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#2 report	record of actions <i>open 1-25-98 NLS 90-134</i> <del>secret Exempt NLS 86-224</del> 1 p	07/07/64	A
#3 memo	for the record <del>sanitized 4-1-93 NLS 91-163</del> <del>top secret Exempt NLS 86-224</del> 6 p <i>Downgraded to Secret per NLS 91-163 sanitized 1-24-01 NLS 98-422 (same sam)</i>	07/07/64	A
#7 memo for the President from George Ball	<del>secret Exempt NLS 90-122</del> <i>open 11-5-97 NLS 96-307</i> 8 p	07/07/64	A
#9 report	re: Cyprus <i>sanitized 12-14-99 NLS 98-419</i> top secret 12 p	07/08/64	A
#11 memo	for the President from McGeorge Bundy secret 1 p	07/07/64	A
#12 memo	to McGB from HHS <i>open 1-25-91</i> <del>Secret NLS 90-134</del> 1 p	07/07/64	A
#13 report	agenda for <del>535th</del> 535th NSC Meeting secret <i>open 3-29-90</i> 1 p	<del>06/06/64</del> 07/06/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, National Security Council File,  
NSC Meetings, Vol. 2 Tab 8, 7/7/64, Cyprus

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

RECORD OF ACTIONS

NSC  
Action

2491. CYPRUS

Noted a briefing on the Cyprus situation,  
including a presentation by the Acting  
Secretary of State and a military appreciation  
by the Director of the Joint Staff.

July 7, 1964  
535th NSC Meeting  
NSC Action 2491

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NSC Control No. 172

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 90-130

By mg NARA. Date 1-3-91

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July 7, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting July 7, 1964 at 12 Noon on Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS: See Attached List

Secretary Ball led off the discussion of Cyprus by telling the President he thought it would be useful to report to the NSC on a situation which was like a time bomb that could blow up any time in the next six weeks. His report largely reflected the State Department memorandum submitted prior to the meeting.

One of the principal problems, he said, is irrationality on both sides. The Greeks figure time is on their side. They think they can work out a plebiscite followed by enosis simply by sitting tight. The threat of Turk invasion has roused their stubbornness and Athens seems blind to its long-range interest in conceding enough to Ankara to provide a basis for improved relations after a Cyprus settlement. The Turks, on the other hand, see their position being eroded day by day. They resent our having restrained them when chances for a successful invasion were best, and they are bitter over Greek and Cypriot disregard of the London-Zurich treaties. They see a political solution as the only alternative to exercising their right of intervention.

Pressures are building up, Mr. Ball went on. The Greeks have sent 4000 troops to the island (CIA believes 5-7000), in addition to their regular garrison there. The Turks, who have to put their men ashore at night from small boats, have sent perhaps 1000 in addition to their garrison. The Turks see the Greek buildup outrunning theirs and their hope of successful intervention vanishing. Meanwhile, General Grivas--a fanatic, fortunately anti-Communist--has taken over the Greek Cypriot forces and hopes to build an army of some 35,000 men. The Turks have a lurking fear that Grivas may overthrow Makarios suddenly and simply announce annexation of Cyprus to Greece. So the pressure on the Turks to act soon is increasing. Moreover, the Turks know of the Greek plan, if the situation drags on through the summer, to throw the whole question to the UN General Assembly where the Greeks are confident they will get a blessing for self-determination leading to enosis. On top of this, incidents could trigger Turk Cypriot rebellion or island-wide fighting at any time.

We are staking our bets of necessity on the Geneva talks, Mr. Ball continued. Acheson has arrived. The arrangements made for him there are not good but

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are the best we have been able to work out. He had his first talk with the UN Mediator yesterday and reports an atmosphere of pessimism. However, we hope his further discussions before talks with the Greeks and Turks begin early the week of 13 July may improve the atmosphere. Meanwhile, we are doing extensive contingency planning to limit the scope of a Greek-Turk war if the Turks invade and to keep bloodshed on Cyprus to a minimum. We are also considering how we should handle ourselves in the UN Security Council and how we might develop safehavens for refugees on the island. On 9 July we are holding a meeting here with the British and Canadians to see what pressure they can bring to bear on the Greeks. We are also studying seriously the problem of evacuating officials and tourists should war break out.

