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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#38 meeting notes	<i>more info released 12-17-90 NLJ 88-151</i> <i>sanitized 10-6-83 NLJ 82-51</i> meeting with for foreign policy advisors		
	Top Secret 3 p. <i>Downgraded to SECRET per NLJ 82-51</i>	9/4/68	A
#39 agenda	for lunch meeting on 9/4 <i>per 7-8-85 NLJ 85-03</i>	9/4/68	A
#40 meeting notes	handwritten notes from which # 38 were transcribed <i>sanitized 12-17-90 NLJ 88-151</i> Top Secret 5 p. <i>Downgraded to Secret per NLJ 82-51</i>	9/4/68	A

FILE LOCATION

Meeting Notes File, Box 3

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SEPTEMBER 4, 1968 - 1 p.m.

MEETING WITH FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS

The President	General Maxwell Taylor
Secretary Rusk	Walt Rostow
Secretary Clifford	George Christian
General Earle Wheeler	

SERVICE SET

~~TOP SECRET~~

38

NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
WITH FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS

September 4, 1968
1 p.m.
In the Mansion

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 88-151

By 207 NARA Date 12-13-90

ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE:

The President	General Maxwell Taylor
Secretary Rusk	Walt Rostow
Secretary Clifford	George Christian <i>YXC</i>
General Earle Wheeler	

The President: Tell us about our meeting in Paris.

Secretary Rusk: It was standard. There was not much progress. North Vietnam blasted American politics. But the tea break produced an agreement for a Saturday meeting -- a private talk. We might press Hanoi for a response on something, to tell us what parts they can agree to. I believe we are at a real watershed here. If North Vietnam takes the DMZ, it means the jig is up for them in South Vietnam. The same applies to us if we stop the bombing without reciprocal action. It is important that we make no public move until Saturday.

The President: What is the military situation?

Secretary Clifford: There is more activity, but we don't know whether this is the third offensive. The attacks are not coming off very well. It may be Abrams' spoiling the operations. I heard about a plan to assassinate General Abrams because he has been so successful.

Their losses are substantial. Their actions don't seem to have much plan or program.

General Wheeler: I asked General Abrams to increase his personal security arrangements - and also that of his staff and Ambassador Bunker. I agree with General Abrams that the enemy has been trying to mount an offensive, without success.

(At this point the group went in to lunch.)

Secretary Rusk: Prince Sihanouk has agreed to see Eugene Black. Does the President want to see him? I just met with Ambassador Dobrynin at his

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request.



Secretary Rusk: The Black visit may bring about the release of our men they're holding.

The President: What about Eastern Europe?

Secretary Rusk: Discussed the statement on Czechoslovakian refugees. (The President approved the statement.)

Russia's second inaugural flight is due in a few days. I think it should be postponed, and Ambassador Dobrynin agrees. (The President OK'd this action.)

Should the President withdraw the Most Favored Nation treatment from Poland, rather than Congress doing it? I think it is better. The chances of forestalling the Congressional action is slim.

The President: What about the Pueblo?

Secretary Rusk: The rumors are that North Korea Independence celebration might bring a gesture. We should ask for a meeting the day after the celebration. Independence Day is September 7.

The President: What other measures?

Secretary Rusk: We could sign something, but they have shown no inclination to do this.

Walt Rostow: My guess is that they'll move only when they see signs North Vietnam wants to negotiate seriously.

Secretary Rusk: I think we should postpone the Sugar Conference. The Australians are pushing us.

The President: It is clear to me that we should postpone it. Is there anything else?

Walt Rostow: On the Saturday meeting, it is important that we decide the minimum conditions for a bombing halt. We've listed many things but kept it flexible. It is conceivable Ambassador Harriman should have it in his pocket.

Secretary Rusk: I'd be inclined not to give this to Harriman Saturday, but find out what Hanoi will propose. Their willingness to talk to Saigon and the DMZ would be the gut.

Walt Rostow: A cease-fire format might be the easiest way to reach contact with the Government of North Vietnam about a willingness to talk about the details of a ceasefire plan.

The President: I'll be happy to see Gene Black. Who will you send with him?

Secretary Rusk: Thomas Corcoran, country man for Laos and Cambodia.

The Non Proliferation Treaty will be in the Senate in September. I have no doubt that the Senate should go ahead with it, on its merits. Clearly, it will be more difficult now for the Germans to ratify.

