

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 cable	Smith to Rostow (CAP 81078) C 1 p [Duplicate of #79b] OPEN 6/21/95 NLJ 94-344	5/12/68	A
#3 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 67913) open 8-8-97 NLJ 94-344 appeal C 1 p SANITIZED 6/21/95 NLJ 94-344	10/30/67	A
#5 cable	Deptel 192372 to Bonn open 12-12-94 NLJ 94-342 C 2 p [Duplicate of #13, #17, and 17a]	6/27/68	A
#7 cable	Deptel 194050 to Moscow open 12-12-94 NLJ 94-342 S 7 p	6/30/68	A
#9 cable	Geneva 2266 " " " " " " S 3 p	1/15/68	A
#10 cable	Geneva 1995 S 2 p open 9-16-94 NLJ 94-343	12/7/67	A
#12 cable	Deptel to Bonn C 1 p open 12-12-94 NLJ 94-342	6/28/68	A
#13 cable	Duplicate of #5 " " " "		
#14 cable	Deptel 189649 to London open 9-16-94 NLJ 94-343 C 1 p	6/24/68	A
#15 cable	Deptel 111070 to London " " " " C 3 p	2/6/68	A
#17 cable	Duplicate of #5 open 12-12-94 NLJ 94-342		
#17a cable	Duplicate of #5 " " " "		
#17b cable	Duplicate of #5 " " " "		
#18 cable	Bonn 7559 " " " " C 3 p	1/24/68	A
#19 cable	Bonn 7559 (corrected copy) " " " " C 3 p	1/24/68	A
#21 cable	Tokyo 4030 " " " " C 2 p	12/15/67	A
#22 memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 1 p open 8-25-94 NLJ 94-345	11/27/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Subject File, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Vol. 2

Box 26

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#22a memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 14 p open 8-25-94 NLS 94-345	11/27/68	A
#23 memo	Duplicate of #22a open 11/30/01 NLS 94-345		
#31 cable	Deptel 185753 to All Diplomatic Posts C 3 p open 12-12-94 NLS 94-342	6/18/68	A
#32 cable	Deptel 192885 to Kingston C 1 p open 9-16-94 NLS 94-343	6/28/68	A
#35 memo	Fisher to President " C 2 p	12/12/68	A
#35a report	"Ninety-Day Transition Paper--The NPT" " C 9 p	12/10/68	A
#36 cable	Smith to President (CAP82813) OPEN 6/21/95 NLS 94-344 S 1 p (dup #2, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Murphy, Rostow" Box 5)	11/29/68	A
#36a memo	Rusk to President [Duplicate of #36]		
#40 memo	Read to Rostow C 1 p open 12-12-94 NLS 94-342	11/25/68	A
#42a memo	Fisher to President open 9-16-94 NLS 94-343 C 1 p [Duplicate of #56a, NSF, Memos to the President, W. Rostow, Vol. 99, Box 40]	10/10/68	A
#44 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p OPEN 6/21/95 NLS 94-344	10/9/68	A
#45 memo	Duplicate of #42a open 9-16-94 NLS 94-343		
#48 memo	Rostow to President, 6:40 p.m. C 1 p OPEN 6/21/95 NLS 94-344 [Duplicate of #25, NSF, Memos to the President, W. Rostow, Vol. 96, Box 40]	9/27/68	A
#50 memo	Rostow to President TS 2 p OPEN 6/21/95 NLS 94-344 [Duplicate of #1, NSF, Memos to President, W. Rostow, Vol. 92]	8/29/68	A

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#50a memo	Rusk to President → <i>open 12-12-94 NLS 94-342</i> TS 1 p [Duplicate of #1a, NSF, Memos to President, W. Rostow, Vol. 92]	8/27/68	A
#50c report	"Strategic Missile Talks Initial..." TS 7 p	8/24/68	A
#50e report	"Strategic Missile Talks Basic Position Paper" → <i>open 1-31-96 NLS 95-314</i> TS 14 p <i>sanitized 12-12-94 NLS 94-342</i> [Duplicate of #1e, NSF, Memos to President, W. Rostow, Vol. 92 and #20d, Files of Walt Rostow, "Strategic Missile Talks"; Sanitized 1989]	8/24/68	A
#51d memo	Foster to President S 1 p	8/10/67	A
#51e memo	Foster to President S 2 p → <i>open 9-16-94 NLS 94-343</i>	8/10/67	A
#51g report	"Text of Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation..." S 5 p	8/10/67	A
#51i report	"Enclosure B" C 1 p	undated	A
#51j cable	Geneva 480 S 6 p → <i>open 12-12-94 NLS 94-342</i>	8/10/67	A
#51k cable	Geneva 485 S 2 p → <i>open 9-16-94 NLS 94-343</i>	8/11/67	A
#52 memo	Lemnitzer to Rostow S 1 p OPEN 6/21/95 NLS 94-344	7/9/68	A
#52a report	"Comments on Kybal's Technical Considerations..." S 3 p OPEN 6/21/95 NLS 94-344	undated	A
#54a report	"After NPT, What?" S 9 p → <i>open 12-12-94 NLS 94-343</i>	5/28/68	A
#63a memo	Keeny to Brown S 5 p OPEN 6/21/95 NLS 94-344	7/1/68	A
#68 memo	Walsh to Rostow C 1 p [Duplicate of #70f]	6/28/68	A

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#69 memo	Read to Rostow S 1 p <i>open 12-12-94 NLJ 94-342</i>	6/29/68	A
#69a report	"Unofficial Translation" <i>11</i> S 8 p	undated	A
#70d cable	Moscow 4440 <i>open 12-12-94 NLJ 94-342</i> C 1 p [Duplicate of #31b, NSF, Memos to President, W. Rostow, Vol. 85, Box 37]	6/29/68	A
#70f memo	Duplicate of #68		
#71 memo	Read to Rostow <i>open 12-12-94 NLJ 94-342</i> C 2 p	6/28/68	A
#74a memo	Marks to President C 2 p <i>open 9-7-94 NLJ 94-346</i>	6/17/68	A
#75 report	"Technical Considerations on..." S- 54 p	undated	A
#78 memo	Rostow to President, 9:25 a.m. S 1 p <i>OPEN 6/21/95 NLJ 94-344</i> [Duplicate of #60, NSF, Memos to President, W. Rostow, Vol. 81]	6/9/68	A
#78a cable	Deptel 179496 to USUN <i>open 12-12-94 NLJ 94-342</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #60a, NSF, Memos to President, W. Rostow, Vol. 81]	6/9/68	A
#78b cable	Deptel 179495 to USUN <i>open 12-12-94 NLJ 94-342</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #60b, NSF, Memos to President, W. Rostow, Vol. 81]	6/9/68	A
#79b cable	Smith to Rostow (CAP 81078) <i>OPEN 6/21/95 NLJ 94-344</i> C 1 p [Duplicate of #2]	5/12/68	A
#80 memo	Rostow to President, 12:50 p.m. C 1 p <i>OPEN 6/21/95 NLJ 94-344</i> [Duplicate of #29, NSF, Memos to President, W. Rostow, Vol. 73, Box 33]	4/29/68	A
#81 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>OPEN 6/21/95 NLJ 94-344</i>	4/23/68	A
#81d cable	Deptel 76255 to Seoul S 6 p <i>open 12-12-94 NLJ 94-342</i>	10/31/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#82 cable	From General McConnell (JCS 04182) <i>exampl 12-12-95 NLJ 94-344</i> S 5 p exampl 10-6-95 NLJ 94-348	4/18/68	A
#84 memo	Keeny to Rostow TS 1 p OPEN 6/21/95 NJL 94-344	3/4/68	A
#85 draft	"Initial Presentation to Soviet Delegation" TS 5 p open 12-12-94 NLJ 94-342	undated	A
#86a cable	Bucharest 1145 C 2 p "	2/26/68	A
#90b memo	Rostow to President C 1 p OPEN 6/21/95 NJL 94-344	6/20/68	A
#91 memo	Rostow to President, 7:50 p.m. S 1 p OPEN 6/21/95 NJL 94-344 [Duplicate of #53, NSF, Memos to President, W. Rostow, Vol. 57]	1/19/68	A
#91a draft	Deptel to Moscow <i>open 12-12-94 NLJ 94-342</i> S 4 p [Duplicate of #53a, NSF, Memos to President, W. Rostow, Vol. 57]	1/18/68	A
#94 memo	Keeny to Rostow C 2 p OPEN 6/21/95 NJL 94-344	1/18/68	A
#98 memo	Weiler to Read S 1 p <i>open 9-16-94 NLJ 94-343</i>	1/17/68	A
#98a report	"Possible Presidential Statement on NPT" S 2 p "	1/18/68	A
#99 memo	Duplicate of #98		
#99a report	Duplicate of #98a		
#102 memo	Keeny to Rostow <i>OPEN 6/21/95 NLJ 94-344</i> S 1 p	12/20/67	A
#102a cable	US MISSION NATO 1010 S 5 p open 12-12-94 NLJ 94-342	12/13/67	A
#103a letter	Fisher to President S 3 p open 9-16-94 NLJ 94-343	12/5/67	A
#104 memo	Keeny to Rostow S 1 p	12/4/67	A

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NSF, Subject File, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Vol. 2

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#105a letter	Duplicate of #103a <i>open NLJ 94-343, 9/13/94</i>		
#107 memo	Rostow to President, 7 p.m. C 1 p <i>OPEN 6/21/95 NLJ 94-344</i> [Duplicate of #77, NSF, Memos to President, W. Rostow, Vol. 53]	12/1/67	A
#107b memo	Rusk to President <i>open 12-12-94 NLJ 94-342</i> C 1 p [Duplicate of #77a, NSF, Memos to President, W. Rostow, Vol. 53]	4/6/67	A
#107c memo	Foster to President <i>open 9-16-94 NLJ 94-343</i> C 3 p [Duplicate of #77c, NSF, Memos to President, W. Rostow, Vol. 53]	4/6/67	A
#107e letter	Ramey to Rostow C 2 p <i>open 10-6-95 NLJ 94-347</i> [Duplicate of #77b, NSF, Memos to President, W. Rostow, Vol. 53]	12/1/67	A
#107f memo	Duplicate of #107c <i>open 9/13/94 NLJ 94-343</i>		
#108 memo	Keeny to Rostow S 1 p <i>OPEN 6/21/95 NLJ 94-344</i>	11/30/67	A
#108a cable	Deptel 76022 to US Mission NATO S 2 p <i>open 12-12-94 NLJ 94-342</i>	11/29/67	A
#108b cable	Deptel 76628 to US Mission NATO S 2 p <i>open 9-16-94 NLJ 94-343</i>	11/29/67	A
#109 memo	Keeny to Rostow S 4 p <i>OPEN 6/21/94 NLJ 94-344</i>	11/14/67	A
#109a cable	Moscow 1775 S 3 p <i>open 12-12-94 NLJ 94-342</i>	11/13/67	A
#110 letter	Scoville to President S 4 p <i>open 9-16-94 NLJ 94-343</i>	11/14/67	A
#111 memo	Keeny to Rostow S 2 p <i>OPEN 6/21/95 NLJ 94-344</i>	11/9/67	A
#111a cable	Bonn 4957 S 3 p <i>open 12-12-94 NLJ 94-342</i>	11/8/67	A
#112a memo	Rostow to President S 2 p <i>OPEN 6/21/95 NLJ 94-344</i> [Duplicate of #87a, NSF, Memos to President, W. Rostow, Vol. 50]	11/7/67	A

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#112b cable	Bonn 4773 <i>open 12-12-94 NLJ 94-342</i> S 5 p [Duplicate of #87b, NSF, Memos to President, W. Rostow, Vol. 50]	11/2/67	A
#113b memo	Joyce to Under Secretary C 3 p <i>open 12-12-94 NLJ 94-342</i>	9/15/67	A
#113c report	Bio Sketch PCI 1 p <i>open 8-25-94 NY 94-345</i>	undated	A
#113d report	"Visit of Minister Stoltenberg--NPT" C 5 p <i>open 1-10-95 NLJ 94-342</i>	9/14/67	A
#114 memo	Rostow to President, 12:15 p.m. S 1 p <i>OPEN 6/21/95 NLJ 94-344</i> [Duplicate of #69, NSF, Memos to President, W. Rostow, Vol. 40]	9/5/67	A
#114a memo	Fisher to Secretary <i>open 9-16-94 NLJ 94-343</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #69a, NSF, Memos to President, W. Rostow, Vol. 40]	9/5/67	A
#115 memo	Duplicate of #114a <i>open 9-16-94 NLJ 94-343</i>		
#119 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p <i>OPEN 6/21/95 NLJ 94-344</i>	8/10/67	A
#120b memo	Camps to Owen C 1 p <i>open 12-12-94 NLJ 94-342</i>	6/21/67	A
#120c memo	"The Relationship between further Integration in..." " C 12 p	6/21/67	A
#121 memo	From Brzezinski S 16 p <i>open 12-12-94 NLJ 94-342</i>	6/29/67	A

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CAP

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Received Washington CommCen
3:03 P.M. EDST Sunday 12 May 68

Received LBJ Ranch CommCen
2:45 P.M. CDST Sunday 12 May 68

NPT

EEA435
OO WTE10
DE WTE 1865

FROM BROMLEY SMITH
TO WALT ROSTOW
CITE CAP81078

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-344
By cb, NARA, Date 6-1-95

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

THIS IS A REVIEW OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION DEBATE IN THE UN WHICH SICSO DID FOR SECRETARY RUSK.

AFTER 29 SPEAKERS IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE DEBATE ON THE DRAFT NPT, THE VARIOUS POSITIONS ARE BEGINNING TO FALL INTO CATEGORIES.

1. A MAJORITY (ABOUT 20 COUNTRIES) SUPPORT THE PRESENT DRAFT TREATY AND GENERAL ASSMEBLY ENDORSEMENT AT THIS SESSION.
2. A SMALLER, BUT INFLUENTIAL, GROUP INCLUDING SWEDEN, ITALY, JAPAN AND BRAZIL HAVE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF AGREEING ON AN NPT NOW, BUT SUGGEST A NUMBER OF IMPORVEMENTS.
3. SOME AFRICIAN STATES DO NOT BELIEVE THE NPT HAS TO BE ACTED ON AT THIS SESSION.

