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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del># 21 agenda</del>	<del>open 10-6-83 NLS 82-51 Tuesday Luncheon Secret 1 p.</del>	<del>6/11/68</del>	<del>A</del>
# 21adraft letter	President to Chairman Kosygin Secret 2 p. (dup. in #35a, NSF, Memo to the President, Vol. 81 - Rush days) dupe in Files of WWR, Box 3, Lunch MTG 6/11/68	6/10/68	A
#-22-- # 21b draft letter	President to Chairman Kosygin Secret 2 p. (dup. #35b, as above - Bender draft)	6/10/68	A
<del>#21c cable</del>	<del>Paris 15760 Secret 3 p.</del> open 6-1-93 (dup. #35c, as above) NLS 93-16	<del>6/7/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del># 21d cable</del>	<del>Section 2 of Paris 15760 Secret 1 p.</del> (dup. #35c as above) open 6-1-93 NLS 93-16	<del>6/7/68</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

Briefing Papers for Tuesday Luncheon, June 11, 1968  
Meeting Notes File, Box 3

DCH 11/81

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1. Message to Kosygin. (Secretaries Rusk and Clifford)

Tab A. Sec. Rusk's suggested redraft attached as well as Amb. Bunker's proposed revision.

2. Instructions for Wednesday Meeting in Paris. (Sec. Rusk)

Tab B. The key question here is whether they should get into item (c) at the bottom of page 2 and the top of page 3.

It has been agreed there will be no reference to bombing between the 19th and 20th parallels.

3. Defense budget cuts. (Sec. Clifford)

The President asked for a report by Tuesday. Sec. Clifford will be ready.

4. Violations of North Korean air space. (Sec. Clifford)

Sec. Clifford was apprised of the President's interest in this matter. He will report steps that have been taken.

5. Seabeds issue. (Secretaries Rusk and Clifford)

The issue will arise in the UN on Monday, June 23. Sec. Rusk will present a proposed U.S. position.

6. Naval vessels in the Black Sea. (Sec. Clifford)

Sec. Rusk has raised this matter with Sec. Clifford; and it was suggested the issue be aired with the President.

7. Amb. Goldberg's suggestion that the President speak at the close of the Special General Assembly. (The President)

We put this on the agenda because it would be one way to dramatize the President's interest in the NPT as well as an occasion to talk more generally on the search for peace in the world.

8. Other.

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Authority NLJ 82-51

is, NARS, Date 10-6-83

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W. W. Rostow

SERVICE SET





Department of State

TELEGRAM

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By ing, NARA, Date 5-24-93

N O D I S/HARVAN

DELTO 255

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

WE ARE SUBMITTING IN THIS MESSAGE A DRAFT OUTLINE FOR THE JUNE 12 MEETING. WE SUGGEST A DISCUSSION OF THE OUTLINE DURING OUR VISIT THIS WEEKEND.

1. WE WILL OPEN. WE PROPOSE MAKING A BRIEF OPENING STATEMENT DEFINING OUR IMMEDIATE PURPOSE IN SPECIFIC TERMS DEALING WITH THE CONNECTION BETWEEN CESSATION OF LIMITED BOMBING OF NORTH VIET-NAM AND WHAT WE HAVE CALLED "RELATED MATTERS."

2. THE STATEMENT WOULD REFER TO THE LACK OF PROGRESS AND THE FACT THAT THE OTHER SIDE HAS BEEN USING THESE MEETINGS AS A PROPAGANDA FORUM RATHER THAN DISCUSSING THE NECESSARY ISSUES. WE WOULD INDICATE NO INTEREST IN PURSUING THE PROPAGANDA LINE AND SUGGEST THAT WE NOW FOCUS ON THE ESSENTIALS AS THEY HAVE EMERGED.

3. WE WOULD DEFINE THE HEART OF THE MATTER AS BEING THEIR DEMAND FOR THE DETERMINATION OF AN UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF ALL BOMBING BEFORE CONSIDERING MATTERS RELATED TO THIS DETERMINATION, AS AGAINST OUR CALL FOR CONSIDERATION OF CESSATION OF BOMBING TOGETHER WITH RELATED MATTERS WHICH INCLUDE RESTRAINT ON THEIR PART AS A SIGN OF GOOD FAITH.

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Tab B



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4. WE WOULD INFORM THE NORTH VIETNAMESE THAT, CONTRARY TO THEIR CHARGES THAT WE HAVE INTENSIFIED THE WAR IN THE NORTH SINCE MARCH 31, WE HAVE EXERCISED A DEGREE OF RESTRAINT EVEN BEYOND THAT ANNOUNCED IN THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH OF THAT DATE. AS THEY MUST HAVE NOTED, WE HAVE SHOWN, FOR THE TIME BEING, AN EXTRA MEASURE OF RESTRAINT BY NOT BOMBING IN THE AREA BETWEEN THE 19TH AND 20TH PARALLELS SINCE APRIL 4. MOREOVER, NONE OF OUR TROOPS OR THOSE OF OUR ALLIES HAVE BEEN OPERATING IN THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE DMZ SINCE THEN. THIS EXTRA MEASURE OF RESTRAINT ON OUR PART HAS BEEN APPARENT TO THE AUTHORITIES IN HANOI. UNFORTUNATELY, HANOI HAS RESPONDED WITH THE OPPOSITE OF RESTRAINT AND HAS INTENSIFIED ITS EFFORTS TO TAKE OVER THE SOUTH BY FORCE. SUCH ACTIONS CREATE SERIOUS DOUBTS IN OUR MIND THAT COMPLETELY STOPPING THE BOMBING OF THE NORTH WOULD EVOKE ACTS OF GOOD FAITH ON THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SIDE.

