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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#96 memo	<i>open 6-12-85 N2184-395</i> Walt Rostow for the President Secret 1 p.	10/15/66	A
#96d agenda	Agenda for NSC Secret 1 p.	10/15/66	A <i>6-21-84</i>
#96f cable	State 66747 Secret 16 p. <i>Sanitized</i>	10/14/66	A
#96h agenda	Seven-Nation Conference Agenda Secret 1 p.	10/14/66	A
#96j cable	State 66738, pages 6-8 Secret 3 p. <i>open 6/10/82 N21598001</i>	10/14/66	A

FILE LOCATION

Meeting Notes File, Box 1

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Saturday, October 15, 1966
11:00 a.m.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on Your Asia Trip

The meeting is scheduled at 2 p.m. today. List of invitees attached (Tab A).

The agenda is attached (Tab B).

I thought you might want to start off with a brief report from Secretary McNamara on his trip to Vietnam and on his views of the situation there.

You might then ask Secretary Rusk for a report on the current status of planning and arrangements for the Manila Conference. The first question is: what do we want to come out of the Conference?

Discussion might focus on the scope paper (attached at Tab C).

The Secretary and Bill Bundy should have a list of things that remain to be done between now and October 24, the opening day of the Manila conference. There should be specific action assignments for the unfinished business.

I suggest the same procedure for discussion of your visits to other capitals -- the main problems by Secretary Rusk; list of things that remain to be ironed out; action assignments.

The agenda for Manila is buttoned up (Tab D).

A possible communique and Manila Declaration are attached (Tab E). Here -- aside from detailed drafting -- the issues are:

-- Do we want a separate Vietnamese Declaration as at Honolulu?
(I do. State uncertain.)

-- Do we want a separate broad statement of principles governing Asia policy? (I do. State originally reluctant, but moving.)

The issues should be explored at this meeting.

DECLASSIFIED

Author: NLS 84-385
By: [signature] 6-12-85

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Walt Rostow

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LIST OF INVITEES, NSC MEETING, OCTOBER 15, 1966

Saturday, 2:00 P.M.

Vice President Humphrey
CIA Director Helms
Secretary of Defense McNamara
Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance
Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton
JCS Chairman Wheeler
Secretary of State Rusk
Under Secretary of State Katzenbach
Assistant Secretary of State Bundy
Secretary of the Treasury Fowler
USIA Director Marks
Bill Moyers
Walt Rostow
Robert Kintner
Robert Komer
George Christiam
Bill Jorden
Bromley Smith

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 15, 1966

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Agenda for NSC Meeting on the President's Asian Trip

1. Brief report on Secretary McNamara's Trip
2. Manila Conference
 - (a) What we want to come out of it
 - (b) Main problems
 - (c) What needs to be done between now and the conference
 - (d) Who is responsible for (c)
3. Other visits
 - (a) Main problems
 - (b) What remains to be done
 - (c) Who will do (b)

 W. W. Rostow

Attachments:

1. Agenda for Manila Conference
2. Scope paper
3. Manila Declaration
4. Communique

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Authority State 7-10-79
By DCH NARS Date 10-16-81

CONFERENCE - SUBSTANCE

1. To clear our own thinking and provide guidance to several posts at which individual points are being raised in current discussion, we have prepared following draft paper covering scope and issues of conference.

It is divided into two parts as shown. Almost all of the points will have been covered by addressees in discussions already held, but others may be new to one or more. While paper should be used in toto or verbatim form, it should serve as current guidance for discussions as necessary. Request comment by all addressees to reach us by Monday for further refinement.

US OBJECTIVES AND POSITIONS

I. Themes, Purposes, and Areas of Work

A. The conference must serve as a vivid demonstration of the common collective purposes of the participants to support SVN in securing its independence and freedom from external interference. The participants

Drafted by: WPBundy:bmm 10/14 4235
U - Mr. Katzenbach (draft)
CoD - Mr. McNaughton
classification approved by: William P. Bundy

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must show their determination to carry through the conflict by all necessary and appropriate measures.

