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By DLH, NAES. Date 9-2-81

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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

SUMMARY NOTES OF 545th NSC MEETING
February 6, 1965; 7:45 P.M.

Reprisal Strikes in North Vietnam

(This is a partial record of the meeting because the writer was in and out of the Cabinet Room talking by secure phone from the Situation Room to McGeorge Bundy in Saigon.)

The meeting opened with a discussion of how to react to the surprise attack by the Viet Cong on the U. S. Army barracks at Pleiku in South Vietnam and other attacks on two South Vietnamese airfields. A recommendation was made that U. S. planes attack three targets in North Vietnam and the South Vietnamese, with U. S. air cover, attack a fourth target. There was recognition that MIG's based near Hanoi might respond to the strikes.

General Wheeler: CINCPAC reports that if he receives an execute message by 10:00 P.M. tonight, his planes could be over their targets in North Vietnam at 3:00 P.M. their time.

The President gave the following figures on the four recommended targets:

| <u>Target</u> | <u>Troops</u> | <u>Military Casualties</u> | <u>Civilians</u> |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------|------------------|
| Dong Hoi Barracks | 6,000 | 3,600 | 40 |
| Vit Thu Lu Barracks | 150 | 90 | 0 |
| Chap Le Army Barracks | 1,200 | 720 | 30 |
| Vu Con Barracks | ----- NO GOOD ESTIMATES ----- | | |

General Wheeler: The attack on Pleiku came as a surprise. There were no South Vietnamese casualties. Our forces were in a compound outside the town. The area has been quiet recently. At one time it was General Khanh's headquarters and formerly was pacified.

Secretary McNamara: However, the Viet Cong had recently been building up in this area.

Under Secretary Ball: We are all in accord that action must be taken. We need to decide how we shall handle the air strikes publicly. The Soviets may call for a conference. We must make clear that the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong are the same. We retaliate against North Vietnam because Hanoi directs

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Under Secretary Ball (cont'd.):

the Viet Cong, supplies arms, and infiltrates men. We need to answer the question as to why we are striking North Vietnam when the Americans were attacked by Viet Cong in South Vietnam.

Deputy Defense Secretary Vance: Arrangements should be made for a joint U.S. -South Vietnamese announcement.

Under Secretary Ball: Should U.S. dependents in South Vietnam be withdrawn at once or only later at a time when the North Vietnamese may be responding to our air attacks?

General Wheeler and Secretary McNamara: Get them out now.

Ambassador Thompson: Should the U.S. dependents be evacuated so quickly that it appears we are running away?

The President: We cannot contemplate the loss of U.S. women and children in an attack by the North Vietnamese or the Viet Cong in Saigon or elsewhere. We have long sought to get out the dependents and have been waiting only for the proper atmosphere.

In summary, we have decided to make the air strikes. Our strikes should be arranged so as to hit in daylight hours. We need a recommendation from Saigon. One hundred and twenty U.S. planes would attack three barracks in the south of North Vietnam and a fourth target would be hit by South Vietnamese planes. A final decision is needed within the hour.

Deputy Secretary Vance: The four targets to be struck are those discussed earlier.

General Wheeler: A total of 132 U.S. planes will be involved, plus 22 South Vietnamese planes for a total of 154. Estimates are that we will lose no planes and the South Vietnamese will lose two planes.

There followed a discussion of several issues including the need for U.S. reinforcements following the air strikes, and whether a Congressional resolution was needed to insure the legal position of the Administration. Under Secretary Ball's position was that the quicker we have a resolution, the better.

* * * * *


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Senator Mansfield: The North Vietnamese attack has opened many eyes. We are not now in a penny ante game. It appears that the local populous in South Vietnam is not behind us, else the Viet Cong could not have carried out their surprise attack.

The President said the group would meet again at 8:00 A.M. tomorrow to decide what additional forces should be moved into South Vietnam. The strike on the four targets was authorized and the request was made that commercial transports be used to fly out dependents. (Location of targets to be struck is marked on the attached map and target list.)