WE CAN, ON BALANCE, HAVE CAUSE FOR SATISFACTION WITH THE COURSE OF EVENTS.

THE RESOLUTION ENDORSING THE NPT NOW HAS 26 CO-SPONSORS. OPPOSITION TO THE TREATY REMAINS SOMEWHAT IN DISARRAY. THERE SEEMS TO BE A COMMON ASSESSMENT IN THE CORRIDORS THAT WE HAVE 80-100 VOTES FOR THE ENDORSING RESOLUTION.

OUR OBJECTIVE FOR THE BALANCE OF THE SESSION WILL BE TO ENSURE THAT THE VARIOUS GROUPS OF COUNTRIES OBJECTING TO THE NPT GAIN NO HEADWAY. IF POSSIBLE, OF COURSE, WE WANT TO BRING THEM ALL ALONG.

THE MOST TROUBLING RECENT DEVELOPMENT HAS BEEN OUR INABILITY TO GAIN VOCAL LATIN AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE TREATY, EVEN THOUGH MANY OF THEM HAVE ASSURED US PRIVATELY THEY WOULD VOTE FOR IT. MEXICO HAS NOW SOUGHT LATIN AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR A GROUP OF AMENDMENTS TO THE TREATY. IN A CONVERSATION MAY 10, GARCIA ROBLES ASSURED AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG THAT HIS INTENTION IS NOT TO SUBMIT FORMAL AMENDMENTS BUT ONLY TO HELP US TOWARD A BROADLY SUPPORTED ENDORSEMENT AT THIS SESSION.

SEE IF WE COULD DO SOMETHING W/ THEM. TALK TO CANJICO FLORES GET ALL LATIN AMERICANS

WE HAVE OPPOSED ANY AMENDMENTS, FEELING THAT THIS WOULD OPEN THE GATES TO A MULTITUDE OF SUGGESTIONS AND ENDLESS NEGOTIATIONS. BECAUSE OF THIS, WE ARE SEEKING TO SHORT-CIRCUIT THE MEXICAN EFFORT. NEVERTHELESS, THE MEXICAN INITIATIVE SEEMS TO HAVE STIMULATED OTHERS, SUCH AS GHANA, TO TAKE UP THEIR DRAFTING PENCILS.

THE NEXT WEEK, THEREFORE, MAY CONFRONT US WITH A WAVE OF NEW PROPOSALS.

DTG: 121903Z MAY 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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OO WTE10
DE WTE 2330

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Received Washington CommCenter
11:07 A.M. Monday 30 Oct 1967

NPT

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP67913

Received LBJ Ranch CommCenter
12:20 P.M. Monday 30 Oct 1967

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OCTOBER 30, 1967

FOLLOWING MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION MAY INTEREST YOU. YOU MAY WISH TO KEEP IN THE BACK OF YOUR MIND THE IDEA IN PARAGRAPH 2. I GATHER FROM CASPER THAT KIESINGER IS QUITE RELAXED ABOUT THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AT THE PRESENT TIME.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 94-344 appeal
By iss, NARA Date 6-30-97

QUOTE

MR. AND MRS. WALTHER CASPER CAME TO LUNCH AT MY HOUSE ON SUNDAY, OCTOBER 29. THERE WAS SOME OPPORTUNITY FOR PRIVATE CONVERSATION BETWEEN HIM AND ME AS FOLLOWS.

1. HE SAID THAT , BEFORE HE HAD COME TO THE U.S. FOR A SHORT VISIT TO SEE EXPO 67 AND CONDUCT PRIVATE BUSINESS, HE HAD DINED WITH CHANCELLOR KIESINGER. THE CHANCELLOR TOOK THE OCCASION TO SEND, THROUGH ME, HIS WARMEST GREETINGS TO THE PRESIDENT. HE TOLD CASPER THAT HE NOW FELT THAT HE HAD A DEEP UNDERSTANDING WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON WHOM HE REGARDED AS HIS FRIEND.
2. THINKING OF THE PRESIDENT'S POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN THE MONTHS AHEAD, HE ASKED CASPER TO CONVEY THE FOLLOWING: KIESINGER WOULD BE GLAD TO ORGANIZE A HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN EUROPE IN THE MONTHS AHEAD, PERHAPS ON THE OCCASION OF THE COMPLETION OF WORK ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. SUBJECT, OF COURSE, TO THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW, HE, KIESINGER, JUDGED THAT A MEETING IN EUROPE ON THE OCCASION OF A CONSTRUCTIVE, PEACEFUL ACHIEVEMENT, WOULD BE HELPFUL TO THE PRESIDENT. CASPER ADDED IT MIGHT BE NICE IF, AFTER SUCH A MEETING, THE PRESIDENT WERE TO SPEND A WEEK END WITH KIESINGER AT HIS COUNTRY PLACE IN TUEBINGEN WHERE THE CHANCELLOR FINDS REFRESHMENT MUCH AS THE PRESIDENT DOES AT THE RANCH.
3. CASPER SAYS THAT KIESINGER IS NOW DETERMINED TO SUPPORT BRITISH ENTRY INTO THE COMMON MARKET. IN THIS HE HAS THE SUPPORT OF HIS WHOLE CABINET OF BOTH PARTIES. IN ADDITION, HE HAS THE SUPPORT OF BOTH RAINER BARZEL AND HELMUT SCHMIDT, THE LEADERS OF THE TWO MAJOR PARTIES IN THE PARLIAMENT. HE IS AWARE THAT THE FRENCH ARE GOING TO SLOW DOWN THE OPERATION AND NEGOTIATE VERY HARD. SINCE THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SIX CANNOT "INVADE FRANCE" ON THIS ISSUE, IT WILL, IN KIESINGER'S VIEW, TAKE PERHAPS TWO YEARS OF HARD, TOUGH BARGAINING WITH THE FRENCH. THE OTHERS, INCLUDING THE U.K., MUST GENERATE THE STUBBORNNESS TO SEE IT THROUGH ON THOSE TERMS.
4. KARL CARSTENS IS NOW TO BE MADE THE HEAD OF THE OFFICE OF THE CHANCELLORY -- A POST OF GREAT INFLUENCE. THIS MEANS THAT THE ADVICE COMING DIRECTLY TO THE CHANCELLOR WILL BE PRO-NATO AND PRO-U.S. THE CHANCELLOR HAS NO ILLUSIONS, ACCORDING TO CASPER, ABOUT DE GAULLE.
5. IN GENERAL HE SAID THAT IN HIS DEALINGS WITH THE U.S. THE CHANCELLOR WOULD NOT COME ASKING FOR CONSTANT REASSURANCES ABOUT BERLIN OR EARLY REUNIFICATION. HE WOULD LIKE TO DEAL WITH THE U.S. AS A PARTNER, DISCUSSING WITH THE PRESIDENT WORLD PROBLEMS AND WORLD PERSPECTIVES. KIESINGER UNDERSTANDS THAT THE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY CAN ONLY TAKE PLACE ON THE BASIS OF A TOTAL CHANGE IN THE WORLD SITUATION. HE IS GROPING FOR A WAY TO BE ABLE TO TALK INFORMALLY WITH THE PRESIDENT AT REGULAR INTERVALS.

END QUOTE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NATO



Department of State

Ed. 5
TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 386

46
Orig under
Bonn
Cey also in London

PAGE 01 STATE 192372

89
ORIGIN EUR 20

INFO IO 13, SSO 00, USIE 00, NSCE 00, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07,
L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, ACDA 16, SCI 05,
OST 01, NEA 13, EA 10, /131 R

DRAFTED BY: EUR/GER:EDCROWLEY
APPROVED BY: EUR:MR. SPRINGSTEEN
EUR/GER:MR. JOHN POLL
ACDA:MR. FISHER (DRAFT)
EUR/RPM:MR. BLUMBERG
L:MR. BELMAN
EUR/AIS:MR. DOZIER
EUR/BMI:MR. CHESLAW
M:MR. RIEMER
S/S:MR. WALSH
WHITE HOUSE:MR. FRIED
G/PM:J. SHAW

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-342
By ug, NARA, Date 12-6-94

O R 272327Z JUN 68 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
✓ USMISSION NATO
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
USMISSION GENEVA
XMT AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION NATO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 192372

SUBJ: REAFFIRMATION OF NATO AT TIME OF NPT SIGNING

1. IN RESPONSE TO DESIRE OF FRG FOR REAFFIRMATION OF NATO COMMITMENT AT SIGNING OF TREATY, THE PRESIDENT WILL INCLUDE LANGUAGE ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES IN HIS STATEMENT DURING THE SIGNING CEREMONY: GTE IN WELCOMING THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, I WISH TO REAFFIRM THAT THE UNITED STATES REMAINS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE 02 STATE T92372

FULLY COMMITTED TO FULFILLING ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER EXISTING TREATIES OF MUTUAL SECURITY. SUCH ARRANGEMENTS HAVE PROVIDED A SIGNIFICANT MEASURE OF SECURITY FOR THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER PARTIES TO THESE TREATIES. THEY HAVE CREATED A DEGREE OF STABILITY IN AN OTHERWISE UNSTABLE WORLD. UNQTE

2. WE BELIEVE IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FOR THE UK TO MAKE A STATEMENT AT THE LONDON SIGNING ALONG SIMILAR LINES AT THE TIME OF SIGNATURE.

3. WE ALSO BELIEVE IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR OTHER NATO MEMBERS SO DESIRING, AT THE TIME OF SIGNATURE, TO MAKE STATEMENTS SIMILAR TO THOSE OF THE US AND THE UK, WITH PERHAPS MORE SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY THAN WE, WITH OUR WORLD-WIDE SYSTEM OF ALLIANCE.

4. AS ADDRESSEES AWARE, TREATY IS OPEN FOR SIGNATURE JULY 1. ATTENTION SHOULD ALSO BE CALLED TO SECRETARY'S REMARKS ON NPT IN HIS STATEMENT AT REYKJAVIK (SECTO 13, REYKJAVIK'S 543). NEED FOR URGENT ACTION UNDERLINED BY FACT US WILL SIGN JULY 1.

FOR LONDON. EMBASSY SHOULD RAISE THE ABOVE ON AN URGENT BASIS WITH UKG AND SEEK UK AGREEMENT TO MAKING STATEMENT PARALLEL TO US STATEMENT AT NPT SIGNING.

FOR USMISSION NATO. USNATO SHOULD INFORM NAC REPRESENTATIVES OF POINTS IN PARAGRAPHS 1 - 4 ABOVE.

FOR BONN. EMBASSY SHOULD CONVEY THE ABOVE TO THE FRG ON AN URGENT BASIS. (SECRETARY INFORMED BRANDT OF OUR INTENTIONS IN REYKJAVIK). BELIEVE IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR FRG, IF IT WISHES, TO APPROACH OTHER NATO GOVERNMENTS. IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT THEY SPEAK WITH ITALIANS. RUSK

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By mg, NARA, Date 12-6-94

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DRAFTED BY: S/S:JPMWALSH
APPROVED BY: S/S-MR. WALSH



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INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF SOVIET DOCUMENT HANDED BOHLEN YESTERDAY
FOLLOWS:

MEMORANDUM OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USSR ON SEVERAL URGENT
MEASURES WITH REGARD TO CURBING THE ARMS RACE AND ON DISARMAMENT.

FROM THE VERY FIRST DAYS OF ITS EXISTENCE THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT
HAS PUT FORWARD AS A BASIS OF ITS FOREIGN POLICY LINE THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST THE IMPERIALIST POLICY OF AGGRESSION AND WARS AND HAS
STOOD FOR THE SAFEGUARDING OF PEACE AMONG PEOPLE. FOLLOWING THE
COURSE POINTED OUT BY V. I. LENIN, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT
PERSISTENTLY AND CONSISTENTLY HAS STOOD FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
A BROAD PROGRAM OF MEASURES IN THE AREA OF CURBING THE ARMS RACE
AND OF DISARMAMENT AND FOR PUTTING INTO EFFECT A PLAN FOR GENERAL
AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT.

THE ACTIVE STRUGGLE OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, OF ALL PEACE LOVING
STATES HAS PERMITTED THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A NUMBER OF PRACTICAL
STEPS DIRECTED TOWARD THE LIMITATION OF THE RACE OF NUCLEAR ARMS
AND TOWARD DISARMAMENT. AFTER THE MOSCOW TREATY ON BANNING
NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE AND OUTER SPACE AND UNDER
WATER THERE FOLLOWED THE TREATY ON PRINCIPLES OF ACTIVITY OF
STATES IN OUTER SPACE, BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE COSMOS.
NOW THERE HAS BEEN WORKED OUT AND READY FOR SIGNATURE A TREATY ON

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NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH HAS GREAT SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE COURSE OF STRENGTHENING PEACE AND WHICH CREATES FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR THE FURTHER STRUGGLE FOR CURBING THE ARMS RACE, FOR IMPLEMENTING EFFECTIVE MEASURES IN THE PROHIBITION AND DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE INTEREST OF INSURING PEACE DEMANDS FURTHER STEPS DIRECTED TOWARD THE CURBING OF THE ARMS RACE AND TOWARD DISARMAMENT. THIS IS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT SINCE AS A RESULT OF THE ACTIVATION OF AGGRESSIVE FORCES, TENSION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HAS INCREASED, THE AGGRESSIVE WAR OF AMERICA IN VIETNAM IS EXPANDING, THE OCCUPATION BY ISRAEL OF THE TERRITORY OF A NUMBER OF ARAB STATES SEIZED BY FORCE CONTINUES.

FOLLOWING THE CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY ON NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT PROPOSES THAT AGREEMENT BE REACHED ON BRINGING INTO FORCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE FOLLOWING URGENT MEASURES ON TERMINATION OF THE ARMS RACE AND ON DISARMAMENT.

1. PROHIBITION OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

FROM THE TIME THE NUCLEAR WEAPON CAME INTO BEING, THE SOVIET UNION HAS CONSISTENTLY STOOD FOR THE PROHIBITION AND COMPLETE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION. AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD RESOLUTION OF THIS TASK, TOWARD ELIMINATION OF THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR WOULD BE THE CONCLUSION OF AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON BANNING THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE A SERIOUS RESTRAINING FACTOR FOR ALL THOSE WHO MIGHT CONTEMPLATE UNLEASHING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN THE PRESENCE OF SUSPICIONS BY SOME STATES OF THE INTENTIONS OF OTHER STATES TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THIS AGREEMENT WOULD FACILITATE IMPROVEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE.

IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE EARLIEST RESOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USSR HAS INTRODUCED AT THE 22ND SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY A DRAFT CONVENTION ON PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. A SIGNIFICANT MAJORITY OF DELEGATIONS TO THE ASSEMBLY SUPPORTED THE IDEA OF THE NECESSITY OF CONCLUDING SUCH AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION. THE ASSEMBLY CALLED UPON ALL STATES TO STUDY THE DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROPOSED BY THE

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SOVIET UNION, AS WELL AS OTHER PROPOSALS WHICH MIGHT BE MADE ON THIS QUESTION AND TO CARRY ON DISCUSSIONS IN THE 18 NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT OR DIRECTLY AMONG STATES CONCERNING THE CONCLUSION OF AN APPROPRIATE CONVENTION THROUGH CALLING AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE.

FOR THE PURPOSE OF A PRACTICAL RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF BANNING THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT PROPOSES THAT THE 18 NATION COMMITTEE DISCUSS AS A MATTER OF FIRST PRIORITY THE DRAFT CONVENTION ON BANNING THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THE CALLING OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR SIGNATURE OF THE CORRESPONDING CONVENTION.

2. MEASURES TO END THE PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, REDUCTION AND LIQUIDATION OF STOCKPILES.

IN AN EFFORT TO RELIEVE MANKIND OF THIS DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT PROPOSES TO ALL NUCLEAR POWERS THAT THEY IMMEDIATELY ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TERMINATION OF PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, REDUCTION OF STOCKPILES AND EVENTUALLY A COMPLETE BAN AND LIQUIDATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DECLARES ITS READINESS TO BEGIN AT ANY TIME SUCH NEGOTIATIONS WITH ALL OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS. IN THIS, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT PROCEEDS FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT IN THE COURSE OF SUCH NEGOTIATIONS AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED ON A WHOLE COMPLEX OF MEASURES LEADING TO THE DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS WELL AS ON SEVERAL DIRECTED TOWARD THIS AIM.

3. LIMITATION AND SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION OF MEANS OF DELIVERY OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT PROPOSES AGREEMENT ON CONCRETE STEPS IN THE AREA OF LIMITATION AND SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC MEANS OF DELIVERY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN THIS PROCEEDS FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT DESTRUCTION OF THE WHOLE ARSENAL OF STRATEGIC MEANS OF DELIVERY AND, IN ANY CASE, THE REDUCTION OF THIS ARSENAL TO AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM, WITH THE RETENTION, AND THIS ONLY TEMPORARILY, OF ONLY A STRICTLY LIMITED QUANTITY OF SUCH MEANS, WOULD BE A MEASURE CONDUCIVE TO ELIMINATION OF THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR.

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THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DECLARES ITS READINESS TO CONDUCT AN EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS WITH INTERESTED STATES ON MUTUAL LIMITATIONS AND SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC MEANS OF DELIVERY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

4. PROHIBITION OF FLIGHTS OF BOMBERS WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BOARD BEYOND NATIONAL BOUNDARIES.

LIMITATION ON OPERATING AREAS FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS SEVERAL TIMES CALLED ATTENTION OF GOVERNMENTS OF OTHER STATES AND WORLD PUBLIC OPINIONS TO THE DANGER WHICH IS REPRESENTED BY FLIGHTS OF BOMBERS WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BOARD BEYOND NATIONAL BOUNDARIES. THE CATASTROPHES WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE INVOLVING AMERICAN BOMBERS WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BOARD BEYOND THE NATIONAL BOUNDARIES OF THE USA HAVE GIVEN RISE TO LEGITIMATE ALARM ON THE PART OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES. THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT A ROUTINE CATASTROPHE INVOLVING A BOMBER ARMED WITH NUCLEAR BOMBS WOULD NOT CAUSE A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION WITH ALL THE CONSEQUENCES THAT WOULD FLOW FROM THIS. IN THE PRESENT TENSE SITUATION SUCH AN EXPLOSION COULD IGNITE A WHOLE CHAIN OF SERIOUS DEVELOPMENTS, COULD LEAD TO A CONFLICT, DANGER FOR ALL MANKIND. FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, THESE FLIGHTS OF BOMBERS MAKE NO SENSE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EXISTENCE OF NUCLEAR MISSILES. THEY CAN HAVE ONLY ONE PURPOSE: TO INCREASE INTERNATIONAL TENSION, WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A DANGEROUS PRACTICE.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT PROPOSES AN IMMEDIATE BAN ON FLIGHTS BEYOND NATIONAL COUNDARIES OF BOMBERS WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BOARD. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ALSO PROPOSES, FOR THE PURPOSE OF LESSENING THE DANGER OF THE OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR, THAT AGREEMENT BE REACHED ON ENDING PATROLS BY BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES ARMED WITH NUCLEAR MISSILES WITHIN THE LIMITS OF RANGE OF THESE MISSILES FROM THE BORDERS OF CONTRACTING PARTIES.

5. PROHIBITION OF UNDERGROUND TESTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN AND REMAINS A FIRM SUPPORTER OF THE PROHIBITION OF ALL TESTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND CONSIDERS A

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PROHIBITION OF ALL TESTS WOULD SERVE THE INTERESTS OF STRENGTHENING PEACE AND WEAKENING THE ARMS RACE. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS READY WITHOUT DELAY TO AGREE ON A PROHIBITION OF UNDERGROUND TESTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE BASIS OF THE USE OF NATIONAL MEANS OF DETECTION FOR VERIFICATION OF SUCH A PROHIBITION.

6. PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS REPEATEDLY DRAWN THE ATTENTION OF NATIONS TO THE THREAT THAT THE USE OF CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS REPRESENTS TO MANKIND. REFLECTING THE GENERAL CONCERN OF PEOPLES IN CONNECTION WITH THIS THREAT, THE XXI SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ADOPTED A RESOLUTION WHICH CONTAINS A SUMMONS TO STRICT OBSERVANCE BY ALL NATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE GENEVA PROTOCOL OF 1925 ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, CONDEMNS ALL ACTIONS CONTRADICTORY OF THIS PURPOSE, AND PROPOSES TO ALL NATIONS ACCESSION TO THE GENEVA PROTOCOL.

HOWEVER, SOME NATIONS, AND FIRST OF ALL THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DO NOT FULFILL THIS IMPORTANT DECISION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. MOREOVER THE USA USES CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN ITS AGGRESSIVE WAR IN VIETNAM. IN VIEW OF THIS, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT PROPOSES THAT THE ENDC REVIEW THE PATHS AND MEANS OF ENSURING THE FULFILLMENT BY ALL NATIONS OF THE GENEVA PROTOCOL ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.

7. THE ELIMINATION OF FOREIGN MILITARY BASES

FOREIGN MILITARY BASES ON OTHERS' TERRITORIES CONSTITUTE A SERIOUS DANGER TO PEACE. SUCH BASES SERVE AS SOURCES FOR THE OUTBREAK OF MILITARY CONFLICTS, AND THREATEN THE FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE OF PEOPLES. THE CONTINUING UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AGGRESSIVE WAR IN VIETNAM AS WELL AS TENSION AND CONFLICTS IN OTHER REGIONS OF THE WORLD WHERE FOREIGN BASES ARE LOCATED CONVINCINGLY TESTIFY TO THIS.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT PROPOSES, IN CONFORMITY WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS OF XXI SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, PROMPTLY TO EXAMINE IN THE ENDC THE QUESTION OF THE ELIMINATION

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OF FOREIGN MILITARY BASES.

8. REGIONAL DISARMAMENT MEASURES

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS THE CREATION OF NUCLEAR FREE ZONES IN VARIOUS REGIONS OF THE WORLD. IN THIS IT PROCEEDS FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE FORMATION OF SUCH ZONES MUST EFFECTIVELY LIMIT THE SPHERE OF DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND IN FULL MEASURE BE RESPONSIVE TO THE TASK OF PREVENTING THEIR DIRECT OR INDIRECT PROLIFERATION.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THAT OBLIGATIONS IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR FREE ZONES MAY BE UNDERTAKEN NOT ONLY BY GROUPS OF STATES ENCOMPASSING ENTIRE CONTINENTS OR LARGE GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS BUT ALSO BY MORE LIMITED GROUPS OF STATES OR EVEN INDIVIDUAL NATIONS.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT SIMILARLY SUPPORTS PROPOSALS FOR THE REALIZATION OF MEASURES OF REGIONAL DISARMAMENT AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENT IN VARIOUS REGIONS OF THE WORLD, INCLUDING THE NEAR EAST. THE QUESTION OF SUCH MEASURES FOR LIMITATION OF THE ARMS RACE IN THE NEAR EAST COULD BE EXAMINED, NATURALLY, ONLY ON CONDITION OF THE ELIMINATION OF THE AFTERMATH OF THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION AGAINST THE ARAB STATES, AND FIRST OF ALL, THE FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI TROOPS FROM THE TERRITORY OF ARAB NATIONS OCCUPIED BY THEM.

9. THE PEACEFUL USE OF THE BED OF SEAS AND OCEANS

THE INTERESTS OF REDUCING THE ARMS RACE ARE SERVED BY LIMITING MILITARY USE OF THOSE ENVIRONMENTS IN WHICH MAN LIVES AND FUNCTIONS, AND BY PREVENTING SUCH USE OF NEW ENVIRONMENTS OF HUMAN ACTIVITY. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS CONSISTENTLY EXERTED AND EXERTS EFFORTS TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THESE GOALS AND STATES WITH SATISFACTION THAT IMPORTANT PRACTICAL STEPS IN THIS DIRECTION ARE THE APPROPRIATE LIMITATIONS FIXED BY THE ANTARCTIC AGREEMENT AND THE AGREEMENT ON THE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITY OF STATES IN THE EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE INCLUDING THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES. THE COURSE OF EXPLORATION AND THE PROSPECTS FOR MASTERING THE BED OF SEAS AND OCEANS PERMIT THE QUESTION TO BE RAISED OF A TIMELY ESTABLISHMENT IN APPROPRIATE FORM OF A REGIME WHICH WOULD ENSURE THE USE OF THE

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SEA BOTTOM BEYOND THE LIMITS OF EXISTING TERRITORIAL WATERS SOLELY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. THE SAME WOULD PROHIBIT, IN PARTICULAR, THE CREATION OF STATIONARY INSTALLATIONS OF MILITARY DESIGNATION ON THE SEA BOTTOM, AS WELL AS OTHER ACTIVITIES OF A MILITARY CHARACTER. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT PROPOSES TO BEGIN IN THE ENDC TALKS ON THE QUESTION OF THE USE OF THE SEA BOTTOM BEYOND THE LIMITS OF EXISTING TERRITORIAL WATERS SOLELY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES.

IN PROPOSING THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MEASURES, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DIRECTS ATTENTION TO THE NEED FOR MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO ACHIEVE CONCRETE RESULTS IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DEEMS IT NECESSARY TO ACTIVATE NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS QUESTION IN THE 13 NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT. MEANWHILE, IT STANDS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECISION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON CALLING A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE AND EXPRESSES ITS CONVICTION THAT THE CALLING OF SUCH A CONFERENCE WOULD FACILITATE A RESOLUTION OF THIS MOST IMPORTANT TASK CONFRONTING MANKIND.

GUIDED BY ITS LINE OF PRINCIPLE IN QUESTIONS OF THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE, THE SOVIET UNION IN COOPERATION WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, WITH ALL PEACE LOVING STATES WILL PRESS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR, FOR THE LEASHING OF FORCES OF AGGRESSION, FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A BROAD PROGRAM OF DISARMAMENT. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT APPEALS TO ALL STATES TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF AGREEMENT ON THE URGENT STEPS OF TERMINATING THE ARMS RACE AND ON DISARMAMENT. RUSK

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By ijg, NARA, Date 12-6-94

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SUBJECT: CO-CHAIRMEN'S MEETING, JANUARY 15

RE: NPT SAFEGUARDS ARTICLE AND OTHER AMENDMENTS

1. ROSHCHIN ASKED WHETHER US DEC 9 STATEMENT THAT AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS ARTICLE LIES THROUGH NOV 2 FORMULATION, MEANS THAT US WOULD BE WILLING ENVISAGE NEW FORMULATION FOR FIRST SENTENCE. FISHER STATED THAT NOV 2 WAS BEST FORMULATION US COULD OFFER AND WE ARE NOT MAKING ANY OTHER SUGGESTIONS.

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2. ROSHCHIN EXPLAINED THAT SOVS WERE APPREHENSIVE THAT NOV 2 FIRST SENTENCE COULD BE INTERPRETED IN DIFFERENT WAYS. USSR WOULD LIKE MORE ASSURANCE THAT THIS SENTENCE WILL LEAD TO ESTABLISHMENT OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS. FISHER READ NOV 2 FORMULATION AND PRINCIPLES WHICH US INTENDED STATE AT ENDC,

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STRESSING THAT SAFEGUARDS SHOULD BE OF NATURE THAT ALL COULD HAVE EQUAL CONFIDENCE IN THEM AND THAT, TO AVOID UNNECESSARY DUPLICATION, USE SHOULD BE MADE OF EXISTING RECORDS, WITH THE PROVISIO THAT IAEA COULD SATISFY ITSELF THAT MATERIALS NOT BEING DIVERTED.

3. ROSHCHIN THEN INQUIRED IF COMPLETE TREATY COULD BE PRESENTED WITH SAFEGUARDS ARTICLE OF NOV 2. FISHER RESPONDED THAT US STANDS BY NOV 2 DRAFT TOGETHER WITH INTERPRETATIONS IT INTENDS TO STATE IN ENDC.

