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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#25 meeting notes	Sanitized 7-13-95 NSJ92-380 more released Near duplicate of #496, NSF CH VN, "2EE, Primarily McNamara..." Box 75 Sanitized 10-6-83 NLJ 82-51 Sanitized 5/25/01 NS/RAC 00-60 Luncheon meeting with foreign policy advisors Top Secret 6 p. Downgraded to SECRET per NSC 8-23-83	9/29/65	A
#25a-memo	Bundy for the President		
#25b-memo	McNamara for the President Top Secret 2 p. open 2-5-85 NLJ 84-364	9/22/65	A
#25c-memo	McNamara for the President Top Secret 1 p. open 2-5-85 NLJ 84-364	9/1/65	A
#25d-agenda	for 9/29/65 meeting 1 p. Secret Open 5/25/01 NS/RAC 00-60	9/29/65	A

FILE LOCATION

Meeting Notes File, Box 1

DCH 10/81

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EX-12938, Sub 3.5
NLS/KAC 00-60
By CG, NARA Date 2-16-01

25

September 29, 1965

FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Luncheon Meeting with the President, Ball, McNamara,
McGeorge Bundy, Raborn, Moyers, and Califano

Level of Forces in Vietnam

McNamara reviewed his memorandum of September 22, 1965, (attached) concerning the need to increase the level of forces in Vietnam. He said that the original estimate of 175,000 was now increased to 210,000. The proposed 35,000 increase did not involve any increase in combat troops; they were support troops, such as communications personnel and refugee relief units. McNamara requested an interim authorization to go to 195,000 men and indicated that he would be back to the President about November 15 with a request for the remaining 15,000 men. The President commented that it was a situation in which he had no choice but to approve the increase. McNamara confirmed the President's comment and the President approved the increase to 195,000 men.

McNamara said that the public announcement of increased troops would be made from Saigon as the troops arrived there. While he admitted that this would encourage rumors, he said that this was important for the security of our men and in line with previously announced policies.

Tear Gas

Bundy noted that Secretary McNamara had authorized a one-time use of tear gas by General Westmoreland. He said that the question of the continuing use of tear gas was still up in the air, although the authority to use tear gas technically remained with the field commander, General Westmoreland. Ball said it would be desirable for Westmoreland to use tear gas before the end of the week because of the Red Cross

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conference next week in Geneva, which might make some statements opposing the use of tear gas. McNamara said that the use of tear gas must be handled carefully in the right operation and that he was opposed to pushing Westmoreland to use it within the next few days unless Westmoreland felt such action was desirable. Bundy said that the President might get a press query about tear gas if he held a press conference tomorrow. McNamara suggested that the President respond by stating (1) tear gas is a humane way to restore order under certain circumstances and (2) Westmoreland is authorized to use it in those circumstances. Bundy underscored the importance of using the words "tear gas" rather than "non-lethal agents" or "riot control agents". Moyers said that we had been too defensive in our public handling of the tear gas situation, that we should remind the world that the Viet Cong slit throats and bomb children and that any human being in one of the Vietnam caves would prefer to cry from tear gas rather than be killed by hand grenades. Ball and Raborn agreed.

Rice Shipments

Bundy said Lodge had requested 100,000 tons of rice as fast as possible. Bundy proposed to make the rice available in four shipments of 25,000 tons each, rather than in a single shipment. The President approved this. McNamara said that no matter how we were shipping the rice, we were not sending enough rice to South Vietnam and that we should be sending three or four hundred thousand tons of rice. The President agreed and Bundy said he would make sure there was a continuing program for the purchase and shipment of rice to South Vietnam.

Possible Press Conference Statement

Bundy said he was inclined to the view that the President should make a statement at his press conference about the non-military elements of our Vietnam effort. Bundy said that only when the President makes such statements did they get any substantial coverage. He believed it was important to obtain such coverage in view of the world opinion and forthcoming student demonstrations. Bundy said he would submit a statement to the President for his consideration this afternoon.