At that point the President broke in to ask how many Americans are in the area. Mr. Ball replied that there are about 250 on Cyprus, mostly with our communications facilities there. Since we went through an evacuation exercise earlier this year, he contemplates little difficulty there. In Greece there are 5-6000 Americans and in Turkey 16-17,000. However, he felt that danger in the mainland countries of a severe anti-American reaction would not be great.

The President then asked whether Papandreou had replied to his letter (of 2 July). Mr. Ball said the reply had just come in and that it was simply a pro forma reiteration of the Greek position and really did not take us anywhere. The President said he wanted to see that letter as soon as possible.

There followed a detailed briefing by Gen. Burchinal on the military forces that would participate in any hostilities on Cyprus. The attached memorandum records the substance of this briefing. Mr. Ball, at the end of the briefing, highlighted the fact that the Turk goal is limited to establishing a beachhead for bargaining purposes; the Turks do not want the kind of war that complete conquest would require. Mr. Ball also estimated that perhaps 20-25,000 villagers might be slaughtered once an invasion started. General Burchinal suggested that Turk air mastery might prove some deterrent since Greek villages would be vulnerable. [No one responded, but the feeling seemed to be that this would only increase the carnage.]

The President summarized his understanding in these terms: The Turks have substantially greater forces than the Greeks in every respect; they could land and maintain a beachhead; and the Soviets would not intervene. General Burchinal confirmed the President's understanding, estimating Turk army superiority at 3-1 and air force at 4-1.

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Secretary McNamara elaborated on the President's last point, saying we didn't think the Soviets would intervene militarily but they would unquestionably try to make political hay out of any disorder on Cyprus. General Wheeler added that a prime Soviet objective is the fragmentation of NATO and any Greek-Turk hostilities would further that end.

The President moved on to the question of what our next steps might be and asked whether there is anything further we can do to prevent Turkish invasion and to assure the success of the Geneva talks. He pointed out that the Greeks didn't expect much to come of these talks and have shown a good deal of irritation at the way we treated them during Papandreou's visit here.

Mr. Ball felt that the President had seriously shaken Papandreou with his statement that the US would not militarily restrain a Turkish invasion. He felt we had gained some ground with the Greeks during that visit. Mr. Bundy felt less optimistic, noting Greek peevishness over the President's latest letter.

The President recalled that Papandreou had pressed for a US formula when he was here. Mr. Ball pointed out the pitfalls of providing one at the outset of discussions. He said that Mr. Acheson is well prepared to introduce the elements of such a formula in the course of the Geneva talks. However, if we presented a US solution in advance, he felt both parties would attack it and walk out. The President agreed.

Secretary McNamara brought up the desirability of using General Lemnitzer and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to bring home to the Greek and Turk military that a clash between them would be suicidal. Mr. Ball said General Lemnitzer was bearish on this idea because he did not feel the Greek military had much influence over its political leaders. His previous talks with them had netted little. However, the NAC will be meeting 8 July and we expect a strong Canadian challenge to the Greeks based on reports that Greek NATO units and materiel are now on Cyprus. Both Secretaries McNamara and Ball, however, favored instructing General Lemnitzer to go ahead and tell the Turk and Greek military again what we have told the political leaders. While Papandreou seems to have absorbed the President's warning, the military leaders still apparently feel that we will stop a Turk invasion and that no move they make really risks a direct Greek-Turk confrontation.

The President asked General Wheeler whether we have taken into account the demands that a Turkish invasion would place on NATO. General Wheeler

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felt we had examined the consequences carefully. He was concerned particularly about how the Turks would receive a direct US rebuff. However, he did not feel Turkey would "fall into the Soviet Bloc." He felt the strength of Greek Communists made Greece potentially very unstable. Ultimately he saw both Greece and Turkey lost to NATO if hostilities were permitted to go on very long.

The Attorney General suggested another approach. He asked about the possibility of organizing an effort to explain to influential elements other than the military and government in Greece and Turkey what the situation would be if either country took the steps it is contemplating. In other words, would the Turks like the situation that would exist after they secured a beachhead on Cyprus--carnage in the Turk Cypriot villages, world opinion against them, Greece less willing than ever to negotiate a settlement? Would the Greeks welcome a Turk foothold on Cyprus, the economic disruption of a Greek-Turk war, possibly defeat of Greek forces? Wouldn't there be some deterrent effect in getting across to influential Greeks and Turks an objective analysis of the situation they will have to cope with if they don't negotiate now?

