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SPEECH BY
HONORABLE ROBERT S. McNAMARA
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
BEFORE THE FELLOWS OF THE AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION DINNER
EDGEWATER BEACH HOTEL, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1962

Address by
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara
Fellows of the American Bar Foundation
Chicago, Illinois
17 February 1962

Your Chairman's invitation to talk with you this evening was a welcome one. I have always been impressed by the way in which the legal profession lives up to its public responsibilities, and the American Bar Foundation seems to me an important expression of these responsibilities.

I want to take as my text this evening a document which is a comprehensive statement about the Communist design for world conquest, by a man who should know whereof he speaks, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Supreme Soviet. It was, I believe, one of the most significant speeches of the past year, and it may prove to be one of the most important statements made by a world leader in the decade of the 60's.

Chairman Khrushchev delivered this speech, entitled "For New Victories of the World Communist Movement," on January 6, 1961, at a meeting of Soviet Communist party organizations, reporting on the results of the November 1960 Conference of World Communist Parties.

Khrushchev did not describe the Communist threat in quite the way that we would describe it, but he gave us some extremely valuable clues to the nature of that threat over the next decade. He began by declaring that "the prevention of a new war is the question of all questions." He traced the Communist concern with "the question of war and peace" back to Lenin, and he noted that Lenin's words "resound with increased force in our days" because of "the new means of mass destruction."

He went on to announce that the conference of world Communist parties "has discovered and outlined . . . new opportunities of preventing a world war . . . "

Khrushchev then proceeded to analyze three categories of wars: "world wars, local wars, and liberation wars or popular uprisings." This breakdown, he said, "is necessary to work out the correct tactics with regard to these wars."

As to world wars, he declared that "Communists are the most determined opponents" of such wars, and he asserted that "we can forestall the outbreak of a world war." Local wars, he thought, were more likely to occur in the future, but he rejected them also because a local war "may grow into a thermonuclear rocket war." But "liberation wars and popular uprisings," he predicted, "will continue to exist as long as imperialism exists." "Such wars," he asserted, "are not only admissible but inevitable . . ." "We recognize such wars. We help and will help the people striving for their independence." Chairman Khrushchev then asked and answered a series of rhetorical questions about these wars of liberation. "Can such wars flare up in the future? They can. Can there by such uprisings? There can . . . In other words, can conditions be created where a people will lose their patience and rise in arms? They can. What is the attitude of the Marxists toward such uprisings? A most positive one . . ."

Then after a description of the horrors of a thermonuclear war, Khrushchev stated a significant conclusion. "The victory of socialism throughout the world," he announced, "is now near." But "for this victory, wars among states are not necessary."

Khrushchev is saying here that a major war in the nuclear age has become too dangerous to play the role of "midwife to revolution" which Communist leaders before him had always preached. At the same time, the Soviets wish to keep alive the threat of nuclear war as a means of intimidation, a form of blackmail intended to discourage the Free World from resisting Communist encroachment at other levels.

What Chairman Khrushchev describes as wars of liberation and popular uprisings, I prefer to describe as subversion and covert aggression. We have learned to recognize the pattern of this attack. It feeds on conditions of poverty and unequal opportunity, and it distorts the legitimate aspirations of peoples just beginning to realize the reach of the human potential. It is particularly dangerous to those nations that have not yet formulated the essential consensus of values, which a free society requires for survival.

In this connection, I recall the admonition of Learned Hand: "I believe that this community is already in process of dissolution where each man begins to eye his neighbor as a possible enemy, where non-conformity with the accepted creed, political as well as religious, is a mark of disaffection; where denunciation, without specification or backing, takes the place of evidence; where orthodoxy chokes freedom of dissent;

where faith in the eventual supremacy of reason has become so timid that we dare not enter our convictions in the open lists, to win or lose. Such fears as these are a solvent which can eat out the cement that binds the stones together; they may in the end subject us to a despotism as evil as any that we dread; and they can be allayed only in so far as we refuse to proceed on suspicion, and trust one another until we have tangible ground for misgiving. The mutual confidence on which all else depends can be maintained only by an open mind and a brave reliance upon free discussion."

Learned Hand's observations apply almost equally, it seems to me, to a society in the process of dissolution and to a society not yet assured of its own stability.

Our response to this new Soviet threat cannot be a simple one. Clearly the new Soviet posture, as announced by Khrushchev, gives us no cause to relax our nuclear guard. The Soviet decision to concentrate on wars of covert aggression was not taken in a power vacuum. It rests on the fact of U.S. nuclear power, which is able to survive a nuclear surprise attack and strike back with sufficient power to destroy the enemy target system. We have such power today, and we are continuing to devote to it the energies and the resources necessary to keep it up-to-date under conditions of accelerated technological advance. But our superior nuclear power may not be a credible deterrent for the kind of conflict proposed by Khrushchev.

