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#2 report	summary notes of 566th NSC Meeting Secret open 10-11-83 NLS 83-73	12/13/66	A
#3a report	re: NATO Secret open 10-4-83 NLS 83-74	12/10/66	A
<p>See also: File of Walt Rostow, Box 15, "Non-Vietnam OCT.-Dec-1966" docs # 17-7e (some closed est 4/14/92)</p>			

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

SUMMARY NOTES OF 566th NSC MEETING
 December 13, 1966; 12:10 P. M.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Acting Secretary Katzenbach: Summarized the State Department paper. (copy attached) We cannot take a deep breath and relax, because many problems are ahead of us down the road, such as:

The organization of a permanent nuclear consultative group,

The NATO study proposed by Belgium which France will oppose and which may not come out to be very much, and

The technological gap, the nature of which is not clear.

At a forthcoming NATO meeting in Paris next week, we do not expect dramatic developments or any major crises.

Secretary McNamara: The Nuclear Planning Group, which we are developing, meets the needs of our allies, especially Germany. It will more closely tie in Germany with the U. S. and the U. K. in the nuclear field. It will end talk of the Multilateral Force.

As for tripartite discussions, it is doubtful that the Germans will present a proposal acceptable to us and to the British with respect to the troop offset problem. This means that there will have to be a relocation of U. S. and U. K. forces. We must act to keep the British from suddenly withdrawing U. K. troops.

As to the relocation of our forces outside France, 90 percent of our personnel will be out by April 1. The remainder will be out by mid-summer. The cost of getting out of France we do not yet know.

The President: Let us get out rather than be pushed out by de Gaulle.

Secretary McNamara: Estimates of the cost of getting out range from \$175 to \$275 million. Some 75,000 Americans, plus 14,000 French civilians on the U. S. payroll are involved. Foreign exchange costs to us may drop from \$175 million to \$100 million, a yearly saving of about \$75 million.

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Authority NLS 83-73
 By ... NAME, Date 10-11-83

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The President: Expressed general agreement with the State Department paper. We should get out of France as quickly as possible. If we cannot meet the French deadline for withdrawal, we should avoid a public fight about it if we can. As soon as our team returns from the Paris meeting, they should report their evaluation of whether the 14 NATO powers can hold together.

Assistant Secretary Leddy: We should await the results of the McCloy mission sometime in mid-January to make up our minds on the level of U.S. forces remaining in Europe. We must be very careful of the political effect in Europe of any withdrawal we make. We must reach an agreed government position on whether we think the allies are carrying their fair share in relation to what we are doing. This position will be essential in defending our policy domestically.

Acting Secretary Katzenbach: The allies' view of the Soviet threat is such that they are not willing to make adequate force contributions. Our allies face the difficult problem of not wanting to accept de Gaulle's solution but not wanting to pay for a NATO solution.

The President: Recent French, British and German actions make clear that they are looking inward. We can't get the American people to support our NATO policy when they see the actions taken by the French, British, and Germans. We are fast approaching a day of reckoning. Our recent elections make this quite clear. Our policy must take into account the diminishing support of U.S. citizens for the present level of our forces in Europe.

We should do our very best to comply with de Gaulle's request that we leave -- even if it means putting men in inadequate housing during winter. We should try to get through to the Germans to convince them of the necessity of offsetting a greater amount of our expenditures in Europe. The serious nature of the problem we face in maintaining support for NATO must be conveyed to the allies. They must understand that the demands on us to meet home front needs are serious-- that we are facing a budget of 142 billion with revenue estimates of 120 billion. The labor unions are going to get raises and U.S. Government employees merit salary increases. Expenditures for the poor in the U.S. have increased tremendously since the Kennedy Administration. We are now very near a debt limit.

The Vice President: The NATO alliance is vital. However, changes are necessary. The dissolution of the alliance means the loss of our diplomatic cards in dealing with the Russians. We must talk to Congress every chance we get about the continuing but changed NATO structure.

Bowley Smith

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 10, 1966

SECRET ENCLOSURE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: National Security Council
Meeting, December 13, 1966

I enclose a paper on NATO for discussion
in the National Security Council meeting on
December 13, 1966.

