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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#33a memo	Sanitized 11-23-83 NLS 83-29 <i>Sanitized 9-24-85 NLS 83-28</i> Walt Rostow for the President Secret 2 p.	12/1/67	A
#33b. cable	Saigon - 12/1/67 2 p. Secret <i>?open 11/16/82</i>	12/1/67	A
#33c cable	<i>NLS 83-29 Sanitized 11-23-83</i> Bunker to Rostow Secret 1 p.	12/1/67	A
#33d memo	Rostow for the President <i>open 5-18-83 per NLS 83-28</i> Confidential 1 p.	12/1/67	A
#33e memo	Henry Owen re DOD Report - Confidential 1 p. <i>open 11-23-83 NLS 83-29</i>	11/30/67	A

FILE LOCATION

Meeting Notes File, Box 2

10/81 DCH

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- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
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Marie,

The luncheon was put on schedule AFTER this went over to the mansion. I believe there is a connection. Also, I think you'll want to scan the tickers so we can put "feel" into today's diary.

mjdr

12/1/67

copy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONLBJ LIBRARY 412
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 83-28
Document # 332
332
R~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Friday, December 1, 1967 -- 8:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

[REDACTED] 1.3(a)(4)
C

[REDACTED]

How the next moves are made may be quite important; and I am sure you will wish to have your senior advisers focus hard on the matter today. The issues appear to be these:

-- What we in Washington, our people in Saigon, and especially the South Vietnamese government, say about AP 27 and the stories which will follow;

[REDACTED] 1.3(a)(4)
C

[REDACTED]

Behind all this is a truly great unresolved issue: What should be the GVN's attitude towards the future political role of the NLF; and how can a South Vietnamese governmental consensus be achieved without splitting the non-Communists.

As you know, my own view has been that we should work to persuade them to take the view that those now fighting with the VC have the right to engage in organized politics under two conditions:

- they stop the fighting;
- they recognize the legitimacy of the Constitution.

The underlying problem for the South Vietnamese is that they have not yet achieved enough organized political unity -- and a big national political party -- to face the Communists in an election. (This came out quite clearly in the Clifford-Taylor discussions with the Foreign Minister, Do.)

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ 83-28
By [signature] 9-24-85

~~SECRET~~

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11.3(a)(4)
C

It is most unlikely that Hanoi [REDACTED] is now prepared to accept a southern solution on the basis of the two principles set out above. As the talk of the NLF program, coalition government, etc., develops, it is essential that we and the South Vietnamese develop soon a clear, firm and common position on which to stand before the world (and the U.S. public) as well as in such private contacts as may generate.

11.3(a)(4)
C

Again, let me underline, I do not believe that [REDACTED] reflected a firm determination in Hanoi and the NLF to negotiate a solution in the South now, which would be acceptable to us and the South Vietnamese. One of their probable objectives, in fact, was ~~this~~ produces the kind of division among the South Vietnamese and between us and them which appears to be surfacing. But that fact does not relieve us from formulating a position that is lucid; and using all our skill to persuade Thieu and the political leadership in the Vietnamese executive and legislative branches to line up with us. We shall only be able to do this if we make it clear that by backing the constitutional process firmly, we are backing them; and we are not looking for some face-saving way to turn political power in the South over to the Communists.

W. J. Hostow

AP 27, Dec. 1, 1967
Saigon 005, Dec. 1, 1967

SERVICE SET

~~SECRET~~

AP 27
WUHH VIET (240)

(SAIGON)--INFORMED SAIGON SOURCES SAY A MEETING BETWEEN U-S
AMBASSADOR ELLSWORTH BUNKER AND A HIGH-RANKING REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
VIET CONG'S NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT WAS THWARTED RECENTLY WHEN
SOUTH VIETNAMESE POLICE ARRESTED THE VIET CONG EMISSARY.

THE U-S EMBASSY HAS NO COMMENT ON THE REPORTS.

BUT THE SOURCES SAY THE MEETING HAD BEEN ARRANGED FOR EARLIER THIS
MONTH.

THE VIET CONG MAN WAS ARRESTED IN SAIGON BEFORE HE REACHED
THE EMBASSY.

THE SOURCES SAY IT IS BELIEVED THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARRESTING
OFFICERS DID NOT KNOW THE PURPOSE OF THE VIET CONG AGENT'S VISIT TO
SAIGON, BUT THE AGENT "SPILLED THE BEANS" AFTER HE WAS QUESTIONED.

THIS SUGGESTS THAT THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT WAS NOT INFORMED OF THE
MEETING.

OTHER SOURCES SAY VIET CONG REPRESENTATIVES DID MEET IN A
"NEUTRAL EMBASSY" IN SAIGON WITHIN THE LAST TEN DAYS WITH GENERAL
CREIGHTON ABRAMS, THE DEPUTY U-S MILITARY COMMANDER IN VIETNAM;
DEPUTY U-S AMBASSADOR EUGENE LOCKE AND CAPTAIN ROBERT O'BRIEN, IN
CHARGE OF THE EMBASSY SECURITY GUARD.

THE LIBERATION FRONT REPRESENTATIVES WERE LE VAN HUAN AND HUONG VAN
LE.

THE MEETING TOOK PLACE WHILE AMBASSADOR BUNKER AND THE U-S
MILITARY COMMANDER IN VIETNAM, GENERAL WILLIAM WESTMORELAND, WERE IN
WASHINGTON.

THE PRESENCE OF ABRAMS INDICATES THE MEETING HAD SOMETHING TO DO
WITH MILITARY MATTERS, POSSIBLY WITH THE COMING CHRISTMAS AND NEW
YEAR'S CEASE-FIRES, OR PERHAPS IN CONNECTION WITH A PRISONER
EXCHANGE.

