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May 17, 2004

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
028	memo	Rostow to LBJ [Sanitized 6/2/04 NLJ/RAC 00-380]	S	2	11/03/67	A
		<i>open 3.25.09 [EB]</i>				
028a	memo	Rostow to LBJ [Sanitized 8/6/01 NLJ 01-106]	S	2	11/03/67	A
		<i>open 3.25.09</i>				

Collection Title Meeting Notes File
Folder Title [November 4, 1967 - 2:20 pm Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisors]
Box Number 2

Restriction Codes

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6/2/2004

Initials

**NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#26 memo w/meeting notes	more info released 1-8-93 NLS 92-186 sent 10-6-83 NLS 82-51 Jim Jones to President re meeting with foreign policy advisors <i>Open NLT 97-186 10-6-98</i>	same paratition 8-26-93 NLS 92-154 11/4/67	A
#27-agenda	possible classified information 6 p. SECRET per Nsc 8-23-83		
#27 agenda	meeting of 11/4/67 Secret 1 p. <i>OPEN 8/5/96 NY 94-251</i>	11/4/67	A
#28 memo	paratition 8-26-93 NLS 92-154 sent 10-15-96 NLS 95-349 Walt Rostow to the President Secret 2 p. <i>EXEMPT NLS 82-71</i>	11/3/67	A
#28a memo	Walt Rostow to the President Secret 2 p. <i>sent 8/14/01 NLS 01-106</i>	11/3/67	A
#28c memo	Rusk for the President Secret 2 p. <i>EXEMPT NLS 82-71</i>	11/3/67	A
#28e draft communique	sent 8-27-82 NLS 82-50 sent 4-7-94 NLS 94-257 draft language for communique 1 p. Secret <i>Open 11-7-94 NLS 94-257</i>	Open 4/20/00 n.d.	NLS 97-183 A

FILE LOCATION

Meeting Notes File, Box 2

DCH 10/81

RESTRICTION CODES

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SERVICE SET

TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JIM JONES

SUBJECT: Luncheon meeting with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Walt Rostow, CIA Director Richard Helms, George Christian and Jim Jones.

Meeting convened at 2:20 p. m., Saturday, November 4, 1967
Meeting adjourned at 3:55 p. m.

The meeting convened in the West Sitting Room of the Mansion. Secretary Rusk reported that Ambassador Goldberg will present the draft resolution which Foreign Minister Eban of Israel has cleared. Goldberg thinks the King of Jordan will accept it this afternoon.

The President related that he had met with representatives of Columbia Broadcasting System yesterday. One of the men asked him if the proposal on the U. N. was a new one and what is the major departure from the Administration policy. The President told him "it represents neither a major nor a minor departure of this government's policy."

Secretary Rusk said he asked Bill Bundy, in front of reporters, if any Ambassador from any country had asked if this was any departure from our policy, and Bundy replied no.

The President asked about the Ambassadorial post in the Philippines. He wondered whether Eugene Locke could fill this. The President said he is worried about the Philippines. "I feel in my bones that there's going to be a problem there," the President said. He said he would trust Locke but perhaps Locke is too close to the President to be put in to that position.

The President then asked Secretary McNamara what can he do to solve crime in the District of Columbia. The President said he asked Wirtz the same thing. "Crime will be the principal problem, even more so than Vietnam. We've got to show some progress and action. Perhaps have some troops patrol with the Washington police," the President said. The President asked if McNamara could put MP's either in plain clothes or in uniform to help patrol Washington. He pointed out that the District police have 450 vacancies that they can't fill.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 97-186

By uo, NARA Date 10-6-98

McNamara replied that he can help fill those vacancies. He mentioned that 750,000 come out of the service every year, and many of these can fill these vacancies.

The President asked if McNamara was going to Denver for the Educational Broadcasters Convention.

McNamara replied that he was, and the President said he may join him.

The President asked that Rusk and Wheeler and Helms and McNamara put together a high level task force to make a campaign pamphlet of three pages answering all the questions on Vietnam, such as stopping the bombing and negotiations. The President said to get the ten most asked questions and get them answered so that all a person has to do is make a speech from the pamphlet.

The group adjourned for lunch and the President opened the luncheon conversation by asking about Buttercup response. "Are both Bunker and Westmoreland coming back?" the President asked.

McNamara replied that Bunker would be leaving on November 9 and Westmoreland on November 15.

On Buttercup, Rusk said that Bunker is inclined to release several of the Viet Cong before they agree to release the Americans.

The President said I am inclined to agree, at least let the first five or six go. The President said that he does not like to override his man in the field (Bunker) nor does he like to see McNamara and Rusk override him any more than McNamara or Rusk like to be overridden by the President.