Brouley Smith

Return Bromley Smith
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REPRISAL OPTIONS

2 FEBRUARY 1965

OPTION I -

| IGT # | NAME | ESTIMATED SORTIES STRIKE/FLAK/CAP/TOTAL | | | |
|-----------------|------------------|--|----|----|-----|
| 33 | Dong Hoi Bks | 24 | 8 | 8 | 40 |
| 36 | Vit Thu Lu Bks | 24 | 8 | 4 | 36 |
| 39 | Chap Le Army Bks | 40 | 12 | 4 | 56 |
| Option I Totals | | 88 | 28 | 16 | 132 |

OPTION II - +

| | | | | | |
|------------------|---------------|-----|----|----|-----|
| Option I plus | | 88 | 28 | 16 | 132 |
| 24 | Chanh Hoa Bks | 28 | 12 | 12 | 52 |
| 32 | Vu Con Bks | 10 | 8 | 4 | 22 |
| Option II Totals | | 126 | 48 | 32 | 206 |

OPTION III - + +

| | | | | | |
|-------------------|----------------------|-----|----|----|-----|
| Option II plus | | 126 | 48 | 32 | 206 |
| 14 | Thanh Hoa Bridge | 32 | 12 | 4 | 48 |
| 74 | Quang Khe Naval Base | 22 | 4 | 2 | 28 |
| Option III Totals | | 180 | 64 | 38 | 282 |

TARGETS REMOVED FROM CONSIDERATION

| | | | | | |
|----|-------------------|----|----|----|----|
| 52 | Vinh Supply Depot | 32 | 16 | 12 | 60 |
| 71 | Ben Thuy Port | 30 | 14 | 2 | 46 |

See next page



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TAB A
REPRISAL OPTIONS

TGT

#

NAME

TGT DATA

- 33 Dong Hoi Bks - 1100 acre area probably containing Hdq of 325th Inf Div. Hdq area - 15 bldgs. Bks area - 225 bldgs. in 4 groups of Bn size. Probably in direct support of insurgents in RVN and Laos. AA defense - 1 AA site in tgt area (4 occupied Lt AA positions). 4 inactive sites in Dong Hoi area (16 positions). Radar - EW in immediate vicinity. Collateral damage - Insignificant to light damage.
- 36 Vit Thu Lu Bks - Four separate areas containing 53 storage, utility and bks. bldgs. Is principal supply point for troops moving into DMZ or beyond. AA defense - Within defense of DMZ complex. No AA positions reported in immediate area. Radar - Covered by radar in Kem Bang area. Collateral damage - Insignificant.
- 39 Chap Le Army Bks - Hdq of extensive complex near DMZ. Four groups of barracks. Probably contains Hdqs of 270th Regmt. and two Bns. Assists in infiltration of insurgents to south and west. AA defense - 18 unoccupied sites (12 57/85 mm - 16 Lt AA). Radar - Covered by Vinh Linh area. Collateral damage - Insignificant.
- 24 Chan Hoa Bks - Large complex of 4 main areas. 27 admin/support, barracks type bldgs. Hdq 325th Inf Div reported here. Supports Mil Region IV in DMZ and constitutes a major installation in area. AA defense - No AA positions known to exist in immediate vicinity. Radar - Covered by radar in Dong Hoi area. Collateral damage - Insignificant.
- 32 Vu Con Bks - Two major areas .5 NM apart. North area - 38 bldgs. South area - 26 bldgs. This newly constructed area extensively used is an occupied strong point on DMZ and also may be staging area for infiltration units. AA defense - Falls within defenses of DMZ complex. No 57 mm or higher caliber AA positions known to exist in immediate target area. Radar - Covered by radar in Vinh Linh area. Collateral damage - Insignificant.
- 14 Thanh Hoa Bridge - RR & Hwy Fr. over Song Ma River 510' x 25'. Two lane highway with single track RR. Only N-S line from Hanoi to Vinh. Prestige bridge of major importance. AA defense - 2 occupied sites (8 Lt positions). 3 inactive sites. Radar - Early warning with GCI capability. Collateral damage - Minor warehouse damage.
- 74 Quang Khe Naval Base - Southern-most base providing berthing, repair and logistics to patrol craft. Includes marine RR, dry dock, 6 bks., Admin Bldg., warehouse, 15 support bldgs., several ammo bldgs. and 5 POL tanks. 6 patrol craft on repair tracks sighted Dec 64. AA defense - 4 unoccupied sites (4 Lt positions and 4 57/85 mm positions). 1 occupied site (3 57/85 mm positions). Radar - Radar coverage with GCI capability. Collateral damage - None.