4. ROSHCHIN STATED SOVS WOULD LIKE TO RECEIVE MORE DEFINITE INTERPRETATION OF ART III FROM US. HE THEN READ SENTENCE FROM NOV 2 TALKING POINTS WHICH FISHER HAS USED IN PRESENTING NOV 2 US REDRAFT OF ART III TO SOVS. (COPY OF TALKING POINTS WERE INFORMALLY GIVEN TO SOVS ON NOV 2 TO FACILITATE THEIR REPORTING.) SENTENCE READS: "OF COURSE SAFEGUARDS ESTABLISHED BY AN AGREEMENT NEGOTIATED AND CONCLUDED WITH THE IAEA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATUTE OF THE IAEA AND THE AGENCY'S SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM CANNOT

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CONCEIVABLY BE ANYTHING OTHER THAN IAEA SAFEGUARDS." FISHER EXPLAINED THAT THIS WAS ARGUMENTATIVE STATEMENT MADE IN URGING US PROPOSAL AND REQUEST FOR FORMAL STATEMENT PRESENTS DIFFERENT PROBLEM.

5. WHEN ASKED IF ROSHCHIN'S REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION MEANT SOVS WOULD TABLE NOV 2 FORMULA IF THIS TYPE INTERPRETATION WERE GIVEN, ROSHCHIN SAID THERE WOULD BE "RECIPROCAL DEPENDENCE". HE ADDED SOVS WOULD BE READY GIVE POSITIVE CONSIDERATION TO NOV 2 FORMULA IF SATISFACTORY AND CLEAR INTERPRETATION STATED BY US IN INDC. STATEMENT WOULD NOT HAVE TO CONTAIN SAME WORDING AS IN TALKING POINTS, BUT SHOULD PROVIDE ASSURANCE TO OTHERS, PARTICULARLY ALLIES OF SOVS, THAT US UNDERSTANDING OF FIRST SENTENCE IS SAME AS THAT EXPLAINED TO SOV DELEGATION ON NOV 2. ROSHCHIN STATED THIS WAS "POSITIVE ANSWER" TO US REQUEST FOR NOV 2 FORMULATION WITH ONLY ONE CONDITION, I.E., STATEMENT ALONG LINE OF US ORAL EXPLANATION OF NOV 2 TO SOV DEL.

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6. FISHER SAID HE WOULD CONSULT HIS GOVERNMENT AND ATTEMPT REPLY SOONEST. HE INQUIRED IF THERE WOULD BE ANY OTHER QUESTIONS RE ART III. ROSHCHIN SAID HE ENVISAGED RAISING NO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ON ART III BUT WISHED TO KNOW WHAT KIND OF STATEMENT US WILLING MAKE.

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7. FISHER RAISED QUESTION OF TABLING FOUR OTHER NPT AMENDMENTS ALREADY AGREED BETWEEN US AND USSR. ROSHCIN STATED IT WOULD BE VERY DESIRABLE SUBMIT COMPLETE TREATY TEXT AND FOUR PREVIOUSLY AGREED AMENDMENTS COULD BE TABLED IF ART III WORKED OUT. FISHER COMMENTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN VERY HIGH DEGREE OF IRRITATION AT UNGA BECAUSE OF CO-CHAIRMAN NOT DEALING WITH NON-ALIGNED AMENDMENTS DURING LAST SESSION. AS RESULT, KUZNETSOV HAD INDICATED THAT AMENDMENTS ALREADY AGREED SHOULD BE TABLED. ROSHCIN THEN STATED FLATLY THAT SOVS NOT READY TABLE OTHER AMENDMENTS WITHOUT ART III. FISHER SAID HE AGREED IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE PRESENT COMPLETE TREATY BUT US CONSIDERS THAT QUESTIONS OF DURATION, PERIODIC REVIEW AND AMENDMENTS PROCEDURE MUST BE DEALT WITH BEFORE THERE CAN BE COMPLETE TREATY. ROSHCIN SAID SOVS WERE PREPARED ATTEMPT FIND SOLUTION TO THESE QUESTIONS BEFORE JAN 18.

8. ROSHCIN SUGGESTED CO-CHAIRMAN MEETING TUESDAY, 11:00 AM (GENEVA TIME), TO CONSIDER SAFEGUARDS ARTICLE FURTHER AND TO PREPARE GROUNDWORK ON OTHER REMAINING ISSUES. FISHER STATED HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE OBTAIN US GOVERNMENT RESPONSE BY THAT TIME, BUT HE AGREED TO MEET TOMORROW IN ANY EVENT IN ORDER HEAR SOV VIEWS ON OTHER ISSUES.

9. COMMENT: DELEGATION RECOMMENDS THAT WE BE AUTHORIZED TO RESPOND TO THE POINT MADE BY ROSHCIN BY INDICATING OUR WILLINGNESS TO ADD THE FOLLOWING FOURTH PRINCIPLE TO THE THREE PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN NOV 13 AIDE-MEMOIRE DEALING WITH THIRD

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EURATOM PRINCIPLE ON VERIFICATION AND WHICH WE INDICATED IN NOV 2 CO-CHAIRMAN'S MEETING WE INTENDED TO STATE IN ENDC:
"4. SAFEGUARDS ESTABLISHED BY AN AGREEMENT NEGOTIATED AND CONCLUDED WITH THE IAEA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATUTE OF THE IAEA AND THE AGENCY'S SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM MUST RESULT IN A UNIVERSAL SYSTEM SO THAT THE IAEA CAN CARRY OUT ITS RESPONSIBILITY OF PROVIDING, WITH EQUAL CONFIDENCE WITH RESPECT TO ALL PARTIES TO THE TREATY, ASSURANCE THAT NO DIVERSION IS TAKING PLACE."

GP-3. TUBBY

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FOR SECRETARY FROM FOSTER

SUBJECT: NPT

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-343
By ing, NARA, Date 9-13-94

NOW THAT WE HAVE CONCLUDED ANOTHER ROUND OF NAC CONSULTATIONS, I BELIEVE I SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED APPROACH ROSHCIN HERE PROMPTLY WITH OUR CONSIDERED VIEW AS TO REASONABLE LANGUAGE FOR ARTICLE III. IT WOULD BE HIGHLY INADVISABLE IF WE WERE TO ALLOW ENDC TO RECESS NEXT WEEK BEFORE DOING SO, PARTICULARLY IF WE MUST REITERATE OUR SUPPORT FOR NOV 2 VERSION OF FIRST SENTENCE OR SOMETHING LIKE IT.

ALLOWING ENDC TO RECONVENE IN JANUARY ONLY TO FACE PRESENT IMPASSE WOULD SEEM TO ME TO PUT NPT IN SERIOUS JEOPARDY. I WOULD URGE WE CONVEY OUR FURTHER VIEWS ON ART III TO SOVIETS NOW SO THAT IF THEY DO NOT ACCEPT OUR PROPOSAL, WE SHALL

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AT LEAST HAVE RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS MATTER. WE MIGHT THEN HOPE, DEPENDING ON NATURE SOVIET REPLY, TO SETTLE QUESTION DURING RECESS.

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IN THIS CONNECTION, IT NOW APPEARS THAT THE DATE OF DECEMBER 14 FOR THE RECESS HAS BECOME REASONABLY FIRM. TODAY ROSHCIN SUGGESTED TO ME THAT WE FIX SPECIFIC DATE OF JAN 12 TO RECONVENE ENDC SINCE HE FEARS THAT LEAVING DATE OPEN COULD RESULT IN LONG DELAY ENDANGERING TREATY PROSPECTS. HE ADDED THAT DATE COULD ALWAYS BE ADJUSTED IN INTERVAL IF CO-CHAIRMEN FIND IT NECESSARY. I RECOMMEND WE BE AUTHORIZED PROPOSE JAN 18 AS RECONVENING DATE, SUBJECT TO CHANGE IF CO-CHAIRMEN FIND IT NECESSARY. I AGREE IT IS IMPORTANT TO FIX A DEFINITE DATE, BUT BELIEVE 18TH PREFERABLE SINCE OTHER ENDC REPRESENTATIVES FEEL THEY NEED A LITTLE MORE TIME. GP-3, TUBBY

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
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Classification

Origin ACTION: BONN IMMEDIATE

Info: INFO: LONDON
USMISSION NATO

STATE

SUBJECT: Reaffirmation of NATO at Time of NPT Signing

REF: Bonn 13939

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1. Our understanding is that Italians will not sign July 1.
2. We appreciate suggestions by Schnippenkoetter but have problem with first which might suggest acceptance of obligations within the "framework" of the treaty which do not directly arise under the treaty. On second suggestion, ~~do not~~ believe it ~~is significant enough to include in the~~ ~~date task already set at White House~~ is implicit in any case in present language.

END

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-342
By , NARA, Date 12-6-94

Drafted by: ER/GER: EDCrowley:rl 6/28/68

Tel. Ext. 4734

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

EUR - Mr. Springsteen
~~EUR - Mr. Starnes~~

Clearances:
ER/GER - Mr. Johnpoll
DA - Mr. De Palma
White House -

L - Mr. Berlack
EUR/AIS - Mr. Dozief
EUR/RPM - Mr. Baker

M - Mr. Riemer
S/S - Mr. Walsh

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Classification



Department of State

TELEGRAM

Ed. 13

46
Orig under
Bonn
by also in NATO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 386

PAGE 01 STATE 192372

89
ORIGIN EUR 20

INFO IO 13, SSO 00, USIE 00, NSCE 00, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INRI 07,
L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, ACDA 16, SCI 05,
OST 01, NEA 13, EA 10, /131 R

DRAFTED BY: EUR/GER: EDCROWLEY
APPROVED BY: EUR: MR. SPRINGSTEEN
EUR/GER: MR. JOHN POLL
ACDA: MR. FISHER (DRAFT)
EUR/RPM: MR. BLUMBERG
L: MR. BELMAN
EUR/AIS: MR. DOZIER
EUR/BMI: MR. CHESLAW
M: MR. RIEMER
S/S: MR. WALSH
WHITE HOUSE: MR. FRIED
G/PM: J. SHAW

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-342
By ijg, NARA, Date 12-6-94

O R 272327Z JUN 68 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION NATO
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
USMISSION GENEVA
XMT AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION NATO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 192372

SUBJ: REAFFIRMATION OF NATO AT TIME OF NPT SIGNING

1. IN RESPONSE TO DESIRE OF FRG FOR REAFFIRMATION OF NATO COMMITMENT AT SIGNING OF TREATY, THE PRESIDENT WILL INCLUDE LANGUAGE ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES IN HIS STATEMENT DURING THE SIGNING CEREMONY: QTE IN WELCOMING THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, I WISH TO REAFFIRM THAT THE UNITED STATES REMAINS

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PAGE 02 STATE T92372

FULLY COMMITTED TO FULFILLING ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER EXISTING TREATIES OF MUTUAL SECURITY. SUCH ARRANGEMENTS HAVE PROVIDED A SIGNIFICANT MEASURE OF SECURITY FOR THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER PARTIES TO THESE TREATIES. THEY HAVE CREATED A DEGREE OF STABILITY IN AN OTHERWISE UNSTABLE WORLD. UNQTE

2. WE BELIEVE IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FOR THE UK TO MAKE A STATEMENT AT THE LONDON SIGNING ALONG SIMILAR LINES AT THE TIME OF SIGNATURE.

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4. AS ADDRESSEES AWARE, TREATY IS OPEN FOR SIGNATURE JULY 1. ATTENTION SHOULD ALSO BE CALLED TO SECRETARY'S REMARKS ON NPT IN HIS STATEMENT AT REYKJAVIK (SECTO 13, REYKJAVIK'S 543). NEED FOR URGENT ACTION UNDERLINED BY FACT US WILL SIGN JULY 1.

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Department of State

¹⁴ ED
TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 689

NPT

PAGE 01 STATE 189649

45
ORIGIN ACDA 16

INFO EUR 15, L 03, NSC 10, SS 20, CIAE 00, INR 07, IO 13, NSAE 00, OST 01,
RSC 01, SCI 05, AEC 11, /102 R

DRAFTED BY ACDA/GC RSTEIN
APPROVED BY CREVANS L/T
ACDA MR VANDOREN
ACDA/IR MR NEIDLE
EUR MR STOESSEL
SS MR BROWN
THE WHITE HOUSE MR KEENEY

P 242317Z JUN 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 189649

SUBJECT NPT SIGN TURE

REFERENCE LONDON 10145

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-343
By ing, NARA, Date 9-13-94

1. RE PARA 3 REFTTEL, FULL POWERS APPROVED FOR NPT SIGNATURE IN WASHINGTON BY SECRETARY RUSK AND ACDA DIRECTOR WILLIAM C. FOSTER, PRINCIPAL NPT NEGOTIATOR. FULL POWERS ALSO APPROVED AND BEING POUCHED FOR SIGNATURE BY AMB BRUCE OR IN HIS ABSENCE KAISER IN LONDON, AND AMB THOMPSON, OR IN HIS ABSENCE SWANK IN MOSCOW.

2. APPRECIATE INFORMATION AS TO SIGNERS FOR OTHER DEPOSITARIES.
GP-3. KATZENBACH

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

15 5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 190

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2

ORIGIN ACDA 20

INFO AEC 11, AF 09, ARA 08, CIAE 00, DODE 00, EA 10, EUR 15, GPM 03, H 02,
INR 07, IO 13, L 03, NASA 04, NEA 13, NSAE 00, NSC 10, OIC 05, OST 01,
P 04, RSC 01, SAH 03, SC 01, SCI 05, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, MM 01, PCH 02,
/185 R

DRAFTED BY: ACDA/IR:CGLEESTEEN
APPROVED BY: ADRIAN S FISHER
G/PM: JSHAW
EUR/RPM: RCOLLINS
NEA/IAI: AATHERTON
WHITE HOUSE: SKEENY
ACDA/GC: MR BUNN
NEA/UAR: MR PARKER (SUBSTANCE)
IO/UNP: MR HELMAN
DOD/ISA: DR HALPERIN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-343
By mg, NARA, Date 9-13-94

R 062358Z FEB 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON 3222
INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2534
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0807
USMISSION GENEVA 1406
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2191
AMEMBASSY CAIRO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 111070

SUBJECT: UK APPROACHES ON NPT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 111070

REF: LONDON 6175

DISTO

BRITISH EMBOFF QUERIED ACDA OFFICER ON FEB 2 WHAT BEELEY SHOULD SAY (ON ASSUMPTION HE MAKES REPRESENTATION)

PAGE 2 RUEHC 111070 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
IF UAR INQUIRES WHETHER SIMILAR APPROACH BEING MADE TO ISRAEL AND ALSO WHETHER WE HAVE MADE RECENT ASSESSMENT OF ISRAEL'S INTENTIONS REGARDING NPT.