Mr. Bundy asked Mr. Ball whether we could not do this sort of thing through our embassies. He felt that embassy involvement might create a clearer view in Ankara and Athens of our concern. Mr. Ball felt that it would be very difficult to do anything of this kind publicly because of the irrational atmosphere in both capitals. Anything we do, he said, gives the appearance of our working for the other side. For instance, if we described the terrible consequences of a Greek-Turk war, the Greeks would simply ask why, then, we would refuse to stop a Turk invasion.

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When the President asked how much of the position we took in the Washington talks has "dribbled down to the Greek and Turk populace", Mr. Ball said that the average Greek thinks we're holding the gun of a Turk invasion at Greek heads to force a deal. The Turks feel that, because we restrained their invasion, we're pro-Greek. So the people have very stereotyped views of our position. In the current hysterical atmosphere, it is very difficult to put across a reasonable explanation of our goals.

Secretary McNamara asked whether we couldn't stimulate leading Greek citizens to brief their own press and make it more aware of the consequences of the present course of events. For instance, could we get Onassis and others

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3.4(c)(1) of his importance to explain the economic consequences of provoking a  
Greek-Turk war?

The Attorney General said he did not see any objection to our being associated with such an effort. He felt that we would be talking simply about the facts of a potential situation, not about controversial positions. Mr. Bundy asked Mr. Ball how painful it might be if such a campaign came out of Paris -- from NAC members and NATO officers there. Mr. Ball agreed that the farther from Washington the better and pointed out that the UN Secretary General could also do some of this if he would.

Mr. Bundy wrapped up this part of the discussion by suggesting to the President that we draw up a program for mounting such a campaign just to see what it looks like. The President instructed him to do so with the help of the agencies involved.

Mr. Bundy then moved to the problem of how we get the Geneva talks going. He felt that the Greeks could get what they wanted if they would just sit down and talk and asked whether we shouldn't use this argument with them. Secretary Ball said he had done just this during his luncheon with Papandreou. However, he pointed out that it is difficult to carry this argument much further than private conversations because the Turks could easily construe it as a US-Greek deal.

Mr. McCone asked whether the real problem wasn't what the Turks would get out of these talks rather than how we could satisfy the Greeks. He said he hadn't seen any evidence of a formula that would meet Turk needs. Mr. Ball said he felt we could put together a package which the Turks would think pretty good if we could once get the two parties together.

The President returned to the question of how we might bring pressure to bear on the two governments. He asked Mr. Wilson how seriously concerned the people of each country are about what is going on. Mr. Wilson responded that the people of Turkey particularly are frustrated by their government's inability to act in the current situation and pointed out the danger that such frustration would lead to impulsive action. He did not feel, however, that the people had thought through the consequences of a Turkish invasion. He felt we could draw up a list of people in Paris, Athens, and Ankara who might be useful in creating a more realistic view of the consequences of invasion.

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Mr. Talbot brought the discussion back to Geneva by pointing out that we can't count on the Greeks to act in their own best interests. We can't rely simply on a campaign to make people aware of the consequences of their action--especially when they are acting irrationally. Therefore, he felt our best hope was in pushing the negotiations in Geneva.

The President reacted by saying if we are to succeed there we will need more power than we have had to date. We did our best during the Washington talks to convince both Greeks and Turks to negotiate. Now we are going to make another approach to the Turk military in an effort to get them to throw their weight into the scales on the side of moderation. He saw no reason why we should not explore every way of getting a reasonable view of the situation across to important people in both countries.

In conclusion, the President outlined two courses of action: (a) our military in Paris would make clear to the Greek and Turk military what consequences they could anticipate if either nation moved militarily; (b) we should also draw up a plan for getting this understanding across to as many influential people in both countries as possible.

With that the meeting adjourned.

Attach.

