

~~SECRET-LIMDIS~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 17, 1967

*NPT*  
*65*

NOTE FOR MR. ROSTOW *S*

Walt--

With reference to your question on the attached cable, I have been able to find no reference to "peaceful explosions" in Brezhnev's Karlovy Vary speech, as reported by Shustov. The only related statement appears to be the attached rather general paragraph on peaceful uses.

I have requested that ACDA ask Shustov just what he had in mind.

*Spurgeon*  
Spurgeon Keeny

Atts. :

1. GENEVA 3669  
dtd 5/15/67
2. Extract from  
Brezhnev's speech

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12356, Sec. 3A**  
**NIJ 94-340**  
**By *CG*, NARA, Date *3-29-95***

~~SECRET-LIMDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-337

By 129, NARA, Date 1-12-95

~~SECRET LIMDIS~~

*Butov*

*65a*

1967 MAY 15 19 37

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUEHIA/USIA  
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3308  
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 236  
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~~SECRET~~ GENEVA 3669  
STATE GRNC  
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~~SK~~  
*what was  
that reference,  
please?*

DISTO/NATUS

SUBJ: NPT

LIMDIS

1. DURING MAY 15 LUNCHEON CONVERSATION SHUSTOV MADE FOLLOWING POINTS TO DELOFF:

SHUSTOV DOES NOT THINK SOVIETS WILL MAKE ANY COMMENT ON OUR Q AND A INTERPRETATIONS. THESE WERE DULY REPORTED TO MOSCOW. SHUSTOV COMMENTED THAT SOVIETS ADMIRERD THE WAY OUR INTERPRETATIONS

PAGE TWO RUFHGV 3669 ~~SECRET~~  
DRAFTED. HE ONLY ASKED AGAIN WHETHER THEY WOULD BE PUBLICIZED. DELOFF REITERATED POINT WE HAVE MADE THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE PUBLISHED AND WERE NOT PART OF TREATY BUT SAME POINTS UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD BE MADE BY ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN DURING SENATE HEARINGS. DELOFF REFERRED TO HEATH QUESTIONS IN HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATE. SHUSTOV SAID SOVIETS WERE PUZZLED BY THESE, WONDERING WHAT HEATH'S INTENTION HAD BEEN BUT SEEMED TO BE SATISFIED BY ANSWERS OF WILSON AND CALLAGHAN. SHUSTOV SAID SOVIETS UNDERSTAND REASONS FOR OUR HAVING CONVEYED INTERPRETATIONS TO THEM AND INDICATED SOVIETS UNDERSTOOD THAT THESE WERE OUR INTERPRETATIONS OF ARTS. I AND II, THAT WE WERE NOT EXPECTING THEM TO CONCUR WITH THEM FORMALLY, BUT THAT IF THERE WERE SOVIET OFFICIAL OBJECTIONS, THIS WOULD CAUSE SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR US. SHUSTOV INDICATED SOVIETS PROBABLY WOULD REMAIN SILENT.

2. QUERIED ABOUT ABSENCE UNTIL NOW OF SOVIET RATIFICATION OF OST AND CONSULAR CONVENTION, SHUSTOV SAID HE WORKED CLOSELY ON OST IN MOSCOW BUT NOT FAMILIAR WITH BACKGROUND CONSULAR CONVENTION. HE WAS SURE THAT SOVIET GOVT WAS SERIOUS WHEN IT

PAGE THREE RUFHGV 3669 ~~SECRET~~

NEGOTIATED OST AND THOUGHT IT MOST UNLIKELY THAT IT WOULD NOT BE RATIFIED. HE ASSURED SAME APPLIED TO CONSULAR CONVENTION. HE NOTED THAT BOTH INSTRUMENTS WOULD HAVE TO BE RATIFIED BY SUPREME SOVIET, WHICH NOT NOW IN SESSION AND SAID THERE SOME QUESTION ABOUT WHEN NEXT SESSION WILL BE HELD. HE SAID HE HAD HEARD TALK OF DELAY OF NEXT SESSION UNTIL OCTOBER BECAUSE OF PREPARATIONS FOR 56TH ANNIVERSARY OF BOLSHIEVIK REVOLUTION. SHUSTOV DID NOT THINK THAT EVENTS ELSEWHERE IN WORLD HAVE AFFECTED SOVIET ATTITUDE ABOUT DESIRABILITY OF THESE AGREEMENTS COMING INTO FORCE. USSR ALSO STRONGLY FAVORS NPT.

3. SHUSTOV SAID HE AWARE OF AWKWARDNESS TO US IN NOT HAVING OFFICIAL RESPONSE FROM MOSCOW ON PROPOSALS MADE BY US IN RECENT CO-CHAIRMAN MEETINGS. HE SAID SOVIETS WOULD NOT FAVOR DELAY IN RECONVENING ENDC AND ASSUMED WE WOULD NOT EITHER. PERSONALLY HE ALSO THOUGHT BEST SOLUTION WOULD BE TO TABLE WHAT CO-CHAIRMAN COULD AGREE ON IF NO AGREEMENT ON ART. III AND IV (2). HE SAID HE THOUGHT ONLY REMAINING SERIOUS PROBLEM WAS ART. III WHICH SOVIETS STILL WRESTLING OVER. SOVIETS DO NOT WISH TO GIVE FRG PRETEXT FOR NOT ADHERING TO

PAGE FOUR RUFHGV 3669 ~~SECRET~~

NPT BECAUSE OF EURATOM CONCERNS BUT ALSO DO NOT SEE HOW THEY CAN GIVE EURATOM UNIQUE POSITION.

4. SHUSTOV SAID WE SHOULD DISCUSS SECURITY ASSURANCES PROBLEM BEFORE LONG BUT THIS WAS NOT URGENT. SOVIETS HAVE NO SPECIAL VIEWS ABOUT WHERE THIS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED BUT GENEVA WOULD BE AS LOGICAL PLACE AS ANY OTHER. ONLY PLACE THEY SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN US IS NEW DELHI, HE SAID IN HALF-HUMOROUS WAY.

5. SHUSTOV CALLED OUR ATTENTION TO STATEMENT ON PEACEFUL EXPLOSIONS BY BREZHNEV IN KARLOVY VARY SPEECH (APRIL 26 PRAVDA).

GP-3. TUBBY

BT

~~SECRET LIMDIS~~

NNNN

5/16 - 2 PM

PRESERVATION COPY

EXTRACT

25 April 1967

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

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In Europe there are not only the U.S. military bases but also bases of a different kind. They are the subversive espionage and sabotage centers, the broadcasting stations, and various organizations which have been created by the Americans in the German Federal Republic and other West European countries and which engage in slanderous propaganda directed against the socialist countries. The time has come to question the activities of all venomous breeding grounds on European soil which poison relations. The development of bilateral relations between European nations could be an important prerequisite for the strengthening of European security. The present trend toward a detente in Europe is very much the result of the improvement of bilateral relations between East and West European countries.

As for the Soviet Union, our policy in the future will aim, as before, at the development of mutually advantageous relations with the capitalist countries of Europe on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence, in the interests of a durable peace and the security of peoples. The Soviet Union is ready to exchange opinions on the preparation of bilateral agreements and treaties with the governments of the European countries which, on their part, wish to develop their relations with our country.

There is yet another important and promising trend in the efforts of European peoples and states which has a direct bearing on the solution of tasks of consolidating European peace. This is cooperation in the field of economy, science and technology, as well as culture, on both a bilateral and an all-European basis.

The foundations for this have already been laid. It is our opinion, however, that this is only the beginning. The developing scientific and technological revolution, the increasing efforts to consolidate national independence and liberation from the dollar diktat, suggest to the European states many ways and projects in a great variety of fields--from the construction of a gas pipeline crossing the continent to the introduction of a unified color television system for all Europe.

The field of the peaceful use of atomic energy also arouses interest in many countries. We are willing to agree with other European countries on cooperation in conducting nuclear research and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. The realization of this proposal will make it possible for states which relinquished their right to the manufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons to participate in all the advantages offered mankind by the peaceful energy from the split atom.

Another important field for cooperation on an all-European basis is the joint work on such problems as the purification of European rivers and seas, the unification of efforts of countries in the struggle against such diseases as cancer, cardiovascular diseases, and so on.

Each European nation has made its contribution to the treasure-house of world culture. Each of the European countries has its own history, its own national characteristic features. We communists have been called upon to devote our revolutionary energy to the cause of the struggle for the preservation of the cultural heritage of European peoples, for the further development of Europe--one of the most important centers of world civilization, history, and social progress.

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EXTRACT from text of 24 April speech by Leonid Brezhnev at the conference of communist and workers parties of Europe discussing problems of European security at Karlovy Vary.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

66  
file  
Mr. Rusk notified  
Ben Read.

Tuesday, May 16, 1967  
4:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I sent up late this morning the attached document from Sect. Rusk on non-proliferation tactics.

I am now informed that your decision on it is urgent because it will be discussed tomorrow in the North Atlantic Council, and before that time Sect. Rusk would like to send a letter to Willy Brandt explaining our position.

W. R.

Approved ✓

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

66a

Mr Rostow

~~SECRET~~ ~~NODIS~~

Tuesday, May 16, 1967  
11:05 p. m.

NAC  
advise - based  
before  
Rusk - Bator

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk urgently seeks clearance for:

-- Tabling on Thursday in Geneva a draft non-proliferation treaty with Article III on safeguards left blank, due to the differences between the position of the Soviet Union and NATO; and

-- To advise the Germans that we urge postponement of the duration issue until we see whether the other issues in contention can be cleared out and to avoid having the Germans out in front.

Sec. Rusk will probably wish to raise this at lunch today.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP~~  
~~SECRET~~ ~~NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-340  
By CL, NARA, Date 3-29-95

cc: Mr. Bator  
Mr. Keeny

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET/NODIS~~  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

1845

66-b

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proposed Tabling of a Non-Proliferation  
Treaty at the ENDC

The Federal Republic of Germany has objected to our proposal to table a Non-Proliferation Treaty jointly with the U.S.S.R. with the safeguards Article (Article III) left blank subject to further U.S.-Soviet efforts to achieve a joint proposal. They take the position that this might result in a safeguards Article which is harmful to the interests of EURATOM. They also propose that we introduce a U.S. draft which would include our safeguards Article, with an additional clause to make clear that inspectors are to be drawn only from countries accepting safeguards inspections on their territory, and with certain other additions to the text which has been shown the Soviets.

On Sunday the Germans, acting on instructions from the Foreign Minister, changed the emphasis on this approach to indicate that, although their basic position is that they still favored tabling two separate complete drafts, they would accept as a fall-back the tabling of a joint draft with Article III left blank, provided we assured them

(1) that we would obtain an understanding with the Co-chairman that we would attempt to negotiate out an Article III privately, and

(2) that if the subject of Article III was nevertheless raised in the Plenary, the U.S. would state that it considered an Article III like that which we have been discussing with the FRG as an essential condition for Western approval.

GROUP 1.

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-337

By WJ, NARA, Date 1-12-95 ~~SECRET/NODIS~~

In this fall-back position the Germans are now, in effect, asking that if, as is most likely, the Soviets won't at this time accept the German-preferred Article III and we table a joint draft with a blank Article III, the U.S. would in any future discussion of safeguards in Geneva become the spokesman for the German position.

The fact that the Germans are backing off from their opposition to the tabling of a joint draft with Article III blank is in itself an encouraging sign. I believe a decision to table a separate U.S. draft treaty now would seriously jeopardize the prospect of achieving U.S. - Soviet agreement on a treaty. It would leave the Soviets free to introduce -- or reintroduce -- various ideas of their own which we and the FRG would find unacceptable. It is most unlikely that any worthwhile treaty could be concluded in the absence of U.S. - Soviet agreement.

Nor can we object to the first of their conditions, namely that the U.S. would obtain an understanding with the Soviets that we would attempt to negotiate out an Article III privately and that multilateral discussion at the Conference of safeguards would be suspended pending availability of language protecting EURATOM interests to which the Soviets could agree.

My recommendation is that, if the Soviets will agree to this procedure -- as I believe they may -- we proceed to table a jointly-recommended draft in the ENDC with Article III, safeguards, initially left blank.

I have considerable difficulty with the second German condition. The German condition is based on a realistic assumption; it is certain that the Indians and others among the Eight will take an initial position that a safeguards Article should apply to the peaceful activities of all countries, both those which do and those which do not have nuclear weapons. We can accept this, but it will put great pressure on the Russians who will reject it.

There is no reason that this discussion should be to our disadvantage. The United States need not assume the responsibility for the fact that the ENDC is not considering such an Article. We are justified in making it quite clear that it is the continuing

refusal of the U.S.S.R. to accept safeguards on its territory that prevents acceptance of a non-discriminatory article. We can use this position as a basis for establishing a consensus at the ENDC in support of the position recommended by the FRG that IAEA inspectors are to be drawn only from countries accepting inspectors on their territories.

It is not clear that this tactical advantage would extend to obtaining general support for the relationship between regional inspection systems (in particular, EURATOM) and IAEA which the FRG has in mind. We should make every effort to reach agreement on this point and we should tell the Germans that we will do so. However, we should not now lose all flexibility on this subject by promising that it will be our current draft of Article III or nothing. We should rather indicate to the Germans that if we fail to obtain agreement on this approach, we would have to reassess the entire safeguards issue if it continues to stand in the way of an otherwise worthwhile treaty. We should indicate that we will do so through full NATO consultation and taking into account the views of all our allies. We should point out that the purpose of this negotiation is not to impose a treaty on anyone but to reach a treaty which all governments can accept in good spirit. This will involve extended negotiations in the period ahead which will be carried on in full consultation with our allies both in NAC and in capitals. We will expect the Western Four in the ENDC to be fully alert to protect the interests of NATO.

The further point made by Minister von Lilienfeld on behalf of Chancellor Kiesinger to Walt Rostow was for a treaty of limited duration. The suggestion was that the treaty should either be limited to a period of 20 years or signatories should be able to accede for a limited period. The Italians have suggested an even shorter duration clause and I believe that other key countries will also want to limit the treaty's duration.

It is most unlikely, however, that we could, at this time, negotiate a limited duration clause with the Soviets who would see it as the result of German pressure. This problem would be eased with the Soviets if it became clear that it was being raised by other countries. Moreover, the question of duration

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

-4-

is closely linked with the amendment, review, and withdrawal provisions that are finally agreed upon. We, therefore, believe we should defer consideration of the duration issue until such time as we can see that a meaningful treaty is taking shape. If, as we expect, a number of other governments raise the duration issue, we ought to be prepared to think seriously about a treaty of limited duration provided it is long enough to accomplish the purpose of the treaty. We should not indicate to other governments anything specific on this subject at this time but rather indicate our willingness to consider all relevant questions with respect to the treaty, including the question of duration, in consultation with other governments and our own Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

I recommend that you authorize me to convey these views to the FRG and, while recognizing the Chancellor's political problems, to indicate that the possibility of achieving a mutually satisfactory resolution is increased if the idea of a treaty of limited duration does not appear to be a German initiative.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

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ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1967 MAY 16 AM 9 10

PRESERVATION COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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~~SECRET~~ — NODIS

Tuesday, May 16, 1967  
11:05 p. m.

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*W. W. Rostow*  
W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ — NODIS

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4**  
**NEJ 94-340**  
**By *g/cb*, NARA Date 12/05/01**

~~SECRET/NODIS~~  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

1845

67a

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-337  
By kg, NARA, Date 1-12-95 ~~SECRET/NODIS~~

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~~SECRET/NODIS~~

-4-

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Dean Rusk

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 16, 1967

68

NOTE FOR MR. ROSTOW

Walt--

I have no problems or suggestions concerning the attached memorandum.

I believe it states the issue fairly, and I agree with the recommended course of action.

*Spurgeon*  
Spurgeon Keeny

Att.

*Sec Rusk's memo:  
"Proposed Signing of a  
non-Proliferation Treaty  
at the ENDC."*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 16, 1967  
Tuesday, 12:00 N

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Non-Proliferation Treaty

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 74-340  
By CS, NARA, Date 3-29-95

We, the members of your Science Advisory Committee, strongly support your continuing efforts to achieve a Non-Proliferation Treaty. We are most encouraged by the indications that success may be close at hand in this most important endeavor.

We believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is one of the most critical issues of our time. A Non-Proliferation Treaty appears to be our only hope of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to many nations during the next decade.

We understand that the only major point of disagreement on the Treaty between the Soviets and ourselves is the formulation of the safeguards provision. We agree that it would be very desirable to have a strong safeguards provision in the Treaty. At the same time, we believe that a Non-Proliferation Treaty without any safeguards provision would still be a very significant agreement. We would therefore strongly urge that the Treaty not be allowed to founder on this issue.

While we recognize that the remaining problems are essentially political and diplomatic in nature, we are prepared to assist you in any way we can to help achieve the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Donald F. Hornig (Chairman)  
Charles H. Townes (Vice Chairman)  
Ivan L. Bennett, Jr.  
Lewis M. Branscomb  
Sidney D. Drell  
Michael Ference, Jr.  
Marvin L. Goldberger  
Philip Handler

William R. Hewlett  
Gordon J. F. MacDonald  
George E. Pake  
Kenneth S. Pitzer  
Charles P. Slichter  
Lewis Thomas  
F. H. Westheimer

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1776



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE

10

9 MAY 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House



SUBJECT : Status of Negotiations on the Nonproliferation Treaty

1. Attached is a CIA memorandum on the current status of negotiations on the nonproliferation treaty. An update of our memorandum of 28 February, it reports on developments in the treaty negotiations which have taken place during the recess of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee. That committee, as you know, is scheduled to resume its deliberations on 18 May.

2. This memorandum, like the earlier one, is being given only limited dissemination.

*R. J. Smith*

R. J. SMITH

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachment a/s  
No. 1111/67

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-339

By cb, NARA, Date 12-16-94

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~~Secret~~  
No Foreign Dissem

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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-339  
By ct, NARA, Date 12-16-94

# Intelligence Memorandum

STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

~~Secret~~

3  
8 May 1967  
No. 1111/67

~~SECRET~~  
Background Use Only



## WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING AND  
DECLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
8 May 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Status of Negotiations on the Nonproliferation Treaty

Summary

The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) resumes discussions in Geneva on 18 May with the fate of the nonproliferation treaty still hanging in the balance. In the six weeks since the ENDC recessed, the US has proposed changes in the draft text of the treaty, or offered interpretations or assurances, designed to meet the barrage of criticism which the initial draft drew from some of the European members of NATO. Many of the reservations and particularly those deriving from the specific substance of the treaty have now been met, but no allied endorsement of the treaty has yet been obtained, and those countries which do not like it for broad political reasons are still dissatisfied.

The European opponents of the treaty are less likely to be in as strong a position again to delay or even prevent its conclusion unless the attitudes of the other main participants make it easy for them to do so. If, for example, India and Japan continue to press for security guarantees in the context of the treaty, then the Europeans can press their case for a treaty of limited duration. Above all, if Moscow is unwilling to accept the concessions the US has made to European opinion, there will probably be no treaty. Present indications still are, however, that Moscow wants an agreement badly enough to show some flexibility--if only at the end of another period of strenuous bargaining.

NOTE: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and the Directorate for Science and Technology.

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The New Text

1. The revised draft of the nonproliferation treaty (NPT) which the US presented to the Soviets a week ago is the result of weeks of consultations with America's allies and is designed primarily to meet their objections. Some of the Europeans, however, still have problems with it.

2. The treaty's preamble has been rewritten in order to commit the nuclear powers in a more binding way to work for arms control measures. They are also now committed to provide peaceful nuclear explosions to the nonnuclear states at the lowest possible cost. A new paragraph was added expressing support for further research to develop devices which would reduce the need for international safeguards inspectors to have direct access to processes and facilities. Still another revision would eliminate the nuclear states' veto over amendments, a privileged position which a number of the allies have objected to. In the present draft, the amendment approved by a majority of parties to the treaty would apply only to those who accepted it.

3. The major change, however, has been effected in the article on safeguards. The text now makes clear that the purpose of inspection is solely to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to weapons uses, and only the fissionable material used or produced by nuclear installations--not the equipment itself--is subject to safeguards controls. Above all, the article now provides that the international safeguards shall be either those of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or such other international safeguards as are accepted by the IAEA under "mutually agreed verification procedures." Thus the possibility of EURATOM's continuing its inspection under IAEA supervision is allowed for. Moreover, an earlier US proposal that IAEA controls should be automatically applied at the end of a three-year period if IAEA and EURATOM should fail to reach a verification agreement--the so-called "guillotine clause"--has been dropped at EURATOM's insistence. The result is the strongest safeguards article the allies would accept, but one the USSR may not.

4. In addition to changes in the draft, the allies have been offered parallel assurances to encourage them to adhere to the text. The US has drafted interpretations of the treaty on which it has agreed to stand in future dealings with the USSR or in the event misunderstandings later arise. In the US view, for example, the NPT does not prohibit the transfer of nuclear delivery vehicles as long as such transfer does not involve bombs or warheads. Also it does not deal with allied consultations on nuclear defense or with arrangements for the deployment of nuclear weapons within allied territory. It also does not deal with the problem of European unity, and would not bar the succession by a new European federated state to the nuclear status of one of its components. Furthermore, the US has assured its allies that it would continue to supply them with nuclear materials for peaceful uses on a commercial, nondiscriminatory basis. Still another concession is the offer by the US and the UK to put their civilian activities under IAEA safeguards. This has made a favorable impression on many countries, but some still complain that it is discriminatory because military installations are excepted.

5. At the 20 April meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the US was given a "green light"--or at least a "yellow one"--to negotiate with the Soviet Union. The members merely took note of the NATO consultations and did not specifically endorse the treaty. Secretary General Brosio in summing up the discussion stated that all member countries--except France--reaffirmed the desirability of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, but two countries (West Germany and Italy) still retained reservations. The other NATO members expect the US to continue to consult with them closely, especially before an agreed US-USSR text is tabled at the ENDC; and since they have withheld endorsement of the treaty, it is always possible they will raise further objections after they see the results of the US-USSR talks. While the Europeans as a whole have been favorable impressed with the attention their complaints have received and the concessions they have won, the pressure to agree in such a short time on problems of such importance has continued to rankle

them. Moreover, it is doubtful that any amount of talking or concessions would assuage those who are opposed to the treaty in principle and who regard it as a kind of diktat imposed on the weak by the strong.

#### The Key Allies

6. Most of Bonn's initial reservations have apparently been satisfied, among them the German desire for a US statement affirming that the treaty does not alter existing NATO arrangements or ban the possibility of an eventual federated European nuclear force. Also, Bonn is no longer worried that the treaty might restrict development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, West Germany has still not indicated unequivocally and unconditionally that it is prepared to accept the treaty as it now stands. The most difficult remaining problem, and one of particular importance to Chancellor Kiesinger, concerns the treaty's escape clause provisions.

7. Kiesinger is extremely reluctant to sign a treaty which would put Germany's unilateral renunciation of access to atomic weapons into a multilateral commitment valid "for all time." He maintains that his responsibility to the younger generation of Germans would not permit this. He also argues that, unless he can obtain some kind of a time limit, his party will not accept the treaty. Specifically, Kiesinger proposes an initial period of validity for the treaty of 10 to 20 years, followed by an additional period during which it would continue automatically in force. However, at the end of the initial period, a country could withdraw for reasons other than the already existing provision for opting out. This provides that a country may do so only if it thinks its national interests are in jeopardy. The Germans have reportedly sounded out the Italians on this and also hope for Indian support.

8. The Germans are also preoccupied with the "vertical disarmament" issue. Bonn insists that the NPT must be only a first step toward disarmament and that the treaty should provide for further steps.

Others support this view and want the nuclear powers under some obligation to take disarmament measures. Finally, Germany's reservations still reflect a vague suspicion that somehow the Soviets will be getting an enormous advantage from the NPT. German leaders are still reluctant to undertake formal agreements which will create a direct obligation on their part to the Soviet Union. It is one thing, they point out, to make commitments to one's allies, but quite another to do so with the Soviet Union.

9. In many respects, Italian leaders remain more vociferous in their objections to the draft treaty than the Germans. In particular, Rome sees grave implications in the NPT for European unity. It is worried about the lack of "a European clause," and considers unacceptable a draft that would prohibit Western Europe from collectively establishing its own nuclear force except in the eventuality of a federated Europe with supranational control over defense and foreign policies. As Rome sees it, the treaty would tend to inhibit eventual creation of such a European federation since the freedom and elasticity to adopt institutional forms on the road to European unity would be hampered. Premier Moro reportedly also shares Kiesinger's objections to a treaty of indefinite duration. Whether these problems will prevent Rome from signing the treaty in the end is difficult to say. The vigor of the Italians' opposition has surprised many, but Rome would find it hard not to go along if the other allies do.

10. EURATOM's position has been a crucial one in the negotiations with the allies in the past six weeks. Since the current draft now provides for IAEA verification of EURATOM safeguards, the community has been somewhat reassured that the NPT would not impinge on EURATOM's purview, one of the chief functions of which is to prevent the diversion of fissionable materials to weapons uses within the Community. For most of the EURATOM members the preservation of this safeguards system is important, not only to EURATOM, but to the whole European integration movement which is based on the principle of equal treatment of its members. By contrast, France as a nuclear state would be exempted from any of the safeguards provisions of the NPT.

11. All of the EURATOM members accept the safeguards provision in the version the US has now proposed to the USSR. However, the Netherlands has stated that if the Soviet Union does not accept this, The Hague will reserve its right to fall back on the earlier proposal that IAEA safeguards be automatically applied at the end of the three-year transition period. The other EURATOM members will not accept this. The EURATOM Commission would rather have the application of IAEA safeguards discussed at the review conference held five years after the treaty entered into force. This would probably have the support of at least five of the EURATOM members, but the French have heretofore indicated only tacit consent to it. The US mission has cautioned that there have been signs of growing French opposition to EURATOM's playing a "political role" in considering the NPT, and the possibility that France might eventually try to call a halt to any negotiations between EURATOM and the IAEA cannot be dismissed.

