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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 report	10-1-84 more info released per NLJ 84-312 summary notes 590th NSC Meeting <i>Open 5/25/00 NLJ 93-477</i> Secret SECRET 14 p	09/04/68	A
#3a memo	to the President from W. Rostow 1 p	09/04/68	A
#3b memo	to the President re: Czechoslovak refugees 2 p	09/04/68	A
#3c memo	to Walt Rostow from John Walsh 1 p	09/04/68	A
#3d memo	to the Secretary from Graham Martin 2 p	09/04/68	A
#3f cable	CAP 82318 to President from Walt Rostow top secret Exempt per NLJ 84-313 1 p <i>Sanitized 9-7-95 NLJ 93-478 SAME SANI. NLJ 016-002-10-2, 9/6/02</i>	08/31/68	A
#3j report	re: NATO countries <i>more info released 11-21-94 NLJ 93-465</i> Secret <i>Sanitized 1-5-85 per NLJ 84-314</i> 7 p	09/04/68	A
#3-L cable	CAP 82361 to the President from W. Rostow Secret <i>NLT/ISS 7</i> 2 p	09/03/68	A
#3m cable	MAC 11821 <i>Sanitized 7/12/01 NLJ 93-490</i> Secret 2 p	undated	A
#4 memo	to the President from Walt Rostow Secret <i>open 2-13-85</i> 1 p <i>NLJ 84-315</i>	09/04/68	A

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Summary Notes
590th NSC Meeting
September 4, 1968, 5:00-7:25 P.M.

U.S., Europe and the Czechoslovakian Crisis

The President: The purpose of the meeting is to assess the impact of the Czechoslovakian crisis, to discuss how we can use the crisis to strengthen Western European defense and NATO, and to talk about our relations with the Russians and Eastern Europeans.

Secretary Rusk will summarize the issues and possible ways of dealing with them. Secretary Clifford will talk about the defense of Western Europe and the new disposition of Soviet troops in Central Europe.

Director Helms and Secretary Rusk will give us their views on the German reaction to the crisis. The press has already printed that the State Department was recommending additional reassurances to the Germans even before Secretary Rusk had made any recommendation to the President.

Secretary Fowler will speak on the financial problems.

If we speak out about a threatening situation and the situation does not develop, we are accused of over-reacting. If we don't speak out and a serious situation does develop, then we are accused of not having done what we should have done. This is what happened following an indirect mention of the Romanian situation in the speech of last Friday.

More meetings of the NSC should be held in the next few weeks so that all of the members may be fully informed on current foreign problems.

All requests of political candidates for briefings are to be granted. Mr. Temple and Mr. Rostow are to clear Administration responses to requests for positions on foreign problems coming from candidates, advisors, task forces, etc.

Secretary Rusk: The gravity of the current situation cannot be overstated in view of the very high costs the Soviet government was willing to pay for intervening in Czechoslovakia.

The situation in Czechoslovakia has been developing since 1967. Dubcek gained power over conservative Communist Party members in January, 1968. Press censorship was lifted and other reforms were initiated. Dissention between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union rose rapidly. The summer maneuvers

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of the Warsaw Pact were used to build up military pressure against the Dubcek government in the hope that the liberals would slow down the reform campaign.

The day of the Soviet invasion, the President met with Ambassador Dobrynin at 8:15 P.M. and then with the NSC later that evening. Decisions were reached at the NSC meeting to take the Czech case to the United Nations immediately and on a response to the oral message Dobrynin delivered earlier.

The response to Dobrynin's message emphasized two points:

- a. Jefferson's quotation about governments based on the consent of the governed, and
- b. Denial that there was any U.S. or NATO attempt to intervene in Czechoslovakia as alleged by Moscow.

Dobrynin had said that U.S. state interests were not affected by the Soviet action. In response he was told that U.S. interests are involved in Berlin where we are committed to prevent the city being overrun by the Russians.

Although the Soviet military effort went smoothly, the Russians badly miscalculated the political reaction in Czechoslovakia. All Czechs opposed the movement of Soviet troops into their country. Their performance and discipline were superb. The Russians were unable to organize a puppet government to take over and legitimize their invasion. Opposition outside Czechoslovakia to the Soviet move was world-wide and very strong.

The President: Asked to interrupt the meeting to deal with a proposed press release on the admission of Czech refugees to the United States. The statement was read. (Copy Attached as TAB A)

Secretary Rusk: The United States must grant refuge to those Czechs who want to leave their country or who are now outside and do not wish to return. The number is not large. We have to open our doors because if we do not, the refugees might return to Czechoslovakia and oppose the existing government. This would not be in our interest.

Ambassador Thompson: We should not encourage Czechoslovakian refugees to come to the United States but only welcome them. If we appear to be urging them to come to the United States, the Soviet Union could use this policy to argue that we are, in fact, intervening in Czechoslovakian affairs.

Secretary Fowler: Are the borders of Czechoslovakia now open? Are we by this statement inviting another Berlin Wall?

The President: We can accept those who desire to come to the United States but not encourage them to come.

Director Marks: The draft statement would be read by the refugees as encouragement to come to the United States.

Ambassador Thompson: We should say no more than that the long-standing U.S. policy of offering asylum to political refugees remains unchanged. We should not appear to be accepting the entire burden because we want the Europeans to accept some of the refugees.

Secretary Fowler: The statement should say no more than that our asylum policy is unchanged.

Ambassador Cleveland: We should try for a uniform allied policy toward refugees.

Mr. Leddy: The humanitarian aspect is overriding. Let all refugees come who so wish. The refugees cannot resist in Czechoslovakia. The Soviets would like to have liberals, intellectuals, etc., leave Czechoslovakia.

The Vice President: Agreed with Secretary Rusk. We have to say something. We should reiterate our long-standing policy. Inevitably, many people will compare what we do for Czech refugees with what we did for Hungarian refugees.

Secretary Clifford: What did we do following the Hungarian crisis?

(Several recalled that thousands of Hungarian refugees came to the United States. Private organizations raised substantial sums to make possible the resettlement of Hungarians in the U.S.)

Director Helms: The statement as read was acceptable.

The President: Read a revised statement, commenting that he thought the State Department coordinated such statements. He suggested that the draft be further worked on taking into account all views expressed, and sent back for approval.

Secretary Rusk: Last week there were disturbing indicators and press reports that the Russians might invade Romania, states other than Czechoslovakia, possibly even Yugoslavia.

Read the evidence we had Friday, August 30. (Copy Attached as TAB B)

Ambassador Dobrynin Friday evening asked for an appointment for Saturday morning without mentioning the nature of his business. It was possible that his Saturday call would be to inform us of a Soviet move into Romania.

The President in his Friday speech referred to the rumors and issued a warning against another invasion.

Dobrynin was asked to call Friday night to deliver his message rather than wait until the next day. The message dealt with the Czechoslovak situation. During this call, Dobrynin was asked about reports that the Russians were going to invade Romania. He was told that such a move would have incalculable consequences. Dobrynin said he was without instructions but, as he had said previously, he personally doubted the Russians would move into Romania.

Saturday evening Dobrynin dropped by to say that Moscow had informed him that reports of an invasion of Romania were without foundation. This was interpreted to be reassurance that there would be no intervention in Romania. When asked, Dobrynin said his comments applied to Berlin as well, although he went on to mention many Berlin developments which the Soviets consider unsatisfactory.

Intelligence available Saturday evening indicated that the Russians were not going to move into Romania. The answer from the Soviet Union to our question about Romania came promptly after the President's Friday speech in San Antonio. Moscow had decided to hold down further troop movements for the present. However, no one can be sure that the Soviets won't hit Berlin and Romania in the days ahead.