B. Review of Progress and Plans. The conference should be the occasion for the GVN to review ~~xxxx~~ all aspects of the situation, with other participants offering assistance and advice but with the GVN role paramount and the GVN in no sense "reporting to the Board of Directors for approval." Specifically:

- The military situation will be reviewed by a GVN spokesman (with ^{there} MACV ready to assist.) This should be fairly brief, and it should be no intent to produce new strategic or military decisions.
- Revolutionary development and pacification programs should be presented at greater length and stressed as a theme. The points made in Honolulu should be reviewed and progress noted. Future problem areas should be frankly explored in private, and if possible attainable future objectives and specific actions (such as retraining of ARVN for pacification) should be highlighted for use in communique.
- The economic situation should be reviewed, with due credit to GVN measures against inflation. Short term dangers should be noted and ^{also} measures to meet them discussed, and there should ~~be~~ be emphasis on continuing and long-term efforts to improve economic ~~and~~ development in SVN. While post-war planning should be referred to in the discussions, and limited actions in this area noted, there should be no implication that

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~~the report~~

the participants expect the conflict to end soon.

The GVN political timetable and program should be presented, but care should be taken that this is treated by the conference as a wholly internal matter, with any advice extended in low key & or preferably private. We hope and believe that the GVN will be prepared to reaffirm its program for Constitutional development in fairly ringing terms, and the latest indications are that the GVN is preparing to announce on Nov. first substantial additional stress on its amnesty program, including Chien Hoi. We do not wish to scoop the GVN announcement, which should be in a Vietnamese setting and occasion, but general language along these lines could ~~not~~ well be included in the communique.

C. Peace Objectives and Prospects for Peaceful Settlement. While this should be a major topic and theme for the conference, we should ~~be careful~~ ~~not to arouse hopes for any dramatic new initiative.~~

Again, the GVN should take the lead in stating its peace objectives and the issues it regards as fundamental and difficult. Private discussion among foreign ministers should be conducted concurrently with the main sessions, to elicit all possible differences of view. The public ~~the~~ documents of the conference should have as their minimum objective a GVN re-statement of its peace objectives along the lines of Tran Van Do's statement of June 1965 and other points covered in later GVN statements. GVN statements of

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stresses security under this topic, and the SVN situation can certainly be used as an example of the dedication of the participants to regional security and the defeat of aggression. As to regional political and economic cooperation, discussion of this topic at the conference should be held, but the major stress should be on the participants' describing what is being done by their nations in other groupings and organizations (ADB, ASPAC, ASA, etc.). The Manila conference should not be, or appear to be, a new action grouping in the Asian regional sphere. It should confine itself to being a specific grouping of nations assisting South Vietnam with military forces.

A. A communique will of course be required, and should be the occasion

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for stating the theme of determination in very firm tones, for reviewing ~~of~~ what the GVN has said about progress and plans and indicating the endorsement and assistance of the other participants for these plans, for indicating that peace was fully discussed, possibly with mention of the great number of negotiating initiatives and Hanoi's failure to ~~respond~~ respond), and for ~~stating~~ stating the common dedication of the participants, each in his own way, to Asian regional security and cooperation. It should be a record of the actions taken and topics discussed, with the accent on progress and non-military themes. The proposed public statement of GVN peace objectives might be included in the communique, with a shortened form in the Declaration covered under B below.

B. In addition to the communique, we tentatively believe that there should be a broader statement of principles (as distinct from a record of action and discussions) in the form of a Declaration. This should stress the peace objectives of the participants in relation to Vietnam, but could achieve a wider and more dramatic purpose by going on to link the common objectives in Vietnam with wider purposes in Asia -- that each ~~nation~~ nation should be free to develop as it sees fit, that the future of nations in Asia lies with Asians themselves, that nations located outside of Asia are welcome to assist toward the security and economic and social development of Asian nations, and that Asian and non-Asian nations should cooperate together toward these common goals, accepting the diversity of the nations of Asia and their respective national desires. (We are drafting a communique and Declaration along these lines and

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should have them in your hands early in the week.)