Rusk said "You've got to make arrangements with the other side. Bunker can tell the other people you are ready to release..."

The President then read the cable and reiterated that he does not believe we should overrule Bunker's recommendation.

Rusk said it would be alright if we could add the following "after taking fully into account our observations back here."

The President asked how we are going to do a better job of winning the war in the South. He asked if we could not have a military government put in the provinces and make them city managers like Tom Fletcher is in the District of Columbia. The President said "we've been on dead center for the last year." The President also wondered whether the bombing of the small tire factories, steel mills and airfields are "worth all the hell we are catching here." The President thought perhaps we should get into a position where we could strike and restrike. He pointed out that it's very possible that we could get a no confidence vote any day now.

"Gallup and Harris say anyone could beat us. Gallup takes these polls a month old, jiggles them a little, and makes it look that way and the public believes them," the President said. The President mentioned that Senators Hartke, Fulbright and McCarthy are going to all the colleges and stirring up problems and we are not answering them. He pointed out that Princeton got a resolution just yesterday.

The President turned his attention to the troubles at home and said "I'm not going to let the Communists take this government and they're doing it right now." The President pointed out that he has been protecting civil liberties since he was nine years old, but "I told the Attorney General that I am not going to let 200,000 of these people ruin everything for the 200 million Americans. I've got my belly full of seeing these people put on a Communist plane and shipped all over this country. I want someone to carefully look at who leaves this country, where they go, why they are going, and if they're going to Hanoi, how are we going to keep them from getting back into this country."

Dick Helms said under the laws today you cannot prosecute anybody for anything.

The President said that the Leadership of Congress told him Monday at their weekly meeting that they would give the President anything he wants. "In fact, they are trying to give me an anti-riot bill which I do not want." The President said he talked to General Eisenhower today. "I think you (Eisenhower) would be good for Secretary McNamara, and McNamara would be good for you. I told him that I would give him anything he wants in the way of a map room, intelligence briefings or whatever to keep him informed. General Goodpastor is doing a reasonably good job with him or he would not be with us," the President said.

The President said we should emphasize that there are no deep divisions among the Joint Chiefs and the other advisers, and he said that's one of the reasons why he has not picked a Marine Commandant yet. "I'm going to take that man's blood pressure and make sure he's loyal. It doesn't do any good to win the fighting over there (Vietnam) and lose it over here. We've got to get our story told," the President said.

The President said he wants to make a tour on November 10 and 11 of military installations throughout the country so that he can salute the men "who keep me free." The President said that Eisenhower told him that we have forgotten what it means to be patriotic. The President said we need to get some of our secondary men like Kohler and Nitze, etc. to go out and speak and get our story across.

Secretary Rusk said concerning Vietnam, that if they are ready to have private talks without stopping the bombing, we should follow through. He said some encouraging signs have been heard this week by the Communists and Kosygin who are beginning to draw the line between Hanoi and the NLF. Rusk admitted however, that he does not think Moscow, nor for that matter Peking, has enough horsepower to deliver Hanoi.

The President asked if someone could talk to Thieu and get the corruption cleaned up. The President also said we are mishandling our information from Vietnam. He said Sigard Larmon has just come back from Vietnam and he is violently upset with the way the press is handling the situation there.

General Wheeler said that he sent Westmoreland a cable and asked him if he could find some way to preclude the press from flying on these combat missions.

The President said that all we have to do is to read what we've done in World War I and II and the Korean War concerning the information problem. He pointed out that we have not dealt with censorship at all. "Perhaps we should send three good editors out there to take a look at the situation and make some recommendations on how we can handle this better. Perhaps we could send Bill Stevens of the Chicago Sun-Times and Palmer Hoyt and maybe Hedley Donovan from the east coast," the President said.

The conversation then turned to the subject of the Bonins and the forthcoming visit of Prime Minister Sato of Japan.

General Wheeler said "we agree that we should consult with the Japanese on the return of the islands. But we think the proposal before the President goes too far too fast, especially with regard to Chichi Jima and Iwo Jima." Wheeler said they (the Japanese) should sign up as to what they are going to do concerning the defense of the islands before the President returns the administrative control to them.

The President said in other words you're saying "put your money where your mouth is."

Secretary McNamara said the problem with that is that we cannot get something signed between now and November 18 when Prime Minister Sato leaves the United States, and McNamara does not believe the President wants Sato to go home without some resolution. McNamara believes that Sato did a good deed for us by going to Vietnam and the mere fact that he went there is an endorsement for our policies there.

The President asked why we couldn't say to Sato "here is our attitude and we are willing to turn over the control of the island when you are ready to sign up."

The President asked what we are getting from Sato on Vietnam.

McNamara said "that guy put his political future in his hands when he went to Vietnam."