Over the next several years, development of the Soviet intercontinental missile force will complicate the problem still further. Today, not even the most boastful Russian rocket rattler asserts that the Soviet Union has the nuclear power to destroy the United States. It does have the power today to damage severely the nations of Western Europe, and we must anticipate that over the years the Soviets can, and undoubtedly will, produce weapons with sufficient range and destructive power to inflict increasingly severe damage on the United States, even while we ourselves retain a substantial margin of strategic power.

Under these conditions, what should be our military policy to meet the threat expressed in Khrushchev's speech? How can we continue to confine the Communist threat to the area delineated by Mr. Khrushchev, and within that area, how can we best meet and overcome it?

The first requirement for such a policy is clearly to maintain our nuclear strike power as a realistic, effective deterrent against Soviet initiation of major wars. We can no longer hope to have such a deterrent merely by maintaining a larger stockpile of nuclear weapons. Our weapons must be hardened, dispersed, and mobile so that they can survive an enemy attack, and they must be equipped with the most sophisticated devices necessary to penetrate enemy defenses. This kind of nuclear capability is expensive. To achieve it, we have over the last 12 months added a total of almost $4 billion to the previously planned level of the military budgets for the current and the following fiscal years.

We have increased by 50% our manned bombers on 15-minute alert. We have increased our capacity to produce MINUTEMAN missiles by 100% and propose to increase our planned force by one-third. We have more than doubled the rate of construction of POLARIS submarines. We have in the last year twice increased the funds for penetration aids and are requesting still more in Fiscal 1963. We have moved ahead in the development of the SKYBOLT air-to-ground ballistic missile, which allows our bombers to launch "stand-off" attacks on targets 1,000 miles distant.

It is not enough, however, for us to have weapons that can survive an enemy attack and that can penetrate enemy defenses. In a world in which both sides may be capable of inflicting severe damage on each other, we must have machinery for the command and control of our forces, which is itself able to survive an attack and to apply the surviving forces in consonance with national security objectives. To this end we are providing alternate command posts at sea and in the air, with communications links to all elements of our strategic force.

With this protected command and control system, our forces can be used in several different ways. We may have to retaliate with a single massive attack. Or, we may be able to use our retaliatory forces to limit damage done to ourselves, and our allies, by knocking out the enemy's bases before he has had time to launch his second salvos. We may seek to terminate a war on favorable terms by using our forces as a bargaining weapon -- by threatening further attack.

In any case, our large reserve of protected firepower would give an enemy an incentive to avoid our cities and to stop a war. Our new policy gives us the flexibility to choose among several operational plans, but does not require that we make any advance commitment with respect to doctrine or targets. We shall be committed only to a system that gives us the ability to use our forces in a controlled and deliberate way, so as best to pursue the interests of the United States, our Allies, and the rest of the Free World.

In light of all the measures undertaken to improve our strategic striking forces -- with respect to their survivability, strength and control -- it is clear that we have upgraded rather than downgraded our thermonuclear power. That power is essential to our strategy and tactics, indeed to our survival as a nation.

But it is equally clear that we require a wider range of practical alternatives to meet the kind of military challenges that Khrushchev has announced he has in store for us. Unless the Free World has sufficient forces organized and equipped to deal with these challenges at what appears to be the highest appropriate levels of conflict, we could be put into difficult situations by the Communists. In such situations we could lose by default; or we could lose by limiting our response to what appears to be the highest appropriate level -- but a level at which we may be inferior; or we could resort to thermonuclear war -- the level at which we are superior -- but at a cost which could be out of proportion to the issues and dangers involved.

To continue such a situation would be to invite the Soviets to practice the "salami slice" technique. The effectiveness of the technique depends not so much on what may be lost to piecemeal military conquest, as it does on acceptance of a fait accompli or concessions made at a diplomatic negotiating table. In areas where the nuclear deterrent is the only deterrent, and where the political or other issue is such that the nuclear deterrent does not appear to be fully persuasive to the Soviets, our friends ultimately could come to believe in the sincerity of Soviet threats. They could be inclined to succumb to Soviet blackmail if we had available no suitably scaled and obviously credible countermeasures.

There is no need, however, for the Free World to be vulnerable to this dangerous Soviet tactic. An adequate level of non-nuclear military strength will provide us with the means to meet a limited challenge with limited forces. We will then be in a position of being able to choose, cooly and deliberately, the level and kind of response we feel most appropriate in our own best interests; and both our enemies and our friends will know it.

The non-nuclear build-up will increase our capacity to tailor our responses to a particular military challenge to that level of force which is both appropriate to the issue involved and militarily favorable to our side. Not only will it avoid complete dependence on nuclear weapons, but it will also enhance the credibility to the Soviets of our determination to use nuclear weapons, should this prove necessary.