Tab A - Attendance List

Tab B - State Memorandum for President

sgnd Ball for NSC Mtg 7 July 12 Noon

Tab C - TS Briefing Paper on Cyprus for NSC

by Lt. Gen. Burchinal, Director, Joint Staff

HHS/jk

*Saunders*

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ATTENDANCE LIST FOR THE 535th NSC MEETING  
JULY 7, 1964, AT 12:00 NOON IN THE CABINET ROOM OF  
THE WHITE HOUSE

---

The President of the United States, Presiding

ATTORNEY GENERAL

Robert F. Kennedy

CIA

John A. McCone, Director

DEFENSE

Robert S. McNamara, Secretary  
John McNaughton, Assistant Secretary (ISA)

JCS

General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, Chairman  
Lieut. General David A. Burchinal, Director of the Joint Staff  
Lieut. Col. L. B. Hardy

STATE

George W. Ball, Acting Secretary  
Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary  
Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary

TREASURY

C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary

USIA

Donald Wilson, Deputy Director

WHITE HOUSE

McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President  
Major General Chester V. Clifton, Military Aide to the President  
Jack Valenti, Special Assistant to the President  
Harold Saunders, National Security Council Staff  
Bromley Smith, Executive Secretary, National Security Council

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


NSC Meeting

July 7

12 Noon

Subject: Cyprus

The attached memorandum has been prepared for use in connection with the July 7, 1964 NSC discussion on Cyprus.

  
Acting Secretary

cc: NSC Members

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-307  
By CB, NARA Date 8-4-97

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MEMORANDUM FOR NSC MEETING

Subject: Cyprus

The next six critical weeks may well decide whether there will be war between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. The chances of avoiding conflict may be less than 50%.

This paper describes the forces that may lead to a crisis. It discusses the measures we are taking to try to avoid a series of events that could tear up the whole right wing of NATO.

I.

THE ATMOSPHERE

Greece and Turkey are each committed to finding a Cyprus solution that requires no loss of face. Overhanging the Cyprus issue are two thousand years of Greek-Turkish antipathy. Today events, not people, are in command. Each side is acting a Greek tragedy--obsessed by a sense of the inevitable.

II.

MOTIVATIONS

✓ A. Greece: - The Greeks are convinced that time is on their side. The Turkish position is being progressively eroded. In due course they feel that they will be able to annex Cyprus without the need for any concessions to the Turks. Prime Minister Papandreou was obviously shaken by the President's argument that he must find a peaceful settlement and by his statement that the United States would not oppose a Turkish move by force.

✓ B. Turkey: - The Turks recognize that they are steadily losing. Prime Minister Inonu and the responsible leaders in the Government know the costs and dangers of a military intervention. Yet if they lose further ground to the Greeks and the hope of an acceptable settlement continues to fade, they will be under irresistible pressures to exercise what they regard as their valid treaty rights

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of unilateral intervention.

### III EVENTS THAT MAY TRIGGER MILITARY ACTION

Two kinds of events may lead the Turks to undertake military action against Cyprus:

(a) The breakdown of the Geneva talks--which would destroy the hope of a political solution; and

(b) events on the Island prejudicial to the Turks or the Turk-Cypriots.

#### A. Breakdown at Geneva

If the Greek representative at Geneva shows no flexibility, Prime Minister Inonu will be deprived of his last argument against invasion. The Turks stood down action on June 5 in the hope that the United States would be able to provide them an alternative in the form of a political solution. This hope will vanish if the talks break down--or if, after some weeks, they clearly appear to be leading nowhere.

#### B. Events on the Island

For the last several weeks the Greek Government has been surreptitiously introducing into Cyprus not only equipment but officers and men of the Greek Army. Intelligence estimates indicate that there may be as many as 4,000 there now (including the treaty-authorized contingent). Since the Greek-Cypriots control the ports and airfields, this infiltration is easily achieved.

*5000-7000  
any more*  
✓ The Turks are also sending in "volunteers" from the mainland. Since they must be landed on the coast in small boats, the number introduced so far probably does not exceed 1,500 (including the treaty contingent).

✓ Turkish awareness that the Greek buildup is far outrunning their own is producing mounting anxiety. The activities of General Grivas--who is organizing an armed force of Greek Cypriots that is expected ultimately to total 30 to 35 thousand men and who is publicly proclaiming the advent of enosis--further contributes to Turkish disquiet.

✓ These developments threaten the Turk Cypriots with two possibilities: (a) the danger that when the Greek strength is deemed adequate General Grivas may take over the government and announce a plebiscite to bring about immediate enosis (union with Greece) as an accomplished fact and (b) the danger that growing Greek military strength on the Island will substantially increase the cost of Turkish intervention.

✓ The continued preoccupation with these two possibilities may increase the pressure for a Turkish intervention now. At the same time, the buildup of military forces on both sides could reach the flash point, causing an incident that would have chain reactions all over the Island. In addition, there is the chance that, if the Turkish Cypriots become convinced that increasing Greek superiority is diminishing the possibility of intervention, they may provoke an incident. There is evidence that they are developing a Gotterdammerung spirit.