General Wheeler: 19 Soviet divisions could move into Romania with two or three days notice. This force could quickly overwhelm any Romanian opposition. There would be little intelligence warning. The movement of Soviet planes, however, we would be able to detect.

Secretary Rusk: The Romanians have not been whipping up false scares. We have been careful, in talking to the Russians, to make clear that our sources of intelligence are not Romanian. We informed the Romanians of what we had done. The Romanian Foreign Minister has been in New York. Ambassador Ball will report on his conversation with him.

It is important that everyone know we have never had any understanding with the Soviet Union about respective spheres of influence as De Gaulle alleges. The current difficulty arises out of Soviet violation of the Yalta agreement, not out of that agreement itself which called for free elections in Eastern Europe.

There is a great difference between the Warsaw Pact and NATO with respect to internal affairs of members. NATO is operative only in the event of international aggression and grants no rights to a member to intervene in the affairs of another.

The Soviet Union is actively trying to put across the idea that its invasion of Czechoslovakia should not affect its bi-lateral relations with us.

We have a difficult problem of handling the American people as well as others throughout the world who would not approve if we act as if nothing had happened. We have cancelled numerous activities of a good-will nature such as a visit of the Minnesota band to the USSR and a second inaugural flight to the U.S. of a Soviet civilian airliner.

On the other hand, Soviet action against Czechoslovakia has not eliminated many major world problems involving the USSR and the U.S. such as the Middle East, strategic missile control, and Vietnam.

We must not mislead the Soviet Union, the American people, or our allies.

The Soviet Union is trying to carry on business as usual with us. For example, they have told us they have ratified the Astronaut Treaty.

Western Europe reacted with shock following the Soviet invasion but it has not broken off trade relations with the USSR. Many European states have cancelled good-will projects.

NATO must consider the new Soviet deployments in Eastern Europe. There is a real need to reassure the Alliance.

The President: The members of the Council should know that when the Russians invaded Czechoslovakia, they took measures to insure that they would not be blocked. No further mention of this activity should be made but it is brought

up for the benefit of those who are optimistic about the Russian willingness to improve relations and reach agreements. (This apparently was a reference to the Soviet missile alert on the day of the invasion.)

Secretary Rusk: The effect of the Soviet action on the policy of detente has been serious. NATO members must consult with each other and be seen consulting. High level NATO meetings will be necessary. As to the future of NATO, it may be necessary to extend now the life of the treaty beyond 1969. The problem is what can we do to reassure NATO members that the treaty will not disappear in 1969 which does not require Senate approval and does not commit the new President.

The President: We must not forget that a large number of Senators not long ago favored a substantial immediate reduction of the level of U.S. forces deployed in Europe. Some wanted to reduce this number to 50,000.

Secretary Rusk: The country will now have to debate again the amount of its resources which it is willing to commit to keeping peace in the world. There is some isolationism in the United States. As NATO was warned at its last meeting held in Iceland, fears of the Soviet leaders as they face a changing world create a dangerous attitude in Moscow.

Ambassador Thompson: The Soviet leaders decided to intervene in Czechoslovakia because they felt their power position in the USSR was threatened.

1. The Czech system was going democratic. For example, press censorship was abolished.
2. The other Warsaw Pact powers, especially East Germany and Poland, were worried as to the effect in their countries of the Czech liberal reforms.
3. The Czechs were printing, for the first time, suppressed accounts of the horrors of the Stalin regime. The Kremlin leaders were acutely embarrassed.
4. The Czechs were requesting financial backing from the USSR which came to a very large sum.
5. The Soviets concluded Dubcek couldn't retain control of the Czech reform elements and that the result would cause serious difficulties for other European Communist states and even within the Soviet Union itself.

We do not know what triggered the Soviet action.

1. East German Chairman Ulbricht reported to the Soviets following his August visit to Prague. He may have expressed his deep concern over developments in Czechoslovakia and their harmful effect in East Germany.

2. Brzhnev may have realized that the majority of the Kremlin leaders was shifting and therefore changed his position to that of supporting an invasion.
3. Soviet military leaders may have pressured the Politburo on grounds of the security of the USSR.
4. The Kremlin may have decided that Dubcek either could not or would not carry out agreements reached earlier.

We do not know of any secret agreement reached in Moscow with Dubcek. Nor do we know whether Dubcek can carry out the terms of the agreement reached with the Russians.

It is very clear that the Russians totally misjudged the reaction of the Czech people to the invasion of their country by Warsaw Pact troops.

The Soviets are unlikely to invade Romania. There is no current threat to the Communist system in Romania. The situation is quite different from the threat to Soviet and Communist power which was rising in Czechoslovakia.

Ambassador Cleveland: The Czech invasion was considered in Europe as a momentous event. Soviet troop deployments raised basic questions for NATO members. Shivers went through Europe when it became clear that a successful military operation was launched with such sloppy political preparations. Some European NATO members concluded that the Soviet invasion has upset the warning theory on which they had been relying, i. e., that strategic warning would come far enough in advance to allow the NATO countries to prepare for a military response.

NATO agreed to lie low during the time the Czech case was before the UN. They now have issued a statement. (Copy attached) They have agreed to assess the implications of the Czech invasion for allied defense policy, particularly force postures. (TAB C)

In recent years NATO had followed a two-pillar policy. One pillar was the defense of Western Europe and the other was detente, including the concept of a mutual reduction of NATO-Warsaw Pact forces. The detente pillar had made it possible for liberal political groups in Western Europe to support NATO.

There is uncertainty about what NATO now does. There is already an approved policy on not getting chummy with aggressors. There are proposals to hold a high-level meeting consisting of foreign ministers plus defense ministers. Some members favor a review of NATO strategy. Another proposal is to find a way, without amending the treaty, to give members assurance that NATO's life will go beyond the treaty date of 1969.

Despite the Czech crisis, Europeans still favor talks with the Soviet Union on major world problems. Some Europeans think that US-USSR relations grow out of shared "atomic complicity" and the Yalta Agreement.

Secretary Clifford: There are two views as to whether the deployment of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia has increased the threat to NATO. One view holds that the actual threat against European NATO members is actually less than before the Czech crisis, in part because Soviet divisions are farther away and in part because Romanian and Czech troops are no longer available to the Warsaw Pact powers. Therefore the total number of troops available to fight NATO has decreased.

The other view is that the threat has increased because Soviet and Pact forces are on a higher readiness level. This readiness level, plus the partial mobilization which was necessary prior to the Czech invasion, along with the possibility that the loyalty of Czech and Romanian troops can be regained, produces a force more powerful than before the crisis.

We must use the crisis to prompt NATO states to improve the quality of their troops and to improve their mobilization potential. We should push hard on the Germans to increase their defense budget. On offsets and other balance of payment problems, we should request more from NATO members.

We do not know whether there is any possibility of the French rejoining the NATO military effort.

NATO members should react by promptly calling a meeting of the Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers and Chiefs of Staff to discuss the Warsaw Pact threat to Western Europe. The meeting should be held as early as September 20, even though little comes out of it, because there would be little value in a meeting later. A general communique at the end of the meeting would produce the desired result.

We must use this opportunity to find out if our allies are really serious about carrying their fair share of the cost of the defense of Western Europe.

Domestically, the crisis has ended the threat of passage by the Senate of the Symington Amendment. Senator Mansfield no longer is urging a major reduction in the level of U.S. forces in Europe.

Secretary Rusk: Director Helms should call together an interdepartmental group to write a coordinated estimate of the change in the threat to NATO brought about by the Soviet action against Czechoslovakia.

