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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#71 a meeting notes</del>	<del>open 10-6-83 NLS 82-51 meeting with foreign policy advisors and President Eliot Nixon 3 p. possible classified info.</del>	<del>11/11/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#72 meeting notes</del>	<del>open 2-14-84 NLS 83-153 draft for # 71 5 p. Secret</del>	<del>11/11/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#73 chronology	total bombing cessations Secret 3 p. sanitized 11-30-84	n.d.	A
<p align="center">see also Appointment File (Diary Backup) Nov. 11, 1968</p>			

FILE LOCATION

Meeting Notes File, Box 3

DCH 11/81

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NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE  
PRESIDENT-ELECT RICHARD NIXON

November 11, 1968

PRESENT AT THE MEETING WERE:

The President  
President-elect Richard M. Nixon  
Secretary Dean Rusk  
Secretary Clark Clifford  
General Earle G. Wheeler  
Director Richard Helms  
W. W. Rostow

The President and President-elect came in at 3:00 p. m.

The President began by telling Mr. Nixon that the Secretaries of State and Defense would brief him on Vietnam. Secretary Rusk would also touch on problems in other areas. General Wheeler was available to deal with the military situation; and Mr. Helms would contribute intelligence data and make arrangements for keeping Mr. Nixon informed from day to day.

Secretary Rusk immediately suggested that it would be wise if Mr. Nixon would appoint a man in whom he had absolute confidence and adequate background to be stationed in a room next to Secretary Rusk's office for immediate liaison purposes.

Mr. Nixon said that, despite observations in the press, he had made no decisions on his Cabinet. He hopes to have his Cabinet appointed by December 5. He would naturally like to have someone keep in touch on Vietnam. To this end he had contacted Cabot Lodge. He found Lodge's views close to his own and those of President Johnson. In general, he found no significant difference between his views on Vietnam and those of the present Administration. Cabot said he did not wish to be considered for any permanent position in the new Administration.

Nixon said he accepted that view but would use him for special chores. He said that if it were acceptable to the present Administration, he would like Cabot Lodge to be his observer on Vietnam. He had great confidence in him. The only question he would raise is whether it would disturb the Germans if he were pulled out of Bonn for this special immediate task.

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Authority NLS 82-51  
By ma, NARS, Date 10-6-83

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Secretary Rusk said immediately that Cabot Lodge would be wholly acceptable to him.

Mr. Nixon said that he needed someone for this task who had a deep knowledge of the Vietnam situation. He could not begin an education on Vietnam now. He asked how much of a problem would it be with Bonn. How good is the DCM?

Secretary Rusk said that Russ Fessenden, the DCM, was competent. He would have a better feel for the danger of leaving the Ambassador's post open after he went to the NATO meeting. He would not raise the matter directly with Willy Brandt, but he would get a feel for the risk of leaving the post open for several months.

Mr. Nixon said he planned to appoint a career man to Bonn; it is too technical a post to appoint a political man.

Mr. Nixon said he would say and do nothing about this until he had a chance to hear from Secretary Rusk. He would discuss it further with Cabot in whom he had great confidence. He hoped the matter could be settled soon.

The President then asked Secretary Rusk if he would review the diplomatic situation. Working from the attached chronological paper, Secretary Rusk said that for the first two months there was no progress in Paris. The U. S. held to the President's position of March 31. Hanoi held to its position of April 3; namely, that the only purpose of the meeting in Paris was for us to stop the bombing unconditionally.

During June, the your-side, our-side formula was talked over with Thieu. By the end of June Thieu and Ky had agreed that this was the best practical way to proceed. In July, Vance spelled out the your-side, our-side formula to Lau. Nothing came of it, however, at that time.

In mid-September the President, through a special channel, put his basic three points to the Soviet leadership. On the 9th of October the delegation from Hanoi in Paris indicated an interest in the question of GVN participation and its relation to a bombing cessation. On 11 October they asked bluntly, would the bombing stop if the GVN were to participate in the Paris talks. Harriman said he would have to refer it to Washington, but reaffirmed the facts of life about the DMZ and the cities.



We then checked with Bunker and Abrams, who agreed to Harriman's instructions based on the President's three points.

A Soviet diplomat in Paris affirmed to us that Hanoi would accept GVN participation.

On 13 October Thieu fully agreed to the proposed instructions to Harriman.

There were then meetings at which the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State expressed to the President their agreement. The JCS were polled individually and agreed. We then went out to the troop contributing countries who accepted the proposition.

On October 16 the President briefed the three candidates and received their support.

When the proposition was put to the Hanoi delegation in Paris, however, they raised other issues.

First, they proposed that the new, enlarged meetings be called a "four-power conference." This we refused. They also proposed that we state the bombing cessation was "without conditions." This we also refused because the President's "facts of Life" represented, in effect, "conditions subsequent." Finally, there was the question of the time that would elapse between a bombing cessation and the first meeting. Hanoi offered "several weeks." We pressed them back towards a period of about three days, because the South Vietnamese government had steadily insisted that the time interval should be minimal. They thought that a gap might be politically awkward for them; and it might be awkward here as well, because the opening of the wider talks was the one concrete action in the wake of bombing cessation we could talk about frankly.

On October 27 there was a breakthrough. Hanoi dropped all the unacceptable points it had been pressing upon us and accepted a gap of three days and sixteen hours between the bombing cessation and the first meeting.

