

**NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#2 report</del>	<del>summary notes of 567th NSC Meeting</del> <del>Secret</del> <del>[sanitized 5/24/82 ics, NLJ-82-29]</del> <i>Open 9-26-96 NLJ 93-476</i>	<del>01/25/67</del>	<del>A</del>

**FILE LOCATION**

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, National Security Council File  
NSC Meetings, Vol. 4 Tab 49, 1/25/67, Southern Rhodesia

**RESTRICTION CODES**

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

49

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE  
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
MJ 93-476  
By cb, NARA, Date 8-30-96

DECLASSIFIED

2

SUMMARY NOTES OF 567th NSC MEETING  
January 25, 1967; 12:10 to 12:45 P. M.

U. S. Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia

The President: The purpose of this meeting is to review our current policy toward Southern Rhodesia, to see where we are now, as well as where we expect to end up. Secretary Rusk will outline the State Department paper (copy attached) and Ambassador Goldberg will give his views on the problem as seen from New York.

Secretary Rusk: This is first a UK problem, then a UN problem, and only then is it a U. S. problem. We should not take a dominant role but should seek to get the parties together. When the issue was brought to the UN Security Council, we voted our principles. We rejected efforts to settle the problem by force and we took our lumps.

We will be criticized by both extremes as having done too much or having done too little. We can expect increasing trouble here and in Africa. Economic sanctions will not bring down the Smith Regime in Rhodesia. We must get UK Prime Minister Wilson talking to Smith and exert our influence behind the scenes.

This problem cannot be settled by force. The thought of using U. S. troops is appalling. A multi-division effort would be necessary.

We must get negotiations going again because there is rising support in the UN for sanctions against South Africa which is not complying with the UN resolution of limited sanctions against Rhodesia.

Ambassador Goldberg: The Rhodesian problem causes us difficulties with domestic public opinion and with Congress. There is in the U. S. a very active Rhodesian lobby. In the U. S. business community, there is more support than opposition for our policy.

We were obliged to vote in the U. N. as we did because to do otherwise would have caused us domestic racial difficulties and hurt our business interests in every African country. We have a strong political interest in keeping moderates in control of the problem. Our military interests, i. e., tracking stations in African countries, can be affected by the policy we pursue.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

Ambassador Goldberg (Cont'd.):

We have been talking to U. S. Negro leaders trying to convince them that we are not pulling UK chestnuts out of the fire as they believe.

Senator Russell was told that no military commitment is involved in our current policy. He relaxed after he learned that we do not plan to use U. S. troops and of my promise to veto any proposed use of force in Africa.

Secretary Rusk: The House Foreign Affairs Committee was reassured when told that our vote in the UN for sanctions against Rhodesia is not looked upon by the Administration as a first step toward the use of U. S. forces.

Ambassador Goldberg: Our role is a moderating one. We are not egging anyone on. African radicals are not happy with our policy. The Communists are actively troubling the waters in Africa. Sanctions will not work against Rhodesia. However, their economy may be affected sufficiently to induce them to negotiate. We have told the British to settle this issue honorably. Meanwhile, we will have to take current criticism. Even Haile Selassie cannot take a firm stand.

Senator Dirksen is not in as great a sweat as appears. He acknowledges we can't control the actions of our junior partner.

Acting CIA Director Taylor: Zambia is harder hit as a result of the current difficulties than is Rhodesia. It depends on Rhodesia for copper ore and coal. It is now toying with the idea of working out a deal with the Soviets.

The President: What are the British going to do if Rhodesia won't give in, and economic sanctions don't work, primarily because South Africa won't comply with them? A blockade would not be effective and there is no way to stop South African oil from going to Rhodesia. The British would be hurt if South Africa moves against them. We can't prevent South Africa from giving aid to Rhodesia.

Secretary Rusk: The British do not have a plan to propose if the selective sanctions do not force Rhodesia to negotiate an honorable settlement.

The President: How are we going to work out of this black/white African problem: (a) without drifting into a situation involving the use of force; (b) upholding the UN; (c) maintaining our good relations with the UK; (d) avoiding a showdown with South Africa; and (e) retaining our influence in black Africa?

Secretary Rusk: We must tell the British to resume their negotiations with the Rhodesians. At one point the parties were close to a compromise agreement which would not make black Africans happy but would get closer to a peaceful solution.

Ambassador Goldberg: To push for this kind of a solution is a delicate policy decision. We will be charged with selling out black Africa.

Deputy Secretary Vance: There is one thing which is quite clear; namely, no U.S. ground or naval forces are to be used to settle this problem.

Secretary Fowler: Concurs in the proposed policy direction. The Rhodesian problem is having a serious effect on sterling and the UK economic situation generally. The talk of sanctions against South Africa may have an impact on the U.S. dollar. The State Department paper should be revised to deal with the U.S. financial aspects of the Rhodesian problem.

*Brouley Smith*

Tuesday, January 24, 1967

Mr. President:

The suggested Order of Business for the 45-minute NSC discussion of Southern Rhodesia:

1. Your opening Remarks
  - a. The purpose of the meeting is to review our current policy toward Southern Rhodesia.
  - b. We need to look at where we now are as well as where we expect to end up.
2. Ask Secretary Rusk to outline the State paper and to make additional comments if he wishes to do so.
3. Ask Ambassador Goldberg for his views as seen from New York.
4. Ask Admiral Taylor, who is sitting in for CIA Director Helms, to comment on the effectiveness of economic sanctions-- unless the subject has already been discussed.
5. Conclude the meeting by asking Secretary Rusk to:
  - a. Review carefully the actions we must take in the next few months, and
  - b. Study the alternatives which face us in the next year or two with recommendations as to the course of action we should adopt.

Walt W. Rostow

Attached are the two unanswered questions which I suggest you put to the assembled company. WWR

SERVICE SET

LIST OF ATTENDEES, NSC MEETING, JANUARY 25, 1967

Wednesday, 12:00 P.M.

Vice President Humphrey

Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance  
Deputy Assistant Secretary Hoopes

Secretary of State Rusk  
Under Secretary of State Katzenbach  
Ambassador Goldberg

CIA Deputy Director Taylor

JCS General Johnson, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

OEP Director Bryant

Secretary of the Treasury Fowler

USIA Director Marks

Walt Rostow  
George Christian  
Bromley Smith  
Nat Davis  
Ed Hamilton

SERVICE SET