

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 report	record of actions NLS 84-139 secret <i>open 6-12-84</i> <i>1 p</i>	07/28/64	A
#5 report	summary record on National Security Meeting No. 536 top secret <i>sanitized 8-9-85 NLS 84-140 4 p</i> more info released 6-2-93 NLS 92-45	<i>open 12-7-99</i> 07/28/64 <i>NLS 98-#25</i>	A
#7 cable	Saigon 235 secret <i>2 p</i>	07/28/64	A
#9 memo	to Bromley Smith from Major Duffield top secret <i>1 p</i>	08/14/64	A
#9a report	re: Viet Cong <i>sanitized 10-30-84 NLS 84-741</i> top secret <i>4 p</i> <i>more released NLS 93-479</i> <i>same sanitization 3/04</i>	undated	A
#11 memo	to Sec. Def from Gen. Wheeler top secret <i>open 4-25-84 NLS 84-138 12 p</i>	07/27/64	A
#13 memo	to the President from John McCone top secret <i>sanitized 12-2</i> <i>4 p</i> <i>open 6-17-94 NLS 93-463</i>	07/28/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, National Security Council File
 NSC Meetings, Vol. 2 Tab 9, 7/28/64, Ninth OAS Foreign
 Ministers Meeting; Cyprus: Mainland Southeast Asia

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



SERVICE SET

2

ATTENDANCE LIST FOR THE 536th NSC MEETING
JULY 28, 1964, AT 12:15 IN THE CABINET ROOM
OF THE WHITE HOUSE

The President of the United States, Presiding

CIA

John A. McCone, Director

DEFENSE

Robert S. McNamara, Secretary
Cyrus Vance, Deputy Secretary

JCS

General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, Chairman

OEP

Edward A. McDermott, Director

STATE

Dean Rusk, Secretary
George W. Ball, Under Secretary
Averell Harriman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson
Marshall Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Far East

TREASURY

C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary

USIA

Carl T. Rowan, Director

WHITE HOUSE

George Reedy, Press Secretary to the President
McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Bill Moyers, Assistant to the President
Jack Valenti, Special Assistant to the President
Walter Jenkins, Special Assistant to the President
Douglass Cater, Special Assistant to the President
Bromley Smith, Executive Secretary, National Security Council

ATTENDANCE LIST FOR THE 536th NSC MEETING
JULY 28, 1964, AT 12:15 IN THE CABINET ROOM OF
THE WHITE HOUSE

The President of the United States, Presiding

CIA

John A. McCone, Director

DEFENSE

Robert S. McNamara, Secretary

Cyrus Vance, Deputy Secretary

John McNaughton, Assistant Secretary (ISA)

JCS

General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman, USA

OEP

Edward A. McDermott, Director

STATE

Dean Rusk, Secretary

George W. Ball, Under Secretary

Averell Harriman, Under Secretary

Llewellyn Thompson, Ambassador at Large

Marshall Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Far East

USIA

Carl Rowan, Director

WHITE HOUSE

Douglas Cater

George Reedy

McGeorge Bundy

Bromley Smith

4

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

RECORD OF ACTIONS

NSC
Action

2492. NINTH OAS FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

Noted a summary by Secretary of State Rusk of the recent OAS Foreign Ministers meeting which dealt with the problem of Cuban aggression in this Hemisphere.

2493. CYPRUS

Noted a briefing by Under Secretary of State Ball on the negotiations in Geneva with Greek and Turkish representatives which, if successful, could lead to a settlement of the Cyprus problem.

2494. MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA

Following a review of recent political and military developments in Laos and South Vietnam, discussed the advantages and disadvantages of possible U. S. military actions which could be undertaken in the immediate future.

July 28, 1964
536th NSC Meeting
NSC Actions 2492, 2493 & 2494

~~SECRET~~

NSC Control No. 174

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 84-139

By acs, SRS, Date 6-12-84

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-425

~~TOP SECRET~~

By is, NARA Date 10-6-99

Summary Record on National Security Meeting No. 536
July 28, 1964 -- Ninth Foreign Ministers Meeting; Cyprus,
Mainland China

Secretary Rusk reported on the recent meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States, which was convened to deal with Cuban subversion in this Hemisphere, especially the shipment by Cuba of arms to Venezuela. Secretary Rusk summarized the Resolution adopted by the Foreign Ministers. The major advance is the agreed definition of "subversion" as "aggression". Secretary Rusk made the following points:

1. The United States did not press Mexico to break its air link to Cuba because this is the last remaining airline operating between Havana and the mainland.
2. The clause in the Resolution calling on non-OAS States to join with States in the Hemisphere in taking measures against Cuba is of major importance.
3. Chile, Uruguay and Bolivia may comply with the Resolution and break relations with Cuba. What Mexico will do remains in doubt.
4. An important achievement was to handle discussion in the meeting so that it did not become a United States versus Latin America contest. Emphasis was kept on the threat to Venezuela arising out of the shipment of arms by Cuba.
5. The United States avoided arm-twisting.
6. We hope the message contained in the Resolution will get through to Castro, as the Punte del Este Resolution did not.
7. The meeting was a success from our point of view. It was impossible to obtain unanimous agreement on the Resolution but Brazil, contrary to earlier meetings, played a constructive role.

