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
FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 report	summary record of NSC Meeting 532 OPEN 1/10/77 top secret initials NSC letter 10-24-80 7-p	NY 93-464 05/15/64	A
#5 report	record of actions confidential open 1-25-91 1 p NLJ 90-134	05/15/64	A
#8 report agenda	532nd NSC Meeting secret open 9/3/93 1 p	05/13/64	A
#4 speech	Speech by Belgian Foreign Minister NATO Secret 24 pp.	05/13/64	A
#9 notes	draft meeting notes possible classified information 5 pp. open 8-21-95 NLJ 93-478	05/15/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, National Security Council File
NSC Meetings, Vol. 2 Tab 4, 5/15/64, Rusk Report on NATO Meeting at the
Hague McNamara Report on His Trip to Vietnam

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By Cb, NARA Date 10-30-96

Summary Record of National Security Council Meeting No. 532
May 15, 1964, 12:00 noon - Reports by Secretary Rusk and
Secretary McNamara

The agenda of the meeting, which included presentations on U.S. assistance to Indonesia and U.S. policy toward Panama, was cancelled. The bipartisan Congressional leaders had been invited by the President to attend the Council session to hear reports by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara.

Secretary Rusk summarized the NATO meeting from which he had just returned. He referred to a classical speech made by Foreign Minister Spaak, the text of which the State Department is to obtain (copy attached).

1. France -- The difficulties we are encountering with France in NATO are limited to the military field. We should press France to support NATO in all other fields.

2. Cyprus -- NATO is not to take a role in efforts to settle this problem. It will help in limited ways, but the UN is to take the lead. An effort will be made to strengthen the UN mandate covering Cyprus.

3. United Nations -- A report on what we are doing in South Vietnam accompanied a plea to the NATO members to assist in the effort against the Viet Cong. About half a dozen States may register their presence in South Vietnam. It is important that more flags appear in South Vietnam. The contribution which additional states will make helps the war effort but also has a beneficial effect on the morale of the South Vietnamese government. The resistance among NATO members to assisting in Vietnam is an echo of the past and recalls colonial disputes in which European nations believe we worked against them.

4. Cuba -- Our position on the necessity of continuing overflights of Cuba was made clear. NATO members were reminded that earlier we had tried to solve this problem by being prepared to accept UN on-site inspection in Cuba and a Latin American nuclear-free zone. NATO members were told of our efforts to isolate Cuba economically. Our primary problem is with the British and to a lesser extent the French. The other thirteen NATO members are cooperating with us in the effort to block trade with Cuba.

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5. Tripartite Talks -- There was a tripartite discussion of the problem of dealing with the reunification of Germany. Our position was that the subject should be discussed further by the Ambassadorial group in Washington.

Secretary McNamara then summarized the report he had prepared following his most recent visit to South Vietnam.

1. The situation in South Vietnam has worsened since his last visit. The number of people under Viet Cong control and the amount of Vietnamese territory they control is increasing. The Viet Cong holds the initiative in the military action. The Khanh government is fragmented and a religious crisis is brewing. South Vietnamese efforts involve clear and hold exercises, the oil spot program, and pacification programs. Khanh controls eight out of fourteen million South Vietnamese. His major problem is not military but civilian and religious. He does not feel that he should strike north before his security situation in the south is improved, possibly by this Fall. No strike to the north is required now, but there may be a psychological requirement to hit North Vietnam at a later time. He feels that because the reaction of the Communists to an attack on North Vietnam is unknown, he must have a U.S. guarantee of protection, i.e., the introduction of U.S. forces, before such an attack is initiated.

In response to the President's question, General Taylor said that if we attack North Vietnam, there would be a strong reaction by the Viet Cong in the south. It is difficult to estimate what the North Vietnamese and the Chinese Communists would do. The Chinese Communists could intervene but probably would not. The larger the U.S. attack, the greater chance of Communist reaction. The level of the attack would be the determining factor in the Communist reaction.

The President pointed out that Khanh's support of any attack on North Vietnam would be essential.