12. The French maintain their position that they will not sign the treaty, but do not object if others do. By taking this position, Paris has sought to avoid the horns of three dilemmas. One of De Gaulle's major objectives has been to prevent German access to nuclear weapons. Now, because of his opposition to participation in any "partial" disarmament efforts and his strong aversion to any US-USSR-sponsored agreement, Paris finds itself refusing to sign a treaty which would prevent Germany from becoming a nuclear power. Also, the French have been unable to exercise their "leadership" in Europe and rally their European neighbors to oppose a treaty "detrimental" to European interests, since to do so would have made trouble with the Soviets and would have placed France in the position of supporting the right of Germany to nuclear arms. Furthermore, the French have a deep distrust of IAEA. Thus, while the French might have been expected to play an active role in developing a common EURATOM position against the safeguards article even in its revised form, they were stopped by their belief that EURATOM cannot deal with a political problem and were forced, in effect, to abstain.

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13. The UK in some respects finds itself in a similarly "schizoid" attitude toward the NPT. Although wholeheartedly in favor of the treaty in principle, the UK has become increasingly restrained--particularly on the question of safeguards--for fear of harming its chances of entering the European Community.

Other Key Countries

14. Japan, which is basically nonnuclear in its outlook, has shared many of the Europeans' reservations. A chief concern to Japan is that the treaty lead to nuclear disarmament as well as prevent proliferation. Tokyo wants an explicit statement in the treaty that the nuclear states will make strong efforts to obtain agreement on disarmament. It also wants the treaty to state that the peaceful uses of atomic energy would not be limited or prevented. Although it is aware that the Soviet Union is opposed to the nuclear powers' being subjected to safeguards, Japan feels it inequitable to require safeguards on the peaceful nuclear programs of the nonnuclear powers alone. Like Germany, Japan would like to see the provision for the unlimited duration of the treaty eliminated and claims this would be "psychologically good" for the nonnuclear countries.

15. Finally, Japan wants security guarantees provided for the nonnuclear states. Japan regards such guarantees as a right of the many nonnuclear states which are not protected by collective security arrangements. It further believes that a joint declaration by the parties to the treaty or by the UN that the nuclear powers would come to the assistance of nonnuclear states threatened by nuclear attack would make it possible for the maximum number of countries to adhere to the treaty.

16. India's accession to the NPT is still in doubt. Foreign Minister Chagla in recent conversations with Ambassador Foster has given the impression that India probably would sign but wants to get the best terms possible for its signature. These terms should include, in the Indian view most importantly, a nuclear guarantee by nuclear powers against both nuclear blackmail and nuclear attack.

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This guarantee, the Indians insist, should be convincing, should be offered by both the West and the USSR, and should provide for appropriate moves the moment the threat is seen. The guarantee should become operative as soon as there is use of a threat, regardless of the merits of the dispute between the parties. The Indians would prefer parallel statements outside the formal framework of the NPT from the US, UK, France, and the USSR followed by a UN resolution. The Soviet Union has in fact already provided New Delhi with two rough drafts of Soviet declarations on security assurances, but they may not meet India's demands.

17. India's other reservations with the NPT concern the unlimited duration provision, the failure to apply safeguards to the nuclear powers, and the fear that the NPT might hamper India's peaceful nuclear development. There has been considerable pressure within the Indian Government to build the bomb, and sentiment for not signing the treaty is widespread. However, many government officials feel that India cannot oppose the USSR and the US by refusing to sign. Nevertheless, India is expected to take the lead at the ENDC in making its objections known, and will probably attract the support of the other nonaligned members.

18. Other nonaligned members have special objections which they will undoubtedly raise in the ENDC discussions. Brazil is concerned about the question of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and has vigorously pushed the idea that provisions of the recent Latin American Nuclear Free Zone treaty allowing non-nuclear states to undertake peaceful nuclear explosions should be reflected in the NPT. A significant factor in the attitude of the UAR, an ENDC member, will be that of Israel, which is not a member. Israel, reluctant to give up its nuclear option, has been silent on the negotiations. The UAR is evidently preoccupied with the nuclear disarmament commitment question which will be one of the main topics at the upcoming ENDC. In some instances, the advocates of such a provision would consider a failure to achieve nuclear disarmament a default that would release them from their treaty obligations. In other cases those countries relying on nuclear guarantees for their security might regard an actual running down of nuclear arsenals by the guarantor powers as a threat to their own security.

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The Soviet Attitude

19. The results so far of the current talks between ENDC cochairmen Foster and Roshchin strongly suggest that there has been no change in Moscow's desire to conclude a nonproliferation treaty. The cochairmen's decision to postpone reconvening the ENDC until 18 May will, according to Roshchin, give the Soviets additional time to consider the US proposed changes. Although the Soviets have at times stated that US involvement in Vietnam threatened certain US-Soviet bilateral agreements--such as the consular treaty--they have not linked the NPT with Vietnam.

20. There are now two major issues on which the Soviets are balking--Article III dealing with inspections, and the amendments clause. The Soviets, as expected, have remained adamant that IAEA safeguards must be mandatory. They have so far refused to go along with the US proposal for a three-year transition period during which the IAEA and EURATOM would seek agreement on inspections arrangements and clearly want the "guillotine clause." The Soviets have questioned the implication for safeguards and indeed for the treaty itself if no IAEA-EURATOM agreement was reached at the end of three years.

21. Moscow's firm stand on Article III may be prompted in part by objections made by its allies, especially Rumania. Roshchin told Ambassador Foster that the Eastern Europeans had accepted the Soviet version of Article III on the condition that it would apply to all nonnuclear states, notably those in Western Europe. Roshchin said that giving EURATOM--which was a closed and not a truly international system--a special position was discriminating against Eastern Europe as well as other countries. In his view, and that of each of his advisers in Geneva, it would be "impossible" for the USSR to accept the US version of Article III.

22. Nevertheless, the Soviets now seem willing to table a draft treaty leaving Article III blank, although they had refused to do so when the ENDC convened earlier this year. The cochairmen could state, Roshchin has suggested, that they were continuing to consider safeguards and would present a text in the near future. This is under the proviso that there is no breakthrough on the issue before the ENDC reconvenes on 18 May. It is also conceivable that in

the end, the Soviets may revert to the position they took last fall on international inspections. At that time, they did not believe strongly that any article dealing with inspections was necessary.

23. With regard to the amendment clause, the Soviets have continued to insist that the nuclear powers retain a veto. They consider the proposal for an amendments clause similar to the one in the Outer Space Treaty an entirely inappropriate precedent for the nonproliferation treaty. Basically, they fear that such a clause might lead to a situation in which different groups of parties would claim to have differing sets of obligations. It may thus be necessary to go to the ENDC with the amendments clause also blank. However, there may be a possibility of eventually interesting the Soviets in the British compromise proposal. The essence of the British proposal was to provide a veto to the nations represented on the IAEA Board of Governors at the time the amendment is considered, with every other party having the right to reject an amendment it does not wish to accept.

24. In any event, the Soviets have been business-like and understanding in their recent dealings with the US officials in Geneva.

#### The Outlook

25. Given the difficulty of the problems which remain and the breadth of the interests to be reconciled, it would be rash to bank on an expectation that an agreement will emerge from the hard bargaining ahead. Despite the clear evidence that Moscow is interested in a treaty and the workmanlike attitude of its negotiators, it has also shown itself highly suspicious that loopholes might be negotiated into the treaty--to the German advantage. The USSR appeared remarkably slow to appreciate the importance of the safeguards question, and it has shifted its stand on this several times. The Soviets are fully aware of the divisive impact which the NPT has had on the Western alliance, and are attuned to the exploitable opportunities this provides. In the end, Moscow will have to weigh the desirability of concluding an agreement with, and perhaps against, some of its other objectives both within and outside the Communist bloc.

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26. If for any of these reasons the Soviet Union should decide to harden its position or to draw back from concluding a treaty at all, the developments of the past six weeks have probably had the effect of narrowing the room for maneuver in dealing with such a shift. On the other hand, the European critics of the treaty have been disarmed to some extent by the concessions which they have received, but on the other, they have had the heady experience of insisting that their interests not be overlooked. These concessions have now become essential conditions for acceptance of the treaty--not readily to be relinquished for the sake of accommodating Moscow.

27. Nevertheless, it would be equally rash to overlook the considerations which make an agreement a more practicable possibility now than ever before. The agreement on the basic principles of the treaty which the US and the USSR reached last fall does not appear to have been put in question by the problems of the past few months. The general realization that prospects for concluding such an agreement will deteriorate rather than improve in the future has generated strong pressures to exploit the present opportunity. Despite the non-nuclears' complaints of discrimination, it is widely appreciated that in moving toward more general disarmament, preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons must have first priority.

28. Moreover, while there is no doubt that the debate over the NPT of the past few months has put a strain on relations among friends and allies, it is probably also true that some of the emotionalism which has accompanied it would disappear were the treaty to become accomplished fact. The basic objective of the treaty is in fact generally accepted; it is widely appreciated that the lead which the supernuclear powers now have cannot be closed--unless those powers themselves move to reduce their nuclear arsenals; and among the countries which still aspire to nuclear status there are those who will argue the advantages of a confirmation of the nuclear status quo over the onset of a nuclear race among fourth-string runners. In short, it may be that the NPT will prove to have been more difficult for the non-nuclears to contemplate than to accept.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE

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9 MAY 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bromley Smith  
White House Staff  
The White House

SUBJECT : Status of Negotiations on the Nonproliferation Treaty

1. Attached is a CIA memorandum on the current status of negotiations on the nonproliferation treaty. An update of our memorandum of 28 February, it reports on developments in the treaty negotiations which have taken place during the recess of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee. That committee, as you know, is scheduled to resume its deliberations on 18 May.

2. This memorandum, like the earlier one, is being given only limited dissemination.

*R. J. Smith*

R. J. SMITH  
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachment a/s  
No. 1111/67

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By Q/cb, NARA, Date 12/5/01

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DIRECTORATE OF  
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By cb, NARA, Date 1-10-95

# Intelligence Memorandum

STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

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8 May 1967  
No. 1111/67

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
8 May 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Status of Negotiations on the Nonproliferation Treaty

Summary

The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) resumes discussions in Geneva on 18 May with the fate of the nonproliferation treaty still hanging in the balance. In the six weeks since the ENDC recessed, the US has proposed changes in the draft text of the treaty, or offered interpretations or assurances, designed to meet the barrage of criticism which the initial draft drew from some of the European members of NATO. Many of the reservations and particularly those deriving from the specific substance of the treaty have now been met, but no allied endorsement of the treaty has yet been obtained, and those countries which do not like it for broad political reasons are still dissatisfied.

The European opponents of the treaty are less likely to be in as strong a position again to delay or even prevent its conclusion unless the attitudes of the other main participants make it easy for them to do so. If, for example, India and Japan continue to press for security guarantees in the context of the treaty, then the Europeans can press their case for a treaty of limited duration. Above all, if Moscow is unwilling to accept the concessions the US has made to European opinion, there will probably be no treaty. Present indications still are, however, that Moscow wants an agreement badly enough to show some flexibility--if only at the end of another period of strenuous bargaining.

NOTE: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and the Directorate for Science and Technology.

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The New Text

1. The revised draft of the nonproliferation treaty (NPT) which the US presented to the Soviets a week ago is the result of weeks of consultations with America's allies and is designed primarily to meet their objections. Some of the Europeans, however, still have problems with it.

2. The treaty's preamble has been rewritten in order to commit the nuclear powers in a more binding way to work for arms control measures. They are also now committed to provide peaceful nuclear explosions to the nonnuclear states at the lowest possible cost. A new paragraph was added expressing support for further research to develop devices which would reduce the need for international safeguards inspectors to have direct access to processes and facilities. Still another revision would eliminate the nuclear states' veto over amendments, a privileged position which a number of the allies have objected to. In the present draft, the amendment approved by a majority of parties to the treaty would apply only to those who accepted it.

3. The major change, however, has been effected in the article on safeguards. The text now makes clear that the purpose of inspection is solely to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to weapons uses, and only the fissionable material used or produced by nuclear installations--not the equipment itself--is subject to safeguards controls. Above all, the article now provides that the international safeguards shall be either those of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or such other international safeguards as are accepted by the IAEA under "mutually agreed verification procedures." Thus the possibility of EURATOM's continuing its inspection under IAEA supervision is allowed for. Moreover, an earlier US proposal that IAEA controls should be automatically applied at the end of a three-year period if IAEA and EURATOM should fail to reach a verification agreement--the so-called "guillotine clause"--has been dropped at EURATOM's insistence. The result is the strongest safeguards article the allies would accept, but one the USSR may not.

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4. In addition to changes in the draft, the allies have been offered parallel assurances to encourage them to adhere to the text. The US has drafted interpretations of the treaty on which it has agreed to stand in future dealings with the USSR or in the event misunderstandings later arise. In the US view, for example, the NPT does not prohibit the transfer of nuclear delivery vehicles as long as such transfer does not involve bombs or warheads. Also it does not deal with allied consultations on nuclear defense or with arrangements for the deployment of nuclear weapons within allied territory. It also does not deal with the problem of European unity, and would not bar the succession by a new European federated state to the nuclear status of one of its components. Furthermore, the US has assured its allies that it would continue to supply them with nuclear materials for peaceful uses on a commercial, nondiscriminatory basis. Still another concession is the offer by the US and the UK to put their civilian activities under IAEA safeguards. This has made a favorable impression on many countries, but some still complain that it is discriminatory because military installations are excepted.

5. At the 20 April meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the US was given a "green light"--or at least a "yellow one"--to negotiate with the Soviet Union. The members merely took note of the NATO consultations and did not specifically endorse the treaty. Secretary General Brosio in summing up the discussion stated that all member countries--except France--reaffirmed the desirability of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, but two countries (West Germany and Italy) still retained reservations. The other NATO members expect the US to continue to consult with them closely, especially before an agreed US-USSR text is tabled at the ENDC; and since they have withheld endorsement of the treaty, it is always possible they will raise further objections after they see the results of the US-USSR talks. While the Europeans as a whole have been favorably impressed with the attention their complaints have received and the concessions they have won, the pressure to agree in such a short time on problems of such importance has continued to rankle

them. Moreover, it is doubtful that any amount of talking or concessions would assuage those who are opposed to the treaty in principle and who regard it as a kind of diktat imposed on the weak by the strong.

The Key Allies

6. Most of Bonn's initial reservations have apparently been satisfied, among them the German desire for a US statement affirming that the treaty does not alter existing NATO arrangements or ban the possibility of an eventual federated European nuclear force. Also, Bonn is no longer worried that the treaty might restrict development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, West Germany has still not indicated unequivocally and unconditionally that it is prepared to accept the treaty as it now stands. The most difficult remaining problem, and one of particular importance to Chancellor Kiesinger, concerns the treaty's escape clause provisions.

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Others support this view and want the nuclear powers under some obligation to take disarmament measures. Finally, Germany's reservations still reflect a vague suspicion that somehow the Soviets will be getting an enormous advantage from the NPT. German leaders are still reluctant to undertake formal agreements which will create a direct obligation on their part to the Soviet Union. It is one thing, they point out, to make commitments to one's allies, but quite another to do so with the Soviet Union.

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This guarantee, the Indians insist, should be convincing, should be offered by both the West and the USSR, and should provide for appropriate moves the moment the threat is seen. The guarantee should become operative as soon as there is use of a threat, regardless of the merits of the dispute between the parties. The Indians would prefer parallel statements outside the formal framework of the NPT from the US, UK, France, and the USSR followed by a UN resolution. The Soviet Union has in fact already provided New Delhi with two rough drafts of Soviet declarations on security assurances, but they may not meet India's demands.

17. India's other reservations with the NPT concern the unlimited duration provision, the failure to apply safeguards to the nuclear powers, and the fear that the NPT might hamper India's peaceful nuclear development. There has been considerable pressure within the Indian Government to build the bomb, and sentiment for not signing the treaty is widespread. However, many government officials feel that India cannot oppose the USSR and the US by refusing to sign. Nevertheless, India is expected to take the lead at the ENDC in making its objections known, and will probably attract the support of the other nonaligned members.

18. Other nonaligned members have special objections which they will undoubtedly raise in the ENDC discussions. Brazil is concerned about the question of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and has vigorously pushed the idea that provisions of the recent Latin American Nuclear Free Zone treaty allowing non-nuclear states to undertake peaceful nuclear explosions should be reflected in the NPT. A significant factor in the attitude of the UAR, an ENDC member, will be that of Israel, which is not a member. Israel, reluctant to give up its nuclear option, has been silent on the negotiations. The UAR is evidently preoccupied with the nuclear disarmament commitment question which will be one of the main topics at the upcoming ENDC. In some instances, the advocates of such a provision would consider a failure to achieve nuclear disarmament a default that would release them from their treaty obligations. In other cases those countries relying on nuclear guarantees for their security might regard an actual running down of nuclear arsenals by the guarantor powers as a threat to their own security.

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The Soviet Attitude

19. The results so far of the current talks between ENDC cochairmen Foster and Roshchin strongly suggest that there has been no change in Moscow's desire to conclude a nonproliferation treaty. The cochairmen's decision to postpone reconvening the ENDC until 18 May will, according to Roshchin, give the Soviets additional time to consider the US proposed changes. Although the Soviets have at times stated that US involvement in Vietnam threatened certain US-Soviet bilateral agreements--such as the consular treaty--they have not linked the NPT with Vietnam.

20. There are now two major issues on which the Soviets are balking--Article III dealing with inspections, and the amendments clause. The Soviets, as expected, have remained adamant that IAEA safeguards must be mandatory. They have so far refused to go along with the US proposal for a three-year transition period during which the IAEA and EURATOM would seek agreement on inspections arrangements and clearly want the "guillotine clause." The Soviets have questioned the implication for safeguards and indeed for the treaty itself if no IAEA-EURATOM agreement was reached at the end of three years.

21. Moscow's firm stand on Article III may be prompted in part by objections made by its allies, especially Rumania. Roshchin told Ambassador Foster that the Eastern Europeans had accepted the Soviet version of Article III on the condition that it would apply to all nonnuclear states, notably those in Western Europe. Roshchin said that giving EURATOM--which was a closed and not a truly international system--a special position was discriminating against Eastern Europe as well as other countries. In his view, and that of each of his advisers in Geneva, it would be "impossible" for the USSR to accept the US version of Article III.

22. Nevertheless, the Soviets now seem willing to table a draft treaty leaving Article III blank, although they had refused to do so when the ENDC convened earlier this year. The cochairmen could state, Roshchin has suggested, that they were continuing to consider safeguards and would present a text in the near future. This is under the proviso that there is no breakthrough on the issue before the ENDC reconvenes on 18 May. It is also conceivable that in

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the end, the Soviets may revert to the position they took last fall on international inspections. At that time, they did not believe strongly that any article dealing with inspections was necessary.

23. With regard to the amendment clause, the Soviets have continued to insist that the nuclear powers retain a veto. They consider the proposal for an amendments clause similar to the one in the Outer Space Treaty an entirely inappropriate precedent for the nonproliferation treaty. Basically, they fear that such a clause might lead to a situation in which different groups of parties would claim to have differing sets of obligations. It may thus be necessary to go to the ENDC with the amendments clause also blank. However, there may be a possibility of eventually interesting the Soviets in the British compromise proposal. The essence of the British proposal was to provide a veto to the nations represented on the IAEA Board of Governors at the time the amendment is considered, with every other party having the right to reject an amendment it does not wish to accept.

24. In any event, the Soviets have been business-like and understanding in their recent dealings with the US officials in Geneva.

#### The Outlook

25. Given the difficulty of the problems which remain and the breadth of the interests to be reconciled, it would be rash to bank on an expectation that an agreement will emerge from the hard bargaining ahead. Despite the clear evidence that Moscow is interested in a treaty and the workmanlike attitude of its negotiators, it has also shown itself highly suspicious that loopholes might be negotiated into the treaty--to the German advantage. The USSR appeared remarkably slow to appreciate the importance of the safeguards question, and it has shifted its stand on this several times. The Soviets are fully aware of the divisive impact which the NPT has had on the Western alliance, and are attuned to the exploitable opportunities this provides. In the end, Moscow will have to weigh the desirability of concluding an agreement with, and perhaps against, some of its other objectives both within and outside the Communist bloc.

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26. If for any of these reasons the Soviet Union should decide to harden its position or to draw back from concluding a treaty at all, the developments of the past six weeks have probably had the effect of narrowing the room for maneuver in dealing with such a shift. On the other hand, the European critics of the treaty have been disarmed to some extent by the concessions which they have received, but on the other, they have had the heady experience of insisting that their interests not be overlooked. These concessions have now become essential conditions for acceptance of the treaty--not readily to be relinquished for the sake of accommodating Moscow.

27. Nevertheless, it would be equally rash to overlook the considerations which make an agreement a more practicable possibility now than ever before. The agreement on the basic principles of the treaty which the US and the USSR reached last fall does not appear to have been put in question by the problems of the past few months. The general realization that prospects for concluding such an agreement will deteriorate rather than improve in the future has generated strong pressures to exploit the present opportunity. Despite the non-nuclears' complaints of discrimination, it is widely appreciated that in moving toward more general disarmament, preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons must have first priority.

28. Moreover, while there is no doubt that the debate over the NPT of the past few months has put a strain on relations among friends and allies, it is probably also true that some of the emotionalism which has accompanied it would disappear were the treaty to become accomplished fact. The basic objective of the treaty is in fact generally accepted; it is widely appreciated that the lead which the supernuclear powers now have cannot be closed--unless those powers themselves move to reduce their nuclear arsenals; and among the countries which still aspire to nuclear status there are those who will argue the advantages of a confirmation of the nuclear status quo over the onset of a nuclear race among fourth-string runners. In short, it may be that the NPT will prove to have been more difficult for the non-nuclears to contemplate than to accept.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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May 9, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Subject: Birrenbach's Statement on NPT and European Unity

At your request, I have checked the records on Birrenbach's concern that a shift in our language in connection with the NPT (by specified dates) reflects a weakening in our position on European unity.

I conclude that Birrenbach must be referring to the changes in our language in Articles I and II of the NPT itself. The dates he gave you (25 Aug 65, 22 Mar 66, and Dec 66) correspond essentially to the tabling of the original treaty (17 Aug 65); tabling of the "new language" (22 Mar 66); and Rusk's discussion of Articles I and II of the current NPT draft with the Germans during the Ministerial Conference in mid-December 1966. I am not aware of any other documents with these dates relating to this subject.

The changes in the language of Article I (attached, Tab A) do represent a shift in the US position on a European nuclear force. However, this represents a weakening in our position on European unity only to the extent that one believes a multilateral nuclear force is a pre-condition to such unity.

Article I in the original Treaty draft would have permitted an association of states to control nuclear weapons, with majority voting, provided at least one nuclear state folded all of its independent nuclear capability into the association. It would also have permitted an association composed entirely of non-nuclear states to control nuclear weapons in the unlikely event that some nuclear state not included in the association unilaterally gave up all of its independent nuclear capability and thus reduced the number of nuclear states by one.

Article I in the "new language" tabled March 22, 1966, would also have permitted an association of states to control nuclear weapons, with majority voting, provided at least one nuclear state folded all of its independent nuclear capability into the association. It was more restrictive, however, in that it specifically prohibited an association consisting entirely of non-nuclear states from having control over nuclear weapons, a possibility that theoretically existed under the original draft.

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**E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4**  
**NIJ 94-340**  
By cl, NARA, Date 3-29-95

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Article I of the current draft is even more restrictive in that it would prohibit an association of states from controlling or owning nuclear weapons under any circumstances. The article would not, however, bar the succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former components. We have made the latter point clear to our NATO allies and to the Soviets in our Statement of Interpretations on the NPT (also attached, Tab B).

*Spurgeon*  
Spurgeon Keeny

Attachments:

Tab A

- Art I of Orig US Draft, tabled 17 Aug 65
- Art I & IV(c) of New Language, tabled 22 Mar 66
- Art I of Current Draft, not yet tabled

Tab B

- Statement of Interpretations, dtd 17 Apr 67

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NIJ 94-340  
By Cl, NARA, Date 3-29-45 72-b 5/8/67

COMPARISON OF NPT LANGUAGE

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ARTICLE I (Original US Draft, 17 Aug 65)

1. Each of the nuclear States Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer any nuclear weapons into the national control of any non-nuclear State, either directly, or indirectly through a military alliance; and each undertakes not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and other Organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons.
2. Each of the nuclear States Party to this Treaty undertakes not to assist any non-nuclear State in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

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ARTICLE I (New Language, 22 Mar 66)

Each of the nuclear-weapon States party to this treaty undertakes:

1. Not to transfer nuclear weapons into the national control of any non-nuclear weapon State, or into the control of any association of non-nuclear-weapon States.
2. Not to provide to any non-nuclear-weapon State or association of such States --
  - (a) assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, in preparations for such manufacture, or in the testing of nuclear weapons; or
  - (b) encouragement or inducement to manufacture or otherwise acquire its own nuclear weapons.
3. Not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and associations of States having control of nuclear weapons.
4. Not to take any of the actions prohibited in the preceding paragraphs of this Article directly, or indirectly through third States or associations of States, or through units of the armed forces or military personnel of any State, even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance.

ARTICLE IV (c) (New Language, 22 Mar 66)

"Control" means right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the concurrent decision of an existing nuclear-weapon State.

