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76

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~~FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY~~

Author: NLS 83-76  
By: ccg, R. H. S. Date: 9-10-84

SUMMARY NOTES OF 594th NSC MEETING  
November 25, 1968; noon to 1:20 P. M.

Monetary Issues, Vietnam, UN

The President: Noted that Secretary Rusk is meeting Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin for lunch so the NSC meeting should end by 12:45. Asked Secretary Fowler to report on the current international monetary situation.

Secretary Fowler:

1. First reports on the market situation (at 11:00 A. M.) are encouraging. The reaction to De Gaulle's decision is good. The pound rate is up and funds are flowing from marks into francs. The dollar is firm and the gold market is relatively calm. The President's message to De Gaulle and the latter's reply probably had a favorable effect on the market, over and above its political impact.

2. First assessment of the measures taken by the French government:

-- The new exchange controls are stronger than those that had previously been put into effect in May and subsequently rescinded. In the case of tourism only \$140 per person is allowed per year. The measures and provisions for their enforcement looks very tough and they should do some good for a period of time.

-- Export tax incentives: We still don't know what form they will take or how much they will be.

-- Imports: Nothing special expected although there may possibly be some restrictions through licensing. Generally, the French have been opposed to import surcharges as being inflationary.

-- Wages and prices: The attempt will be to hold the line but probably not through direct controls.

3. In general, we do not expect the monetary arrangements to disadvantage our own trade or balance of payments position. The advantages we will receive from the German measures should about offset what we might lose as a result of the British and French restrictions.

4. We should remember that four major countries are now cutting back on their economic growth rate and this could have its impact on world trade.

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5. The events of the past week will have an abrasive impact on the monetary system and politically will affect UK-German relations and UK-French relations. Schiller had said with indignation that he had been summoned to Paris the week before the Bonn meeting. He had instead sent his Deputy, Schoellhorn. The French had then threatened drastic action if the Germans did not revalue. The Germans in general feel that the French put them in a very tough position. The French, on the other hand, feel that the Germans did not do as much as they should have and would have preferred a straight bilateral deal with them.

The President: What might we be asked to do in addition to what we have already done.

Secretary Fowler:

1. We might be asked for from \$300, 000, 000 to \$500, 000, 000 in credits in addition to those already offered.

2. After De Gaulle's speech, Bill Martin called his German counterpart Blessing and talked with him about what further action could be undertaken to avoid further flows of funds into Germany; to speed up the study of recycling speculative flows from the recipient countries back to the countries from which they originated; and to provide press guidance that put a positive cast on prospects. Mr. Martin had done much the same in calls to his Dutch and Swiss counterparts.

Deming had called his counterpart in the UK Treasury who had had mixed reactions on the De Gaulle message but agreed that it was important to provide positive press guidance.

Deming had also called Schweitzer, the Managing Director of the IMF, to talk about the position he would take and to see that arrangements were ready in case the French might apply for a standby credit facility.

The President: Asked Secretary Fowler whether he thought the program would be successful.

Secretary Fowler: Replied that he thought it would be successful in the short term but the long term is more doubtful.

The President: What additional steps should we take or be thinking about in the event of emergency--have we done all that we should be doing in the way of contingency planning in view of the new situation.



Secretary Fowler: Did not know of any new steps we should take now. The most important thing that we can do is to keep our situation at home strong. The strength of the dollar is basic to the entire international monetary situation. If the dollar continues strong, the probability is that a monetary crisis could be calmed rather than result in disaster.

The President: Cautioned all Cabinet Ministers to be careful in their private or public predictions on how large the next budget will be. A press story states that the budget might even be in balance. If this does not turn out to be correct or if other predictions turn out to be inaccurate, his own credibility would be questioned.

Secretary Clifford: Do the developments at Bonn affect the commitments the NATO countries have undertaken at Brussels.

Secretary Fowler: No reason why they should.