Secretary McNamara said that the most important thing to do now is to back Khanh solidly. He suggested that we could help Khanh in the following ways:

1. Increase the South Vietnamese force level.
2. Help get his budget approved and implemented.

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3. Provide financial support to ensure the stability of the South Vietnamese economy. More foreign aid in 1965 will be needed, as well as additional military equipment.

4. Train Vietnamese pilots in order to provide crews for the increased number of U.S. planes which we should send to Vietnam.

In answer to a question, Secretary McNamara said that U.S. military personnel would be training Vietnamese and would not be in combat. However, U.S. men are exposed to fire on the ground and in the air during their training time. He referred to Jungle Jim, an Air Force program to train a Vietnamese force for counter guerrilla activity. As to U.S. planes given to the Vietnamese earlier, he said there was a sound case for sending the T-28s. Propellor-driven planes are more appropriate to Vietnam than jets. The size of the airfields is small. The T-28s had been used to provide air cover for helicopters. U.S. experts agree that the T-28s are the best type of plane for the Vietnamese war. Fatalities were low, considering the large number of sorties flown.

Secretary McNamara said, in summary, that we would be obliged to increase our previous level of economic and military assistance. In answer to Senator Dirksen's question, Director Bell said total U.S. assistance amounted to about \$500 million a year.

Senator Dirksen recalled Secretary McNamara's earlier report to the Congressional group and asked whether the Vietnamese had been able to enlist or conscript the additional soldiers called for under their program. Secretary McNamara said the present goal is 75,000 more men by the end of the year. In fact, 150,000 recruits are needed but it is unlikely that this number will be obtained.

In answer to a question by Senator Dirksen as to the effect of our increased assistance on the economy of South Vietnam, both Secretary McNamara and Mr. Bell agreed that the effect would be little. This year's rice crop is expected to be good.

In answer to Senator Dirksen's question about the Cambodian border incident, Secretary McNamara said it was very difficult to determine the specific facts. Apparently there were two different incidents

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involving the crossing of the border by South Vietnamese. Secretary Rusk added that the Viet Cong felt free to move across the border into Cambodia. He added that we may try to use the Cambodian appeal to the UN to get UN observers on the Cambodia/South Vietnam border. Director McCone noted that both sides have crossed and recrossed the border. These crossings are not deep and are in areas where the border is not clearly identified.

The President summarized the McNamara report by saying that the situation in South Vietnam was deteriorating and caused us to be extremely alarmed. The religious situation is explosive. A great effort will be necessary to turn the tide back to our side.

Senator Saltonstall asked whether U.S. soldiers will be engaged in fighting under the new program. He also asked whether U.S. planes were being adequately maintained, adding that many people had expressed their concern to him on this point.

Secretary McNamara replied that U.S. soldiers are not engaged in combat except in the course of their training Vietnamese. The number of our fighter pilots in South Vietnam has not been greatly increased. The bulk of the air effort is by South Vietnamese forces and does not involve exposing our men.

Congressman Jensen asked whether our allies are helping us. He wanted to know why the U.S. is carrying so much of the load and why our allies can not be forced to contribute more.

Secretary Rusk replied that we are carrying almost all of the load but are getting some assistance from Germany, France, the U.K. and Australia. The U.K., however, is involved in Borneo and in Malaysia. Some twenty nations have been asked to help us in South Vietnam.

Congressman Jensen made clear that he thought we are merely putting around instead of launching a campaign against the Red Chinese. He is convinced that we have to deal with the Red Chinese. He is unhappy because he believes our allies really do not give a damn about Communist aggression in Southeast Asia.

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Secretary McNamara repeated his view that effective action must be taken in South Vietnam. Attacks on North Vietnam may become necessary, but our purpose would be to make possible the carrying out of present programs in South Vietnam. The Viet Cong is being hurt in South Vietnam now. We are trying to get our allies to help, but many of them have severe limitations. However, the Australian effort is much too small. Because their entire defense budget is so low, the Australians would be able to put only a token force in South Vietnam.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that Prime Minister Menzies can now increase his defense budget because, in a recent election, he gained sufficient additional political support to make this action possible.