If we have shown ourselves able and ready to engage in large-scale non-nuclear warfare in response to a Communist provocation, the Soviets can hardly misconstrue two things: first, that we regard this provocation as a challenge to our vital interests; and second, that we will use nuclear weapons to prevail, if this becomes necessary.

Nuclear and non-nuclear power complement each other, in our own military forces and within the NATO alliance, just as together they complement the non-military instruments of policy. Either without the other is, over-all, not fully effective. If we strengthen one and not the other, part of the effort is wasted. Our policy is aimed at achieving the best balance of military capabilities -- over the entire range of potential conflict, in the various areas of the globe where the Free World has vital interests, and over the years as far ahead as we can reasonably plan. I firmly believe that the non-nuclear build-up will -- by improving and expanding the alternatives open to the Free World -- reduce the pressures to make concessions in the face of Soviet threats.

This then is the reason for our present urgent emphasis on balancing our nuclear strength with limited or non-nuclear war forces. The sharp rise of over $8 billion in annual Defense appropriations -- from $41.9 billion originally proposed in January of last year to the $50.1 billion requested for 1963 -- unmistakably underlines our determination to carry forward simultaneously our increased efforts in both of these areas.

The measures we took last year and those we propose for the coming fiscal year to improve our limited war capabilities follow a number of well-defined lines. Our over-all purpose here, as in our strategic build-up, is to augment our forces in a balanced fashion. We have increased the number of combat-ready divisions to meet the military contingencies with which we may have to deal. As we have increased manpower, we have modernized and expanded weapons procurement. We have increased our tactical air power to match our ground forces, and we have launched a program to provide sea and airlift tailored to the men and equipment.

We are taking special measures to improve the non-nuclear capability of the NATO alliance on the continent of Europe. We have augmented United States forces in Europe. Our European Allies have increased the number of their ready divisions. We have prepositioned more than 100,000 tons of equipment and several thousand vehicles required by both armored and infantry divisions. And we have deployed to Europe nearly 300 tactical fighters.

While we still depend on our nuclear superiority to support the NATO alliance, it is important to realize that the Soviet bloc forces are not unlimited, nor without their own problems. A simple comparison of numbers of Allied and bloc divisions takes no account of the fact that many of the bloc divisions are a good deal smaller at full strength than our own, many are under strength, and some of them may be highly unreliable. The important point to bear in mind is that NATO has a strong defensive capability. Its further growth is only limited to the degree to which its members are willing to devote resources to the task.

As we develop a balanced, modern non-nuclear force, ready to move rapidly against aggression in any part of the world, we continue to inhibit the opportunities for successful conduct of Khrushchev's "local wars." It is tempting to conclude that our conventional forces will leave us free to compete with communism in the peaceful sphere of economic and social development, where we can compete most effectively.

But we shall have to deal with the problems of "wars of liberation." These wars are often not wars at all. In these conflicts, the force of world communism operates in the twilight zone between political subversion and quasi-military action. Their military tactics are those of the sniper, the ambush, and the raid. Their political tactics are terror, extortion, and assassination. We must help the people of threatened nations to resist these tactics by appropriate means. You cannot carry out a land reform program if the local peasant leaders are being systematically murdered.

To deal with the Communist guerrilla threat requires some shift in our military thinking. We have been used to developing big weapons and mounting large forces. Here we must work with companies and squads, and individual soldiers, rather than with battle groups and divisions. In all four Services we are training fighters who can, in turn, teach the people of free nations how to fight for their freedom. At the same time that our strategic weapons are becoming more and more sophisticated, we must learn to simplify our tactical weapons, so that they can be used and maintained by men who have never seen a machine more complicated than a well sweep.

Combatting guerrilla warfare demands more in ingenuity than in money or manpower. But to meet the range of Communist military challenges, calls for unprecedented efforts in men, money and organization. For this reason we have taken a number of major steps to make the operation of our military establishment more efficient and more effective. By way of example only, I might mention the elminiation of overlapping activities in procurement of common supplies, through the organization of the Defense Supply Agency. In the same way, we have eliminated duplication in intelligence activities through the organization of the Defense Intelligence Agency. The Air Force has placed responsibility for development and production of new weapons systems in a single Command. The Army is going through a major reorganization, combining the functions of a number of specialized technical services, into a single Materiel Development and Logistic Command. And the Strategic Army Corps and the Tactical Air Command have been united into a new Strike Command to provide a unified, mobile, highly combat ready force.

While we are simplifying the internal structure of the Department, we are seeking to make more competitive our dealings with private industry. Flexible incentive fees and more competitive procurement of spare parts for major systems are only two of the many devices with which we are experimenting in this area.