The President:

1. Reminded the group that he had three messages to send to Congress--the State of the Union, the Budget Message and the Economic Report. He did not want to be tied to a fixed figure. He did not want Cabinet Members to be predicting what his decision would be. He had not made up his own mind as to which direction he should go--whether the budget this year would be in balance or whether there should be a relatively small deficit.

2. A newspaper story alleges there is disagreement between Secretary Rusk and Clifford. (Secretary Rusk interjected to ask what are we disagreeing about now?) There is no reason for having stories about differing views in the Administration, particularly when such did not in fact exist. We do not want stories during the remainder of this Administration which report disagreements on Vietnam or any other subject.

3. Called attention to press stories reporting Chairman Mills' position on tax reform. Mills seemed reconciled to not putting in a reform bill. He preferred to leave tax reform to President Nixon who would have four years to consider the subject.

General Wheeler: In response to the President's request, reported on the military situation in Vietnam which he described as "good." The details of his briefing are contained in the attached notes which he used. General Abrams' tone is optimistic and U.S. military forces are driving the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese forces back into their base areas.

The President: Did he or General Abrams regret the decision to halt the bombing?

General Wheeler: Aerial reconnaissance is essential to the security of our forces. General Abrams is undertaking to get the required information with the fewest number of casualties.

The President: Are the military leaders reassessing their judgment that a bombing halt was acceptable from a military point of view?

General Wheeler: No. Secretary Clifford and General Abrams share his view. No infiltration south from the DMZ into South Vietnam has been detected. Some enemy forces have been seen in the DMZ. Infiltrators are coming around the end of the DMZ through Laos.

Secretary Clifford: An escorted reconnaissance plane had been shot down yesterday. In keeping with existing authority, an attack had been made on the source of the fire. Our negotiators in Paris had been informed but did not know whether this information had gotten to Hanoi. There is concern that retaliation attacks could derail the negotiators in Paris.

Following a discussion with General Wheeler, a temporary standdown was ordered for all aerial reconnaissance for a period of time sufficient to inform the North Vietnamese in Paris and time for them to cable Hanoi. North Vietnamese Negotiator Lau asked for four hours to convey the message to Hanoi. Aerial reconnaissance was recommended at 7:00 P.M. yesterday (Sunday).

Today we lost one reconnaissance plane and one armed escort plane, making three planes lost in 48 hours.

The problem is as follows: we go into North Vietnam on escorted reconnaissance missions. They shoot at our planes. We reply with attacks on the ground, possibly including villages.

What should we do in the brief period until the talks in Paris get going? Once these talks begin we can take up the subject of the North Vietnamese firing on our reconnaissance planes. Meanwhile, can we get the information we must have without provocation. We are using drones and low-level flights now and we shall be looking to see if there may be ways in which we can obtain comparable information in a different way. It would be a tragedy if this problem of reconnaissance derailed the Paris talks.

Secretary Rusk: Said he was obliged to leave but before doing so he wanted to say how fortunate the Administration is to have Ambassador Wiggins. He has done a beautiful job--a highly professional operation in New York. Up to now, he has not even awakened us in the middle of the night.

Ambassador Wiggins: Summarized the current problems before the United Nations:

1. The atmosphere in the General Assembly is pervaded by the Czech invasion. Representatives from many countries are upset by the Soviet "commonwealth doctrine." Senator Cooper, in a speech on rules of aggression, hit the Russians in a very sensitive spot. In all UN committees we are speaking about the Soviet invasion but we are not seeking to reopen the cold war.

2. On the issue of Chinese representation we obtained a better vote this year than last on all three resolutions proposed. The issue lacked passion this year but, because of replacements in the Security Council, we will not be in as good shape next year as we are now.

The President: Engaged in an exchange with Assistant Secretary Sisco on where we will lose support when the Security Council membership changes. The real loss comes down to the replacement of Ethiopia, a strong supporter of our position, by Zambia which cannot be counted on to support our position.