III. Handling of Conference Sessions

The physical handling of the conference is inseparable from the issues of substance and from our objectives. The following are key points:

a. The agenda now developed in Manila (~~XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX~~)

~~XXXXXXX~~ appears satisfactory.

(FYI and possibly Ky End FYI)

b. Speeches. We concur that only President Marcos should make a public speech. (Seoul please note.) Speeches by all the chiefs at the outset would

be too long and might only highlight differences that we hope would be

largely ironed out in the conference. Speeches at the end would have the

same difficulty, and the communique, and Declaration, should then speak

for themselves. However, would like Saigon comment on whether Ky should speak but not others, and how good he would be.

c. Time for Discussion. As we have pointed out ~~sk~~ to Manila, we believe

that the present schedule may unduly accent all-chiefs social occasions

at the expense of essential working discussions with major delegation

members present. The GVN must have enough time to present its full

picture, and time must be reserved on the second afternoon for ironing

out the communique and Declaration.

d. Attendance. We ourselves will have roughly ten senior people in

attendance, which seems to fit with the delegations so far submitted by

GVN, GOA, and RTG. Our own delegation has a virtually continuous and

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inter-locking interest in the main action items on the agenda, subject to

the below. If we want to cut back for particular sessions we can, but facilities should allow full delegations if desired.

e. Separate meetings of foreign ministers. We believe it essential that

the foreign ministers conduct separate meetings just as soon as the main

agenda ~~turns~~ turns to plans and progress items. This might even be con-

currently on the morning of the first ~~of~~ day. The first and foremost aim

of the foreign ministers should be to thrash out all the problems ~~over~~ under peace

the ~~possible~~ objectives and settlement headings. Secondly, the foreign

ministers (possibly with a drafting sub-committee) should refine and to

the maximum possible extent complete the communique and Declaration

for final revision by the chiefs on the second afternoon. These meetings

should be private, and held to minimum attendance, with the strongest

injunction against leaks.

f. Presentations in the main conference session. The GVN should be

prepared to take the lead on all the action items. As at Honolulu, Saigon will

have worked with the GVN on the form and content of these presentations,

so that they are as current and mature as possible, but also so that the

US hand shows as little as possible.

g. Press briefings and leak problem. We are only tentative at this stage

on press briefings. A mid-day briefing may be strongly desired by the

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~~XXX~~ GOP and perhaps others, and may have some advantage in keeping
In any case, we do envisage press briefing at close of first day.
the large US press corps happy. // Moreover (even if the participants stay at
the Palace) absence of a briefing may compound the leak problem. In
general, the leak problem appears very serious, with the GOP having no
tradition at all of discretion or security and the ROK having its own customs
and probably its own press pressures. ~~KACHX~~ If we could induce
Marcos to say something strongly about this at the start of the main private
sessions, this might be generally helpful and specifically inhibiting on the
GOP participants. However, any actions we can devise will probably not
prevent some leaks, and we must direct ourselves to the areas where ^{they} ~~there~~
would be most damaging -- any differences expressed in the meeting and
particularly the ~~pre~~ peace settlement discussions of the foreign ministers.

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PROBLEM AREAS AND ISSUES

These points are keyed to the headings under "US Objectives and Positions" above.

I-A

1. There are indications that the GVN wants the participants to make a "multilateral security commitment." The Thai might also raise the strengthening of SEATO, including the possible expulsion of France and Pakistan and perhaps even the addition of Korea (GRC?). We of course want the participants to join in the strongest possible declaration of their common determination to see SVN through to independence any new US undertaking or and freedom from external interference. But any "commitment" in the sense of a treaty or new alliance seems to us unwise from any standpoint. As to SEATO, we would not rule out appropriate discussions in the SEATO setting of changes in membership, but would not wish to see this a serious conference topic. Generally speaking, we have grave doubt whether any new alliance structure is wise, since it would add little to existing commitments and attitudes (or capabilities), and might only highlight the unwillingness of such key nations as Japan to participate in any such grouping. (FYI: It could not be ~~sxk~~ ratified now without grave difficulties. End FYI).

