

**NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#9 memo w/meeting notes	<i>more info released 10-29-92 NLS 91-202</i> sanitized 11-14-85 NLS 85-13 Jim Jones to the President - NSC meeting 9/13/67 Secret 4 p.	9/13/67	A
#10 memo w/meeting notes	duplicate of #9		A
#10a memo	Bromley Smith for NSC Secret 1 p.	9/8/67	A
#10b paper	Major Issues of 22nd UN General Assembly <i>open 1-7-85 NLS 84-398</i> Secret 5 p.	n.d.	A
#10c agenda	NSC meeting		
#11 memo	Walt Rostow for the President <i>open 11-12-85 NLS 85-348</i> secret 1 p.	9/13/67	A
#11a cable	Paris 3224 2 p. <i>open 7-8-85 NLS 84-396 85-347</i> Secret	9/13/67	A
#12a memo	Walt Rostow for the President <i>open 7-8-85 NLS 84-396</i> Secret 1 p.	9/12/67	A
#12b agenda	order of business for NSC meeting <i>open 7-8-85 NLS 84-396</i> Secret 1 p.	9/12/67	A
#12d paper	summary of State Dept. paper <i>open 7-8-85 NLS 84-396</i> Secret 2 p.	9/12/67	A
#12f memo	duplicate of 10a		A
#12g paper	duplicate of 10b		A
#12h memo	handnotes possible classified info. 1p.	n.d.	A

FILE LOCATION

Meeting Notes File, Box 2

DCH 10/81

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FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JIM JONES

SUBJECT: National Security Council Meeting in the Cabinet Room -
Wednesday, September 13, 1967

Meeting convened: 12:32 PM

President departed meeting 12:58 PM

Attending were: The Vice President, Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary Katzenbach, General J. P. McConnell, Leonard Marks, Ambassador Goldberg, Under Secretary Paul Nitze, CIA Director Dick Helms, Secretary Henry Fowler, Joe Sisco, Bromley Smith, Walt Rostow and George Christian.

The President opened the meeting calling on Under Secretary Katzenbach.

Katzenbach pointed out that Secretary Rusk will be going to the United Nations for the usual meetings of Foreign Ministers. He said these are very helpful and useful to have these bilateral discussions, although it is very wearing on Mr. Rusk. Katzenbach said that the Africans are better than they used to be. They held together well, and they are more realistic than they used to be. Katzenbach said the President's announcement of the U.N. Delegation with new and different people is very helpful politically both the the United Nations and to this Administration domestically. Katzenbach said that Joe Sisco briefed the NATO people on the Middle East and this was helpful, but he is not sure that they will stay considering the pressure the NATO countries are under. On Vietnam, Katzenbach said Goldberg has been having discussions with the U. N. delegates.

The President said he appreciated what Katzenbach said about the United Nations delegation. The President then called on Goldberg for discussion of the major issues facing the United Nations General Assembly.

Goldberg said there are about 100 items on the General Assembly agenda, many of these are repetitious. The principal issues listed by Goldberg were Middle East, Vietnam, non-proliferation, Chinese representation, oceanography and African problems.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-202

By WJ, NARA, Date 10-13-92

Goldberg began with the Middle East saying that there are some signs of moderation in the Arab camp, and some signs of hardening in the Israeli camp. He said this presents a problem for us. Israel has serious internal problems and it is difficult for any Israeli spokesman to be "sweetly reasonable." Goldberg pointed out that Israel takes the President's statement of June 19 and uses those portions it likes and omits those portions it does not like. On the withdrawal issue, they have referred to the President's statement on June 19. Goldberg said he believes the United States has a sound policy. We don't charge the Israelis with aggression. Goldberg said it will be more difficult in the next session to hold the line against a resolution in line with our desire for peace in the Middle East. He said he believes Israel feels now that they would have been better to support the Latin proposal we supported which also included a withdrawal provision. They were with us tactically in getting the Latin Resolution voted, but they now say that was merely a tactical support, Goldberg said. Goldberg said the minimum conditions for a sensible peace in the Middle East is a commitment by the Arab states that they are not in a state of war with Israel. If the Arab states do this (and Goldberg pointed out that the Khartoum Conference did not say this) we may have to part with the Israelis on formulation.... Goldberg said the Israelis have not faced up to the demographic problem....