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Dominican Republic

Bundy reported that the reports from the CIA and Bunker on the Dominican Republic were disturbing. He said that Hector Garcia Godoy had not moved to establish control over the left as he was moving to establish such control over the right. Bundy doubted whether there would be a military take-over as a result of Godoy's actions to date, but noted that General Alvin might well begin to think the situation so out of hand that he would support or approve some Dominican military action. After noting the President's desire to have a meeting on the Dominican problem as soon as possible, Bundy said Bunker believed it important to remain in the Dominican Republic until another OAS representative could arrive. Bundy recommended a meeting on Friday after Bunker's return. The President agreed. Bundy said that as a result of the President's interest in the Dominican Republic, he had held a meeting this morning with Mann, Vance, Helms and others, and that the group agreed that (a) there was a real danger of a popular front through which the communists would gain and (b) there was no clear leadership of the moderate and non-communist liberal elements in the Dominican Republic. In this situation Mann had expressed the view the United States might be forced to make a choice between two undesirable alternatives: (1) postpone the election or (2) let the military take over.

Bundy reported that Mann did not believe there was much hope of doing business with Bosch and also believed that we could not afford a popular front government in the Dominican Republic. Vaughn essentially agreed with Mann, but placed more emphasis on keeping continuing communications with Bosch and continuing to sanitize and improve the military leadership. Bundy said his own view was that we had pushed the military as far as we could at this time without first moving on the leftists.

Bundy reported that Ambassador Stewart was in communication with anti-communist Venezuelan liberals who were backing Miotlan for leadership of the PRD and that Ambassador Stewart would like to establish communication with them. Mann told Stewart to go to Caracas on some other business and open those lines of communications.

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Bundy pointed out that each Dominican faction was trying to find sympathy and support with its counterpart in the United States and thus divide us along the lines the Dominican factions were divided.

The President said that all these things should be sorted out and some proposals should be ready for discussion on Friday. He also said that Senators had reported to him that there would be an Internal Security Meeting in Miami at which testimony would be taken about the communist moving into the Dominican Republic.

[REDACTED]

The President asked who recommended Garcia Godoy. Bundy replied that out of the vacuum in June, Bunker and the OAS Committee felt that Godoy was the best man to build on. The President asked Admiral Raborn what he thought. Raborn said that he believed Godoy was fine and so reported at the time he was considered by our government as a provisional president down there, but that since then he has seemed to support the leftist elements.

Fulbright Letter

Ball said he had received a request from the Foreign Relations Committee staff for a compilation of Latin American reactions to Fulbright's speech on the Dominican Republic. Ball said there was very little reaction but it was highly favorable, most indicating that the Senator was correct and the Administration was mistaken. President expressed his concern about the adverse impact of Senator Fulbright's speech in terms of the Dominican Republic and the increased danger of a communist take-over. Moyers noted that USIA had said that the papers which had praised Senator Fulbright's speech were mostly leftist and communist. It was agreed that State should reply to the request putting any comments on the Fulbright speech in the Latin American papers in the true context. The President asked that an analysis of the Latin American press reaction be obtained from Leonard Marks.

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Foreign Visitors

Bundy said that there were several foreign visitors coming into town during the next several weeks but that President did not have to consider this until next week.

Pakistan/India

Bundy reported that Ayub said he could not come to the United States within the next six weeks. Bundy said that the Paks were placing increased pressure against United States installations there. Raborn reported that the Paks had just closed two more of our installations, making four U.S. stations in Pakistan that have been closed. Bundy said we apply our own, non-publicized salami tactics in retaliation. He said that he would have a proposal for the President's consideration in his night reading this evening. Bundy recommended that negotiations on the India/Pakistan question remain in the U.N. and that we concentrate on areas of mutual interest outside of the Kashmir dispute where the two countries might be able to get together in a more fruitful relationship. Ball said that this was tried in 1962 and did not work. Ball also noted that he was bringing in third countries, such as Germany, on our India/Pakistan policy because they felt they had been left out.

Foreign Aid Review

Bundy recommended that the Cabinet Committee do its work on foreign aid and that the special advisers approved by the President be called in to review the work. The President agreed and said he would consider the question of a chairman for the review group at a later date.


