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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#2 report</del>	re: <del>Indonesia</del> <i>Open NLT 97-432 9-29-98</i> <del>Secret</del> <i>Sanitized 4-17-87</i> <i>NLS 86-167</i>	<del>01/07/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#4 memo</del>	to the President from Dean Rusk <del>Secret</del>	<del>01/06/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#7 memo</del>	re: <del>Indonesia</del> <del>secret</del> <i>open 1-15-87 NLS 86-158</i>	<del>01/07/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#8 NSC Action report</del>	NSC Action 2474 <del>Secret</del> <i>open 1-15-87 NLS 86-158</i>	<del>01/07/64</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, National Security Council File  
NSC Meetings, vol. 1, Tab 2, 1/7/64, Assistance to Indonesia

RESTRICTION CODES

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-432

By ica, NARA Date 9-27-98

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SUMMARY RECORD OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING,  
January 7, 1964, 4:00 PM -- Indonesia

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Director McCone gave a briefing on current developments in Southeast Asia, with special attention to the situation in Indonesia.

Secretary Rusk opened the discussion as to whether the President should determine that U.S. economic and military assistance to Indonesia is in the U. S. national interest. In an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, Congress required the President to make such a determination (see attached State Department paper).

Secretary Rusk said it was not a good time for the President to sign a determination because of the situation existing in the area, i. e., Sukarno actively seeking to "confront" Malaysia by training and using guerrilla forces on islands now controlled by Malaysia. However, Secretary Rusk continued, the President cannot delay indefinitely taking the action required by the Congressional amendment. The Foreign Assistance Act was signed December 18 and Congress will expect Presidential action on the determination shortly, Sukarno is coming up to the water shed where he will have to decide either

(a) to pull back from his "confrontation". We have no confidence that he will do so, but it would be possible for him to retreat via a decision to carry on his confrontation policy in an Asian context, i. e., not frontal opposition to the British as sponsors of Malaysia, or;

(b) to go ahead with his present policy. If he chooses the latter course, he might resort to open aggression against Malaysia. In such an event, our obligations under the Anzus Pact would be involved.

If we oppose Sukarno by cutting off all U.S. aid, he might react by confiscating extensive U.S. investments in Indonesia. In the case of a showdown, he might ask help from China and even Russia.

Secretary Rusk said Philippine President Macapagal will be talking to Sukarno in Manila this week. If he so chooses, he might be able to persuade Sukarno to hold back. Therefore, we should take no action today or this week which could have the effect of pushing Sukarno into all-out aggression against Indonesia. If the law requires action, a temporary determination should be signed. Timing is an important part of the problem. We want to keep the

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U. S. in a position to influence Sukarno, but we must keep our good relations with Congress and not allow Congressmen to think we are disregarding the legal requirement they imposed upon us when the Foreign Assistance Act was amended. A determination restricting the scope of the assistance and limited in time would be one way to deal with the present situation.

AID Director Bell said a decision would be required within a few days. After citing the law, which was signed December 18, he said a determination must be made in a reasonable time.

Secretary McNamara recommended that the President sign the determination today and instruct all agencies to monitor closely the assistance now in the pipeline which would continue to be sent to Indonesia. He said he understood it was agreed that we would hold up aid amounting to approximately \$140 million. In the pipeline, there is \$50 million of aid, plus an additional \$25 million which is to be put into the pipeline. We should try to hold down this \$70 million of assistance but we should avoid the consequences to us of action terminating all aid immediately.

In response to the President's request for his views, Speaker McCormack said he had no confidence in Sihanouk. He recalled an address which Sihanouk made several years ago to a Joint Session of Congress as being the most supercilious speech ever made by a foreigner to the Congress. We must have supreme regard for our friends, i. e., the British, who have primary responsibility in the Malaysian situation. He admitted that the decision was a very close one, but he could not disagree with the reasoning contained in the State Department paper.

Secretary Rusk said no one in Washington disagreed with the Speaker's description of the unsavory character of Sukarno who is the least responsible leader of any modern State. He said allied solidarity in this situation is very important. He noted that neither the British nor the Australians are ready to break relations with Sukarno. Australia is continuing its aid to Indonesia in an effort to influence Sukarno to give up his confrontation with Malaysia. Our allies are agreed that the time has not yet come to break with Sukarno and conclude the situation is hopeless.