Congresswoman Bolton asked when we began training South Vietnamese pilots. Secretary McNamara replied in January 1962. He added that in two and one-fourth years twenty-eight U.S. lives have been lost, but that Vietnamese sorties had increased eight times. He cited additional facts to refute criticism that the Vietnamese are not fighting and that U.S. soldiers are actually carrying on the war.

When Secretary McNamara finished, Mrs. Bolton requested that his information be made public. She said she is getting a tremendous amount of mail criticizing our actions in South Vietnam. Secretary McNamara said we are making the information he had summarized available to the public and he had given some of it during his testimony before Congressional committees.

In response to a question from Senator Dirksen as to the location of the Seventh Fleet, Secretary McNamara said elements of the Fleet are off the coast of South Vietnam, within forty-eight hours steaming time of Saigon.

In response to a question by Senator Dirksen as to whether Communist China is increasing the number of weapons shipped to South Vietnam, Secretary McNamara replied that there had been no increase in weapon shipments above the March level.

Senator Dirksen asked for a description of the routes of supply from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. Secretary McNamara described several of the routes, adding that 90-95% of Viet Cong forces are recruited in South Vietnam. Only cadres are sent from North Vietnam.

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Speaker McCormack said that the Administration was doing everything it could to get help from our allies. He pointed out that if South Vietnam goes, all of Southeast Asia will fall to the Communists. It is in our national interest to keep Southeast Asia non-Communist.

Congressman Jensen agreed that the U.S. has an interest in Southeast Asia but firmly restated his view that so do others who are not now helping us. He asked about the position of Thailand.

Secretary Rusk replied that Thailand is focusing on the problem in Laos and has moved some of its forces to northeast Thailand. This helps the situation in South Vietnam. In addition, the Thais are worried about the activity of Sihanouk. The South Vietnamese do not want Thai forces in their territory. The Thais are giving us good political support, but we have not pressed them to send military forces to South Vietnam.

Secretary Rusk called attention to the fact that the Vietnamese problem is ten years old. We have been committed to help Vietnam remain independent since 1954. In 1959, U.S. aid to Vietnam was increased when it became clear that Hanoi was intensifying its efforts to overthrow the South Vietnamese government.

The President said that a request for a supplemental appropriation to pay for increased economic and military assistance to South Vietnam would come from the Bureau of the Budget to the National Security Council and then be sent to Congress. The amount required was more than could be covered by the contingency fund. The specific amount was not yet known. The President requested that information on this point not be made public.

Senator Saltonstall asked what could be said. The President replied that we would say that Congressional leaders had been asked to attend the National Security Council meeting to hear a briefing by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara. It was clear that more U.S. funds would be required for the Vietnamese program, but no details should be given out because they were still considered confidential.

In response to a question, Secretary McNamara said that Ambassador Lodge and General Harkins were in full agreement that more U.S. effort was needed in South Vietnam.

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- 7 -

The President concluded the meeting by commenting that even with increased U.S. aid the prospect in South Vietnam is not bright.

Bromley Smith

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S/S 7864

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 26, 1964

SECRET ENCLOSURE

1. Bundy's note
1. File

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Spaak's Speech at NATO Ministerial
Meeting, May 13

In his telegram to the President (SECTO 39) at the conclusion of the recent NATO Ministerial Meeting, the Secretary promised to try to obtain for the President the text of the speech made by Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak in Restricted Session, May 13. Such a text has been obtained by the Department through unofficial channels from the NATO staff. A translation is enclosed for the President's information.

BHR

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Translation of
Spaak's speech.

~~SECRET~~ ENCLOSURE

5
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

RECORD OF ACTIONS

NSC
Action

2488. BRIEFING BY SECRETARY RUSK AND
SECRETARY McNAMARA

- a. Noted the President's welcome to the bipartisan Congressional Leaders who had been invited to attend the Council meeting.
- b. Noted the briefings of Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara.
- c. Deferred the scheduled presentations on Indonesia and Panama.

