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#45 agenda	NSC meeting 2/6/68 1 p. Top Secret	n.d.	A
#45b memo	Rostow for the President 1 p. Secret Exempt per NLS 82-207 <i>open w/21/11</i>	2/5/68	A <i>sanitized</i>
#45c cable	Amman 3270 1 p. Secret Exempt per NLS 82-208 <i>open 3-16-92 NLS 91-201</i>	2/3/68	A
#45d memo	Rostow for the President 3 p. Secret Exempt per NLS 82-207 <i>open w/21/11</i>	2/6/68	A <i>sanitized</i>
#45e memo	McNamara for the President 1 p. Secret <i>open 8-20-82 via NLS-82-209</i>	2/6/68	A

FILE LOCATION

Meeting Notes File, Box 2

DCH 10/81

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TOP SECRET

Lunch Meeting with the President
Tuesday, February 6, 1968 -- 1:00 p.m.

AGENDA

- 1. Korea (Secretaries Rusk and McNamara)
 - Panmunjom and beyond
- 2. Vietnam (Secretaries Rusk and McNamara)
- 3. Bombing Targets (Secretary McNamara)
 - narrow circles?
- 4. Jordan Arms (Secretaries Rusk and McNamara)
 - Note at Tab A is a briefing paper on the Jordan Arms Package which you will wish to read also as a backdrop for your 11:00 A.M. appointment with Israeli Ambassador Harman.
- 5. Other
- 6. Personnel (Secretary Rusk)

W. W. Rostow

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State 3-13-79, NSC 3-27-80
By DLH, NARS, Date 10-28-81

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

458

~~SECRET~~

Monday, February 5, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Background on Jordan Arms Package

The attached from Harry Symmes is the best background I could give you for your decision on the arms package for Jordan, which will be coming up in the next day or two. It also provides a useful backdrop for Harman's farewell call tomorrow.

What strikes me is not the familiar point about buying Soviet arms if we can't meet Jordan's needs but the increasing Jordanian conviction that we are bowing out of the Middle East and only the USSR can bring justice to the Arabs.

We told our Arab friends last fall that, if they went along with a balanced UN resolution, we'd do all in our power to help bring Israel around. Until last Thursday, the Israelis had refused to tell Jarring they accepted that resolution. In addition, they keep making their own changes in Jerusalem, either feeling they have us in their pockets or discounting our view entirely. The Arabs are beginning to believe that we aren't even trying to press Israel.

In fact, we can take some credit for Eban's acceptance of the resolution last week. But we haven't made a dent on his Jerusalem position, and we are trying today to keep the Jordanians from calling a Security Council meeting on Jerusalem.

Our dilemma is that it's hard to lean on the Israelis until negotiations produce a reasonable proposition to throw our weight behind. But if we can't persuade the Arabs now that we're willing and able to get some results, we may not get to negotiations because they may figure the Jarring mission is hopeless without our behind-scenes help.

W. Rostow
W. Rostow

Attachment: Amman 3270, 2/3/68

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Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 20, #68
By jc NARA. Date 6-15-11

SERVICE SET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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1042Q
FEB 3, 1968
8:14 P.M.

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

NODIS

SUBJECT: ACTIONS NEEDED FORESTALL FURTHER JORDANIAN MOVES
TOWARD SOVIETS

1. AFTER SENDING KING'S MESSAGE TO GENERAL KHAMMASH TODAY THROUGH SPECIAL CHANNELS (IN ESSENCE KING TOLD KHAMMASH THAT IF USG DOES NOT MEET HIS REQUIREMENTS HE WILL BUY SOVIET ARMS), I ARRANGED MEETING WITH KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY AND CONFIDANT ZAID AL-RIFA'I TO TRY TO OBTAIN BETTER INSIGHT INTO KING'S CURRENT MOOD. I ALSO WANTED TO GET ZAID'S ADVICE ON WHETHER IT WOULD BE WISE FOR ME TO TRY TO SEE KING BEFORE KHAMMASH RETURNS WITH ARMS PACKAGE.

