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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#2 report</del>	<del>summary notes of 575th NSC Meeting Secret <i>sanitized 10-1-84 NLS 83-144</i> 6 p</del>	<del>09/13/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#3 report</del>	<del>Major Issue of the 22nd UN Gen. Assembly Secret <i>open 6-24-94 NLS 93-465</i> 5 p</del>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#4 report</del>	<del>suggested order of business for NSC meeting secret 1 p</del> <i>open 1-29-91 NLS 90-134</i>	<del>09/12/67</del>	<del>A</del>

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SUMMARY NOTES OF 575th NSC MEETING  
September 13, 1967; noon to 12:55 P. M.

Major Issues of the 22nd General Assembly

The President: In the absence of Secretary Rusk, asked Under Secretary Katzenbach to give his estimate of what is likely to cause us real trouble in the forthcoming General Assembly meeting.

Under Secretary Katzenbach:

1. Secretary Rusk will attend the General Assembly sessions. During the time he is in New York he will see 70 or 80 Foreign Ministers. This opportunity provides a useful review of bilateral problems in addition to useful discussions of UN issues.

2. As to African representatives, they are better than they used to be and are now more realistic; but they have a long way to go before they assume fully responsible attitudes.

3. The naming of private citizens to our United Nations Delegation is an excellent idea. Delegation members become advocates for Administration policy as they become familiar with the difficulties encountered in the UN. (The President commented on the list of private citizen advisors which had been sent to him. Assistant Secretary Sisco said he had sent over a list and was awaiting the President's decision.)

4. NATO had been briefed by Assistant Secretary Sisco on issues coming up in the General Assembly. Although the NATO Representatives indicated to Sisco that they would support us in general, it is likely that this support may disappear under pressures which will develop in New York, especially as regards our position on Suez.

5. As to Vietnam, we didn't have much luck on gaining support for an initiative in the UN Security Council. We may not even get enough support to subscribe our draft resolution; but even if we do, we would encounter trouble blocking attempts to vote a resolution calling for unilateral cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam.

Mr. Katzenbach said he would defer to Ambassador Goldberg, who would present a paper summarizing the major issues we expect to face in the General Assembly.

Ambassador Goldberg: (The attached State Department paper was used as a guide to his discussion of major General Assembly issues)

1. The Middle East - Some signs of moderation in the Arab camp, but some hardening of position in the Israeli camp. The Israelis face serious political problems at home. They will be more difficult at this General Assembly session than they had been during the special GA session which discussed the Middle East. The Israelis no longer talk about withdrawal of troops. We may be saved by the stupidity of the other side.

The President: This is always a valuable asset.

Ambassador Goldberg: A sensible peace can be achieved if the Arabs would acknowledge the end of the state of war. If they did this, the Israelis could no longer claim the rights of war, thereby losing their legal ground for holding on to Arab territory won during the war. We face serious problems in achieving our policy objectives in the Middle East.

2. Vietnam - Summarized his soundings in New York on our proposal to take an initiative in the Security Council. The plan would be to sponsor a resolution calling for the reconvening of the Geneva Conference.

Our friends are timid and reluctant to join us in this initiative. They say they don't know what the end result of such an initiative would be. Amendments could be attached to our resolution which would be difficult to handle. They fear beginning a course of action when they cannot estimate where it will end up. If our friends stood with us to the end, there would be little risk of unsatisfactory outcome. However, they do face domestic problems.

The reply to the President's question is that the Soviets oppose our effort to get the Security Council into the Vietnam problem. Of the 15 Council members, only 3 fully support our initiative. They are two Latin American states (Argentina and Brazil) and Nationalist China.

Disagrees with Secretary Rusk, who had said that if our initiative in the Security Council did not succeed this time we could just as easily try it at a later time. This is not so because as of January 1 the Council membership changes. The new composition of the Council will result in our being unable to gain sufficient votes for our resolution, even though we will still retain sufficient support to block action by the Council to which we are opposed. Pakistan replaces Japan on the Council--a net loss in terms of support of our Vietnam policy.