2. Joint Command. This appears to be only a ROK idea, which we have apparently successfully cooled off. FYI This has been the subject of some discussion and our reaction is negative. and consideration here and in Saigon, but END FYI we do not believe the inevitable complexities can well be addressed in this conference or that the conference ~~simply~~

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should take any position on it. Above all, SVN attitudes are paramount.

3. Consultative Group of Ambassadors. The ROC has suggested this in Washington, to which we are clearly negative. On the other hand, we would see little problem with periodic meetings in Saigon, which could be handled to taste.

4. Further meetings of the Participants. Our minds are open on this, and much will depend on how this conference comes out. Separate later meetings of the Foreign Ministers are a possibility we could certainly consider, but with appropriate caveats about the difficulty of scheduling.

I-B

1. Military Emphasis. The ROC appears unhappy with the relatively light military emphasis we have envisaged. [

] We are negative on both counts, believing that the kind of reaffirmed determination we expect to see in the communique should be entirely adequate warning to Hanoi.

2. On economic matters, the GOP appears to have some rather flamboyant long-range development notions that may be ahead of the possibilities. We want this topic in, with appropriate stress, but it should/be allowed to run away.

3. The meshing of GVN plans for a November 1 amnesty offer with whatever said in the communique will need care. Saigon should comment with care on this.

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and we will try to cover it in the forthcoming drafts.

4. In general, other participants may be less prepared than we to let the GVN really take the lead in this whole area.

At the same time, if the GVN presentations include ^{appropriate} ~~appropriate~~ mention and stress for the ROK role, the Philippine role (however embryonic) and the role of the other participants, ^{this} ~~which~~ will help head off friendly lectures for national consumption.

I-C

1. Marcos is at one extreme in stressing the peace theme excessively (including his now we hope aborted proposal for a bombing pause) while the GVN and ROK are at the other extreme, perhaps wanting less emphasis on peace than we see as necessary. The Thai will probably incline to the latter view. However, the GOA, GNZ, and US appear to be very close in their views; and the substance of the GVN proposals accords with our own views. We should continue to cool the GOP, while assuring the GVN and ROK (as Moyers has now done in Seoul) that there will be full stress on determination and action measures, and that we do not look for dramatic peace initiatives. (NOTE: Points 2-7 below are for Saigon comment only, not repeat not as guidance to others at this stage.)

2. We do not yet see any significant pressure to have public statements go into the tough negotiating issues except to the degree that we may achieve real private agreement on them. The GNZ had a lot of bright ideas, but we do not believe will press them

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and handle it quietly with them beforehand.

3. The GVN (and ROK) are talking a great deal about "guarantees" and not withdrawing until a full security structure is in being. We are not yet prepared for sweeping future assurances now, and this will take careful handling. The essential elements of SVN's future security are the expulsion of all North Vietnamese elements and SVN being able to call on trusted friends for help if they return. These are not at all inconsistent with our position that SVN might be neutral, and that we do not need to retain forces or bases there after NVN aggression ceases.

4. The GVN may want to say something public about the terms of a cease-fire. We have always thought that a cease-fire must include full GVN freedom to exercise its functions in entire country, but the topic is hard to cover in public language without appearing hostile to an ending of hostilities in some form and through some stages. This will have to be covered in private discussions in Saigon and Manila.

5. The question of amnesty and reconciliation language seems the best way to deal with the NLF role in SVN politics. As to the NLF role in negotiations we note the adamant GVN position against mentioning this, and are inclined to think that the subject simply should not be covered in any public statement.

6. Withdrawal Conditions: We have pitched our own position in terms of a phased withdrawal as and when all North Vietnamese elements are withdrawn. The GVN speaks in terms of withdrawal when its security is assured and guaranteed. We need to work out some formula that reconciles these two positions without adding to our commitments/ or detracting

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from our public position. This is a tough one. However, the Tran Van Do four points are excellent on the general theme of withdrawal, and we should be able to make some news by a GVN statement that they will ask foreign forces to leave under stated conditions, and a reciprocal ~~expression~~ expression by the other participants that they share this view.

