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LIST OF INVITEES, NSC MEETING, SEPTEMBER 15, 1966

Thursday, 11 A.M.

Vice President Humphrey
ACDA Director Foster
CIA Director Helms
Secretary of Defense McNamara
Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton
OEP Director Bryant
Acting Secretary of State Ball
U.S. Representative to the UN Goldberg
Under Secretary of the Treasury Barr
USIA Director Marks
Bill Moyers
Walt Rostow
Robert Kintner
Bromley Smith
George Christian

Joe Sisco

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Papers for NSC Meeting on the United Nations
Thursday, September 15, 1966, 11 A.M.

1. Suggested Order of Business (Tab A)
2. State Department Paper - "Major
Issues at the 21st UN General
Assembly" which has been dis-
tributed to those present - (Tab B)

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MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, September 14, 1966

Mr. President:

The suggested order of business for the 45-minute NSC discussion of major issues at the 21st UN General Assembly is as follows:

1. Your opening remarks:
 - a. Meeting called to survey the major problems we face when the General Assembly meets in New York next week.
 - b. We take the UN seriously--not as an after-thought.
 - c. Our policies in the UN are part of our overall national security policy. Our stance here is the same as it is in New York.
2. Call on Acting Secretary Ball - (Ball may defer to Goldberg)
 - a. To summarize the major issues listed in the State Department policy paper.
 - b. To discuss the proposals for strengthening the UN's ability to run peacekeeping operations like the one in Cyprus and the one in Kashmir last fall.
3. Call on Secretary McNamara to comment on UN peacekeeping.
4. Conclude the meeting by:
 - a. Giving general approval to the U.S. objectives for this General Assembly meeting which are listed on the last page of the State Department paper.
 - b. Instructing Secretary Ball and Ambassador Goldberg to send to you specific recommendations for decision as policy issues come up in the General Assembly.

W. W. Rostow

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MAJOR ISSUES AT THE 21ST UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Political Climate

The 21st UN General Assembly will convene on September 20 in an atmosphere of uncertainty, anticipated controversy, and continued concern over the UN's ability to deal effectively with many critical issues. Although U Thant's announced desire not to continue as Secretary-General will contribute to this climate, the major elements will be feelings of frustration on the part of the Africans over several major problems in southern Africa and anxiety of the general membership over the war in Viet-Nam, a conflict which may preclude substantial Soviet-American cooperation in the Assembly.

This outlook is, nevertheless, moderated by our expectation that the UN will continue to support its two principal peacekeeping operations in the field (the UN forces in Gaza and Cyprus) as well as its economic and technical assistance programs. Moreover, the prospects of reaching agreement with the Soviets on a treaty governing the exploration of outer space are reasonably good. We can also use the Assembly period to probe quietly in private conversations possible further steps to achieve a peaceful solution in Viet-Nam.

Major Issues

The following are likely to be the major issues before the Assembly in some cases necessitating important decisions on our part at various stages of the GA:

1. The Secretary-General -- U Thant's request that he not be considered for another term as Secretary-General could, but need not necessarily, provoke a new crisis in the UN. As we have stated publicly, we wish to have U Thant

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reconsider his apparent decision and are trying to reach an agreement with other members on the best method of urging him to do so. Although enthusiasm for U Thant varies considerably, all major political groupings in the UN still seem to favor his continuation in office, a consensus formed in part from awareness that selection of a successor might involve a major dispute. In any case, we do not intend to explore an alternative to U Thant until we are convinced he will not accept a draft.

2. Viet-Nam -- While Viet-Nam is not now on the Assembly's agenda, it will strongly influence the thinking of many delegates and figure heavily in the general debate. The Soviets and other Communist delegations are likely to attack our policy and actions, and we think it probable that some non-aligned nations will display concern, if not outright criticism, contending that we are risking a wider conflict by our continued bombing of North Viet-Nam and refusing to deal directly with the NLF. For our part, we intend a careful exposition of our basic policy. While affirming our determination to resist North Vietnamese aggression, we plan to put special stress on our desire to engage in negotiations with the other side and the importance of our firmness in Southeast Asia for the continued existence of other small states throughout the world.