CYPRUS

At the request of the President, Under Secretary Ball summarized the current situation on Cyprus:

1. We put money in the bank with passing of every week without serious fighting on the Island.
2. Progress is being made in the Geneva negotiations being conducted by Dean Acheson. These talks are in their second round. Acheson has managed to establish close relations with both-

~~TOP SECRET~~ - CODEWORD

SERVICE SET

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

the greek and turkish representatives. The talks will have to enter the third round before we know exactly how they will come out. The real problem consists of getting Makarios to accept an agreed Greek-Turkish solution.

3. We are using the NATO structure in an effort to gain some hold on the military buildup on the Island of both Greek and Turkish forces.

4. We are making a serious effort to build up the UN forces in Cyprus and prompt the UN officers there to act with firmness in holding down fighting.

5. Every effort is being made to play down the Geneva talks. Acheson is working quietly and without press attention. The talks are being carried on under the cover of the UN Mediator who is cooperating in this tactic. We have a moderately hopeful attitude toward the possibility of a solution of the problem.

McGeorge Bundy pointed out the importance of not letting the press know of our current optimism. It was agreed that no optimistic noises should be made to the press.

LAOS

Under Secretary Ball reviewed negotiations for a possible 14-Nation conference on Laos. The Soviets, in a note, have indicated they do not want to continue as a Co-chairman of the Laos International Control Commission if a 14-Nation conference is not arranged or if there is escalation of the fighting in Laos. Mr. Ball reported that Ambassador Taylor had succeeded in cooling off General Kahn on his public campaign to "move North". He said Taylor had told Kahn of our willingness in joint planning of the military measures prerequisite to extending the war beyond South Vietnam. With respect to morale in the South Vietnamese Army, Mr. Ball referred to Telegram No. 235 from Saigon (attached). ^{TAB} This telegram is a report of interviews conducted by General Westmoreland's officers with South Vietnamese leaders. The conclusion is that the morale in general remains good to excellent.

Secretary Rusk noted that UK Foreign Minister Butler had held several conversations with Khrushchev in Moscow. As soon as we know what went on in these conversations we may well need to take a long range look at our mainland Southeast Asia policy.

~~TOP SECRET CODEWORD~~

SERVICE SET

Secretary McNamara, speaking from the attached paper, ^{TAB} emphasized that Viet Cong actions had reached a new high in July, including the highest number of weapons lost by the South Vietnamese to the Viet Cong. It has been a difficult month, but the increased Viet Cong activity has not affected the morale of the lower commands. Secretary McNamara read sizeable extracts from General Taylor's telegram referred to by Mr. Ball. He said Taylor's report had dampened his fears and he was not now asking the President to approve any new actions. He said he was opposed to additional actions in the Panhandle, adding that the Joint Chiefs are also opposed to new actions now.

In response to the President's request, General Taylor summarized the attached JCS paper. ^{TAB} The Chiefs have concluded that of all the actions suggested, there are only the following three categories of limited actions which would be feasible:

1. Air strikes in the Panhandle which would reduce but not stop movement of men and supplies through Laos to South Vietnam. However, such strikes would convey a strong signal to Hanoi.
2. Cross border ground operations which would not stop the traffic but would reduce it.
3. Attack by South Vietnamese into North Vietnam which would be an extension of modest ^{PROGRAMS} ~~progress~~ now being implemented.

General Wheeler said one objective would be to avoid triggering a Communist Chinese or a North Vietnamese reaction to measures we undertake. Therefore, the Chiefs did not favor sending backup forces into the area if they were merely to stand by and not be used. The three types of actions discussed above could be done but should be done in such a way as to ^{AVOID} ~~free~~ any slow-down of the pacification program. None of the actions would be very effective. In addition, the political effect of taking these actions might be counter productive. The Chiefs do not favor taking any of the suggested actions until they have obtained from the field the views of those on the ground as to the feasibility and usefulness of the proposed actions.

General Wheeler said Operation Triangle was going forward slowly because of the difficult terrain and the necessity of resupplying Loatian forces by air. He estimated that we would not be getting meaningful reports of the action for 24 to 28 hours.

McGeorge Bundy said he wished to call to the President's attention the difference of view as to whether napalm should be given to the

~~TOP SECRET~~

-4-

the Laotians for use in Operation Triangle. Ambassador Unger has recommended that we grant permission. The view in Washington is that we should not make napalm available to the Laotians in the present touchy political situation unless the fighting in Laos becomes critical. The purpose of withholding napalm would be to avoid complicating the current negotiations involving Laos.