Risk Factors - OPTION I - 1.5% (Est. 2 a/c by AA)
 OPTION II - 1.5% (Est. 3 a/c by AA)
 OPTION III - 1.5% (Est. 5 a/c by AA)

Forces - See Tab B. Option III may require some recycling.

REPRIEAL OPTIONS

Targets Removed from Consideration

| <u>TGT #</u> | <u>NAME</u> | <u>TGT DATA</u> |
|--------------|-------------------------------|---|
| 52 | <u>Vinh Army Supply Depot</u> | <p>- 250 acre supply depot. Three separate areas containing 118 bldgs. Provides major supply and support for two regmts. in vicinity of Vinh. Suspected of providing direct support to PL/VC forces.</p> <p>AA defense - Part of Ben Thuy-Phuc Loi-Vinh air defense system containing 12 occupied sites (59 57/85 mm positions and 20 Lt positions). 12 inactive sites (87 positions).</p> <p>Radar - Extensive radar coverage with GCI capability.</p> <p>Collateral damage - Insignificant.</p> |
| 71 | <u>Ben Thuy Port</u> | <p>- Port serving important military and industrial area of Vinh. 600 long tons general cargo capacity per day. One principal wharf, one offshore wharf. 4 transisheds, storage bldgs. and numerous storage areas.</p> <p>AA defense - Part of Ben Thuy-Phuc Loi-Vinh air defense system containing 12 occupied sites (59 57/85 mm positions and 20 Lt positions). 12 inactive sites (87 positions).</p> <p>Radar - Extensive radar coverage with GCI capability.</p> <p>Collateral damage - Insignificant.</p> |

TAB E

STRIKE, AIR DEFENSE AND RECONNAISSANCE
AIRCRAFT - SOUTHEAST ASIA AREA

I. AVAILABLE FOR REPRISAL

| <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>TAC/FTR/BMB</u> | <u>FIS</u> | <u>RECCE</u> |
|-----------------------|---|------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Bien Hoa | 8 B-57 | | |
| Tan Son Nhut | | 6 F-102 <u>2/</u> | 4 RB-57E 12 RF-101 |
| Da Nang | 18 F-105 <u>3/</u> 14 F-100 <u>3/</u> 12 A-1H <u>1/</u> | 6 F-102 <u>2/</u> | |
| Korat | 18 F-105 <u>3/</u> | | |
| Don Muang | | 4 F-102 <u>2/</u> | |
| Takhli | 18 F-100 <u>3/</u> | | |
| Hancock (CVA 19) | 24 A4 <u>3/</u> 12 A1 3 A3 | 22 F8 <u>4/</u> 12 F4 <u>4/</u> | 3 RF-8 |
| Coral Sea (CVA 43) | 37 A4 <u>3/</u> 12 A1 9 A3 | 14 F8 <u>4/</u> 12 F4 <u>4/</u> | 3 RF-8 |
| - Ranger (CVA 61) | 24 A4 <u>3/</u> 3 A3 | 23 F4 <u>4/</u> | 3 RF-8 6 RA-5 |
| TOTALS | 212 | 99 | 31 |

II. ADDITIONAL FORCES

| | | | |
|------------|-------------------------------|--------------------|----|
| Clark | 19 F-100 <u>3/</u> 40 B-57 | 24 F-102 <u>2/</u> | |
| Cubi Point | 24 A4 <u>3/</u> | 14 F4 <u>4/</u> | |
| TOTALS | 83 | 38 | |
| AGGREGATE | 295 | 137 | 31 |

III. BASE AND CVA LOCATIONS - See Map.

- NOTES: 1/ VNAF aircraft estimated as available.
2/ Limited capability as tactical fighter.
3/ Dual capability as a Fighter Interceptor.
4/ Dual capability as Attack Fighter.

ATTENDANCE LIST FOR THE 545th NSC MEETING
FEBRUARY 6, 1965, AT 7:45 PM IN THE CABINET ROOM
OF THE WHITE HOUSE

The President of the United States, Presiding

Speaker McCormack

Senator Mansfield

CIA

Lt. Gen Marshall Carter, Deputy Director
William Colby, Chief of Far East Division

DEFENSE

Robert S. McNamara, Secretary
Cyrus Vance, Deputy Secretary

JCS

General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, Chairman

STATE

George W. Ball, Under Secretary
Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large
William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs

TREASURY

C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary

USIA

Carl T. Rowan, Director

WHITE HOUSE

George Reedy
Bill Moyers
Bromley Smith