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COMPARISON OF NPT LANGUAGE

(page 2)

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ARTICLE I (Current Draft)

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

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NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY INTERPRETATIONS ✓

1. The treaty deals only with what is prohibited, not with what is permitted.

2. It prohibits transfer to any recipient whatsoever of "nuclear weapons" or control over them, meaning bombs and warheads. It also prohibits the transfer of other nuclear explosive devices <sup>2</sup> because a nuclear explosive device intended for peaceful purposes can be used as a weapon or can be easily adapted for such use.

3. It does not deal with, and therefore does not prohibit, transfer of nuclear delivery vehicles or delivery systems, or control over them to any recipient, so long as such transfer does not involve bombs or warheads.

4. It does not deal with allied consultations and planning <sup>3</sup> on nuclear defense so long as no transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them results.

5. It does not deal with arrangements for deployment of nuclear weapons within allied territory as these do not involve any transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which time the treaty would no longer be controlling.

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By CB, NARA, Date 3-31-95

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6. It does not deal with the problem of European unity, and would not bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former components. A new federated European state would have to control all of its external security functions including defense and all foreign policy matters relating to external security, but would not have to be so centralized as to assume all governmental functions. While not dealing with succession by such a federated state, the treaty would bar transfer of nuclear weapons (including ownership) or control over them to any recipient, including a multilateral entity.

Notes on Changes made Since April 4 NAC Meeting

1. Former title was "DRAFT SUMMARY OF INTERPRETATIONS". Word "summary" dropped; since might be mistaken to imply that a fuller set of interpretations existed.
2. Remainder of this sentence, beginning with "because" added.
3. Former version read "consultations (including planning)" rather than "consultations and planning"

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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-339  
By cb, NARA, Date 1-10-95

# Intelligence Memorandum

STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

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8 May 1967  
No. 1111/67

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Background Use Only



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
8 May 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Status of Negotiations on the Nonproliferation Treaty

Summary

The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) resumes discussions in Geneva on 18 May with the fate of the nonproliferation treaty still hanging in the balance. In the six weeks since the ENDC recessed, the US has proposed changes in the draft text of the treaty, or offered interpretations or assurances, designed to meet the barrage of criticism which the initial draft drew from some of the European members of NATO. Many of the reservations and particularly those deriving from the specific substance of the treaty have now been met, but no allied endorsement of the treaty has yet been obtained, and those countries which do not like it for broad political reasons are still dissatisfied.

The European opponents of the treaty are less likely to be in as strong a position again to delay or even prevent its conclusion unless the attitudes of the other main participants make it easy for them to do so. If, for example, India and Japan continue to press for security guarantees in the context of the treaty, then the Europeans can press their case for a treaty of limited duration. Above all, if Moscow is unwilling to accept the concessions the US has made to European opinion, there will probably be no treaty. Present indications still are, however, that Moscow wants an agreement badly enough to show some flexibility--if only at the end of another period of strenuous bargaining.

NOTE: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and the Directorate for Science and Technology.

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The New Text

1. The revised draft of the nonproliferation treaty (NPT) which the US presented to the Soviets a week ago is the result of weeks of consultations with America's allies and is designed primarily to meet their objections. Some of the Europeans, however, still have problems with it.

2. The treaty's preamble has been rewritten in order to commit the nuclear powers in a more binding way to work for arms control measures. They are also now committed to provide peaceful nuclear explosions to the nonnuclear states at the lowest possible cost. A new paragraph was added expressing support for further research to develop devices which would reduce the need for international safeguards inspectors to have direct access to processes and facilities. Still another revision would eliminate the nuclear states' veto over amendments, a privileged position which a number of the allies have objected to. In the present draft, the amendment approved by a majority of parties to the treaty would apply only to those who accepted it.

3. The major change, however, has been effected in the article on safeguards. The text now makes clear that the purpose of inspection is solely to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to weapons uses, and only the fissionable material used or produced by nuclear installations--not the equipment itself--is subject to safeguards controls. Above all, the article now provides that the international safeguards shall be either those of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or such other international safeguards as are accepted by the IAEA under "mutually agreed verification procedures." Thus the possibility of EURATOM's continuing its inspection under IAEA supervision is allowed for. Moreover, an earlier US proposal that IAEA controls should be automatically applied at the end of a three-year period if IAEA and EURATOM should fail to reach a verification agreement--the so-called "guillotine clause"--has been dropped at EURATOM's insistence. The result is the strongest safeguards article the allies would accept, but one the USSR may not.

4. In addition to changes in the draft, the allies have been offered parallel assurances to encourage them to adhere to the text. The US has drafted interpretations of the treaty on which it has agreed to stand in future dealings with the USSR or in the event misunderstandings later arise. In the US view, for example, the NPT does not prohibit the transfer of nuclear delivery vehicles as long as such transfer does not involve bombs or warheads. Also it does not deal with allied consultations on nuclear defense or with arrangements for the deployment of nuclear weapons within allied territory. It also does not deal with the problem of European unity, and would not bar the succession by a new European federated state to the nuclear status of one of its components. Furthermore, the US has assured its allies that it would continue to supply them with nuclear materials for peaceful uses on a commercial, nondiscriminatory basis. Still another concession is the offer by the US and the UK to put their civilian activities under IAEA safeguards. This has made a favorable impression on many countries, but some still complain that it is discriminatory because military installations are excepted.

5. At the 20 April meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the US was given a "green light"--or at least a "yellow one"--to negotiate with the Soviet Union. The members merely took note of the NATO consultations and did not specifically endorse the treaty. Secretary General Brosio in summing up the discussion stated that all member countries--except France--reaffirmed the desirability of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, but two countries (West Germany and Italy) still retained reservations. The other NATO members expect the US to continue to consult with them closely, especially before an agreed US-USSR text is tabled at the ENDC; and since they have withheld endorsement of the treaty, it is always possible they will raise further objections after they see the results of the US-USSR talks. While the Europeans as a whole have been favorably impressed with the attention their complaints have received and the concessions they have won, the pressure to agree in such a short time on problems of such importance has continued to rankle

them. Moreover, it is doubtful that any amount of talking or concessions would assuage those who are opposed to the treaty in principle and who regard it as a kind of diktat imposed on the weak by the strong.

#### The Key Allies

6. Most of Bonn's initial reservations have apparently been satisfied, among them the German desire for a US statement affirming that the treaty does not alter existing NATO arrangements or ban the possibility of an eventual federated European nuclear force. Also, Bonn is no longer worried that the treaty might restrict development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, West Germany has still not indicated unequivocally and unconditionally that it is prepared to accept the treaty as it now stands. The most difficult remaining problem, and one of particular importance to Chancellor Kiesinger, concerns the treaty's escape clause provisions.

7. Kiesinger is extremely reluctant to sign a treaty which would put Germany's unilateral renunciation of access to atomic weapons into a multilateral commitment valid "for all time." He maintains that his responsibility to the younger generation of Germans would not permit this. He also argues that, unless he can obtain some kind of a time limit, his party will not accept the treaty. Specifically, Kiesinger proposes an initial period of validity for the treaty of 10 to 20 years, followed by an additional period during which it would continue automatically in force. However, at the end of the initial period, a country could withdraw for reasons other than the already existing provision for opting out. This provides that a country may do so only if it thinks its national interests are in jeopardy. The Germans have reportedly sounded out the Italians on this and also hope for Indian support.

8. The Germans are also preoccupied with the "vertical disarmament" issue. Bonn insists that the NPT must be only a first step toward disarmament and that the treaty should provide for further steps.

Others support this view and want the nuclear powers under some obligation to take disarmament measures. Finally, Germany's reservations still reflect a vague suspicion that somehow the Soviets will be getting an enormous advantage from the NPT. German leaders are still reluctant to undertake formal agreements which will create a direct obligation on their part to the Soviet Union. It is one thing, they point out, to make commitments to one's allies, but quite another to do so with the Soviet Union.

9. In many respects, Italian leaders remain more vociferous in their objections to the draft treaty than the Germans. In particular, Rome sees grave implications in the NPT for European unity. It is worried about the lack of "a European clause," and considers unacceptable a draft that would prohibit Western Europe from collectively establishing its own nuclear force except in the eventuality of a federated Europe with supranational control over defense and foreign policies. As Rome sees it, the treaty would tend to inhibit eventual creation of such a European federation since the freedom and elasticity to adopt institutional forms on the road to European unity would be hampered. Premier Moro reportedly also shares Kiesinger's objections to a treaty of indefinite duration. Whether these problems will prevent Rome from signing the treaty in the end is difficult to say. The vigor of the Italians' opposition has surprised many, but Rome would find it hard not to go along if the other allies do.

10. EURATOM's position has been a crucial one in the negotiations with the allies in the past six weeks. Since the current draft now provides for IAEA verification of EURATOM safeguards, the community has been somewhat reassured that the NPT would not impinge on EURATOM's purview, one of the chief functions of which is to prevent the diversion of fissionable materials to weapons uses within the Community. For most of the EURATOM members the preservation of this safeguards system is important, not only to EURATOM, but to the whole European integration movement which is based on the principle of equal treatment of its members. By contrast, France as a nuclear state would be exempted from any of the safeguards provisions of the NPT.

11. All of the EURATOM members accept the safeguards provision in the version the US has now proposed to the USSR. However, the Netherlands has stated that if the Soviet Union does not accept this, The Hague will reserve its right to fall back on the earlier proposal that IAEA safeguards be automatically applied at the end of the three-year transition period. The other EURATOM members will not accept this. The EURATOM Commission would rather have the application of IAEA safeguards discussed at the review conference held five years after the treaty entered into force. This would probably have the support of at least five of the EURATOM members, but the French have heretofore indicated only tacit consent to it. The US mission has cautioned that there have been signs of growing French opposition to EURATOM's playing a "political role" in considering the NPT, and the possibility that France might eventually try to call a halt to any negotiations between EURATOM and the IAEA cannot be dismissed.

12. The French maintain their position that they will not sign the treaty, but do not object if others do. By taking this position, Paris has sought to avoid the horns of three dilemmas. One of De Gaulle's major objectives has been to prevent German access to nuclear weapons. Now, because of his opposition to participation in any "partial" disarmament efforts and his strong aversion to any US-USSR-sponsored agreement, Paris finds itself refusing to sign a treaty which would prevent Germany from becoming a nuclear power. Also, the French have been unable to exercise their "leadership" in Europe and rally their European neighbors to oppose a treaty "detrimental" to European interests, since to do so would have made trouble with the Soviets and would have placed France in the position of supporting the right of Germany to nuclear arms. Furthermore, the French have a deep distrust of IAEA. Thus, while the French might have been expected to play an active role in developing a common EURATOM position against the safeguards article even in its revised form, they were stopped by their belief that EURATOM cannot deal with a political problem and were forced, in effect, to abstain.

13. The UK in some respects finds itself in a similarly "schizoid" attitude toward the NPT. Although wholeheartedly in favor of the treaty in principle, the UK has become increasingly restrained--particularly on the question of safeguards--for fear of harming its chances of entering the European Community.

Other Key Countries

14. Japan, which is basically nonnuclear in its outlook, has shared many of the Europeans' reservations. A chief concern to Japan is that the treaty lead to nuclear disarmament as well as prevent proliferation. Tokyo wants an explicit statement in the treaty that the nuclear states will make strong efforts to obtain agreement on disarmament. It also wants the treaty to state that the peaceful uses of atomic energy would not be limited or prevented. Although it is aware that the Soviet Union is opposed to the nuclear powers' being subjected to safeguards, Japan feels it inequitable to require safeguards on the peaceful nuclear programs of the nonnuclear powers alone. Like Germany, Japan would like to see the provision for the unlimited duration of the treaty eliminated and claims this would be "psychologically good" for the nonnuclear countries.

15. Finally, Japan wants security guarantees provided for the nonnuclear states. Japan regards such guarantees as a right of the many nonnuclear states which are not protected by collective security arrangements. It further believes that a joint declaration by the parties to the treaty or by the UN that the nuclear powers would come to the assistance of nonnuclear states threatened by nuclear attack would make it possible for the maximum number of countries to adhere to the treaty.

16. India's accession to the NPT is still in doubt. Foreign Minister Chagla in recent conversations with Ambassador Foster has given the impression that India probably would sign but wants to get the best terms possible for its signature. These terms should include, in the Indian view most importantly, a nuclear guarantee by nuclear powers against both nuclear blackmail and nuclear attack.

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This guarantee, the Indians insist, should be convincing, should be offered by both the West and the USSR, and should provide for appropriate moves the moment the threat is seen. The guarantee should become operative as soon as there is use of a threat, regardless of the merits of the dispute between the parties. The Indians would prefer parallel statements outside the formal framework of the NPT from the US, UK, France, and the USSR followed by a UN resolution. The Soviet Union has in fact already provided New Delhi with two rough drafts of Soviet declarations on security assurances, but they may not meet India's demands.

17. India's other reservations with the NPT concern the unlimited duration provision, the failure to apply safeguards to the nuclear powers, and the fear that the NPT might hamper India's peaceful nuclear development. There has been considerable pressure within the Indian Government to build the bomb, and sentiment for not signing the treaty is widespread. However, many government officials feel that India cannot oppose the USSR and the US by refusing to sign. Nevertheless, India is expected to take the lead at the ENDC in making its objections known, and will probably attract the support of the other nonaligned members.

18. Other nonaligned members have special objections which they will undoubtedly raise in the ENDC discussions. Brazil is concerned about the question of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and has vigorously pushed the idea that provisions of the recent Latin American Nuclear Free Zone treaty allowing non-nuclear states to undertake peaceful nuclear explosions should be reflected in the NPT. A significant factor in the attitude of the UAR, an ENDC member, will be that of Israel, which is not a member. Israel, reluctant to give up its nuclear option, has been silent on the negotiations. The UAR is evidently preoccupied with the nuclear disarmament commitment question which will be one of the main topics at the upcoming ENDC. In some instances, the advocates of such a provision would consider a failure to achieve nuclear disarmament a default that would release them from their treaty obligations. In other cases those countries relying on nuclear guarantees for their security might regard an actual running down of nuclear arsenals by the guarantor powers as a threat to their own security.

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The Soviet Attitude

19. The results so far of the current talks between ENDC cochairmen Foster and Roshchin strongly suggest that there has been no change in Moscow's desire to conclude a nonproliferation treaty. The cochairmen's decision to postpone reconvening the ENDC until 18 May will, according to Roshchin, give the Soviets additional time to consider the US proposed changes. Although the Soviets have at times stated that US involvement in Vietnam threatened certain US-Soviet bilateral agreements--such as the consular treaty--they have not linked the NPT with Vietnam.

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21. Moscow's firm stand on Article III may be prompted in part by objections made by its allies, especially Rumania. Roshchin told Ambassador Foster that the Eastern Europeans had accepted the Soviet version of Article III on the condition that it would apply to all nonnuclear states, notably those in Western Europe. Roshchin said that giving EURATOM--which was a closed and not a truly international system--a special position was discriminating against Eastern Europe as well as other countries. In his view, and that of each of his advisers in Geneva, it would be "impossible" for the USSR to accept the US version of Article III.

22. Nevertheless, the Soviets now seem willing to table a draft treaty leaving Article III blank, although they had refused to do so when the ENDC convened earlier this year. The cochairmen could state, Roshchin has suggested, that they were continuing to consider safeguards and would present a text in the near future. This is under the proviso that there is no breakthrough on the issue before the ENDC reconvenes on 18 May. It is also conceivable that in

the end, the Soviets may revert to the position they took last fall on international inspections. At that time, they did not believe strongly that any article dealing with inspections was necessary.

23. With regard to the amendment clause, the Soviets have continued to insist that the nuclear powers retain a veto. They consider the proposal for an amendments clause similar to the one in the Outer Space Treaty an entirely inappropriate precedent for the nonproliferation treaty. Basically, they fear that such a clause might lead to a situation in which different groups of parties would claim to have differing sets of obligations. It may thus be necessary to go to the ENDC with the amendments clause also blank. However, there may be a possibility of eventually interesting the Soviets in the British compromise proposal. The essence of the British proposal was to provide a veto to the nations represented on the IAEA Board of Governors at the time the amendment is considered, with every other party having the right to reject an amendment it does not wish to accept.

24. In any event, the Soviets have been business-like and understanding in their recent dealings with the US officials in Geneva.

#### The Outlook

25. Given the difficulty of the problems which remain and the breadth of the interests to be reconciled, it would be rash to bank on an expectation that an agreement will emerge from the hard bargaining ahead. Despite the clear evidence that Moscow is interested in a treaty and the workmanlike attitude of its negotiators, it has also shown itself highly suspicious that loopholes might be negotiated into the treaty--to the German advantage. The USSR appeared remarkably slow to appreciate the importance of the safeguards question, and it has shifted its stand on this several times. The Soviets are fully aware of the divisive impact which the NPT has had on the Western alliance, and are attuned to the exploitable opportunities this provides. In the end, Moscow will have to weigh the desirability of concluding an agreement with, and perhaps against, some of its other objectives both within and outside the Communist bloc.

26. If for any of these reasons the Soviet Union should decide to harden its position or to draw back from concluding a treaty at all, the developments of the past six weeks have probably had the effect of narrowing the room for maneuver in dealing with such a shift. On the other hand, the European critics of the treaty have been disarmed to some extent by the concessions which they have received, but on the other, they have had the heady experience of insisting that their interests not be overlooked. These concessions have now become essential conditions for acceptance of the treaty--not readily to be relinquished for the sake of accommodating Moscow.

27. Nevertheless, it would be equally rash to overlook the considerations which make an agreement a more practicable possibility now than ever before. The agreement on the basic principles of the treaty which the US and the USSR reached last fall does not appear to have been put in question by the problems of the past few months. The general realization that prospects for concluding such an agreement will deteriorate rather than improve in the future has generated strong pressures to exploit the present opportunity. Despite the non-nuclears' complaints of discrimination, it is widely appreciated that in moving toward more general disarmament, preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons must have first priority.

28. Moreover, while there is no doubt that the debate over the NPT of the past few months has put a strain on relations among friends and allies, it is probably also true that some of the emotionalism which has accompanied it would disappear were the treaty to become accomplished fact. The basic objective of the treaty is in fact generally accepted; it is widely appreciated that the lead which the supernuclear powers now have cannot be closed--unless those powers themselves move to reduce their nuclear arsenals; and among the countries which still aspire to nuclear status there are those who will argue the advantages of a confirmation of the nuclear status quo over the onset of a nuclear race among fourth-string runners. In short, it may be that the NPT will prove to have been more difficult for the non-nuclears to contemplate than to accept.

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ROSTON'S OFFICE

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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*Mr. Smith*  
S

NPT

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 8, 1967  
7:05 p. m.

Mr. President:

It looks as though Strauss has forced Kiessinger into a reasonably tight position on the time limit for the NPT.

*Walt*. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-452  
By *gip*, NARA, Date 2/24/94

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

74a

Monday, May 8, 1967

5:00 p.m.

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## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Georg von Lilienfeld came in to report the following:

1. Chancellor Kiesinger has come to the conclusion that it is politically dangerous for him to submit the non-proliferation treaty to the German parliament and to the country unless a time limit is permitted in one of two forms:

- the treaty itself runs for, say, 20 years; or
- signators could accede to the treaty for a limited period of time.

2. Specifically, what he fears is that Franz Josef Strauss will make this an issue of his resignation; destroy the present coalition; and force a general election. Lilienfeld implied that Strauss' intent would be to have the CDU returned with a majority, with Strauss as Foreign Minister.

3. Lilienfeld, in further explanation of the Chancellor's political position, said that in pursuing his policy to the east, he would have to give away, probably, the Oder-Neisse line and accept de facto contacts at high levels with the East German government. If, in addition, he had to stand before the parliament and the country on a non-proliferation treaty without a time limit, he would be facing, in his judgment, more than he could handle.

4. Lilienfeld then asked if the President would be "surprised" by this position. I said that, to the best of my knowledge, the President had listened carefully to Chancellor Kiesinger's discussion of his problems with the NPT; had explained that we were not sure that we had a treaty acceptable to the Soviet Union; but had made the case for a treaty without time limit. He said that also was his understanding.

5. I promised to report his conversation. He told me that Gutenberg would be in to see me soon with a more elaborate account of the German government's position with respect to the time limit.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-452

By grip, NARA, Date 2/24/94

W. W. R.

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OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
WASHINGTON

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
(until released)

NPT

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*same as copy  
furnished by  
S. Keeny*

*FS*

April 28, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT ROSTOW, THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Possible Presidential Answers to  
Questions on Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In response to a request from your office, I have prepared the attached questions and answers on the non-proliferation treaty which the President might use at a Press Conference. It has been cleared with the Secretary of State.

*Adrian S Fisher*

Adrian S. Fisher  
Acting Director

enclosure: Questions & Answers  
(C. until released)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-338

By rip, NARA, Date 9-27-94

cc: State - S/S - Mr. Ben Read

GROUP 3. Downgraded at  
12 year intervals; not  
automatically downgraded.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
(until released)

CONFIDENTIAL

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(until released)

- Q. Did you come to any understanding with our allies to hold up on the U.S. efforts to reach a non-proliferation treaty?
- A. No, I, of course, discussed the non-proliferation treaty with allied leaders on my recent trip. This was a continuation of the consultations with allies which have gone on for some time now and which are continuing. We are now discussing the treaty with the Soviets and certain other governments. I hope that out of these discussions and the deliberations which will follow in Geneva, we can obtain a broadly acceptable non-proliferation treaty which will greatly advance the cause of peace and security.
- Q. Did you come to any understanding on the safeguards question, or on the relationships which should exist between EURATOM and IAEA in safeguarding a treaty?
- A. We have discussed the important problem of a safeguards clause extensively with our allies. We are now discussing it with the USSR. Since the matter is now under discussion I do not wish to go into any detail at this time.

CONFIDENTIAL

(until released)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-338  
By lij, NARA, Date 9-27-94

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April 67 B'oc

Rough translation of the revised Russian Draft

75-b

(90)

Taking into consideration the wishes of the non-nuclear States that in conjunction with the renunciation by these States of the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons according to the Treaty on Non Proliferation of such weapons appropriate measures might be taken to safeguard the security of non-nuclear countries and also bear in mind that any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons will endanger the peace and security of all States the Soviet Union declares the following:

In case of an attack by a nuclear State accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons against States not possessing nuclear weapons or a threat of such an attack an essentially new situation will arise in which the Security Council and above all its Permanent members possessing nuclear weapons will have to act immediately under the U.N. Charter which provides taking "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threat to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace". Any aggressor who embarks on the road of the threat of using nuclear weapons or dares unleash a war accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons and thus breaches the peace and security of nations will not go unpunished.

It goes without saying that, as it is provided in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the States who fall victim to an attack, a nuclear one included, have an inherent right of individual or collective self-defence until the Security Council has taken measures ultimately to maintain international peace and security.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-338

By inf, NARA, Date 9-27-94

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ANNEX B

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SECURITY ASSURANCES TO NON-NUCLEAR STATES

Substantive provision from language suitable for UN Resolution which was approved by Committee of Principals on April 22, 1965:

"Welcomes the intention signified by Member States approving this resolution that they will provide or support immediate assistance to any State not possessing nuclear weapons that is the victim of an act of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used, and calls upon all other States to associate themselves with the objectives of this resolution."

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-338  
By ij, NARA, Date 9-27-94

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

April 19, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Subject: Proposed Soviet Assurance to Non-Nuclear-Weapons States  
in connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty

On the basis of a quick reading, I believe that the attached Soviet draft provides an acceptable basis for parallel statements of reassurance to non-nuclear-weapons states in connection with the NPT. I note that the substance of the statement is essentially the same as the attached statement that was approved by the Committee of Principals on April 22, 1965, as contingency language suitable for a UN Resolution but never used.

I believe that the Soviet statement has the following desirable features:

- Assurance would be provided through the UN mechanism and not directly by the nuclear powers.
- It would be applicable to our NATO allies on whose territory we have stationed nuclear weapons since it does not involve the Kosygin formula which would have excluded such states.
- It would not preclude our using nuclear weapons against China in the event of a conventional Chinese attack since China is now a nuclear state.
- It would not preclude our use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapons state such as North Korea in defense against an overt conventional attack. The assurance covers only "an attack by a nuclear state accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons against states not possessing nuclear weapons or a threat of such an attack . . ." and does not exclude the use of nuclear weapons in a defensive action against an attack by a non-nuclear weapons state on a nuclear state.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-169

By WJ, NARA Date 9-25-98

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We obviously cannot accept this language without further study, and I believe it would be tactically unwise to do so at this point. I believe, however that the President should be quite forthcoming in expressing his interest in exploring this approach.

*Spurgeon*  
Spurgeon Keeny

Attachments:

1. Draft Soviet text
2. Draft UN resolution

cc: FMBator  
Hsaunders  
HWriggins

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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April 18, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW ✓

Subject: Henry Owen's Memorandum on  
Additional Actions to Support the NPT Negotiations

At your request, I have reviewed the attached memo from Henry Owen on "Additional Actions that Might Be Taken to Meet Concerns of NPT Signatories."

I agree with Henry's conclusion that a major Presidential speech would help to set the stage for the NPT. However, I think the major thrust of such a speech should be to underscore the positive reasons for an NPT and should avoid creating the impression that we are "buying off" the various non-nuclear-weapons states. The treaty itself is the most dramatic material for the Presidential speech and the most effective way of encouraging reluctant states to go along. The President should of course dramatize our willingness to put our own peaceful facilities under IAEA as an answer to charges of discrimination and industrial espionage.