Under Secretary Harriman said the British opposed our giving napalm to the Laotians. Foreign Minister Butler is in Moscow and if napalm were used his talks there might be complicated. In addition, Harriman doubts the effectiveness of napalm when used by soldiers inexperienced in its use.

Secretary Rusk agreed that we should delay the use of napalm for a few days but pointed out that after Foreign Minister Butler leaves Moscow, and if the fighting becomes serious in Laos, we should no longer maintain our opposition to the use of this weapon.

Director McCone summarized the attached estimate. ^{TAB} In general he said he agreed with views expressed by General Wheeler. He emphasized that the risk of escalation of the fighting in Southeast Asia was not so great as to call for a deployment of additional United States forces to the area.

Under Secretary Harriman, in response to the President's question, said that there was very little to report on developments in the Congo. He noted that the new Prime Minister Tshombe had strong appeal to the masses.

Bromley Smith

~~TOP SECRET~~ CODEWORD

SERVICE SET



SERVICE SET

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

Fs 7
Wld

32

~~SECRET~~

Action PP RUEHCR RUEPIA
DE RUMJIR 16A 28/0901Z
SS PR 280843Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
Info TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEKDA/JCS
RUEPIA/CIA
RUEKDA/SEC DEF
STATEHGRNC
BT

021915

1964 JUL 23 AM 7:00

003

~~SECRET~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT (235) INFO CINCPAC 109 WHITE HOUSE
16A JCS 11 CIA 15 SEC DEF 16 FROM SAIGON JULY 28 5PM

E X D I S

IN THE WAKE OF THE ACTUAL AND ALLEGED DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT OVER THE PAST WEEK, GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND SELECTED STAFF OFFICERS INTERVIEWED OVER THE WEEK END SENIOR ADVISORS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. INTERVIEWS HAVE FOCUSED ON THREE PRINCIPAL SUBJECTS: MORALE OF THE TROOPS AND LEADERS; LOYALTY TO KHAMH, TO INCLUDE ANY INDICATION OF COUP PLOTTING; AND THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PROSECUTION OF THE PACIFICATION CFN 235 109 14 11 15 16 28 5PM

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 16A ~~SECRET~~
CAMPAIGN. THE GIST OF MACV APPRAISAL FOLLOWS:

MORALE IN GENERAL REMAINS GOOD TO EXCELLENT AT THE TROOP AND LEADERSHIP LEVELS. MORALE IS DOWN IN A FEW BATTALIONS WHICH HAVE SUFFERED RECENT REVERSALS, BUT THIS CONDITION DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE SPREAD TO ANY MAJOR ELEMENT. MORALE HAS DIPPED AT NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS OF BOTH THE REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES BECAUSE OF REVISED ARRANGEMENTS NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION WHICH WILL DIMINISH THE AUTHORITY OF THESE HEADQUARTERS.

NO EVIDENCE OF LACK OF LOYALTY TO KHAMH WAS DISCLOSED, NOR DO THE ADVISORS HAVE REPORTS OF COUP PLOTTING OR RUMORS. SOME LEADERS HAVE EXPRESSED REGRET THAT THE COUNTRY HAS NOT RAPIDLY RALLIED BEHIND KHAMH.

THE COMMANDERS OF I CORPS AND THE 1ST DIVISION EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT THE WAR CAN BE ENDED SOLELY THROUGH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM. THEY FEEL THAT AN ATTACK ON NORTH VIETNAM MUST TAKE PLACE. THE CORPS COMMANDER BELIEVES THAT HE NOW HAS

DECLASSIFIED	1-21-77
By DCH	NARS, Date 11-22-82

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

-2- 235, JULY 28, 5 PM, FROM SAIGON

RESTORED THE SITUATION BUT IS NOT CONFIDENT THAT HE CAN WIN IN HIS AREA SO LONG AS THE VIET CONG ARE CONTINUALLY REINFORCED FROM OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY. THE DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE VNAF WING STATIONED AT DANANG IS CONVINCED THAT AIR ATTACKS ON NORTH CFN 1ST

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 16A ~~SECRET~~
VIETNAM MUST BE CARRIED OUT NOW; IN THIS POSITION HE OBVIOUSLY REFLECTS THE VIEWS OF GENERAL KY, CSAF. ELSEWHERE IN COUNTRY, THE LEADERS HAVE EVIDENCED NO DESIRE TO CHANGE THE METHOD OF PROSECUTION OF THE WAR, NOR IS A SENSE OF PESSIMISM OVER THE OUTLOOK FOR PACIFICATION PROGRESS APPARENT. AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED, SEVERAL COMMANDERS (FOR EXAMPLE GENERAL HON OF THE 5TH DIVISION) FEEL THAT ASSIGNED FORCES ARE INADEQUATE TO THE TOTAL TASK, BUT THE GENERAL ATTITUDE IS ONE OF CONFIDENCE THAT THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM WILL WORK, AND THAT THE JOB AT HAND MUST BE MUCH FURTHER ALONG BEFORE FORCES CAN BE DIVERTED FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST THE NORTH.