I cannot offer you the hope that these changes will reduce the size of the Defense budget in the foreseeable future.

I can assure you that they will provide at the lowest possible cost the security on which the peaceful development of the Free World is based. I know that you would not wish us to pursue any other policy.

E N D

RICHARD WILSON

E S 12-6-67

Johnson Haters Seize on McNamara Affair

Opponents of the Vietnam War have fashioned Robert S. McNamara into a stick to beat President Johnson with, but the tactic isn't working well and probably will have to be dropped.

The problem is that the public generally doesn't seem to care much that McNamara quit as Secretary of Defense, and therefore whether he was eased out or is leaving of his own volition is not, to use the current cliche, very relevant.

For those who do care, the record is clear. McNamara quit of his own volition, realizing that he was nearing the end of his usefulness and not savoring the prospect of another year under fire from a half dozen different ambushes laid in Congress.

McNamara would have had a fearful year. There was more coming up on the controversial TFX issue, on his fringe quarrels with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the limited antimissile defense system, on "cost effectiveness."

In seven years at the Pentagon McNamara had gotten involved in a dozen self-perpetuating controversies with strong-minded men in Congress. This was one of his greatest virtues, though he was sometimes wrong. He is leaving behind him a reorganized defense system and methodology far stronger than when he took over at the Pentagon because he had the fortitude to do such unthinkable things as closing useless military bases.

Now there has been a studied attempt to make Johnson appear ham-handed, insensitive and tricky in easing out a trusted official who had performed so well. These aren't the facts. They are the intuitive deductions of those who wish to make it appear that Johnson got rid of McNamara because he now had decided on those extreme measures in Vietnam of which McNamara disapproved, and for the further reason that Johnson can be expected to handle such delicate matters with crudeness and without style.

On the first count, Johnson did not get rid of McNamara. The Defense Secretary himself expressed his positive interest in taking the job as head of the World Bank, one of the few positions which would become available in the next year which could keep him in the hierarchy of the American establishment.

Now that a few days have passed it has become more evident even than before that McNamara's departure marks no new departure in Vietnam war policy. McNamara's conflicts with the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been demonstrated as so marginal as to have no plausible effect on his decision to leave.

On the second count, involving Johnson's style, it becomes clear that Johnson gave McNamara the option of going or staying with his blessing either way because of his gratitude to McNamara and his sympathetic recognition of the massive punishment the Secretary of Defense had taken for the last several years.

Much has been made of a slight lapse of time between Johnson's nomination of McNamara for the World Bank job and his knowledge that this step actually had been taken. Nominating a World Bank president is like nominating an ambassador; it is first necessary to know if the country will accept the ambassador.

In any case the time lag was insignificant because McNamara had already talked over with Johnson who his successor would be in the Defense Department. Anyone with McNamara's experience in the world of industrial management could not conceivably have been misled in any of the conversations he had with Johnson on quiting as Secretary of Defense.

The myth of a good and faithful servant slyly eased out when his usefulness ended does not hold up. Nor is McNamara departing in a mood to blast the Johnson administration or recant on his commitment to the war in Southeast Asia, leaving ungratified the wish-fulfillment of those who sadly wring their hands over his departure and how it came about.

Antipathy to Johnson emerges in this case as much as sympathy for McNamara, as it does so often on any question affecting the Vietnam War. There are some elements so hostile to Johnson that they would have blamed him if he had forced McNamara to stay.

Stories would undoubtedly have been told of Johnson's cruelty to this poor harassed man so badly in need of relief from his inhuman duties. It would have all been because Johnson did not wish to suffer the embarrassment of having McNamara quit.

This element of Johnson hatred plays its part in the Vietnam War opposition. It is an ugly part of it because there are some who do not like the Vietnam War simply because they do not like Johnson.

Sat. Evening Post
11-18-67

Affairs of State, by Stewart Alsop

McNamara: the light that failed

WASHINGTON:

Desmond FitzGerald, a deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who died of a heart attack recently at the age of 57, was one of the best professional intelligence men this country has produced. Back in the era when only U.S. "advisers" were involved in the Vietnamese war, it was his job to brief Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on the war.

Every week FitzGerald would come into McNamara's huge Pentagon office at the appointed hour, to find McNamara surrounded by charts and tables of statistics which "quantified" the progress of the war. FitzGerald would summarize that week's intelligence input, while McNamara took notes in his tiny handwriting, occasionally interjecting an incisive, factual question. One day FitzGerald asked McNamara if he could make a personal comment, and McNamara nodded.

"Mr. Secretary," FitzGerald said, "facts and figures are useful, but you can't judge a war by them. You have to have an instinct, a feel. My instinct is that we're in for a much rougher time than your facts and figures indicate."

