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<p>#20 memo of meeting</p>	<p>meeting of Jack Valenti with Apostolic Delegate 2 p. Top Secret 6-12-85 sanitized per NLS 84-397 Downgrade to Secret per NLS 84-397 open 8-30-10 NLS/RAL 10-13-16</p>	<p>memo dated 6/14/65</p>	<p>A</p>

FILE LOCATION

Meeting Notes File, Box 1

RESTRICTION CODES

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*DCM
10/87*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI/RAC 10-136
By id NARA, Date 8-11-10

Monday, June 14, 1965 - 10:30 a.m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Memorandum Of Record

Meeting with the Apostolic Delegate

11:25 a.m., June 11, 1965, at the Delegate's home-office

After being seated, I immediately told the Delegate that I had a message for him to transmit to the Holy Father.

The Delegate read the memorandum.

He looked at me thoughtfully, nodded his head and spoke quietly of how Catholics were being maltreated by the Quat government. He reported jailings and severe prejudice on the part of Buddhists. Also, he said, rather sorrowfully, that the priests most involved in stirring up the Catholics were emigrants from the North, where the Delegate reluctantly confessed, the hold of the Vatican over the Bishops was slight.

I remonstrated that the President considered the survival of the government of utmost urgency in the successful venture into the future. I told him that unless we were able to help a viable government become a reality in Viet Nam both the United States and the Vatican would be the losers. He agreed.

I told him we were determined to stay in Viet Nam until some semblance of order and cessation of terror became evident. We were ready, I assured him, to sit down at a conference table and talk out these problems. But we were unable to get the Hanoi people to even consider negotiations at this time. Thus, we were forced to keep our pressure up until talks could begin.

He promised that he would personally transmit this view and the memo to the Holy Father along with his own recommendations that the memo be followed.

Then, he turned to the Dominican Republic. The Dominican Papal Nuncio, Bishop Clarizio, is in Rome and has conferred with the Holy Father. The Delegate asked me what I thought of the Holy Father cabling all Nuncios in Latin America and telling them what Clarizio felt about the Communist intrusion in the Dominican Republic (that unless the Americans had arrived, the Communists would be in total control of the government today.)

~~TOP SECRET~~

I assured him we would find that most helpful and beneficial.

Before I left, I told him that in principle we agreed to the Holy Father coming to the United States to speak at the United Nations. I insisted that the President must however in the best interests of both the Vatican and the United States wait until we see how Article 19 would be resolved before concrete plans could be laid. Then, assuming all would be well on that front, the President would announce he would hope to speak at the United Nations General Assembly in the fall. After a reasonable wait -- say, a month -- the Holy Father could announce he had received an invitation to the United Nations and planned to accept. That way, it would not be so transparent that a meeting was to take place. The President could then, with some justification, meet the Holy Father in New York on the evening of the night the President spoke.

The Delegate assented, saying this was a sound arrangement and one the Vatican could certainly agree to.

He asked me to come back and have dinner with him, quietly, soon. He has other matters to discuss about problems of the United States and the Vatican throughout the world.

The meeting ended at 12:10.

Jack Valenti