If there is a high-level NATO meeting, the first day should consist only of statements by each NATO member as to what each is doing in response to the Soviet action. Only then would members be allowed to say what others should be doing. We would need to be in a position to say that we would not withdraw additional U.S. forces without consultation and that the force rotation exercise scheduled for the end of this year would be announced now.

The President: There hasn't been any shortage of NATO meetings. There should not be a hurry-up meeting. Our critics could accuse us of rushing ahead of other NATO members in the defense of Western Europe. We should be fully prepared before we go to a meeting. It should be recognized that all Presidential candidates will want to send advisers to such a meeting.

First we should find out what each NATO member will do in the light of the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia. They should speak up and be clear about specific actions. The results of the meeting cannot be such as to encourage the aggressors to think that we are not concerned by the Soviet invasion nor such as to lead some people to think that our reaction has been too weak. We should consult, especially with the military leaders, before any decision is made. In addition, we should not have a highly publicized meeting until we know what the other members are prepared to do.

We should not reassure the Germans until they take action on some of the things we want them to do. There is no need to restate our commitments.

Secretary Fowler: Even before the Czech crisis, the increasing deficit in our balance of payments, projected through 1972, was higher than we can accept. (The deficit figures are in the attached paper which was cited by Secretary Fowler.) (TAB D)

The procurement of U.S. military supplies by European NATO members could have greatly helped our balance of payments problem. If such procurement is made, we can avoid the choice between withdrawing troops from Europe and facing an unacceptable financial risk. Many Europeans believe we are more anxious to defend Europe than they are. Unless we make it clear to them, they are likely to let us defend Western Europe with our resources.

It is well to recall that the Berlin crisis led to the first agreement by a NATO member to offset our military expenditures in Europe.

Any NATO meeting held now should include the Finance Ministers so that costs can be dealt with along with military and political problems. Treasury has listed several proposals it recommends in its paper.

The President: We should first get the views of what NATO members are doing and will do in response to the Czech crisis. Unless we do, we might have a big meeting of Foreign, Defense, and Finance Ministers which could blow up without agreement.

We should start by asking our Ambassadors to find out from Foreign, Defense and Finance Ministers what kind of money, marbles, and chalk the NATO states are prepared to put in to counter the Soviet threat. After they have this information, the Ambassadors might come here to tell us exactly what they have found out.

General Wheeler: The threat to NATO is greater now than prior to the Czech crisis because:

- a. Warsaw Pact troops have been moved westward,
- b. the Warsaw Pact states have partially mobilized, and
- c. there are more Soviet troops deployed in the satellite states.

The Soviets are on the alert and will stay on the alert.

General Spivy reports from Brussels that NATO military leaders are alarmed and deeply disturbed by the Czech situation. They think NATO should pull up its socks and that a NATO meeting would help.

The answer to the question of which NATO members would do something specific about strengthening the Alliance is:

- a. The Germans, the Italians and the Dutch have the resources needed to build up their military forces. The question is whether they have the will to do so.
- b. Possibly the Norwegians and the Danes would do more.
- c. The British attitude is uncertain because their current military power is being reduced.

The President: We should have our Ambassadors go to the Germans, the Italians and the Dutch to find out specifically what they are willing to do now to strengthen NATO.

Ambassador Ball: During two conversations in New York, the last three days ago, Romanian Foreign Minister Manescu, currently President of the UN General Assembly, expressed his extreme gratitude for the statement made by the President last Friday warning the Russians not to move into Romania. He thought the statement would have a great effect on Soviet leaders and on the Romanian people. He was still worried about a Soviet invasion and said that the Romanians would fight if the Soviets crossed the border. He said the

Romanians would not expect U.S. troops to be sent to defend them because the Romanians did not want to start World War III. He did not rule out a Soviet invasion now or sometime later. He said that what happens in Czechoslovakia may determine what happens in Romania.

As to the larger situation, the Russians in New York are trying to get the Czech crisis into a Warsaw Pact versus NATO framework. They are telling the Paks and others that the Czech crisis arose out of a NATO plot to interfere in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia. We should act in such a way that we do not help them get their story believed by UN members.

There should be no NATO meeting without knowing in advance what is to come out of it. As to the effect of a NATO meeting, it would have no affect on the Soviet leaders but in the world it would be taken as a sign that the cold war was starting up all over again. The Soviets could use this argument to bring back into line the European communist parties who fell away following the Czech invasion.

Ambassador Thompson: A NATO meeting would be used by those Soviet leaders who opposed the invasion to show their colleagues just how much the Soviet action cost. There is no solid evidence on who favored and who opposed the invasion in the Soviet leadership.

The President: The Russians have responded to our offer to talk about strategic missiles and are willing to meet with us. For the past four or five years the greatest problem has been how to improve the relations of the two powers. Many Pen Pal letters have been sent in an effort to establish greater confidence.

Candidate Nixon has plans to visit the Soviet Union. His request for a briefing should be granted. Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Thompson should do the briefing. In the present circumstances, there is to be no Heads-of-Government meeting, but a meeting should be held at what level? Do we play a holding operation until January 20? Senate agreement to a treaty or understanding would be difficult to get this year.

Secretary Rusk: One channel to the Russians becomes available when Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko comes to New York this month for the opening of the UN General Assembly.

Ambassador Thompson: The strategic missile talks are the most important issue. The Soviets will be eager to reach agreement on something. We must

be very careful not to create in their minds new suspicions because they can misjudge developments fantastically, for example in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Government is in bad shape and their resources are strained. For example, to the cost of supporting Castro is added the sizeable cost of the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet leaders are thus in a mood to take sensible decisions. We could start the strategic missile talks and halt them if the Czechoslovak situation becomes worse.

The Soviet leaders are in difficulty. They have made many bad mistakes. Although the leadership will pull itself together to face the difficulties caused by the Czech invasion, some changes in the leadership will undoubtedly be made. The effect of the Czech invasion is very great inside the Soviet Union. Our policy should be not to slam the door in their faces but to force them to pay a substantial price for their action in Czechoslovakia.

Vietnam - The President asked Secretary Rusk, Secretary Clifford, and General Wheeler to brief the group on current Vietnam problems.

Secretary Rusk: In Paris, we have had no response to our insistence on knowing what the North Vietnamese will do if we halt the bombing. In the talks, the North Vietnamese have attacked the Vietnam policy statements of both U.S. political parties. We have not presented our minimum position in Paris, because we want to keep the door open to almost any move which the North Vietnamese may make. So far, the North Vietnamese have been entirely negative but they may not always continue to be. Hanoi must accept participation of the South Vietnamese Government in the negotiations. In the United States, much has been made of the National Liberation Front as representing some of the South Vietnamese people. This is a phony issue. The NLF is not a real government and cannot be compared with the Saigon government.

In Vietnam, political progress has been substantial. The pacification program is improving. Serious efforts are being taken to fight corruption. The elected legislature of South Vietnam is working.

The President: We should be outgoing to the South Vietnamese Senators who are now visiting in the United States. We should spend time with them and be as helpful as possible. Numbers of our Congressmen go to Saigon, are seen by President Thieu, and are welcomed by the Vietnamese. We should take this opportunity to see that their Senators are well received here.

Secretary Rusk: President Thieu has grown considerably during the time he has been President. He is wise, reasonable, and is prepared to go much further than Hanoi in an approach to peace.

The President: If we can stay for a few weeks with our present posture in Vietnam, we can convince the North Vietnamese that they won't get a better deal if they wait. If we can hold where we are, a break will come from their side. Some of Hanoi's work is being done for them by people in the United States. Some 1,000 votes at the convention went to a proposed platform plank which called for a change in our policy. Hanoi is not only affected by military developments in Vietnam, but also by Congressional debates. But the military situation is basic.