"You really think that?" McNamara asked.

"Yes, I do," said FitzGerald.

"But why?" said McNamara.

"It's just an instinct, a feeling," said FitzGerald.

McNamara gave him a long, incredulous stare. It was, FitzGerald later recalled, rather as though he had said something utterly and obviously mad. McNamara said good-bye politely, but that was the last time FitzGerald was ever summoned to his Pentagon office.

No man is flawless, and this small episode from the past precisely defines the flaw in Robert major historical document. Yet for all his brilliance, McNamara is in bad trouble, and he knows it.

Partly he is in trouble because he provides a convenient scapegoat. But he is also in trouble partly because he has lacked that "instinct," that "feeling," which Desmond FitzGerald had, and which McNamara so disdained.

There are powerful forces in this country that badly need a scapegoat. With his dangerous compulsion to tell the truth as he sees it, McNamara has repeatedly told Congress (to quote *The New York Times*) that the vast weight of bombs on North Vietnam has "not significantly affected North Vietnam's war-making capability nor seriously deterred the flow of men and materials to Communist-led forces in South Vietnam."

Saying this is like hitting the powerful advocates of the air-power legend in the face with a large, red rag. The air-power legend holds that air power is *the* decisive instrument of war. The legend accounts for the fact that for years the U.S. Air Force, plus the Navy Air Arm, has regularly spent the lion's share of every defense dollar. It also accounts for the fact that the air-power advocates are the most powerful spokesmen of what Dwight Eisenhower called "the military-industrial complex."

Now the war in Vietnam is proving all over again, only more vividly, what World War II and Korea proved twice over—that air power, strategic nuclear war aside, is an indispensable but subsidiary military instrument. Underlining this point in testimony like that quoted above is hardly calculated to endear McNamara to the air-power advocates.

The war in Vietnam is proving once again that "wars are won bloodily, on the ground," not that our side was winning the war. He was wrong. After that fact became obvious, and U.S. troops were committed to prevent total defeat, McNamara concluded, on the basis of impeccable logic, that it would only be necessary to persuade the Communists that "they can't win in the South." Then, "we presume that they will move to a settlement." He was wrong again.

He was wrong, at least in part, because of that disdain for "instinct" and "feeling" which is so much a part of the man. Unlike Desmond FitzGerald, who had a magnificent combat record in the Second World War, McNamara has nothing in his personal experience to teach him what war is really like—an Air Force logistics expert, which McNamara was in that war, does not learn much about war's harsh realities. One of war's realities is that running a war is not like running the Ford Company. War is an essentially unreasonable and illogical pursuit. It cannot be "quantified" because there are too many human and other imponderables involved. There is no way to quantify, for example, the totally irrational determination of the Communist side in Vietnam to fight on, when all McNamara's facts and figures point to the conclusion that Ho Chi Minh and Company should have "moved to a settlement" long ago.

McNamara has an almost Calvinistic horror of emotion, an almost mystical reverence for reason. *All* correct decisions, he has often said, must be made "on the basis of reason, not emotion." But reason has been, for Robert McNamara, the light that failed.

McNamara is certainly a troubled man. He has seriously discussed with close friends—including Sen. Robert Kennedy—whether or not he ought to resign. His friends have pointed out

interjecting an incisive, factual question. One day FitzGerald asked McNamara if he could make a personal comment, and McNamara nodded.

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No man is flawless, and this small episode from the past precisely defines the flaw in Robert McNamara. McNamara is, in this reporter's opinion, a great public servant. He has to his credit two towering achievements for which the United States is deeply in his debt.

He is the first Secretary of Defense with the ability, experience, and just plain guts to bring the vast, sprawling, hideously bureaucratic U.S. Defense establishment under effective civilian control. He is also the first Secretary of Defense to face up squarely to the grim fact that the nuclear weapon is an inherently irrational instrument of power, since it is a suicidal instrument; and to draw the necessary strategic conclusions from that fact. McNamara's speech in September, in which he discussed those conclusions, was a genuinely brilliant intellectual exercise and a

to Communist-led forces in South Vietnam."

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The war in Vietnam is proving once again that "wars are won bloodily, on the ground, not cleanly, in the air" (to quote a report in this space on the Vietnamese war more than two years ago). But the war is not being won—or not very rapidly—on the ground either, despite the commitment of more than half a million men and the spending of more than 20 billion dollars a year. As the sense of frustration and disillusion with the war mounts, the need for a scapegoat mounts with it. McNamara has clearly been nominated for that role.

Much of the current assault on McNamara is specious and self-serving. Yet McNamara is vulnerable to honest criticism too. His judgment on the war has twice been dangerously wrong.

