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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
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By CB, NARA, Date 7-31-95

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REACTIONS TO ME CRISIS IN UN CIRCLES

FOL IS ROUND-UP OF REACTIONS TO OR INTERPRETATIONS OF LONG-TERM SIGNIFICANCE OF PRESENT ME CONFLICT AS EXPRESSED TO MISOFFS IN INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BY VARIOUS UN DELS OVER PAST TWO DAYS:

1. SADI (JORDAN) EXPRESSED VIEWS AS FOLS:

A) ARABS ARE DISGUSTED WITH THE SOVS FOR SUPPORTING CEASE-FIRE ONLY RES OF JUNE 6, MYSTIFIED AT SOV SPONSORSHIP OF JUNE 7 FOLLOW-UP RES, AND UNABLE DEFINE SOV MOTIVATION. SAID JORDAN NOT CONSULTED BY SOVS IN ADVANCE, AND BELIEVED OTHER ARABS NOT CONSULTED EITHER. EXPRESSED VIEW THAT SOV SUPPORT OF ARABS ONE OF WORDS ONLY.

B) RE FUTURE, HIS PRIMARY CONCERN IS FUTURE US POSTURE TOWARD ARAB WORLD, STATING ARABS LESS CONCERNED NOW ABOUT STRAIT OF TIRAN THAN THEIR OWN TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. ASKED IF US STILL HAS POLICY TO RESPECT TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL STATES IN AREA AND SAID ARABS HAD COMMENTED ON ABSENCE SUCH STATEMENT FROM GOLDBERG SPEECHES SINCE JUNE 5. WHEN IT WAS POINTED OUT GOLDBERG HAD REITERATED THIS POLICY ON JUNE 6, SADI EXPRESSED HOPE US COULD STATE THIS MORE CLEARLY.

C) JORDAN NOT BEING CRITICIZED BY OTHER ARABS HERE FOR SEEKING CEASE-FIRE. ALL RECOGNIZED THAT JAA HAD DONE MOST AND BEST FIGHTING ON ARAB SIDE, HAD TAKEN BRUNT OF CASUALTIES AND HAD FOUGHT WITH GREATEST DISTINCTION WHEN CHIPS DOWN. BY CONTRAST, UAR HAD PERFORMED MISERABLY; SYRIANS HAD DONE LITTLE; IRAQ WAS FAR AWAY AND COST OF SENDING A FEW PLANES AND MEN MINIMAL.

D) HUSSEIN, HOWEVER, NOW IN GREAT DIFFICULTY INTERNALLY BECAUSE COUNTRY ITSELF ON BRINK OF COLLAPSE.

2. SAUDI DEP PERMREP EXPRESSED FOL VIEWS:

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A) ARABS EXTREMELY DISAPPOINTED WITH USSR FOR TWO REASONS: SOV REFUSAL TO TAKE POSITION LAST WEEK ON MERITS OF ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE; FAILURE TO HELP ARABS WITH ANYTHING BUT WORDS. UAR CLAIMS RE US-UK INVOLVEMENT IN AERIAL WARFARE WERE CONVINCING TO MANY ARABS WHO QUITE NATURALLY WONDERED WHY SOVS HAD NOT TAKEN CONCRETE COUNTER STEPS.

B) HUSSEIN HAD OUTSMARTED NASSER THIS TIME. LATTER COUNTED ON LACK OF COOPERATION FROM HUSSEIN AND FEISAL, WHICH WOULD HAVE ENABLED HIM TO UNDERMINE CONSERVATIVE ARAB REGIMES, AS WELL AS POINT TO INTRA-ARAB SPLIT AS REASON FOR NOT CARRYING THROUGH AGAINST ISRAEL. BY COMING TO CAIRO AND SIGNING TREATY, HOWEVER, HUSSEIN HAD UNDERCUT NASSER.

C) ISRAELI MILITARY VICTORY WOULD LEAVE SURROUNDING ARAB POPULACE MORE EMBITTERED THAN EVER AND DOES NOT BODE WELL FOR FUTURE PEACE OF AREA.