Richard L. Helms
Acting Secretary

Enclosure:
As stated

SECRET ENCLOSURE

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North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The Foreign, Defense and Finance Ministers of the NATO nations will meet in Paris December 14-16. Nine months have passed since President de Gaulle announced the withdrawal of France from the military organization of the Alliance, six months since the Foreign Ministers met to take the basic decisions toward relocating and reorganizing the institutions of the Alliance in response to the French action. This December's meeting will consolidate those decisions and will provide the forum for considering measures for moving a modernized NATO into the future--both in the defense and non-defense fields.

Background to the Meeting

As announced by President de Gaulle in March, all French personnel assigned to NATO commands and French forces assigned to NATO were withdrawn on July 1. NATO and US military installations in France will be required to relocate by April 1, 1967.

The action of the Government of France proceeds from its position that while the Alliance continues to be necessary, the organization of the Alliance is no longer suitable. However, the other NATO allies recognize clearly the benefits provided by NATO for which President de Gaulle has offered no substitute: 1) security - the Soviet military machine is still in place in Eastern Europe and NATO's joint defense effort is the only effective protection; 2) Western European political stability, which looks even more precious in light of recent German political shifts; and 3) political influence - the NATO consultation process is seen as the best hope of securing US attention to European interests and objections. Consequently, the Fourteen have been able unitedly to turn their efforts to relocating and reshaping the Alliance.

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Relocation of NATO and US Organizations Now in France.

SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) will be relocated to Casteau, Belgium. AFCENT (Allied Forces, Central Europe) headquarters will go to the Brunssum-Maastricht area in the Netherlands. The NATO Defense College has been moved to Rome. The North Atlantic Council, the NATO International Staff, the Military Committee (now in Washington), and national delegations will move to Brussels. The US European Command (EUCOM) will be moved to Stuttgart. The US Sixth Fleet home port is being moved to Italy. Other US headquarters and units will go to the UK and Germany.

Negotiations with France. The Government of France has put aside unilaterally its agreements with the United States covering air fields, depots and military headquarters, and has forced the rewriting of the terms governing the presence of French forces in Germany. Consequently, there are in progress a series of negotiations concerning continued US use of petroleum and telecommunications facilities in France and the relationship between French forces in Germany and NATO forces.

US-French Bilateral Negotiations. Discussions have been held on the use of military facilities in France in the event of war or of NATO alert, or in circumstances such as another Berlin crisis. France has now made clear that no re-entry by the US into airfields or depots in France would be possible except after a declaration of war by France. No French commitment can be given regarding such re-entry in time of NATO alert or crisis. They are, however, willing to permit continued US use of the Donges-Metz petroleum pipeline and certain telecommunications facilities in peacetime, provided these are under French management. They give no assurance regarding the availability of such facilities in wartime.

Additional discussions have concerned the April 1 deadline for the removal of US forces and equipment. We do not accept the deadline but plan to withdraw as rapidly as feasible. However, a period beyond next April 1 will be required to complete the removal of logistics facilities.

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France-NATO Relationships

The "Constitutional Question". The process of developing a new role for France in the Alliance has caused less pain and disruption than might have been expected. The changes have been pragmatic and evolutionary. The North Atlantic Council agreed that the fourteen nations in the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) should be authorized to deal with all defense subjects where France no longer contributes. France will not sit in the Committee. The Fifteen will continue to be responsible for non-military Alliance concerns.

French Forces in Germany. At the time the French withdrew from the organizational aspects of the Alliance, they indicated that they were willing to keep their troops in Germany. The Germans in turn indicated that they wished these troops to stay. However, because all other forces (US, UK, FRG, Canada and Belgium) in Germany have a NATO role, the NATO countries thought that the French troops there should similarly have a defined NATO role. At Brussels, the Ministers, including the French Minister, agreed that NAC would establish a political framework for the mission of the French forces in Germany. The French subsequently backed off of the agreement. The Germans with the support of the rest of the Fourteen then agreed to overlook the absence of a political agreement and authorized talks between Lemnitzer and the French Chief of Staff in order to determine the extent to which the French, without commitment, might be prepared to cooperate with NATO. Meanwhile the French have also been discussing bilaterally with the Germans a legal basis to govern the status of French forces on German territory.