THIS SURVEY WAS PATENTLY NOT AN INVESTIGATION IN DEPTH. THE IMPRESSIONS DESCRIBED ARE THE CURRENT OPINIONS OF SENIOR ADVISORS BASED ON THEIR DAY TO DAY CONTACTS WITH THEIR COUNTERPARTS. HOWEVER, IF THE RESULTS REFLECT MAJORITY OPINIONS WITHIN THE ARVN COMBAT UNITS, AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND HAS NO REASON TO BELIEVE OTHERWISE THERE IS NO CAUSE FOR SERIOUS CONCERN AT THIS JUNCTURE OVER THE MORALE AND STABILITY OF THE FIELD FORCES. CONTINUOUS REPORTING IS IN EFFECT ON ANY CHANGES OF ATTITUDES WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES. IF ANY IMPORTANT VARIATIONS OCCUR THEY WILL BE REPORTED IMMEDIATELY.

GP-2. TAYLOR
BT
CFN 5TH GP-2

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 7:38 AM, 7/28/64.

~~SECRET~~





DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

9

14 August 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Bromley Smith

SUBJECT: Viet Cong Activity -- January through June 1964

The attached summary of the Viet Cong activity January through June 1964 is the background for Secretary McNamara's remarks at the Security Council Meeting in question.

James I. Duffield
JAMES I. DUFFIELD
MAJOR, USA
Liaison, DIA

1 Atch
Viet Cong Activity (TSHVCCO)
w/charts

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, 012.30
NLJ 93-479
By cb, NARA Date 3-1-96

SERVICE SET

~~TOP SECRET~~

[Redacted]

9a

VIET CONG ACTIVITY -- January Through June 1964

A review of Viet Cong activities in the Republic of Viet-Nam from January to June 1964 supports the conclusion that the Communists are still carrying the war to the government's home grounds.

The monthly average of Viet Cong-initiated incidents for the first six months of this year (2,100) has exceeded that of last year (1,500). The number of such incidents declined slightly in late May and June, but figures for the second week in July indicate a sharp increase.

The Viet Cong have apparently found terrorism to be their most useful tactic. Emphasis on terrorism has increased sharply over the past several months, while the number of armed attacks has decreased. The monthly average for all types of attacks in 1963 was 374; in 1964, 200. The monthly average of large-scale attacks, those of company size or greater, has also steadily declined since mid-1962. In 1963, it was 11; so far this year, seven. There were, however, 12 large-scale Viet Cong actions in June, and this month's total will probably also be higher than average.

The weapons loss ratio has favored the Viet Cong during the past six months, as it had during most of 1963. Government forces have lost about 4,700 weapons; the Viet Cong, about 2,600. If the Communists recovered only 70 per cent of those lost by the government so far this year, they will have added almost 3,300 to their inventory. At least 40 of these were probably crew-served, and the balance were individual arms. Although the Viet Cong lost 2,600 weapons during the same period, the majority were of low quality compared to those they captured.

1.5(b+c)

[Redacted]

regiment in the border area between Laos and South Viet-Nam, [Redacted] a major Vietnamese tactical operation against the Do Xa Base area, and [Redacted]

[Redacted]

1.5(b+c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

[Redacted]

93-479

CL

3-4-96

SERVICE SET

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED] 1.5(b+c)

1.5(b+c) The number of Viet Cong [REDACTED]

December 1963. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] with the reported infiltration of North Vietnamese Army draftee groups in late May and early June.

1.5(b+c) During the period, two radio stations relocated from the demilitarized zone to the border area between Laos and Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] the group was serving a regimental formation. Although there is no other evidence of a Viet Cong regiment in this area, a new unit may have been deployed there to coordinate infiltration activities.

From January through June, COMUSMACV raised his order-of-battle holdings of regular Viet Cong units by at least four battalions, and four companies. As of 30 June, total Viet Cong hard-core strength was estimated at 24-27,000, including 44 battalions and 92 companies. On 15 July, COMUSMACV estimated hard-core Viet Cong strength at 28-34,000. This last jump was based primarily on refined analysis and does not reflect a sudden increase in Communist forces.


Despite the relative austerity of Viet Cong operations, the insurgents' organization has expanded. For example, a recent COMUSMACV study indicates that the Viet Cong are trying to extract taxes from all sectors of the Vietnamese economy, both foreign and domestic; it was estimated that they collected 325 million piasters (about \$4.5 million at the official rate of exchange) in 1963. A sizable portion of their revenue is obtained from French rubber plantations through "protection" payments and "taxes" on rubber production. Other lucrative sources of revenue are transportation and POL.