In response to the President's request, the Attorney General said that as long as the Indonesians are carrying on an active guerrilla campaign against Malaysia, any announcement that the U. S. was continuing aid to Indonesia would be a big boost to Sukarno. It would be interpreted as action in support

of Sukarno despite Sukarno's present unacceptable behavior. If we must act, we should do so in such a way as to make clear that our action is not a vote of confidence in Sukarno. The effect in the U.S. of continuing aid to Indonesia without a change in Sukarno's policy would result in confusing domestic opinion.

Secretary Rusk said that Ambassador Jones has already told Sukarno that the U.S. will provide no more aid unless the Indonesians turn away from the policy of confrontation. Jones has also said that if Indonesia is blamed as an aggressor, our obligations under the Anzus Treaty will come into play. He said he agreed with the Attorney General on the U.S. domestic reaction if we continue to give aid to Indonesia. However, it would be bad to act now before the situation is ripe. The stakes are very high. More is involved in Indonesia, with it 100 million people, than is at stake in Viet Nam. We will know much more about the situation and be in a better position to decide what to do in two weeks.

The Attorney General asked whether it was absolutely necessary for the President to make a determination now.

Director Bell said it was so far as approving any new obligations. A determination cannot be put off much longer even if the assistance we continue to give involves no new obligations.

The Attorney General asked whether we could continue as we were now doing for two more weeks.

Director Bell said that we could with some difficulty. He suggested that the determination be phrased in such a way as to permit the continuance of aid for a limited period of time. At the end of that period, a new determination could be made or aid could be halted.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy said that Congress would be asking very soon what the President was going to do about aid to Indonesia. In addition, there would be press inquiries. At stake were the Administration's relations with Congress. In response to the President's question, Mr. Bundy said he would recommend signing the determination but sending to Djakarta a tough man who would tell Sukarno that the President did not intend to continue assistance unless Sukarno halted the confrontation effort. He suggested the Attorney General as a Presidential emissary, noting that the Attorney General had a reservoir of good will which was built up during a visit to Indonesia.

The Attorney General demurred and said he did not look forward to a trip to Indonesia.

Director McCone noted that in his view cessation of U.S. aid would not induce Sukarno to give up his effort to destroy Malaysia. He thought that a cutoff of aid would have very serious consequences for us, but would not alter Sukarno's opposition to Malaysia. Possibly there may be a solution in Sukarno's meeting with Macapagal in Manila. We should not write off the possibility of something coming out of Manila by making a decision now, even though further delay will probably cause criticism in the U.S. He recalled that in his meeting with Macapagal recently, he urged the Philippine President to meet with Sukarno. He agreed that a Presidential emissary should be sent to Sukarno but this should be done in such a way as not to impair the relationship which Ambassador Jones now has with Sukarno. He recommended that if action is necessary, a determination for a limited period of time should be signed.

In response to the President's request, Mr. Harriman recommended that a limited determination be signed, i. e., limited in scope. He believed that if a determination limited as to time were signed, then every thirty days we would have to go through the exercise all over again. He believed we should get the decision behind us now to avoid the issue coming up in Congress everytime a fixed period ended. He predicted that some months would pass before we know exactly where we are in Indonesia. He favored continuing a limited program for keeping a foot in the door. If the Indonesians turn against us and seize U.S. investments, the Chinese Communists might get the U.S. oil companies, thereby altering the strategic balance in the area.

Secretary Rusk said the question was whether we decide to stay at the table and play a little longer rather than leave the table now.

Mr. Harriman noted that if Sukarno steps up his guerrilla warfare against Malaysia, we can charge him in the UN with aggression. Other political pressures are available to us.

Secretary Dillon said that the picture was indeed dark, but the U.S. should not force the issue now because this is the wrong time to act. We should continue the smallest amount of aid possible. This aid would serve as a protection to the U.S. investments in Indonesia. The determination should not be friendly and should make clear that our assistance was being continued for the time being, but not for a fixed period.

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Secretary Rusk noted that if a determination were signed, this would not mean that at a later time we could not cut off aid if, for example, Sukarno was charged by the UN with aggression.

Mr. Sorensen asked whether the U.S. was giving aid to Malaysia.