In the early "advisory" era of the war, McNamara interpreted his facts and figures to mean

much about war's harsh realities. One of war's realities is that running a war is not like running the Ford Company. War is an essentially unreasonable and illogical pursuit. It cannot be "quantified" because there are too many human and other imponderables involved. There is no way to quantify, for example, the totally irrational determination of the Communist side in Vietnam to fight on, when all McNamara's facts and figures point to the conclusion that Ho Chi Minh and Company should have "moved to a settlement" long ago.

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McNamara is certainly a troubled man. He has seriously discussed with close friends—including Sen. Robert Kennedy—whether or not he ought to resign. His friends have pointed out that he would be resigning under fire, on no clear and decisive issue, with the war still dragging on. Moreover, he is desperately needed where he is. So far, such arguments have prevailed, and Robert McNamara has been persuaded that he ought to stay where he is as long as the President wants him.

McNamara is not a man who wears his heart on his sleeve. But he is a deeply sensitive man, behind the brisk exterior, and he hates, above all other things, to be wrong. One senses that he knows his light has failed, and that its failure troubles him far more deeply than all the harsh things the generals and the senators are saying about him.

Stewart Alsop

ST. LOUIS GLOBE-DEMOCRAT
November 6, 1967

Rep. Hall Calls on LBJ To Dismiss McNamara

President Johnson should be concerned enough about Russia's new orbiting bomb to fire Robert McNamara," Rep. Durward G. Hall (Rep.), Missouri, told a North St. Louis County Republican rally over the week-end.

Speaking at McCleur High School to about 350 persons, Rep. Hall said Defense Secretary McNamara's statement about the orbiting bomb system is an example of the administration's credibility gap.

"McNamara tells us about a new Soviet weapon that would fly in a new low, strange orbit and approach the U.S. from the south, our soft underbelly, where McNamara removed the Sage system over three years ago," he said.

'NOT CONCERNED'

Rep. Hall said Mr. McNamara told the American people he (McNamara) was "not concerned" about the system.

"This is the Secretary of Defense announcing an enemy weapon system against which we have no defense, which could be operational in a year and about which he is not concerned," Rep. Hall said.

"I'm concerned, our military leaders are concerned, the American people had better be concerned, and my main worry is that LBJ be concerned because there might well not be an election worth winning in 1968," he said.

Rep. Hall also criticized Mr. McNamara for "jumping to the defense of the Soviet Union" by saying the orbiting of a nuclear warhead would not be a violation of the outer space treaty.

HUMOROUS

"The time has arrived for the American people to tell LBJ that either McNamara goes or we go," he said.

He also criticized Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey for referring to the Vietnam war as "our great adventure." He said that some leaders have forgotten that the goal of Communism is still world conquest.

CHICAGO SUN TIMES
October 13, 1967

McNamara

CHARLES BARTLETT

M'Namara Go? Fortunately, No

WASHINGTON—One of the most chilling and fortunately one of the least authentic pieces of gossip floating around has it that Robert S. McNamara may soon depart the Defense Department.

That would be a setback of the first magnitude because McNamara functions as a linchpin and a balance wheel and a redoubt of reason in the capital's disheveled atmosphere. Without him, the intertwine of doves and hawks, Democrats and Republicans, congressmen and generals, well could collapse into hopeless disarray.

McNAMARA

One measure of his stature is the diversity of his critics. Soviet Prime Minister Alexei N. Kosygin, meeting him for the first time at Glassboro, N.J., bitterly upbraided him as an "immoral capitalist." The harshness of that attack seemed to surprise even the Russian because two days later, in gentler tones, he invited McNamara to visit him in Moscow after the war ends in Vietnam.

McNamara's relations with the military-minded Southerners in Congress are only barely more cordial. The most vehement, including the erratic chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. L. Mendel Rivers (D-S.C.), frankly would like to destroy him. The most powerful, including Senators Richard B. Russell (D-Ga.) and John Stennis (D-Miss.), are doggedly determined to prove his judgment wrong.

ONE SENATE COMMITTEE, headed by Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), has set out to make the case that McNamara has infused an excess of intellectualism into the Pentagon. Even President Johnson, in moments when he feels the secretary has veered too sharply from practical politics, has been known to refer to him as "the professor."

A large segment of Washington is working hard to promote a Donnybrook between the secretary and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Their differences of opinion quickly become headlines which spill fresh fuel on the dissent that envelops the policy in Vietnam.

The headlines miss the point, however, that those disputes are legitimate products of the Pentagon machinery. McNamara does not tell the Marine Corps how to deploy its battalions or Gen. William C. Westmoreland, U.S. commander in Vietnam, how to run the war. But he must be sure that their actions blend into the big picture.