7. Terms of Bombing Cessation. Again; Marcos has been out of line on this one and we believe most of the participants will accept privately our position calling for reciprocity. However, there might be real difficulty in getting the GVN to discuss this topic in any public statement, and we will have to play this one by ear. Perhaps the communique could contain an affirmative statement that ^{the} bombing of the North is justified and necessary so long as infiltration and military activity ~~persist~~ persist in the South. By implication, this would contain the conditions under which the bombing could be stopped.

301(1) 8. ~~Identifying an Intermediary for Negotiations.~~

is clearly unrealistic at present. We should be categorically negative, while of course making clear--perhaps in the public statements--that we will always welcome any constructive initiatives by any nation, especially the Asian nations.

9. Status of the Participants in Negotiations. A draft ROX communique just received contains emphatic language that the participants will not be bound by any

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negotiations in which they do not participate. There is also language that the participants must be full members of any negotiating forum. This position--which may be shared in some degree by others--~~brings~~ presents a difficult issue. The probabilities are that realistic peace negotiations would take place on some much narrower basis at least at the outset. We shall have to work here on some formula that guarantees full consultation at all times and the best possible consultation and agreement as negotiations actually develop. However, we cannot see tying our hands by any concurrence necessity for the explicit ~~consent~~ of all participants at all stages. To repeat, this is a tough one, and should be soft-pedaled in any local discussions. It can be handled effectively only by private talks at Manila in our present judgment.

I-D

1. In this general area, we had thought of language which would speak of our respect at least for the territorial integrity of other nations in the area (including Cambodia). Bangkok regards this as acceptable to the RTG, and it seems the least we should aim for. This will need special care in the draft communique.

II-B

1. Marcos apparently wants only a communique (presumably of a resounding sort) but not ~~repat~~ not a declaration. Our own inclination remains to have a lot of action progress and other solid fact covered in the communique, with the declaration covering more general principles. In short, we see a need for both.

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2. Marcos and the ROK, plus Thanat, have been in varying degrees favorable to a sweeping Asian charter of some sort, as the declaration. We continue to believe that this is not the setting to propound such a universal charter, and that the best treatment would be to state the principles of our actions in Viet-Nam and relate these to our common wider ^{purposes} ~~purposes~~ in Asia. This would in fact embrace many of the same points that Thanat and others are making, but not as a document for universal adherence at this stage. We note that the ROK has developed misgivings and now feels that any such ^{universal} ~~document~~ might better come from ASPAC. We agree.

III

that

1. General. We continue to have the impression the ROK GOP arrangements allow inadequate time for real working sessions with participation by adequate delegations. Manila should be working hard on this. This need not of course mean that adequate time is not provided for direct meetings limited to the top participants. (As to the GVN, we assume both Thieu and Ky should be invited to such occasions.)

2. We have some loose ends on whether delegations ~~will~~ will include Congressional participants. Earlier, we thought it a good idea for the GVN to bring perhaps two leaders of the Constituent Assembly, even if they only participated in the political item on the agenda. We still incline to this view, and would like status report from Saigon on whether Ky might now agree. ~~However~~ However, we are somewhat disturbed at indications that GOP may have as many as four Congressional

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representatives in its delegation. This may be a political necessity to Marcos, but dangers the danger of leak and partisan advantage appear great. At any rate, all addressees should be making clear that President will not repeat not be bringing any Congressional representatives in our delegation, although we regard GVN itself as a special case, in light of the unique status of the Constituent Assembly at the present time.

GP-3

End.

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CONFERENCE - SUBSTANCE

To show you the shape of our current thinking on the possible contents of a communique and accompanying Declaration, ~~xxx~~ we are sending you for quick over-night comment very preliminary drafts of these two documents. Without attempting to provide ~~you~~ ^{us} with detailed drafting changes, you should give us your broad-brush comments on scope and content for further discussions tomorrow. We expect then and our accompanying to refine these documents ~~and to accompany them by a full~~ analysis of the scope and issues of the conference. Do not repeat not discuss these drafts with GVN.