#### IV

#### THE LIKELY COURSE OF MILITARY ACTION

The DOD will be prepared to make a military presentation at the NSC meeting.

Intelligence shows that the military action contemplated by Turkey would be limited in character permitting the Turkish forces to establish a substantial beachhead and thus--in the Turk's own view--provide them with an improved bargaining position in their efforts to obtain a partition (double enosis) solution.

The essential points are:

- (a) The Turks have the capability for establishing a substantial beachhead in the area around Kyrenia and securing the pass that dominates the Nicosia Plain;
- (b) They might be able to exercise some deterrent effect on Greek-Cypriot reprisals against the Turk-Cypriot population by threatening air action against Greek-Cypriots.

To put the full Turkish 39th Division ashore, however, with its equipment would require at least a week.

V.

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES

Our objectives are twofold:

- ✓ (a) To do everything possible to avoid a military collision between two of our NATO allies by bringing about an agreed settlement; and
- ✓ (b) If a Turkish military intervention does occur, to assure the taking of measures to minimize the bloodshed, limit escalation, and restrict the damage to the NATO Alliance.

A. Bringing About an Agreed Solution

The only realistic possibility of a political solution is through a deal between the Greek and Turkish Governments. If Greece and Turkey can be brought together, the Greek Government should be able to handle the Government of Cyprus. However, the search for a solution will be rendered almost impossible if Makarios is brought into the negotiations before Athens and Ankara have reached a meeting of the minds. His Beatitude has shown by his conduct that he does not want a negotiated solution. He wants a unitary Cypriot state in which the Turk-Cypriot minority would be submerged. He is prepared to play games with the USSR and the Afro-Asian Bloc to achieve this--even at the risk of creating another Cuba.

We have, therefore, concentrated on pressing for a negotiation between Greece and Turkey, as the two responsible governments most directly concerned.

The President emphasized to Prime Minister Papandreou that unless he negotiated with the Turks he ran the risk of precipitating a disastrous war. At the same time he emphasized to Prime Minister Inonu that a military action against Cyprus could yield nothing but calamity.



The pressure on these two Prime Ministers resulted in an agreement to undertake negotiations at Geneva under conditions where--with luck--the United States could continue to apply pressure to both sides. The Greek and Turkish Governments has each named a representative to meet with the UN Mediator. The President has sent Mr. Dean Acheson to Geneva to advise and assist the Mediator and to conduct discussions with the two representatives.

B. Possible Shape of Settlement

The Greek Government is publicly committed to the achievement of enosis (the union of Cyprus with Greece). So long as the Greek Government pursues this line the Turkish Government will continue to insist upon double enosis (partition with the two parts uniting with the respective metropolises).

The United States has so far refused to put forward any solution. It has, however, proposed the following specifications which a solution should fulfill:

1. It should come about with the full approval of both Greece and Turkey;
2. It should be permanent;
3. It should leave Cyprus in responsible hands;
4. It should involve no humiliation to either side;
5. It cannot in the nature of things be entirely satisfactory to either side;
6. It should be broadly acceptable to the population involved.

We have, of course, studied a wide range of possible solutions. On the basis of these studies Mr. Acheson will be in position to propose various elements for inclusion in a final package--if that proves advisable at Geneva.

C. Ancillary Measures in Support of Negotiation

In support of the Geneva negotiations, we are seeking to bring about additional pressure on both sides through--

- (a) enlisting the aid of our other NATO allies;
- (b) arranging for military discussions between General Lemnitzer as SACEUR and the top military of Greece, Turkey and other NATO countries;
- (c) exploring all available channels to key individuals having influence on Greek policy (Onassis, Niarchos, etc.) in order to impress on them the serious economic consequences of letting the Cyprus problem remain unresolved; and
- (d) conducting tripartite talks with the British and Canadians (to be held in Washington on Thursday).

VI  
MEASURES TO MINIMIZE CONSEQUENCES  
OF TURKISH MILITARY INTERVENTION

✓ A. Contingency Plans

We have developed extensive contingency planning designed to minimize the consequences of a Turkish intervention.