The generals have an obvious responsibility to push for weapons that may be useful to their missions. But when

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Only letters with names and addresses will be considered for this column. Signatures will be withheld on request. Letters cannot be acknowledged or returned and are subject to editing.

Niles

Mike Polan

I am a 13-year-old boy who has a couple of remarks to make on certain subjects.

First of all, I do not think the Cubs or White Sox received the credit deserved by them. The Cubs had a terrific season and the White Sox would have won the pennant except for a few unfortunate incidents.

I also would like to congratulate Chicago on getting the Democratic convention.

Finally, you have had many opinions on the closing of Riverview, but I would like to state mine. It's a pity. I really enjoyed it.

13-Year-Old's Views

For some time I have wanted to express appreciation for your "Cityscape" articles. They are well written, interesting and acquaint us with "good little guys."

It is refreshing to read these articles as compared with front-page stories about gang shootings, robberies, etc. You are giving favorable publicity to deserving people. Why, you may even succeed in motivating some of us from the sidelines.

ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS
September 16, 1967

McNamara Credibility

Editorials

Credibility Gap Widens

Discrepancies between what the Johnson Administration says publicly about its Vietnam war policies and what it actually does have contributed in the past to the "credibility gap" charges which cause unhappiness in the White House.

A new example of such divergence between talk and action arises from the bombing of the ports of Haiphong and Cam Pha in North Vietnam.

It was only three weeks ago that Defense Secretary McNamara told a Senate committee both these ports were exempt from bomb attacks because of the danger of widening the war and because closing them "would not be an effective means of stopping the infiltration of supplies into South Vietnam."

He emphasized that expanded bombing "would not materially shorten the war."

When hawkish southern senators attacked McNamara's testimony and called for all-out bombing of Haiphong and other targets regardless of the possible reactions of China and Russia, President Johnson held a special press conference. He told reporters that McNamara is his "principal deputy in military matters" and indicated he was not in disagreement with the Secretary.

Against this background, the news suddenly came that both Haiphong and Cam Pha had been bombed extensively. McNamara's whole argument that such attacks were not worth while was apparently disregarded. Yet the President insisted there were no serious disagreements on military policy between himself, McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Once again, White House talk simply does not jibe with White House actions.

Presidential spokesmen tried to paper over the inconsistencies of the situation by the tortured explanation that the Cam Pha and Haiphong raids avoided hitting Russian or other foreign ships.

Yet what had taken place was an obvious major change of policy involving presidential acceptance of military advice over the position so firmly held by McNamara on August 25, and apparently supported at that time by Johnson.

Such developments increase the credibility gap so far as the general public is concerned, no matter how much the White House may object to the term.

CHICAGO DAILY NEWS
September 15, 1967

McNamara
Cred Bill 17

Comment

McNamara Credibility Rating Plunges

By William McGaffin
Of Our Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — It is small wonder that correspondents here have grown increasingly cynical about Robert S. McNamara's pronouncements concerning the war in Vietnam.

It was only three weeks ago that the defense secretary presented in elaborate detail the reasons why there would be no point to closing the ports in North Vietnam.

McGaffin

Yet this week Cam Pha and transportation targets inside Haiphong were brought under attack for the first time by U.S. bombers.

McNAMARA stated flatly on Aug. 25, when he appeared before the Senate Preparedness subcommittee that "enemy operations in the South cannot, on the basis of any reports I have seen, be stopped by air bombardment."

They cannot be stopped, that is, unless we are prepared to annihilate North Vietnam and its people, he said, adding that no one was proposing such an indiscriminate bombing of populated areas.

McNamara emphasized that the Communist forces in the South need little from the North to keep on fighting — less than 100 tons of non-food supplies daily. Hanoi would be able to keep them supplied by various improvisations, he insisted, even if all the Northern ports were closed and half the roads, rails and waterways put out of action.

Again and again, McNamara has thrown away his reputation for credibility by taking one position in public and a diametrically opposite one in private. A case in point was the controversial bombing last year of the petroleum storage facilities in the Hanoi and Haiphong area.

IN FEBRUARY, 1966, he expressed his opposition to this in private talks with reporters and declared that it would not be done because it would be ineffective. On June, 29, however, after an initial attack on the petroleum facilities, he called a press conference to stress the beneficial results that could be expected from the action.

But when he appeared before the Preparedness subcommittee three weeks ago, he acknowledged that the raids had been a failure: "The North Vietnamese have demonstrated a capability to adjust their methods, and they now off-load petroleum drums into lighters and barges and bring the drums ashore at night."

Apparently not in the least disturbed over the contradiction between this statement and the one in June, he used the experience to illustrate his argument that it would be futile to seal off the Northern ports.

But that is precisely what U.S. bombers have begun to do this week with, we are assured, the approval of McNamara.