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
EE: WPBundy:bmm 10/14	4235	William P. Bundy

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EO 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLS-58001
By cbm NARA, Date 8-23-02

S/S - Mrs. Davis

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COMMUNIQUE

1. Leaders of seven nations in the Asian and Pacific world have met for the past two days in Manila. Represented in the Philippine capital were Australia, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, the United States and Viet-Nam. Their common concern is the defense of the freedom of South Viet-Nam to which they are all contributing forces and resources. Their common goal is the restoration of peace to that troubled land and the opportunity this will afford to build a good and free life for the entire Vietnamese people living in tranquillity among their brothers in Southeast Asia and in the larger world of Asia and the Pacific.

Action Programs

2. Security provides the shield behind which the South Vietnamese people can build up their country -- without it there can be neither peace nor freedom, neither progress nor prosperity. Thus the seven nations turned their attention first to the military struggle and the equally important "other war". Through the program of revolutionary development, and behind the military shield, the Government of Viet-Nam has begun the forging of a social revolution. It is joining hands with the villager to root out the poisons of terror and intimidation and replace them with schools and wells and clinics and a revived local government at the service of the people. The conference also learned of the measures taken by the GVN to bring under control an inflation which, if left unchecked, could have undermined all the efforts to provide a better livelihood for the Vietnamese people.

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3. Even while the leaders were meeting in Manila the first steps to establish a new constitutional system for South Viet-Nam were being taken in Saigon through the work of the Constituent Assembly, elected on September 11. The conferees heard reports of these deliberations and the successive steps which are to follow until there is installed in Saigon some time next year a government of the people fashioned according to the framework of the constitution now being drafted.

4. The leaders of South Viet-Nam set the Manila consultations in motion by their effective presentation of their efforts and their objectives in each of the fields mentioned above. They recalled the goals set last February at the Honolulu Meeting and noted what progress had been made since that time. Specifically they underlined the greatly expanded training for cadre in the revolutionary development program, the reorganization and retraining of army units to gear them better to the pacification efforts, new anti-inflationary fiscal and budgetary provisions to be enacted shortly, forward steps in land policy ^{the undertaking of a joint} ~~and other measures~~ GVN-US study on the longer-range economic development of SVN under (name) and (name), ~~and other measures~~ and (etc., etc.).

5. The contributing nations all pledged their continuing help, according to their means, in the civil programs of the "other war", whether in funds, technicians, equipment, goods or whatever. They congratulated the leaders of South Viet-Nam for their vision and courage in setting their course toward a representative, constitutional government even while engaged in a bitter war within their borders. All of the conferees recognized that this progressive

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action by the GVN was as essential to defending its country and winning the peace which will follow as any other single step.

The Search for Peace

6. A central question for the leaders of the seven conferring countries was and is: "how can peace come to Viet-Nam?" Despite efforts ranging world-wide which have sought over and over again to follow up every avenue and approach to North Viet-Nam and its supporters, Hanoi has not been persuaded to abandon the path of violence and join in some dialogue, tacit or explicit, to find the way back to peace. The Conference reviewed the efforts which have been made and the courses which might be opened in the future. They consulted among themselves on terms which could assure full security and freedom of choice for South Viet-Nam and which might also hasten the day when the authorities of North Viet-Nam will realize that their real interests lay in peace and not in continuing the war.

Finally the Conference looked ahead to a happier time when a peaceful Viet-Nam would live in tranquillity with its neighbors, with all of them benefitting from an expanding exchange of goods, of people and of ideas brought about by individual, national, and broad, cooperative regional efforts.

7. The six nations providing help to South Viet-Nam solemnly affirmed their determination to stand by that country's side until its security and freedom of choice is assured. They undertook at that time to withdraw their forces and to seek to retain no special position or rights in South Viet-Nam.