The President: I think we'll get in trouble if we try to shove it in, in the last two weeks.

Secretary Rusk: Why not count votes, don't press it, and let them put it off to January if the Senate wants to.

The President: All right.

Secretary Rusk: The Romanian matter is O.K. as far as the press is concerned.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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Lunch with the President
Wednesday, Sept. 4, 1968, 1:00 p.m.

Agenda

1. Vietnam (Sect. Rusk, Sect. Clifford, and Gen. Wheeler)
 - report on Wednesday Paris meeting;
 - next steps in negotiation;
 - military situation and prospects;
 - threat of assassinations in Saigon.
2. Cambodia (Sect. Rusk)
 - Sitrep on possible contacts and initiatives with Sihanouk.
3. Eastern Europe (Sect. Rusk)
 - Poland and Most Favored Nation treatment;
 - asylum for Czech refugees as suggested by Mr. Cherne;
 - handling of second inaugural Soviet flight to the U. S.
4. Sugar Conference (Sect. Rusk)
 - UNCTAD World Sugar Conference scheduled for Sept. 23.
Likely sugar agreement that would emerge would double Castro's income from sugar exports. We may be able to achieve postponement.
Congress unlikely to ratify.
5. PUEBLO (Sect. Rusk)
 - Sitrep.
6. Should Ambassador Shriver call on de Gaulle? (Sect. Rusk)
7. Other.

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Authority NLS 85-03By 226, NAME, Date 7-8-85

W. Rostow

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SANTIZED

Maxwell Taylor

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Lunch - 9-4-68 1:22 p.

P - tell about our meeting in Paris -

R - Standard. Not much progress. NVN blasted Am politics. But tea break produced agreement for Sat. meeting - private talk. We might press Hanoi for a response on something, to tell us what parts they can agree to. I believe we are at a real watershed here. If NVN take DMZ, means jig is up for them in SVN. Same applies to us if we stop boasting w/o reciprocal action. Important that we make no public move till Sat.

P - What is mil sit?

C - More activity, but don't know whether this is third offensive. Attacks not coming off very well. May be Abrams' spiraling operations. Heard about plan to assassinate Abrams because he's been so successful.

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Their losses substantial. Their actions don't seem to have much plan or program. W - I asked Abram to increase his personal security arrangements - also his staff and Amb. Bunker. I agree with Krame that enemy has been trying to mount offensive, w/o success.

(in to lunch)

R - Sihannouk has agreed to see Gene Black. Does Pres want to see him?

I just met with Dolynin at his request.

13
(a) 5
(3)

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Black visit

R - may bring about release of our men
they're holding.

H - ~~For some reason, have~~

P - what about Eastern Europe?

R - ① (Pres approved statement on ~~to~~
Czech refugees).

② Russia's second inaugural flight
due in few days; I think should be
postponed, Dobrynin agrees (Pres OK'd).

③ Should Pres ~~apply~~ withdraw Most
Favored Nation treatment from Poland,
rather than Congress? I think better.
Chances of forestalling Cong action
slim.

P - Perchlo?

R - Rumors that NKorean don't ~~do~~
celebration might bring gesture. We
should ask for meeting day after.
(End. Day is Sept. 7).

(4) P - Other measures?

R - we could sign something -
but they have shown no inclination
to do this.

Ros. - my guess is they'll move only
when they see signs NVN want to
~~see~~ negotiate seriously -

R - sugar conference - think
should postpone. Australians
pushing.

P - Clear to me we should postpone.
Anything else?

Ros - on Sat meeting, important that
we decide minimum conditions for
a bombing halt. We've listed many
things but kept it flexible. Conceivably
Hanniman should have it in his pocket.

R - I'd be inclined not to give this
to H Sat, but find out what
Hanoi will propose. Their willing-
ness to talk to Saigon + the DMZ
would be the gut.

(5).

Ros - a cease-fire format might be easiest way to reach contact with GVN - willingness to talk about details of a ceasefire plan.

P - I'll be happy to see Gene Black who will you send with him?

R - Thomas Corcoran, country man for Laos + Cambodia.

R - NPT in Senate in Sept, I have no doubt Senate should go ahead with it, on its merits. Clearly, more difficult now for Germans to ratify -

P - I think we'll get in trouble if we try to shove it in last 2 weeks.

R - why not count votes, don't press, let them put off to Jan. if Senate wants to.

P - OK.

R - Romanian matter OK as far as press concerned.