In summary, during the first six months of 1964, the Viet Cong continued to build up their main-force units; effectively increased their terrorism of large segments of the rural population; lost fewer weapons; improved their communications structure; and have generally maintained a very high rate of guerrilla activity. (~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED] 1.5(b+c))

COMPARATIVE WEAPON LOSSES



VIET CONG TERRORISM AND ARMED ATTACKS COMPARED



17 July 64 DIA-CIIC


Secret

1.5(bxc)



ON REVERSE OF PAGE


VIET CONG TOTAL INCIDENTS



17 July 64 DIA-CIIC

SECRET

10





~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

JCSM-639-64
27 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Actions Relevant to South Vietnam (U)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered, as requested, those military actions which will:

a. Contribute militarily to the success of the counterinsurgency effort in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN);

b. Reduce the frustration and defeatism of the RVN leaders by undertaking punitive measures against the enemy outside the borders of the RVN;

c. Entail minimum risk of escalatory measures by the enemy; and

d. Require minimum US participation in a combat role.

2. Of the many courses of actions examined, only three fall within the established parameters. These are air strikes against the infiltration routes through Laos into the RVN, cross-border ground operations against the infiltration effort, and selected air missions using non-US unmarked aircraft against prime military targets in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).

3. As to the first, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that air strikes, to include armed reconnaissance missions, against communist installations and traffic in the panhandle of Laos would reduce, but not stop, the flow of support to the Viet Cong and would also signal sharply to Hanoi and Peking that they must pay a higher price to continue the subversion effort. While

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 84-138

By ms, Date 4-25-84

1
Copy of 21 Copies each
of 3 pages series B

~~TOP SECRET~~

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
automatically declassified

~~TOP SECRET~~

such strikes could be mounted with the Vietnamese Air Force alone, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that, to obtain a desirable level of effort and ensure effective US direction of this sensitive operation in both planning and execution, FARM GATE should also be employed. For details see Appendix A hereto.

4. As to the second, reconnaissance and punitive cross-border ground operations into Laos could locate, harass, and, in some cases, destroy communist installations and troop formations. Even moderate success would increase the already sizable problems of the communists in supplying men and material to the Viet Cong and, additionally, would signal Hanoi and Peking. For any worthwhile effort of this kind to be mounted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that US advisors must accompany RVN units. For details see Appendix B hereto.

5. As to the third, over the past several months, a modest, covert, psychological and punitive campaign has been directed against the DRV. However, as yet no air strikes have been mounted. Air missions by unmarked aircraft to mine selected harbors and rivers and to strike prime military targets in DRV could punish the enemy and signal sharply Hanoi and Peking. Non-US air crews would perform these missions. For details see Appendix C hereto.

6. The actions set forth above are not likely to trigger a communist response escalating the conflict in Southeast Asia beyond present levels; therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not recommend moving US combat units into or contiguous to the RVN at this time. Moreover, the introduction of US combat forces which would sit idle could well have a psychological impact on both friends and enemies the reverse of that desired.

7. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that implementation of the limited actions set forth above could prove militarily and psychologically beneficial to the war effort in the RVN, provided they do not siphon off needed resources and distract the attention of the RVN leaders from the counterinsurgency effort. In making this judgment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advise that these actions would not significantly affect communist support of Viet Cong operations in South Vietnam and might have counterproductive results in Laos from a political point of view.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland be queried as to the feasibility and desirability of undertaking the foregoing measures.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachments

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPENDIX A

AIR ACTIONS AGAINST VIET CONG SUPPLY LINES
IN SOUTHERN LAOS

1. Description of Operation - VNAF only. VNAF A-1H aircraft will conduct air strikes against targets in South Laos (and one at Mu Gia pass in North Vietnam) which support VC infiltration into South Vietnam. Initially, targets already identified will be struck. Armed reconnaissance of lines of communications will also be conducted; subsequently additional targets as are developed by both air and ground operations will be struck. The following are pertinent to these air operations:
- a. Targets for initial strikes, estimated sorties per target and armament are set forth in the Annex hereto. Napalm, as the most effective conventional munitions against the targets listed, is set forth as the primary ordnance. If napalm is politically unacceptable, 500-750 lb. bombs and Zumt rockets will be substituted with some reduction in effectiveness. The precise ordnance load and number of sorties should be at the discretion of the field commander.
- b. Results to be expected. Targets are programmed for moderate to severe damage (above 70% damage) which includes destruction of the major portions of barracks and supply dumps and associated buildings, as well as vehicles and guns.
- c. Estimated risk loss. Low, less than 2%.
- d. Readiness and timing. Upon completion of intercountry negotiations involving US, RVN, and RLG and of combined US/RVN operational planning, and depending on the weather, air strikes in the Laos corridor can be undertaken seventy-two hours after implementing order is received.