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8. The Conference endorsed the efforts which have been made, particularly by the Government of the United States of America, to convert the struggle from one of force of arms to a contest across the negotiating table or even in some quieter diplomatic context. Despite the discouraging lack of any meaningful response it was unanimously agreed that every remotely promising lead should be followed up. After vigorous discussion of differing points of view, a thorough understanding was reached on the possible kinds of settlement terms which could bring peace and assure to South Viet-Nam the precious right to determine its own future. This was based on the statement of South Viet-Nam's peace objectives formulated by Foreign Minister Tran Van Do on June 22, 1966.

9. (At this point there would be a statement of the contributors on the prisoner-of-war issue.)

10. Finally the conferees discerned the further goals of a community of Asian and Pacific nations, each respecting the independence and the territorial integrity of the others, and all working together for their common benefit despite differences in political or economic systems. Such a community of nations would provide a further assurance that Viet-Nam, North as well as South, would have a home where it could survive and follow its own pattern for its internal system but benefitting from the freest interchange of goods and people and ideas."

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DECLARATION OF MANILA

(Names and Titles of Participants and their nations, in appropriate order) have joined together in Manila on this 25th day of October in order to make clear their objectives in South Vietnam and the relationship of those objectives to the wider purposes they believe to be shared by all free Asian nations, for the future of Asia.

1. We are unalterably determined that South Vietnam shall be independent and free from political interference in the determination of its own future. We support ~~support~~ the peace objectives enunciated by the Government of South Vietnam and will join with that Government in seeking any avenue to a peaceful settlement.

2. The basic principle at stake in South Vietnam is that aggression in any form, overt or covert, must not be allowed to succeed in Asia or indeed in any other part of the world. Although it is primarily the task of each individual nation to secure and defend itself against aggression, the assistance of other nations for these purposes, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, must continue to play an important cooperative part in view of the fact of aggression in South Vietnam and the threat of such action elsewhere in Asia.

3. As we here dedicate ourselves anew to assist South Vietnam in its present struggle and in the economic development and progress of its people, we believe it to be useful to set forth certain principles which we hold in common. We believe that the effort we are now making in South Vietnam is consistent with, and

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indeed fundamental to, these principles. We base our hopes ^{thereon} /not only for the future of South Vietnam, but for the future of Asia and the Pacific region.

a. It is the unalienable right of peoples freely to determine their own future and to create for themselves the political, economic, and social institutions that they decide they want to meet their own needs and desires.

b. The use of force is an unacceptable means to alter territorial arrangements or to impose on ~~others~~ others against their will a system of government or a political ideology. This is true whether the aggression be direct or by ^{proxy,} ~~proxy,~~ whether it be overt or covert.

c. Each nation has the inherent right of self-defense and the right to seek the help of others in preserving its chosen way of life and its territorial integrity.

d. It is vital to the security of men and to the peace of the world that aggression be deterred where possible, and that it be met and turned back quickly where it occurs.

e. We affirm our respect for the sovereignty and for the territorial integrity of all states, whatever their prevailing ideological tendencies or political systems.

f. The economic interdependence of our ~~nations~~ nations and of our neighbors in the Asian and Pacific region is evident and we are determined to work toward increasing the flow of goods, skills and resources among us to mutual advantage.

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g. In Asia and the Pacific, as in other regions of the world, there is a clear responsibility of the nations concerned to develop closer regional ties and institutions that will meet the demands of our peoples more effectively than can ever be possible if we move individually or only through bilateral channels.

h. There is a fundamental responsibility for the industrially advanced and economically strong nations to provide as much assistance as possible to ^{young} ~~young~~ and under-developed nations. This is a matter both of moral right and of mutual benefit.

i. We seek always to erase the differences -- ancient and modern -- that divide us one from another, large nations from small, Communist nations from non-Communist, industrially advanced from less developed.

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j. Peace is the greatest ~~measure~~ of men and of nations -- and we are pledged here and henceforward to work always to preserve the peace where it exists, and to find peaceful solutions where it does not.

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