Director Bell replied that no U.S. aid was now being given to Malaysia. The British are giving assistance. We decided that we did not have to start a program in Malaysia which, for an underdeveloped country, is comparatively well off.

General LeMay, as acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, favored the State-proposed program. He believed the U.S. should keep its foot in the door. He recommended that a decision be held off until after the Manila conference.

The President asked Secretary Rusk whether a decision had to be made now. He suggested that we could describe the current situation to the Congressional leaders, telling them that no new aid was being provided, that aid in the pipeline would continue, and that the determination that this aid was in the national interest would be a temporary determination. We should inform Sukarno and Macapagal of our position and following the Manila meeting, and in the light of circumstances then existing, we could decide what to do.

Secretary Rusk agreed that it would be useful for us to take a reading following the Manila meeting. He said the problem had been brought to the President because the Department was aware of Congressional pressure on the President to make a decision. He agreed that we could inform the appropriate Congressional committees that we are holding off making a decision.

The President said we should talk to the appropriate Congressional committees, explaining our hope that a solution to the immediate problem caused by Sukarno's confrontation policy would be found. We should consider sending a Presidential emissary to talk to Sukarno and we should tell the British and the Australians what we are doing. As soon as we are able to take a new reading, and if the Congressional committees' reaction is satisfactory, we would be in a position to decide. Both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense should talk to the Congressional committees in an effort to find out what they think. He said it would be a mistake to decide to cut off aid before we knew the outcome of the Manila conference. But, on the other hand, it was very difficult to say that aid to Indonesia under present circumstances is in the national interest.

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Secretary McNamara thought we could avoid a determination for some weeks. He suggested that the Attorney General ask one of his lawyers to decide whether a Presidential determination is required now. If there is a difference among the lawyers, as appears to be the case, the Attorney General could decide which lawyer had the best case.

The President asked the Attorney General to take on this task. He said he did not want to be in the position of acting with lack of faith toward Congress.

Bromley Smith

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

January 6, 1964

The Attached memorandum is distributed in connection with the NSC Meeting at 4 p.m., January 7.

Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

( January 6, 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: AID TO INDONESIA

The Problem

In the light of Indonesia's active opposition to Malaysia, whether a Presidential Determination on aid to Indonesia should be signed.

The Situation

Although Sukarno will avoid open warfare, he continues his policy of "confrontation" aimed at "crushing" Malaysia and makes no secret of his intention to support a guerrilla insurrection in North Borneo.

At the same time, the Indonesians continue to explore with the Thais and the Filipinos the possibilities of negotiations to end the dispute, including a meeting planned for early January between Sukarno and Macapagal.

Up to the period of full "confrontation", the United States maintained a minimal aid program in Indonesia designed, first, to strengthen anti-Communist elements for the battle that will follow Sukarno's departure, and, second, to give us a foot-in-the-door influence on Sukarno's policies and for such benefits as the recent oil agreements.

With the advent of full "confrontation", however, we have strongly opposed Sukarno's policies -- by warning the Indonesians that a direct attack on Malaysia would bring UN action with the US aligned against them; by halting negotiations for new PL 480 programs and for new aid to support economic stabilization; by

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By PCKT NARS, Date 11-22-82

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cutting all weapons and ammunition from existing programs; and by discontinuing the training of Indonesian officers in courses related to guerrilla activity.

A summary of action taken on aid is contained in the following table:

	<u>1963</u>	<u>Requested for 1964</u>	<u>Present</u>
AID-technical assistance to civil groups, police and officers engaged in civic action, and malaria eradication. . . . .	\$19.6	\$29.4	\$12.9
MAP-weapons, communications, training. . . . .	\$16.6	\$16.4	\$ 2.1
Loan support for stabilization! . . . . .	\$17.0	\$40.0	0.0
Total	\$53.2	\$85.8	\$15.0

Recommendation

Our recommendation is against completely cutting off aid at this time. Doing so would not, in our judgment, change Sukarno's behavior, but would wreck the Thai and Filipino efforts at reconciliation. It would also trigger a violent reaction. In all probability, Sukarno would seize the \$500 million American oil properties, encourage Communist hoodlums to burn our Embassy, and break diplomatic relations -- all of which could well be followed by UN action involving the United States or even our obligations under the ANZUS treaty. These violent actions may eventually come in any case, since we continue to oppose Sukarno's "confrontation" policies. But we should see that it is Sukarno that gets the full onus.