5. QUOTING FROM THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECHES, WE WOULD EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THEIR TAKING RELATED ACTION IN CONNECTION WITH A TOTAL BOMBING CESSATION. WE WOULD DEFINE RELATED MATTERS AS THOSE ACTIONS WHICH IN THE ABSENCE OF BOMBING COULD ENABLE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, IF THEY WERE TO ACT IN BAD FAITH, TO INCREASE THE INTENSITY OF THE WAR AND THUS ENDANGER THE LIVES OF OUR MEN AND THOSE OF OUR ALLIES.

6. WE WOULD THEN STATE OUR FUNDAMENTAL POSITION THAT NORTH VIET-NAM MUST NOT IMPROVE ITS MILITARY POSITION AS A RESULT OF A US CESSATION OF BOMBING. THAT IS WHY WE HAVE PROPOSED AMONG OTHER THINGS THE EARLY RESTORATION OF THE DMZ TO ITS PROPER AND ORIGINAL STATUS. WE WOULD REGARD AS ACTS OF BAD FAITH INCONSISTENT WITH OUR OWN RESTRAINT ANY ATTEMPTS BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TO IMPROVE THEIR MILITARY POSITION AS A RESULT OF A US CESSATION OF BOMBING. SUCH ACTS OF BAD FAITH WOULD INCLUDE: (A) ARTILLERY OR OTHER FIRE FROM AND ACROSS THE DMZ; (P) GROUND ATTACKS ACROSS THE DMZ OR THE MASSING OF ADDITIONAL FORCES OR SUPPLIES IN NORTH VIET-NAM OR THE DMZ IN A MANNER WHICH POSES A DIRECT THREAT TO ALLIED FORCES IN SOUTH VIET-NAM; (C) AN INCREASE IN THE MOVEMENT OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS AND SUPPLIES INTO SOUTH VIET-NAM,

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TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT THE INCREASE IN INFILTRATION RATE OF RECENT MONTHS IS ABNORMAL AND THAT WE ARE THINKING IN TERMS OF THE RATE WHICH PREVAILED IN MID-1967.

7. WE WOULD MENTION AGAIN OUR CONCERN OVER THE LEVEL OF NVA-VC TERROR ATTACKS DIRECTED AGAINST SAIGON AND REMIND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE THAT CONTINUATION OF THESE ATTACKS IS NOT CONDUCTIVE TO PROGRESS AT THE PARIS TALKS.


8. WE WOULD CALL UPON THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN THESE TALKS LIE LARGELY IN THEIR HANDS. THEY MUST FACE UP TO THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION AND RECOGNIZE THE NEED FOR WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAS CALLED "SOME GESTURES ON THE OTHER SIDE TOWARD PEACE." IF OUR RESTRAINT AND OUR GOODWILL CONTINUE TO MEET ONLY INFLEXIBILITY, BELLICOSE STATEMENTS AND EVASIONS, WE WILL NOT MAKE ANY PROGRESS TOWARD ACHIEVING AN HONORABLE PEACE. WE ARE PATIENT, BUT WE ARE DETERMINED.

9. WE WOULD PROPOSE THAT, IN LINE WITH THE SERIOUSNESS OF PURPOSE WHICH WE ARE DEMONSTRATING TODAY, THEY ONCE AGAIN CONSIDER OUR EARLIER SUGGESTION TO REDUCE THE PROPAGANDA OUTPUT IN THE WAKE OF EACH MEETING. WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT EACH SIDE AGREE THAT FOLLOWING THIS AND FUTURE MEETINGS NEITHER SIDE WOULD ISSUE FULL TEXTS OF STATEMENTS MADE AND THAT EACH SPOKESMAN WOULD ONLY PRESENT A GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF POSITIONS TAKE BY EACH SIDE. WE WOULD HOPE THEREBY NOT ONLY TO DEMONSTRATE THE SERIOUSNESS OF OUR OWN PURPOSE, BUT TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE WORLD THAT WE WERE NOT APPROACHING THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE WITH POLEMICS AND PURE PROPAGANDA.

10. WE WOULD CLOSE BY REPEATING ONCE AGAIN THE STATEMENT USED AT THE JUNE 5 MEETING AS FOLLOWS: "YOU HAVE ASKED THAT WE ACKNOWLEDGE OR DETERMINE OUR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CESSATION OF ALL BOMBING. AS WE HAVE STATED THIS HAS NEVER PRESENTED AN INSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLE TO US, AND WE ARE PREPARED, IN FACT, TO CEASE BOMBARDMENT AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME AND CIRCUMSTANCE. ACCORDINGLY, I HOPE THAT WE MAY PROCEED FORTHWITH TO DISCUSS RELATED MATTERS"

HARRIMAN

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# Department of State

## TELEGRAM

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8:33 A.M.

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11. THIS STATEMENT AT THE LAST MEETING RECEIVED NO RESPONSE.  
WE BELIEVE THEY NOTED OUR FORMULATION, AND WE WILL BE  
WATCHFUL FOR ANY REACTION FROM THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.  
PARTEXAN

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