(The President asked that no notes be taken of following comment which he made to the group.)

We have many irons in the fire and not all of them are in the newspapers. There has been an exchange with the Pope who sent an emissary to make a peace proposal to Ho Chi Minh. Ho turned him down flatly. This reveals the present attitude of Hanoi very clearly--directly from the ranking Hanoi leader.

Secretary Clifford: For some weeks we have had reports that Hanoi would launch a third offensive. The North Vietnamese are impelled to try again despite their heavy losses in the Tet and in the May offensives. Even though the level of combat is higher, it is difficult to say whether the third offensive has started because General Abrams' spoiling operations may have kept the North Vietnamese from carrying out their original plan. General Abrams' spoiling operations have been very effective. Our intelligence is better and is better used with the result that the North Vietnamese forces have been kept off balance. As an indication of the effectiveness of General Abrams' strategy, we have received a hard report that the North Vietnamese will try to assassinate him.

The North Vietnamese face a serious problem. They feel they can't go back to guerrilla tactics. Probably they will continue for awhile with their present efforts. As a result, both South Vietnamese and U.S. casualties will be higher. The question is whether the North Vietnamese, however, can carry on for very long at the present high rate of their casualties.

General Wheeler: In the view of General Abrams, the third offensive has started. His most recent assessment (copy attached) is that the enemy has four courses of action open to him. The first course, and the one the enemy prefers, would be to continue the war along present lines and at about the current level of intensity. The second course would be to continue fighting but stretch out present attacks over a longer period of time. The third course would be to fall back to only guerrilla activity. The last course would be to propose a cease-fire-in-place. (TAB E)

A cease-fire-in-place is a dangerous course of action for us. It would mean that we would be giving up a block of South Vietnamese territory to the enemy.

The Vice President: Requested General Wheeler to explain in greater detail why a cease-fire would be dangerous to us.

General Wheeler: The North Vietnamese would hold certain areas inside South Vietnam. It is not like the situation in the Korean War when there was a fixed military line separating North and South. Thus, the North Vietnamese would be in a position to organize politically the areas they held. Access to these areas by the Saigon government would be in doubt.

There would be no problem with a cease-fire limited to an area where military talks could take place.

Mr. Rostow: Rather than referring to a cease-fire, we should use the language included in the Honolulu Communique, i. e., total cessation of hostilities. Any cease-fire proposal becomes so complicated that it is difficult to see how we could live with it.

General Wheeler: General Abrams is confident that we can handle anything the enemy tries to do to us. We can not only keep up with the enemy but also get ahead of him. General Abrams is right when he says that South Vietnamese units have performed well--some with distinction. The improvement in the performance of the ARVN is a very hopeful sign for the future.

Mr. Rostow: Cited the high North Vietnamese casualty rates (12,000 during the May offensive as compared with 8,500 in August) as proof of the greatly increased intensity of the war, and concluded by summarizing other parts of the Abrams telegram referred to above.

3a

Wednesday, September 4, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Czechoslovak Refugees

Secretary Rusk plans to talk with you at lunch about the Czechoslovak refugee problem. In the attached memorandum (Tab A), he recommends that you direct him and the Attorney General to make arrangements to admit refugees under the Parole Authority of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

A proposed public statement is at Tab B.

The Secretary also recommends that you authorize the Department of State to seek a \$20 million increase in the Refugee Assistance appropriation request to the Congress. The Hungarian experience cost over \$35 million and there were almost 100,000 Czechs outside Czechoslovakia when the crisis broke. The only other available source of funds for this would be AID contingency funds which are limited to \$10 million under the current authorization. The draft public statement limits itself to announcing the Presidential decision on parole authority. The request for funds would be made public in due course when the State Department requests the increase.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

As stated.

Parole Authority approved _____ Disapproved _____

State authorized to request funds _____ Disapproved _____

Public statement approved _____ Disapproved _____

If package approved, MEMO AT TAB C SHOULD BE SIGNED

September 4, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Authorization for Assistance to Czechoslovak Refugees

Recommendation: That you make the attached statement authorizing the admittance of Czechoslovak refugees to the United States and sign the attached memorandum directing (1) the Attorney General and the Secretary of State to make arrangements for the orderly entry of the refugees; and (2) the Department of State to seek an increase of \$20,000,000 in the FY 1969 Migration and Refugee Assistance appropriation request.

Discussion

When the Soviets occupied Czechoslovakia on August 20, there were up to 100,000 Czechoslovak nationals outside their country on pleasure or business. It now appears that a substantial portion of these travelers will not return home, but will seek asylum elsewhere. Our appraisal of developing conditions within Czechoslovakia would indicate also that many of the population within Czechoslovakia will try to leave.

Although Austria and Germany are prepared to meet the brunt of the initial refugee problem, international assistance will be required to give the refugees interim care and to provide for their onward movement and resettlement. In keeping with our national heritage, our traditional humanitarian role, and our foreign policy interests, it is appropriate that the United States admit some of the refugees to this country. Other countries including the United Kingdom, Canada, and

Australia have already issued statements offering to accept Czechoslovak refugees outside normal legislative restrictions. We have already received indications of Congressional interest and information that the community of American Voluntary Agencies is preparing to mount a public campaign pressing us to take similar action. We are certain that there will be support from the American public for prompt and positive action to take our fair share of these homeless people.

There is attached a statement which you may wish to make authorizing the admittance of the refugees in accordance with Section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. This section provides that the Attorney General may parole aliens into the United States for emergent reasons and in the public interest. Also attached is a proposed memorandum to the Attorney General and the Secretary of State in which you direct them to make the necessary arrangements for the orderly entry of the refugees.

Included in the proposed Presidential memorandum is a directive for the Department of State to seek an increase of \$20,000,000 in the FY 1969 appropriation request for Migration and Refugee Assistance which is still pending before the Congress. These funds are required for the costs of reception, interim care and maintenance, resettlement processing, transportation, integration of the refugees in the United States, and other necessary expenses. Our review of the Hungarian experience reveals that in excess of \$35,000,000 was required to defray our share of the costs of the Hungarian refugee exodus.

September 4, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Authorization for Assistance to Czechoslovak Refugees

The underlying memorandum from the Secretary of State, and the attached proposed statement by the President and proposed memorandum from the President to the Attorney General and the Secretary of State are for the purpose of a response by the United States Government to the plight of refugees from Czechoslovakia following the Soviet occupation.

The proposed admission of Czechoslovak refugees into the United States, by the exercise of the Attorney-General's parole authority and the proposed \$20,000,000 increase in the Migration and Refugee Assistance Appropriation are considered appropriate actions in the foreign policy interests of the United States in behalf of the people of Czechoslovakia, to whom other forms of American assistance are not available.

These proposed actions should elicit broad domestic support from the constituencies of voluntary agencies and organizations interested in refugees and immigration and from minority and nationality groups, many of which are already active in promoting assistance to Czechoslovak refugees. It is also believed that there would be wide support for these actions in Congress and among the American public which has shown great sympathy for the Czechoslovak people and can be expected to welcome positive U.S. action in their behalf.

John P. Walsh
Acting Executive Secretary

September 4, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: Graham Martin

SUBJECT: Authorization For Assistance to Czechoslovak Refugees
ACTION MEMORANDUM

Discussion

We have kept under continuing review the problems that will be posed for us if the situation in Czechoslovakia brings forth a massive outflow of refugees. As you know, more than 100 thousand Czechoslovak nationals were outside the country at the time of the Soviet occupation. We now believe that many of these will not return. Additionally, it is the estimate of EUR that the developing situation inside Czechoslovakia will become increasingly repressive, resulting in an additional outflow of refugees.