After January 1 the Russians may propose a resolution condemning our bombing of North Vietnam. We could defeat such a resolution.

The outcome of a U. S. initiative in the Council might well end up in disagreement and inconclusively; but he favored going ahead with the initiative even under these predicted circumstances. Many would say the United States initiative had been rebuffed. We would gain support if we tried, even if we failed.

The President: Will someone state the other side of this argument?

Secretary McNamara: Our initiative would end up as a rebuff. He was not concerned about the reaction to our receiving a rebuff, but felt there was a net loss if our opponents could say that the reason we were rebuffed was because of our current bombing policy. This would put pressure on us to end the bombing.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: We can only lose if we undertake an initiative in the Security Council. We risk facing a situation in which an amendment to our resolution would condemn our bombing policy. Our friends, put in an impossible position, might well choose to abstain. If you knew in advance you could not get a satisfactory resolution, the debate resulting from this effort would not contribute to a peaceful climate.

Ambassador Goldberg: If we took an initiative, the Security Council would flounder in a state of disagreement.

The President: In the event this happened, would we be ahead of where we now are? Senator Mansfield would probably say, yes, we would be; but the Senator does not see clearly all the evils which are predicted. We should wait till Mansfield gets back from Japan to talk to him candidly about the situation as we see it. Those who urged us to take an initiative would say, after the effort failed, they didn't realize that the situation would develop as it had.

3. Non-Proliferation Treaty - Urged the President to make a major effort in the United Nations to conclude the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Disagreed with William Foster's prediction that we would be able to keep the non-proliferation issue out of the General Assembly until after the 18-nation Disarmament Committee had completed its work. Doubted that the Assembly would stay away from this subject unless the ENDC reported to the UN their approved treaty draft.

The President: Excused himself at 12:55 because he was scheduled to meet the Japanese Cabinet Ministers for lunch in the Mansion. Suggested that Ambassador Goldberg continue.

Ambassador Goldberg: Time is running out, and unless agreement is reached promptly on a Non-Proliferation Treaty, the General Assembly might insist on injecting itself. The First Committee might get into the act. The Pakistanis are already calling for a conference on non-proliferation.

Mr. Katzenbach: We are not far from an agreement with the Russians on Article 3, which is now blank in the draft treaty we and the Russians tabled in Geneva. Ambassador Thompson had reported that Gromyko had clearly indicated the Russians want to reach an agreement on the inspection article. Once we and the Russians agree, however, we will then have hell with our allies, who over and over again have objected to provisions of the non-proliferation draft.

Ambassador Goldberg: In the UN, if the U. S. and the USSR agree on something, many members give their support. We have less support in the ENDC for our position because among the 18 members of the Geneva group there is a higher proportion of those who oppose our position on the Non-Proliferation treaty.

Assistant Secretary Sisco: Presented the case for a completion of the treaty in Geneva and its presentation to the General Assembly along with the generalized UN security assurances. The General Assembly would then approve the treaty and the assurances as a package. If the treaty goes to the General Assembly without Article 3, the Assembly would conclude its debate by sending the draft back to the ENDC. Predicted that India would go along with the treaty.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: Doubted India would ever sign the treaty. There is no reason why an Indian would think it is in the national interest of his country to sign such a treaty.

Secretary Fowler: India will not sign a Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Mr. Sisco: A factor in India's decision would be the kind of security assurances which were offered.

Secretary McNamara: If India won't sign, then Pakistan won't sign. If these two won't, possibly others won't, Germany won't either. A climate will be created in which non-signature of the treaty will become respectable. We should initiate a pressure campaign to get India to sign. Because the assurances we can give the Indians are not really meaningful, we should not approach them with this as an argument for signature. A brass knuckle approach should be used. When Deputy Prime Minister Desai calls this afternoon, the question of the Non-Proliferation Treaty will be raised with him.