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The Shipping Question

The meeting adjourned to the President's office with McNamara, Ball, Moyers, Bundy and Califano. McNamara presented the proposed Rolling Thunder program. He also discussed the question of Hanoi's hardening attitude. He noted that there was a National Intelligence Estimate indicating that Hanoi's attitude was hardening, largely because we were not rough enough in our bombing. McNamara pointed out that the estimate was made without the benefit of advice from experts in the government such as Llewellyn Thompson, Maxwell Taylor et al. He urged a special study of the problem of Hanoi's hardening attitude and the reasons for it. Ball concurred and pointed out that it may well be that some aspects of the bombing program were responsible for Hanoi's hardening attitude. The President approved the Rolling Thunder program proposed by McNamara as well as the recommended study by Taylor, Thompson, McNamara, Ball, Bundy et al on the reasons for Hanoi's hardening attitude.

~~TOP SECRET~~ Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

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9-23-65
5:46p

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 23, 1965
Thurs. 8:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This paper came in after I left the office yesterday, and I think it is one you will want to read yourself and discuss directly with Bob.

Bob Komer knows the problem exists, and he will be glad to do any staff work you wish, but I have not cut him in, without your authority, on the numbers involved or on the nature of the McNamara recommendation.

McB. B.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

Merrin
Put on my desk
& let's get me over
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~~TOP SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON

RECEIVED
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

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Authority NLS 84-364
By us, NARS, Date 2-5-85

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22 SEP 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This memorandum outlines the basis for the increase in estimated US force requirements in South Vietnam from the 175,000 discussed in early July and mentioned in my July 20 recommendations to the 210,000 figure referred to in my September 1 memorandum to you.

You will recall that at your July 28 press conference you stated that you had ordered deployments which would raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately, that additional forces would be needed later, and that they would be sent as requested.

Prior to that date -- specifically, on July 24 -- the Joint Staff, as a result of MACV requests, had revised their total for 1965 deployment, increasing it to a little more than 195,000. I mentioned this higher figure to you at the time. At the August 2-6 Honolulu Meeting of General Wheeler, Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland, the 1965 "Phase I" requirements were refined to 210,000. The Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 23 therefore made specific deployment recommendations totaling approximately 210,000.

Refinements continue to be made. For example, General Wheeler on September 4 listed an additional 3,000 for the 1965 Phase I (mainly three engineer construction/combat battalions); at the same time he indicated that approximately an equivalent number listed earlier (mainly helicopter personnel) will be arriving after the end of 1965. My prediction is that the final version of the 1965 Phase I requirement will end up exceeding 210,000 by a few thousand.

The differences between the 175,000 figure first mentioned in July and the 210,000 number now being discussed are primarily attributable to additional (a) air lift to move supplies around the country for both civilian and military purposes, (b) air defense, (c) artillery to support offensive operations and to provide immediate response to calls for help by villages under attack, (d) strike aircraft and associated support, (e) engineers, primarily to construct additional air bases, and (f) fleshing out, according to General Westmoreland's requests, of existing operational units and advisory and support elements (refugee relief teams, intelligence teams, communications, and security units, etc.).

You have authorized the deployment of 175,000 US personnel. I recommend that, at the present time, you authorize the movement of an additional

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35,000 men, bringing the total to 210,000. These deployments are essential to our effort. The authority will cover our requirements as they now appear although, as we have discussed before, forces in addition to the 210,000 may be needed later.

Robert S. McNamara

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

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McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

1965 SEP 1 AM 11 54
September 1, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

General Westmoreland has requested and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have concurred in the movement of an additional increment of forces to Vietnam. This increment would be in addition to the 28 combat battalions, associated air squadrons, and logistic support forces--totaling 125,000--announced by you on 28 July. The request is for six additional combat battalions (making a total of 34), associated air squadrons, and logistic support forces--totaling 85,000 additional United States personnel.

I recommend that these additional forces be authorized for movement.

I further recommend that no announcement be made at this time of the decision to deploy additional forces, but that announcements be made only as forces arrive in the theater.

Signed
ROBERT S. McNAMARA

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By ics, NARS, Date 2-5-85

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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September 29, 1965

AGENDA FOR 12:30 MEETING, 29 SEPT.

1. Vietnam

- (1) level of forces
- (2) tear gas
- (3) rice shipments
- (4) possible press conference statement

2. The Dominican Republic

- (1) situation report
- (2) Bunker's return and a second meeting

3. Foreign visitors

4. Pakistan/India

5. Foreign aid review

6. Nuclear testing program

7. Operations against Cuba

8. Fulbright and 50-50 shipping on wheat to Communists

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 00-60

By CB, NARA Date 2-16-01

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