May 15, 1964
532nd NSC Meeting
NSC Action 2488

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356. Sec. 3.4
NJ 90-134
By mg NARA. Date 1-3-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSC Control No. 165

7
May 14, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. VALENTI

The following Government officials have been invited to the National Security Council meeting at noon tomorrow:

**Secretary Rusk
Secretary Ball ← See
Secretary McNamara
General Taylor
Attorney General
Director McCone
Director McDermott (Statutory NSC Member)
Director Rowan
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Smith**

A list of the Legislative Leaders who will attend will be sent to you later.

Would you ask the President who of the following White House officers he wishes to have present:

**Mr. Jenkins
Mr. O'Brien (Because of the Legislative Leaders)
Mr. Reedy
General Clifton
Mr. Moyers**

Bromley Smith

DRAFT
5/14/64

9 7a

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. SMITH

Mr. Bundy asked me to pass on the following information about a NSC meeting tomorrow at noon.

1. The meeting will be essentially a "show" meeting at which Secretaries Rusk and McNamara will report on their recent trips.
2. You should get in touch with Larry O'Brien about inviting a bipartisan senior group from Congress -- the general leadership, and the leaders on the House and Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services.
3. Mr. Bundy thought that the executive branch participation should be minimal. The following is a suggested list: Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, Secretary McNamara, McDermott, the AG, McCone, and Max Taylor. You should check out the guest list with Mr. Bundy.
4. Secretary Rusk should be told that he will be expected to report at the meeting. Secretary McNamara already knows this, however, he should be aware that Secretary Rusk will be speaking as well.

Who first?

May 13, 1964

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in the
Cabinet Room of the White House
on Friday, May 15, 1964
at 12:30 PM

- Item 1 -- U. S. ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA
(Presentation by Assistant Secretary of State Bundy)
- Item 2 -- U. S. POLICY TOWARD PANAMA
(Report by Assistant Secretary of State Mann)
- Agenda change*

532nd NSC Meeting

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NSC Control No. 165

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 28, 1983
By *Phy* NARA, Date 9/1/93

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 93-478

By CB, NARA, Date 5-31-95

N.S.C. - May 15 - noon - with Com. leaders

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONRush report

NATO - Discussion meeting

Lyndon Clavell speech

France - only mil field on difficulties

Power France to support NATO in
all other fields

Cyprus - not a role in as such - UN lead

Strengthen UN mandate

Viet Nam - Rush report to NATO on

new flag - 1/2 dozen way

negotiate their presence in VN

Echo of past - colonial disputes

Cuba - Rush position

overflight (UN on site)

trade - primary problem UK

T. report talk 13 out of 15 SIC - UK + FIC

Reunification of Ger. (discussion only)

McNamara Report

Summary of conclusions

1. Situation - worsened

no of people + size of terr will increase

VC holds initiative in mil action

Clear + hold - oil spot - pacification

Kahn gov fragmented

Religious crisis brewing

2. Kahn - 8 out of 14 mil under his control

major problem not military but

civilian + religious

not ready before fall to strike North

no strike required now

may be psy. requirement to hit north later

Reaction of Comm unknown so

must have U.S. guarantee of protection

by introduction of U.S. forces [17]

Taylor - Answer to LBS question.
Reaction by VC in South, North V and
Comm reaction difficult. Chinese could
intervene. ^{THE WHITE HOUSE} ^{WASHINGTON} ^{Probably} ^{mount} ^{greater} OS
attack greater chance of reaction. Level
of attack in turning point.

LBS - Kalin support is essential

McN - most imp US action is to back Kalin
How help Kalin

1. Help Kalin increase level of forces
2. Get budget approved & implement
3. Stand behind ensure stability
of economy. US assistance to be
financial support & equipment
Now Foreign Aid in 65 needed
4. Training of Viet Nam
Pilots - to fly increased no of planes
at add 100 A-1

Phone

US training - not in combat - but US men
exposed to fire on ground & in air
single Nym air force to train force
for counter-guerrilla - also goes US plan
to VN. Proposision more appropriate
than jets, limited air fields - cover for

McN helos - best type - 90% fatalities low
Increase previous levels of econ & mil assistance

Bell \$500 mil a year - Disken question

McN - What about conscript 50,000 addition
Failed to get income

75,000 more men by end of year is now goal
150,000 recruits needed - won't do

McN - Effect on economy asked Disken
Rice ^{crop} ~~growth~~ good. Bell agreed.