2. ZAID TOLD ME THAT HUSSEIN HIMSELF HAD DRAFTED MESSAGE TO KHAMMAS. HE SAID THAT KING HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY CONVINCED ABOUT THE CORRECTNESS OF HIS VIEW OF LARGER CONTEXT IN WHICH HE NOW SEES USG POLICY TOWARD MIDDLE EAST. ZAID THEN EXPLAINED KING'S ANALYSIS VERY MUCH ALONG LINES KING HAD TAKEN WITH ME ON JAN 25 (AMMAN 3129). US IS TIED DOWN IN FAR EAST AND OTHER AREAS AND HAS LITTLE FLEXIBILITY OR, FOR THAT MATTER, WILL TO ACT CONSTRUCTIVELY TO PROMOTE JUST PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST. SOVIETS HAVE BEEN MOVING IN, PARTICULARLY SINCE JUNE WAR AND, RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, ARE CREDITED BY ARAB LEADERS WITH RIGHT MOTIVES AND SYMPATHETH

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POLICIES IN MIDDLE EAST. USG IS JUDGED TO BE BOTH UNWILLING AND UNABLE TO CONTROL ISRAEL. THUS, MODERATE JORDANIANS AGREE WITH KING HUSSEIN THAT TIME HAS COME TO "STAY A STEP AHEAD OF SITUATION BY MOVING TOWARD SOVIETS".

3. KING FEELS HE HAS GONE "NINETY PERCENT OF THE WAY" WITH THE US. AFTER JUNE THE US SEEMED TO FORGET COMPLETELY ALL THAT HE AND OTHER MODERATE JORDANIANS HAD DONE OVER PAST DECADE AND MORE TO HELP PRESERVE STABILITY AND MODERATION IN MIDDLE EAST. US HAD DONE NOTHING TO HELP JORDAN OUT SINCE JUNE. TO THE CONTRARY,

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-201
By inf NARA. Date 2-25-92

WE HAD IN EFFECT, VOTED AGAINST JORDAN ON JERUSALEM QUESTION; WE HAD POSED CONTINUOUS DIFFICULTIES ABOUT MATTERS OF MERE WORDS IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS; WE HAD FINALLY LIFTED ARMS EMBARGO FOR ISRAEL AND CERTAIN OTHER ARAB STATES BUT POINTEDLY EXCLUDED JORDAN; AND THEN WE HAD DISCONTINUED BUDGETARY SUPPORT WHICH HAD BECOME SYMBOL OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. ALTHOUGH SUBSEQUENTLY WE HAD AFFIRMED OUR CONTINUED SUPPORT OF JORDAN IN GENERAL WAY, FACT WAS THAT TOTALITY OF OUR ACTIONS TOWARD JORDAN HAD BEEN NEGATIVE RATHER THAN POSITIVE. FINALLY, KING'S RECEPTION IN US IN NOVEMBER, PARTICULARLY IN CONTRAST TO LATER RECEPTION OF ESHKOL, HAD BEEN SERIOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL BLOW.

4. ZAID EXPLAINED THAT HE SEPARATELY AND LATER TOGETHER WITH PRIMIN TALHOUNI TODAY HAD ARGUED AT SOME LENGTH WITH KING TO EFFECT HE SHOULD ACCEPT US ARMS PACKAGE, EVEN IF IT PROVIDES ONLY 50 PERCENT OF JORDAN ARMS STRENGTH AS OF JUNE 4. THEY HAD URGED IT WOULD BE BETTER GO ALONG WITH US IN PRESENT SITUATION BECAUSE SOVIET ARMS DEAL WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO SOLUTION MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM AND, IN THEIR VIEW, WOULD FURTHER OBSTRUCT SOLUTION. KING HAD PRESSED HIS OWN ANALYSIS IN PARAGRAPH TWO ABOVE IN RESPONSE TO THIS ADVICE.