Mr. Sisco: Acknowledged that neither the U.S. or the USSR could give India the kind of security assurances it wanted, but the package proposal in the UN, which he had discussed earlier, would give the Indians cover for their current insistence on assurances.

4. Africa - Forcefully stated his view, which he acknowledged did not prevail in the Administration, that our dealings with South Africa are over-extensive and do not advance our national security. Urged that we disengage in South Africa. Our current dealings with South Africa do us no good diplomatically and hurt us in our relations with other African states. One day in the near future U.S. business leaders will come to us and ask us to move to a more liberal policy in Africa because U.S. investments in Africa are many, many times larger than U.S. holdings in South Africa. Our military gain from our relations with South Africa are becoming less and less meaningful. Not only does our policy cause trouble with African members, but Latin American representatives are now opposing our current position on African questions.

5. Privileges and Immunities - Appealed for action on the question of UN privileges and immunities saying that he would have to get the President involved in this question.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: Responded negatively and sharply, pointing out that if the Administration sent to Congress the draft bill on privileges and immunities, it would not be possible to get it through the Hayes House Subcommittee. The Administration would be defeated on this issue in view of the fact that 3,000 additional UN personnel would be added to the diplomatic immunity list.

Ambassador Goldberg: Pleaded with Mr. Katzenbach to send the bill up. If a security problem is involved, he will get J. Edgar Hoover to approve the bill. The Secretary General had told him that Senator Fulbright had indicated that the measure would not be opposed in the legislature, but that the Administration wouldn't send it to the Congress with a recommendation for approval.

Mr. Katzenbach: Challenged Ambassador Goldberg to get the support of the New York Congressional Delegation.

Ambassador Goldberg: Said he would be glad to do that, but he thought we should know that the Secretary General says over and over again that the U.S. has failed to deliver on what Senator Vandenberg promised the UN in 1945.

6. Oceanography - The Vice President: As acting Chairman in the absence of the President, called Mr. Goldberg's attention to the paragraphs in his paper on oceanography. The Marine Council, which he chairs, had approved two of the four elements in the oceanographic initiative, i. e., General Assembly establishment of a committee on the oceans similar to the Outer Space Committee and a proposal for a Marine Science Reserve in the Pacific. Two other elements in the initiative were being staffed, and a decision would be made later.

Ambassador Goldberg: Pleaded for urgency in reaching a decision, because he wished to include the oceanography initiative in his General Assembly speech, which required clearance by September 20.

One of the elements of the oceanographic initiative is a declaration of legal principles to govern activities on the ocean floor. This involves positioning of nuclear weapons on the ocean floor.

Complimented General Johnson (in fact it was General McConnell) on the willingness of the military to accept a UN committee on the oceans. Recognized the problems the military would have in accepting a prohibition on the positioning of nuclear weapons underseas.

*Branley Smith*

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By W.D., NARA, Date 5-10-94

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MAJOR ISSUES OF THE 22nd UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Four principal issues will tend to dominate the proceedings of the 22nd United Nations General Assembly which convenes on September 19th, whether or not these issues become a formal part of the agenda.

1. Middle East:

It is still possible, though unlikely, the Security Council will meet before the Assembly opens. If it does and reaches agreement on some forward movement (e.g., the appointment of a mediator), there will be less focus in the Assembly on the Middle East. In all likelihood, however, there seems no way to avoid full dress consideration of the whole range of Middle East questions in the Assembly. The Emergency Special Session is likely to be reconvened before the regular Session and, after a brief discussion of Jerusalem and possibly of the refugee problem, to refer all Middle East items to the regular Session. There, our main problem will be to insure there is no erosion in the position of the majority of the Emergency Session that a Middle East settlement requires at a minimum both the withdrawal of Israeli forces and acceptance by the Arabs of Israel's right to exist in peace and security, free of claims or acts of belligerency. Proposals of the type advanced by Tito will pose serious tactical difficulties. As time goes by, with Israel continuing its occupation of Arab territory and with some conciliatory statements by countries such as Jordan, pressures will mount on Israel to show greater magnanimity than they are now showing. The Israelis' position has hardened and the Arabs show no sign of a willingness to make a concrete act of renouncing belligerency.