Ambassador Wiggins: 3. The Middle East problem -- We have been engaged in two major activities:

- a. By supporting the Jarring Mission we have been seeking to move toward a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. More than 50 bilateral conversations have been held. The two countries have now given papers to Ambassador Jarring who is not now as ready to throw in the towel as he was some months ago. The situation is similar to that which existed in 1946--neither side is ready to turn over its cards. We are hung up because we do not know whether Egypt is willing to make peace and whether Israel is willing to give up territory seized in the war. The present discouraging prospect is for no immediate change.
- b. Attention is focused on the serious Arab refugee problem. The war created 370,000 new refugees and displaced 170,000 old refugees. All are living in tent camps and the weather is poor. Recently there has been some minor easing by Israel of conditions affecting the refugees.
- c. Korea -- we have had a rough row with the Communists this year. The question was thrown into a procedural mess and the debate is only now beginning on how to discuss the subject of Korea.
- d. Disarmament - The issue now is the continuation of the conference of non-nuclear powers. Our position is to oppose a permanent body to deal with this issue. As to the talks on strategic arms limitations, the Soviets have made mention of these talks but we have been non-responsive.

The President: What should we do about conducting talks on strategic arms limitation? We have the Czech situation, a new Administration coming in and there is uncertainty as to the possibility of achieving anything in such talks.

Ambassador Wiggins: We should proceed with the talks. There is no problem about conducting a parallel policy--attacking the Russians for their invasion of Czechoslovakia each morning and each afternoon talking about strategic arms limitations.

The President: The President-elect has slowed down Senate ratification of the non-proliferation treaty. Can we accomplish anything in strategic arms talks if we do not have the NPT ratified?

Ambassador Wiggins: We can accomplish something because the Russians are eager to undertake the arms talks. The Russians are embarrassed by criticism of the Czech invasion. They want to undertake arms talks in order to draw attention away from the Czech issue. However, we should not propose a special Senate session to ratify the non-proliferation treaty.

The President: Ratification of the NPT has a bearing on the strategic arms talks. The Congressional leaders will be coming here this evening to discuss whether or not to hold a special session. The Germans have been softened up by recent actions in the monetary crisis but we have no leverage on them to ratify the NPT because we have not yet ratified. The same situation is involved with Israel. We have given them the Phantom airplanes but this may not be useful in getting them to accept the NPT unless we have already ratified. In India and Japan, those opposing the NPT can argue that their countries should not act on the treaty before we do.

Delaying ratification until the new Senate arrives may mean that the ratification of the NPT is in doubt. The composition of the Senate will be different. Senators Clark and Morse will be out and Goldwater will be in. Senator Russell is in doubt about the treaty and his doubts may grow. Unless we act in December, we may run into trouble.

Ambassador Wiggins: It is embarrassing in the United Nations to be able to say only that we think we will ratify the treaty. It would be wonderful if the treaty were ratified.

The President: Asked for a paper summarizing the attitudes in the UN as reported by Ambassador Wiggins. Bob Murphy has been told that we believe we ought to go ahead with the NPT now. It is true the Senators didn't want to



come back for a special session. The Czech invasion blew up earlier plans for the arms talks. We should get started even if we handle the talks so as not to bind a successor. It is our hope that Mr. Nixon will agree to our going ahead and we have offered to have Bob Murphy as an observer on the delegation.

Secretary Fowler: The NATO meeting at Brussels changed the thinking of Europeans. The European situation is different after the NATO meeting as regards their doubts about bilateral or US-USSR arms talks.

Secretary Clifford: It is clear that NATO members do not want to return to the cold war. Their concern was that a NATO arms buildup might upset the movement toward detente. The NATO meeting was delayed almost to the point where the Soviet invasion could not be fully exploited in an effort to get them to increase their defense contribution. Most of the Soviet divisions are now out of Czechoslovakia and the threat to NATO members is, in their minds, less than it was a few weeks ago. However, NATO members would welcome US-USSR arms talks.