Goldberg then turned the discussion to Vietnam. He said he has not discussed this with all members of the Security Council. Our friends are timid and reluctant. They don't want to come along. They don't think the Security Council will reach a settlement. If they are solid in this belief, nothing could come out. He said Canada, Great Britain and the Danes have shown great diffidence. Russia says don't get into this. They said they would veto a straight resolution.

The President asked who feels we should go to the Security Council.

Goldberg said the general feeling is that we ought not to do it.

The President asked how many on the Council.

Goldberg replied 15. Goldberg pointed out that Argentina, Brazil and China are with us on going to the Council. Bulgaria is lukewarm. Denmark would rather not be involved, Ethiopia is a question mark, France is no. India is against us. Japan will go along but they are not enthusiastic. Mali is against us.

Russia is against us, United Kingdom is against. But will vote with us if pressured.

The President then summarized saying that actually there are only three for us.

1.3(6)(5) Goldberg said he wanted to take exception to a statement made by Secretary Rusk that there will be a future time to go to the United Nations with this. Goldberg pointed out that this will be the last time we can manage the Security Council. He said that we could probably maneuver the Council [redacted] but that after January, this would not be possible, because we lose Japan for Pakistan, [redacted] 1.3(6)(5) We lose Mali. We lose Bulgaria for Hungary; Nigeria for Senegal; Argentina for Paraguay. Goldberg also pointed out that Russia may be playing a waiting game. They may try to go before the new Security Council with a Resolution condemning our bombing.

The President asked what was thought of our going to the U.N. and getting defeated.

Goldberg said I don't think this would be considered a rebuff, although the press may say it is a rebuff.

The President asked can we close off....

Goldberg said no, if they were solid we would have nine votes, but they don't want to be involved.

The President asked what Goldberg's recommendation was.

Goldberg replied I would go recognizing the great dangers. We could not come out with anything that would hurt us. I don't think anything would come out at all. There would be some who would say this was a rebuff, but this would show to the Mansfields and that group that we at least tried.

Secretary McNamara said I'd be for going before the United Nations if there was any possibility that it would pass. But I don't think it will and they will say it was a rebuff because of our unreasonable and inhumane action in the bombing. On balance, that would be a loss in my judgement.

Goldberg said I don't agree.

Katzenbach said he agrees with McNamara. If we got Ethiopia in and got the nine votes to inscribe it, and the question was on unilateral cessation. I figure there would be five in favor, five against, and five abstaining. Probably Algeria and Ethiopia would abstain. That would put Canada and the United Kingdom really on the spot. I think a 5-5-5 situation would be no gain for us.

McNamara said he believes such results would feed the Mansfields et al with new fuel to tell us to stop the bombing.

The Vice President said it depends on what the issue is. If we are rebuffed, the reason may be phrased because we held our old position of quid pro quo. While I am anxious to have the United Nations have some involvement in this, I don't think we should do it if we don't have the votes.

Goldberg said one thing that has been overlooked is that we may not get to the resolution at all. Russia will not support a move to amend on the bombing. Hanoi has already said this and Russia has picked up this line. In my judgement the resolution would just flounder into a state of disagreement and we would get credit for having tried.

The President asked, is that a plus in relation to where we are now? I feel that Mansfield might think that would be a plus, the President said.

Katzenbach said Mansfield would regard those evils as we do.

The President said you should talk to Mansfield when he gets back from Japan.

Goldberg then began discussing the non-proliferation treaty. Saying the likely situation will be that the ENDC will suspend its deliberations soon and the discussion of the non-proliferation treaty in the assembly will be in circumstances which there is no agreement on Article III. Our objective should be in concert with the USSR to maintain the present non-proliferation treaty intact to try to assure certain of the non-aligned of our willingness to consider the assurances problem within the context of the U.N. resolution. Our aim should be to have the matter returned to the ENDC so that further attention can be given to Article III and consultations can be undertaken within the ENDC to see whether the assurances problem can be taken care of in the form of the U.N. resolution.