WE SUGGESTED BEELEY MIGHT RESPOND TO FIRST QUESTION SIMPLY BY POINTING OUT THAT APPROACH BEING DIRECTED TO UAR IN ITS CAPACITY AS MEMBER ENDC.

REGARDING ISRAEL'S INTENTIONS ON NPT, WE POINTED OUT WE HAVE NOT MADE RECENT ASSESSMENT.

IN PAST ISRAELIS HAVE INDICATED THEY WOULD NOT BE FIRST TO INTRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO MIDDLE EAST AREA, BUT ISREAL WOULD NOT TAKE POSITION ON NPT UNTIL COMPLETE TEXT AVAILABLE. WE ARE PRESENTLY UNABLE JUDGE WHETHER RETICENCE RESULTS FROM FUNDAMENTAL ISRAELI DOUBTS ABOUT NPT; IT MAY FLOW FROM ORDINARY CAUTION PENDING EVOLUTION OF MORE DEFINITE ATTITUDES OF OTHER COUNTRIES TOWARD TREATY. IN ANY EVENT WE HAVE ALWAYS ASSUMED THAT UAR WOULD NOT ADHERE TO NPT IF ISRAEL DOES NOT DO SO. FAILURE OF ISRAEL TO ADHERE IF UAR SHOWS INTEREST IN BECOMING

PAGE 3 RUEHC 111070 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
PARTY TO NPT COULD FURTHER COMPLICATE PROSPECTS FOR MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

WE INTEND TO MAKE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIONS TO ISRAEL AND OTHER KEY COUNTRIES WHO ARE NOT MEMBERS OF ENDC OR WITH WHOM WE HAVE NOT DISCUSSED NPT IN FRAMEWORK OF ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS SHORTLY AFTER CURRENT ENDC SESSION COMES TO CLOSE, PROBABLY IN MID-

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 STATE 111070

MARCH.

FOR TEL AVIV; DEPT WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR UP-TO-DATE ASSESSMENT
OF ISRAEL'S ATTITUDE TOWARD NPT. GP-1. RUSK

NOTE: POUCHED CAIRO BY OC/T.

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Department of State

Ed. 12
TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 386

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London
NATO

PAGE 01 STATE 192372

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ORIGIN EUR 20

INFO IO 13, SSO 00, USIE 00, NSCE 00, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07,
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OST 01, NEA 13, EA 10, /131 R

DRAFTED BY: EUR/GER:EDCROWLEY
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ACDA:MR. FISHER (DRAFT)
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WHITE HOUSE:MR. FRIED
G/PM:J. SHAW

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-342
By sig, NARA, Date 12-6-94

O R 272327Z JUN 68 ZFF4
FMI SECSTATE WASHDC
✓ TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION NATO
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
USMISSION GENEVA
XMT AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION NATO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 192372

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PAGE 02 STATE 192372

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-342

By , NARA, Date 12-6-94 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OK
MWS (ERF)
June 27 '68

AmEmbassy BONN IMMEDIATE
AmEmbassy LONDON "
USMISSION NATO "

INFO: USMISSION GENEVA AND OTHER NATO CAPITALS

Chd w/ gen Geneva
1845 6/27 MB

STATE

SUBJECT: Reaffirmation of NATO at Time of NPT signing

1. In response to desire of FRG for reaffirmation of NATO commitment at signing of treaty, the President will include language along the following lines in his statement during the signing ceremony: QTE In welcoming the Non-proliferation Treaty, I wish to reaffirm that the United States remains fully committed to fulfilling its obligations under existing treaties of mutual security. Such arrangements have provided a significant measure of security for the United States and other parties to these treaties. They have created a degree of stability in an often unstable world. UNQTE

2. We believe it is particularly important for the UK to make a statement at the London signing along similar lines at the time of signature.

EUR/GER:EDCrowley:mk 6/26/68 4734

EUR - Mr. ~~Springsteen~~

EUR/GER - Mr. Johnpoll L - Mr. Belman M - Mr. Riemer
ACDA - Mr. Fischer(draft) EUR/AIS - Mr. Dozier S/S - White House-

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ EUR/BMI - Mr. Cheslaw

EUR/RPM -Mr. Blumberg G/PM - J Shaw

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LONDON, NATO, BONN

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3. We also believe it would be appropriate for other NATO members so desiring, at the time of signature, to make statements similar to those of the US and the UK, with perhaps more specific reference to the North Atlantic Treaty than we, with our world-wide system of alliance.

4. As addressees aware, treaty is open for signature ~~IMMEDIATELY~~ July 1. Attention should also be called to Secretary's remarks on NPT in his statement at Reykjavik (SECTO 13, Reykjavik's 543). Need for urgent action underlined by fact US will sign July 1.

FOR LONDON. Embassy should raise the above on an urgent basis with UKG and seek UK agreement to making statement parallel to US statement at NPT signing.

FOR USMISSION NATO. USNATO should inform NAC representatives of points in paragraphs 1 - 4 above.

FOR BONN. Embassy should convey the above to the FRG on an urgent basis. (Secretary informed Brandt of our intentions in Reykjavik). Believe it would be appropriate for FRG, if it wishes, to approach other NATO Governments. Is especially important they speak with Italians.

END

G/PH - J Shaw

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
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17-6

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Origin	ACTION: AmEmbassy BONN	<u>IMMEDIATE</u>
	AmEmbassy LONDON	"
Info	USMISSION NATO	"

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-342

By isp, NARA, Date 12-6-94

INFO: USMISSION GENEVA AND OTHER NATO CAPITALS

STATE

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EUR/GER: EDCrowley:mk 6/26/68	4734	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:	EUR - Mr. Springsteen
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Clearance:	EUR/GER - Mr. Johnpoll	L - Mr. Belman	M -
	ACDA - Mr. Fisher (draft)	EUR/AIS - Mr. Dozier	S/S -
	EUR/RPM - Mr. Blumberg	EUR/BMI - Mr. Cheslaw	

100 C/PM - J Shaw

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Classification

Page 2 of telegram to LONDON, NATO, BONN

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Classification

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END

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ACTION ACDA 20

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INFO EUR 15, IO 13, SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, AEC 11, AF 09, ARA 08, CIAE 00,
DODE 00, EA 10, GPM 03, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NASA 04, NEA 13, NSAE 00,
NSC 10, OIC 05, OST 01, P 04, RSC 01, SAH 03, SC 01, SCI 05, SP 02, SS 20,
NSA 02, AID 28, STR 08, E 15, COM 08, TRSY 08, CEA 02, MM 01, RSR 01,
(NSCE) W

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O P 241212Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6782
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2351
AMEMBASSY PWRIS 2793
AMEMBASSY ROME 937
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 811
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 236
USMISSION USUN 163
USBER BERLIN 2140
USMISSION GENEVA 694
USMISSION NATO 336

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-342
By ijp, NARA, Date 12-6-94

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DISTO/BUSEC/IAEA

SUBJ: NPT: KIESINGER AND BRANDT STATEMENTS

1. ACCORDING TO PRESS ACCOUNTS, KIESINGER TOLD A MEETING OF CDU
ORIENTED GERMAN JOURNALISTS LAST NIGHT THAT THE NPT DRAFT CONTAINED

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PAGE 02 BONN 07559 241255Z

PAGE 2 RUFHOL 7559 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ ~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~
IMPROVEMENTS AS COMPARED TO ITS PREDECESSORS, BUT WAS STILL "NOT
IN SHAPE" TO PERMIT THE FRG TO SAY THAT IT "COULD ACCEPT THIS
TREATY". THE CHANCELLOR EXPRESSED THE HOPE, HOWEVER, THAT THE
ENSUING CONSULTATIONS WOULD RESULT IN AN ACCEPTABLE TREATY.
ACCORDING TO A DPA REPORT, HE ALSO SAID THAT THE NOTABLE
IMPROVEMENTS MADE, WERE, AT LEAST TO AN EXTENT, DUE TO THE
EXTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS THE FRG HAS CONDUCTED WITH THE US. ASKED
ABOUT HIS COMMENT LAST SPRING CHARGING "ATOMIC COMPLICITY BETWEEN
THE US AND THE USSR", KIESINGER SAID THAT HE HAD INTENTIONALLY
PLANTED THIS "SMALL BOMB" TO GET US-GERMAN TALKS GOING.

2. FONMIN BRANDT TOLD THE CDU/CSU BUNDESTAG FRAKTIONON JAN 22
THAT THE NPT DRAFT REPRESENTED A " BETTER" BASIS FOR DISCUSSION.
HE ALSO NOTED THAT IMPROVEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE ON SEVERAL POINTS OF
VITAL INTEREST TO THE FRG, FOR INSTANCE AS REGARDS PEACEFUL USES
AND DISARMAMENT. ON DEFENSE ISSUES AFFECTED BY THE TREATY, INCLUDING
THE "EUROPEAN OPTION", THE FRG CONTINUED TO BE DEPENDENT ON US
INTERPRETATIONS.

2. HOWEVER BRANDT EXPRESSED FEAR THAT THE TREATY WAS STILL TOO
RIGID. THE FRG WAS ALSO DEPENDENT ON US INTERPRETATIONS ON THE

PAGE 3 RUFHOL 7559 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ ~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~
VERIFICATION QUESTION. BUT, BRANDT SAID, CLARIFICATPON ON THESE
POINTS MUST BE SOUGHT "IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF CONFIDENCE", SO THAT
FRG REACTIONS DO NOT CREATE "MISUNDERSTANDINGS".

3. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH KIESINGER WAS QUOTED IN SOME HEADLINES THIS
MORNING FOR INSTANCE IN THEGENERAL ANZEIGER, AS, IN EFFECT,
REJECTING THE TREATY, WE BELIEVE IT IS CLEAR FROM HIS CHOICE
OF WORDS THAT HE ONLY MEANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT IN ITS PRESENT
FORM THE TREATY WAS NOT YET ACCEPTABLE. THIS INTERPRETATION IS SUPPOR
TED
BY THAT PART OF HIS REMARKS LOOKING TOWARD A SOLUTION OF THE
REMAINING PROBLEMS AND AN "ACCEPTABLE TREATY".

4. THIS VIEW WAS ALSO FORCEFULLY CONFIRMED THIS MORNING BY STATE

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PAGE 03 BONN 07559 241255Z

SEC DUCKWITZ TO THE MINISTER, WHEN THE LATTER BEGAN BY EXPRESSING US APPRECIATION FOR THE FRG'S STATESMANLIKE POSTURE ON NPT IN THE LAST DAYS, DUCKWITZ INTERRUPTED TO SAY THAT THE GENERAL-ANZEIGER STORY WAS "ALL NONSENSE". THESE HEADLINES DID NOT CORRECTLY CONVEY THE MEANING OF WHAT KIESINGER HAD SAID. WHAT THE CHANCLOR INTENDED WAS THAT THE FRG WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK IMPROVEMENTS IN THE TREATY AS LONG AS THE NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE, BUT THAT THE FRG BASICALLY FAVORS THE PRINCIPLE OF THE TREATY.

5. THIS INTERPRETATION WAS ALSO CLEARLY SUPPORTED BY THE TENOR OF BRANDT'S REMARKS AND THE WHOLE TONE OF GERMAN COMMENT ON NPT SINCE LAST FRIDAY--WHICH RECOGNIZED THE PROGRESS MADE, BUT PINPOINTED

PAGE 4 RUFHOL ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ ~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~
SEVERAL REMAINING ISSUES WHICH THE FRG WANTS TO HAVE RESOLVED.

6. INTERESTINGLY AT ALMOST THE SAME TIME KIESINGER WAS SPEAKING TO THE PRESS GROUP, DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER SCHNIPPENKOETTER

TOLD AN EMBASSY OFFICER THAT THE GOVT'S POLICY, AS ESTABLISHED AT MONDAY'S NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL MEETING, WAS TO AVOID A NEGATIVE PUBLIC POSTURE ON THE TREATY. HE SAID THAT THE FRG STILL HAD PROBLEMS WITH THE DRAFT. THE GOVT PLANNED, HOWEVER, TO MAKE KNOWN ITS SPECIFIC CRITICAL POINTS IN BILATERAL CONSULTATION WITH THE US, WHILE MAINTAINING A GENERALLY POSITIVE PUBLIC POSTURE.

7. SCHNIPPENKOETTER STRESSED THAT THE FRG'S OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO INTRODUCE GREATER "FLEXIBILITY" INTO THE TEXT. HE DID NOT THINK IT WOULD BE WISE TO CONCENTRATE ON THE DURATION QUESTION AS SUCH ALTHOUGH THIS WAS A MAJOR ELEMENT IN THE TREATY'S CURRENT INFLEXIBILITY. IF A GREATER POSSIBILITY FOR ADAPTION TO FUTURE CHANGES IN THE TECHNOLOGICAL, SECURITY AND POLITICAL FIELDS COULD BE PROVIDED IN THE REVIEW AND AMENDMENTS PROCEDURE, THE DURATION QUESTION, IN SCHNIPPENKOETTERS VIEW, WOULD BECOME FAR LESS IMPORTANT.

8. WHILE KIESINGER DID NOT AVOID GIVING A RATHER NEGATIVE IMPRESSION OF HIS GERMAN POSITION, WE THINK DUCKWITZ'S AND SCHNIPPENKOETTER'S REMARKS GIVE INSIGHT IN WHAT THE CHANCELLOR PROBABLY HAD IN MIND.

