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#32 meeting notes	agen 10-6-83 NLJ 82-51 1/10/65 - meeting with foreign policy advisers on bombing pause possible classified information 4 p.	1/10/65	A
#33 meeting notes	agen 10-6-83 NLJ 82-51 duplicate of #32		

FILE LOCATION

Meeting Note File, Box 1

DCH 10/81

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Cabinet Meeting January 10, 1966, 1:10 p.m.

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Began: 1:10 - Ended: 2:10

Present: President Johnson, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Taylor,
Helms, Ball, Wheeler, Moyers, Valenti

Subject: Peace Offensive, discussions with Congressional
leadership, next steps, diplomatic and military.

RUSK Will brief Congressional leadership. Need to work out some procedures
in conjunction with peace. Some hardening of Soviet position since
Chicom attacks on them.

PRESIDENT Have 25 men who advise on foreign policy. Lippmann, Alsop, etc.
All these fellows will be spreading their judgment.

A minority will recommend *their own* too.

535 members have to give their report. Hardest thing is to say:
"I don't anything."

Ought to give serious thought not to getting the leaders down here but
have the men around this table to appear at as many hearings as possible --
and give them something to have to chew on before their mind hardens. --
To lay our case before them.

We have asked each person who has come back to town (Congressmen).
Of the 104 who have been queried, only 8 or 9 have problems economically.
What most interests him is Viet Nam; 80 feel we ought to follow current
course, 10 % want out, 10% want to go on.

Riverz wants us to go on with bombing. Morse wants us to get out. And
you'll have this dichotomy. Think Russell will be less likely to comment
on his opinions after Rusk testifies.

People will be upset and AP and UPI will provoke them.

Sat down with Dirksen and Mansfield -- and if we can get our ~~story~~ ^{story} over
to appropriate committees, would be better.

Mc Namara
~~RUSK~~

Supposed to start the 19th.

I guess that's all right. They will start talking the Mansifeld report on
Friday 14th.

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Authority NLS 82-51

By us, NARS, Date 10-6-83

SERVICE SET

1/10/66

-2-

What better way do we have to tell our story except through the Secretaries and the Committees?

RUSK Perhaps give a luncheon for official leadership of two Houses -- and talk with them.

PRESIDENT That is excellent:

Speaker	Mansfield	
Boggs	Albert	
Long	Russell	Rivers
	Fulbright	Morgan
	Hayden	Mahon
Ford		
Dirksen		
Kuchel		
Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Appropriations		

Now what about our military and diplomatic situation? When do we announce Harriman's visit to Viet Nam?

BUNDY We'd rather have V N Government announce this.

PRESIDENT I'd like to get it out today.

BUNDY If we go out there right now, it will be out here this evening.

PRESIDENT Should we say anything about a proposal in V N in our Soviet message?

RUSK No, unless we get something concrete today from Goldberg.

PRESIDENT Can we summarize where we are now?

RUSK Good deal of activity on the other side. Some statements are aimed at each other as well as us. Some Soviet statements have been aimed at Peiping. Don't have clear answer to what we've been doing. Don't think we are going to get a clear cut answer -- probably some complicated answer. 5-10% chance we'll get something less than a harsh rejection.

SERVICE SET

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- 3 -

Will take a few days to get anything. Shelepin (?) will wind up by Wednesday I believe. Leave S O N for revision pretty close to actual delivery, in case of Hanoi and Shelepin developments. About 3:00 p.m. will be satisfactory.

BUNDY You can announce Hanriman this afternoon -- if you choose.

PRESIDENT Good

RUSK We have word of 600-700 suspects picked up by Koreans -- How many are actually guilty ?

WHEELER About 10-15% turn out to be VC or sympathizers. Vietnamese and village chiefs do the interrogating.

PRESIDENT What do you think about V N, General Taylor?

TAYLOR Extension of bombing pause after Christmas was good -- if only to show Government sincerity. But now value is wearing off -- danger of extending it -- and get trapped into premature negotiations. We need to get word of caution out -- 2 years of negotiating in Korea. Being successful in getting a conference might be a failure.

PRESIDENT Why can't we get on with bombing after Shelepin leaves?

RUSK Serious political disadvantages if we break the Christmas through Tet pause. If we start bombing again, we would have to start all over again. There is no political advantage. There may be military advantage to bombing again.

McNAMARA Don't think there is a military disadvantage in starting up 3 or 4 days ~~earlier~~ earlier. We are ready to bomb again within 12 hours. We are running all sorties over Laos instead of NVN. Weather.

PRESIDENT Reconnaissance show anything alarming.

McNAMARA Renewing daytime operations -- building bridges. Even during bombing they were building up infiltration.

WHEELER Disagree, Bob. Every day makes a difference. We know both arms of railroad is operational. Assure getting full benefit of supplies. Full scale daylight operations are going on. Every day increases their capability in the South. Chiefs conclude we should make policy decision to resume ~~our~~ ^{our} operations against Hanoi as soon as Shelepin leaves. They are improving anti-aircraft defenses.

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RUSK We have to keep this on a day-to-day basis. Keep looking.

BUNDY Real problem is we decide on interval basis to bomb again. We need to put out the Wheeler info before we bomb again. While it was right to get the pause going, we need now to be saying all these things to clear the way for bombing resumption. As you have pointed out, we have done enough to satisfy the world, but no matter when we start someone will say we should have waited one week longer. At least 30 % of our accredited nations will protest bombing resumption.

TAYLOR We have 3 blue chips -- bombing -- large number of troops -- withdrawal

Under what circumstances do we continue cessation of bombing -- which means no way of pushing pressure on the other way. No way of proving cease fire violations.

WHEELER We simply cannot prove that NVN are there -- until we absolutely capture them.

TAYLOR We could adjust our bombing to the ratio of incidents.

PRESIDENT What's the net of your testimony to the Congress, Dean?

RUSK On V N, run over the summary of ^{diplomatic} ~~our~~ negotiations. Key question is how much we tell them in so far as sensitive info is concerned. Problems posed by Lynd.

Pres. I would answer ~~the question~~ "No good purpose to be served by going into details. Lynd is uninformed man."

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