5. IN ZAID'S VIEW THERE IS MUCH TO WHAT KING SAYS. HE SAID HE BELIEVES THAT IF US ARMS PACKAGE PROVES INADEQUATE IN KING'S VIEW ONLY WAY TO KEEP KING FROM GOING TO SOVIETS FOR ARMS IS TO BE ABLE TO CITE SOMETHING TANGIBLE AND DRAMATIC TO INDICATE THAT US DOES HAVE CONTINUING POSITIVE INTEREST IN JORDAN AND DOES IN FACT INTEND "USE ITS MUSCLE" TO PREVENT ISRAELIS FROM CARRYING OFF A MASSIVE FAIT ACCOMPLI. ZAID SAID THAT "STATEMENTS WITHOUT PRACTICAL EFFECT" SIMPLY ARE NOT ENOUGH. JORDAN MUST BE ABLE TO POINT TO SOMETHING TANGIBLE TO SHOW THAT USG INTENDS TO IMPLEMENT ITS STATEMENTS ABOUT JERUSALEM AND THE JARRING MISSION. IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO SAY USG WILL EXERT PRESSURE; USG MUST ACTUALLY EXERT PRESSURE AND POINT TO RESULTS. IN THE PAST DECADE AND MORE THE KING FELT THAT JORDAN HAD GIVEN EVERYTHING AND GOTTEN NOTHING IN TRYING TO LIVE WITH ISRAEL. USG HAD SPOKEN A GREAT DEAL ABOUT HUMAN AND LEGAL RIGHTS IN VIET NAM. WHAT ABOUT ARAB RIGHTS? WHAT ABOUT VILLAGES THAT HAD BEEN LEVELLED ON WEST BANK BY ISRAEL? WHAT ABOUT PEOPLE WHO HAD BEEN EVICTED FROM THEIR HOMES IN GAZA, JERUSALEM, AND WEST BANK? WHAT ABOUT UN DECISIONS THAT HAD BEEN CONSISTENTLY FLOUTED? WHAT ABOUT RECENT US STATEMENTS ABOUT NOT ACCEPTING UNILATERAL ISRAELI ACTIONS? FACT IS THAT USG IS ACCEPTING ISRAELI ACTIONS AND DOING NOTHING ABOUT THEM.

6. THROUGHOUT THIS CONVERSATION ZAID EMPHASIZED THAT THESE ARE THINGS KING IS THINKING. THIS IS HIS READING OF SITUATION. ACTUALLY HIS ADVISERS ARE TRYING WITHOUT MUCH HOPE OF SUCCESS TO CONVINCE HIM TO MAKE NO DRASTIC MOVES. YET, MANY JORDANIANS NOW BELIEVE THE SOVIETS CAN CALL THE TUNE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE MEDITERRANEAN. THEY ARE BEGINNING TO BELIEVE THE SOVIETS

~~SZGPK~~^{ARE ABLE} TO CHALLENGE THE US SIXTH FLEET IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THAT THE SOVIETS ALSO HAVE MARINES AND HELICOPTERS TO LAND IN MIDDLE EAST IF NECESSARY. THUS, MANY JORDANIANS AND OTHER ARABS NOW SEE A POSSIBILITY OF SECURITY COUNCIL OR OTHER UN ACTION TO FACE ISRAEL WITH SANCTIONS SIMILAR TO THOSE THAT HAD BEEN PUT ON ISRAEL IN 1956 BY THE US. BUT IN THIS CASE IT WOULD BE THE SOVIETS THAT WOULD TAKE THE CREDIT FOR FORCING THE ISRAELIS TO RESPECT WORLD OPINION, NOT THE US.

7. I SHALL NOT DETAIL REJOINDERS AND COMMENTS I MADE TO ZAID WITH REGARD TO FOREGOING. I SOUGHT HIS REACTION TO IDEA I MIGHT SEEK AN AUDIENCE WITH HUSSEIN TOMORROW OR MONDAY BEFORE KHAMMASH RETURNS IN ORDER TO TRY TO DISPEL SOME OF KING'S APPARENT MIS-INTERPRETATIONS OF OUR POLICIES AND ACTIONS. ZAID COUNSELLED ME AGAINST SEEING KING BUT SAID HE WOULD LET HUSSEIN KNOW I WAS AVAILABLE WHENEVER HE WANTED TO SEE ME. (I WILL IN ANY CASE ACCOMPANY EUGENE BLACK IN CALL LATE ON SIXTH). HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR ME NOT TO SEE KING UNTIL KHAMMASH HAS RETURNED WITH "PACKAGE", BUT HE EMPHASIZED IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL FOR PACKAGE TO BE APPROXIMATELY WHAT KING WANTED AND FOR IT TO BE PLACED IN BEST POSSIBLE LIGHT. MORE IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, WOULD BE SOME KIND OF US ACTION WITH REGARD TO JERUSALEM OR JARRING MISSION THAT COULD BE CITED AS REAL EVIDENCE OF US INTENTIONS TO USE ITS MUSCLE TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