The President then requested General Abrams to return.



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Authority NLJ 83-153  
By ris, NARS, Date 2-14-84

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November 11, 1968

Meeting With the President, 11 November 1968, in the Cabinet Room.

Present: The President  
President-elect Richard M. Nixon  
Secretary Dean Rusk  
Secretary Clark Clifford  
General Earle G. Wheeler  
Director Richard Helms  
W. W. Rostow

The President and President-elect came in at 3:00 p.m.

The President began by telling Mr. Nixon that the Secretaries of State and Defense would brief him on Vietnam. Sec. Rusk would also touch on problems in other areas. General Wheeler was available to deal with the military situation; and Mr. Helms would contribute intelligence data and make arrangements for keeping Mr. Nixon informed from day to day.

Sec. Rusk immediately suggested that it would be wise if Mr. Nixon would appoint a man in whom he had absolute confidence and adequate background to be stationed in a room next to Sec. Rusk's office for immediate liaison purposes. He said that an office had already been reserved for this purpose.

Mr. Nixon said that, despite observations in the press, he had made no decisions on his Cabinet. He hopes to have his Cabinet appointed by December 5. He would naturally like to have someone keep in touch on Vietnam. To this end he had contacted Cabot Lodge. He found Lodge's

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The President then requested General Abrams to return. [At this point -- or some time prior -- Tom Johnson's notes pick up.]

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INFORMATION

EYES ONLY

*Pres file*

Friday, November 15, 1968 -- 9:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a combination of my notes, pages 1-3, and Tom's, with key passages side-lined on pages 1, 5, 6, and 9 (paperclipped).

It is clear from the context that only two things were involved:

-- Nixon liaison men to become fully informed before January 20.

-- Checking with Nixon where he is personally involved; for example, when Rusk was to talk at NATO about the outlook of the new administration on NATO.

-- Replying to telegrams to Nixon.

On the NPT, there was, in effect, solicitation of his support for Senate action before January 20.

W. W. Rostow

EYES ONLY

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LEJ LIBRARY

Mandatory Review

Case # NLJ 83-118

Document # 12

Key Chronology of Total Bombing Cessation

June 5: Kosygin has reason to believe cessation would contribute to a breakthrough.

June 26-27: Vance makes two-phase proposal to Lau. **SANITIZED**

July 15: Vance spells out our-side/your-side to Lau.

September 15: President informs Soviets of our three-point position on stopping bombing.

September 17: President discusses position with Harriman (on October 3 with Vance).

September 30: (And Oct 6): Rusk re-emphasizes position [REDACTED] 1.3 (a)(5)

October 9: Thuy expresses interest in discussing inclusion of GVN in negotiations after bombing cessation.

October 11: Tho asks if we would stop bombing if we had a clear answer on GVN participation. Harriman reaffirms "facts of life" and refers question to Washington.

October 11: Bunker and Abrams asked for views on three-point proposal.

October 12: Bunker and Abrams concur in proposed instruction. Oberemko tells Vance he has reason to believe our proposal would be acceptable to Hanoi. [REDACTED] 1.3 (a)(5)

October 13: Thieu agrees to proposal .

October 14: In the morning, Rusk, Clifford, Helms, Wheeler, and Taylor concur in proposal. In the afternoon, JCS polled individually; they agree. [REDACTED] 1.3 (a)(3)(5)

October 15: TCC leaders consulted and they concur. In Paris, Thuy (Hanoi) balks at our proposal.

October 16: (Hanoi) Thuy informed we could wait for a meeting until two or three days after cessation.

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ 83-118

By is, LANS, Date 8-23-84~~SECRET/NODIS~~

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1.3(a)(5)

- October 21: Thuy (Hanoi) proposes joint communique, four-power conference as soon as possible after cessation.
- October 25: Kosygin urges both sides to try to wrap up issues of third importance and move on to next stage. [ ] informed why we can't accept "without conditions" and more than two to three days. <sup>E</sup> 1.3(a)(5)
- October 26: Thuy (Hanoi) insists on secret minute and words "without conditions"; they proposed cessation on 27 October with meeting on November 2.
- October 27: Breakthrough. Thuy (Hanoi) agrees to drop "without conditions," suggests cessation 7 p.m., October 29, and meeting in Paris on November 2. This met U.S. position. Abrams ordered home.
- October 28: Agreement on revised joint statement. Bunker instructed to get Thieu's final concurrence prior to final Presidential decision.
- Kosygin replied to President's message of October 27 that Hanoi is "serious in its intentions" and our "doubts" are "without foundation." (Tabs D-1 and D-2)
- Harriman and Vance state, in summary (Tab E):
- they put the DMZ and cities 12 times to Hanoi delegation plus four Paris meetings with Soviet diplomats;
  - they are sure the points are understood and they have received no negative response;
  - they conclude Hanoi will comply;
  - they reaffirm their support for bombing resumption if they do not comply.
- October 29: After discussion with Abrams and others, President decides to go ahead. Thieu hedges and then states four conditions. President decides we must go ahead.
- October 30: Bunker delivers President's letter to Thieu. DRV drops the secret minute. Thieu states conditions. President decides to stop bombing following day.

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October 31: North Vietnamese and Thieu informed. Bunker meets with South Vietnamese through day and evening until 7 p.m. Washington time.

October 31: Presidential candidates briefed Congressional leadership briefed 8 p.m. TV statement announcing halt.

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