- e. Effect on Pacification Operations. The effect of VNAF/FARM GATE air operations in Southern Laos on the pacification effort will depend upon the day to day requirements. Currently available operational aircraft in South Vietnam are 53 VNAF A-1H and 15 FARM GATE A-1E, force structures established in the context of the pacification effort. It is estimated that these targets can be destroyed without serious degradation to the pacification efforts. Preferably, the attack should be made with a maximum effort over the shortest feasible period of time. Operations in South Laos against infiltration routes could well have a beneficial long range effect on the pacification program. As pointed out above, augmentation of VNAF with FARM GATE will enhance the success of the operations in South Laos. 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
- f. Reconnaissance. Pre- and post-strike reconnaissance by VNAF/FARM GATE/US is an inherent requirement. 15
16
- 2. FARM GATE added. The augmentation of VNAF by FARM GATE will enhance successful accomplishment of the operations. 17
18

ANNEX TO APPENDIX A

INITIAL TARGETS

Annex to
Appendix A

<u>TARGET</u>	<u>SORTIES REQ</u>	<u>ORDNANCE</u>		<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
		<u>PRIMARY</u> (NAPALM)	<u>SECONDARY</u>	
<u>LAOS</u>				
1. Muong Phine Army Bks 16-32-05N/106-01-53E	12	24	20mm	Muong Phine is one of the main staging areas, turn-around points and supply complexes in South-Central Laos; serves as a major jump-off point for infiltration southward and supplies communists serving in southern part of Laos. Destruction of Muong Phine and Ban Thay would disrupt infiltration southward and significantly reduce the stores of supplies available to local communists. This complex should be considered a major target in South-Central Laos.
2. Ban Thay Mil Camp and 4 AAA Gun Emplacements 16-35-00N/106-04-00E	18	36	20mm	Approximately three miles northeast of Muong Phine on Route 9. Ban Thay is believed to serve as an augmentation of the Muong Phine complex; serves as a staging supply area for infiltration southward and a supply point for indigenous troops in the area.
3. Ban Na Nhom Mil Camp 17-02-00N/105-44-00E	12	24	20mm	This is a military support area along Route 12A, and is associated with infiltration into South Vietnam. The military area is enclosed by trenches and contains about 10 barracks or supply buildings. Destruction of the facility would hinder communist support operations.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

<u>TARGET</u>	<u>SORTIES REQ</u>	<u>ORDNANCE</u>		<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
		<u>PRIMARY</u> (NAPALM)	<u>SECONDARY</u>	
4. Tchepone Army Bks 16-41-55N/106-13-00E	68	136	136-500 lb GP bombs 20mm	Barracks and adjacent storage facilities have housed or provided support to about two Pathet Lao and one PAVN battalion based in this area. The area is a key infiltration route to South Vietnam and is the southern terminus to Route 12B, connecting from the Nhommarath/Mahaxay area to the northwest.
5. Muong Nong Mil Area 16-22-00N/106-30-00E	10	20	20mm	Village includes six military-type buildings enclosed by security fence. Believed to be a key point on infiltration route through eastern Laos and the last point in the area reachable by truck before the infiltrators branch out on foot over a maze of trails.
6. Ban Trim Bks & Supply Area 16-53-30N/106-32-20E	34	68	68-500 lb GP bombs 20mm	A small military camp in Laos adjacent to the DMZ. It is suspected of being a rest point and supply/support facility for infiltration around the DMZ, through the eastern spine of Laos into the RVN.
<u>NORTH VIETNAM</u>				
7. *Mu Gia Border Control Pt. 17-40-00N/105-46-00E	14	28	20mm 56-500 lb GP bombs	This PAVN camp appears to be a border control point and support area along Route 12 just inside North Vietnam. Truck convoys have been sighted halted here. The camp contains numerous barracks, supply and administration buildings with others under construction. Its destruction would be a definite hindrance to support activity via Route 12 to communist forces in southern and central Laos as well as to the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. It should be possible to damage the road sufficiently during the rainy season to virtually halt all truck traffic until October.

* FARMGATE should not be used on this particular target

Annex to
Appendix A

4

~~TOP SECRET~~

SERVICE SET

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPENDIX B

GROUND OPERATIONS INTO SOUTHERN LAOS

- 1. Current Operations. Recently small eight-man teams have 1
begun operating into South Laos to gain intelligence informa- 2
tion. To date, practical results have been limited; as con- 3
fidence, ability, and familiarity increase, patrols would 4
probe deeper, stay longer, and leave behind units to observe 5
and report. 6
- 2. Planned operations. COMUSMACV is currently conducting 7
planning for cross-border ground operations with the Vietnamese 8
Joint General Staff. The target date for completion of sub- 9
ordinate echelon plans is mid-August. 10
- a. Objective. To interdict infiltration routes and 11
destroy facilities supporting infiltration into South 12
Vietnam. 13
- b. Targets. There is a current sparsity of firm intelli- 14
gence on targets for ground operations in the area of opera- 15
tions. Targets both known or discovered by air or ground 16
reconnaissance including the eight-man teams described 17
above, fall into three categories. The scope of the opera- 18
tions against them is limited by the capability of friendly 19
forces and also by the inherently isolated and unsophisti- 20
cated nature of the targets. The categories and relation- 21
ship to operations are: 22