8. AS ZAID WAS LEAVING HE SAID HE AND PRIMIN TALHOUNI HAD OBTAINED KING'S GRUDGING AGREEMENT TO LET KING FAISAL KNOW IF HE FINDS US PACKAGE UNACCEPTABLE. ACCORDING TO ZAID, TALHOUNI HAD SAID TO KING THAT EVEN HE, WHO HAD NEVER HAD GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH AMERICANS, BELIEVED IT WOULD BE IN JORDAN'S INTEREST TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE AVOID CHANGING "POLITICAL BALANCE" IN AREA AT THIS TIME. ZAID AND TALHOUNI, HOWEVER, ARE NOT SANGUINE HUSSEIN WILL GO AGAIN TO FAISAL IF US PACKAGE APPEARS TOO FAR SHORT OF HIS REQUIREMENTS. (DEPT. MAY WISH INFORM AMBASSADOR EILTS OF MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS.)

9. COMMENT: A. AT THIS STAGE WE NEED SOMETHING MORE THAN A GIMMICK. WE NEED AN EARNEST OF OUR INTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO JERUSALEM AND THE UK RESOLUTION. JORDAN ACCEPTED THE UK RESOLUTION AND HAS CATEGORICALLY STATED THIS TO JARRING. JORDAN IS WILLING TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT TO THIS EFFECT AS SOON AS ISRAEL SIMILARLY COMMITS ITSELF TO JARRING AND PUBLICLY ACCEPTS RESOLUTION. IN MY OPINION EVEN MORE IMPORTANT THAN GIVING HUSSEIN DOUBLE THE ARMS HE HAS REQUESTED WOULD BE A CLEARCUT PUBLIC STATEMENT WITH PRACTICAL EFFECT OF OUR INTENTIONS RE JERUSALEM AND JARRING (OR FAILING THAT, UNPUBLICIZED EVIDENCE THROUGH JARRING OR OTHERWISE THAT ISRAELIS WILL CEASE THEIR UNILATERAL

ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM AND WILL ACCEPT UK RESOLUTION AS BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS). IN THIS REGARD, I MUST EMPHASIZE THAT JORDANIANS IMMEDIATELY PICKED UP AND BEGAN TO SUSPECT PHRASE "IN SPIRIT OF" IN REFERENCE TO ISRAELI ATTITUDE TOWARD JARRING MISSION AS CARRIED IN ESHKOL-JOHNSON COMMUNIQUE.

B. I THINK WE ALSO MIGHT CONSIDER GIVING IMMEDIATE PUBLICITY TO OUR DECISION SUPPLY ARMS TO JORDAN THUS MAKING IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR KING TO MOVE TOWARDS SOVIET ARMS RELATIONSHIP. THIS STATEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE TO EFFECT WE HAVE DECIDED SATISFY LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS OF JORDAN BECAUSE OF OUR LONG AND CORDIAL RELATIONSHIP, BECAUSE OF ITS MODERATE VIEWS, AND BECAUSE WE THINK JORDAN IS ENTITLED SATISFY ITS DEFENSIVE REQUIREMENTS.

C. DEPT MAY WISH REPEAT THIS ON NODIS BASIS TO USUN AND TEL AVIV.

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SYMMES

MEMORANDUM
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ACTION

Authority FRUS, 64-68, Vol. 20 # 72

THE WHITE HOUSE

45d

By jc NARA. Date 6-15-11

WASHINGTON

SECRET

Tuesday, February 6, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Jordan Arms Package

(no attachment - DT) *(They have not yet signed)*
In the attached, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara recommend what they feel is the minimum package that King Hussein might see as meeting his legitimate needs. This poses two separate issues: (1) whether you are now ready to go ahead with a substantial program; and (2) if so, how to handle the difficult Conte-Long amendments.