ATLANTA CONSTITUTION
September 7, 1967

Barry Goldwater

Is McNamara Less Popular?

PHOENIX, Ariz—There are signs that the administration is getting fed up with the deceit, wrong decisions and dictatorial arrogance of Robert Strange McNamara, the man who never yet has been right about Vietnam or any other military matter.

The major visible sign of McNamara's slippage in the court of LBJ is the fact that, for the first time, military men seem free to voice the opposition to McNamara which always has been present.

The Army chief of staff, Gen. Harold Johnson, has publicly and loudly disagreed with McNamara over the bombing of Vietnamese port facilities through which flow the supplies that make it possible for the enemy to continue the war.

McNamara, displaying his usual grasp of military matters, flatly says that the miles of supplies lined up at Haiphong harbor would not make enough difference in the war to risk bombing them. The risk, he persists, would be in possibly making Red China angry.

Even the Marine Corps, which lately has been the most silent of services in bucking McNamara, has gone on record, through its commandant, Wallace Greene, as favoring stepped-up air attacks against the enemy.

The Air Force chief of staff, Gen. John McConnell, also has spoken out on McNamara's sniping against airpower. It would have taken, Gen. McConnell has testified, 800,000 more ground troops to fight the war so far without our air strikes against the North.

The striking difference in McNamara's defensive stand now is that he finally must come face to face in public with the military professionals he has downgraded, denied and dictated to ever since taking office. In the past he spent his time defending his wrong policies against senators, congressmen and military analysts, all of whom have been powerless before the unlimited White House support upon which McNamara has been able to count.

The fact that the chiefs are now fighting him openly can only mean, it seems to me, that there is certain knowledge now that the White House is withdrawing some of that support.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
September 6, 1967

Washington Background

Generals Rebelling Against McNamara

By JOSEPH C. GOULDEN
Inquirer Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON.

PENTAGON GENERALS are in near-open revolt against their ostensible civilian boss, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. And if they must destroy President Johnson politically along with McNamara to achieve their goal of a widespread Vietnam War, so be it.

McNamara is most unhappy about the situation, to the extent that his displeasure is seeping from the private confines of his Pentagon office — and all the more so because the President has done nothing concrete to squelch the insurrection bubbling all around him.

The President was absolutely correct last Friday when he quoted the section of the National Security Act of 1947 which gives military men the right to make their views known to Congress even if they differ from Administration policy.

* * *

NOTHING in the act authorizes four-star generals to stand around the corridors outside a Senate hearing room and sadly tell the press — and the television cameras — that they don't think the Defense Secretary is conducting the war properly.

But Gen. Harold K. Johnson, the Army Chief of Staff, did just that on Aug. 19, asserting "I made it very clear" to the Stennis subcommittee that he thought Haiphong should be bombed.

If a buck private stood in the same spot and voiced similar doubts about Gen. Johnson's wisdom he would be whisked out to the Fort Belvoir stockade in Virginia so fast his passage would leave whitecaps on the Potomac for hours.

Nothing in the act authorizes the commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. Wallace M. Greene, to run off to Boston and assume for himself the responsibility of establishing national priorities — that the war is more important than doing anything about urban conditions.

* * *

ROBERT McNAMARA hears all this nonsense and kicks his wastebasket (or the McNamara equivalent thereof) and probably wonders why he has stayed in Washington for seven and one-half years.

Lyndon Johnson hears the same nonsense and tells people with a straight face that in all his 36 years in Washington he has never seen a time when the military was so buddy-buddy with the Administration.

The Pentagon rules are very clear on how a general's dissent shall be voiced if he thinks differently from the Administration. They were written to allow routes around such idiots as the Chief of Naval Operations who once wrote a directive, "I trust you will advise all officers in your command that the policy I have announced in this matter is, of course, the one they will believe in."

* * *

ADM. HYMAN RICKOVER learned the rules well during his continuing fight to get the Navy to build nuclear-powered submarines. In defense budget hearings last May he outlined them as follows:

"I am required by the Department of Defense regulations that whenever a question is asked of me in a Congressional committee and my answer would be contrary to the view of my superiors that I first present their views.

"I am now . . . trying to present the other side of my story in accordance with my deep convictions of the case."

The generals, however, shout up and down the hallways, and send Rep. Gerald Ford (D., Mich.) envelopes of secret air-war material he can use to make forensic bombs to hurl at the President. Ford's Aug. 8 floor speech about air operations reads like a first draft of what the Stennis subcommittee produced three weeks later after hearing the generals in closed session.

If the President is really interested in defending Robert McNamara, his most faithful servant here since Nov. 23, 1963, he could do it quite easily.

All that is required is a shut-up directive of the type President Truman sent Gen. Douglas MacArthur on April 11, 1951.