I have the following specific comments on Henry's proposals in the order in which he presents them:

1. I believe that the proposal (Item 2(a) - Technology) to create an international corporation to distribute peaceful technology developed through military nuclear programs might prove counter-productive by implying that there is in fact a great deal of important information to be revealed. We have gone to considerable trouble to make the case that this is not so. I also don't like to proliferate organizations with nothing to do. Contrary to Henry's footnote, information declassified from our military program is in general available to anyone who wants it and the AEC has a major information program to distribute it. In any event, this proposal should presumably refer to nuclear weapons programs and not nuclear military programs since only weapons are controlled by the treaty.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ

97-169

By ics, NARA Date 9-25-98

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2. I do not entirely understand the proposal (Item 2(b) - Technology) to supply all peaceful knowledge acquired through national nuclear programs to EURATOM. Would this be reciprocal and what of "industrial secrecy"? In the present form this would clearly not be acceptable to American industry. I note that the principal stated objection of the Germans and Italians to inspection has been that it would give others (presumably the US, UK, and France) competitive advantages by giving them access to German and Italian industrial secrets.

3. I don't think the proposal (Item 3(a) - Fuel) for an additional pledge of nuclear fuel for IAEA has much to do with the NPT. Despite efforts of our NATO allies to couple the subject, there is absolutely nothing in the NPT that places restrictions on the safeguarded transfer of fissionable material for peaceful purposes. Our present position is so forthcoming that it is difficult to extend it without making an open-ended commitment to meet all safeguarded requirements on a worldwide basis. (We currently have a Presidential authorization covering commitments of up to 250,000 kilograms of enriched U-235 for sale abroad; and the current AEC Omnibus Bill now before Congress would remove any ceiling on these commitments.)

4. Although I don't think it has much to do with acceptability of the NPT, I think there may be some merit in the proposal (Item 3(b) - Fuel) that we join IAEA in the study of an internationally-owned nuclear fuel facility in the US. An interesting variation on this proposal is that we might consider eventually leasing one of our presently unused gaseous diffusion plants to IAEA, EURATOM, or some other international entity.

5. I think the proposal (Item 4 - Guarantees) that we hold private US-India discussions on security matters would be very helpful if the currently proposed parallel guarantees by the US and USSR do not materialize. If we can get the parallel guarantees, I think these would be more important to the Indians and should suffice. However, this proposal might be a helpful add-on if we have further problems with the Indians.

6. I agree that we should consider the proposal (Item 5 - Nuclear Role) to inform the Japanese privately that we would be prepared to join them in creating a bilateral US-Japanese nuclear consultation mechanism.

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-3-

7. I don't believe the suggestion (Item 7 - Duration) that there be a withdrawal clause which permits withdrawal of one year's notice without cause is particularly significant in reducing the "second-class status" of non-nuclear weapons states. I note that the present treaty has the following provision: "Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests." This applies without discrimination to both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states.

8. I believe the proposal (Item 8 - Disarmament) that we strengthen the NPT preambular language on disarmament is correct and this is in fact being done right now. While I don't object to it, I do not believe that the proposal (Item 8 - Disarmament) that the President ask ACDA's General Advisory Panel to undertake a review of the US disarmament position would be particularly useful. This would have little or no impact internationally and might even be counter-productive by suggesting that the government didn't really have a program in this field. I believe we are much better off exploiting the possibility of our current talks with the Soviets and our large list of existing proposals. With regard to the substance of the matter, I don't think we would get any new ideas from the General Advisory Committee. This group, which was picked to represent the Establishment, can be very useful in criticizing proposals and in helping to build public support for Administration proposals. The Panel has not, however, produced new proposals in the past and I don't think it is realistic to expect them to do so in the future.

9. I agree that it would improve the atmosphere for the NPT to have the UK state that they would phase out their independent nuclear weapons program. I do not, however, believe that it is worth taking on the additional political problem inherent in the proposal (Item 9 - UK Status) that we encourage Wilson to restate this position now. Moreover, with China and France in the picture, I don't really share Henry's opinion as to the critical nature of the UK status in the minds of the Japanese and Continental countries. I do agree with him that it would be most inappropriate for us at this time to extend our cooperation

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-4-

with the UK to the next round in the arms race -- Poseidon and MIRVs. I understand that the UK has made a formal decision to stop with the A-3 and we should be very careful not to let the current discussions on technical cooperation on the A-3 spill over into follow-on systems.

*Spurgeon*  
Spurgeon Keeny

Attachment:

cy memo 4/6 by HOwen

cc: FMBator

~~SECRET~~

April 10, 1967

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Mr. Bator  
Mr. Knney ✓

Please staff these out carefully. They may  
well be constructive. And give me your views.

Walt Rostow

77-b

cc: F. B. S. K.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON

*Francis -  
Spurge -  
Please staff  
these out  
carefully.*

April 7, 1967

*They may well  
be constructive.*

Walt:

*It's not just me  
your views*

A while back you told me:  
"Don't mourn, organize."

*Walt*

Attached is the result - a memo which I sent to the Secretary with a covering note, suggesting that he give one of his 7th floor colleagues responsibility for reviewing and acting on such of these proposals as pass muster.

You will note the proposal for a Presidential speech towards the end.

*vo*  
Henry Owen

Mr. Rostow

April 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM

77-c

SUBJECT: Additional Action that Might Be Taken to Meet Concerns of NPT Signatories

1. Introduction. This memorandum deals with actions not now in train<sup>1/</sup> which might help to meet key concerns of nuclear-capable countries and thus to persuade them to sign an NPT. It treats actions to meet three major categories of these countries' concerns:

- (a) concerns over civil uses of nuclear technology;
- (b) concerns over security;
- (c) concerns over second class status.

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.A  
 NIJ 94-337  
 By cl, NARA, Date 5-4-95

I. Concerns Over Civil Uses

2. Technology. The fear of losing technological ground through not having access to civil data secured through military nuclear research exists in Germany, Italy and, to a lesser extent, Japan.

Proposal: To meet this concern, the US and UK should:

(a) offer to join others in creating an international corporation, which would make available to all its members peaceful technology developed through military nuclear programs of any member;<sup>2/</sup>

(b) undertake to supply all peaceful knowledge acquired through their national nuclear programs to EURATOM, thus (i) giving new life to that ailing organization, and (ii) providing it with compensation for the pain which it is being caused on other fronts by the NPT. (EURATOM already acts

1/ It does not, therefore, deal with such issues as safeguards and an international agency to perform peaceful explosions which are already under active consideration.

2/ In the US, AEC makes this technology available only to American industry - which might well howl at losing this exclusive privilege.

as a clearing house for information among its members and thus should be able easily to handle an extension of this function.)

3. Fuel. The FRG has sought, and other nuclear capable countries will probably seek, assurances of a continued supply of fissionable material.

Proposal:

(a) The US should make another public multi-year pledge of nuclear fuel to IAEA and offer a further increase in that pledge if the Soviets will match it. (Even though the IAEA does not now face a fuel shortage, this new and large offer would help to reassure non-nuclear countries for the future.)

(b) The US should offer to join an IAEA study of the possibility of building an internationally owned nuclear fuel facility in the US, to meet other countries' future needs for nuclear fuel, if these are judged likely to exceed presently projected production. (Other countries may not take up this offer, preferring to build national or EURATOM production facilities on their own territory, but the mere fact of the offer might earn us some points.)

## II. Security Concerns

4. Guarantees. Guarantees are a special problem for non-aligned India; Japan, Germany and Italy are covered by existing treaties. India is now seeking Soviet assurances. Regardless of how this comes out, there will remain the problem of what, if anything, the US should do to make its own (October 1964) assurances more persuasive.

Proposal: We should offer to hold private US-Indian discussions of possible contingencies involving ChiCom nuclear blackmail, as recommended in the interagency paper which NEA and S/P submitted to the Secretary in December 1966 on "The Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem", and endorsed

recently by Embassy Delhi. This would not be a guarantee, but it would meet some Indian concerns. (To take this action, we would need either to overcome JCS reservations or to get SecDef, who did not take a position on the paper, to override these reservations.)

5. Nuclear Role. The Japanese do not have the equivalent of the NATO Special Nuclear Committee. They are not ready, politically, for such an ambitious measure; some Japanese officials may, however, see this as the next step, after presently envisaged security consultations get underway.

Proposal:

We should inform the Japanese that we would be ready to join them in creating a bilateral US-Japanese nuclear consultation mechanism, whenever they might wish.

III. Second Class Status

6. Problem. The most basic of the nuclear-capable countries' concerns is their fear of being frozen indefinitely into second class status. This concern has been reflected in suggestions or comments by the non-nuclear countries regarding:

- (a) the duration of the treaty;
- (b) the nuclear powers' commitment to disarmament;
- (c) the special status of the UK.

Each of these is treated below.

7. Duration.

(a) The Italians, Germans, and some Japanese officials have suggested that the NPT have a fixed duration. Japanese planners report this to be the Indian view. Senator Gore has proposed "a non-proliferation agreement with a definite time span -- say ten years -- subject at the end of this period to renegotiation or renewal".

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- 4 -

(b) President Chatenet of EURATOM has suggested that the same object be achieved by the non-nuclear powers' making clear how they proposed to interpret the treaty: "The non-nuclear countries...might say that they were making a contribution to non-dissemination through accepting the treaty but that this was a concession limited in time and dependent upon the nuclear countries taking some action to redress the balance."

(c) The FRG has proposed that the withdrawal clause be changed to provide that any non-nuclear country may withdraw if its sovereign rights and interests are violated or threatened by a nuclear weapon state.

Pressure for thus liberalizing the withdrawal clause, or limiting the duration of the treaty, or linking that duration to progress on disarmament will probably grow. The ACDA March 17 memo points out that "a major confrontation between the nuclear and non-nuclear powers over this issue is apt to emerge in the sharpest terms during the course of further negotiations".

Proposal: If future negotiations indicate that an NPT cannot be secured without some major action to meet the non-nuclear countries' concerns re permanent second class status, we should suggest that a loose withdrawal clause would present fewer difficulties than the proposals outlined under (a) and (b) above.

Such a withdrawal clause might be modeled after the outer space treaty, which permits a country to withdraw with one year's notice, without giving cause.

This would avoid both the "deadline" problem which would result from a treaty with a fixed duration and the strains that would be caused if the non-nuclear and nuclear countries were to interpret treaty language in different ways.

Nor is it clear that the effective life of an NPT would be shortened by our acquiescing in such a withdrawal

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clause. No NPT can be counted on to restrain the key nuclear-capable powers over the longer term, unless it is followed by disarmament or other changes which mitigate their sense of discrimination. Indeed, by implicitly recognizing this fact, a loose withdrawal clause might actually put some heat on the USSR to get on with disarmament.

8. Disarmament. The nuclear-capable countries would, in any event, find it easier to sign an NPT if there were some evidence of the nuclear countries' intent to move seriously toward disarmament.<sup>1/</sup>

Proposal: In addition to strengthening the NPT preambular language on disarmament, the President should indicate, as NPT negotiations move forward, that he intends to ask ACDA's General Advisory Panel to undertake a searching review of past US disarmament positions, to see whether new US proposals can be developed in light of continuing technological advances. A small Executive Committee of that Panel, made up of members who could devote substantial time to the enterprise, might be asked to tackle this job as a matter of urgency.

It's been some time since we reviewed our disarmament position (except for issues involved in the current ABM talks); a new hard look at our past positions, in light of changing technology, might be rewarding.

If ABM/missile talks with the Soviets prove useful, this review could surface proposals to throw into that hopper. If the talks don't get anywhere, such a publicized US review could pave the way for eventual wider negotiations.

Quite aside from the effect of such a Presidential announcement on nuclear-capable countries' attitudes toward the NPT, public opinion in the US and elsewhere would welcome this evidence of US desire to move on from budding US-Soviet agreement on NPT to wider disarmament.

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<sup>1/</sup> In the long run, of course, this progress will have to include China, if India and Japan are to be impressed.

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- 6 -

9. UK Status. The non-nuclear countries' concern over second class status is accentuated by Japanese and Continental resentment of the UK's special status as a nuclear power. These medium-sized powers find it even harder to accept discrimination from one of their own ilk than at the hands of the super-powers.

Proposal: We should encourage Prime Minister Wilson to indicate, in line with his pre-election position, that he does not favor indefinite maintenance of the UK's separate national nuclear program, and hopes that progress toward either disarmament or a politically unified Europe will eventually make it possible to phase out that program.

This position (which would, as the London Economist points out, also brighten HMG's image on the Common Market front) would be the more credible if the UK desisted from going on to the next round in the arms race: Poseidon's and MIRV's. We should bear this in mind in fixing the US position, if we are asked to sell these advanced weapons to the UK.

#### IV. Conclusion

10. Presidential Speech. The Japanese, Indian, German, and Italian concerns re NPT discussed in this memo are shared by public opinion, as well as governments, in these countries. Actions to meet these concerns will need, therefore, to be understood by public opinion, as well as governments, if they are to yield the desired result. A Presidential speech might be useful to this end, if it had enough new substance so that it did not appear to be simply arm-twisting.

Proposal: If some of the suggestions outlined above prosper - notably those for a special US disarmament study, new arrangements for sharing of nuclear technology, and assurances regarding future supply of nuclear fuel, they should be surfaced in a major Presidential address on non-proliferation and disarmament.

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MEMORANDUM

*rec'd  
1:45P*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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*4/9/67*  
*Mr Rostow telephoned*  
*Mr Katzback*  
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*F*  
*S*  
*NPT*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, April 8, 1967 -- 1:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

In the attached memorandum, Sec. Rusk endorses a memorandum from Bill Foster requesting that you approve an offer on our part to let the International Atomic Energy Agency apply its safeguards on "a broad scale" to our peaceful nuclear facilities in connection with the negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The draft safeguards article in the NPT would apply IAEA safeguards only to the peaceful facilities of non-nuclear-weapons states since it is clear that the Soviets will not accept IAEA inspection on their facilities at this time. This is considered discriminatory by some non-nuclear-weapons states and has also led to the charge that it might permit industrial espionage to the advantage of the existing nuclear-weapons states. This voluntary action on our part would help to answer these objections to the treaty.

It is proposed to rely on voluntary cooperation of U.S. industry to implement this offer. However, if it became necessary, the government would determine the additional action required to enforce it. Sec. McNamara and Chairman Seaborg concur in this proposal, as do Senator Pastore and Representative Holifield, and it is reportedly acceptable to the atomic energy industry.

Nick called this morning to urge that you clear this for presentation next week in NATO, because our willingness to do this may prove the key to solving the EURATOM safeguards problem in the NPT context.

*W. W. Rostow*

Approved, without further review \_\_\_\_\_

Approved, subject to White House clearance of statement \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Discuss \_\_\_\_\_

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4**  
**NIJ 94-340**  
By Cl, NARA, Date 3-29-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

March 31, 1967

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NOTE FOR MR. ROSTOW

Walt--

Attached for your information is a status report on NPT consultations that I asked ACDA to prepare. I think this is a good and fair summary of where we stand on the eve of the NAC consultations scheduled for April 4.

*Spurgeon*  
Spurgeon Keeny

Att. :  
Status rpt 3/29

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By *rg*, NARA, Date *4-25-94*

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79a

March 29, 1967

STATUS OF NON-PROLIFERATION CONSULTATIONS

We have informed our NATO allies of the following U.S. views on consultations during the ENDC recess: We believe we should have a NAC meeting on April 4 to review the views expressed to us by some of our allies, to submit proposed changes in the text of the draft treaty that we will suggest to the Soviets before tabling and changes in the Summary of Interpretations, and to put forward the changes in the text that we will support after tabling in the ENDC. (The changes in the text of the treaty and in the Interpretations are still being worked on at this time.) At the April 4 meeting, if not sooner, we will give our allies the text of a new Article III based on suggestions we have already given to EURATOM members. We hope to complete NAC consultations by about April 19 and obtain concurrence of our allies to tabling a text with the understanding that they will not at that time be committed. We wish to give the Soviets any new language we have to suggest and our Summary of Interpretations by about April 21, thus allowing them two weeks for consideration and for consultation with their allies. We hope to have an understanding on a text for tabling and on the Interpretations by about May 5, thus enabling us to jointly table the text on the May 9 ENDC resumption.

The nature of further consultations with the Japanese and Indians is still under consideration.

The FRG

Last week we gave the Germans a lengthy response (Tab A) to their comments. We also gave the Germans suggestions for changes in Article III (safeguards), including the suggestion for IAEA verification of EURATOM safeguards. We are continuing consultations with the Germans here in Washington this week.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-338

By 120, NARA, Date 9-27-94

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GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

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-2-

### Italy

Last week we made a similar response (Tab B) to the various Italian suggestions. We also gave them the suggestions for changes in Article III. We are continuing our consultations with them this week during which time we will respond to various scientific and technical questions they have raised. (While there appear to be differences within the government, the Italians have been concerned about the draft text, among other reasons, because it forecloses a European nuclear force short of European Federation, and they fear this would inhibit progress toward European unification except around the French force de frappe.)

### Belgium and The Netherlands

We have given both of these countries suggested changes in Article III which is their principal concern. They are otherwise favorable to moving ahead with the tabling of a text. The Belgians in particular have been strong supporters of a treaty. The Dutch are still concerned about the effect that Article III will have on EURATOM, particularly of what the French might do to EURATOM if IAEA safeguards are applied. The Benelux countries have said they are seeking to come up with a compromise safeguards formulation in view of the negative attitude of the EURATOM Commission.

### The U.K. and Canada

The British and Canadians are impatient with the pace of progress towards tabling the text. (The British, however, are unlikely to give any overt support on the safeguards question because they do not wish to prejudice their effort to achieve Common Market membership.) The Canadians have only one problem with the text and that is that they would prefer to have safeguards apply equally to nuclear and non-nuclear parties to the treaty, though there are clear indications they would not insist upon it.

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### France

The French have said they will not sign the treaty but do not object to other states adhering. At the present time there is no clear evidence that the French are attempting to sabotage the project clandestinely, although the Dutch have said the French have threatened to paralyze EURATOM in the event that NPT safeguards are accepted.

### Other NATO Allies

The Norwegians and the Danes are strong supporters of a treaty and are also impatient with the pace of negotiations. Luxembourg will probably follow the strong and favorable Belgian lead. Greece generally supports the treaty effort. Turkey, Portugal and Iceland have no strong feelings on the subject but generally support the treaty effort.

### Japan

The Japanese believe that a treaty is important and urgent, but they have some reservations. They are concerned with assuring that the treaty will not inhibit peaceful nuclear activities. They also wish assurance that the treaty will not obstruct the U.S.-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty. They of course also have some hesitations about a firm commitment not to go nuclear and they have some uneasiness about Soviet-American detente but there seems to be no real possibility that the Japanese will not support the treaty.

### India

We are giving the Indians the draft text this week. The Indians will in the first instance object to a treaty which does not impose obligations on the nuclear powers to initiate nuclear disarmament. The Indians have also privately raised the question of Indian security guarantees. In addition they wish to be assured that their peaceful nuclear activities will not be interfered with. Given the Indian reliance upon Soviet and American power for their own security, grudging Indian acceptance of the treaty seems likely, though possibly with some reservations.

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-4-

Israel

Last week we gave the Israelis a rather full briefing on the draft treaty, but not the text. The Israeli Ambassador did not express any views at that time, saying his government would need to study our presentation. The Israelis would prefer not to have a nuclear option foreclosed. However, they are probably aware that once a treaty is agreed upon they will probably have no choice but to adhere to it.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 30, 1967

NPT

80

*Cy sent  
Tom Johnson  
3/31/67*

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Subject: Telephone Conversation  
with John Graham, London Financial Times

This afternoon, at the request of your office, I telephoned Mr. John Graham, London Financial Times, who had called the Press Office concerning John Finney's article in the New York Times this morning on the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Mr. Graham wanted to know whether it was correct that we had told the Germans that the NPT would not prevent the establishment of a European nuclear force in the event of political unification of Western Europe. I stated that, as part of our current consultations with our allies on the NPT, we were clarifying the nuclear activities that would be permitted under such a treaty, since that which was not prohibited would be permitted. I stated that, while I could not discuss these consultations, the point raised by Finney was subject of a great deal of interest in Europe and was obviously involved in the discussions.

Mr. Graham did not press me as to whether or not we had actually given anything in writing on this point to the Germans, which was really the news item in the Finney article.

*Spurgeon*  
Spurgeon Keeny

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 29, 1967

NOTE FOR MR. ROSTOW

Walt--

I think you would be interested in the attached cable, which you might not have seen, giving the present planning on the schedule for NPT discussions with our NATO allies and the Soviets in preparation for tabling the treaty at the ENDC on May 9.

*Spurgeon*  
Spurgeon Keeny

Att. :  
STATE 164401  
to all NATO capitals  
dated 3/28/67.

NPT

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

164401  
SUMMARY

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81a

85

Origin ACTION: ALL NATO CAPITALS PRIORITY

ACDA info.

SS INFO: US Mission, GENEVA

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MAR 28 8 07 PM '67

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-337

By 228, NARA, Date 1-12-95

Following are our views on schedule for future NPT

discussions with our NATO allies and the Soviets.

1. During week of March 27 we will continue bilateral discussions here in Washington with the Germans and Italians. During this time we will seek to obtain from them their reactions to the rather extensive responses we have given them during the past week. We clearly cannot resolve all of the issues during this period but hopefully we can narrow them down in preparation for a NAC discussion. If we receive some encouragement from the EURATOM countries to our suggestions for amending Article III, we will ask the Soviets for their views as soon as possible.

2. In any event, on April 4 we would have a NAC meeting at which we would review the general nature of the views that have

Drafted by: <b>ACDA-Adrian S. Fisher</b>	Tel. Ext. <b>7771</b>	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: <b>The Secretary</b>
Clearances: <b>G - Mr. Kohler</b> <b>EUR - Mr. Springsteen</b> <del>XXXXXXXXXXXX</del>	<b>S/S - Mr. McCall</b>	<b>EUR - Mr. Leddy</b> <b>M - Mr. Rostow</b>

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been presented to us by some of our allies and submit (1) the proposed changes in the text and interpretations that we propose to try out on the Soviets before tabling, and (2) the changes <sup>in text</sup> that we will support after tabling and during the ENDC consideration of the text. We will also explain reasons why other changes suggested by some allies are not desirable or practical. (Foster will attend NAC meeting.)

3. We plan to transmit text of new Article III (based on suggestions already given them) to EURATOM members during the middle of this week for discussion at April 4 NAC meeting.

4. By April 19 we would hope to complete NAC consultations and obtain concurrences of our allies to tabling a text with the understanding that they are not at that time committed. In order to give Soviets time for their high-level review and consultation their allies, we will have to conclude NAC consultations by April 19.

5. Following the April 19 NAC meeting we would want to give the Soviets any new language we had to suggest and our interpretations. We could perhaps do this on the 21st, either in Washington or possibly in Geneva. This would give the Soviets two weeks for consideration and perhaps further discussion with us. We would aim at having an understanding with them with respect to tabling the

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text and with respect to the interpretations by about May 5. Hopefully we could then be ready to jointly table the text on May 9.

6. We are prepared to take time necessary to complete consultations with Allies and believe above is a reasonable schedule for doing so.

Addressees should convey substance paras 2 through 6 to foreign ministry. USRO should inform Pennreps.  
GP-1

END

RUSK

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March 15, 1967

MEMORANDUM

TO: WWR

FROM: HW *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: India and the NPT

82  
**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 94-340 appeal**  
**By is, NARA Date 12-17-99**

1. It is not yet a very serious issue in domestic politics. The present Indian government is probably firm enough to gain acceptance for any position on the NPT it decides to adopt. Public discussion of the NPT has been overshadowed by the election, Cabinet formation, etc. The Jan Sangh has long advocated going for the Bomb, and it did gain strength in this election. So there will be more flack now than before. But Mrs. Gandhi, Morarji and Chavan together could swing it.

2. Morarji at Finance will be a mixed blessing on this question. He will probably opt for not going for the Bomb because of financial pressures, but he is hyper-sensitive about India's status and equality of treatment. We therefore must promptly improve our methods of consultation with the Indians in New Delhi if we want to avoid a last-minute stone-walling by Indians until their status and pride are fully honored.

3. The issues worrying Indian officials remain (a) not even a gesture at equality of sacrifice; (b) 5-year review subject to weapons' holder veto; (c) safeguards imposed on non-nuclear countries do not apply to nuclear countries, (d) and no real assurance when China is their main enemy.

4. They are getting virtually the full text in bits and pieces from Germans, Japanese, etc., but have not yet got the whole from us. State is pushing today to instruct Geneva to consult the Russians about how and when to make it available to the Indians. This will permit some opening of the dialogue with the Indians in New Delhi.

5. But we still need something more high powered and knowledgeable on the details than we yet have in the Embassy in New Delhi, although Jerry Green, the DCM, is a very shrewd and systematic man. He and Chet need a back up, of some kind.

6. I'm pressing Nick to pursue the question of greater consultation with the Indians.

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83

Ed  
File in  
non-proliferation file

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED <sup>83a</sup>  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 94-340 appeal  
By is, NARA Date 12-17-99

~~SECRET~~

March 15, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Japanese Attitudes Toward Non-Proliferation Treaty

Conclusion:

If a non-proliferation treaty comes into being, Japan's signature is a virtual certainty. The Japanese public would not stand for Japanese non-adherence. Meanwhile, considerable backing and filling can be expected, both because Japan has some genuine problems with the treaty and because the government must in any event go through a certain amount of posturing to show a decorous degree of national independence.

A full and frank public dialogue on NPT has only been triggered by articles and editorials over the past month or so. Public objections to the treaty center around three basic considerations:

1. The "inequality" of the treaty; i. e., "sacrifice" is required of non-nuclear powers without concomitant requirement that the nuclear powers move toward disarmament.
2. Tendency of the treaty to foreclose options for non-nuclear powers, thus consigning them to a permanent status as third class nations.
3. Fear that the treaty will inhibit non-nuclear nations in their peaceful use of nuclear power and that technological retardation will result.