This planning includes the following:

- ✓ (1) The use of the Security Council to limit the conflict through such measures as a ceasefire, a stand-still, the employment of the UN peacekeeping force to maintain the ceasefire, a call for immediate negotiations, and an appeal for nonintervention by other states.
- (2) An emergency NATO Foreign Ministers meeting to mobilize support for containing the hostilities and for a negotiated settlement.
- ✓ (3) The development of a plan for action by the UN force on the Island to minimize bloodshed by protecting threatened elements of the population in pre-planned safe havens. (This will be discussed with the British and the Canadians on Thursday and we have alerted our posts in other countries contributing components to the UN force in preparation for discussions at the appropriate time.

✓ (4) We have sent a mission to Athens to update the arrangements for evacuating Americans (including tourists) from Greece in the event that a Turkish intervention precipitates a wave of anti-American feeling.

✓ (5) We are reviewing plans for evacuating Americans from Ankara and Nicosia and are perfecting arrangements for protecting Embassy property in all three capitals. *and Athens*

B. Measures to Prevent Greek-Turkish Collision

Should the Turks move we would seek to avoid a collision with the Greeks by diplomatic moves designed to keep their armed forces apart. There might be considerable delay before Greek national forces could engage Turkish national forces in substantial strength-- although the existence of Greek national elements on Cyprus today renders an ultimate avoidance of a clash less possible.

In any event, we should seek to dissuade the Greeks from attempting to attack Turkish forces while the Security Council is arranging a ceasefire. We should be under no illusions that this will be easy to achieve, even if we can secure the full cooperation of the other NATO powers.

C. Use of Sixth Fleet and other U.S. Military Forces

The President made it clear to Prime Minister Papandreou that we do not propose to use U.S. military force to prevent a Turkish military action against Cyprus. Nor do we intend to use the Sixth Fleet to roll back a Turkish beachhead once achieved.

Plans should, however, be made to ready U.S. military forces for precautionary moves in the event of Soviet intervention and for the evacuation of American personnel.

Our best estimate is that while the Soviet Union would join in deploring the Turks' military intervention and would no doubt utter threats against the Turks, it would not engage its own forces in any Cyprus crisis. We cannot, however, ignore the possibility that Moscow might seek to exploit this crisis of NATO through moves elsewhere in the world, i.e., Cuba, Berlin, etc.

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Briefing on Cyprus for National Security  
Council by Lt General Burchinal, Director, Joint Staff

Mr. President, Gentlemen:

Since the threatened Turkish invasion of Cyprus was postponed on 5 June, emphasis has shifted from the military to the political arena. The threat of the use of force in reaching a solution, however, still exists.

Since this threat does exist, it may be well to review the major forces in the area and attempt to make some predictions of what might happen if the Turks should invade Cyprus.

CHART #1

This chart depicts the Turkish order of battle and shows the Turks to have

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1.5(b)  
3.4(b)(6)

distributed as indicated.

Also shown are major units of the Turk Navy.

[REDACTED]

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CHART #2


This chart gives the Greek order of battle.

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### CHART #3

On Cyprus, the UN Peacekeeping Force is disposed in the zones shown on this chart. The total strength is approximately 6,000. Also on Cyprus, as provided by the Treaty of 1960, are a Greek Army battalion of 950, camped near Nicosia, and a Turkish Army battalion of 650, camped along the Nicosia-Kyrenia road north of Nicosia. British forces on the island, not committed to the UN peacekeeping effort, total approximately 13,000 British Army and Royal Air Force personnel, located in the British Sovereign Base Areas in the south.

It is estimated that there are approximately 10,000 armed Turkish Cypriots whose weapons range from shotguns through automatic weapons to mortars. Their actions are controlled from Nicosia by a very efficient radio network which has stations at all of the outlying posts as well as on the mainland.

Armed Greek Cypriots number approximately 30,000 and are now referred to as the Greek Cypriot Emergency Force. It includes the:

1. Cyprus Army - 




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The Greek Cypriot community apparently has a plentiful supply of small arms, mortars, machine guns, bazookas, and ammunition for those weapons. In addition, they have some armored vehicles, light aircraft and helicopters.

So much for the forces available in the area. Let us now turn our attention to the predictable consequences of a landing of Turkish forces on Cyprus.