The President: State Department officials had told him the arms talks would cause trouble with NATO members. Secretary Rusk believed the talks would trouble our allies. President-elect Nixon said we should delay the talks because of the Czech invasion. A paper was requested giving all the reasons why the talks should or should not be held which he could use in a conversation with Senator Dirksen.

Secretary Clifford: The Germans and British want us to go ahead with the arms talk. They are prepared to have us take the calculated risk that things will quiet down in Czechoslovakia. The rest of the NATO members want us to go ahead but they do not want us to ask them whether we should go ahead.

The President: Bob Murphy has been told that a meeting with the Russians might persuade the Soviets to pressure Egypt on the Middle East problem and Hanoi on the Vietnam problem.

Secretary Clifford: As to whether a special session on the NPT should be called, we must make a very careful nose count before deciding. There is real concern that the Senate might refuse to ratify the treaty. Senators would resent a special session whereas to the arms talks, such talks would help advance in the NPT here and abroad.

The President: We should tell the new Administration the facts of life and then they will have to take responsibility.

Ambassador Wiggins: Returned to his discussion of UN questions but limited himself to listing other UN problems such as seabeds, the human environment, apartheid (on which we abstain but try to avoid being left alone with Portugal), the UN budget and Nigeria, where the relief problem is involved and difficult.

The competence of the officers in the UN mission is impressive and the public delegates are very able, especially Senators Cooper and Symington.

*Bowdler Smith*

DECLASSIFIED  
VIETNAM SITUATION  
BRIEFING NOTES FOR GENERAL  
25 November 1968

HEELER

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Authority NLS 83-85  
By ics, NARS, Date 3-24-8

1. PURPOSE: THE PURPOSE OF THIS BRIEFING IS A BRIEF RESUME OF THE MILITARY SITUATION IN VIETNAM.

2. WHAT IS THE SITUATION ALONG THE DMZ?

- TOTAL INDICATIONS OF ENEMY IN THE DMZ SINCE 1 NOV: 230

- 11 ATTACKS BY FIRE FROM THE DMZ ON FRIENDLY POSITIONS.
- 34 FIRINGS ON OUR FAC/OBSERVER AIRCRAFT FROM DMZ.
- 95 SIGHTINGS OF ENEMY PERSONNEL IN DMZ (11 N OF PMDL).
- 81 OTHER SIGHTINGS OF LIGHTS, VEHICLES, BUNKERS, TRAILS, ETC.
- 66 US/ARVN RESPONSES HAVE BEEN MADE INTO DMZ WITH ARTILLERY, AIR STRIKES & NAVAL GUNFIRE.

DATES: NOV 1-3, 4-10, 11-15, 16-20, 21-24

INDICATIONS:           0,       8,       23,       84,       45

FRIENDLY  
FIRINGS:           0,       7,       18,       34,       13

3. HAVE WE BEEN ABLE TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY ENEMY IN THE DMZ AS NVA?

- NO.

- ON 20 NOV HIGHEST AUTHORITY AUTHORIZED SQUAD-SIZE PATROLS INTO THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE DMZ OVER PERIOD 24 NOV - 3 DEC 68 TO CAPTURE SOME PRISONERS TO PROVE POSITIVELY THAT IT IS THE NVA (OR VC) WHO ARE VIOLATING THE DMZ. (FOR USE IN PARIS). PLATOONS SOUTH OF DMZ BACK UP THE "SNATCH" PATROLS.

- USMC "SNATCH" PATROLS MADE NO CONTACTS IN DMZ ON 24 NOV.

4. HOW MANY ATTACKS ON POPULATION CENTERS SINCE 1 NOVEMBER?

- TOTAL ATTACKS: 60                   - LAST 48 HOURS: 9

I CTZ	15 MINOR	4 MAJOR	3/3 *
II CTZ	7 MINOR	0 MAJOR	2/0
III CTZ	8 MINOR	0 MAJOR	0/0
IV CTZ	24 MINOR	2 MAJOR	1/0

US 165 }  
SVN 242 } 416 { 29  
FWF 9 } { 121  
w

\* MAJOR ATTACKS WERE GROUND/FIRE ATTACKS ON TWO REFUGEE CAMPS AND ONE HAMLET NEAR QUANG NGAI.