Other countries, such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia have already announced their willingness to accept Czechoslovak refugees and it is considered that there would be broad American public support for similar action on our part.

You have already been informed of the activities of Mr. Leo Cherne, Chairman of the International Rescue Committee, who after his recent return from Europe has been in touch with the President. We have also received indication of intensive Congressional interest and information that the large community of American voluntary agencies will shortly mount a public campaign pressing the US to take as forthcoming an attitude as that of the countries mentioned above.

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In any event, it would seem that the situation clearly demands additional action on our part. Therefore, it is proposed that the President make a statement authorizing the admittance of Czechoslovak refugees into the US in which he will direct the Attorney General and the Secretary of State to make arrangements for their orderly entry, including the use of the Attorney General's parole authority. We have prepared the draft of such a Presidential statement and a draft of a proposed memorandum from the President to you and the Attorney General.

Our review of the Hungarian experience reveals that in excess of \$35 million was required to defray our share of the cost of the Hungarian refugee exodus. Since the AID authorizing legislation, already enacted, limits the AID contingency fund so drastically, we believe it would be prudent to seek an augmentation of the pending appropriation under the Refugee and Migration Act in the amount of \$20 million. To facilitate Bureau of the Budget and Executive Branch consideration we have included in the Presidential memorandum a directive to you to seek such augmentation.

Recommendation

That you sign the Memorandum to the President proposing assistance to Czechoslovak refugees through their admission to the United States and by the provision of funds in the amount of \$20,000,000.

Clearance:

: EUR - Mr. Leddy (in substance)

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CO WTE10
DE WTE 3612

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP82318

Sent To GEORGE CHRISTIAN
By ~~Walt Rostow~~ CTR AT 10:35
OUT OF LASH 10:40

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

THE WATCH COMMITTEE IS MEETING AT 7:00 AM THIS MORNING AND
ARE CONSIDERING THE FOLLOWING ITEMS:

- THE DEPLOYMENT OF BULGARIAN AIR FORCE FIGHTERS AND HELICOPTERS
INTO NORTHEASTERN BULGARIA;
- BULGARIAN ARMY COMMAND AND CONTROL EXERCISE NEAR THE ROMANIAN/
BULGARIAN BORDER;
- POSSIBLE RECALL OF SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM LEAVE IN
THE ODESSA MILITARY DISTRICT;

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

- POSSIBLE MOVEMENT OF AT LEAST ELEMENTS OF A SOVIET UNIDENTIFIED
CORPS FROM KOSICE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO THE GENERAL AREA OF KISHINEV,
USSR WHICH IS LOCATED NEAR THE USSR/RUMANIAN BORDER;
- POSSIBLE OVERNIGHT MOVEMENT OF AN UNIDENTIFIED SOVIET UNIT
FROM THE PRAGUE AREA TO KISHINEV.

DTG: 311123Z AUGUST 1968

Downgraded to Secret
Authority NLT 84-313
By Philip NARA. 8/23/93

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Authority NY 016-002-10-2
By [Signature] 6-10-02

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September 4, 1968

Declaration of the Defense Planning Committee of NATO

"The Defense Planning Committee of NATO, recognizing that developments in Czechoslovakia cannot fail to be of grave concern, has initiated a thorough assessment of their implications for allied defense policy, particularly for force postures. When this assessment has been completed, it will be submitted to ministers.

Meanwhile, the Defense Planning Committee has recalled the position taken by Defense Ministers on 10th May, 1968 in Brussels, subsequently reaffirmed by Foreign Ministers at Reykjavik on 24th and 25th June, 1968 to the effect that the Alliance must maintain an effective military capability and must assure a balance of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. At that time ministers also affirmed the proposition that the over-all military capability of NATO should not be reduced except as part of a pattern of mutual force reductions balanced in scope and timing. The Defense Planning Committee has confirmed the validity of this position, and deplores the fact that the prospects for progress in the field of balanced mutual force reductions have suffered a severe setback.

The members of the Defense Planning Committee have accordingly reaffirmed the necessity of maintaining NATO's military capability and of taking into account the implications of recent developments in Eastern Europe in the planning of their national forces. The overall capability of NATO's forces, including their structure and levels, will be kept under constant review in the light of the changing political and military circumstances, and will be re-examined at the next ministerial meeting."

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September 4, 1968

POLICY APPROACH FOR HANDLING U.S. MILITARY BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
DEFICITS IN NATO COUNTRIES

A. Facts

1. Balance of payments projections through CY 1972, concluded before the Czech crisis, show a net deficit on U.S. defense expenditures and receipts in NATO Europe of \$855 million in calendar 1970, \$1.2 billion in calendar 1971 and \$925 million in calendar 1972. This should be compared with \$412 million in calendar 1967, \$270 million in calendar 1968 and a projected \$168 million in calendar 1969. Clearly, these increasing deficits cannot be absorbed by special financial arrangements of the German type, which are unsatisfactory both to the United States and the central banks of the countries concerned as a long-term answer to U.S. payments losses resulting from U.S. force deployments in NATO Europe.

2. U.S. gross military expenditures in NATO in calendar 1967 could have been completely offset if our NATO allies, excluding France, had procured in the U.S. 46% of their defense procurement of major equipment, missiles and ammunition. A table showing the same picture for CY 1968-9 is attached.

3. The pursuit of a procurement policy yielding these results would have substantial budgetary and military benefits for all concerned, and would avoid the harsh necessity in the years ahead of being forced to choose between the security risk of withdrawing U.S. forces from Western Europe and the financial risk of large U.S. payments deficits to the international financial system.

B. Principles

1. In view of the Czech crisis and NATO re-evaluation of force levels it is necessary to secure NATO-wide agreement in principle--with implementation by bilateral arrangements--

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NLJ CO-156

By cb, NARA Date 10-26-00

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to achieve maximum offset to U.S. defense expenditures in NATO over the next 5 years.

2. Review by NATO countries (nationally and within NATO) of appropriate defense efforts over the short and longer run in view of the Czech developments should include attention at the same time to:

- a. National budget actions to increase European national defense efforts.
- b. Dealing with the military balance of payments deficit of the U.S. in NATO countries.

3. U.S. review of its future force posture in NATO should include the following approach--in addition to military and political factors:

- a. Reduce projected U.S. balance of payments expenditures by:
 - (1) Implementing now cost reductions without combat unit redeployments (e.g., present Defense Department REDCOSTE program).
 - (2) Maintaining the combat unit redeployment program being implemented in Germany (REFORGER).
 - (3) Considering further combat redeployments or reductions, replaced, if needed, by assumption by our allies of military and support functions previously carried by the U.S. (This requires increased defense efforts by the allies.)
 - (4) NATO-wide commitment in principle to alleviate the U.S. military balance of payments drain in Europe

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by new emphasis on military procurement in the U.S. and with decreasing reliance on special financial arrangements to neutralize the residual deficit.

4. The hard choice to be made clear to our NATO partners is:

- a. NATO-wide agreement in principle (implemented by bilateral actions) to offset the U.S. balance of payments costs of whatever level of U.S. forces the U.S. commits in Europe.
- or
- b. A weaker U.S. role militarily in Western Europe in the years beginning with CY 1970.