Our own statements and those which we will encourage other friendly states to make will be designed to help channel peace sentiment in the Assembly away from demands for unilateral concessions on our part toward balanced calls for unconditional negotiations and the principle of mutual de-escalation, but even so we expect to be subjected to heavy pressure to cease the bombardment of North Viet-Nam.

The Assembly session will provide opportunity for Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Goldberg to engage in private probes to determine whether some progress towards a peaceful solution in Viet-Nam can be made.

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3. African Problems -- The voting power of the Africans and their Asian friends, who share strong feelings on colonial matters, will again dominate many of the Assembly's decision making activities. The Africans will enter the session in a mood of frustration and bitterness since no headway has been made on the hard core problems of southern Africa. We will not be able to meet their demands for far-reaching sanctions and the use of force, and their exasperation over what they will consider our immobility may weaken our influence on a wide range of immediate issues in the Assembly and, in the longer range, stimulate initiatives at the UN which are increasingly pointed at us.

Although we cannot hope to satisfy intense African desires for strong measures against the minority governments of southern Africa, we should take whatever steps are available to us to demonstrate our concern over lack of progress in these intractable colonial and racial issues. In addition, we should indicate whatever follow-up is possible to the President's proclaimed intention to increase cooperation with the African states and to his approval of the Korry Report.

In Rhodesia the failure of UN-sponsored sanctions to bring down the Smith regime and the British efforts to negotiate with Smith have strengthened Afro-Asian distrust of the British and to some degree ourselves in respect to this problem. We must keep the British in front on this question, but we should also restate as our own policy our firm commitment to majority rule.

The Africans will press for an early decision on revocation of South Africa's mandate for South West Africa as a result of the International Court of Justice's failure to grapple with the substance of the matter in its decision of July 18, 1966. We must be prepared to take an early stand on the question of the mandate's revocation. While it would be desirable for political reasons to support revocation, an affirmative vote could carry the implication

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of readiness to take the enforcement action which would probably be required to give reality to revocation. We may also wish to take other steps to distance ourselves from South Africa. If South Africa should withdraw from the UN as a result of the mandate's revocation, we should stand aside.

Inasmuch as there are no prospects for forward movement in the Assembly with respect to apartheid, we must, in addition to registering our strong opposition to this policy, decide how to vote on a resolution which would "take no decision" on South Africa's credentials in the General Assembly. We should vote against such a motion which would nevertheless be adopted.

In the case of the Portuguese territories, we can expect to be in the minority on African resolutions calling for a total arms embargo and across-the-board economic sanctions against Portugal. We will continue to press Portugal to move toward self-determination for the people of her African territories.

4. Disarmament -- The slow, deliberate pace of the ENDC's negotiations will likely be the subject of debate and criticism in the General Assembly. This may be reflected in criticism of the ENDC as an institution, and may be accompanied by suggestions for modifying its composition and functions.

The failure of the ENDC to register dramatic progress on a non-proliferation treaty will be singled out for particular attention by many delegations. The Soviet bloc will certainly try to blame the U.S. for failure to reach accord on a treaty; a number of non-aligned may indicate their preference for the Soviet treaty draft and may even join in criticizing the U.S. We will probably not be supported fully by some of our major allies. We should be as forthcoming as possible on non-proliferation in light of the President's public statements. If progress is to

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be made on this question during the Assembly, it will be by private US-Soviet discussions rather than formal General Assembly action.

The Assembly can, however, consider the general question of security assurances for non-nuclear powers. We can explore with others the possibility of a resolution that would welcome the intention of states voting for it to provide or support assistance to non-nuclear states if they were the object of nuclear aggression. However, the Soviets will almost certainly oppose this, since they have already put forth a competing proposal calling for non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear parties to a non-proliferation treaty who do not have nuclear weapons on their territory. This proposal has already been supported by important non-aligned countries and variations of it are of interest to some of our allies. If we wish to take an initiative in the field of security assurances for non-nuclear countries which has some possibility of success, it may be necessary to consider including a provision in our proposal which would be responsive to the evident desire of many General Assembly members to receive assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used against them if they promise not to acquire nuclear weapons.