- TO PROVIDE AN EVALUATION OF TRENDS, FOLLOWING IS A COMPARISON MADE OF ATTACKS ON POPULATION CENTERS BY (1) GROUND ATTACK AND/OR (2) ATTACK BY FIRE OF MORE THAN 20 ROUNDS:

	<u>TET</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>3D OFF</u>	<u>OCT 68</u>	<u>1-24 NOV</u>
ATTACKS PER WEEK:	47/WK	35/WK	16/WK	9/WK	11.5/WK

- IN OTHER WORDS, THERE IS NOTHING SHARPLY OUT OF LINE HERE, SO FAR, ALTHOUGH SOME INCREASE IS NOTED.

5. WHAT HAS BEEN THE ENEMY'S REACTION TO OUR RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS OVER NORTH VIETNAM SINCE 1 NOVEMBER 1968?

- TOTAL RECON FLIGHTS OVER NVN: 229 - LAST 72 HOURS: 23

(195 TAC RECON FLIGHTS, 5 SR-71, 29 DRONES).

- TOTAL HOSTILE REACTIONS: 80

-- 3 DRONES SHOT DOWN EARLY THIS MONTH.

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- 1 RF-4 DOWNED BY AAA NW DONG HOI 23 NOV.

(AT LEAST ONE SURVIVOR: SURROUNDED, BELIEVED CAPTURED).

-- WAS ESCORTED BY A SECOND RF-4; NO FIRE SUPPRESSION.

-- AFTER MR. VANCE NOTIFIED NVN OF OUR INTENTIONS ON 24 NOV, WE RESUMED MANNED RECON FLIGHTS WITH ARMED ESCOR TO SUPPRESS ENEMY FIRE AGAINST RECON AIRCRAFT (241901E NOV).

- 1 RA-5C DOWNED BY SAM NORTH OF VINH. (242239E NOV).

- 1 F-4D ESCORT DOWNED BY AAA NW DONG HOI (250045E NOV). SAR WITH ARMED SUPPRESSION CARRIED OUT.

6. WHAT IS THE CURRENT SCALE OF RECON FLIGHTS AUTHORIZED OVER NORTH VIETNAM?

- 90 MISSIONS PER WEEK (UP TO 25/DAY) WITH AUTHORITY TO REQUEST MORE IF REQUIRED.

- ARMED ESCORT TO SUPPRESS HOSTILE AIRCRAFT AND GROUND FIRE IS AUTHORIZED AND BEING FURNISHED.

7. WHAT HAVE OUR RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS OVER NVN AND LAOS DISCOVERED?\*

- ENEMY IS MOVING MILITARY SUPPLIES, POL AND CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS INTO RP-I AND LAOS WITH IMPRESSIVE SPEED.

- ALL MAJOR ROADS AND BRIDGES IN RP-I LEADING TO DMZ, BAN KARAI PASS AND MU GIA PASS ARE OPEN.

- TRUCK TRAFFIC

-- 5000 TRUCKS PHOTOGRAPHED IN RP-I, II, III BEFORE 20 NOV; MOST MOVING IN CONVOYS OF 50-100.

-- POL, AMMO, AAA, SAM EQUIPMENT AND FIELD ARTILLERY MOVING SOUTH.

-- OVER 2000 TRUCKS DETECTED BY SENSORS IN LAOS 1-16 NOV; SOUTH OF MU GIA, 250 TRUCKS PER DAY.

- RAIL TRAFFIC

-- HANOI-VINH RAIL LINE OPEN; RR 7 OPEN DOWN INTO RP-I, RAIL QUOTA OF "400 TON/DAY" SET (SIGINT).