The President departed the meeting at 12:58 PM, and turned the remainder of the meeting over to the Vice President.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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September 8, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The attached State Department paper on Major Issues of the 22nd UN General Assembly will be considered by the National Security Council on Wednesday, September 13, 1967.

Bromley Smith

Bromley Smith
Executive Secretary

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.4(b)
White House, Washington, D.C. 20503
By Oct 11/23, 1984 6-21-84

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MAJOR ISSUES OF THE 22nd UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Four principal issues will tend to dominate the proceedings of the 22nd United Nations General Assembly which convenes on September 19th, whether or not these issues become a formal part of the agenda.

1. Middle East:

It is still possible, though unlikely, the Security Council will meet before the Assembly opens. If it does and reaches agreement on some forward movement (e.g., the appointment of a mediator), there will be less focus in the Assembly on the Middle East. In all likelihood, however, there seems no way to avoid full dress consideration of the whole range of Middle East questions in the Assembly. The Emergency Special Session is likely to be reconvened before the regular Session and, after a brief discussion of Jerusalem and possibly of the refugee problem, to refer all Middle East items to the regular Session. There, our main problem will be to insure there is no erosion in the position of the majority of the Emergency Session that a Middle East settlement requires at a minimum both the withdrawal of Israeli forces and acceptance by the Arabs of Israel's right to exist in peace and security, free of claims or acts of belligerency. Proposals of the type advanced by Tito will pose serious tactical difficulties. As time goes by, with Israel continuing its occupation of Arab territory and with some conciliatory statements by countries such as Jordan, pressures will mount on Israel to show greater magnanimity than they are now showing. The Israelis' position has hardened and the Arabs show no sign of a willingness to make a concrete act of renouncing belligerency.

2. Vietnam

We are exploring the feasibility of the Security Council adopting a resolution calling for a conference to achieve a permanent settlement of the Vietnam problem in accordance with the Geneva agreements. We will know before the opening of the General Assembly whether we are able to mobilize the

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Authority NLS 84-398

By us, NARS, Date 1-7-85

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necessary nine votes to inscribe the matter on the agenda. If the Security Council should decide to consider this matter, which is doubtful, the likelihood of formal substantive results is not great in view of the continuing negative attitude regarding UN involvement held by Hanoi, Peking, Paris and Moscow.

In any event, Vietnam will be on the minds of most delegates. Over 100 Foreign Ministers will at one time or another be in attendance, and this will afford Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Goldberg the opportunity in private discussions to make our policy clear. Last year the fact that we put forward a new proposal, consistent with our overall basic approach, provided many of our friends with the opportunity to come out publicly in the general debate in support of our position. We will want to make a positive statement of our position on Vietnam in the general debate speech. This statement will be prepared over the next ten days and submitted to the President for review.

3. Non-Proliferation Treaty and Related Issue of Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear Powers

The best result would be if the ENDC over the next four to six weeks could achieve agreement on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including Article 3, and therefore be in a position to present it to the General Assembly for its endorsement at a late stage in its proceedings. This has been our prime objective. However, the more likely situation will probably be that the ENDC will suspend its deliberations soon and the discussion of the NPT in the Assembly will be in circumstances in which there is no agreement on Article 3. Some of the non-aligned will seek to mobilize support for inclusion of a security assurances article in the Treaty. Our objective should be, in concert with the USSR, to maintain the present Non-Proliferation Treaty intact, to try to assure certain of the non-aligned of our willingness to consider the assurances problem within the context of a UN resolution. We ought to be able to manage the debate, with the assistance of the Soviet Union, so as to give the non-aligned an opportunity

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to express their views and make their criticisms without upsetting the agreement thus far achieved between the US and the USSR. Our aim should be to have the matter returned to the ENDC so that further attention can be given to Article 3 and consultations can be undertaken within the ENDC to see whether the assurances problem can be taken care of in the form of a UN resolution.