The President said "but what I'm interested in is bodies."

McNamara said that Sato could be very helpful by speaking out for our policies.

The President asked again why cannot we say that we're ready to move when you're ready to assume your part of the defense.

McNamara said for several reasons: a.) We don't know what we want him to do; b.) He cannot do much at the present time; c.) We want nuclear bases there later.

General Wheeler said we can tell the Japanese that we reserve the right to negotiate nuclear weapons on the Bonins. Wheeler said that the Bonins lie on the great circle route for submarine traffic between the Chinese mainland and the United States and we might in time want to put nuclear weapons on the Bonins.

Rusk said we don't need these islands unless Guam is knocked out.

The President asked, "can't we take it if we need it."

Wheeler said this will have an impact on negotiations on Okinawa. The Japanese will insist on the same formula in Okinawa on nuclear weapons and this will be a precedent.

Rusk said the appetite on Okinawa will feed itself. All we're doing here is gaining time.

The President said we should not give away land just to put a man in good humor for 48 hours. The Japanese have been treated darn well. Why can't we say that we don't want to hold on to the islands, but we cannot secure the world alone. Maybe we can't work out an agreement in two weeks, but let us know when you're ready. I'm somewhat disappointed with the Japanese and Pakistan and some of these others anyway.

McNamara said "you should push the Japanese, but this is not the issue. This will only weaken Sato."

Rusk says "he's been the most pro-American Prime Minister Japan has had since World War II. Besides, we are only a squatter on the Bonins."

The President inquired, "is what we're asking in this communique (part B attached) when you move, we move?"

Rostow said this enters into consultations leading to the early return of the Bonins. Some of the consultations involve their taking over the defense, and finally the retention of base rights.

McNamara says you are saying more than that. If the Japanese will let us have bases on Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima, than you can have the administration.

The President asked McNamara and Rostow to concisely and clearly put down on paper what we are offering in this communique and present it to him later.

At this point, the President and Mrs. Johnson departed the meeting at 3:55 p. m.

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Meeting with the President

Saturday, November 4, 1967, 2 PM

Possible Agenda

1. The Ryukyus and the Bonins (Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and General Wheeler)
Papers attached at Tab A.

2. Buttercup response (Secretary Rusk)

Issues:

- Should we try to get first response to Buttercup message before Bunker returns?
- Should first response be limited to prisoners, or should political statement be included?
- Should we go beyond Dang's conditions? If so, how far?

Secretary Rusk will have a draft at 2 PM.

3. Other

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4
NLT 94-251
By Cb, NARA Date 7-16-96

W. C. R.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Friday, November 3, 1967

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is a supplementary note to give you more clearly the position in the government on the reversion of the Bonins to Japan.

The attached proposal is agreed by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara. General Wheeler was personally willing to go along; but the Joint Chiefs did not agree.

Essentially, the Joint Chiefs believe that we should retain the option to base nuclear weapons at our installations on Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima without the consent of Japan, should this be necessary, and they would not return administrative rights to these islands until Japan permitted nuclear storage. The Joint Chiefs fear that by yielding our rights to nuclear storage in the Bonins we would set a precedent which would make it more likely that the Japanese would refuse nuclear storage in Okinawa. Additionally, the JCS are reluctant to accept at this time the Japanese offer to assume major defense responsibilities in and around the Bonins area.

We do not now store any nuclear weapons in the Bonins and do not have any plans to do so. Secretaries Rusk and McNamara believe that agreeing to a return of the Bonins without rights for nuclear storage would not in any way prejudice our case for insisting on nuclear storage in the Ryukyus. A request for nuclear storage rights on islands where we now maintain very small bases and only 77 military personnel would hardly be understandable to the Japanese.

Secretaries Rusk and McNamara believe, and I concur, that acceptance of the Joint Chiefs' position would risk serious strains in our relations with Japan, and decrease the prospects of Japan's responsiveness for support on Viet Nam, balance of payments, and other issues. At Tab A is a memorandum to you from Secretary Rusk, in whose recommendation Secretary McNamara has concurred.

As for procedure, I recommend that you have a meeting with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and General Wheeler. At that meeting you let General Wheeler present the argument of his military colleagues. And then, if you agree with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, you could make your decision and let Buzz Wheeler report to the JCS that their argument had been heard, before you made a final decision.

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Authority FRUS, 64-69, 61-29, #100

By JK NARA, Date 9-25-07

Nov. 3, 1967

What lies behind the JCS holding to what is, in fact, a marginal position, is an old view deep in the Pentagon; namely, that to make any concession to the Japanese with respect to the Ryukyus and Bonins is to put us on a slippery slope. The fact is that the old, immediately pre-war relationship is changing and must change. Our objective can only now be a gradual and judicious transition into a new relationship in which the Japanese take increased responsibility as a partner as we alter the essentially occupation status on the islands. At the moment they are assuming more partnership responsibility in aid and monetary affairs; and they should do more. The transition to military partnership will take longer.