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(190)

MORE AP27 SAIGON BUNKER X X X EXCHANGE.

THE REPORTS OF THE CONTACTS BETWEEN THE EMBASSY AND THE VIET CONG
ON THE HEELS OF INDICATIONS FROM CAPTURED DOCUMENTS THAT THE
VIET CONG MAY BE TRYING TO SET UP TALKS WITH THE UNITED STATES TO
SEEK A COALITION GOVERNMENT FOR SOUTH VIETNAM.

THE LEADERS OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT ARE ADAMANTLY
OPPOSED TO A COALITION GOVERNMENT AND WOULD BE HIGHLY ANNOYED
IF THE UNITED STATES TRIED TO MEET SEPARATELY WITH THE VIET CONG.
ONE SOURCE SAYS THE MEETING WITH BUNKER THAT DIDN'T COME OFF HAD
BEEN ARRANGED BY THE U-S CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, PERHAPS WITHOUT
BUNKER'S KNOWLEDGE.

THE SOURCES WHO REPORTED THE CAPTURE OF THE VIET CONG
REPRESENTATIVE SAY HE WAS QUESTIONED BY BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN
(NAME) LOAN, THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL POLICE.

BUT LOAN WAITED THREE OR FOUR DAYS BEFORE RELAYING THE INFORMATION
TO VICE PRESIDENT KY (KEE) HIS MENTOR.

KY RELAYED THE INFORMATION TO PRESIDENT THIEU (TOO), WHO REPORTEDLY
WAS ANGERED THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN INFORMED SOONER.


THIEU REPORTEDLY CALLED IN LOAN AND SEVERAL OTHER TOP SECURITY
OFFICIALS AND DRESSED THEM DOWN FOR NOT BEING AWARE OF THE MEETING
PLANNED FOR BUNKER AND THE VIET CONG MAN.

SOME SOURCES SAY THIS WAS THE REASON LOAN PUT IN HIS RESIGNATION
LAST WEEK.

THE RESIGNATION WAS REJECTED.

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FM CIA
TO WHITE HOUSE
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MODIS

FM AMB BUNKER SAIGON 005

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVE FOR MR ROSTOW

SECSTATE, EXCLUSIVE FOR SECRETARY RUSK

SECDEF, EXCLUSIVE FOR SECRETARY MCNAMARA

DIRECTOR CIA, EXCLUSIVE FOR MR HELMS

THE BARRY KRAMER AP STORY IS THE RESULT OF RUMORS WHICH HAVE BEEN CIRCULATING THIS WEEK IN SAIGON WHICH CAN BE TRACED BACK TO POOR SECURITY WITHIN THE (DGNP) AND WHICH FINALLY SURFACED IN THE NOVEMBER 30 ISSUE OF THE NEWSPAPER "SONG".

RECEIVED REPORTS FROM A NUMBER OF SOURCES WITHIN THE DGNP AND THE (MSS) TO THE EFFECT THAT LOAN'S RESIGNATION WAS BROUGHT ABOUT NOT ONLY BY HIS DISSATISFACTION WITH THE LOC CABINET AND THE HUCNG APPOINTMENT BUT ALSO BY HIS UNHAPPINESS WITH THE PROSPECTIVE RELEASE OF SAU HA AND CONTINUING AMERICAN PRESSURE TO RELEASE ADDITIONAL PRISONERS.

HELD MEETINGS THIS WEEK WITH LOAN AND VIEN AND, AT MY INSTRUCTIONS, VISITED PRESIDENT THIEU TODAY. WE WILL BE REPORTING THE RESULTS OF THESE MEETINGS TOMORROW. PRESIDENT THIEU HAS GONE TO DALAT FOR THE WEEKEND AND I EXPECT TO SEE HIM AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE ON HIS RETURN. WE ARE URGING PROMPT RESOLUTION OF OUR DIFFERENCES. IN ORDER TO AVOID FURTHER SPECULATION AND LEAKS. THE CASE IS UNFORTUNATELY CAUGHT UP IN WHAT THIEU CONSIDERS TO BE A POLITICAL CHALLENGE TO HIMSELF BY GENERAL LOAN AND HIS SYMPATHIZERS IN THE POLICE AND MILITARY, AND WE ARE NOW CONFRONTED WITH THE TASK OF SALVAGING THE OPERATION WITH THE MINIMUM RISK TO PRESIDENT THIEU'S POLITICAL POSITION.

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SANITIZED
Authority NLJ 83-29
By is NARS, Date 11-23-83

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY SS DATE 1-25-88

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Col. A - Caption removed:
transferred to O/PADRC
Col. B - Transferred to O/PADRC
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Col. C - Caption and custody
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Reviewed by: Edgar Kelly
Date: Dec 30 1982

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, December 1, 1967
8:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

Depending precisely on what Bob would say, this Henry Owen idea could be good -- or bad.

Properly told, the defense evolution since 1961 is a great, proud tale; what he could say about Vietnam could be unifying in the country, not divisive.

But you'd have to be sure.

Authority

By WCS

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETACHED

NLS 83-28

5-18 83

SERVICE SET

492
330

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

November 30, 1967

SUBJECT: DOD Report

1. Proposal: Secretary McNamara should give a farewell TV report to the American people on what's been accomplished in national defense to date during this administration.

2. Advantages: This would provide an opportunity for:

(a) making better known the value of the defense innovations which have been pioneered during this period;

(b) reviewing what has been achieved and where we stand now in Vietnam.

3. NOTE: The farewell remarks of people who leave their jobs, like those who are quitting this life, tend to get taken especially seriously - because listeners know that the speaker (i) has no ulterior motive, (ii) won't soon be heard again.

130
Henry Owen

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By ics, NARS, Date 11-23-83

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