I. The package contains 18 F-104 aircraft, 88 M-48 A-1 tanks, medium artillery and a range of support equipment. This \$82 million (FY 1968-FY 1970) package contrasts to Hussein's \$200 million request, which included 36 aircraft and 200 M-48 A-4 tanks. Our rationale for paring his request is to help replace war losses except for some planes and tanks and heavy artillery. We would have to be willing to consider something beyond this package later but would suggest starting with this.

Our paring may leave this too little to meet what Hussein considers his needs. He lost 179 tanks in June, and we are offering half that. He wants tanks with a diesel engine (greater range) and a 105 mm. gun (which we sold the Israelis). We couldn't supply what he wants for two years. Our plane offer has a better chance, since we would just pick up our 1966 contract where it was suspended but offer half the number of planes now.

Our two hopes for flexibility are (a) that he can get British tanks to his specifications much sooner (they're available) and (b) that he might take some British aircraft if the Saudis would give them and we would supply a few more tanks instead. But the Secretaries feel we have to offer to supply both if neither of these deals works out.

Jordan could pay cash for the FY 1968 installment (about \$32 million, of which \$10 million already paid under the 1966 contract). The cost in FY 1969 would be \$36.3 million and in FY 1970 \$10.3 million. Neither Khammash nor the USG yet knows definitely how the FY 1968 and FY 1969 tranches might be financed, so we would have to feel our way.

This package will be painful to approve, but the alternative is accepting the probable consequences of not going ahead now. Eshkol acknowledged to you that he wished no one had to give arms to Jordan but he'd rather see us there than the USSR. Dayan in a published interview on January 19 said: "We shall not profit by it in any way if the Americans lose their influence in Jordan."

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I should hate to see this presented to you simply as selling arms to block Soviet military aid, because the issue is now much broader. We have reached the point in Jordan where the question is whether they think they have a better chance of achieving their objectives with US or Soviet help. If we are ending our aid relationship and are unable to press Israel toward a settlement, then Hussein is wondering whether a Soviet ring around Israel wouldn't better bring Israel to terms. This is, of course, the thinking of an increasingly desperate man who sees his choices diminishing. It would just about end chances for the kind of settlement we'd like.

There are other things we must do on the diplomatic front such as presenting a clearer position on Jerusalem and helping get the Jarring exercise moving. But unfortunately, this military aid decision has become a symbol to Hussein. We have strung him along since last June, and Khammash has been here since January 17. Now Hussein has told you he would continue to avoid Soviet arms if he could be sure of meeting his legitimate needs in the US. That is the purpose of this exercise.

Approve Secretaries' approach _____ Disapprove _____ Call me _____

II. The Conte-Long amendments require you to withhold aid from Jordan in an amount equal to its expenditure for sophisticated weapons unless you waive on the ground that the Jordanian purchases are "vital to the national security of the United States." The airplanes, the tanks, and the howitzers in this package are pretty clearly sophisticated weapons. If you do not waive, we would have to eliminate all economic aid to Jordan for at least the next two years.

It would be possible to weave a complicated legal argument which might allow you to maintain aid without a waiver. But it would be very dubious and would certainly cause serious trouble on the Hill. Therefore, Rusk and McNamara recommend that you make the waiver.

This will be the first use of the waiver provision. I think the Secretaries have a strong case, but you may want to have some fast checking done on the Hill. I don't think we should seek agreement from Conte, Fulbright, Morse, Church and the others most interested in this topic, but you may want to be able to say that you notified them beforehand. (The law requires you to make formal notification of waiver to the Congress within 30 days.)

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III. If you approve this package, Secretary McNamara would go over it in detail with Khammash. In view of the importance of your personal intentions as Hussein sees them, there could be great advantage in your inviting him in before he leaves for a heart-to-heart talk.

I'll see him _____

I'd rather not _____

Walt Rostow

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301


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6 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You have asked that I inform you of "the latest date on which the President could make a decision to supply Israel with Phantom aircraft of appropriate configuration to be delivered to Israel beginning in January 1970."

If your decision is made on or before December 31, 1968, we can begin the delivery of Phantoms to Israel in January 1970. The Israeli request was for 50 aircraft. We would plan to deliver them at the rate of approximately 4 per month.



Robert S. McNamara

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Authority NW 82-209

By isw, NARS, Date 8-20-82

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