The press has been sympathetic with these objections, which are shared by both the government and the public, but has been reluctant to come out and say that Japan should preserve its nuclear options. While the effect of the public debate is in the direction of "legitimizing" discussion of nuclear weapons, the debate is usually put in terms of peaceful uses. "Nuclear" is thereby becoming a somewhat less dirty word, but this trend is not expected to go far enough to affect strong public support for adherence to a non-proliferation treaty if one should come into being.

A basic problem is that parity with the great powers has been a consistent theme in the modern history of Japan. There is great reluctance to be excluded forever from the super-power club. Furthermore, the

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Japanese fear that our detente with the Soviets will go too far, to their detriment. Hence their (well taken) caution to us that the Soviets are not to be trusted.

There is a possibility that Japan will join with other non-nuclear nations in collective bargaining concerning the treaty in the hopes that it may yet constitute a firm step toward achievement of general and complete disarmament -- and particularly that it may stimulate progress toward nuclear disarmament.

Our problem is not to get the Japanese to sign the treaty. They are almost certain to do so. Our problem is to get them to accept it as not having been rammed down their throats, thereby producing troublesome political fallout.

Consultations since last December have helped. If we had consulted with them perhaps a year ago, and thus had obtained a reading on their problems earlier, we would probably be in better shape today. Foster's position was that we were not ready to talk with such as Japan until we had worked out a draft treaty with the Soviets.

Recommendations:

1. Basic to such problems as exist with both the government and the public is the Japanese feeling that they simply do not want to have to look in from the outside in a matter of such crucial concern to them. Our problem with Japan would be made dramatically easier if we could get Japan into the ENDC, or at least make a major effort in that direction. The Soviets may buck it, but the blame should be on their backs. (I understand that while Foster has taken this matter up with Dobrynin, it was done in a rather half-hearted way.)

2. Our consultations with the Japanese should be more egalitarian in tone. While there has been improvement in recent weeks, much of what we call consultation has been close to lecturing. Alex Johnson has been doing a first rate job, both in substance and in atmospherics and largely through that we have made some progress on a number of specific worries which the Japanese originally had. (The tone of our recent briefings on ChiCom advanced weapons was excellent. The Japanese had the feeling that we were treating them much as we would our British colleagues.) Frankly, it does seem that ACDA has all too frequently viewed consultations with our allies as an inconvenience, and as quite peripheral to the


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- 3 -

central issue of agreement with the Soviets. There has been a reluctance to pay attention to special national sensitivities -- and perhaps even a lack of the requisite understanding of such sensitivities on the part of ACDA personnel. This situation may be improving. Someone from Dick Sneider's office sat in on ACDA's discussions with the Japanese Embassy for the first time two days ago.

3. We should ask Alex Johnson whether a visit to Tokyo by Foster or someone else in the near future to discuss remaining problems at a high level would be useful or whether it might in fact create the idea that we have too much apprehension about chances for the treaty's success. If Foster talks to the NAC he may not need to go to Tokyo, but if he engages in bilateral talks in Europe he probably should go to Tokyo as well. He certainly must go if he goes to New Delhi. In any event, the Japanese should be kept fully informed on what we are saying to our NATO allies.

In short, our problem with the Japanese is manageable, with a satisfactory outcome highly probable. Chiefly, at issue is obtaining that outcome in a manner which will not cost unduly.



Alfred Jenkins

cc: Mr. Jordan  
Mr. Ropa

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

83-6

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March 15, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. W. W. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Italy and the Non-Proliferation Treaty

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 94-340 appeal**  
**By is , NARA Date 12-17-99**

The Problem: The central problem for the Italians can be most simply stated as one of national pride, prestige and status. Italy regards itself as one of the four great powers of Free Europe. It sees the U.K. and France as nuclear powers -- giving up nothing of substance in the Treaty -- and Germany as in a special category and already bound in self-renunciation. Therefore the Italians feel themselves unique and, in a sense discriminated against. They also fear being locked into a permanent inferior status, particularly as regards France.

Nevertheless, the Italian buffs in EUR, in the Intelligence side of State and in CIA all estimate that the Italians will go along with the Treaty in the end -- particularly if we can make at least a nod in their direction. They will probably even agree to Article III if some reasonable transitional and other facilitating arrangements can be worked out. So the Italians probably will be prepared to make the sacrifice. However, this leads us to their second problem. They have envisaged this sacrifice as a contribution to European unity. It has seemed to them that the Treaty as now drafted may make European unity harder, and may facilitate France's obstruction. They would be happier if the half-way house of a partially unified Europe were not so clearly ruled out (although they are coming to realize that we cannot get a treaty with the Russians if we try to change this key element). The Italians have somewhat moderated their stand on this point in the past days.

Besides European unity, the Italian worries seem to revolve around:

- Italian security against non-signatories (Albania, the UAR, Yugoslavia, etc.)
- further US-Soviet disarmament, as the nuclears' compensating sacrifice.
- technological spin-off.

The Internal Political Situation: All the Washington observers agree with Reinhardt's oft-repeated point that the locus of opposition is in the Italian governmental leadership, and that the press and nation-wide political forces are following the government's lead. They believe that the internal political problem is manageable if the leadership can be brought around, and the opposition to the Treaty is not yet deeply embedded in the public mind. Nevertheless, the governmental leadership is a big "if", and deeply-felt national emotions could certainly be aroused as the debate progresses.

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The key figures are Fanfani, Saragat, Moro, Andreotti and Colombo. CIA believes Fanfani is the real center of doubt and opposition, partly attributing his concern to the fact that he is trying to break out of the mold of Italian politics to become a true Europeanist leader. They believe he has ambitions to be Hallstein's successor. Apparently Saragat and Moro are deeply concerned, but our information is less complete than it might be about the play of personalities. Nenni has told us he supports the Treaty and emphasizes the need for its early conclusion.

Meeting the Situation: The following areas would seem most promising.

1. Greater attention to the relationship between purposes of the treaty as set forth in the preamble -- including its hortatory language about Soviet-American progress in disarmament -- and the provisions for the review conference, amendment, and possible withdrawal. As it is, the nuclear powers retain a veto on treaty amendments; and the non-nuclear powers' rights to withdraw from the treaty are conspicuously discouraged. Obviously, we do not want to make it easy for the non-nuclear powers to back out after five years, but some language relating the review provisions to the purposes of the preamble might be helpful. (We should bear in mind, however, that this change might be better accomplished in response to wider pressures against both the Soviets and ourselves from all the non-nuclear powers, after the treaty is tabled.)
2. Regarding Italian security, we will have to repeat and underline our strong reassurances that we remain committed to the defense of Italy and Europe. The Italians would like strong assurances of the continued effective operation of the NATO permanent committee.
3. We should intensify our efforts to convince and assure the Italians that they will not be discriminated against in peaceful nuclear technology (along the lines of our efforts with the Germans).
4. We should provide assurances on the availability of U.S. fissionable material for Italian reactor projects along the same lines that Foster has just been authorized to give the Federal Republic.
5. We should consider how and whether we can accelerate negotiations on the provision of fuel for an Italian nuclear ship (now hung up with the Joint Committee).
6. As regards atmospheric, what the Italians need is evidence that we take them seriously, and also the possibility to indicate to their own public that we have to some extent been responsive to their concerns. Like some others, they need to be able to say they have their thumb prints on the Treaty and its negotiation -- and that their own sacrifices are worthwhile. To this end we might consider a Presidential letter to Moro.

Attachment  
INR Study dated March 2, 1967

  
Nathaniel Davis

RECEIVED  
H.S.C.

*Intelligence* 83-c

*Note* - 170

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

MAR 3 9 34 AM '67

March 2, 1967

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To : The Secretary  
 Through: S/S  
 From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *TH*  
 Subject: Italian Frustrations Over The NPT

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
 NEJ 94-337  
 By *ip*, NARA, Date 1-12-95

Recent Italian objections to some aspects of the draft nonproliferation treaty (NPT) appear to be motivated by concern for prestige as well as by genuine fears that Italian vital interests may be adversely affected. There still exists in Italy widespread public and political support for the principle of nonproliferation (originally engendered and fanned by the solemn commitments of all recent Italian governments in favor of a "non-proliferation policy"), and any Italian government which refused to sign an NPT would probably find itself in serious difficulties. It is almost certain, therefore, that if and when a treaty agreed to by the US and the USSR is opened for signature, Italy will sign.

So long as the US and the USSR were far apart on the form and contents of an NPT, the Italians made something of a nuisance of themselves by proposing their own compromise solutions aimed at achieving some sort of nonproliferation. In 1965, they initiated and militantly pushed, first in Geneva and subsequently in the UN, a plan calling for a unilateral "moratorium" on the part of the non-nuclear states with regard to the manufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons. Limited to a specific period of time, the moratorium was designed to encourage the nuclear powers to make some progress toward nuclear disarmament. Italian fervor for nonproliferation was not only generated by the activist

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

character of Foreign Minister Fanfani, but was also dictated by genuine popular and political support for it.

While this support has, if anything, increased as chances of a US-USSR accord have improved, the Italian government and its spokesmen in Geneva, in NAC, and in the press have suddenly begun to make waves against it. Although the government still maintains, both publicly and privately, its full support for the principle of an NPT, it has raised a number of "reservations" to some of the articles of the treaty as presently formulated. As they have surfaced during the past several weeks, Italian reservations are based principally on the following "official" motivations: 1) the treaty, minus the so-called European option, places the non-nuclear members of the "Six" at the mercy of nuclear France, which will not become an NPT signatory and which will be in a position to dictate the terms of eventual European political unity; 2) Italian adherence to the treaty would place Italy at a disadvantage should other states either in Europe or in the "Mediterranean Basin" refuse to sign; 3) the proposed safeguards article threatens to widen the "technological gap" between the nuclear and the non-nuclear states by placing the latter's peaceful research and application of nuclear energy under a system of inspection and "control," and, in any event, should apply to both nuclear and non-nuclear states; and 4) the treaty does not provide for a sufficiently strong commitment by the nuclear powers to make further progress toward disarmament.

Every US effort to reassure the Italians on these issues has thus far failed. Moreover, hardly a day goes by without some newspaper article or editorial (doubtless government-inspired) adding new reservations to the official laundry list. Among the latest jewels, gleaned from a recent

editorial in Il Popolo, the official organ of the ruling Christian Democratic Party, is the following: Italy, "as one of the most important industrial powers in the world," cannot accept the discrimination between nuclear and non-nuclear states based on the "odious" demarcation line of the "mere possession" of "A and H bombs." Another and even more hysterical objection was registered by an editorial in the Roman daily Il Messaggero (reportedly very close to President Saragat) which asks: "Is the bomb the only title that qualifies a state as a nuclear state?" After answering in the negative, the editorial states that "Italy must be counted among the most important nuclear powers [sic] because it is among the most important producers of plutonium." "Italy," says Il Messaggero, "could produce... a bomb" if it wanted to, but has chosen not to do so. In a heart-rending finale, the paper asks, "should Italy be downgraded [declassata] because its democracy [sic] has no atomic or imperialistic vocations?"

Although the third and fourth "official" reservations cited above doubtless reflect genuine and legitimate Italian concern, they may also hide an Italian ploy to extract political and technological concessions from the nuclear powers (read US). Nevertheless, it appears that a very important reason for the present Italian agitation must also be sought in the motivations underlying the other two official reservations and the above-quoted press editorials, namely prestige, or what the Italians call bella figura. For reasons of bella figura, Italy is reluctant to accept the idea not only of being cast in a lesser role than France, but also of being equated with the "non-nuclear non-states."

We believe that present Italian unhappiness would be considerably assuaged if the preambular language to the NPT dealing with the "intention" of the nuclear signatories to proceed with other aspects of nuclear disarmament were strengthened, and if, perhaps, some incense were burned to the magnanimous offer of self-sacrifice made by a "near-nuclear" such as Italy in swallowing the anti-atomic pill. At any rate, public and political support for the principle of nonproliferation is such that we doubt that any Italian government would risk its life by refusing to adhere to an NPT. Although we can anticipate that the Italians will engage in some sort of Alphonse et Gaston act with the Germans and other reluctant dragons on the timing of their adherence, we continue to believe that they will eventually sign.

Intelligence

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

RECEIVED  
H. S. C.  
Note - 192

MAR 10 10 27 AM '67  
March 9, 1967

84

To : The Secretary  
Through: S/S  
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *tlh*

Subject: Japanese Reservations Toward NPT

DECLASSIFIED *Patlow*  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-337  
By *ij*, NARA, Date 1-12-95

Japanese dissatisfaction with the draft Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), while foreshadowed earlier, has been unexpectedly vociferous for a nation in which discussion of indigenous nuclear-weapons capabilities had long been taboo. Like Germany and Italy, Japan is much concerned that by accepting the NPT it will be forced into the position of a second-class power in both political and economic terms. While Japan will probably eventually adhere to some form of NPT, it will make strenuous efforts to avoid nuclear subservience and keep future options open.

Government Favors "Non-Discriminatory" NPT. At a press conference on February 18, Prime Minister Sato stated that while he favored non-proliferation "in principle" and Japan would cooperate in the realization of the pact, "Japan would be gravely concerned if the nuclear powers should attempt to perpetuate their international advantages and refuse to cooperate with the non-nuclear powers on the arms cut issue." He reiterated earlier statements that Japan would neither develop nuclear weapons nor permit them on its territory, but pointed out that peaceful uses of atomic energy are internationally recognized (though he admitted it would be "impossible" to determine whether a nuclear explosion had been conducted for peaceful or military purposes). Foreign Minister Takeo Miki will reportedly enlarge on this position in a foreign policy speech to the Diet March 14. Miki is expected to advocate conclusion

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

of a treaty which will attract a maximum number of signatories but which will not perpetuate the superior status of the nuclear-weapons powers and which will be a step toward complete disarmament. He will also state that the Treaty must not interfere with US-Japan security arrangements (i.e., US nuclear protection of Japan) and must not prevent non-nuclear weapons powers from participating in peaceful nuclear development, including use of explosive devices if they can be distinguished from weapons.

Press More Outspoken. The Japanese press has been much more assertive about its objections to the NPT and has unanimously played up the "conflict of interest" between the nuclear-weapons and the non-nuclear-weapons states, sharply criticizing the NPT as "unfairly" and "unreasonably" preserving the "monopoly" of the weapons powers while perpetuating the "second-class" status of the non-weapons states. Asahi and Mainichi buttressed this contention by reporting that at a meeting of Japanese ambassadors resident in Europe a majority had termed the treaty "unequal" and believed that steps should be taken to protect Japan's national interests; the Deputy Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs told the Embassy in Tokyo that while there was a general consensus that an NPT was needed, most of the ambassadors believed the weapons powers must make a commitment to reduce their arms, that the treaty should provide for renegotiation after a fixed period, and that Japan should study its implications carefully before signing. The press strongly contends that the "super powers" must give positive assurances that they will discard their nuclear monopoly and blames the United States and the Soviet Union for the proliferation (in France and Communist China) that has taken place thus far. In view of the taboo on discussing nuclear weapons for Japan, most of

the published misgivings have emphasized concern that Japan will be put at a disadvantage in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially as regards explosive devices. However, some commentators have been bold enough to express the fear that if Japan signs the treaty it will become permanently dependent upon the United States for defense and that Japan will become "powerless in international politics." The press has also expressed support for German reservations and echoed the Japanese Government views on the need for continued security guarantees.

Japan Will Argue But Probably Sign. The stand already taken by the government, backed up by the more vigorously expressed reservations in the press, suggests that Japan will make a concerted effort to make the NPT as non-discriminatory against the non-weapons powers as possible, particularly vis-a-vis peaceful uses. Japan will push for a commitment on the part of the weapons powers to discard their nuclear arms eventually and will insist on a provision for renegotiation after a fixed, limited period. The Japanese will press their contentions in consultation and perhaps in concert with Germany and Italy (ironically enough, their former Axis partners), which have similar reservations. However, in the long run, if an NPT draft which does not meet all Japan's reservations is eventually agreed to by the US and the USSR, Japan will probably sign, while keeping its future options explicitly open.

Focus on Japan's Power Status. The debate over the NPT, which would have been unlikely to reach so high a pitch in Japan a few years ago, coincides with an increasing consciousness among the politically articulate

of Japan's revitalized power potential in the Far East. This accounts for the strongly expressed contention that Japan must not accept a treaty which could limit that potential. There is underlying concern that Japan could become more vulnerable vis-a-vis Communist China, which is a major competitor in East Asia. The open discussion of nuclear matters, coupled with increased interest in Japan's future power status, should help stimulate debate on defense matters in general; the arguments used in the press appear to indicate that opposition to the government's desire to build up Japan's indigenous defenses is weakening. At the same time, the debate suggests, a growing desire for less dependence on the United States and may well foreshadow greater Japanese self-assertiveness in discussions of power relationships in the Far East.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

85

March 9, 1967

WWB:

ACDA just called all in a sweat for fear somebody might ask the President a question relating to a speech which Senator Pastore has just given in the Senate concerning the necessity for IAEA safeguards in connection with the NPT.

I think a question on the NPT, possibly relating to the safeguards aspect, is very likely.

ACDA's suggested response is a bit too patronizing of the Senator and I think, if used, it might be toned down as I have indicated.

If this subject was not covered in the meeting with the President this morning, what do you think we should do?

  
Dick Moose

Send it up to George Christian as is \_\_\_\_\_

Send it up as revised \_\_\_\_\_

Don't bother \_\_\_\_\_

85a

Non-Proliferation Treaty

One of the questions which seems to be holding up the completion of a Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the fact that we have no agreement with our allies on what the control provisions should be. Senator Pastore has just given a speech in the Senate in which he says the US should insist that the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna verify the effectiveness of any regional inspection system, such as that set up under the European Energy Community.

Suggested Response: I have not seen Senator Pastore's speech, but he is very knowledgeable about these matters. [He is Chairman of Congress' Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.] *and I am sure his approach is a reasonable one.*

I might remind you that in my message to the Geneva Disarmament Conference last month I pointed out that we must work toward a joint international system of safeguards satisfactory to everyone in order to ensure that the peaceful atom stays peaceful.

I think the present negotiations on the NPT provide a unique opportunity for still future progress in this direction.

Our negotiators are discussing this question with various countries right now. [I am sure that any approach taken by Senator Pastore will be a reasonable one and helpful in working out a satisfactory answer to the question of controls in the treaty.]

SECRETARY McNAMARA. The activity in the north is up. We can't tell, and won't be able to tell for many months, the level of infiltration of men at the present time, because we can only measure that by information received from intelligence sources in South Vietnam and it takes perhaps 4 to 6 months to correlate the sources of information and come up with reasonably accurate figures.

But we can measure every day through our reconnaissance activities, reconnaissance aircraft operating in North Vietnam and the movement of trucks from north to south over the roads both in North Vietnam and over the pass leading from North Vietnam into Laos and hence the Ho Chi Minh trail.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the interview that you referred to, was that a newspaper interview, or some one other of the North Vietnamese diplomats?

SECRETARY RUSK. It was an interview published, I think, in the New York Times on February 23.

Q. Secretary Rusk, there is an assumption in this city that the Russians now really want the war in Vietnam stopped. How does this square with the other side's starting to use Soviet 140 millimeter rockets?

SECRETARY RUSK. We hope that the Soviet Union, as one of the two cochairmen, will support the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords. And in the joint communique of Mr. Kosygin and Prime Minister Wilson in London the other day, they both reaffirmed their support of those accords.

We know that the Soviet Union has been supporting Hanoi, particularly in some of the more sophisticated weapons. Most of those have been used in North Vietnam itself, but some of them have turned up in the south.

It is true that we and the Soviet Union have important differences of view on this. But we would hope that all sides could take the 1954 and 1962 accords as a basis for a settlement and that somehow the two cochairmen, despite some of the complications that they might see in it, we could move this situation to a conference or to a settlement based on those accords.

Q. Mr. McNamara, is the use of the waterways something new, of the North Vietnamese, and, if not, why have we waited this long to mine those?

SECRETARY McNAMARA. The North Vietnamese moved, first, from rails to highways. As we attacked the rail routes, they were forced to use the land routes. As we attacked the land routes, they moved a higher percentage of their traffic to the water routes.

As I mentioned earlier, as bad weather affected our air sorties and reduced them by perhaps 50 percent from September to January of this year, we felt it necessary to supplement our attacks on the water routes by naval gunfire.

REPORTER. Thank you.

NOTE: Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara held their briefing at 12:55 p.m. in the West Lobby at the White House. As printed above, the remarks follow the text of the White House press release.

## THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF MARCH 2, 1967

THE PRESIDENT. For your information, prior to visiting with HEW, I am going to drop by Howard University. Today is the 100th anniversary of the signing of the legislation that brought Howard University into existence.

I have been requested to appear there at a brief ceremony that they are holding. I shall go out a little earlier.

For any of you who may want to go, there will be transportation for you. If you don't want to go, there will be a pool that can report to you on it.

### DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

I have a brief announcement to make. I have received a reply from Chairman Kosygin to my letter of January 27. This reply confirmed the willingness of the Soviet Government to discuss means of limiting the arms race in offensive and defensive nuclear missiles.

This exchange of views is expected to lead to further discussions of this subject in Moscow and with our allies. It is my hope that a means can be found to achieve constructive results.

I will be glad to take any questions in the time allotted to me.

Q. Mr. President, this applies, did I understand correctly, to offensive weapons as well as the establishment of an antimissile system?

THE PRESIDENT. Offensive and defensive.

Q. Mr. President, on what level will these discussions be?

THE PRESIDENT. They will be in Moscow with Ambassador Thompson. Then we will see how they progress.

Q. Mr. President, will these Moscow discussions be concurrent with the ones going on in the 18-nation disarmament conference going on in Geneva?

THE PRESIDENT. Not necessarily. They are not timed in connection with any other conferences.

As you know, I sent Chairman Kosygin a letter and asked him to consider the desirability of an exchange of views in this regard. He has responded. We would assume that the discussions would be initiated with Ambassador Thompson. I wouldn't go further than that at this time.

Q. Mr. President, do you see an interconnection between Senate passage of the consular treaty, the space treaty, East-West trade, and a nonproliferation treaty? Do you see these as kind of one movement?


THE PRESIDENT. I think they are all very desirable moves in the national interest of the United States.

When I became President, one of the first steps I took in the first few weeks I was President was to communicate with Chairman Khrushchev and suggest that we explore

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bromley Smith  
White House Staff  
The White House

87

The President requested that Mr. Helms have the enclosed material delivered to him by 1700 hours today.



EDWARD W. PROCTOR  
Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-339

By cb, NARA, Date 12-16-94

2 March 1967  
(DATE)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE

*mf Rostow*

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28 February 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bromley Smith *S*  
White House Staff  
The White House

SUBJECT : Status of the Nonproliferation  
Treaty Negotiations

1. Attached is a memorandum prepared in CIA concerning the present status of negotiations on the nonproliferation treaty. I think you will find it useful as a study of the crosscurrents of opinion and the reservations among the members of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee now meeting in Geneva to consider the treaty.

2. Because much of its content is drawn from sensitive sources, the memorandum is being given only limited dissemination.

*Edward W. Proctor*

EDWARD W. PROCTOR

Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachment

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

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By CG, NARA, Date 12-16-94

# Intelligence Memorandum

STATUS OF THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY NEGOTIATIONS

~~Secret~~

2

28 February 1967  
No. 0796/67

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## WARNING

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
28 February 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Status of the Nonproliferation Treaty Negotiations

1. The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) resumed its sessions in Geneva on 21 February still facing serious difficulties in reaching agreement on a treaty to curb the spread of nuclear weapons. At present, the ENDC is proceeding with a general debate while awaiting submission of the draft nonproliferation treaty (NPT) by the co-chairmen of the ENDC --the USSR and the US. The US wanted to submit the draft formulations at the opening ENDC session but the USSR refused on grounds that an agreed complete draft text was not available for high-level consideration in Moscow. The major missing article is the provision for international safeguards. Since mid-February, the Soviets have shifted their position and say they are now willing to submit a draft to the ENDC--presumably even without the safeguards article--after they have consulted with their allies and following agreement on the text by the US and USSR. However, the US delegation in Geneva now estimates it may be several weeks before a draft can be presented to the ENDC. This would allow those Western and nonaligned countries which have reservations about the treaty additional time to concert their views and to obtain further concessions.

2. In an effort to prevent this, the US delegation is giving oral briefings on the treaty formulations to the eight nonaligned members of the ENDC.

NOTE: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates.

The US is explaining to the nonaligned that the preamble to the treaty would include assurances that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology would be available to all parties. Nuclear explosives for peaceful uses would likewise be available on a nondiscriminatory basis through appropriate international procedures. Whether this will overcome the prevailing skepticism among the nonaligned is difficult to say. Although they all favor a nonproliferation treaty as such, they will be very persistent not only in trying to obtain guarantees of the continued availability of atomic energy for peaceful uses for all parties, but also in pressing the nuclear powers to undertake disarmament measures and to provide security guarantees to nonnuclear states threatened by "nuclear blackmail."

3. A major stumbling block remains the projected article on safeguards which has become a source of serious friction within the Western alliance. Particularly among the EURATOM countries, opposition continues to grow to acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards as a part of the draft treaty. In West Germany, the press has from the beginning insisted that the safeguards provision would be "grossly discriminating" against EURATOM members. Germany's ambassador to NATO has on several recent occasions stated that the provision is not only incompatible with EURATOM, but with the EEC as well. Similar objections have been voiced in Italy, and within the past few days, official opinion in the Benelux countries--which had been favorable toward the nonproliferation treaty--has taken a distinctly more skeptical trend.