D) FAILURE OF IRAQI ARMY PLAY GREATER ROLE SOURCE OF GREAT CONCERN AMONG ARABS. WITH BEST ARMY OF ALL ARABS AND GOOD AIR FORCE, ACTIVE IRAQI ROLE COULD MAKE GREAT DIFFERENCE.

3. REACTIONS OF SEVERAL ASIAN DEL MEMBERS (JAPAN, MALAYSIA, CEYLON, THAILAND, INDONESIA, BURMA, PHILIPPINES) REVEALED FOL COMMON ELEMENTS:

A) NASSER AND RADICAL ARAB GOVTS HAVE SUFFERED GRIEVOUS LOSS OF FACE AND PRESTIGE AT HOME AND ABROAD. EVEN THOUGH THIS IN LARGE PART DUE TO NASSER'S OWN MISJUDGMENT RE MOOD AND STRENGTH OF ISRAEL, IT WILL HAVE RESULTS, BOTH SHORT AND LONG-TERM, SATISFACTORY TO VERY FEW, E.G., DOMESTIC INSTABILITY IN ARAB STATES (ESPECIALLY JORDAN), INTENSIFICATION OF ARAB DESIRE FOR REVENGE AGAINST ISRAEL (ESPECIALLY DANGEROUS IN CASE OF SYRIA), AND ABRUPT DECLINE IN US INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT ARAB WORLD.

B) UAR CHARGES RE US-UK INVOLVEMENT IN AERIAL WAR NEITHER CREDIBLE NOR GENERALLY BELIEVED, EVEN AMONG ARABS AT UN. CHARGES PROBABLY RESULT FROM COMBINATION OF UAR NEED FOR SCAPEGOAT FOR MISERABLE MILITARY PERFORMANCE PLUS WILD HOPE THERE WAS STILL CHANCE OF GETTING SOVS TO PROVIDE IMMEDIATELY EQUIPMENT TO HELP IN AIR DEFENSE OF ARABS.

C) US CLAIM TO BE NEUTRAL IN THOUGHT, DEED AND WORD DID NOT RING QUITE TRUE. WHILE US WAS CONSISTENT (ONCE FIGHTING BROKE OUT) IN URGING SIMPLE CEASEFIRE, GENERAL ASSUMPTION IS THAT US WOULD HAVE TAKEN DIFFERENT STAND (I.E., INSIST UPON CEASEFIRE PLUS WITHDRAWAL) IF COURSE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS HAD GONE AGAINST ISRAEL. MOREOVER US POSITION IN THIS CASE NOT CONSISTENT WITH POSITION US TOOK AT TIME OF INDO-PAKISTAN CONFLICT IN 1965.

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D) GENERAL FEELING IS THAT US, WHILE IT DID NOT ENCOURAGE ISRAELIS TO TAKE TO ARMS, IS NOT AVERSE TO TAKING ADVANTAGE OF ISRAELI MILITARY SUCCESS TO SECURE SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS RE STRAIT OF TIRAN. MOREOVER, THERE IS UNDERCURRENT OF SUSPICION US AWARE OF AND DID NOTHING TO PREVENT ISRAELI RESORT TO ARMS.

E) ONCE MISERABLE MILITARY PERFORMANCE OF ARABS CLEAR, SOVS WERE FACED WITH VERY UNATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVES; THEY COULD EITHER WORK TO STOP ISRAELI ADVANCE THROUGH UN, OR TAKE SOME CONCRETE AND DIRECT ACTION TO BOLSTER UAR DEFENSES. LATTER ALTERNATIVE RULED OUT PARTLY BECAUSE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN THROWING GOOD MONEY AFTER BAD, EVEN MORE BECAUSE OF SOV CONCERN IT WOULD GENERATE COUNTER STEPS BY US AND UK.