McN - Disken question re Cambodian
border incident - Difficult to determine
facts. Two incidents

[2]

Rush - VC feel free to move across border
use Cambodian appeal in VN to try to
get ~~the~~ UN people on border. (3)

McCone Both ^{THE WHITE HOUSE} ~~side~~ ^{WASHINGTON} crossed - not deep
border not clearly identified
LBS asking ~~it~~ ^{deterring} - extremely alarmed
Relig. sit explosive
Great effort to turn tide to our side

Suttonsall

U.S. men to do some things

US planer to be maintained? people
concerned

We H - US soldiers not fighting except in
training. Fighter pilots not go up much
Bull of an effort by VN forces - not
expose our men

→ move planer sent now 10

Rush - we carrying almost all load
some ~~French~~ ^{Australian} some French - some UK

Jenson - Allies ~~are~~ helping? Why US carry
whole load? Why not contributing more

Rush - Heats allies - UK involved in Malaysia
in Borneo. Other hard to pitch in.
We asking 20 nations to help.

Jenson - Putting off campaign against
Red. Clinger? How to go home. Allies don't
give a damn.

We H - effective action must be in So Viet Nam
Attacks north may be necessary
VC being least in So now.
i trying to get allies but there are some
limitations

Australian effort much to small
on actual defense budget - can't put
only token force in VN -

Rush
now increasing def. budget because
Menzies has more pol power after
election

[3]

Mr Bolton - when began training V pilots
Mr N - Jan 64

2805 hours in 2 1/4 years - V N Southern
up 8 fold THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Pol - met to public

Mr N - Doing

Dist - 7th fleet

Mr N - off coast - 48 hours

Dist - no Saigon set from C China

Mr N - not further mission of work level

Dist - Route of supply

Mr N - Described route

VC Recruited 90-95% from So Viet
Roads from north

Speak - trying get others to help

improve VN govt - all SEA

not interest to keep

Person - US has interest but no do others

Position of Thailand

Rush - Thailand focusing on Laos -

its forces in NE but helping in
Laos. concerned by Soudan position

So. Viet don't want foreign force
from Thailand. Good Pol. support
but not pressed to act

Problem is 10 year old - Promise

made in 1954-1959 was aid increased
when Hanoi upped its campaign.

LBS - Supplemental for Viet Nam from

BOB to WSC to Cong - increased

mil & econ assistance - more than
contingency - amount not yet known.

Sutton - newly informed

LBS - have briefing of Rush & Mr N [47]
no details because confidential

more funds needed - details later
try to get in present budget -

We'll - Amb & Mil Com agreed more
effort needed

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

2 BS - Even with increased aid, prospect
not bright -

[5]

ATTENDANCE LIST FOR THE 532nd NSC MEETING
MAY 15, 1964, AT 12:00 NOON IN THE CABINET ROOM
OF THE WHITE HOUSE

The President of the United States, Presiding

Speaker of the House of Representatives

AID

David Bell, Director

ATTORNEY GENERAL

Robert F. Kennedy

CIA

John A. McCone, Director

DEFENSE

Robert S. McNamara, Secretary

JCS

General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA, Chairman

OEP

Edward A. McDermott, Director

STATE

Dean Rusk, Secretary

George Ball, Under Secretary

USIA

Carl T. Rowan, Director

WHITE HOUSE

McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President

George Reedy, Press Secretary to the President

Lawrence O'Brien, Special Assistant to the President

Bromley Smith, Executive Secretary, National Security Council

CONGRESS

Senator Carl Hayden

Senator Mike Mansfield

Senator Hubert H. Humphrey

Senator J. W. Fulbright

Senator George A. Smathers

Senator Everett M. Dirksen

Senator Thomas H. Kuchel

Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper

Senator Leverett Saltonstall

CONGRESS (continued)

Congressman Hale Boggs
Congressman Carl Vinson
Congressman Thomas E. Morgan
Congresswoman Frances P. Bolton
Congressman Ben F. Jensen
Congressman George H. Mahon
Congressman Otto Passman