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C. Proposed Actions

1. Obtain agreement in principle at the Ministerial level in the NATO Council that:

- a. It is necessary to alleviate to the maximum extent U.S. military balance of payments drains from its expenditures for NATO mutual security.
- b. Alleviating the U.S. deficit should be accomplished through standardization of military equipment within the Alliance, in order to improve military capabilities of the Alliance, obtain the technological and economic benefits of the advanced U.S. arms industry and conserve budget resources.
- c. NATO organs and Defense Ministries should undertake an urgent review of the requirements for military equipment in national inventories to maximize standardization with U.S. forces over a long-term period.
- d. The U.S. review with individual NATO countries alternative means for production allocation (among two or three or more countries depending upon the specific equipment, production capabilities, etc.,) to fulfill their equipment requirements in a way which maximizes procurement in the U.S. At the same time appropriate attention would be given to insure production shares for foreign countries where it is economically feasible with a view to most effective use of defense budgets.
- e. Finance Ministries and central banks of NATO countries should consult bilaterally with the U.S. to devise longer-term arrangements for neutralizing residual

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amounts of the U.S. military balance of payments deficit in their respective countries, including investments in the U.S. which are convertible as required for payments by governments to U.S. military suppliers.

2. Mount a major political effort with our NATO allies which includes the following rationale:

- a. Czech developments and the economic and military realities of the world mean that we cannot practice business as usual.
- b. U.S. approach proposed in NATO is based on mutual gain for the security of all members, economic production shares for foreign countries and international financial viability.
- c. The undesirable alternatives to hard choices in long-term production allocation and financial cooperation are a weaker U.S. role abroad militarily or financially, or both.

3. Undertake an urgent U.S. study on a country-by-country basis of the following:

- a. Equipment requirements of our allies.
- b. Major potential areas for production allocation (for example, main battle tank, truck modernization, aircraft replacement, naval missiles and fire control, etc.)

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- c. General magnitudes of U.S. and other national production shares which would cover the foreign exchange drain of U.S. forces deployed in foreign countries.
- d. Residual foreign exchange drain requiring financial neutralization cooperation.
- e. Possibilities for bilateral or multi-lateral techniques for implementing the U.S. approach.

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~~SECRET~~Pages. Copy No. 8 September 4, 1968
of 25 Copies. Series D

Comparison of NATO Military Procurement and U.S. Defense Expenditures
(\$ Million)

	NATO European Countries				Canada		U.S.	
	With CY 67	France CY 68-69	Without CY 67	France CY 68-69	CY 67	CY 68-69	CY 67	CY 68-69
A. U.S. Defense <u>1/</u>								
1. Expenditures	1,529	3,009	1,529	3,009	239	523		
2. Receipts	851	977	851	977	32	69		
3. Net	678	2,032	678	2,032	207	454		
B. Military Budgets <u>2/</u>	22,030	44,051	16,359	32,019	1,817	3,372	74,210	155,900
C. Procurement Amount <u>3/</u>	4,344	8,678	3,330	6,532	240	445	22,491	47,238
% of B.	19.7%	19.7%	20.4%	20.4%	13.2%	13.2%	30.3%	30.3%
D. % of C to Equal A.1.	35.2%	34.7%	45.9%	46.1%	100%	117.5%		
E. % of C Spent in U.S. (A.2.)	19.6%	11.3%	25.6%	15.0%	13.3%	15.5%		

Changes if Average Annual Procurement During 1961-67 is Substituted for CY 67 in C.

C. Procurement Amount	7,646	5,998	488
% of B	17.4%	18.7%	14.5%
D. % of C to Equal A.1.	39.4%	50.2%	107.2%
E. % of C Spent in U.S. (A.2.)	12.8%	16.3%	14.1%

Sources:

1/ DOD Comptroller. (Data as of July 8, 1968)

2/ Country plans as reported to NATO and estimated in AC/127-WP/218.

3/ "Procurement" is as reported to NATO in the categories of "major equipment, missiles and ammunition." The actual amount for CY 1967 is obtained from NATO Secret Document ISM (67) as summarized in DOD (ISA) April 5, 1968 chart for Secretary Clifford, "Defense Expenditures and Related Data." CY 1968-69 amounts are projected on the assumption that the same percentage used for procurement in CY 1967 is continued in CY 1968-69.

Treasury

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82361

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

SEPTEMBER 3, 1968

YOU WILL WISH TO READ ABRAMS' LUCID SUMMARY OF THE MILITARY SITUATION.

A. IT IS BECOMING CLEAR THAT THE ENEMY HAS ATTEMPTED TO LAUNCH A MAJOR OFFENSIVE EFFORT, POSSIBLY HIS GREATEST THUS FAR. YOU ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE SURGE IN INFILTRATION PRECEDING THE AUGUST EFFORT. IT IS NOTEWORTHY TO ME THAT THE SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS AND FIRES IN NORTH VIETNAM AND SOUTH VIETNAM CAUSED BY TACAIR AND B-52 WERE AS FOLLOWS: 5 APRIL-4 MAY TOTAL 1730 AND 19 JULY-17 AUGUST TOTAL 4772. COMPARING THE PERIOD OF 18-29 AUG 68 TO 5-16 MAY 68 WE FIND THAT THE ENEMY KIA FOR THE AUGUST PERIOD TOTAL ABOUT 8500, WHILE THE ENEMY KIA FOR THE MAY PERIOD RUN TO ABOUT 12,000. ENEMY INITIATED GROUND ASSAULTS AND ATTACKS BY FIRE TOTAL ALMOST 300 FOR EACH PERIOD. WE SAW MORE GROUND ASSAULTS IN THE MAY PERIOD AND A FEW MORE ATTACKS BY FIRE IN AUGUST. IN MAR THE ENEMY FIRED AN AVERAGE OF 21 ROUNDS PER ATTACK BY FIRE (ABF); IN AUGUST HE EXPENDED 34 ROUNDS PER ABF.

B. EXCEPT FOR DANANG, HIS OPERATIONS THUS FAR, HAVE BEEN PREPARATORY AND DIVERSIONARY IN NATURE. HE HAS TRIED TO ATTRACT US FROM HIS PRIMARY OBJECTIVES. HE SEEKS TO ATTRIT OUR FORCES ON GROUND OF HIS CHOOSING. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE HAS MADE A SERIOUS EFFORT TO GET INTO DANANG. HE FOUGHT HARD AT DANANG AND HAD AROUND 1200 KILLED IN ACTION THERE.

C. WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DISLOCATE HIS PLANS. HE HAD A MAJOR ATTACK PLANNED FOR THE DMZ AND THE TRI-THIEN AREA ON 26-27 AUGUST. HE COULD NOT GET IT OFF. HIS DANANG FAILURE HAS FORCED HIM TO SHIFT THE 21ST REGIMENT OF THE 2D NVA DIVISION NORTH TO REINFORCE HIS FRONT 4 UNITS. ON THE WAY NORTH THIS REGIMENT GOT ENTANGLED IN THE FIGHTING WEST OF TAI KY AND TOOK AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF CASUALTIES. WE KNOW THAT THE ENEMY HAS HAD TO POSTPONE PLANNED ATTACKS IN THE DELTA AT CAI LAI AND CAN THO. HE HAS LOST OVER 600 KIA AT DUC LAP WITHOUT ATTRACTING A SINGLE FRIENDLY UNIT FROM THE DEFENSE OF BAN ME THOUT. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE ORCHESTRATION OF HIS EFFORTS AROUND SAIGON HAVE BEEN THROWN OFF IN TIMING AND RESULTS REQUIRING HIM TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT ADJUSTMENTS TO HIS PLANS. WE HAVE A REPORT FROM A VERY RELIABLE PENETRANT AGENT THAT HIGH RANKING CADRE FROM HIS SUB-REGION HEADQUARTERS LEFT ON 18 AUGUST TO ATTEND A MEETING AT COSVN. THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS TO RECEIVE ORDERS FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE THIRD OFFENSIVE. THIS SAME AGENT STATED THAT THE ATTACK ON SAIGON HAD BEEN POSTPONED AND THAT THE CADRE WHO HAD GONE TO COSVN HAD NOT RETURNED BY 29 AUGUST.