F) WHILE THERE IS RELIEF THAT SOVS MADE CHOICE THEY DID, IT IS FELT SOVS HAVE THEREBY DONE SERIOUS DAMAGE TO THEIR OWN PRESTIGE AND RELIABILITY AS "PROTECTOR" IN EYES OF ARABS AND MANY AFRICANS; SOVS HAVE ONLY INTENSIFIED THIS DAMAGE BY THEIR LOUD TALK

ABOUT THE CONFLICT BEING ISRAELI AGGRESSION, ENCOURAGED BY IMPERIALISTS.

4. ACCORDING MCKEOWN (AUSTRALIA), EBAN (ISRAEL) EXPRESSED VIEW TO CORNER (NEW ZEALAND) THAT SOV HASTE IN DEMANDING CEASE-FIRE BASED ON USSR DECISION SCUTTLE NASSER AND PIN HOPES ON SYRIA AS LEADER ARAB WORLD. EBAN REPORTEDLY SAID SYRIA ONLY ARAB STATE AT MOMENT ENJOYING RELATIVELY FAVORABLE MILITARY POSITION AND RAPID CEASEFIRE MIGHT PREVENT SYRIA FROM SUFFERING DEFEAT EQUAL TO UAR'S. MCKEOWN THOUGHT SOVS HAD DECIDED THEY HAD BACKED WRONG HORSE AND WANTED CUT THEIR LOSSES. REISCH (AUSTRIA) SAID HE HAD HEARD THEORIES SIMILAR TO EBAN'S. MOREOVER, HE GATHERED FROM CONVERSATIONS WITH ARAB AND EE DELEGATES THAT SOVS HAD DISCUSSED THEIR INTENTION REQUEST RAPID CEASEFIRE ONLY CASUALLY WITH UAR AND OTHER ARABS, BUT QUITE FULLY WITH SYRIA.

5. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN GREAT DEAL OF SPECULATION AMONG SCATTERED LAS AND EUROPEANS, AS WELL AS VAKIL OF IRAN, THAT NASSER HAS SUFFERED SERIOUS DEFEAT, AS RESULT OF WHICH ENTIRE ME BALANCE HAS SHIFTED AWAY FROM HIM. CREMIN (IRELAND) THOUGHT SOVS HAVE LOST MAJOR ROUND IN DIPLOMATIC BOUT; JOURNALISTS HEARD TO COMMENT ON WHOPPING SOV ERRORS OVER PAST YEARS (E.G., CUBA, INDONESIA AND NOW UAR) AND TO WONDER WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF US COMMITTED SUCH BLOOPERS.

6. INDICATIVE OF REACTION MORE INTELLIGENT "PROGRESSIVE" ARAB SPOKESMEN HERE WAS FACT THAT AMB BOUATTOURA (ALG) STOPPED USUN OFFICER EVENING JUNE 7 TO SAY HE HOPED RECENT OCCURRENCES

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WOULD NOT MEAN END OF CONTACT WITH USUN (OBVIOUSLY ALLUDING TO ALGERIAN BREAK IN RELS WITH US). WHEN ASSURED THAT HE COULD COUNT ON CONTINUING CONTACT BUT THAT US REGRETTED ALG GOVT HAD ACTED ON BASIS WHOLLY ERRONEOUS INFO, BOUATTOURA HEDGED BY SAYING THAT ALG DECISION BASED ON "OBJECTIVE" (IN MARXIST SENSE) ALIGNMENT US ON SIDE OF ISRAEL. ALTHOUGH HAMAD (ARAB LEAGUE) BEWAILED PLUMMETTING US CREDIBILITY AMONG ARABS IN WAKE ISRAELI MOVE AND APPEARED ACCEPT YARN ABOUT US PLANS, BOUATTOURA POINTEDLY REFRAINED FROM ASSOCIATING HIMSELF WITH THIS ARGUMENT.

GP-3.

GOLDBERG  
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC FOR POLAD, CINCSTRIKE, 6/8/67 - 2:25 A.M.

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