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PAGE 04 BONN 07559 241255Z

CLEARLY THE KEY PHRASE LOCALLY HAS BECOME "GREATER FLEXIBILITY".
MCGHEE

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-342
By WJ, NARA, Date 12-6-94

PAGE 01 BONN 07559 241602Z

53
ACTION ACDA 20

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, AEC 11, AF 09, ARA 03, CIAE 00,
DODE 00, EA 10, GPM 03, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NASA 04, NEA 13, NSAE 00,
NSC 10, OIC 05, OST 01, P 04, RSC 01, SAH 03, SC 01, SCI 05, SP 02, SS 20,
NSA 02, AID 23, STR 08, E 15, COM 08, TRSY 08, CEA 02, MM 01, RSR 01,
/243 W

O P 241212Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6782
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2351
AMEMBASSY PARIS 2793
AMEMBASSY ROME 937
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 811
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 236
USMISSION USUN 163
USBER BERLIN 2140
USMISSION GENEVA 694
USMISSION NATO 336
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1282

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDITION OF BRUSSELS AS INFO ADDEE ONLY)

DISTO/BUSEC/IAEA

SUBJ: NPT: KIESINGER AND BRANDT STATEMENTS

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PAGE 02 BONN 07559 241602Z

ORIENTED GERMAN JOURNALISTS LAST NIGHT THAT THE NPT DRAFT CONTAINED

PAGE 2 RUFHOL 7559 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ ~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~
IMPROVEMZNTS AS COMPARED TO ITS PREDECESSORS, BUT WAS STILL "NOT
IN SHAPE" TO PERMIT THE FRG TO SAY THAT IT "COULD ACCEPT THIS
TREATY". THE CHANCELLOR EXPRESSED THE HOPE, HOWEVER, THAT THE
ENSUING CONSULTATIONS WOULD RESULT IN AN ACCEPTABLE TREATY.
ACCORDING TO A DPA REPORT, HE ALSO SAID THWT THE NOTABLE
IMPROVEMENTS MADE, WERE, AT LEAST TO AN EXTENT, DUE TO THE
EXTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS THE FRG HAS CONDUCTED WITH THE US. ASKED
ABOUT HIS COMMENT LAST SPRING CHARGING "ATOMIC COMPLICITY BETWEEN
THE US AND THE USSR", KIESINGER SAID THAT HE HAD INTENTIONALLY
PLANTED THIS "SMALL BOMB" TO GET US-GERMAN TALKS GOING.

2. FONMIN BRANDT TOLD THE CDU/CSU BUNDESTAG FRAKTIONON JAN 22
THAT THE NPT DRAFT REPRESENTED A " BETTER" BASIS FOR DISCUSSION.
HE ALSO NOTED THAT IMPROVEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE ON SEVERAL POINTS OF
VITAL INTEREST TO THE FRG, FOR INSTANCE AS REGARDS PEACEFUL USES
AND DISARMAMENT. ON DEFENSE ISSUES AFFECTED BY THE TREATY, INCLUDING
THE "EUROPEAN OPTION", THE FRG CONTINUED TO BE DEPZNDENT ON US
INTERPRETATIONS.

2. HOWEVER BRANDT EXPRESSED FEAR THAT THE TREATY WAS STILL TOO
RIGID. THE FRG WAS ALSO DEPENDENT ON US INTERPRETATIONS ON THE

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VERIFICATION QUESTION. BUT, BRANDT SAID, CLARIFICATPON ON THESE
POINTS MUST BE SOUGHT "IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF CONFIDENCE", SO THAT
FRG REACTIONS DO NOT CREATE "MISUNDERSTANDINGS".

3. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH KIESINGER WAS QUOTED IN SOME HEADLINES THIS
MORNING FOR INSTANCE IN TH GENERAL ANZEIGER, AS, IN EFFECT,
REJECTING THE TREATY, WE BELIEVE IT IS CLEAR FROM HIS CHOICE
OF WORDS THAT HE ONLY MEANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT IN ITS PRESENT
FORM THE TREATY WAS NOT YET ACCEPTABLE. THIS INTERPRETATION IS SUPPOR
TED
BY THAT PART OF HIS REMARKS LOOKING TOWARD A SOLUTION OF THE
REMAINING PROBLEMS AND AN "ACCEPTABLE TREATY".

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4. THIS VIEW WAS ALSO FORCEFULLY CONFIRMED THIS MORNING BY STATE SEC DUCKWITZ TO THE MINISTER, WHEN THE LATTER BEGAN BY EXPRESSING US APPRECIATION FOR THE FRG'S STATESMANLIKE POSTURE ON NPT IN THE LAST DAYS, DUCKWITZ INTERRUPTED TO SAY THAT THE GENERAL-ANZEIGER STORY WAS "ALL NONSENSE". THESE HEADLINES DID NOT CORRECTLY CONVEY THE MEANING OF WHAT KIESINGER HAD SAID. WHAT THE CHANCLOR INTENDED WAS THAT THE FRG WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK IMPROVEMENTS IN THE TREATY AS LONG AS THE NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE, BUT THAT THE FRG BASICALLY FAVORS THE PRINCIPLE OF THE TREATY.

5. THIS INTERPRETATION WAS ALSO CLEARLY SUPPORTED BY THE TENOR OF BANDT'S REMARKS AND THE WHOLE TONE OF GERMAN COMMENT ON NPT SINCE LAST FRIDAY--WHICH RECOGNIZED THE PROGRESS MADE, BUT PINPOINTED

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SEVERAL REMAINING ISSUES WHICH THE FRG WANTS TO HAVE RESOLVED.

6. INTERESTINGLY AT ALMOST THE SAME TIME KIESINGER WAS SPEAKING TO THE PRESS GROUP, DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER SCHNIPPEN-KOETTER TOLD AN EMBASSY OFFICER THAT THE GOVT'S POLICY, AS ESTABLISHED AT MONDAY'S NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL MEETING, WAS TO AVOID A NEGATIVE PUBLIC POSTURE ON THE TREATY. HE SAID THAT THE FRG STILL HAD PROBLEMS WITH THE DRAFT. THE GOVT PLANNED, HOWEVER, TO MAKE KNOWN ITS SPECIFIC CRITICAL POINTS IN BILATERAL CONSULTATION WITH THE US, WHILE MAINTAINING A GENERALLY POSITIVE PUBLIC POSTURE.

7. SCHNIPPENKOETTER STRESSED THAT THE FRG'S OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO INTRODUCE GREATER "FLEXIBILITY" INTO THE TEXT. HE DID NOT THINK IT WOULD BE WISE TO CONCENTRATE ON THE DURATION QUESTION AS SUCH ALTHOUGH THIS WAS A MAJOR ELEMENT IN THE TREATY'S CURRENT INFLEXIBILITY. IF A GREATER POSSIBILITY FOR ADAPTION TO FUTURE CHANGES IN THE TECHNOLOGICAL, SECURITY AND POLITICAL FIELDS COULD BE PROVIDED IN THE REVIEW AND AMENDMENTS PROCEDURE, THE DURATION QUESTION, IN SCHNIPPENKOETTER'S VIEW, WOULD BECOME FAR LESS IMPORTANT.

8. WHILE KIESINGER DID NOT AVOID GIVING A RATHER NEGATIVE IMPRESSION

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OF HIS GERMAN POSITION, WE THINK DUCKWITZ'S AND SCHNIPPENKOETTER REMARKS GIVE INSIGHT IN WHAT THE CHANCELLOR PROBABLY HAD IN MIND. CLEARLY THE KEY PHRASE LOCALLY HAS BECOME "GREATER FLEXIBILITY".
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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-342

By sig, NARA, Date 12-6-94

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7784
INFO USMISSION GENEVA 189
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 108

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOKYO 4030

SUBJ: NPT

1. RECENTLY CONCLUDED SERIES DIET INTERPELLATIONS OF PRIMIN AND FONMIN EDUCED REAFFIRMATION OF GENERAL GOJ POLICY SUPPORT FOR NPT COUPLED WITH CONCERN OVER SPECIFICS OF CURRENT DRAFT. LATTER INCLUDED GOJ DESIRE SEE NUCLEAR POWERS STATE CLEARLY IN NPT THEIR INTENTION REDUCE ARSENALS AND THAT DEVELOPMENT OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY BY NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT BE HINDERED BY TREATY.

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2. AT SAME TIME PRIMIN SATO IN DEC 13 INTERPELLATIONS REVEALED SENSITIVITY OVER DOMESTIC OPINION ON NPT IN HIS DENIAL THAT IN JOINT COMMUNIQUE DURING WASH VISIT

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HE HAD "MADE PROMISE" TO U.S. THAT JAPAN WOULD ACCEPT NPT. DSP QUESTIONER INTIMATED SUCH PROMISE IMPLICIT IN COMMUNIQUE PASSAGE ON NON-PROLIFERATION, AND IMPROPER IN ADVANCE OF FINAL DECISION ON DRAFT OF TREATY AND IN PRESENT SITUATION OF DIVIDED OPINION (UNSPECIFIED) IN JAPAN. SATO REPLIED THAT COMMUNIQUE STATEMENT MADE ON PREMISE OF "THREE NUCLEAR PRINCIPLES" OF GOJ POLICY, I.E., NO JAPANESE PRODUCTION, NO JAPANESE POSSESSION, AND NO INTRODUCTION INTO JAPAN OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. JAPAN'S ATTITUDE, HE SAID, WAS "IN SPIRIT" OF NPT BUT HE RECOGNIZED THAT FINAL DECISION MUST BE MADE BY LEGISLATURE.

3. PROBLEM OF NPT DURATION WAS NOT PRESSED DURING DEBATE. IN RESPONSE TO QUERY ABOUT AMB SHIMODA'S DEC 1 SPEECH IN U.S. TO JAPAN-AMERICA SOCIETY, WHICH REFERRED TO LEAVING QUESTION OF JAPAN'S POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PAGE 3 RUALOT 4030D ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
TO NATION'S FUTURE GENERATIONS, FOMMIN MIKI SAID THAT SHIMODA'S STATEMENT MEANT ABOUT FIFTY YEARS HENCE.

4. COMMENT: EMB HAD NOT EXPECTED ANY SOFTENING OF GOJ ATTITUDE TOWARD NPT TO COME OUT IN DIET INTERPELLATIONS, BUT REITERATION OF COMMITMENT NONETHELESS WELCOME. FONOFF (SAWAI, CHIEF, DISARMAMENT SECTION) CONSIDERED THAT EXCHANGES IN DIET ON SUBJECT OF NPT WENT OFF QUITE NICELY. SAWAI SAID THAT NPT CRITICS REMAIN UNABLE TO CHANGE GOJ POLICY OF SUPPORT FOR TREATY, BUT CONTINUED DELAYS AFFORD THEM MORE TIME TO GAIN ADHERENTS AND GERMANS ARE INDEFATIGABLE IN ENCOURAGING THEM.

GP-3. JOHNSON

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Walt W. Rostow

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This is the paper which the President asked me for during the NSC meeting on Monday.

We hope to have the other paper (on arms talks) ready by Friday.

Dir
Richard Helms

Attachments - 2

~~Copy Nos. 1 and 2 - Intel Memo - No. 1582/68
Prospects for the Nonproliferation Treaty.~~

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

PROSPECTS FOR THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

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27 November 1968
No. 1582/68



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
27 November 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Prospects for the Nonproliferation Treaty

Summary

The Nonproliferation Treaty is still far short of receiving the number of signatures and ratifications required to bring it into force. For a variety of reasons the momentum required to bring about the treaty's speedy acceptance has failed to develop. Some of the holdouts retain their earlier reservations that the treaty will impede their access to peaceful nuclear technology. Others are dissatisfied with the security assurances provided. Many countries believe that, so long as progress is not made toward actual reduction of nuclear arsenals, the treaty aggravates the imbalance between the have and have-not countries. Moreover, the world situation generally--particularly the continuing uncertainties in Eastern Europe and the Middle East--is not a propitious one for disarmament. Early US ratification of the NPT would give a boost to its prospects, but inertia and delay have already taken their toll of support and will be hard to overcome.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by the Central Intelligence Agency. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Scientific Intelligence and the Office of National Estimates.

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Current Status

1. On 1 July 1968, the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was simultaneously opened for signatures in London, Washington, and Moscow. By 27 November 1968, some 83 countries had signed the treaty and four (the UK, Ireland, Nigeria, and Mexico) had ratified it (see Annex). By its terms the treaty will enter into effect when 43 nations, including its three nuclear-weapon-possessing sponsors (US, UK, and USSR), have signed and ratified it. A substantial list of countries have signed the treaty, but have since adopted a wait-and-see attitude before ratifying. Of the three nuclear sponsors, only Britain has ratified. So far no momentum has developed to speed the ratification process, and the treaty is a long way from entering into force.

Obstacles to the NPT

2. The nonsigners have raised a number of specific objections to the treaty's provisions. These fall mainly into three groups: security guarantees against nuclear attack or threat, guarantees that national programs for peaceful uses of atomic energy will not be impeded, and imbalances in favor of the nuclear countries in the machinery to administer the treaty. Underlying these stated objections are deeper political concerns. Some holdouts are unwilling to renounce a nuclear option because they regard it as a bargaining weapon against a hostile neighbor. Others are disturbed because the treaty, by formalizing and freezing the distinction between haves and have-nots, seems to discriminate against them. Some, particularly West Germany, fear that the NPT seems to point toward a developing Soviet-American partnership to which their national interests will be sacrificed.

Security Assurances

3. Naturally, the sine quo non of the non-nuclears for yielding the nuclear option has been freedom from nuclear blackmail and a credible security arrangement in case of nuclear attack. The security assurance scheme of the NPT contemplates that the UN Security Council will act upon threat or use of nuclear weapons, calling upon the US, UK, and USSR to counter the danger to world peace, with

force if necessary. In addition, each of the three sponsoring nuclear powers has declared its willingness to act through the Security Council to counter such aggression.

4. The have-nots have pointed out bitterly that these arrangements are not credible since any proposed future Council action could be thwarted by a permanent member's veto. Among the demands for additional guarantees, India has sought explicit undertakings that the US or Britain would use its nuclear capabilities to defend India. Several nations have demanded international agreements, or promises from the Great Powers that they will not use their veto. Brazil and others have tried to convene an international conference on security assurances, apparently on the theory that one more attempt to embarrass the nuclear powers publicly cannot hurt.

5. Most proposals to "harden" security arrangements have sought to eliminate the UN as the implementing mechanism. The nuclear powers, however, continue to see the Security Council's peacekeeping machinery as a protection against commitments and circumstances that might prove catalytic to nuclear war. As a substitute for the security assurances they have requested, the non-nuclear powers have also sought from the Great Powers either progress toward nuclear disarmament or commitments not to use nuclear weapons.