The only Turkish ground force which has been prepared for an invasion of Cyprus is the



This division probably could be landed on the north coast of Cyprus against Greek Cypriot opposition and probably would be able to seize and hold a sizable area in the vicinity of the beachhead. It would not be able to gain control of the entire island. Because of a dearth of amphibious craft and the need to conduct shuttle operations from Turkey, the landing of the entire division with its artillery, transport and other impedimenta would be slow and possibly would require

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approximately one week. Initial elements, however, would start landing approximately 12 hours after getting underway from [REDACTED] 1.5(b)  
3.4(b)(6)

Three areas on Cyprus have been reported as possible landing areas for a Turkish invasion force. Each area has its advantages and disadvantages. Mansoura on the northwest coast of the island has the advantage of being in the hands of Turkish Cypriots but it lacks landing facilities. Famagusta has the only real port facilities on the island but the port is controlled by the Greek Cypriots who might be able to sabotage the facilities or bottle up the entrance to the harbor on the approach of a Turkish invasion force. Beach areas north and south of Famagusta, while suitable for amphibious landings, offer no military objective unless Famagusta port facilities could be secured undamaged at the same time. Although it is insignificant as a port, Kyrenia on the north coast has the advantage of being close to Turkey, only 16 miles from Nicosia and its major airport, adjacent to several small beaches and two rough airstrips, near the Turkish army contingent on the island, and in the area which can be defended. Thus, while a Turkish force might attempt to land at other areas on Cyprus and there might be diversions at those areas, it appears that the Turks would most likely select Kyrenia as their objective area. The Greek Cypriots appear to be

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aware of the possible use of Kyrenia by Turkish invasion forces and have tried to eliminate or neutralize the Turkish Cypriot irregular force in the area of the Kyrenia pass south of Kyrenia.

In the event the Turks should decide to invade at Kyrenia, the Turkish Air Force would provide support to the Turkish Cypriot irregulars who would have the mission of preventing the Greek Cypriots from disrupting the Turkish landing.

1.5(b)  
3.4(b)(6)

The Turkish Army contingent on Cyprus probably would be used to prevent the Greek Army contingent from moving north to the landing area. Thus the Turkish invaders would have a marked superiority of force in the area and the Greek Cypriot forces would be able only to confuse and slow the invasion, not stop it.

The Turks might hope that their initial landing would be peaceful and would fire only if fired upon. However, they would have their naval gunfire and fighter aircraft available if required. A first objective would be to secure the landing area from aimed small arms and crew served weapons fire. Thus, they would attempt to extend their beachhead at least a mile in all directions. Since they would want to

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link up with their Army contingent on the Nicosia road and gain complete control of the two airstrips they would probably extend the southern limit of their beachhead another four miles to include Kyrenia Pass. With luck, they might be able to achieve this objective by nightfall of the first day and expand the beachhead about five miles to the east and west on the following day. The next two or three days would be used to defend and build up the beachhead. Assuming covering fire from the Turkish air and naval arms and good weather, most of the 39th Division would be ashore in four or five days and the remainder, including all troops, artillery, armor and transport, in six or seven.

The Turks might be tempted to dispatch units from the beachhead during the build up phase in order to rescue Turkish Cypriots under attack by the Greek Cypriots. In view of the possibility that such rescue forces would be ambushed, however, the Turks might decide to take reprisals by air raids instead. In addition, there are numerous, well-armed Turkish Cypriot forces with excellent communications and discipline which could be used by the Turks to take reprisals in kind.

There has been a steady increase in the number of Greek troops and heavy equipment transported covertly on to the island. While the presence of these troops has served to discipline the irregular forces and thus curtail communal bloodshed they

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have the important mission of organizing the irregular force and assisting them in defense of Cyprus against a Turkish invasion. Their capability for this mission is increasing daily. Accordingly, while the Turks could land and hold an area by the use of air and naval gunfire, unless they increased significantly the force they have earmarked for an invasion it is doubtful they could expand their beachhead much beyond the area discussed.

Next, let us inquire into what actions might take place on Cyprus at the time of, and following, an invasion. First,

1.5(b)  
3.4(b)(6)

Turk Cypriots would assist the Turk invasion forces as much as possible. Greek Cypriots would oppose the invasion and would probably succeed in containing the beachhead within certain

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limits since it is expected that the Turks would use only one division and not attempt to seize the entire island. Of course, it is possible that attacks by Greek Cypriots on Turk Cypriots all over the island would result in the slaughter of thousands of Turkish Cypriots. However, fear of retribution at the hands of the Turk Army and Air Force may restrain the Greek Cypriots. Certainly it would be wise to urge such restraint upon President Makarios and General Grivas, and point out that a massacre of Turk Cypriots would surely work very much to their disadvantage.

