both these subjects next week.

9. But being against subversion is not just a matter of fighting Communism. We have the positive job of helping to make the democratic system effective and attractive, both in our own country and wherever we have influence. This positive job, too, is of first importance.

10. I'll make just one more comment: We are all here to serve the interest of the United States, but I think we can serve that interest better if we always remember that the other man

sees things in his own way. We need to show patience and understanding of other systems as well as our own, and each of us should ask himself when he deals with other nations how he would feel if he were in the other man's place.

11. The business of this meeting is to hear the intelligence assessment of the current situation in the Soviet Union, and I will ask Mr. McCone to take over.