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Authority NLT/CBS 7
By LW/pel NARS Date 7-27-6
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D. GENERALLY, THE RVNAF HAVE PERFORMED COMPETENTLY, AND IN SOME CASES, WITH DISTINCTION. THE FRIENDLY OPERATION AT DUC LAP, TO GIVE JUST ONE EXAMPLE, WAS FIRST RATE. RVNAF MORALE IS GOOD, AND ITS CONFIDENCE IS HIGH. ARVN OPERATIONS SINCE JUNE IN THE DELTA HAVE BEEN MOST SUCCESSFUL. THEY HAVE KEPT THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITY THERE ON A DECLINING CURVE.

OUR PREEMPTIONS ARE PERHAPS FORCING THE ENEMY TO RECONSIDER HIS CONCEPT FOR THE THIRD OFFENSIVE. IF SO, IT SEEMS TO US HE HAS THREE BASIC COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO HIM. FIRST, HE CAN CARRY FORWARD HIS THIRD OFFENSIVE, LAUNCHING MAJOR ATTACKS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY EITHER SIMULTANEOUSLY OR IN IMMEDIATE TANDEM. SECOND, HE CAN DELAY THE INITIATION OF MAJOR ATTACKS, CREATING ANOTHER "LULL PERIOD", CONCENTRATING HIS EFFORTS AGAINST SPECIAL FORCES CAMPS AND DISTRICT AND PROVINCE CAPITALS, AND STRETCHING-OUT HIS OFFENSIVE. THIRD, HE CAN CANCEL THE THIRD OFFENSIVE. I BELIEVE HE WOULD PREFER TO ADOPT THE FIRST COURSE OF ACTION. OUR PREEMPTIONS, HOWEVER, ARE GIVING HIM MAJOR PROBLEMS, AND MAY DRIVE HIM INTO THE SECOND COURSE OF ACTION - THE STRETCH OUT. AS OUR FRIENDLY OPERATIONS CONTINUE, WE AIM TO SO DISLOCATE HIS PLANS THAT HE WILL CALL OFF THE THIRD OFFENSIVE JUST AS HE CANCELLED THE SECOND OFFENSIVE ON 14 JUNE 68.

THERE IS TO MY MIND ANOTHER POSSIBILITY WHICH WE SHOULD CONTEMPLATE. AT SOME POINT IN THIS THIRD OFFENSIVE THE ENEMY MAY ACCEPT THE FUTILITY OF HIS BLOODY ATTACKS AND THE STERILITY OF THE OFFENSIVE MAIN FORCE WAR STRATEGY HE HAD ADOPTED FOR 68. AT THAT POINT, WHILE HE STILL HAS SIZEABLE FORCES AS BARGAINING POINTS, HE MAY ASK FOR A CEASEFIRE OR SOME SIMILAR PLOY. IF THIS SHOULD OCCUR, I THINK IT ESSENTIAL THAT WE REALIZE THAT THE ENEMY IS DEALING FROM A POSITION OF MILITARY WEAKNESS, WHILE WE ARE IN A POSITION OF MILITARY STRENGTH AND GROWING.

REGARDLESS OF WHAT COURSE OF ACTION THE ENEMY ADOPTS, WE WILL BE READY FOR HIM. HOPEFULLY, WE WILL BE AHEAD OF HIM. WE HAVE ALREADY COST THE ENEMY 8500 KIA IN THIS CAMPAIGN, AND HE CAN SHOW NOTHING OF VALUE FOR THEM. WITH OUR COMBINED STRENGTH AND THE ATTITUDE OF QUIET DETERMINATION, TEAMWORK, AND SOLID CONFIDENCE I FIND AMONG COMMANDERS WHEREVER I VISIT, I AM CONFIDENT THAT WE CAN CONTINUE TO DEFEAT HIM.

DTG 031900Z SEPTEMBER 1968

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FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
TO GEN WHEELER CJCS
INFO ADM MCCAIN CINCPAC
MR RUSK SEC STATE
MR ROSTOW WHITEHOUSE
MR HELMS DIR CIA
MGEN SEIGNIOUS [REDACTED] PARIS
ZEM

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SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec 3.6

NLJ 93-490

By COM NARA Doc 6-28-01

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ON 31 AUG-1 SEP 68, ENEMY ACTIVITY INCREASED SHARPLY IN I CTZ WHILE REMAINING LOW ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY.

IN I CTZ, THREE SEPARATE CONTACTS IN THE DMZ AREA RESULTED IN 93 ENEMY KIA.

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[REDACTED]

IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT ENEMY INITIATED ENGAGEMENTS IN 3 AREAS WEST OF HOI AN, AND ABFS ON DANANG AB AND THE MARLE MOUNTAIN AIR FACILITY. THE 1ST MAR DIV WILL CONDUCT DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OPERATIONS NORTH AND WEST OF DANANG FOLLOWING ARC LIGHT STRIKES YESTERDAY. THE COMBINED ARVN AND MARINE OPERATION SUXXEX BAY SOUTH WEST OF DANANG CONTINUES TO PRODUCE FAVORABLE RESULTS. AN ARVN SWEEP FORCE MADE HEAVY CONTACT YESTERDAY AND NEW CONTACTS HAVE DEVELOPED TODAY. A NEW LIFE HAMLET 10 KM SE OF DANANG WAS ATTACKED BY AN ENEMY PLATOON WHO TOLD THE VILLAGERS TO LEAVE OR THEY WOULD DIE IN A FEW DAYS. TWO REFUGEE CAMPS WEST OF HOI AN WERE EACH ATTACKED BY AN ESTIMATED ENEMY CO WHICH DISTRIBUTED PROPAGANDA LEAFLETS BEFORE WITHDRAWING. ON 30 AUG, AN UNKNOWN SIZE ENEMY FORCE ATTACKED A PF PLATOON AND A VILLAGE WHICH IT WAS GUARDING, 13 KM NW OF TAM KY. A DELAYED REPORT INDICATES THAT IN ANOTHER ACT OF TERRORISM ON 29 AUG 68, AN ENEMY FORCE ATTKD A VILLAGE 6 KM NE OF QUANG NGAI CITY. CUMULATIVE RESULTS OF THESE TERRORIST ATTACKS BETWEEN 29-31 AUG 68 WERE 41 CIVILIANS KILLED, 40 CIVILIANS WOUNDED, 68 CIVILIANS MISSING, AND 203 HOUSES DESTROYED. FRIENDLY POSITIONS 27 KM SW OF TAM KY RECEIVED MORE THAN 100 MORTAR ROUNDS AND A LIGHT GROUND PROBE. THE NUMEROUS CONTACTS AND ATTACKS WERE PROBABLY DESIGNED TO COVER ENEMY TROOP MOVEMENTS, KIDNAP LABORERS AND TERRORIZE CIVILIANS. THE AMERICAL DIVISION IS CONDUCTING AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE AND GROUND EXPLOITATION OF ARC LIGHT STRIKES DELIVERED ON 31 AUGUST WEST OF QUANG NGAI CITY.

IN II CTZ, THE ENEMY'S OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN LIMITED TO HARASSMENT, ATTACKS BY FIRE AND TERRORISM. ON 1 AUG 68, THE ENEMY INITIATED AN ATTACK BY FIRE ON A POL PUMP STATION APPROX 50 KM WEST OF PLEIKU CITY. FIVE MINUTES LATER, A US CONVOY ON HIGHWAY 19, IN THE SAME AREA, WAS ATTACKED BY AN ESTIMATED ENEMY COMPANY. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, A US LZ IN THE SAME GENERAL AREA, RECEIVED 19 ROUNDS OF 82MM MORTAR FIRE.