4. The situation within EURATOM, however, is a very complicated one. France, which has no intention of signing the NPT and which as a nuclear power would not be subject to IAEA inspection even if it did, has come out strongly against parallel or joint IAEA-EURATOM safeguards controls within the EURATOM area. The French argue that the IAEA presence would jeopardize cooperative research projects and ultimately call into question the existence of EURATOM itself. Moreover, posing as EURATOM's

"protector," the French also charge that the US is "discriminating" against the community and is "prepared to sell EURATOM's safeguards system down the river." While these arguments have the effect of stirring up a kind of nationalistic fervor for the community among the other members, they also have had the effect of making them painfully aware of the preferred position France would have within the community under the NPT. Thus, for example, Italian Premier Moro is said to be convinced that if the treaty were signed in its present form, De Gaulle and his successors would be given a strong motivation for preventing any further moves toward political or military unity among the EEC countries.

5. Italy and the Benelux countries also fear that the safeguards question could become another obstacle to Britain's accession to the Common Market. A senior Italian Foreign Ministry official told the US Embassy in Rome last week that conclusion of the treaty in its present form would so confirm France's dominant position that it "would never let the UK into the community." The Dutch are likewise said to fear that Paris has been maneuvering to be able to claim that London has showed "too little concern for European integration" in its support of the treaty. The British press has in fact taken notice of the difficulties within EURATOM and the delicate situation in which the UK has been placed. In a recent aide-memoire to the US, London said it fully supported an effective safeguards provision in the treaty, but added that since some EURATOM countries considered the provision discriminatory, Britain would have to "comment on this aspect of the question with caution."

6. These crosscurrents were particularly evident at the 16 February meeting of EURATOM's permanent representatives. The Germans offered two counterproposals for consideration: (1) a safeguards provision which would include an option covering EURATOM with the understanding that negotiations with IAEA would follow; or (2) a treaty with no safeguards provision. The first alternative obviously derives from a proposal offered by Germany last fall for a formal agreement between EURATOM and the IAEA--providing for various exchange

arrangements. (It would probably take a long time to work out such an agreement, and even then it might not be acceptable to the USSR.) The French, however, refused to allow consideration of the general German proposition that the NPT and safeguards issue be discussed and decided on a community basis. Although he reiterated that Paris did not intend to sign the treaty, the French representative pointedly advised his colleagues that while France considered the question of signing to be a sovereign national decision to be made by each country, France also expected each EURATOM member to "weigh most carefully" the implications for the future of EURATOM, the EEC, and European unity.

7. In any case, the problems of some of the Western allies go far beyond the safeguards question. The West Germans continue officially to support the treaty in principle. They maintain, however, that it should be linked to general disarmament, that civil uses of nuclear energy must not be hindered, and that Bonn must receive binding interpretations of certain other provisions of the draft treaty. Although the opposition to the treaty continues to focus on the effect it might have on German scientific and technological advancement, these objections in a number of instances seem little more than a cover masking some leaders' opposition to the treaty for largely political reasons. Influential nationalist elements in the CDU/CSU, for example, maintain that the US and the USSR are dealing over the heads of the European powers. They maintain that the treaty is in the nature of a "diktat" which will be imposed on Bonn and which would compel acceptance of restraints incompatible with West Germany's status as a sovereign state.

8. Chancellor Kiesinger and Foreign Minister Brandt have had some success in calming public opinion, and a number of newspapers have called for a halt to the "wild, emotional and dangerous" controversy on grounds that it threatens both the prestige of the government and the credibility of German policy. Nevertheless, much of the press, and many politicians in the CDU/CSU, like Strauss, Adenauer, Guttenberg, and Zimmerman, have publicly declared their opposition to the treaty in its

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present form. Probably even more worrisome to Kiesinger is the concern expressed by respected figures such as Minister of Scientific Research Stoltenberg, Bundestag deputy Birrenbach, and the physicist, Professor Weizsaecker. German officials have meanwhile approached the US with proposals which are intended to meet their basic objections to the NPT. These proposals specifically call for an agreement with the US on "binding interpretations" on well-known key issues.

9. The debate over the NPT could possibly cause strains in the grand coalition sufficiently serious to jeopardize the Kiesinger government. The US Embassy in Bonn notes that while the NPT controversy is still essentially a foreign policy issue it could turn into a major internal problem for Kiesinger. Moderates on this issue within the CDU/CSU are thus pinning their hopes on obtaining from the US textual changes or the proposed binding interpretations which would lessen opposition to the treaty. The Embassy estimates that there are about 70 CDU/CSU deputies (out of 245) who are intrinsically opposed to the treaty and will vote against it come what may in the way of changes, because they consider a negative vote good politics. If other "troubled and undecided" CDU/CSU members should join this hard-core opposition, Kiesinger would face a serious dilemma. As a CDU chancellor he could hardly contemplate a vote in which his principal support would come from the SPD with a majority of his own party in opposition.

10. Italy's attitude toward the NPT draft also continues to be negative, and there is as yet no sign that Rome is preparing to modify its basic objections. At a 21 February meeting of the Western Four of the ENDC, Rome's representative reiterated the Italian reservations already expressed in NATO. His major points were that the treaty should clearly specify that a future European defense community would have access to nuclear weapons and that safeguards should apply to nuclear as well as nonnuclear countries, with EURATOM being delegated inspection functions by the IAEA. He also pointed out that Italian adherence would have to be conditioned on that of certain other countries.

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While this reference presumably reflects Italian fears that nonsignatories in the Mediterranean area might pose an eventual threat to Italy, it is more likely that Italy's decision will be contingent on Germany's position. The Italian representative's position at the Western Four session was given prior approval by Italy's Supreme Defense Council--which includes the most important officials in the government--and the government is now preparing proposed amendments to the treaty draft.

11. The Japanese, who continue to be in contact with the Germans and the Italians, also retain their reservations about the treaty. Prime Minister Sato in a recent press conference expressed support for the treaty but indicated that the nuclear powers should pay attention to the interests of the non-nuclear-weapon states. Other Japanese officials have questioned whether the restrictions the treaty would impose are sufficiently nondiscriminatory, and whether enough consideration has been given to the security problems of the nonnuclear states. The Tokyo press has expressed fears that the first two articles of the US draft are so brief as to leave "loopholes for farfetched interpretations." Japanese newspapers have also played up the widening gap between nuclear and nonnuclear nations in the areas of nuclear technology and security which might allegedly result from the treaty, and argued that the only way to ensure world security would be to close the gap gradually through nuclear arms reduction by nuclear powers.

12. In India the Secretary to the Prime Minister has told the US Embassy that if the new Indian Government agrees to sign the nonproliferation treaty it will be open to a barrage of attacks from the greatly strengthened opposition in parliament as well as from the members of the Congress Party. He said New Delhi's concern centered on what it believes to be the one-sided nature of the draft treaty which is in effect asking the nonnuclears to give up their right to develop nuclear weapons while asking the nuclear powers to give up nothing. Furthermore, the development of the Chinese nuclear weapons program, plus the evidence that Peking is moving into the missile business, increases India's sense of insecurity.

13. What impact this chorus of objections might ultimately have on Moscow's attitude toward the treaty is anybody's guess. Soviet negotiator Roshchin in his recent talks with Ambassador Foster at Geneva has seemed eager for the US and the USSR to come to some agreement on a complete text, apparently in the belief that this would weaken the opposition. On the safeguards issue, the Russians have made it clear that they would be willing to drop the issue or accept other compromise language as long as it did not entail Soviet recognition of EURATOM and did not subject Eastern Europe to IAEA safeguards before it subjected the EURATOM community to them. On the other hand, the Russians have also made it clear that there are limits on how far the US might go in meeting the desires of its allies without losing Soviet support of the treaty and that it was for the US, in effect, to elicit the agreement of its allies. For example, a member of the Soviet delegation in Geneva has said that if confronted with any public US statement that the NPT would permit an eventual federated European state to have nuclear weapons, Moscow would have to reject it. The delegate added that Soviet opinion would interpret such a statement as permitting German "access" to nuclear weapons, and that this would jeopardize all the laborious progress of the last six months.

14. Thus, while the nonproliferation treaty commanded broad world support so long as it was a more-or-less remote prospect, its emergence as a close-at-hand reality has brought to the surface difficulties heretofore submerged. In Western Europe, it has been caught up in the problems of European integration and in the struggle for predominant influence among France, Britain, and West Germany within the developing European community organization. For some Europeans, the US attitude toward the safeguards question has seemed to cut across two decades of strong US support for European unification, and for still other Europeans, the secret negotiations between Moscow and Washington which paved the way for the present advance toward an agreement have raised the old bogey of the USSR and the US "dealing over the heads of the Europeans." For some West Germans, the treaty has seemed to

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carry the world closer to the postwar settlement in Europe--a settlement which would leave Germany in a permanently subordinate position. For the world at large, the prospect of the treaty has given new currency to the idea that the super nuclear powers are trying to solidify their world position--a position which would give them not only military predominance, but also the technological superiority which many of the nonnuclear countries still believe is the by-product of a nuclear weapons program. Answers to most if not all of these concerns can probably be found, but this will probably require concessions and specific programs to deal with the views of the "have-nots"--not just assurances that their interests are not being overlooked--and even then, the bruised sensitivities may last a very long time.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE

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*By sent  
Keeny  
Proctor*

28 February 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow *←*  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House

SUBJECT : Status of the Nonproliferation  
Treaty Negotiations

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*Edward W. Proctor*

EDWARD W. PROCTOR

Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachment

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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-339  
By CB, NARA, Date 1-10-95

# Intelligence Memorandum

STATUS OF THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY NEGOTIATIONS

~~Secret~~

3

28 February 1967  
No. 0796/67

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## WARNING

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
28 February 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

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4. The situation within EURATOM, however, is a very complicated one. France, which has no intention of signing the NPT and which as a nuclear power would not be subject to IAEA inspection even if it did, has come out strongly against parallel or joint IAEA-EURATOM safeguards controls within the EURATOM area. The French argue that the IAEA presence would jeopardize cooperative research projects and ultimately call into question the existence of EURATOM itself. Moreover, posing as EURATOM's

"protector," the French also charge that the US is "discriminating" against the community and is "prepared to sell EURATOM's safeguards system down the river." While these arguments have the effect of stirring up a kind of nationalistic fervor for the community among the other members, they also have had the effect of making them painfully aware of the preferred position France would have within the community under the NPT. Thus, for example, Italian Premier Moro is said to be convinced that if the treaty were signed in its present form, De Gaulle and his successors would be given a strong motivation for preventing any further moves toward political or military unity among the EEC countries.

5. Italy and the Benelux countries also fear that the safeguards question could become another obstacle to Britain's accession to the Common Market. A senior Italian Foreign Ministry official told the US Embassy in Rome last week that conclusion of the treaty in its present form would so confirm France's dominant position that it "would never let the UK into the community." The Dutch are likewise said to fear that Paris has been maneuvering to be able to claim that London has showed "too little concern for European integration" in its support of the treaty. The British press has in fact taken notice of the difficulties within EURATOM and the delicate situation in which the UK has been placed. In a recent aide-memoire to the US, London said it fully supported an effective safeguards provision in the treaty, but added that since some EURATOM countries considered the provision discriminatory, Britain would have to "comment on this aspect of the question with caution."

6. These crosscurrents were particularly evident at the 16 February meeting of EURATOM's permanent representatives. The Germans offered two counterproposals for consideration: (1) a safeguards provision which would include an option covering EURATOM with the understanding that negotiations with IAEA would follow; or (2) a treaty with no safeguards provision. The first alternative obviously derives from a proposal offered by Germany last fall for a formal agreement between EURATOM and the IAEA--providing for various exchange

arrangements. (It would probably take a long time to work out such an agreement, and even then it might not be acceptable to the USSR.) The French, however, refused to allow consideration of the general German proposition that the NPT and safeguards issue be discussed and decided on a community basis. Although he reiterated that Paris did not intend to sign the treaty, the French representative pointedly advised his colleagues that while France considered the question of signing to be a sovereign national decision to be made by each country, France also expected each EURATOM member to "weigh most carefully" the implications for the future of EURATOM, the EEC, and European unity.

7. In any case, the problems of some of the Western allies go far beyond the safeguards question. The West Germans continue officially to support the treaty in principle. They maintain, however, that it should be linked to general disarmament, that civil uses of nuclear energy must not be hindered, and that Bonn must receive binding interpretations of certain other provisions of the draft treaty. Although the opposition to the treaty continues to focus on the effect it might have on German scientific and technological advancement, these objections in a number of instances seem little more than a cover masking some leaders' opposition to the treaty for largely political reasons. Influential nationalist elements in the CDU/CSU, for example, maintain that the US and the USSR are dealing over the heads of the European powers. They maintain that the treaty is in the nature of a "diktat" which will be imposed on Bonn and which would compel acceptance of restraints incompatible with West Germany's status as a sovereign state.

8. Chancellor Kiesinger and Foreign Minister Brandt have had some success in calming public opinion, and a number of newspapers have called for a halt to the "wild, emotional and dangerous" controversy on grounds that it threatens both the prestige of the government and the credibility of German policy. Nevertheless, much of the press, and many politicians in the CDU/CSU, like Strauss, Adenauer, Guttenberg, and Zimmerman, have publicly declared their opposition to the treaty in its

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present form. Probably even more worrisome to Kiesinger is the concern expressed by respected figures such as Minister of Scientific Research Stoltenberg, Bundestag deputy Birrenbach, and the physicist, Professor Weizsaecker. German officials have meanwhile approached the US with proposals which are intended to meet their basic objections to the NPT. These proposals specifically call for an agreement with the US on "binding interpretations" on well-known key issues.

9. The debate over the NPT could possibly cause strains in the grand coalition sufficiently serious to jeopardize the Kiesinger government. The US Embassy in Bonn notes that while the NPT controversy is still essentially a foreign policy issue it could turn into a major internal problem for Kiesinger. Moderates on this issue within the CDU/CSU are thus pinning their hopes on obtaining from the US textual changes or the proposed binding interpretations which would lessen opposition to the treaty. The Embassy estimates that there are about 70 CDU/CSU deputies (out of 245) who are intrinsically opposed to the treaty and will vote against it come what may in the way of changes, because they consider a negative vote good politics. If other "troubled and undecided" CDU/CSU members should join this hard-core opposition, Kiesinger would face a serious dilemma. As a CDU chancellor he could hardly contemplate a vote in which his principal support would come from the SPD with a majority of his own party in opposition.

10. Italy's attitude toward the NPT draft also continues to be negative, and there is as yet no sign that Rome is preparing to modify its basic objections. At a 21 February meeting of the Western Four of the ENDC, Rome's representative reiterated the Italian reservations already expressed in NATO. His major points were that the treaty should clearly specify that a future European defense community would have access to nuclear weapons and that safeguards should apply to nuclear as well as nonnuclear countries, with EURATOM being delegated inspection functions by the IAEA. He also pointed out that Italian adherence would have to be conditioned on that of certain other countries.

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While this reference presumably reflects Italian fears that nonsignatories in the Mediterranean area might pose an eventual threat to Italy, it is more likely that Italy's decision will be contingent on Germany's position. The Italian representative's position at the Western Four session was given prior approval by Italy's Supreme Defense Council--which includes the most important officials in the government--and the government is now preparing proposed amendments to the treaty draft.

11. The Japanese, who continue to be in contact with the Germans and the Italians, also retain their reservations about the treaty. Prime Minister Sato in a recent press conference expressed support for the treaty but indicated that the nuclear powers should pay attention to the interests of the non-nuclear-weapon states. Other Japanese officials have questioned whether the restrictions the treaty would impose are sufficiently nondiscriminatory, and whether enough consideration has been given to the security problems of the nonnuclear states. The Tokyo press has expressed fears that the first two articles of the US draft are so brief as to leave "loopholes for farfetched interpretations." Japanese newspapers have also played up the widening gap between nuclear and nonnuclear nations in the areas of nuclear technology and security which might allegedly result from the treaty, and argued that the only way to ensure world security would be to close the gap gradually through nuclear arms reduction by nuclear powers.

12. In India the Secretary to the Prime Minister has told the US Embassy that if the new Indian Government agrees to sign the nonproliferation treaty it will be open to a barrage of attacks from the greatly strengthened opposition in parliament as well as from the members of the Congress Party. He said New Delhi's concern centered on what it believes to be the one-sided nature of the draft treaty which is in effect asking the nonnuclears to give up their right to develop nuclear weapons while asking the nuclear powers to give up nothing. Furthermore, the development of the Chinese nuclear weapons program, plus the evidence that Peking is moving into the missile business, increases India's sense of insecurity.

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13. What impact this chorus of objections might ultimately have on Moscow's attitude toward the treaty is anybody's guess. Soviet negotiator Roshchin in his recent talks with Ambassador Foster at Geneva has seemed eager for the US and the USSR to come to some agreement on a complete text, apparently in the belief that this would weaken the opposition. On the safeguards issue, the Russians have made it clear that they would be willing to drop the issue or accept other compromise language as long as it did not entail Soviet recognition of EURATOM and did not subject Eastern Europe to IAEA safeguards before it subjected the EURATOM community to them. On the other hand, the Russians have also made it clear that there are limits on how far the US might go in meeting the desires of its allies without losing Soviet support of the treaty and that it was for the US, in effect, to elicit the agreement of its allies. For example, a member of the Soviet delegation in Geneva has said that if confronted with any public US statement that the NPT would permit an eventual Federated European state to have nuclear weapons, Moscow would have to reject it. The delegate added that Soviet opinion would interpret such a statement as permitting German "access" to nuclear weapons, and that this would jeopardize all the laborious progress of the last six months.

14. Thus, while the nonproliferation treaty commanded broad world support so long as it was a more-or-less remote prospect, its emergence as a close-at-hand reality has brought to the surface difficulties heretofore submerged. In Western Europe, it has been caught up in the problems of European integration and in the struggle for predominant influence among France, Britain, and West Germany within the developing European community organization. For some Europeans, the US attitude toward the safeguards question has seemed to cut across two decades of strong US support for European unification, and for still other Europeans, the secret negotiations between Moscow and Washington which paved the way for the present advance toward an agreement have raised the old bogey of the USSR and the US "dealing over the heads of the Europeans." For some West Germans, the treaty has seemed to

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carry the world closer to the postwar settlement in Europe--a settlement which would leave Germany in a permanently subordinate position. For the world at large, the prospect of the treaty has given new currency to the idea that the super nuclear powers are trying to solidify their world position--a position which would give them not only military predominance, but also the technological superiority which many of the nonnuclear countries still believe is the by-product of a nuclear weapons program. Answers to most if not all of these concerns can probably be found, but this will probably require concessions and specific programs to deal with the views of the "have-nots"--not just assurances that their interests are not being overlooked--and even then, the bruised sensitivities may last a very long time.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET-NODIS~~

February 27, 1967

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ ~~97-338~~ 97-169

By ics, NARA, Date 9-25-98

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Subject: US-Soviet Exchanges concerning Unified Western Europe  
under a Non-Proliferation Treaty

Francis asked me this morning to summarize for you the status of US-Soviet exchanges on the status of a unified Western Europe under a non-proliferation treaty.

To date, we have not given the Soviets anything in writing on this subject. However, in connection with Kosygin's recent visit to London, the British on February 11 gave the Soviets a Note (See Tab B of attached memcon) giving their interpretation of the NPT. This Note stated specifically that the treaty "cannot bar the possibility of the creation of new sovereign states, including federal states, which could acquire by succession the status of one or more of their original constituents."

In his Oral Statement on the NPT on February 8, Secretary Rusk made the following commitment (which has not yet been carried out) to Vice Chancellor Brandt on this subject:

"In response to the request made in the Aide Memoire of February 3, however, we shall undertake to set out in a note to the Federal Republic a summary of the interpretations we have already provided on certain points, after which we propose to give the summary to the Soviets. We shall indicate to the Soviets that we are providing the summary to inform them of the explanations we have given our NATO allies in response to their questions but would not request any comment from the Soviets."

In the extended discussions last fall with the Soviets, the point was not discussed directly since there was a general understanding that

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-169

By ics, NARA Date 9-25-98

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"what is not prohibited by the treaty is permitted." For example, on September 24, 1966, Gromyko in a conversation with the Secretary said that he was "not raising the question of consultation in connection with a non-proliferation treaty. In the Soviet view the treaty should state which is to be prohibited rather than that which is to be allowed..."

I am informed by ACDA that the only significant specific discussions on the subject with the Soviets this year prior to the resumption of the ENDC in Geneva were the Bunn/Vorontov and the Rusk/Dobrynin conversations of which the pertinent extracts are as follows:

Bunn/Vorontov Conversation, 1/17/67 (S/LIMDIS) (Bunn) . . . "An NPT could not be expected to prevent a United States of Europe from succeeding to the nuclear assets of France or the UK if they were consolidated into the new state, particularly in view of the changed political situation which would have to have come about. Succession to assets, of course, could not happen short of the creation of a new federated state. It could not happen with just an alliance or a group of states of that kind. In our view, a United States of Europe would be a 'recipient' under the treaty, and the United States could not transfer its nuclear weapons to it. However, if France were one day consolidated with Germany into a new state, that new state would automatically have nuclear weapons. Statements reflecting this point of view would seem to me a small price for the Soviets to pay to gain FRG accession to the treaty. Vorontsov did not disagree, but neither did he agree. He said he did not know what Moscow's view would be on this point."

Rusk/Dobrynin Conversation, 1/18/67 (S/NODIS) (Secretary) . . . "said the main point which remained to be clarified was what would happen in a case of political unification of Western Europe. In our view if such a political entity emerged, and included France and/or the UK, it would be a nuclear power by succession. He pointed out that the Soviets and ourselves had not discussed specifically the possibility of political unification of Western Europe but this was a matter which we would have to talk about and on which we would have to have an agreed interpretation."

In his meeting with Roshchin on February 16 just prior to the resumption of the ENDC, Mr. Foster summarized some of the concerns of our Allies saying the question of a possible United States of Europe and its probable succession to nuclear weapons was probably most important. This drew no response from Roshchin.

Although there have been no further formal conversations on the subject with Roshchin, I am informed by ACDA that US delegation members have had the following informal discussions with Grinevsky, a member of the Soviet delegation:

DePalma/Grinevsky, 2/17/67 (Geneva's 2371, S/EXDIS) "After persistent probing by Deloff for other considerations which must have led Soviets to adopt present position, Grinevsky admitted there was also problem posed by US intention make public statement at Senate NPT hearings on doctrine of succession by new federated European State to nuclear status its components. (Deloff had made no mention such US intention.) He said Soviets would have to challenge such assertion. Deloff stressed this could wreck entire project and urged Soviets consider carefully how much they want NPT. Deloff also pointed out our view on federated state succession was touched on in various talks with Soviets and could not understand Soviet concern since we did not expect them to agree with it and would base our position on fact treaty does not deal with this possibility and hence cannot preclude it. Grinevsky said regardless how many legal experts might agree on doctrine of succession, for Soviet people and their allies it meant FRG as dominant European force would acquire nuclear weapons."

Bunn/Grinevsky, 2/22/67 (Geneva's 2443, S/LIMDIS) "Federated European State Succession. Grinevsky raised this problem and said Soviets could not tolerate public statement by US on this problem. US could have its own opinions, but if they were put publicly Soviets have to reject them. Deloff pointed out that as lawyer, Grinevsky has to realize that NPT could not bind a State which did not now exist, and that old States which were components of new State would disappear at least as far as their obligations like those of NPT were concerned when new State created. Grinevsky said he understood our theory that

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new United States of Europe would 'inherit' nuclear weapons of formerly separate component which possessed them. But we would have to recognize that not possible for them politically to accept a text which US said publicly permitted what they would regard as German 'access' to nuclear weapons even if US of Europe not likely to happen. He repeated several times his concern that if Soviets challenged on this by US public statement, this would jeopardize all progress on Article I and II which so laboriously made in last six months."

*Spurgeon*  
Spurgeon Keeny

Att.: Weiler/Smart Memcon

cc: FMBator - w/att.

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This document consists of 4 pages. No. of copies.

ACDA/DD:LDWeiler:sv  
2/15/67

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

COPY NO. SERIES B

OFFICE

Memorandum of Conversation

89a

1967 FEB 21 PM 4 47

DATE: February 15, 1967

SUBJECT: Non-Proliferation/Wilson-Kosygin Talks

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-338

By WJ, NARA, Date 9-27-94

COPY 10-PBR

1967 FEB 17 PM 12 36  
EF 18-6

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. I. M. Smart, First Secretary,  
British Embassy  
Mr. Lawrence Weiler, ACDA/DD

COPIES TO:

S/S - Mr. Read  
U - Mr. Morse  
G/PM - Mr. Garthoff  
EUR -  
L - Mr. Meeker  
ACDA (5)

WH - Mr. Keeny  
Amembassy - LONDON  
US Mission GENEVA  
DISDEL (3)  
DOD/ISA  
Amembassy - Moscow

18

Mr. Smart gave me the attached two extracts from telegrams the British Embassy had just received from London concerning the talking points on non-proliferation given to the Soviet Embassy following the Wilson-Kosygin talks. Mr. Smart said the telegrams were in response to the request I made of him yesterday for the texts of the talking points, at which time I expressed our concern at the danger of crossing wires on interpretations given to the Soviets of the non-proliferation treaty provisions. The first extract (Tab A) concerns the oral discussion with Mr. Kosygin. It also discusses the separate point of a paper on assurances to non-nuclear countries which I also raised with Mr. Smart yesterday. The second extract (Tab B) contains the text of the talking paper, which it should be noted was given to the Soviet Embassy following the Wilson-Kosygin talks.

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Attachments:

Tab A.  
Tab B.

GROUP 1  
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downgrading and  
declassification

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TAB A

"1. On Saturday 11 February we handed to the Soviet Embassy a piece of paper (text in my immediately following telegram) based on the brief for the Prime Minister's talks with Kosygin.

2. The interpretations were based on the two U.S. aides memoires but our paper does not make this plain and the Russians were not told of the connection.