4. African Problems

The pattern of these questions in the UN is relatively unchanging. In their desire to produce movement and to force changes in the status quo, the black African delegations press for measures which go beyond what we can accept despite the fact that we are in general agreement with the goals. Our failure since the 21st GA to meet African expectations that the US would be more forthcoming on southern African issues will make us a target for more widespread attacks than in the past. Nonetheless, we should continue with positions that discourage illusions, among others, that the US might be willing to move further than we know to be the case.

A. South West Africa

The Special Assembly Session in April-June 1967 established a UN Council for South West Africa to administer the territory which was instructed to report to the 22nd General Assembly. Its activities so far have been confined to preparing a letter to the South African Government requesting its cooperation in implementing UN resolutions on South West Africa. If the Council limits its report in this way, it may be that the Assembly will simply recommend cooperation with the Council and be willing to hold off on other action pending further Council activity. In view of the new proposals for legislation on South West Africa made by Vorster, it can be anticipated the Africans will press for stronger measures this year. Since we have gone as far as we can in meeting African demands on South West Africa and are not in a position to support recommendations for more forceful measures against South Africa, such as sanctions, we plan to try to persuade the

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Africans that the best interim course is to permit the Council to undertake such activities as it can, to maintain pressure on South Africa, and to discourage it from further implementation of the Odendaal plan calling for establishment of "bantustans" in the Territory.

B. Rhodesia

The Security Council imposed selective mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in December 1966. The Assembly will be convening at a time when the sanctions will have been in effect about nine months without any visible effect. Consequently, we can expect further African demands for broader sanctions, and for the use of force, as well as condemnation of those countries who appear to be violating them. Our efforts in the Assembly will be to cooperate with the British, whatever the state of their own discussions with the Smith regime, in counseling moderation and in seeking to prevent the Assembly from recommending measures that go beyond what we consider reasonable.

5. Other Developments

A. General Assembly Presidency

For the first time in its history the Assembly will have a Communist President, the Rumanian Foreign Minister, Manescu. In the absence of any other candidate, we expect to support him and he is likely to be a competent and objective presiding officer.

B. Chinese Representation

Developments on the mainland continue to work in our favor on this issue which should be manageable this year. We will seek as pro forma a consideration of this matter as possible. The present vote count indicates sufficient support to defeat the traditional resolution seeking to substitute Red China for the Republic of China and to reaffirm that this issue is an important question requiring a two-thirds

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vote. However, we will have to watch carefully to see whether there are significant Arab defections as a result of bitterness over the Middle East which, combined with a few changes in the African line-up, could jeopardize our position. In view of the uncertainty of the tactical situation, we have kept open the option of going along with an Italian Study Committee. This proposal was welcomed last year as some evidence of forward movement and was useful in helping to mobilize a substantial vote in support of our position.

C. Peacekeeping

We will continue to give strong support to the United Nations peacekeeping role demonstrating this through our financial contributions to pay for the costs of the United Nations force in Cyprus and the United Nations' peacekeeping efforts in the Middle East and Kashmir. Fundamental constitutional differences between the US and the USSR will not be bridged, and we can expect no lightening of the financial burden of the UN from the Soviet Union or France who have been unwilling to make any voluntary contributions to date. We would welcome the demise of the GA committee studying this problem.

D. Oceanography

We are developing a possible US proposal which would call for: (i) GA establishment of a Committee on the Oceans similar to the Outer Space Committee; (ii) an outline for a Declaration of Legal Principles to Govern the Activities on the Ocean Floor; (iii) a proposal for a marine science reserve in the Pacific; and (iv) a suggestion for a Decade of Exploration and Development of the Resources of the Deep Sea to begin in 1970. This proposal is still being cleared in the interested parts of the Government.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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September 8, 1967

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING No. 574

September 13, 1967, 12:00 noon

AGENDA

Major Issues of the 22nd UN General Assembly

(For discussion of State Department paper circulated with
this agenda)

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Determined by the
Administrative marking
By DCH On 10-21-81

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, Sept. 13, 1967
11:20 a.m.

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MR. PRESIDENT:

Before today's NSC meeting, you may wish to read this report of Sisco's briefing of NATO on the UN General Assembly.

On balance:

- They are with us on our general approach to the Middle East;
- They are against our pushing Vietnam in the Security Council.

W.H.R.