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

6. Another major concern to the non-nuclear powers has been the possibility that safeguards might deprive them of access to the equipment, material, and technology essential to the development of their peaceful nuclear industries. Germany has interpreted the treaty as obliging nuclear countries to disclose all technology not strictly weapon-oriented, including the technology involved in isotopic separation and enrichment. Several countries have requested express commitments between haves and have-nots covering the non-nuclear powers' requirements. The idea of a "fuel bank" funded by the US, UK, and USSR has been pressed. Many countries have complained that the safeguards requirements are unduly burdensome.

Arguments over Appropriate International Agencies

7. Several key "threshold" countries, for example Italy and Japan, have expressed fears that international politics could influence implementation of the treaty, with the nuclear countries occupying an unduly strong position. These countries have exerted great influence to create new international bodies, balanced in favor of the non-nuclear countries, to administer the treaty, instead of depending upon existing machinery which is more or less controlled by the nuclear countries. Italy, for example, fears that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), overbalanced with nuclear powers, might be prejudiced in their favor in administering safeguards. Italy has therefore fought to expand membership of the IAEA's governing body to include more non-nuclears (and particularly Italy). The Italians also seek a permanent committee to carry on the work and to implement the recommendations of the non-nuclear conference, an idea unpleasant to the nuclear powers.

Positions of Principal Non-Signatories

8. The following paragraphs discuss the prospects for signature in the major countries now holding out. Each of these countries will probably defer a decision until the US ratifies. In most of them, US ratification would generally encourage the proponents of signature, but in important instances early US action would not decisively tip the scales. The failure of a US ratification effort, of course, would finish off the treaty.

West Germany

9. The key country in Europe obviously remains West Germany. The decision for Bonn has been an agonizing one, with strong feeling running both pro and con. Under present circumstances there is no prospect for early action. The Czechoslovak invasion has aggravated German suspicions of the Soviets, and the continuing Soviet verbal broadsides against West Germany have further thinned the ranks of NPT supporters. Upper echelons of the Christian Democratic Union, which seem to be close to the public mood on the matter, contend that the Federal Republic

should not risk entering into such an important undertaking with a nation whose readiness to break its word and to intervene in other countries was amply demonstrated in Czechoslovakia on 21 August. Officials of the Social Democratic Party, while still sympathetic to the treaty, say that the Soviet intervention rendered any West German action on the NPT politically impossible for the time being. A number of frequently heard arguments have been trotted out again. Three are of particular interest in West Germany: 1) there is no guarantee of unimpaired access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; 2) there is no clear substantive linkage between the treaty and vertical disarmament; and 3) German security is not adequately assured.

10. Of special importance to Bonn has been the Soviet contention, following Czechoslovakia, that, under Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter, the USSR has the right to intervene in West German affairs if the Federal Republic engages in acts of provocation. Some Germans have linked this obviously strained construction of the Charter with ratifying the NPT. Naturally, any such intervention would be of overwhelming international import, which leads to the conclusion that the Soviet claim was probably an effort to regain the propaganda initiative after the Czechoslovak invasion. This, however, does not eliminate concern over the issue among the Germans.

11. West German action on the NPT is thus unlikely for the time being. Disarmament specialists in Bonn have said that there certainly will be no action until next year at least, very possibly not until after elections in late 1969, and maybe not even then. But the NPT still has friends in Bonn, chief among them Foreign Minister Brandt and the Social Democrats. They see the treaty as an important adjunct to their policies of detente, and as they revive talk of the latter they are likely to resume supporting the NPT. Signatures by other key holdouts will be influential in West Germany. Many in Bonn will be following the treaty's progress in the US Senate. Ratification by the US, particularly if it creates momentum toward ratification by other countries, will in the end probably lead to West

German accession, but Bonn will be in no hurry and will probably require further urging by the major powers.

Japan

12. Japanese leaders basically support the NPT, but have reservations on certain points. The Japanese wish to see further progress toward nuclear disarmament, security guarantees of a higher order than those proffered, and equal treatment under the safeguards provisions for all countries. The latter point is of special importance to business leaders, who seek protection from "commercial espionage" and fear that the relative freedom the US and the USSR have from safeguards gives them a commercial advantage.

13. The government would like to have a specific bilateral guarantee of protection against nuclear attack from one or more of the NPT's nuclear sponsors--a guarantee of more assured duration than the US-Japan Security Treaty--and Japan may not sign unless it obtains such a guarantee. Chinese progress in weaponry is a matter of concern to the Japanese, which, together with apprehensions stirred up by Czechoslovakia, has germinated some support for holding open the nuclear weapon option.

14. Policymakers will continue to follow closely the decisions of other major powers, particularly West Germany and India, before making any decision. Ratification of the NPT by the US would not, by itself, have an overriding impact on Japan. In fact, the Sato government would be loath for domestic political reasons to appear subservient to Washington by acting on the heels of US Senate ratification. It will probably take favorable action by the US and major non-nuclear holdouts like West Germany and India to build up enough internal pressure for Japanese signature and ratification.

India and Pakistan

15. When the Security Council passed the security assurances resolution as part of the NPT package, India--a member of the Security Council at the

time--abstained. India has refused to sign the treaty, and there is no indication that it will change its policy in the foreseeable future. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi reaffirmed this decision in early November, citing popular opposition as a major factor. Additionally the government still takes a dim view of the security assurances arrangement in view of India's proximity to China, and Indian policymakers remain dubious that the treaty will in fact retard proliferation. The safeguards provisions are unpopular with the nuclear establishment in the country. Also, the government is quite possibly taking a second look at the weapons option. There seem to be few arguments that could enhance the chances of Indian adherence to the treaty at this time. And, as a prime example of the regional balance required to secure NPT ratification, unless and until India becomes a party to the NPT, Pakistan will not sign or ratify.

Italy

16. Italy is expected to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty during the first few months of 1969 if the United States has ratified by then. At present, government preoccupation with domestic political uncertainties is a factor against immediate signature of the treaty. However, the most important element influencing Italian leaders to go along with popular feeling and sign will probably be the attitude of the United States as shown by its own actions on ratification. Popular sentiment as reflected by most parliamentary delegates strongly favors the treaty. Once the treaty is signed and presented to the Parliament, ratification should follow quickly.

Israel and the Arabs

17. The Israelis continue to resist signing the treaty, and so long as conditions in the Middle East do not improve, there is little likelihood of a change in their position. Prime Minister Eshkol said recently that he saw no reason for Israel to rush into the pact. He raised the issue of possible Soviet-Arab supervision, under the safeguards provisions, of Israel's nuclear program, a spurious issue

since the IAEA's nuclear procedures will permit a state in effect to choose the nationality of the inspectors assigned it. He also argued that Israel could ill afford to relinquish the nuclear option without ironclad security assurances, since the Soviets might give nuclear weapons to the Arabs in violation of the treaty at any time. In the meantime, the Israelis' nuclear program proceeds apace.

18. All of the Arab countries have signed the treaty. Among them only the UAR has a peacetime nuclear program of any significance. They have leveled verbal barrages at the Israelis, and are clearly concerned that Israel's inaction on the NPT is indicative of a nascent Israeli nuclear weapons development program. It is doubtful whether US ratification would have much bearing on Arab willingness to ratify.

Other Countries

19. Among other nonsigners are France, Communist China, Indonesia, and Australia. France has never participated in the ENDC, it has said it will not sign the treaty, and there is no indication that this attitude is changing. It no doubt wants Germany to adhere to the treaty, however, and probably will not prevent EURATOM's negotiating a safeguards arrangement with the IAEA.

20. Peking has regarded the NPT from the outset as an effort to perpetuate the "US-Soviet nuclear monopoly" and will not become a party to the treaty. Indonesia and Australia are both bothered by their proximity to Communist China and have not yet made up their minds. If a substantial landslide of support should develop for the treaty, however, it is quite possible that both would ultimately decide to affirm the pact.

21. South Africa, a producer of fissionable material, is dissatisfied with the extent to which safeguards under the treaty would encroach on its industrial operations, even though South Africa as a member of IAEA has always cooperated with safeguards requirements. The South Africans, never strongly in favor of the NPT, have seized upon the

Czechoslovak occupation as a reason for not agreeing to the treaty. They have used this as an excuse to keep available the privilege of beginning a nuclear weapons program, should it appear necessary. They would probably hold fast to this position despite a timely US ratification.

22. In Latin America, three key nations--Brazil, Argentina, and Chile--are closely linked as indefinite holdouts against signing the treaty. Rio, which has assumed a role of leadership among the three, has consistently opposed the NPT on grounds that the potential restrictions impinge on Brazil's "sovereign right" to develop its own national nuclear programs. It also points to the allegedly inadequate security guarantees and the absence of a binding commitment among the nuclear powers to limit their arsenals of nuclear weapons. These attitudes reflect the traditional national sentiment that Brazil is destined for "Great Power" status, and the government will probably not alter its view that the NPT is an obstacle to this national goal. Foreign Minister Magalhaes Pinto, who has formulated the Brazilian opposition, is probably reflecting accurately widespread Brazilian nationalist sentiment.

23. Argentina has taken an almost identical position and in fact is following the Brazilian lead. With traditional ambitions for leadership in South America, it apparently will not modify its policy until Brazil has done so. Chile, a traditional rival of Argentina, in turn will probably not sign the NPT until both Argentina and Brazil have become signatories. Cuba is adamantly opposed to the treaty and will not sign.

24. Mexico is the one major country of the hemisphere which has taken an active role in support of the NPT and the only one in the area to ratify it thus far. Its stance is a logical projection of its leading role in the formulation and promotion of the Treaty of Tlaltelolco of 1967, which designates the southern half of the hemisphere a nuclear-free zone.

Soviet Position

25. The Soviet Union is clearly disturbed by the NPT's loss of momentum. Moscow fears that any additional delay invites further efforts by the non-nuclear countries to create obstacles. Like the US, the Soviets have pushed hard, in public and in private, for signatures, although the invasion of Czechoslovakia has impeded success.

26. The Soviets themselves have not yet ratified the NPT. Early US ratification would reduce uncertainty and would probably give prospects for early Soviet ratification a boost.

Expectations

27. The NPT has become so integrally tied to other international issues that to bring it into effect at an early date will be difficult under the best of circumstances. With the passage of time, attrition of support could be fatal to it. It is probably safe to say that the treaty's prospects depend upon accession by West Germany and at least one or two of the other prominent holdouts. Unless a trend of ratification can be started by these countries, the effects of the inertia of delay which have already rendered the treaty moribund could finish it off entirely.

28. There appear to be several contingencies which could produce substantial new interest in ratifying the treaty. If the French could be persuaded to assume some of the obligations of the treaty--such as voluntary acceptance of safeguards, West German receptivity would probably be enhanced. If the Soviets toned down their anti-Bonn diatribes, it would assist those Germans who favor the treaty. Support from a number of countries would grow if Moscow should make a token acceptance of safeguards. And naturally, easing of major international tensions over Vietnam and the Middle East would be helpful.

29. Many countries have tied their willingness to agree to the NPT to US-USSR progress in disarmament; yet, ironically, many of the same countries are experiencing unprecedented apprehensions that the Great

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Powers may "get together" too readily. Although it is quite possible that US ratification of the treaty would give a boost to its prospects, inertia and delay have already taken their toll of support and will be hard to overcome.

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ANNEX

STATES WHICH HAVE SIGNED THE NPT
(On 1 July 1968 unless otherwise indicated)

- | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. U.S. | 43. Lebanon |
| 2. Afghanistan | 44. Lesotho - July 9 |
| 3. Austria | 45. Liberia |
| 4. Barbados | 46. Libya - July 19 |
| 5. Belgium - Aug. 20 | 47. Luxembourg - Aug. 14 |
| 6. Bolivia | 48. Malagasy Republic - Aug. 22 |
| 7. Botswana | 49. Malaysia |
| 8. Bulgaria | 50. Maldive Islands - Sept. 11 |
| 9. Cameroon - July 17 | 51. Mauritius |
| 10. Canada - July 23 | 52. Mexico - July 26 (ratified) |
| 11. Ceylon | 53. Mongolia |
| 12. Chad | 54. Morocco |
| 13. Republic of China | 55. Nepal |
| 14. Colombia | 56. Netherlands - Aug. 20 |
| 15. Congo (Kinshasa) - July 22 | 57. New Zealand |
| 16. Costa Rica | 58. Nicaragua |
| 17. Cyprus | 59. Nigeria (ratified) |
| 18. Czechoslovakia | 60. Norway |
| 19. Dahomey | 61. Panama |
| 20. Denmark | 62. Paraguay |
| 21. Dominican Republic | 63. Peru |
| 22. Ecuador - July 9 | 64. Philippines |
| 23. El Salvador | 65. Poland |
| 24. Ethiopia - Sept. 5 | 66. Romania |
| 25. Finland | 67. San Marino |
| 26. Gambia - Sept. 20 | 68. Senegal |
| 27. Ghana | 69. Somali Republic |
| 28. Greece | 70. Sweden - Aug. 19 |
| 29. Guatemala - July 26 | 71. Syria |
| 30. Haiti | 72. Togo |
| 31. Honduras | 73. Trinidad & Tobago - Aug. 20 |
| 32. Hungary | 74. Tunisia |
| 33. Iceland | 75. USSR |
| 34. Iran | 76. UAR |
| 35. Iraq | 77. UK (ratified) |
| 36. Ireland (ratified) | 78. Upper Volta - Nov. 25 |
| 37. Ivory Coast | 79. Uruguay |
| 38. Jordan - July 10 | 80. Venezuela |
| 39. Kenya | 81. Vietnam |
| 40. Republic of Korea | 82. Yemen Arab Rep. - Sept. 23 |
| 41. Kuwait - Aug. 15 | 83. Yugoslavia - July 10 |
| 42. Laos | |

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

PROSPECTS FOR THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
27 November 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Prospects for the Nonproliferation Treaty

Summary

The Nonproliferation Treaty is still far short of receiving the number of signatures and ratifications required to bring it into force. For a variety of reasons the momentum required to bring about the treaty's speedy acceptance has failed to develop. Some of the holdouts retain their earlier reservations that the treaty will impede their access to peaceful nuclear technology. Others are dissatisfied with the security assurances provided. Many countries believe that, so long as progress is not made toward actual reduction of nuclear arsenals, the treaty aggravates the imbalance between the have and have-not countries. Moreover, the world situation generally--particularly the continuing uncertainties in Eastern Europe and the Middle East--is not a propitious one for disarmament. Early US ratification of the NPT would give a boost to its prospects, but inertia and delay have already taken their toll of support and will be hard to overcome.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by the Central Intelligence Agency. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Strategic Research and the Office of National Estimates.