EARLY ON 1 SEP, 68, THE ENEMY FIRED AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF B-40 ROCKET ROUNDS INTO CIVILIAN HOUSES ONE KM NW OF PLEIKU CITY; ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF HIS CONTINUING EFFORT TO TERRORIZE CIVILIANS. ON 31 AUG, AN ARVN UNIT ENGAGED AN UNKNOWN SIZE ENEMY FORCE NEAR BASE AREA 229, 21 KM NORTH OF PLEIKU CITY. THE 24TH NVA REGT HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED OPERATING IN THIS AREA. ON 2 SEP, TWO ARC LIGHTS WILL STRIKE THE AREA NORTH AND NORTHWEST OF DUC LAP WHERE RECENT HEAVY CONTACTS AND IR CONFIRM PRESENCE OF A LARGE ENEMY FORCE AND ENEMY POSITIONS. AN ARVN BN WILL REMAIN AT DUC LAP TO FOLLOW UP THE STRIKES IN CONJUNCTION WITH CIDG FORCES. 1ST BDE OF THE 4TH DIV WILL CONTINUE THE GROUND SWEEP OVER THE 30 AUG ARC LIGHT STRIKE WEST OF DAX SEANG CIDG CAMP.

~~IN III CTZ, EARLY ON 1 SEP 68, THE SF BASE CAMP AT THIEN NGON IN~~
~~RECEIVED AN ATTACK BY FIRE OF MIXED MORTAR, B-40~~

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IN THE SAME AREA, WAS ATTACKED BY AN ESTIMATED ENEMY COMPANY SHORTLY THEREAFTER, A U-2 LZ IN THE SAME GENERAL AREA, RECEIVED 19 ROUNDS OF 82MM MORTAR FIRE.

EARLY ON 1 SEP, 68, THE ENEMY FIRED AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF B-40 ROCKET ROUNDS INTO CIVILIAN HOUSES ONE KM NW OF PLEIKU CITY; ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF HIS CONTINUING EFFORT TO TERRORIZE CIVILIANS. ON 31 AUG, AN ARVN UNIT ENGAGED AN UNKNOWN SIZE ENEMY FORCE NEAR BASE AREA 229, 21 KM NORTH OF PLEIKU CITY. THE 24TH NVA REGT HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED OPERATING IN THIS AREA. ON 2 SEP, TWO ARC LIGHTS WILL STRIKE THE AREA NORTH AND NORTHWEST OF DUC LAP WHERE RECENT HEAVY CONTACTS AND IR CONFIRM PRESENCE OF A LARGE ENEMY FORCE AND ENEMY POSITIONS. AN ARVN BN WILL REMAIN AT DUC LAP TO FOLLOW UP THE STRIKES IN CONJUNCTION WITH CIDG FORCES. 1ST BDE OF THE 4TH DIV WILL CONTINUE THE GROUND SWEEP OVER THE 30 AUG ARC LIGHT STRIKE WEST OF DAK SEANG CIDG CAMP.

IN III CTZ, EARLY ON 1 SEP 68, THE SF BASE CAMP AT THIEN NGON IN TAY NINH PROV RECEIVED AN ATTACK BY FIRE OF MIXED MORTAR, B-40 AND 122MM RKT. THE SF BASE CAMP AT BEN SOI IN WEST CENTRAL TAY NINH PROV RECEIVED A ROCKET ATTACK FOLLOWED BY A GROUND ATTACK COMMENCING AT 0200. RESULTS ARE NOT YET AVAILABLE. ENEMY ACTION ELSEWHERE IN III CTZ WAS LIGHT AND SPORADIC, CONTINUING A PATTERN OF HARASSMENT OF FRIENDLY OUTPOSTS. THE 1ST US INFANTRY DIVISION IS CONCENTRATING ITS EFFORTS ON LOCATING AND INTERDICTING THE DONG NAI REGIMENT AS IT ATTEMPTS TO INFILTRATE THROUGH FRIENDLY FORCES. NINE ARC LIGHT STRIKES ARE ALLOCATED TO III CTZ ON 1 SEP. EIGHT WILL BE DIRECTED AGAINST STAGING AREAS OF THE 5TH NVA DIVISION IN TAY NINH AND BINH DUONG PROVINCES. ONE STRIKE IS SCHEDULED FOR HAU NGHIA PROVINCE WHERE MORE THAN 400 NEWLY CONSTRUCTED BUNKERS WITH A SUPPORTING TRENCH SYSTEM HAVE BEEN REPORTED.

IN IV CTZ, THERE WAS NO SIGNIFICANT ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY DURING THE NIGHT OF 31 AUG-1 SEP 68. ENEMY TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS REMAIN ESSENTIALLY THE SAME, WITH MAJOR CONCENTRATIONS SW OF CAN THO AND IN BASE AREA 470 IN NW DINH TUONG PROV. IN VINH LONG PROVINCE, THE 9TH ARVN DIV WILL CONDUCT A COMBAT SWEEP, SUPPORTED BY US AND USAF HELICOPTERS AGAINST VC FORCES THAT HAVE BEEN CONDUCTING SMALL SCALE HARASSING ATTACKS IN THE AREA. ON 2 SEP, AN ARC LIGHT STRIKE WILL BE FLOWN IN KIEN PHONG PROVINCE TO DESTROY SUSPECTED WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION CACHES AND PROBABLE ELEMENTS OF A MAIN FORCE REGIMENT.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY TO GEN WHEELER
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS TO ALL OTHER ADDRESSEES

~~SECRET~~

1.5(6)
3.4(6)(1)

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NSC meeting file

4

Wednesday, September 4, 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Order of Business for NSC Meeting
on Issues Raised by the Czech Crisis

The purpose of the meeting is:

- To assess the impact of the Czechoslovakian crisis on Western Europe.
- To discuss how we can use the crisis to strengthen Western European defense and NATO.
- To discuss how we carry on our current business with the Russians and Eastern Europe.

(Attached is a State Department paper discussing the problems.)

Ask Secretary Rusk to summarize the major issues and possible ways of dealing with them.

Ask Secretary Clifford to speak to the defense of Western Europe in the light of reactions to the Czech crisis and the new dispositions of Soviet troops in Central Europe.

Director Helms is prepared to reply to the question, "How scared are the Germans?"

Secretary Fowler wishes to comment on the problems from Treasury's viewpoint.

Ask Secretary Rusk to comment on the work we should be doing with the Congress.

Conclude the meeting by asking for specific recommendations on ways to strengthen Western Europe and NATO.

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Authority NLS 84-315
By us, NARS, Date 2-13-85

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

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LIST OF ATTENDEES, NSC MEETING

September 4, 1968, Wednesday, 5:00 P. M.

- ✓ Vice President Humphrey
- ✓ Secretary of State Rusk
 - ✓ Ambassador Thompson
 - ✓ Ambassador Cleveland
 - ✓ Assistant Secretary Leddy
 - ✓ Ambassador Ball
- ✓ Secretary of Defense Clifford
 - ✓ Deputy Secretary Nitze
- ✓ Secretary of Treasury Fowler
 - ✓ CIA Director Helms
 - ✓ JSC Chairman Wheeler
 - ✓ OEP Director Daniel
- ✓ USIA Director Marks
- ✓ Walt Rostow
 - ✓ George Christian
 - ✓ Bromley Smith
- ✓ Ed Fried
 - ✓ Nat Davis

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