Let us consider the likelihood of a Greek attempt to reinforce Cyprus after a Turkish invasion.

The Turks have the capability of establishing and maintaining air superiority over the island of Cyprus from air bases in Turkey. Additionally, the Turks have the capability of maintaining control of the seas around the island. With this air and sea control the Turks would have complete freedom of action on the island and, if desired, could build up to a strength of several divisions. Thus, Any Greek attempt to reinforce Cyprus would end in disaster to Greek forces.

An outbreak of fighting between Greek and Turkish forces in Thrace would have predictable consequences as follows:

1.5(b)  
3.4(b)(6)




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1.5(b)  
3.4(b)(b)



Forces of both sides have the mission of defending against an attack from the north and would require considerable reorientation before being in a position to launch an attack against the other. The Maritsa River boundary is a major obstacle to each side. In addition, the lower reaches of the river are quite marshy. The terrain in Greece from the Maritsa River toward the west is well suited for defense. With the exception of the marshes, the Turkish terrain from the Maritsa River to Catalca (25 miles west of Istanbul) is a plain with a nearly level to rolling surface. Thus, the Turkish superiority in divisions is balanced by the suitability of the Turkish terrain for offensive operations against it, while the Greek inferiority in divisions is offset in part by the suitability of the Greek terrain for its defense. Disregarding outside influencing factors such as apprehension over Bulgarian military moves, if the Greeks or Turks attacked the other in Thrace it is doubtful if either force could advance very far. Hostilities would more likely be confined to raids, including air, crossborder and amphibious.

Let us finally consider what military actions the Soviet Bloc might take.

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
There are no intelligence indications that the Soviet Bloc will take military actions if a Turkish-Greek war materializes. Bloc forces have the capability to invade in Thrace or Eastern Turkey. If such Soviet Bloc actions occur the United States and NATO will be faced with grave problems. The Soviets most likely believe that greater advantages would accrue from a policy of limiting their actions to the continued political and propaganda support of the Greek Cypriots with the hope that the conflict would result in the ultimate disintegration of NATO.

In summary, neither Turkey nor Greece is mobilized for all-out war. Each has the potential of inflicting grave damage on the other and, in the event of war between the two countries, the viability of both NATO and CENTO would be jeopardized. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the solution to the Cyprus problem must be found in the political arena and that there is no military action available to any of the parties concerned that will not worsen the problem.

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July 7, 1964


MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT


At the NSC meeting, State and Defense will explain where we are and describe contingency plans in case the Turks invade. Only the last two pages of their paper (attached) deal with what we do next. You might want to concentrate on two points:

1. We can't let Geneva talks fail. State's paper (pp. 5-6, para. c) notes what they'll do this week to support Acheson, but a pep talk from you will increase their sense of urgency. The Greeks know time is on their side. Grivas is already campaigning for enosis. They figure the worst they can come out with is a UN debate ending in a blessing for self-determination, which would result in enosis. So the big problem is to get something for the Turks out of the Geneva talks. Our failure (1) could trigger a Turk invasion and (2) would ruin our position in Ankara.

2. Spur efforts to keep peace on Cyprus. State-Defense planning focuses on how to minimize the consequences of a Turk invasion. However, we ought to be thinking, too, about what more we might do, if anything, to keep violence from breaking out on Cyprus itself. Belcher got assurance from Makarios last week that the Greeks wouldn't attack the Turks. But we can't trust Makarios, and besides he could make political moves that would provoke a Turk rebellion.



McGeorge Bundy



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July 7, 1964

McGB:

Here's a short memo for the President on the NSC meeting to cover State's paper if you want. The paper says the situation on the island could trigger a Turk invasion but concentrates on what we do after invasion--not on what we might do to prevent a blowup.

Talbot is double-checking with Ball whether we should try to put the subject of this NSC meeting on the record somehow as another means of warning the Greeks. I'll let you know their feelings.

*Hal*  
HHS

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 90-134  
Re sig NARA. Date 1-3-91

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July 6, 1964

*Smith*  
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in the  
Cabinet Room of the White House  
On Tuesday, July 7, 1964 at  
12:00 Noon

Item 1 -- CYPRUS

(Presentation by the Acting Secretary  
of State.)

535th NSC Meeting

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