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What we do recommend is a policy of very tight control over all aspects of both aid and trade with Indonesia, with progressive cuts in our aid programs as the situation and Indonesian behavior warrant.

The primary disadvantage of this policy is the risk of domestic criticism of continuing aid and friendly relations with Sukarno at this time. In addition, any aid to Indonesia will produce continuing resentment from the United Kingdom and from Malaysia, and continuing pressure on us by them. It is also possible, though not probable, that even the very limited aid we propose may lead some Indonesians to believe that we are not firm in our opposition to their policy of confrontation.

The advantages, in ascending order of importance, are that we (1) preserve our foreign business investments in Indonesia, (2) continue strengthening anti-Communist elements within Indonesia as long as possible, (3) maintain for the time being US presence and foot-in-the-door influence, which exercises at least some restraint on the Indonesians and puts us in a position to take advantage of any opportunities for steering their policies into more constructive channels, and (4) avoid the onus of triggering a break and putting the responsibility for any violent action directly on the Indonesians.

Under this policy, we would for the time being:

1. permit 40,000 tons of PL 480 rice, which you recently approved, plus small Title II and III programs, to continue;
2. continue the reduced 1964 AID program;
3. continue the reduced 1964 MAP program;
4. delay decision on other aid, PL 480, and related matters as long as possible, making decisions in the light of Indonesian behavior at the time decision is required.

A recapitulation of these various programs follows:

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TO BE CONTINUED, SUBJECT TO REVIEW:

	(Millions of <u>U. S. Dollars)</u>
1. PL 480 - 40,000 tons of rice, plus small Title II and III programs	\$ 8.5
2. 1964 AID (Presidential Determination <u>required</u> ) technical assistance, civic action, and malaria eradication at monthly rate of \$1,075,000.	\$12.9
3. 1964 MAP (Presidential Determination <u>required</u> ) training (monthly rate \$0.175)	\$ 2.1

TO BE DELAYED:

1. PL 480 - Completion of existing three year Title I program (Decision on about \$10 million needed within next month. Decision on balance required during calendar year 1964.)	\$36.6
2. PL 480 - Consideration of pending requests for new agreement to provide additional rice up to 100,000 tons.	\$13.5 (est.)
3. Consideration of pending development loan for rehabilitation of tin mines.	\$10.0 (est.)

In addition, we have warned Lockheed, first, that we would not be willing to grant export licenses for new purchases of C-130's; and, second, that we may not be willing to grant export licenses for additional spare parts (decision due in February).

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## PIPELINE

The Presidential determination required by Section 620(j) relates only to new obligations. With respect to assistance now in the pipeline (funds obligated in prior years), we propose the following actions.

In the case of MAP, we have already suspended deliveries of aircraft, ships, and all weapons and ammunition. Up to now, however, we have continued deliveries of other items such as, trucks, electronics equipment, and various spare parts and consumable items (uniforms, tires, etc.) for the Indonesian armed forces, less one major long-standing project for communications in Java and Sumatra only (i. e., possibly not contributing to Indonesian capabilities against Malaysia in the foreseeable future.) Preliminary analysis is that about 7.5 million dollars of such items remain for delivery at the present time, of which only a small fraction of the items directly used by the armed forces would be likely to be delivered in the near future. Weighing the impact of cut-off on Indonesia versus the consequences of delivering items that do in some degree contribute significantly to Indonesian military capability, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, will examine the list in detail and suspend deliveries that could in any way so contribute. The Secretary of Defense will then report to you the action taken, noting any items that may in his judgment be deliverable under this criteria.

With respect to the AID "pipeline" of unexpended obligations, the Secretary of State and the Administrator of AID, in consultation with Department of Defense, will examine continually the desirability of continuing deliveries of equipment to the Mobile Brigade in the light of its geographic dispositions, leadership and other considerations and will suspend other deliveries they judge likely to contribute substantially to Indonesian military capability. Approximately \$5 million in equipment for the Mobile Brigade is in the pipeline; of this, approximately \$2.5 million in arms and ammunition already has been suspended. Other elements of the economic assistance pipeline, deliverable over the next two years, consisting of approximately \$10 million for technical assistance, \$5 million for industrial

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supplies and equipment, and \$7 million outstanding on capital project loans, will be discharged in accordance with our commitments.

#### PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION

A Presidential Determination is required to implement the above policy as it relates to 1964 programs. However, we believe that this determination can be so worded as to reflect the selective policy recommended above and the provisional nature of the decisions being taken on aid matters. Two alternatives along these lines for your signature are attached at Tabs A and B.

#### GRUENING AMENDMENT

One further matter concerning aid to Indonesia is the Gruening Amendment, Section 620(i) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 which, in pertinent part, provides -

No assistance shall be provided under this or any other Act, and no sales shall be made under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, to any country which the President determines is engaging in or preparing for aggressive military efforts directed against etc...

Our recommendation is that responsibility be assigned to the Secretary of State to keep the situation under continuing review and at such time as the situation may warrant, recommend to the President that he determine that Indonesia is engaged in or preparing for aggressive military action.

  
Dean Rusk

MEMORANDUM FOR:   The Secretary of State  
                          The Secretary of Defense  
                          The Administrator, Agency for  
  International Development

In the light of Section 620(j) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, I hereby direct that the furnishing of assistance to Indonesia shall be only for such selective purposes and in such amounts as I may from time to time authorize.

Pursuant to Section 620(j), I hereby determine, subject to my continuing review in the light of developments, that the furnishing of limited and provisional assistance to Indonesia as follows is essential to the national interest of the United States:

- (1) Assistance for training Indonesian specialists, officials and military personnel in the United States;
- (2) Technical assistance to educational and governmental institutions and agencies, including police;
- (3) Assistance for malaria eradication;
- (4) Assistance in the form of equipment and training for civic action programs; and
- (5) Transportation and communications equipment for police forces.

In accordance with the provisions of Section 620(j), the Foreign Relations Committee and the Appropriations Committee of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives will be kept fully and currently informed of any assistance furnished to Indonesia under the Foreign Assistance Act.

January , 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR:       The Secretary of State  
                          The Secretary of Defense  
                          The Administrator, Agency for  
  International Development

Pursuant to Section 620(j) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, I hereby determine that the furnishing of limited and provisional assistance to Indonesia is essential to the national interest of the United States. I have directed that the furnishing of such assistance shall be only for such selective purposes and in such amounts as I may personally from time to time authorize.

In accordance with the provisions of Section 620(j), the Foreign Relations Committee and the Appropriations Committee of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives will be kept fully and currently informed of any assistance furnished to Indonesia under the Foreign Assistance Act.

January     , 1964

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Authority NLS 86-158  
By isp, NARS, Date 1-15-89

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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January 7, 1964

MEMORANDUM ON INDONESIA

We face two questions -- one broad and one narrow:

A. Broadly, it is agreed that we should have a cool and firm policy of increasing opposition to Sukarno, if he goes on lifting the level of force used against Malaysia. This policy has already led to a reduction of 80% in our planned assistance to Indonesia for FY 1964. Further reductions should be made in this assistance, in PL-480, and in Pipeline deliveries if Sukarno does not cool off. All this has been made very plain to Sukarno and is agreed throughout the Executive Branch.

B. Narrowly, we have a question whether all assistance to Sukarno except goods in Pipeline and some PL-480 should now be cut off because of certain amendments to the Foreign Aid Act. Pros and cons are:

For the cut-off:

- (1) Nobody likes Sukarno, and with good reason.
- (2) Congress has expressed itself strongly.
- (3) A cut-off might show Sukarno consequences of "confrontation" with Malaysia.
- (4) Cut-off protects the President from having to determine that assistance to Indonesia is "essential to the interest of the United States."
- (5) Adverse consequences in Indonesia could be mitigated by "wind-up" assistance, by continued PL-480, and by continuing parts of Pipeline deliveries (all outside the reach of the amendment).

Against the cut-off:

(1) The programs we have planned are there now because we think them "essential to our national interest." They are there not because we like Sukarno, but because we are contending for the long-range future of a country of 100 million with great resources in a strategic location. The odds may be long, but the stakes are high, and our investment is small. A cut-off now could end our hopes by our own act. "Wind-up" assistance, PL-480, and Pipeline deliveries would probably not reverse the political effects of the cut-off in Indonesia.