Here, as in US-French talks, the French have underscored their insistence on maintaining total freedom of action.

Air Defense. France is interested in continued participation in the early warning and communications aspects of the NATO Air Defense System, on which the Force de Frappe depends for credibility. The Fourteen have agreed to French participation under present circumstances.

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Overflights. President de Gaulle has put authorizations for overflights by foreign military aircraft on a month-by-month basis. There has been no reduction in the number of flights, nor have the monthly authorizations been delayed in any case. But de Gaulle has made clear that these overflights continue at his sufferance and could be terminated on short notice. The Fourteen have a large requirement for overflights of France. The only real pressure on de Gaulle is that if he were to terminate or drastically reduce his cooperation on overflights he would effectively read himself completely out of the Alliance, with major political effects.

The Ministerial Meeting

Organization of the Meeting. The Fourteen, sitting as the Defense Planning Committee, will conduct the Alliance's military business on December 14 and the Fifteen, as the North Atlantic Council, will conduct its non-military business on December 15 and 16.

US Objectives. Our general objectives at the meeting will be: 1) to present the picture of an organization and of an Alliance which has surmounted its crisis with France but which will continue to accept French cooperation to the extent this does not damage essential NATO interests; 2) to demonstrate that the Fourteen are going ahead in a business-like manner; 3) to demonstrate that the nature of the Soviet threat still calls for an effective NATO; 4) to evidence that a strong Alliance is essential to the attainment of a genuine detente and an equitable settlement in Europe; 5) to support European efforts to study the future organization and activities of NATO.

Principal Ministerial Meeting Topics.

East-West Relations. Consistent with last June's Ministerial mandate and the President's October 7 speech, our general aims in NATO and at this meeting are to keep the organization very much in the East-West picture as a major instrument for coordinating Western policies and, where appropriate, specific action. Aside from the fundamental French

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reservation about coordinated positions, several countries lean toward the view that too prominent a NATO label on anything gives the East an impression of Western rigidity. Nevertheless, we expect that the NATO Ministers will endorse a report which examines possible initiatives looking toward improved East-West relations. (The French are expected to abstain.)

Technological Gap. European concern about the "technological gap" has led to various statements and suggestions for corrective action. Among these is the "Italian" proposal, on which the President commented favorably in the Erhard communique and in his New York speech. Italy has proposed that the Ministerial Council either instruct the Permanent Council and the Secretary General to consider the establishment of a committee to study the technological gap and recommend possible solutions to a future meeting of the Ministers, or directly establish a committee of all NATO countries for this purpose.

The Future of NATO. Foreign Minister Harmel of Belgium is expected to propose that the Ministerial Council, including France, give a mandate for a high-level, comprehensive study on the future of the Alliance. The Belgians have discussed their ideas with us at some length and we have encouraged them to go ahead with their proposal.

NATO Force Planning/Trilateral Talks. The Trilateral talks are now in recess, in view of the NATO Ministerial Meeting and until the new German government gets its feet on the ground. It seems unlikely that the three governments will be able to narrow much further the remaining differences in their views on military matters until they have made substantial progress on the financial problems which triggered the talks. While the other NATO members remain sensitive to this trilateral activity they appear to accept the three powers' assurances that the talks are a one-time approach to urgent and special problems.

The Special Committee. One of the major advances we expect is the establishment of nuclear planning machinery within the Alliance, which will include a Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee and a Nuclear Planning Group as permanent features of the Alliance.

LIST OF ATTENDEES, NSC MEETING, DECEMBER 13, 1966

Tuesday, 12:00 P.M.

Vice President Humphrey

Secretary of Defense McNamara
Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance
Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton

Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach
Assistant Secretary of State Leddy

CIA Director Helms

JCS Acting Chairman Johnson

Acting Secretary of the Treasury Barr

USIA Director Marks

Bill Moyers
Walt Rostow
Robert Kintner
Francis Bator
Bromley Smith