2. Vietnam

We are exploring the feasibility of the Security Council adopting a resolution calling for a conference to achieve a permanent settlement of the Vietnam problem in accordance with the Geneva agreements. We will know before the opening of the General Assembly whether we are able to mobilize the

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necessary nine votes to inscribe the matter on the agenda. If the Security Council should decide to consider this matter, which is doubtful, the likelihood of formal substantive results is not great in view of the continuing negative attitude regarding UN involvement held by Hanoi, Peking, Paris and Moscow.

In any event, Vietnam will be on the minds of most delegates. Over 100 Foreign Ministers will at one time or another be in attendance, and this will afford Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Goldberg the opportunity in private discussions to make our policy clear. Last year the fact that we put forward a new proposal, consistent with our overall basic approach, provided many of our friends with the opportunity to come out publicly in the general debate in support of our position. We will want to make a positive statement of our position on Vietnam in the general debate speech. This statement will be prepared over the next ten days and submitted to the President for review.

3. Non-Proliferation Treaty and Related Issue of Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear Powers

The best result would be if the ENDC over the next four to six weeks could achieve agreement on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including Article 3, and therefore be in a position to present it to the General Assembly for its endorsement at a late stage in its proceedings. This has been our prime objective. However, the more likely situation will probably be that the ENDC will suspend its deliberations soon and the discussion of the NPT in the Assembly will be in circumstances in which there is no agreement on Article 3. Some of the non-aligned will seek to mobilize support for inclusion of a security assurances article in the Treaty. Our objective should be, in concert with the USSR, to maintain the present Non-Proliferation Treaty intact, to try to assure certain of the non-aligned of our willingness to consider the assurances problem within the context of a UN resolution. We ought to be able to manage the debate, with the assistance of the Soviet Union, so as to give the non-aligned an opportunity

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to express their views and make their criticisms without upsetting the agreement thus far achieved between the US and the USSR. Our aim should be to have the matter returned to the ENDC so that further attention can be given to Article 3 and consultations can be undertaken within the ENDC to see whether the assurances problem can be taken care of in the form of a UN resolution.

#### 4. African Problems

The pattern of these questions in the UN is relatively unchanging. In their desire to produce movement and to force changes in the status quo, the black African delegations press for measures which go beyond what we can accept despite the fact that we are in general agreement with the goals. Our failure since the 21st GA to meet African expectations that the US would be more forthcoming on southern African issues will make us a target for more widespread attacks than in the past. Nonetheless, we should continue with positions that discourage illusions, among others, that the US might be willing to move further than we know to be the case.

##### A. South West Africa

The Special Assembly Session in April-June 1967 established a UN Council for South West Africa to administer the territory which was instructed to report to the 22nd General Assembly. Its activities so far have been confined to preparing a letter to the South African Government requesting its cooperation in implementing UN resolutions on South West Africa. If the Council limits its report in this way, it may be that the Assembly will simply recommend cooperation with the Council and be willing to hold off on other action pending further Council activity. In view of the new proposals for legislation on South West Africa made by Vorster, it can be anticipated the Africans will press for stronger measures this year. Since we have gone as far as we can in meeting African demands on South West Africa and are not in a position to support recommendations for more forceful measures against South Africa, such as sanctions, we plan to try to persuade the

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Africans that the best interim course is to permit the Council to undertake such activities as it can, to maintain pressure on South Africa, and to discourage it from further implementation of the Odendaal plan calling for establishment of "bantustans" in the Territory.