<u>Type Targets</u>	<u>Scope of Operations</u>	
Fixed facilities or installa- tions	Hit and run raid, small pre- planned air strike	23 24
Areas of hostile concentra- tions to include VC, PL, PAVN operating and support areas	Search and contact operations; ground controlled air strikes; psychological operations	25 26 27
Lines of communications and infiltration	Area ambush; air interdiction; psychological operations.	28 29

~~TOP SECRET~~

SERVICE SET

TOP SECRET

- c. Types of operations and forces involved: 1
- (1) Covert intelligence and reconnaissance by 6 to 8 2
man teams from Vietnamese Special Forces (VNSF). (This 3
is a continuation and an extension of present operations). 4
- (2) Covert or overt offensive operations (raids, 5
ambushes, harassing, destruction) by up to company size 6
units from VNSF, Airborne and Ranger companies. 7
- (3) Ground reconnaissance to identify targets for 8
air strikes by VNAF/FARM GATE. 9
- (4) Overt attacks of company or battalion size by units 10
of the VNAF Airborne Brigade. 11
- (5) Airlift and aerial resupply for above operations 12
would be provided by VNAF augmented with US airlift when 13
beyond VNAF capability. 14
- In general, ground reconnaissance would precede larger 15
offensive operations. Ground reconnaissance would be more 16
or less continuous with several teams committed at any one 17
time. As capabilities are developed, larger and deeper 18
operations would be undertaken. Training would include con- 19
ducting operations with and without air and/or artillery 20
support. 21
- d. Role of US Advisers. Based on long-term experience in 22
combat operations with the ARVN in South Vietnam against the 23
VC and the initial experience with the Intelligence and Recon- 24
naissance Teams, it appears that a successful company and 25
battalion size cross-border operation will require US Army 26
advisers. 27
- e. Armaments. Individual arms and light crew served 28
weapons would be employed by company/battalion sized units. 29
Individual arms are sufficient for the Intelligence and Recon- 30
naissance Teams. 31

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

f. Results to be Expected. Ground operations based on 1
timely and accurate intelligence will interdict VC lines 2
of communications, disrupt PAVN operations and complement 3
the pacification program in RVN. These operations may be 4
much more productive, unit for unit, than operations in RVN. 5
As contrasted to RVN, there is reason to believe that facili- 6
ties and stores are consolidated and thus concentrated and 7
units are channelized over identifiable and, up to now, well 8
secured lines of communications. Hanoi and Peking would be 9
further convinced of determination to eliminate the insur- 10
gency threat. 11

g. Estimated Risk of Loss. Casualties are likely to be 12
heavier than for comparable operations in RVN. 13

h. Readiness and Timing. Service planning is scheduled 14
for completion by mid-August. Training situation is as 15
follows: 16

(1) Readiness depends on the Intelligence and Recon- 17
naissance Team Program which has been described above. 18

(2) Ranger Companies - One 87-man company currently 19
in training is scheduled to be ready by mid-August. Three 20
additional companies are scheduled to complete training 21
by 1 September. 22

(3) The ARVN Airborne Battalions are considered ready. 23

(4) Complete readiness will require acquisition of 24
detailed and timely intelligence, preparation of detailed 25
operations plans, briefings and rehearsals. 26

i. Effect on Pacification Operations. The priority 27
task in RVN is the pacification effort. The cross-border 28
operations in Laos will complement this but cannot substitute 29
for it. Large-scale diversion of resources allocated to 30
pacification within RVN would be unwise except against 31
occasional lucrative targets. 32

~~TOP SECRET~~

SERVICE SET

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPENDIX C

POSSIBLE UNATTRIBUTABLE AIR OPERATIONS
AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

1. Under the operational control of COMUSMACV, covert operations against North Vietnam were begun on 1 February 1964. To date these operations have consisted of low key propaganda radio broadcasts, overflights of the DRV dropping propaganda leaflets and gift kits, delivery of leaflets and gift kits by marine methods, and the introduction by airdrop of teams to conduct psychological/sabotage operations along the national roads of North Vietnam and one team particularly targeted against the Lao Kay - Yen Bay railroad. In addition, several destruction teams have been infiltrated by fast patrol boats along the coast of North Vietnam. Only three of these missions have been successful and have accomplished the destruction of a bridge on Route 1, partial destruction of a storage area, and temporary interdiction of a water pumping station.
2. Air operations provide an appropriate extension to the above operations. All air missions would utilize unmarked aircraft, and US air crews would not be used in these operations.
3. Examples of appropriate air strike targets are these:

Target	Illustrative Tactics	Remarks
Aerial Mining of SWATOW bases	2-4 VNAF A-1H aircraft lay mines at first light. Number of aircraft to be determined by size of the field. (Quang Khe, Ben Thuy/Vinh, or Port Wallut). Low level.	Require USN support to prepare and load mines. Mines to be laid primarily to interfere only with SWATOWs and not to present a hazard to third country shipping.
Vinh/Ben Thuy POL Storage	Low level first light destruction attack by VNAF A-1H aircraft using 500 lb bombs and rockets. Single pass.	Intended to hamper flow of supplies into RVN and Laos.