3. Mr. Kosygin's reaction when the Prime Minister made these points to him orally, was to say that the Prime Minister had correctly set out the present situation. It was clear that the Americans had provided us with detailed information and there seemed no need to go into detailed consideration of the various points here.

4. We interpret this as confirmation of the U.S. belief that the Russians will acquiesce in these interpretations when the time comes, particularly in the definition of the "hardware option" which we took direct from the U.S. NATO aide memoire in the interests of accuracy.

5. On the question of assurances, apart from the statement at the end of the paper, we agreed to give the Russians a general survey of the problems in writing. Mr. Kosygin said however that this was something which had been discussed before and he remained of his previous opinion.

6. We are working on a paper, but have not yet finalized it. We have always intended to and will show whatever we produce to the Americans before handling it to the Russians. We propose generally to follow the line of what we have already given to them."

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TAB B

"The following is the text of the paper which we have handed to the Soviet Embassy:

NON-PROLIFERATION.

The Americans have told us of the results of the bilateral Russian-American talks over the past three months and we have fully supported them in the discussion which are going on in NATO. We hope that these will reach a positive conclusion and that the Soviet Government and their allies will also be able to agree.

2. I believe that the language which has been discussed does everything possible to meet the legitimate concerns of the Soviet Government about what they call 'access to nuclear weapons' by a non-nuclear state or states, individually or collectively.

3. In particular it would deal with the theoretical possibility which had been left open in the original United States draft, of one of the nuclear states abandoning its control to an association in which the majority of members were non-nuclear states. As we interpret the text it would also rule out the transfer of nuclear weapons (including ownership) or of control over them to a new multilateral or other entity, apart from cases in which a new state succeeded to the nuclear status of one or more of its constituent states.

4. As for what is left open, we accept the argument that this should not be stated in the treaty but we think that we must make clear our belief that the proposed language would not prohibit consultation and planning on nuclear matters in NATO or the machinery established for this purpose.

5. Nor would this language disturb existing bilateral arrangements for the deployment of nuclear weapons within allied territory, as these arrangements do not involve any transfer of warheads up to the point where a decision to go to war is made, after which point the treaty would no longer be controlling.

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p. 4

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6. Finally we take the view that the proposed language would not prohibit the consolidation of states and therefore cannot bar the possibility of the creation of new sovereign states, including federal states, which could acquire by succession the status of one or more of their original constituents.

7. I realise of course that we cannot expect the Soviet Union to say in public that they approve of these arrangements: nor would we gratuitously make our interpretations public. What we do ask is that we should not allow mutual doubts and suspicions about the nature of the Eastern and Western Alliances to stand in the way of the conclusion of the agreement which is now almost within our reach.

8. In the hope that this is agreed we must now plan the way ahead. How do the Soviet Government view the tactical situation which will arise if an agreed draft treaty can be tabled at Geneva? In particular how do they think we can best reassure the non-nuclear states that their wishes and interests will be safeguarded by the treaty?

9. We assume that the Soviet Union regard, as we do, the proposed five-year review conference as being an adequate assurance to the non-nuclears that the military nuclear powers are serious about the need for action on nuclear disarmament.

#### SECURITY ASSURANCES.

10. Another problem is that of guarantees. We are committed by the resolution of the General Assembly to examine the problem and we agree with the view expressed by the Soviet Government that there is need to reassure the non-nuclear states that their security will not be prejudiced by signing a non-proliferation treaty. This is a complex problem which needs much thought, particularly in the light of the views expressed by the non-nuclear countries themselves. We should consider all possibilities in this field. A possible approach, perhaps under the United Nations, might be a general assurance of assistance to non-nuclear countries, the victims of nuclear aggression, as I suggested to Mr. Kosygin when I saw him in February last year."

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 25, 1967

90

NOTE FOR MR. ROSTOW

Subject: Henry Owen's Voting Proposal  
for Non-Proliferation Treaty

Walt--

Following up on the discussion at the staff meeting Monday, I called Adrian Fisher's attention to Henry Owen's suggestion that we might modify the voting procedure on amendments in the NPT (Article IV, attached) to remove the veto by the nuclear weapons states and thus reduce the "discriminatory" features of the treaty. I suggested that they might consider a requirement for two-thirds or three-fourths of the signatories to approve any amendment.

Fisher thought this might be a good idea although it would present problems with the Soviets and possibly the Senate. I suggested that he discuss the suggestion with Henry.

*Spurgeon*  
Spurgeon Keeny

Att. :

Article IV

~~SECRET-LIMDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-340

By CS, NARA, Date 3-29-95

90a

NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

ARTICLE IV

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-337  
By WJ, NARA, Date 1-12-95

1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one third or more of the Parties, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

2/21/67

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~~WWR -~~

If you didn't  
happen to read  
this, I think  
it would interest  
you.

WD

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-337

By inf, NARA, Date 1-12-95

To : The Acting Secretary  
Through: S/S  
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes

Subject: Soviet Tactics on Nonproliferation -- Why the Shift?

Admittedly, we cannot be certain at this juncture precisely how much of a change in policy may lie behind Roshchin's refusal to proceed with tabling portions of the nonproliferation draft when the ENDC opens. For the present, however, such evidence as we have suggests a Soviet tactic designed to speed up the negotiations and to secure advantageous handling of the European-option issue. It does not point toward a more general Soviet loss of interest in having a treaty.

Soviet Loss of Interest? -- The Far-out Hypotheses. Continuing Soviet expressions of interest in a Foreign Ministers' meeting seem to be based upon a presumption that there will in fact be a treaty; Gromyko would hardly wish to go to Geneva to bury it. While we cannot completely exclude the possibility that the Soviets have had a major change of heart and are now backing away from an agreement, we have no evidence to support such hypotheses as:

-- some change in Soviet policy toward China which might make a nonproliferation agreement unduly embarrassing. There is, of course, no evidence of such a change.

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downgrading and  
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-- a decision that a nonproliferation treaty would undercut Soviet policy on Vietnam. We have, of course, long looked at this as a possible impediment for the Soviets. But the general trend over the past year has been for the Soviets to be increasingly specific and authoritative in publicly committing themselves to the proposition that a nonproliferation treaty need not be conditional upon Vietnam. We know of nothing very recent on the Vietnam scene which would have led Moscow to change its mind on that score.

-- differences in the Soviet leadership. We have no current indications of any drastic maneuverings in Kremlin inner circles, and we note that both Brezhnev and Kosygin are on public record as being both knowledgeable about the state of negotiations on the nonproliferation issue and as favoring an agreement.

-- extremely adverse Warsaw Pact reaction. We have no indication of that, and we suspect that had there been a firm Pact decision to change basic terms for a negotiation on nonproliferation we would have had some wind of it.

In the absence of evidence to support any of these more extreme hypotheses, we are inclined to see the Soviet shift as arising from the negotiations themselves rather than as a result of development in other fields.

A Forcing Tactic. In an effort to create a presumption that the US must sign, seal, and deliver its end of the bargain for Soviet consideration and approval, Roshchin withheld agreement to

put a partial text before the ENDC and even suggested that nothing be tabled short of a signed treaty. Obviously Roshechin's refusal to go ahead with the tabling of partial texts will delay ENDC consideration of treaty language, but we doubt that his underlying purpose was dilatory. On the contrary, we are inclined to think that he was invoking the delay (and even the threat of further delay by insisting that the Soviet Union might need more time for its own consideration of the treaty once the Western allies had agreed) in order to try to force the US to move more rapidly. In this regard he in effect made two demands:

(1) that the US promptly have done with the question of Article III (safeguards). The Soviets may see the discussions of Article III as giving a handle to West German opponents of the treaty, and perhaps as complicating the matter of Indian adherence to the treaty. While Moscow clearly prefers a version of Article III which would rely only upon the IAEA, we suspect that the Soviets do not see that variant as being particularly in their interest. Rather, the Soviets may prefer a treaty with a no safeguards article as the one easiest to negotiate out quickly.

(2) that the US quickly commit its allies to Articles I and II. Moscow is probably nervous lest extensive discussion of Articles I and II in the Western alliance lead to a situation in which the Soviets are forced to address explicitly questions which they had been prepared to leave moot for the sake of getting a treaty.

A Drift Toward Explicitness on "Successor States." Moscow, of course, has long been aware of the US view that the language of Articles I and II would permit the emergence of a nuclear armed Western European federation as a "successor state" to a present nuclear power. Although they almost certainly oppose such a development, the Soviets apparently had been willing to leave this matter aside, giving neither formal approval nor explicit disapproval. They now may see a trend toward greater US explicitness on the point which would be troublesome for them. Soviet concern may have been heightened by the British exposition to Kosygin two weeks ago of their reading of the US interpretation. In this connection, it should be borne in mind that the British account of that meeting noted that the interpreter had difficulty, and we cannot rule out the possibility of some misunderstanding on Kosygin's part.

Moscow's Alliance Problems. Moreover, the Soviets may be concerned that too much, too explicit talk of the "successor state" European option may give them trouble in the Warsaw Pact. The January 1965 and July 1966 Pact declarations can be read as committing Moscow to oppose all possible European options. And, if the Soviets talked about the treaty at the February 10 meeting of Pact foreign ministers in Warsaw, they may have run into some flak there.

A Pig in a Poke? The Soviets probably see the present drafts of Articles I and II as something of a pig in a poke. They cannot be certain that Western consultations may not result in demands for changes in the draft language, or in America's adopting various interpretations in order to secure the agreement of its allies. The Soviets may think it prudent to try to get the US to commit itself (and its allies) more firmly before publicly subscribing to the drafts of Articles I and II. So far, Moscow has not evidently altered its previous position. To the extent that the subject of a European force was broached in Geneva last week, Grinevsky hinted that the USSR would be prepared to live with differing Soviet and Western interpretations over the "successor state" issue, provided that the Western interpretation could be kept from becoming part of the public legislative history of the treaty. He warned, however, that if the US makes public its interpretation, Moscow may have to reply with its own. He did not go on to speculate about the effect that such contradictory interpretations might have on the conclusion of a treaty or, if one is signed, on its viability.

Clearances: RSB - Mr. Sonnenfeldt and Mr. Martens

INR/RSB:RBaraz:caw  
2-20-67

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

92

SECRET

Saturday, February 18, 1967 -- 9:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

This letter from Jean Monnet to Gene shows the danger that the non-proliferation treaty could crystallize against us the most powerful pro-U.S. forces in Europe.

You should also know we are heading this particular issue off in our latest instructions to Foster in Geneva.

Gene also reports (with fingers crossed) that:

-- He believes we have an agreed State-Defense negotiating position on the trilateral talks to which McCloy also will sign on. This would be excellent.

-- He recommends that you meet alone with Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara on Tuesday and then have a larger meeting -- with McCloy, Fowler, etc. -- formally to settle our negotiating path.

In my judgment, the heart of the issue is not troops but a monetary-offset plan. Any troop withdrawals which will still keep the alliance will not save enough to cover our balance of payments problem.

I believe we are on the way to finding such a plan -- although I'll only believe it when the Germans are truly locked in.

*W. Rostow*  
W. Rostow

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-323

By *glip*, NARA, Date *2/24/94*

SECRET

83, Avenue Foch  
Paris XVI  
Passy 52-36

92a

February 14, 1967

PERSONAL

*My dear Gene -*

I am glad to have seen you a few minutes and I want to recall the point of our conversation.

You will remember that I emphasized the fact that my remarks did not in any way bear on the military aspect of the non proliferation treaty, but solely on its civilian aspects.

Euratom is an important unit of the European Community. It deals solely with civilian uses of atomic energy and this is practically the only area in which close cooperation on equal footing has been established and is working between the USA and the European Community.

The draft treaty on non proliferation would require that the peaceful activities of the non weapon nuclear States would be controlled by the IAEA. Therefore, in addition to Euratom control, the members of the European Community would submit to control by the Vienna Agency, with the exception of France which is a nuclear military state. It would thus create and institutionalize discrimination in this field of peaceful development where it does not exist up to now. The very basis of European integration which is equality between the member countries, is threatened by the introduction from outside of such discrimination.

The Six are since almost ten years bound and organised together for the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Within the Euratom territory the same control applied to all civilian activities of each of the member countries including France.

Even if the non nuclear weapon members were to accept to submit to the IAEA, it is difficult to see how the existing situation could be changed without the consent of all members. This situation results from the Euratom treaty and from the Euratom - US agreement which both proceed of a common decision of the Six.

.../...

Assuming this difficulty could be overcome, IAEA intervention would recreate an administrative border line splitting the nuclear common market and shrinking industrial integration in a vital technological sector.

For these reasons, while Europe has always believed - as the President has repeatedly said - that European integration was part of the USA foreign policy, it may be led to believe that American policy is changing and has come to regard the necessary understanding between the USA and USSR and the uniting of Europe not as a process completing each other but as conflicting.

As you know, I am deeply convinced that the context of the European Community is necessary to solve the German problem and to achieve a lasting peace between East and West.

*With best regards*

*James Callaghan*

*James*

N.B. I enclose herewith a copy which please give to Walt *and please convey the best*  
*my best regards -*

*I was hoping to see you this evening - but as your leaving is now uncertain, I think it is wiser to send you these notes -*

*Jim*

*The Hon. J. Rostand -*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

565

R.R. by Keeney 2/20

S/S 3034

February 18, 1967


93

CONFIDENTIAL Enclosure

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Draft Presidential Message on  
Non-Proliferation Treaty

I enclose a Memorandum to the President from Mr. Adrian S. Fisher, Acting Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Mr. Fisher's memo transmits a draft Presidential message to be presented to the ENDC in Geneva on February 21 by Mr. Foster. The message would also be released in Washington on February 21.

  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Memo to President w/att

CONFIDENTIAL Enclosure

93a



UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 18, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am transmitting a draft Presidential message on the non-proliferation treaty, which I recommend for your consideration. I also recommend delivery of this message in Washington simultaneously with the opening of the Conference, at which time Mr. Foster would present it to the Conference in Geneva. (This will mean 9:30 a.m. in Washington and 3:30 p.m. in Geneva.)

I have discussed this with Mr. Katzenbach and he concurs. Secretary McNamara has not yet been able to consider this draft; his staff, however, has examined it and has recommended concurrence.

Adrian S. Fisher  
Acting Director

Enclosure: Draft Message.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-338  
By ing, NARA, Date 9-27-94

93-b

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-338

By ig, NARA, Date 9-27-94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 18, 1967

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference reconvenes today in a time of renewed hope for still further progress in our efforts to bring the arms race under control. The recent conclusion of a treaty to ban weapons of mass destruction in outer space and a treaty for a Latin American nuclear free zone have given renewed impetus to those efforts.

The Disarmament Committee now confronts its most significant opportunity -- the negotiation of a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It is my earnest hope that in the near future the Co-Chairmen will be able to recommend draft provisions of a non-proliferation treaty for the consideration of the Committee.

We are, as I pointed out to the Congress in my State of the Union message, "in the midst of a great transition, a transition from narrow nationalism to international partnership; from the harsh spirit of the cold war to the hopeful spirit of common humanity on a troubled and threatened planet."

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- 2 -

A compelling obligation rests upon the world community to bring nuclear weapons under control. An integral element in that obligation is to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. The power to unleash devastation on the world will continue to proliferate if we fail to act now. The inevitable gravitation towards that power will drag in nations who will be forced to stretch their resources to the breaking point in order to acquire nuclear weapons. It will include nations in unstable areas where open warfare has taken place in recent years or is all too frequently threatened. It will heighten the danger of involvement by the great powers in what would otherwise be local conflicts. It will occasion the diversion to nuclear weapons of much-needed resources; among other things, it will inevitably have a crippling effect on fledgling peaceful nuclear programs. And it will increase tensions among nations to the point where the progress towards effective arms control and disarmament now so well begun will be reversed.

The significance of the agreement we are jointly seeking to achieve is difficult to over-estimate. Its

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achievement will represent a determination to reach agreements more difficult and complex than the treaty to ban nuclear weapons from Antarctica; the limited test ban; a system of safeguards over peaceful nuclear activities; and the recent treaty to ban weapons of mass destruction in outer space and on celestial bodies. As these agreements accumulate, they will carry with them a force which will be felt in all areas of our international political life.

The United States and the Soviet Union are in agreement, I am sure, that a non-proliferation treaty must be equitable as between the nuclear and the non-nuclear-weapon powers. It is my earnest belief that the military security of all states -- particularly those who renounce nuclear weapons -- will be enhanced by this treaty. I entertain this conviction because I know from melancholy experience that the mere possession, or threat of possession, of nuclear weapons can create tension, mutual fear and uncertainty among nations. And the price, in treasure and technological talent, has been high -- even for a country of such vast resources as the United States.

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One of the important benefits of such a treaty will be to help free the non-nuclear-weapon powers from the agonizing question of whether to pursue the costly and futile search for security through nuclear arms. Freed of the fear that non-nuclear neighbors may develop such weapons, nations can go forward unhampered in the development of a strong peaceful nuclear capability.

I have instructed our negotiators at the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament to exercise the greatest care to ensure that the treaty is drafted so as not to hinder the non-nuclear-weapon powers in their development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. For more than twenty years the United States has been deeply committed to the principle of international cooperation for peace in every field of human endeavor. And I reaffirmed this principle in my message to the Tenth General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency. We believe strongly in sharing the benefits of scientific progress and we have consistently acted on this belief. By positive programs for the exploitation of the peaceful uses of atomic energy undertaken through IAEA, through EURATOM, and through innumerable other international channels, we

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- 5 -

have shared -- and will continue to share -- the rich and expanding technology of nuclear energy. Special nuclear materials for energy and medical therapy, training opportunities in our institutions, and even some types of equipment; and the scientific and technical literature of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy -- the world is even now sharing and exchanging all these benefits, in a free and open way.

There is, of course, one necessary limitation which must be agreed upon if a non-proliferation treaty is to be effective. But this limitation will apply to only one small portion of the total spectrum of peaceful nuclear activities. Although non-nuclear weapons states will be able to participate in any potential benefits, the development of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes by them must be foreclosed since a peaceful nuclear explosive device is, in effect, a highly sophisticated nuclear weapon. The technology of developing an explosive device as well as the device itself, are the process and product of nuclear weapons. A non-proliferation treaty would not therefore be effective if it allowed non-nuclear weapons nations to manufacture peaceful nuclear explosives.

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- 6 -

In order to mitigate this one seeming inequity, the United States is prepared to join the nuclear-weapon states in a commitment to make nuclear explosive services available on the same basis that they use them themselves. In addition, the United States recommends to the Committee that the treaty clearly state the undertaking of all its signatories to share the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including those which may be derived by the nuclear-weapon states as a by-product of their weapons. The world should participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information on nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and this should be a continuing process as development progresses. Finally, the potential benefits from any future peaceful applications of nuclear explosions which may develop should be available on a worldwide basis without discrimination.

I would hope that the negotiators will also be able to work out the text of an article dealing with safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities satisfactory to all concerned. Such an article is important since the eventual development of a broad, internationally-administered safeguards system is the best way to insure that the peaceful atom remains

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- 7 -

peaceful.

It is my firm belief that agreement on a treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons will be an historic turning point in our long effort to bring the malevolent aspect of the atom to heel. We may very well have arrived at the place where man's essential sanity calls a halt at last to the senseless and futile competition in nuclear arms, and demands that we begin to remove them from our arsenals.

There is nothing to choose here between the nuclear and the non-nuclear nations. There is a terrible and inescapable equity in our common danger. A world of nuclear nations is a world it is now within our power to prevent, and I pledge the United States, as well as my personal efforts, to the task. The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference will play a cardinal role in our joint effort towards an early agreement on a non-proliferation treaty.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

FS

November 28, 1966

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94

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Suggested Language for the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Relationship to Existing and Possible Allied Nuclear Arrangements.

Attached to this memorandum is new language for the first article of a non-proliferation treaty.

This draft states an obligation by a nuclear-weapon State ". . .not to transfer nuclear weapons. . .to any recipient whatsoever directly, or indirectly; (and) not to relinquish to any recipient whatsoever its control over its nuclear weapons. . ." This draft is based on the language which was attached to my memorandum to you of October 14 on this subject. It incorporates changes in this earlier language suggested, on a personal basis, by the Soviet representative in New York. The Soviet representative stated that he did not know whether these changes would make our draft acceptable to Moscow but said that they would improve it a great deal from the Soviet point of view.

The first change suggested is to prohibit transfers of nuclear weapons "to any recipient whatsoever." Our earlier language would have precluded transfers of nuclear weapons to any non-nuclear-weapon state "either individually or by virtue of its membership in a military alliance or group of States." The second change is to prohibit the relinquishment of control over its nuclear weapons "to any recipient whatsoever" as contrasted with the previous language which prohibited a relinquishment of control without explicitly saying to whom.

There follows an analysis of the suggested revised language. It shows that with the exception of the transfer of nuclear weapons (as opposed to control of them) to the U. K.,

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NEJ 94-337

By *[signature]*, NARA, Date 1-12-95

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dealt with in paragraph 6) the revised language would not change the substantive obligations over those stated in our prior language.

Like our earlier draft, the undertakings in the new one would parallel the obligations of the U. S. Atomic Energy Act.

Like the earlier one, this draft:

1) Would not disturb existing bilateral arrangements. I believe the Soviets already understand this but this should be made quite clear as a matter of negotiating history.

2) Would have no bearing on the decision of the NATO allies to go to war, or on the establishment of a permanent NATO committee for nuclear planning and consultation.

3) Would not preclude the assignment to NATO of additional Polaris submarines with U. S. nuclear weapons in a manner consistent with present legislation.

4) Would not rule out the establishment of a multilateral entity in which non-nuclear-weapons states participated, and to which they made financial contributions, so long as there was no transfer to this entity of an ownership interest in nuclear warheads (as opposed to delivery vehicles) and so long as the United States retained control over the nuclear warheads. It would not bar participants in such an entity from having their own veto either on the basis of prohibiting firing from their territory or as otherwise provided by agreement.

5) Would not bar succession by a federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former components. It would bar transfer of nuclear warheads to a European defense community not involving a new federated European state. But it would permit the formation of a European collective nuclear force, with joint ownership of delivery vehicles, so long as any participating nuclear-weapon state (U. K. or France) retained control of its nuclear warheads.

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6) Would bar transfers of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives to the U. K. (The earlier draft would only have prohibited relinquishment of control over such weapons or explosives to the U. K.) However, we cannot now transfer completed weapons to the U. K. under the Atomic Energy Act. (The U. S. has for many months taken the position publicly that nuclear explosive devices, even for peaceful purposes, cannot realistically and properly be distinguished from nuclear weapons.) In general, the kind of cooperation in which we now engage with the British would be protected by the third clause of the proposed language which would prohibit assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives only to non-nuclear-weapon States.

. . . . .

I believe this language would keep open enough options for the present, and the treaty would, of course, contain a provision permitting U. S. withdrawal if it later felt its supreme interests were jeopardized. If you approve, I will authorize Mr. Foster to state to the Soviet representative that he believes that if the language attached commends itself to the Soviet Union it would be considered by the United States as a suitable basis for consultation with its allies in order to facilitate coming to a final position by both sides.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

Attachment: Draft Article I.

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ARTICLE I

"Each nuclear-weapons State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives to any recipient whatsoever directly, or indirectly; not to relinquish to any recipient whatsoever its control over its nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives."

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
WASHINGTON

*Bata 10/4*

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*F 3*

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**E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4**  
**NEJ 94-338**  
By ig, NARA, Date 9-27-94

September 30, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW

Subject: Working Group Language for the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Relationship to Existing and Possible Allied Nuclear Arrangements.

Pursuant to your request I am attaching language produced by the U.S. - Soviet working group for consideration by their Principals. As you will see, I am transmitting it in a memorandum analyzing its contents.

*1. Veto on firing VS weapons'*  
*2. Form? open -*

*R - Crossed out*  
*Walt language*  
*LBJ*

*Adrian Fisher*

Adrian S. Fisher

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NEJ 94-338  
By ing, NARA, Date 9-27-94

September 15, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW, THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Steps to Achieve a Non-Proliferation Agreement

We have been working for some time to crystalize our recommendation for next steps in the attempt to achieve a non-proliferation treaty. Toward that end, I am attaching hereto a Memorandum for the President containing those recommendations and certain supporting and explanatory documents.

While Secretary Rusk is aware of these suggestions it has been impossible, due to the circumstances, to discuss this in detail with him prior to this transmission. He does have copies of the various documents, including copies of this memorandum.

We feel in ACDA that a decision on this matter is urgent and that action along the recommended lines may well enable Secretary Rusk to initiate negotiations with Foreign Minister Gromyko leading to a successful conclusion of an agreement.

*William C. Foster*  
William C. Foster

Attachment:

Memo for the President,  
9/15/66, with 3 Annexes  
(2 copies)

SEP 12 1966

GROUP 1

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
WASHINGTON

96a

OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

September 15, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Steps to Achieve a Non-Proliferation Agreement

As a result of the recent private discussions with the Soviets at Geneva, I believe it should be possible to negotiate a non-proliferation agreement which would not interfere with the "McNamara Committee" type of nuclear consultative arrangements and which would not require changes in our existing bilateral NATO nuclear arrangements. I am transmitting the text of such an agreement.

Although this draft treaty does not expressly so state, I believe we can only negotiate it if we make clear to the Soviets that we are no longer holding open the option of transferring ownership of nuclear warheads to the Federal Republic of Germany or to an association of states through which the FRG obtains joint ownership of nuclear warheads. U.S. law presently prohibits the exercise of this option and both the Administration and Congress have made it clear that they do not favor a change in this legislation.

It is, of course, necessary to advise Chancellor Erhard of our thoughts on this matter and it might be advisable to do so prior to his visit at the end of this month. A draft of a possible letter from you to Chancellor Erhard is attached.