- POL

-- MORE PHOTOGRAPHED IN RP-I SINCE 4 NOV THAN IN PREVIOUS 12 MONTHS.

- WATER-BORNE LOGISTICS CRAFT

-- HEAVY TRAFFIC ON RP-I WATERWAYS; COASTAL CONVOYS ENROUTE FROM HAIPHONG-DONG HOI.

-- ACTIVITY AT LEAST AS GREAT AS DURING HOLIDAY TRUCES OF LAST TWO YEARS.

- IN SUMMARY: ENEMY IS EXPLOITING THE BOMBING HALT TO SHIFT HIS LOGISTIC COMPLEX SOUTHWARD FROM NORTH OF 19TH PARALLEL TO RP-I, NEAR DMZ.

- EXPECT ENEMY TO PUSH SUPPLIES THRU LAOS (NOW DRYING OUT) TO SUPPORT ENEMY IN I & II CTZ.

- NO CONFIRMED EFFECTS SO FAR ON ENEMY ACTIVITY IN AND THROUGH THE DMZ. WE ARE WATCHING THIS CLOSELY.

\* White House, State, OSD, and Paris have information in this para.

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8. WHAT IS THE SCALE OF OUR AIR EFFORT IN LAOS TO STOP THE TRUCKS?

- 380 TACTICAL AIR SORTIES PER DAY.
- 20 ARC LIGHT SORTIES PER DAY.

9. WHAT IS THE CURRENT TACTICAL SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM?

- DURING 1968, THE ENEMY HAS CONCENTRATED GENERALLY ON OFFENSIVE EFFORTS BY MAIN FORCE NVA/VC UNITS.

- AS RESULT, CASUALTIES AND SUPPLY SHORTAGES HAVE IMPACTED MOST DRAMATICALLY ON NVA/VC REGIMENTS.

- OF 59 NVA/VC REGIMENTS IN SVN, 23 WITHDREW IN AUG/SEP TO NVN, LAOS AND BORDER SANCTUARIES. THEREFORE, WE HAVE INCREASED THE EMPHASIS ON ELIMINATING VC LOCAL FORCES AND VC INFRASTRUCTURE. (3 NVA REGTS MOVED BACK INTO III CTZ; NO SIGNIFICANT THREAT INCREASE).

- RESULTS INCLUDE:

-- HIGHER ATTRITION ON VC LOCAL FORCE UNITS,

-- IMPROVED CHIEU HOI RATE,

-- INCREASED EFFECTS ON VC INFRASTRUCTURE.

- GVN HAS INCREASED EMPHASIS ON TERRITORIAL SECURITY.

-- R/F COMPANIES DEC 67 - 931; NOW - 1,092.

-- P/F PLATOONS DEC 67 - 4,237; NOW - 4,615.

-- BOTH RECEIVING MODERN ARMS AND RADIOS RAPIDLY.

-- SELF-DEFENSE FORCES: 815,000 MEMBERS, 330,000 TRAINED, 86,000 ARMED.

- US/ARVN FORCES ARE OUT IN THE JUNGLES AND TRAILS AFTER THE VC LOCAL FORCE UNITS.

- ENEMY ACTIVITY IN NOVEMBER HAS BEEN GENERALLY LIGHT.

-- RECENT ACTIVITY MAINLY CENTERED IN SOUTHERN I CTZ, WHERE US OPERATIONS SEEKING OUT VC/NVA UNITS WHICH HAVE INITIATED RECENT ATTACKS ON HAMLETS, REFUGEE CAMPS, AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.

10. WHAT IS THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE PACIFICATION EFFORT?

- THERE IS A VIGOROUS ENEMY EFFORT TO ESTABLISH "LIBERATION" AND "REVOLUTIONARY" COMMITTEES TO GOVERN THE RURAL PEOPLE PLUS AN URBAN "ALLIANCE OF NATIONAL AND DEMOCRATIC PEACE FORCES."