Recommendation

That, if you approve the State-Defense language in the attached draft (Tab B), you call a meeting to hear argument as suggested.

Attachments

Walt R.

Approved ✓

Disapproved _____

See me _____

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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November 3, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: United States Position on Reversion of the Bonins

Since the matter was discussed with you on October 31, new language for the Sato communique has been drafted on reversion of the Bonins (Tab B). Secretaries Rusk and McNamara believe (Rusk memo, Tab A) that the new language fully protects our military needs. They believe that to exempt Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima from the overall principle of return of administration to Japan is not required for any foreseeable military purpose.

Secretaries Rusk and McNamara do not believe that failure to achieve nuclear storage rights on Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima would in any way prejudice our case for insisting, at some point, on a right of nuclear storage in the Ryukyus.

In addition to protecting our military needs, the two Secretaries conclude that the new language constitutes a wise and essential move at this time in the framework of our relations with Japan, including our hope to obtain more firm support on Vietnam and favorable action on several other matters, particularly our balance of payments problems. Secretary Rusk, with Secretary McNamara's concurrence, recommends that you approve Ambassador Johnson's presenting to the Japanese Government language concerning the Bonin Islands, in accordance with Tab B.

Recommendation:

That you approve the new draft language for the communique.

W. Rostow
W. Rostow

Attachments _____

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

See me _____

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *J*, NARA, Date *9-25-07*

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SERVICE SET

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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November 3, 1967

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: United States Position on Reversion
of the Bonins

Recommendation

That you approve Ambassador Johnson presenting to the Japanese Government language concerning the Bonin Islands in accordance with TAB ^A_B attached.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion

Secretary McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I are fully agreed on the general principle that we should undertake to enter into immediate consultation with the Japanese with a view to the early return of administration of the Bonin Islands to Japan.

In the light of the proposal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to preserve a right to store nuclear weapons on Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima, Secretary McNamara and I have reviewed the possibility that an exception should be made, for purposes of the communique, regarding these two islands. We have noted that the general language in our proposal would in any event permit us to negotiate for the retention of appropriate "military facilities and areas" on these islands or any other part of the Bonins. The language on this point has been strengthened since the matter was discussed with you on October 31.

In the light of this strengthened language, our conclusion is that the proposal fully protects whatever

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

GROUP 3

NLJ 97-183

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;

By CG/10, NARA Date 2-19-00 not automatically declassified.

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military needs we wish to retain. We believe that to exempt Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima from the over-all principle of return of administration to Japan is not required for any foreseeable military purpose.

In reaching this conclusion we have given particular weight to the question of possible nuclear storage in the Bonins. We do not now station any nuclear weapons there, and do not have any plans to do so. We therefore do not believe that it should be necessary to press for retaining the right for nuclear storage in working out the return of administration to Japan. Nor do we believe that failure to achieve such rights would in any way prejudice our serious case for insisting, at some point, on a right of nuclear storage in the Ryukyus. Furthermore, even if we were to so conclude in the future, the general language in the attached proposal would permit us to negotiate the matter with Japan.

Secretary McNamara and I thus conclude that the language in the attached proposal fully protects our military needs and is a wise and essential move at this time in the over-all framework of our relations with Japan, including our desire to obtain more firm Japanese support on Vietnam and favorable action by Japan particularly with respect to our balance of payments problems.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Draft Communique Language
on the Bonins

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DRAFT LANGUAGE FOR SATO COMMUNIQUE
ON THE BONIN ISLANDS

The President and Prime Minister also reviewed the status of the Bonin Islands and agreed that the mutual security interests of Japan and the United States could be accommodated within the arrangements for the return of administration of these islands to the GOJ.

They, therefore, agreed that the two Governments will enter immediately into consultation regarding the specific arrangements for accomplishing the early restoration of these islands to Japan without detriment to the security of the area. These consultations will take into account the intention of the Japanese Government, expressed by the Prime Minister, gradually to assume much of the responsibility for defense of the area. The President and Prime Minister agreed that the United States would retain such military facilities and areas in the Bonin Islands as required in the mutual security of both countries.

The Prime Minister stated that the return of the administrative rights over the Bonin Islands would not only contribute to solidifying the ties of friendship between the two countries but would also help to reinforce the conviction of the Japanese people that the return of the administrative rights over the Ryukyu Islands will also be solved within the framework of mutual trust between the two countries.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-257
By cb, NARA, Date 10-14-94

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