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Jan. 7, 1964

Against the cut-off (continued)

(2) The right way to cut or increase these programs is by continuous Presidential judgment in a swiftly moving diplomatic situation. The President can control all the programs all the time. To let the amendment take effect now would be to cut out one part of the program at a quite arbitrary moment.

(3) Such a cut-off today could trigger a violent reaction from Sukarno and block efforts to settle dispute by Filipinos and Thais. It could cost us half a billion of private investment. It could hand Indonesia's future to Communists. Aswan Dam case should remind us that neutrals are ready to seize on our acts to justify their outrages -- and to some extent they get away with it.

(4) The Presidential Determination can be reasonably explained to the American people. A draft statement is attached at TAB A. This draft aims to explain as much as possible to our own people without giving Sukarno excuses for wild actions.

McG. B.

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DRAFT

TAB A

1/7/64

The President today signed a Determination permitting certain limited assistance to Indonesia which is essential to the interests of the United States. At the same time, and in accord with the views of Congress, he directed that all programs of assistance to Indonesia be limited and selective, and placed under a requirement of review and recommendation to him, in each case, from the Secretary of State.

The President, like the Congress, is gravely concerned by the tensions which have developed from the confrontation of Indonesia against Malaysia. It has been necessary, in the light of this confrontation, to curtail or to omit many parts of the planned program of assistance to Indonesia. Nevertheless, the United States has had friendly relations with Indonesia and has no wish to end cooperative programs unrelated to the confrontation with Malaysia.

The United States is supporting the forces working for reconciliation and peaceful agreement among all the countries concerned. This effort is essential to our own interest and to that of others. A total cut-off of peaceful assistance now would be inconsistent with this effort.

SERVICE SET -

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

RECORD OF ACTIONS

8

NSC  
Action

2474. ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA

Following a discussion of economic and military assistance to Indonesia, the President:

- a. Directed the Attorney General to prepare an opinion of law on whether a Presidential Determination, pursuant to Section 620(j) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, is required with respect to assistance obligations incurred prior to the enactment of this Section.
- b. Directed the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Administrator, Agency for International Development, to inform appropriate Congressional leaders of the Administration's views on the subject of the Presidential Determination and relations between the United States and Indonesia as these matters were discussed at the meeting.
- c. Directed the Secretary of State to consider the appointment of a personal representative of the President to undertake a special mission to discuss with President Sukarno the current state of relations between the United States and Indonesia.

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January 7, 1964  
521st NSC Meeting  
NSC Action 2474

Authority NLJ 86-158  
By ig, NARS, Date 1-15-87

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NSC Control No. 152

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ATTENDANCE LIST FOR THE 521TH NSC MEETING  
HELD ON TUESDAY, JANUARY 7, 1964, AT 4:00 PM  
IN THE CABINET ROOM OF THE WHITE HOUSE

The President of the United States, Presiding  
The Speaker of the House of Representatives

AID  
✓ David E. Bell, Administrator

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
✓ Kermit Gordon, Director

CIA  
✓ John A. McCone, Director

DEFENSE  
✓ Robert S. McNamara, Secretary  
✓ William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary for  
International Security Affairs

JCS  
✓ General Curtis LeMay, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

JUSTICE  
✓ Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General

OEP  
✓ Edward A. McDermott, Director

STATE  
✓ Dean Rusk, Secretary  
✓ W. Averell Harriman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs  
✓ Roger Hillsman, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs

TREASURY  
✓ C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary

USIA  
✓ Donald M. Wilson, Acting Director

*Richard*  
*Peter*  
*AID*

*(Jim Calby)*  
*Conger (CIA)*

WHITE HOUSE

- ✓ **McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs**
- ✓ **Bill D. Moyers**
- ✓ **John Valenti**
- ✓ **Pierre Salinger, Press Secretary to the President**
- ✓ **Maj. Gen. Chester V. Clifton, Military Aide to the President**
- ✓ **Bromley Smith, Executive Secretary, National Security Council**
- ✓ **Michael V. Forrestal, National Security Council Staff**

*Soumission*

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**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

**AGENDA**

**For the Meeting to be held in the  
Cabinet Room of the White House  
on Tuesday, January 7, 1964  
at 4:00 p.m.**

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- 1. Presentation by CIA Director McCone  
(Approximately ten minutes)**
- 2. Indonesia -- Presentation by Secretary Rusk**