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Authority NLS 85-348
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Wednesday, September 13, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR CLEVELAND (Paris, 3224)

In a very useful NATO Council session this morning, Assistant Secretary Sisco briefed NATO members on UN issues, concentrating in particular on the Middle East and possible UN action on Vietnam. In view of NSC consideration of UN issues Wednesday, the following brief highlights may be useful.

Middle East

First, there was a large measure of common approach expressed by NATO members, in particular as it relates to the need to link withdrawal with the end of the state of belligerency.

There was remarkable near unanimity regarding the fundamental shortcomings of Tito's proposal, with a consensus.

In view of continuing Arab unwillingness to face up clearly to recognition of Israel to live in peace and security in the area, the hardening Israeli position, doubt that the Soviets will stand by the common ground achieved with the US on the resolution of language in the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, no high hopes were expressed that the General Assembly will be able to take constructive action. As a matter of principle, strong preference was expressed for continuing Security Council involvement, recognizing prospects of constructive action were limited as a result of attitudes held by the principal interested powers. In view of the unlikelihood of a meeting of the minds on fundamental principles, a number of NATO members look towards some procedural approach (for example, appointment of a UN mediator) as a possible way to make progress in the foreseeable future.

Expressions by a certain number of members reflected European concern over the closure of the Suez Canal and a desire for some action leading towards an early opening. As expected, the United Kingdom took the lead on this point. Italy made similar noises.

There was broad agreement that the future Soviet attitude is the key and endorsement of the US desire to continue consultations with the Soviets on the Middle East, and expression of hope, even though not optimistic, that the Soviets would hold firm to US-USSR language agreed to at the end of the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly.

NLJ 94-361

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Vietnam

Regarding possible Security Council consideration, the reaction of others was characterized by "timidity and doubt."

While NATO members who presently are members of the Security Council (United Kingdom, Canada and Denmark) expressed an "open mind," they at the same time voiced serious reservations regarding the possible risk of a resolution or amendment calling for cessation of bombing without reciprocity. Both the Danes and the United Kingdom took this line and the Canadians even more strongly, very much along the lines Martin expressed in Washington last week, that such a likely move would put Canada and the other Allies in serious difficulty. Combell (Canada) went so far as to provide the NATO Council with their vote count, saying seven members of the Security Council are unlikely to support inscription. The Danes (it was unclear whether the NATO Council representative was aware of our private demarche to Danes in New York) expressed strong preference for quiet discussions in the corridors and said his government's views will be made clear to Ambassador Goldberg in New York.

In short, most members who spoke (seven out of the fifteen NATO members) expressed appreciation of our desire to try to involve the UN particularly in light of Charter responsibilities, doubted we could succeed, and thought the certain risks clearly outweighed the dubious benefits. Some concern was expressed that forcing the Soviets hand in the Security Council on Vietnam might jeopardize possible cooperation with them on the Middle East. The most positive support for cooperation came from the Dutch who, while rehearsing the risks, said such a debate would nevertheless contribute to public understanding at home regarding American policy on Vietnam. Canada, France and Italy expressed a preference for a reactivated Geneva Conference rather than recourse to the Security Council.

Note for Gene Rostow: We will be repeating to you at the request of Sisco the full presentation he made on the Middle East and Vietnam in view of your discussions with the United Kingdom in London on Thursday. You will find the United Kingdom continues to be interested in some separate approach to reopening the Suez Canal which we did not encourage in the private discussion Sisco and Cleveland had with Under Secretary Hayman here. We continued to place emphasis on the possibilities of the appointment of a UN mediator at such time as the attitude of the parties make this possible. Also stressed with Hayman the undesirability of an early move to the Security Council in circumstances where the result is debate highlighting divisions rather than constructive action.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, September 12, 1967
8:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk asks your permission to be excused from tomorrow's NSC meeting. He is scheduled to chair the opening session of the U.S. - Japan Cabinet meeting. He feels that Nick Katzenbach and Amb. Goldberg can handle the presentation.

Walt Rostow

MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON

Tuesday,
September 12, 1967, 7:00 pm.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: NSC Discussion of Major Issues of UN General Assembly
Wednesday, September 13, 1967

The National Security Council meeting is to discuss the major issues which will come up during the 22nd United Nations General Assembly session opening September 19 in New York.