I recognize that there are other aspects of our relations with the Federal Republic which make this an unfavorable time to seek German recognition of the realities of the current situation but the passage of time will continue to make it increasingly difficult to clarify this matter. The Germans

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**E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4**

**NEJ 94-338**

By mg, NARA, Date 9-27-94

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
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are undoubtedly aware that it is extremely unlikely that we will ever exercise this option and if we do not clear the matter up and are forced to reiterate at the time of the Erhard visit that we are keeping the option open, it may well cause increased doubts among Germans about U.S. frankness in dealing with them.

Once we have come to an understanding with the Federal Republic, the United States would be in the position to undertake serious negotiations with the Soviet Union in the conversations between Secretary Rusk and Gromyko. I recommend that those conversations be preceded by a letter from you to Chairman Kosygin. I have attached a draft of such letter.



William C. Foster

Attachments: Annex A Proposed Revised Articles Non-  
Proliferation Treaty  
Annex B Draft Letter, President to  
Chancellor Erhard  
Annex C Draft Letter, President to Chairman  
Kosygin

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

96-b

A

96-c

PROPOSED REVISED ARTICLES  
OF  
U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

ARTICLE I

Each of the nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives to any non-nuclear-weapon State, and not to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives. 1/

ARTICLE II

Each of the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty undertakes not to accept the transfer of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives, not to manufacture them, and not to acquire them in any other manner. 2/

---

1/ With one addition, this is the language which Mr. Fisher was authorized to give Roschchin as Fisher's personal suggestion. The addition is "other nuclear explosives" which is designed to deal with the "Plowshare" problem in a manner consistent with the U.S. position stated at the ENDC on August 9, 1966.

The Soviets may desire to preclude transfers to groups of states in Article I. They may also ask for a prohibition on transfers of control of nuclear weapons so as to preclude a majority vote to fire U.S. nuclear weapons in some multilateral consultative forum such as the McNamara Committee.

2/ This is essentially a mirror reflection of Article I.

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**E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4**

**NEJ 94-338**

By ing, NARA, Date 7-27-94

ARTICLE III

Each of the States Party to this Treaty undertakes not to do any of the things prohibited in the preceding articles directly; or indirectly to or through third States or groups of States or units of the armed forces or military personnel of any State, even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance. 3/

ARTICLE IV

Each of the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty undertakes to accept International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent international safeguards on all its peaceful nuclear activities. Each of the States Party to this Treaty further undertakes not to provide source or fissionable material, or specialized equipment, or non-nuclear material for the processing or use of source or fissionable material or for the production of fissionable material, to other States for peaceful purposes unless such material and equipment will be subject to such safeguards. 4/

---

3/ This is quite similar to language appearing in Articles I and II of the Soviet draft. Almost identical language now appears in subparagraph 4 of the same articles of the U. S. draft. The word "to" has been added so that transferring "indirectly" will clearly mean "to or through third States or groups of States or units of the armed forces or military personnel of any State....".

4/ With the omission of an unimportant hortatory sentence, this is the "safeguard" language discussed with our allies and described in general terms by Mr. Fisher at the ENDC on August 11, 1966. The U.K. asked us not to table the language at that particular time but did not object to an ENDC statement describing our position.

ARTICLE V

Any Party to the Treaty shall have the right to withdraw from the Treaty, upon six months notice, if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. Notice shall be given to all other signatory and acceding States and to the Security Council of the United Nations. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland in order to review the operation of the Treaty. 5/

ARTICLE VI

(This article covers signature, entry into force, etc. It would be the same as the present U.S. draft.)

---

5/ With one addition, this withdrawal language is the same as that suggested in Secretary Rusk's memorandum to the Members of the Committee of Principals of June 23, 1966. The addition is the sentence stating to whom notice of withdrawal should be given.

A possible variant of this clause which would have appeal to the FRG and some of the near-nuclear countries but probably not to the Soviets would be to give the treaty a specific five or ten year term.

96-d

B

D R A F T

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

9 <sup>96e</sup>

ANNEX B

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

One of the matters we shall both want to discuss during your visit here later this month is the status of the negotiations on a non-proliferation treaty. I believe it would be useful if, in preparation for our talks, I shared with you my current view of the situation.

As you know, in all consultations with our allies, in bilateral talks with the Soviets, as well as in public discussions at Geneva and elsewhere, we have adhered steadfastly to our understanding regarding the effect of a non-proliferation treaty on possible allied nuclear sharing arrangements and on an eventual European nuclear force. However, a number of recent developments suggest the need to review our approach to these options.

The stalemate reached in the negotiation of a treaty is viewed not only by our adversaries and most of the non-aligned, but also by our allies as caused primarily by our desire to hold open these options. This is obviously not an adequate assessment of the negotiating situation, but it is being exploited by the Soviet Union to place the onus on us for preventing agreement on a treaty.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-340  
By CL, NARA, Date 3-29-95

Although basic Soviet intentions toward a non-proliferation treaty remain somewhat ambiguous, our assessment is that the Soviets are prepared to conclude a treaty designed to deal with the world-wide danger of proliferation even though their main preoccupation continues to be with NATO arrangements, particularly as they affect the Federal Republic of Germany. Despite their concern over existing bilateral NATO nuclear arrangements and plans for strengthened consultation on nuclear matters, they probably have no real expectation of being able to force us to abandon those arrangements or efforts to improve consultation. We, therefore, believe they will tolerate them to the extent of concluding an otherwise acceptable treaty which does not affect them. Moreover, they know we cannot accept their draft treaty and it is our impression that they are prepared to consider a simplified and more general compromise text which would not require them explicitly to endorse allied nuclear arrangements in general.

Another development which must be taken into account is the fact that, with the passage of time and in the absence of any agreement on a NATO nuclear sharing arrangement, support has seriously declined for a "hardware" solution and

for any option permitting majority voting in a European nuclear entity short of some actual union into a federated European state. Those of our allies who have been directly involved in considering possible "hardware" solutions now oppose a European option of the kind held open in our present draft treaty, i.e., one permitting majority voting. In addition, we have the impression that the United Kingdom is now opposed to any "hardware" solution involving shared ownership of nuclear warheads.

These developments have made a strong impact on opinion in the United States. Our reading of Congressional sentiment in this country indicates that a large majority would strongly oppose any change in existing United States legislation to permit the sharing of ownership of our nuclear warheads or any dilution of the veto on their use. We see no prospect of an early change in this sentiment. On the contrary, a growing group of Senators has been urging intensified efforts to achieve an agreement with the Soviet Union on a non-proliferation treaty and believes that a compromise might be reached based on our existing legislation. A large body of public opinion in this country would support this view.

Apart from these considerations, our assessment of the danger of nuclear proliferation compels us to seek every realistic measure which could contain it. We continue to feel that a non-proliferation treaty would be perhaps the measure most readily negotiated at the present time and that it would be in our interest to achieve such a treaty promptly.

That is why I believe we must review this situation together on the occasion of your visit. We must discuss this matter with a view to maintaining the identity of views which we have achieved with you on these matters, and which we consider vital. I hope that our review would enable us to agree on a course of action that would redound to the benefit of both our countries and permit us seriously to test Soviet intentions with regard to the early conclusion of an acceptable non-proliferation treaty.

We have been considering possible ways to narrow the differences between us and the Soviet Union over such a treaty. After so much discussion and negotiation extending over several years, it is obvious that no ideal solution is to be found which would be effective in dealing with the threat of nuclear proliferation throughout the world without in any way affecting possible future allied arrangements.

But one thing is particularly important; we must avoid language which would enable the Soviet Union to interfere in any way with the conduct of normal defense arrangements or consultations within NATO. I have enclosed with this letter a possible revised draft of a non-proliferation treaty which we feel fully meets this test. I shall want to discuss it with you personally and I am anxious to receive your views and comments.

I am mindful of the difficulties which an effort on our part to achieve a compromise treaty with the Soviet Union could pose for you. I would fully appreciate your concern in this regard, the more so because we too are faced with a problem of Congressional attitudes. In these circumstances, however, it would seem advisable to reassess the difficulties we each confront in adhering to a course of action involving certain options which we no longer see our way clear to implementing.

As you will note, with the approach we have under consideration we would avoid the language in the Soviet draft treaty which appears to preclude all feasible options and which could also be used to call into question existing

NATO arrangements. The text which I have enclosed for your consideration does not by its terms preclude such options as we can realistically expect to implement in the foreseeable future, nor the option of a federated European state which should be held open for the distant future. It would, however, avoid language explicitly sanctioning them -- language which we know the Soviets will continue to oppose. We would expect to have to make clear to the Soviet Union that the enclosed text is based on existing United States legislation, from which it would also be clear to them that we do not intend to transfer ownership or control over our nuclear warheads. The Soviet Union would have to make its own assessment as to any allied arrangements we may wish to implement within this framework.

Mr. Chancellor, I believe you will agree with me that achieving such a treaty would be of value not only in dealing with the danger of nuclear spread, but that by improving the international climate and our relations with the Soviet Union it could also contribute to the eventual solution of problems of vital interest to our two countries. A renewal of the hopes and atmosphere generated by the Limited Test Ban Treaty would, I believe, open new possibilities for

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dealing with such problems. Given the wide political appeal of such a prospect, it would appear to me that you may wish to consider the possibility of taking some initiative which would give fresh impetus to the negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty and thereby bring credit to the Federal Republic for a major advance on the international scene.

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ANNEX C

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-340  
By CG, NARA, Date 3-29-95

Dear Mr. Chairman:

During the months that have passed since my last message to you, our representatives in Geneva have had many exchanges of views on the subject of a non-proliferation treaty. While, as you know, no agreement was reached, it is my impression that much progress was made in clarifying, first, the fact that we both regard this objective as urgent and important; and, second, that despite appearances to the contrary, the differences between us do not involve the essence of the matter, namely, non-transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states and non-manufacture of nuclear weapons by such states.

Indeed, after reviewing the discussions that took place in Geneva, I firmly believe that sufficient clarification of each side's position was achieved to warrant a decisive effort now to resolve the remaining differences.

I have given further thought to how we might resolve these differences in order to reach a final agreement. I am convinced that a compromise is possible, provided the Soviet Union understands that the United States does not

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- 2 -

intend to give up its defensive arrangements within NATO or in any way to restrict the legitimate right of consultation within the alliance, neither of which involves or will involve the transfer of nuclear weapons.

I have therefore instructed Secretary Rusk to discuss a possible compromise approach to a non-proliferation treaty with the Soviet Foreign Minister during the opening days of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. In these discussions we shall earnestly seek a meeting of minds on the essence of such a treaty. If both sides approach the discussions in this spirit, I am convinced that agreement is possible.

It is important that we achieve such a meeting of minds as soon as possible and that we agree on the fundamental elements of a treaty so that we may seek the acceptance of other governments while there is yet time to head off the emergence of additional nuclear-weapons states, with all the dangers such a development would pose for both our countries and for world peace.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Chairman  
Policy Planning Council  
Washington

2511-A

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July 22, 1966

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Walt:

Attached are:

1. The memo from ACDA to Bill Moyers of which I spoke to you this morning and which, it is evident from ACDA's covering note, is intended for transmission to the President.
2. An absolutely first-rate EUR comment on same, which I would hope you could send to the President at the same time as he gets the ACDA memo.
3. A Tab which will reach you later through other channels, and which quotes recent Presidential commitments to the FRG not to close out nuclear options.

<sup>mo</sup>  
Henry Owen

Mr. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-337  
By ijg, NARA, Date 1-12-95

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-338  
By inf, NARA, Date 9-27-94

ACHIEVEMENT OF A NON-PROLIFERATION AGREEMENT

I. Where We Are

Negotiations are at a standstill because we and the Soviets have tabled draft treaties with language explicitly protecting our divergent positions on NATO nuclear arrangements. The delay and growing uncertainty regarding a NATO solution to the nuclear question are enabling the Soviets to exploit a widely-held view that the only obstacle to agreement is the desire of the U.S. and FRG to protect an option for a NATO "hardware" solution.

Our negotiating position is further weakened by the fact that the US draft is encumbered with provisions which were specially designed to protect options for an MLF-type arrangement and for a remote, independent European nuclear force (before European federation is achieved) which cannot be achieved on the basis of present US-UK policy and are now opposed by all but the FRG among our major allies.

Unless we find a way out of this impasse, the Soviets will be in a position to secure a heavy endorsement of their approach at the coming UNGA and the non-aligned members of the ENDC may further complicate the situation by offering a draft treaty of their own which we could probably not accept.

II. What Is Required

Present indications are that the Soviets would tolerate existing NATO nuclear arrangements and a consultative mechanism such as envisaged for the Special Committee -- provided they are not asked to accept treaty language which would appear to endorse them.

If the Soviets are also prepared, as now seems likely,

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to act on what appears to be their own conviction that a NATO "hardware" solution is "dead", a way out of the present impasse may be found by a simplified US draft which clearly restrains proliferation but neither endorses nor precludes allied nuclear arrangements. This would be a fair compromise of the kind forecast in the President's press conference statement of July 5. If accepted by the Soviets, it would involve abandoning provisions in their draft which could be used to question existing as well as possible future NATO arrangements.

Before such a proposal could be put to the Soviets we would have to inform the FRG of the need to modify our existing draft to bring it into conformity with US (and UK) publicly-stated policy with respect to transfer of control and with US intentions with respect to the question of joint ownership.

There would have to be an understanding with the FRG that (a) the options which are in fact open involve no MLF-type "hardware" solution (since neither the US nor UK intends to share ownership of nuclear warheads) and (b) would limit a future European nuclear entity essentially to some form of federation which could succeed to the nuclear assets of its constituent members (since neither the US nor UK is prepared to transfer control over its weapons to non-federated European association capable of acting by majority voting). There would be no other limitation as regards the scope of consultation in a Special Committee or on bilateral or other possible forms of allied nuclear arrangements.

Although the FRG has undoubtedly correctly assessed US-UK intentions, it wants to continue to act as if other options were still open in order to retain leverage for promoting reunification. Since we do not share its view as to the utility of this form of leverage, we should move to bring our joint policies closer into line, and we should do this soon -- while there is still time to halt proliferation.

### III. Elements of a Possible Agreement

The main article of a draft treaty that could serve to open a serious negotiation with the USSR would contain a simple undertaking on the part of nuclear powers not to transfer nuclear weapons or control over them to any non-nuclear state or any group of states and not to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear state or any group of states to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.

The Soviets may insist on an explicit restriction against transferring or sharing ownership of nuclear warheads. Given present US-UK policy regarding acceptable nuclear sharing arrangements, we should be able to accept such a clause, if necessary to achieve an agreement.

The second article would set forth a parallel undertaking by the non-nuclear states not to seek such weapons or control over them and not to manufacture them.

If the Soviets also demand a provision against granting any "physical access" to nuclear weapons, we might consider such a limitation, provided it applied clearly to access that could involve dilution of our control over such weapons or enable non-nuclear states to acquire design data useful in the manufacture of such weapons. (An unqualified "physical access" prohibition could be construed to call into question certain features of existing bilateral arrangements.)

There appears to be no insurmountable obstacle to US-Soviet agreement on other desirable elements in a treaty.

William C. Foster  
July 20, 1966

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July 22, 1966

MEMORANDUM

TO: EUR - Mr. Stoessel  
FROM: RPM - Eugene V. McAuliffe  
SUBJECT: ACDA Memo of July 20 - Non-proliferation

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-337  
By lig, NARA, Date 1-12-95

ACDA's July 20 Memorandum to Mr. Moyers (attached) suggests that our draft non-proliferation treaty be changed to foreclose the European option and the possibility of the collective acquisition of nuclear warheads. This would mean that there could be no collective force that goes beyond joint ownership and control of delivery vehicles. It would also mean that so long as France and Great Britain survived as nation states they would by treaty be required to maintain national control, by means of a veto, over the collective defense efforts of the alliance in the nuclear field.

These steps are seen to be justified by 1) the fact that they are consistent with US and UK national policy, 2) the unlikelihood that the European option will ever be exercised and 3) the hope that these concessions would provide significant impetus to the search for a non-proliferation text acceptable to the Soviets and to ourselves.

In our view the significance of these options transcends the framework within which they are currently being addressed. Though these options are cast in terms of the future they have an important political impact here and now irrespective of the possibility that they may be exercised. The mere fact that they are open means that West Germany and the other non-nuclear European nations have a claim to equality with Britain and France which of itself permits an important measure of self respect. We feel that this sense of equality and self respect is particularly crucial if the Germans are to weather the present crises in Bonn and NATO and still responsibly play the greater role which has been thrust upon them by the withdrawal of France from NATO.

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Conversely, to outlaw these options would put these nations in a position of permanent political inferiority which in the FRG would have the immediate effect of undermining the Erhard Government and more importantly, eroding the confidence of all segments of German political life in the reliability of the US as a protector of FRG interests in dealing with the Soviets. Faced with the possibility that these options might be foreclosed and the concomitant internal and international consequences, the West Germans might find it necessary to hastily press their claims for equality in the substantive way, adding further to the stresses in the alliance and the tension in Europe.

At the same time it seems unlikely that these concessions will satisfy the Soviets, who have repeatedly talked in terms of nuclear arrangements in general and have not bothered with details such as the European clause or whether the warheads or delivery vehicles are jointly owned. Soviet Ambassador Roschin recently remarked in Geneva that even present NATO "arrangements" in which delivery vehicles are "shared" may have gone too far to permit a non-proliferation treaty. ACDA's memorandum to Mr. Moyers elliptically concedes that the Soviet view of "access" is designed to cover collective force arrangements irrespective of ownership arrangements. The Soviet position seems formulated with deliberate imprecision as regards collective forces, consultation and existing arrangements, and the Soviets have exploited this by implying that a non-proliferation treaty was just beyond the next western concession. Rather than fall in with this tactic it is our view that changes in the present US draft should endeavor to make clear that we are prepared to agree to a treaty that would prevent any more nuclear powers from coming into existence, be they states, groups, associations or entities. Such a provision might read as follows:

Each state party to this treaty undertakes to refrain from any action, direct or indirect, which would increase the total number of entities, including states or groups of states, having independent capacity to utilize nuclear weapons.

We believe that this all one can reasonably ask from a non-proliferation treaty and that such language would make it plain that it is the Soviet Union and not the West that has blocked progress toward non-proliferation by the introduction of extraneous issues.

TAB AI. Recent Correspondence Between the President and the  
Chancellor on Non-Proliferation Treaty

1. On February 25 the Chancellor said in a letter to the President:

"On examination of the changes proposed by your government doubts have, however, arisen whether the amendments envisaged would not in fact narrow down the present possibilities of the alliance to settle the nuclear question. Thus, the new wording in particular raises the question whether it is still beyond any doubt that the establishment of a European nuclear force, in which majority decisions on the use of the weapons could be taken, remains possible."

2. March 2, the President said in his reply:

"Let me say right off that the changes we have proposed do not alter the situation with respect to the nuclear sharing arrangements that would be permissible under our August draft. You raise specifically the implications for a possible European nuclear force which might acquire control of its own nuclear weapons. I assure you that this option would not be excluded for treaty signatories either by our August draft or by the recently proposed amendments to it, provided that the nuclear forces of an existing nuclear power (either the United Kingdom or France) were fully incorporated in such a European force: In such a circumstance decisions would not have to be subject to the veto of a nuclear power if that were the agreement of the parties."

3. On March 18, the Chancellor said in his reply:

"I am especially grateful to you for the understanding that you show for our concern in this matter. I was highly gratified to note the assurance given in your letter that the American draft treaty, even in its amended form, is not

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**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**

**NLI 94-340 appeal**

By is, NARA Date 12-17-99

intended to curtail the possibilities of establishing a joint NATO nuclear force or a future European development in this field."

## II. Meeting Between Secretary and Ambassador Knappstein

July 9, 1965 Ambassador Knappstein called on the Secretary to discuss non-proliferation and the MLF. In the context of MLF planning, the Secretary assured the Ambassador that "there was no US policy change." And on proliferation said, "The US had never, and does not now, accept the Soviet view that the MLF has anything to do with proliferation. We will not compromise with Soviet objections to MLF and abandon our efforts." He went on in the discussion to say, "However, if the Soviets insist on their views on MLF, a non-proliferation agreement is not a possibility..." assuring the Ambassador that the matter was firmly in the hands of the President and that the FRG had no cause for worry re the development of a non-proliferation agreement "at any price." (Deptel 90 to Bonn)

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July 13, 1966

MEMORANDUM TO: F. Bator  
S. Keeny  
C. Johnson

SUBJECT: July 8, 1966, Memorandum to the Committee of Principals,  
"Proposed Revisions of Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty,"  
signed by Adrian S. Fisher.

What about this? What are implications?

WWR

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993  
By 19, NARA, Date 4-25-94

*Enc: log # 2306*

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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Number 2 of 11 copies, Series A



UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

WASHINGTON RECEIVED  
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1965 JUL 21 PM 6 36

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MC GEORGE BUNDY  
The White House

SUBJECT: UK Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty

Embassy London telephoned us just before Noon today, and confirmed by its telegram 313, to give the UK response to our proposals for amending the UK draft non-proliferation treaty. That draft, as indicated in Deptel 298 to London July 17th, had in our view excessively restricted the possible development of an MLF/ANF with a European clause. We had suggested in Deptel 298 and 299 to London a formula which was closer to our 1963 draft declaration plus an undertaking not to increase the total number of states and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons. We also suggested a few other modifications, but on the other hand, accepted major parts of the original UK draft, e.g., the withdrawal clause.

Despite an initial favorable reaction from Lord Chalfont, we have now been told by Embassy London that he was over-ridden by other ministers on political grounds and that the UK will agree to no changes whatsoever in its draft. The British argue that our suggested changes would leave open options which the British would not be willing to imply they would accept in connection with an ANF. Therefore, the UK intends to have NAC consultation on its original draft already circulated in NATO and also to table promptly that draft treaty in the ENDC.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-338  
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There are only two hopeful aspects to this situation. (1) the Prime Minister has not been brought into these activities in the past days, and Chalfont is sending him a memo on this question through the Foreign Minister. (2) Lord Chalfont said that his government would be willing to consider tactics again in light of the NAC consultations on July 26th.

Embassy London has emphasized to Lord Chalfont the risks of a serious confrontation within NATO, as I did during my conversation with the British Ambassador on July 19th. The Embassy has also stressed to Lord Chalfont that, in light of the present situation, the UK should not assume that the formula we suggested as a possible modification of their text will continue to be part of the US negotiating position.

We now feel that we should delay no longer in informing the German Embassy here that the UK draft does not represent our views and that we tried and failed to have it amended to respond to a greater degree to German views. We would be forced at NAC next Monday to make clear our non-support for the UK draft, if it is not amended in the meantime. If the present UK intentions are carried out, it is obvious that we will have at least a serious and deep three-way division within NAC (it is hard to predict what advantage the French might attempt to take of the situation).

It should also be noted that we have no assurance the Germans would be satisfied with the formula we suggested to the British. While they might see it as an improvement over the British text, they will probably continue to oppose the tabling of any text at this time.

In the ENDC the Soviets would have a made-to-order situation to exploit, especially since we would have difficulty publicly explaining our non-support of the UK draft (HMG may be counting on just that).

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There is attached a draft message that might be sent from the Secretary of State to Foreign Minister Stewart. Or it might be used as the basis for a revised message from the President to the Prime Minister.

William C. Foster

Attachment:  
Draft message

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-338

By ijg, NARA, Date 9-27-94

DRAFT MESSAGE TO

BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER OR PRIME MINISTER

A situation seems to be rapidly evolving in relation to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons about which I feel a need to communicate with you in the frankest possible manner. First of all, you will agree, I am sure, that both of us and our governments are equally preoccupied with and committed to the attainment at the earliest possible date of a satisfactory treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. Our problems arise over questions of how best to reach that objective.

After the most careful consideration of the draft treaty your government presented for our consideration, your government was informed in London and in Washington on July 19th, of suggestions for amending the draft treaty to a

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modest extent that would permit the US to support a United Kingdom initiative at the ENDC, after adequate consideration by the North Atlantic Council and, hopefully, with a united allied front.

Our spokesmen attempted to make clear the United States understanding of your government's domestic situation and its commitment to some form of early action with regard to a non-proliferation treaty. At the same time, our spokesmen emphasized our equal desire to avoid any schism in NATO. In the latter regard, our suggestions took into account what we judged to be certain long range but serious pre-occupations of the Federal Republic of Germany.

I have just been informed today of the rejection by your government of all of our suggested changes in the draft treaty and of

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your governments intention promptly to table the draft at the ENDC, after NAC consultation apparently of only one day's duration. In the circumstances I foresee, as virtually certain, results clearly contrary to your interests and ours. Following the sharpest of disagreements within the North Atlantic Alliance, in which the UK draft treaty could not receive support from at least the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, other even more unfortunate developments would be bound to occur. There could be no successful negotiation of the treaty at the ENDC without the support of the United States or the willingness of the Federal Republic of Germany to sign it. This would present a heaven-sent opportunity to the Soviets both to exploit allied differences and to rebuff United Kingdom efforts as unacceptable in view of the

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provision that would still permit some form of nuclear sharing within NATO. Only you could judge the political gains or losses for your government. But such developments could clearly not be regarded as advantageous to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in terms of its elections only two months from now. In my own country there would inevitably arise further doubts about the effectiveness of the NATO alliance.

I therefore urge you to reconsider the proposals made by my government to yours on July 19th and also to table a draft treaty at the ENDC only after adequate consultation within NATO and the achievement there of at least a minimum of consensus.

Given all that is at stake with regard to our mutual basic interests, I would be deeply grateful for a reply, hopefully before July 26th, indicating that Her Majesty's Government is prepared to adopt a position that my government will be able to support.

~~SECRET~~