A possible means of breaking the deadlock in test ban negotiations would be a threshold proposal. Our seismic detection capabilities have improved to the point where our scientists can detect and distinguish almost all man-made underground explosions above the seismic magnitude of 4.75. This improved seismic capability is becoming known in the international scientific community, and others may suggest that it be the basis for extending the Limited Test Ban Treaty to prohibit underground tests above seismic magnitude of 4.75. However, this proposal has not been approved throughout the U.S. Government since some agencies believe the proposal would have undesirable limitations on the U.S. testing program. With regard to a comprehensive test ban there will be little sympathy at the GA with our position that on-site inspections are required for adequate verification.

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While conversations regarding regional control of conventional weapons are still in a most preliminary stage, we believe, if sufficient support developed, that there would be value in a resolution (a) stressing the dangers and waste of resources in conventional arms races; (b) encouraging regional consideration of agreements to limit importation and production of conventional arms; and (c) suggesting broad guidelines for such agreements.

5. Outer Space -- Considerable progress has been made towards agreement on an outer space treaty with only a few substantive issues still outstanding. The most important disagreement concerns freedom of access to installations on celestial bodies. Negotiations resumed on September 12 in New York and we are seeking agreement on a draft treaty which could be tabled at the coming General Assembly.

6. Chinese Representation -- This may be the critical year on Chinese representation. Our very tentative vote tally for holding the line against the usual resolution which would try to seat Communist China at the expense of the GRC is almost the same as last year, although there will be uncertainties as we near the actual debate which may take place in November. No nation has so far undertaken a serious effort to develop any alternative for the Assembly.

Whatever our contingency plans, we will in any case remain flatly opposed to any resolution which would substitute Communist China for the GRC, and we will continue to press strongly for a majority to maintain the view that any proposal to change the representation of China is an "important question" requiring a two-thirds vote.

7. Korea -- This year's debate on Korea may involve some fresh elements because of North Korea's recent moves to indicate its "independence" from Chinese Communist influence and refurbish Communist proposals for a conference on unification outside the aegis of the UN. We are trying to encourage the ROK to maintain a flexible position regarding tactics and regarding the wording of the seating and substantive resolutions.

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We are not, however, optimistic that the ROK will see its way to going along and we may have to continue with draft resolutions similar to those of last year. This item holds major importance for ROK morale, especially this year in view of the ROK military contribution to Viet Nam.

8. Peacekeeping -- Whether any concrete progress can be achieved on new arrangements for authorizing or financing peacekeeping operations by the UN is not yet certain. We will support every feasible move to sustain the UN's capacity to meet threats to the peace, improve the psychological climate for peacekeeping operations, and assure that the UN is prepared to continue peacekeeping even where there is no unanimity. With these limited ends in mind we might consider: (a) agreeing to a non-mandatory apportionment for peacekeeping costs above the one-third limit governing our mandatory assessment; (b) keeping adequate air transport units available at all times for UN airlift; and (c) proposing a U.S. program to train units earmarked by any other countries for the UN.

9. Oceans -- We intend to emphasize the importance of increased attention being given to the oceans, in particular the importance of further utilization of the economic resources of the oceans, both fisheries and minerals. In this connection, we will encourage greater concerted action in this area, including an exploration of the possibility of bringing together into a single agency various oceanic programs now going on in a number of different intergovernmental bodies. We expect wide support for our generalized approach at this General Assembly.

We do not at this time intend to make proposals on arms control and treaty arrangements on this subject.

U.S. Objectives

There are several important objectives which we ought to seek at the coming Assembly.

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(a) We will, in affirming our determination to resist Communist aggression, want to make a maximum effort to get across our desire for a peaceful solution in Viet-Nam;

(b) We should continue to express ourselves forthrightly on self-determination and majority rule in southern Africa, and be as forthcoming as possible on specific methods to achieve this (although it must be expected that our policy will appear negative to the Africans); we should also make a speech as a specific follow-up to the President's address of May 27 on Africa;

(c) We will want to assure that the GRC is not expelled or the Chicoms seated in its place;

(d) We will want to do everything possible to resolve the remaining differences between ourselves and the Soviet Union on a celestial bodies treaty;

(e) We will want to use the occasion of the Assembly to probe the Soviet intentions on possible moves in the disarmament field;

(f) We will want to ensure that UN objectives in Korea are reaffirmed;

(g) We will want to continue to support current UN peacekeeping operations, and at the same time seek a financial formula which will give some assurance that reasonable resources will be available in case of future needs; and

(h) We wish to take the initiative in organizing a more systematic and concerted international approach in the field of marine resources.

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