- HOWEVER, THE PACIFICATION EFFORT SHOWS:

-- POPULATION CONTROL GAIN OF 3% IN OCT 68, (DOUBLE PREVIOUS RATE IN '68), WITH 69.8% GVN CONTROLLED, 14.9% CONTESTED, 15.3% VC CONTROLLED.

-- CHIEU HOI RATE SHOWED SHARP INCREASE IN SEP 68 (2,381 vs 1,130 AVERAGE DURING FIRST NINE MONTHS OF '68). 14,000 FOR YEAR.

-- VC INFRASTRUCTURE. SEP 68 BEST MONTH IN 1968 (EXCEPT TET & MAY PEAKS). 11,000 ELIMINATED THIS YEAR.

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- ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN BEGAN 1 NOV 68, AIMS TO BRING 1000 CONTESTED HAMLETS UNDER GVN CONTROL BY TET 1969.

-- SECURITY FORCES NOW IN 700 OF THE 1000 HAMLETS.

11. WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM?

- ENEMY HAS MADE A DECISION TO SHIFT MAJOR EMPHASIS FROM MILITARY TO POLITICAL OBJECTIVES TO ATTAIN HIS GOAL OF DOMINATING SOUTH VIETNAM.

-- A COMBINATION OF POLITICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MILITARY ACTIONS IS ENVISIONED.

- HE SEES OUR STRATEGY (CAPTURED DOCUMENTS) AS:

-- CLEAR AND HOLD.

-- REPLACE US UNITS WITH STRONG RVNAF.

-- ATTACK OF VC INFRASTRUCTURE.

- HE HAS SET FORTH THREE MEANS TO COUNTER OUR STRATEGY:

-- DESTROY OUR OUTPOSTS AND UNITS.

-- DESTROY WAR FACILITIES TO WEAKEN RVNAF.

-- MAINTAIN AND EXPAND HIS CONTROL OVER POPULATION.

- THE ENEMY IS INTENSIFYING ACTIVITY, BUT MINIMIZING CASUALTIES.

-- HITTING OUR OUTPOSTS, WHICH IMPEDE HIS RURAL OPERATIONS.

- HOWEVER, PRINCIPAL TARGETS HAVE BEEN:

-- VILLAGES AND HAMLETS.

-- PROVINCE AND DISTRICT CAPITALS.

- WEIGHT OF EFFORT SINCE 1 NOV AIMED AT POPULATION CONTROL; GREAT MAJORITY OF TARGETS ARE CONTESTED HAMLETS (OF 35 ATTACKED, ALL WERE CATEGORY B, C, OR D).

-- MANY OF THOSE ATTACKED ARE TARGETS OF OUR VC INFRASTRUCTURE OPERATIONS.

-- 69% OF ATTACKS ON HAMLETS THIS MONTH BY THE VC LOCAL FORCE UNITS.

- SUMMARY:

-- THE ENEMY PERCEIVES OUR PACIFICATION OBJECTIVES.

-- HE MAY WISH TO INDICATE AN NVA WITHDRAWAL AND SHIFT OF RESPONSIBILITY TO VC FOR MILITARY/POLITICAL OPERATIONS IN SVN.

-- WE CAN EXPECT THE ENEMY TO FIGHT US HARD TO DENY THE GVN CONTROL OF THE POPULATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

-- CONSEQUENTLY, SUCCESSES IN THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM, WHICH IS CRUCIAL TO THE FUTURE OF THE GVN, WILL BE HARD-WON IN THE COMING MONTHS.

LIST OF ATTENDEES, 594th NSC MEETING

Monday, November 25, 1968 - noon

The President

Secretary of State Rusk

Ambassador Wiggins

Assistant Secretary Sisco

Secretary of Defense Clifford

Secretary of Treasury Fowler

CIA Director Helms

JCS Chairman Wheeler

George Christian

Walt Rostow

Bromley Smith

Ed Fried

Tom Johnson

The Vice President and OEP Director Daniel were out of the city. The Acting Director of USIA had not been invited.

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