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

4. The RVNAF now has the capability to conduct this pro- 1
gram. Since the DRV does not now possess an air defense 2
fighter force, the greatest risk would be the exposure to AAA 3
fire. Low level attacks offer the best chance for success and 4
this type attack has been designated with known DRV AAA defenses 5
in mind. 6


TOP SECRET

SERVICE SET

12

1

1



1

1

1

SERVICE SET

~~TOP SECRET~~
SENSITIVE

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

TS #185752-h

4061

13

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Probable Communist Reactions to Certain
US or US-Sponsored Courses of Action in
Vietnam and Laos

PROPOSED COURSES OF ACTION*

CATEGORY 1. Air raids upon key supply centers along the
Viet Cong supply and infiltration corridor in the Laos pan-
handle, these raids to be conducted by the VNAF, possibly
using napalm and possibly augmented by FARMGATE.

CATEGORY 2. Ground force cross-border raids on the same
targets by GVN units up to battalion in size and perhaps
accompanied by US advisors.

* These descriptions of proposed courses of action are
abbreviated summaries of the courses spelled out in
the JCS Memorandum devoted to this subject.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 93-463
By ju, NARA, Date 5-26-94

~~TOP SECRET~~
SENSITIVE

[Service set]

~~TOP SECRET~~
SENSITIVE

CATEGORY 3. Limited air strikes against specific military and transportation targets in North Vietnam by unmarked planes flown exclusively by non-US aircrews.

1. In response to the first or second categories of action, local Communist military forces in the areas of actual attack would react vigorously, but we believe that none of the Communist powers involved would respond with major military moves designed to change the nature of the conflict. Rather than risk escalation, which must appear to them unnecessary and potentially disastrous to long-term achievement of their objectives, they would be more likely to rely on a continuing war of attrition and on intensive propaganda and political maneuvering aimed at isolating the US and building up pressure for an international conference to "neutralize" South Vietnam. In any event, the intensity of Communist response to Category 1 and 2 actions would depend to some extent upon the scale and manner in which such actions were executed.

2. Air strikes on North Vietnam itself (Category 3) would evoke sharper Communist reactions than air strikes confined to targets in Laos, but even in this case fear of escalation

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~
SENSITIVE

~~TOP SECRET~~
SENSITIVE

would probably restrain the Communists from a major military response. Though we think it unlikely, they might attempt isolated air raids on Saigon and other South Vietnamese cities hoping quickly to shatter South Vietnamese morale.

3. There are various local military or semi-military actions, short of major change in the character of the conflict, which should be considered among possible Communist responses:

(a) Improvement of local air defenses (probably with additional AA equipment from North Vietnam and China), dispersal of supplies and troop concentrations, and movement discipline designed to hamper effective air attack. Such measures would be likely.

(b) Intensification of Viet Cong ambushes and attacks, accompanied perhaps by the more or less covert introduction into South Vietnam of some additional personnel from North Vietnam. This response also would be likely.

(c) Sabotage attacks on airfields in South Vietnam to damage their communications facilities, POL depots, etc., and if possible to cripple planes on the ground. We believe such attacks likely.

(d) A widespread campaign of terrorism against Americans, including civilians and dependents, in South Vietnam. We think the chances of such a campaign would be less than even.

(e) Communist forces now in Laos could attempt to seize one or more of the Mekong towns. We believe such an attempt would be unlikely.

~~TOP SECRET~~
SENSITIVE

~~TOP SECRET~~
SENSITIVE

(f) Fighter aircraft would be introduced into North Vietnam. We think this unlikely if US/GVN air strikes are confined to targets in Laos (Category 1). However, if attacks are initiated against North Vietnam itself (Category 3), chances of the Communists introducing some defensive air capability in North Vietnam would increase appreciably, mounting as the scope and intensity of the attacks increased.

4. The influence of the USSR on the Communist camp in the Indochina situation is limited, and it wants to avoid too direct involvement. Moscow would certainly want to show itself no less strong than the Chinese in opposition to the US-sponsored moves. It would almost certainly consider that an intense international campaign against the US could damage US interests considerably, to Soviet world-wide gain, and would not necessarily jeopardize Soviet detente tactics on issues of US-Soviet relations other than Vietnam. Accordingly, the Soviets would give Hanoi vigorous political and propaganda support, and would probably place themselves in the forefront of those calling for an international conference -- and might accompany this by leading a move in the UN to condemn the US.

John A. McCone
Director

- 4 -

~~TOP SECRET~~
SENSITIVE