A State Department paper lists four major problems:

1. Middle East
2. Vietnam
3. Non-Proliferation Treaty and Security Assurances for non-nuclear powers, and
4. African problems, including South West Africa and Rhodesia

Four other issues grouped under other developments are:

1. General Assembly Presidency
2. Chinese Representation
3. Peacekeeping
4. Oceanography

A summary of the State paper is at Tab A. The paper itself is at Tab B.

A suggested order of business is on the next page.

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11-8-85

W. A. Rostow

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September 12, 1967

Suggested Order of Business for NSC Meeting

KATLOW BACK

1. Ask Secretary ~~Back~~ to give his estimate of what is likely to cause us real trouble in the General Assembly meeting.

2. Call on Ambassador Goldberg to summarize the major issues we will face.

3. At the end of Goldberg's presentation, or as he finishes each major issue, you may want to put to him or to Secretary ~~Back~~ some of the following questions: on the Middle East **KATLOW BACK**

- a. What is your best guess as to how the General Assembly will finally come out on the Middle East question?
- b. If the Jerusalem question is brought up what is our position in New York?
- c. What are the prospects for this General Assembly taking some action on arms control or arms registration?

on Vietnam

- a. When will we have a draft of what is to be said on Vietnam in the General Assembly opening debate?
- b. Where do we stand on today a Vietnam initiative in the Security Council?

on Non-Proliferation

- a. Will we be on the defensive in the General Assembly if non-nuclear powers raise the issue of security assurances?

4. Conclude the discussion by asking that questions coming to you for decision reach you in time for full consideration.

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Authority NLS 84-396
By , Date 7-8-85

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MAJOR ISSUES IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

This will be a difficult Assembly.

Middle East

- The general debate will produce a lot of noise.
- The Yugoslavs will be drumming up support for their proposals.
- No doubt the Arabs will push for a still stronger resolution calling on the Israelis to undo their actions incorporating Jerusalem.
- We will see stronger agitation to force Israel to take back the recent refugees.

Later the Russians may take these issues from the General Assembly to the Security Council -- although their strategy may develop slowly, as neither they nor the Arabs seem to have sorted out their tactics.

We must try to prevent erosion of the principle that any Israeli withdrawal must be matched by Arab acceptance of Israel's right to exist, free of claims of acts of belligerency.

Vietnam

Consultations with our friends reveal misgivings about a new move on Vietnam in the Security Council.

In the General Assembly, Ambassador Goldberg hopes to present a new formulation that will make it easier for friendly governments to support us. He is preparing a draft speech.

Secretary Rusk expects to discuss and explain our Vietnam policy to about a hundred Foreign Ministers.

Non-Proliferation

The best solution of the safeguards issue (Article III) would be to continue talks in Geneva and with our European allies until we get an acceptable formula. We and the Soviets would then push for General Assembly endorsement of a treaty before adjournment in December.

On the question of security assurances to the non-nuclear powers, the best solution would be to work out a separate GA resolution to accomplish the purpose.

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Southern Africa

We want to maintain our basic support for the rights of Black Africans while avoiding commitments to force, sanctions against South Africa or other measures we believe unrealistic. There is some chance that the Assembly will confine itself to a resolution on South West Africa calling for cooperation with the newly-established UN Council for the territory. However, a more ambitious and unenforcible resolution is somewhat more likely.

We shall cooperate with the British on the Rhodesian question in an attempt to uphold the present level of sanctions, but not to extend them.

Chinese Representation

We believe that we have the votes to prevent passage of an Albanian-type resolution calling for the seating of Red China. The main danger is that the Arabs' bitterness over the Middle East will cause them to line up against us and the Republic of China. If this happens, we may have to revert to last year's strategy of supporting a study committee.

Oceanography

Within the U.S. Government we are intensively studying the complex policy issues involved. The establishment of a UN Committee on the Oceans (similar to the Outer Space Committee) will enable us to channel the various current UN proposals and take a position of leadership and initiative.

September 12, 1967

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