B. Rhodesia

The Security Council imposed selective mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in December 1966. The Assembly will be convening at a time when the sanctions will have been in effect about nine months without any visible effect. Consequently, we can expect further African demands for broader sanctions, and for the use of force, as well as condemnation of those countries who appear to be violating them. Our efforts in the Assembly will be to cooperate with the British, whatever the state of their own discussions with the Smith regime, in counseling moderation and in seeking to prevent the Assembly from recommending measures that go beyond what we consider reasonable.

5. Other Developments

A. General Assembly Presidency

For the first time in its history the Assembly will have a Communist President, the Rumanian Foreign Minister, Manescu. In the absence of any other candidate, we expect to support him and he is likely to be a competent and objective presiding officer.

B. Chinese Representation

Developments on the mainland continue to work in our favor on this issue which should be manageable this year. We will seek as pro forma a consideration of this matter as possible. The present vote count indicates sufficient support to defeat the traditional resolution seeking to substitute Red China for the Republic of China and to reaffirm that this issue is an important question requiring a two-thirds

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vote. However, we will have to watch carefully to see whether there are significant Arab defections as a result of bitterness over the Middle East which, combined with a few changes in the African line-up, could jeopardize our position. In view of the uncertainty of the tactical situation, we have kept open the option of going along with an Italian Study Committee. This proposal was welcomed last year as some evidence of forward movement and was useful in helping to mobilize a substantial vote in support of our position.

#### C. Peacekeeping

We will continue to give strong support to the United Nations peacekeeping role demonstrating this through our financial contributions to pay for the costs of the United Nations force in Cyprus and the United Nations' peacekeeping efforts in the Middle East and Kashmir. Fundamental constitutional differences between the US and the USSR will not be bridged, and we can expect no lightening of the financial burden of the UN from the Soviet Union or France who have been unwilling to make any voluntary contributions to date. We would welcome the demise of the GA committee studying this problem.

#### D. Oceanography

We are developing a possible US proposal which would call for: (i) GA establishment of a Committee on the Oceans similar to the Outer Space Committee; (ii) an outline for a Declaration of Legal Principles to Govern the Activities on the Ocean Floor; (iii) a proposal for a marine science reserve in the Pacific; and (iv) a suggestion for a Decade of Exploration and Development of the Resources of the Deep Sea to begin in 1970. This proposal is still being cleared in the interested parts of the Government.

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Sep<sup>r</sup> 12, 1967

Suggested Order of Business for NSC Meeting

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1. Ask Secretary Rusk to give his estimate of what is likely to cause us real trouble in the General Assembly meeting. ✓
2. Call on Ambassador Goldberg to summarize the major issues we will face. ✓
3. At the end of Goldberg's presentation, or as he finishes each major issue, you may want to put to him or to Secretary Rusk some of the following questions: on the Middle East

- a. What is your best guess as to how the General Assembly will finally come out on the Middle East question?
- b. If the Jerusalem question is brought up what is our position in New York?
- c. What are the prospects for this General Assembly taking some action on arms control or arms registration?

on Vietnam

- a. When will we have a draft of what is to be said on Vietnam in the General Assembly opening debate?
- b. Where do we stand on today a Vietnam initiative in the Security Council?

UN Non-Proliferation

- a. Will we be on the defensive in the General Assembly if non-nuclear powers raise the issue of security assurances?

4. Conclude the discussion by asking that questions coming to you for decisions reach you in time for full consideration.

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By uj NARA. Date 1-8-91

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LIST OF INVITEES, NSC MEETING, September 13, 1967

Wednesday, 12:00 noon

Vice President Humphrey

Secretary of Defense McNamara

Under Secretary Katzenbach  
Assistant Secretary Joseph Sisco

Ambassador Goldberg

Secretary of Treasury Fowler

CIA Director Helms

General McConnell, acting for Chairman, JCS

USIA Director Marks

Walt Rostow  
George Christian  
Nathaniel Davis  
Bromley Smith  
James Jones

(Rusk at U. S. - Japan Cabinet Session)

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