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Current Status

1. On 1 July 1968, the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was simultaneously opened for signatures in London, Washington, and Moscow. By 27 November 1968, some 83 countries had signed the treaty and four (the UK, Ireland, Nigeria, and Mexico) had ratified it (see Annex). By its terms the treaty will enter into effect when 43 nations, including its three nuclear-weapon-possessing sponsors (US, UK, and USSR), have signed and ratified it. A substantial list of countries have signed the treaty, but have since adopted a wait-and-see attitude before ratifying. Of the three nuclear sponsors, only Britain has ratified. So far no momentum has developed to speed the ratification process, and the treaty is a long way from entering into force.

Obstacles to the NPT

2. The nonsigners have raised a number of specific objections to the treaty's provisions. These fall mainly into three groups: security guarantees against nuclear attack or threat, guarantees that national programs for peaceful uses of atomic energy will not be impeded, and imbalances in favor of the nuclear countries in the machinery to administer the treaty. Underlying these stated objections are deeper political concerns. Some holdouts are unwilling to renounce a nuclear option because they regard it as a bargaining weapon against a hostile neighbor. Others are disturbed because the treaty, by formalizing and freezing the distinction between haves and have-nots, seems to discriminate against them. Some, particularly West Germany, fear that the NPT seems to point toward a developing Soviet-American partnership to which their national interests will be sacrificed.

Security Assurances

3. Naturally, the sine qua non of the non-nuclears for yielding the nuclear option has been freedom from nuclear blackmail and a credible security arrangement in case of nuclear attack. The security assurance scheme of the NPT contemplates that the UN Security Council will act upon threat or use of nuclear weapons, calling upon the US, UK, and USSR to counter the danger to world peace, with

force if necessary. In addition, each of the three sponsoring nuclear powers has declared its willingness to act through the Security Council to counter such aggression.

4. The have-nots have pointed out bitterly that these arrangements are not credible since any proposed future Council action could be thwarted by a permanent member's veto. Among the demands for additional guarantees, India has sought explicit undertakings that the US or Britain would use its nuclear capabilities to defend India. Several nations have demanded international agreements, or promises from the Great Powers that they will not use their veto. Brazil and others have tried to convene an international conference on security assurances, apparently on the theory that one more attempt to embarrass the nuclear powers publicly cannot hurt.

5. Most proposals to "harden" security arrangements have sought to eliminate the UN as the implementing mechanism. The nuclear powers, however, continue to see the Security Council's peacekeeping machinery as a protection against commitments and circumstances that might prove catalytic to nuclear war. As a substitute for the security assurances they have requested, the non-nuclears have also sought from the Great Powers either progress toward nuclear disarmament or commitments not to use nuclear weapons.

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

6. Another major concern to the non-nuclears has been the possibility that safeguards might deprive them of access to the equipment, material, and technology essential to the development of their peaceful nuclear industries. Germany has interpreted the treaty as obliging nuclear countries to disclose all technology not strictly weapon-oriented, including the technology involved in isotopic separation and enrichment. Several countries have requested express commitments between haves and have-nots covering the non-nuclears' requirements. The idea of a "fuel bank" funded by the US, UK, and USSR has been pressed. Many countries have complained that the safeguards requirements are unduly burdensome.

Arguments over Appropriate International Agencies

7. Several key "threshold" countries, for example Italy and Japan, have expressed fears that international politics could influence implementation of the treaty, with the nuclear countries occupying an unduly strong position. These countries have exerted great influence to create new international bodies, balanced in favor of the non-nuclear countries, to administer the treaty, instead of depending upon existing machinery which is more or less controlled by the nuclear countries. Italy, for example, fears that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), overbalanced with nuclear powers, might be prejudiced in their favor in administering safeguards. Italy has therefore fought to expand membership of the IAEA's governing body to include more non-nuclears (and particularly Italy). The Italians also seek a permanent committee to carry on the work and to implement the recommendations of the non-nuclear conference, an idea unpleasant to the nuclear powers.

Positions of Principal Non-Signatories

8. The following paragraphs discuss the prospects for signature in the major countries now holding out. Each of these countries will probably defer a decision until the US ratifies. In most of them, US ratification would generally encourage the proponents of signature, but in important instances early US action would not decisively tip the scales. The failure of a US ratification effort, of course, would finish off the treaty.

West Germany

9. The key country in Europe obviously remains West Germany. The decision for Bonn has been an agonizing one, with strong feeling running both pro and con. Under present circumstances there is no prospect for early action. The Czechoslovak invasion has aggravated German suspicions of the Soviets, and the continuing Soviet verbal broadsides against West Germany have further thinned the ranks of NPT supporters. Upper echelons of the Christian Democratic Union, which seem to be close to the public mood on the matter, contend that the Federal Republic

should not risk entering into such an important undertaking with a nation whose readiness to break its word and to intervene in other countries was amply demonstrated in Czechoslovakia on 21 August. Officials of the Social Democratic Party, while still sympathetic to the treaty, say that the Soviet intervention rendered any West German action on the NPT politically impossible for the time being. A number of frequently heard arguments have been trotted out again. Three are of particular interest in West Germany: 1) there is no guarantee of unimpaired access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; 2) there is no clear substantive linkage between the treaty and vertical disarmament; and 3) German security is not adequately assured.

10. Of special importance to Bonn has been the Soviet contention, following Czechoslovakia, that, under Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter, the USSR has the right to intervene in West German affairs if the Federal Republic engages in acts of provocation. Some Germans have linked this obviously strained construction of the Charter with ratifying the NPT. Naturally, any such intervention would be of overwhelming international import, which leads to the conclusion that the Soviet claim was probably an effort to regain the propaganda initiative after the Czechoslovak invasion. This, however, does not eliminate concern over the issue among the Germans.

11. West German action on the NPT is thus unlikely for the time being. Disarmament specialists in Bonn have said that there certainly will be no action until next year at least, very possibly not until after elections in late 1969, and maybe not even then. But the NPT still has friends in Bonn, chief among them Foreign Minister Brandt and the Social Democrats. They see the treaty as an important adjunct to their policies of detente, and as they revive talk of the latter they are likely to resume supporting the NPT. Signatures by other key holdouts will be influential in West Germany. Many in Bonn will be following the treaty's progress in the US Senate. Ratification by the US, particularly if it creates momentum toward ratification by other countries, will in the end probably lead to West

German accession, but Bonn will be in no hurry and will probably require further urging by the major powers.

Japan

12. Japanese leaders basically support the NPT, but have reservations on certain points. The Japanese wish to see further progress toward nuclear disarmament, security guarantees of a higher order than those proffered, and equal treatment under the safeguards provisions for all countries. The latter point is of special importance to business leaders, who seek protection from "commercial espionage" and fear that the relative freedom the US and the USSR have from safeguards gives them a commercial advantage.

13. The government would like to have a specific bilateral guarantee of protection against nuclear attack from one or more of the NPT's nuclear sponsors--a guarantee of more assured duration than the US-Japan Security Treaty--and Japan may not sign unless it obtains such a guarantee. Chinese progress in weaponry is a matter of concern to the Japanese, which, together with apprehensions stirred up by Czechoslovakia, has germinated some support for holding open the nuclear weapon option.

14. Policymakers will continue to follow closely the decisions of other major powers, particularly West Germany and India, before making any decision. Ratification of the NPT by the US would not, by itself, have an overriding impact on Japan. In fact, the Sato government would be loath for domestic political reasons to appear subservient to Washington by acting on the heels of US Senate ratification. It will probably take favorable action by the US and major non-nuclear holdouts like West Germany and India to build up enough internal pressure for Japanese signature and ratification.

India and Pakistan

15. When the Security Council passed the security assurances resolution as part of the NPT package, India--a member of the Security Council at the

time--abstained. India has refused to sign the treaty, and there is no indication that it will change its policy in the foreseeable future. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi reaffirmed this decision in early November, citing popular opposition as a major factor. Additionally the government still takes a dim view of the security assurances arrangement in view of India's proximity to China, and Indian policymakers remain dubious that the treaty will in fact retard proliferation. The safeguards provisions are unpopular with the nuclear establishment in the country. Also, the government is quite possibly taking a second look at the weapons option. There seem to be few arguments that could enhance the chances of Indian adherence to the treaty at this time. And, as a prime example of the regional balance required to secure NPT ratification, unless and until India becomes a party to the NPT, Pakistan will not sign or ratify.

Italy

16. Italy is expected to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty during the first few months of 1969 if the United States has ratified by then. At present, government preoccupation with domestic political uncertainties is a factor against immediate signature of the treaty. However, the most important element influencing Italian leaders to go along with popular feeling and sign will probably be the attitude of the United States as shown by its own actions on ratification. Popular sentiment as reflected by most parliamentary delegates strongly favors the treaty. Once the treaty is signed and presented to the Parliament, ratification should follow quickly.

Israel and the Arabs

17. The Israelis continue to resist signing the treaty, and so long as conditions in the Middle East do not improve, there is little likelihood of a change in their position. Prime Minister Eshkol said recently that he saw no reason for Israel to rush into the pact. He raised the issue of possible Soviet-Arab supervision, under the safeguards provisions, of Israel's nuclear program, a spurious issue

since the IAEA's nuclear procedures will permit a state in effect to choose the nationality of the inspectors assigned it. He also argued that Israel could ill afford to relinquish the nuclear option without ironclad security assurances, since the Soviets might give nuclear weapons to the Arabs in violation of the treaty at any time. In the meantime, the Israelis' nuclear program proceeds apace.

18. All of the Arab countries have signed the treaty. Among them only the UAR has a peacetime nuclear program of any significance. They have leveled verbal barrages at the Israelis, and are clearly concerned that Israel's inaction on the NPT is indicative of a nascent Israeli nuclear weapons development program. It is doubtful whether US ratification would have much bearing on Arab willingness to ratify.

Other Countries

19. Among other nonsigners are France, Communist China, Indonesia, and Australia. France has never participated in the ENDC, it has said it will not sign the treaty, and there is no indication that this attitude is changing. It no doubt wants Germany to adhere to the treaty, however, and probably will not prevent EURATOM's negotiating a safeguards arrangement with the IAEA.

20. Peking has regarded the NPT from the outset as an effort to perpetuate the "US-Soviet nuclear monopoly" and will not become a party to the treaty. Indonesia and Australia are both bothered by their proximity to Communist China and have not yet made up their minds. If a substantial landslide of support should develop for the treaty, however, it is quite possible that both would ultimately decide to affirm the pact.

21. South Africa, a producer of fissionable material, is dissatisfied with the extent to which safeguards under the treaty would encroach on its industrial operations, even though South Africa as a member of IAEA has always cooperated with safeguards requirements. The South Africans, never strongly in favor of the NPT, have seized upon the

Czechoslovak occupation as a reason for not agreeing to the treaty. They have used this as an excuse to keep available the privilege of beginning a nuclear weapons program, should it appear necessary. They would probably hold fast to this position despite a timely US ratification.

22. In Latin America, three key nations--Brazil, Argentina, and Chile--are closely linked as indefinite holdouts against signing the treaty. Rio, which has assumed a role of leadership among the three, has consistently opposed the NPT on grounds that the potential restrictions impinge on Brazil's "sovereign right" to develop its own national nuclear programs. It also points to the allegedly inadequate security guarantees and the absence of a binding commitment among the nuclear powers to limit their arsenals of nuclear weapons. These attitudes reflect the traditional national sentiment that Brazil is destined for "Great Power" status, and the government will probably not alter its view that the NPT is an obstacle to this national goal. Foreign Minister Magalhaes Pinto, who has formulated the Brazilian opposition, is probably reflecting accurately widespread Brazilian nationalist sentiment.

23. Argentina has taken an almost identical position and in fact is following the Brazilian lead. With traditional ambitions for leadership in South America, it apparently will not modify its policy until Brazil has done so. Chile, a traditional rival of Argentina, in turn will probably not sign the NPT until both Argentina and Brazil have become signatories. Cuba is adamantly opposed to the treaty and will not sign.

24. Mexico is the one major country of the hemisphere which has taken an active role in support of the NPT and the only one in the area to ratify it thus far. Its stance is a logical projection of its leading role in the formulation and promotion of the Treaty of Tlaltelolco of 1967, which designates the southern half of the hemisphere a nuclear-free zone.

Soviet Position

25. The Soviet Union is clearly disturbed by the NPT's loss of momentum. Moscow fears that any additional delay invites further efforts by the non-nuclear countries to create obstacles. Like the US, the Soviets have pushed hard, in public and in private, for signatures, although the invasion of Czechoslovakia has impeded success.

26. The Soviets themselves have not yet ratified the NPT. Early US ratification would reduce uncertainty and would probably give prospects for early Soviet ratification a boost.

Expectations

27. The NPT has become so integrally tied to other international issues that to bring it into effect at an early date will be difficult under the best of circumstances. With the passage of time, attrition of support could be fatal to it. It is probably safe to say that the treaty's prospects depend upon accession by West Germany and at least one or two of the other prominent holdouts. Unless a trend of ratification can be started by these countries, the effects of the inertia of delay which have already rendered the treaty moribund could finish it off entirely.

28. There appear to be several contingencies which could produce substantial new interest in ratifying the treaty. If the French could be persuaded to assume some of the obligations of the treaty--such as voluntary acceptance of safeguards, West German receptivity would probably be enhanced. If the Soviets toned down their anti-Bonn diatribes, it would assist those Germans who favor the treaty. Support from a number of countries would grow if Moscow should make a token acceptance of safeguards. And naturally, easing of major international tensions over Vietnam and the Middle East would be helpful.

29. Many countries have tied their willingness to agree to the NPT to US-USSR progress in disarmament; yet, ironically, many of the same countries are experiencing unprecedented apprehensions that the Great

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Powers may "get together" too readily. Although it is quite possible that US ratification of the treaty would give a boost to its prospects, inertia and delay have already taken their toll of support and will be hard to overcome.

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ANNEX

STATES WHICH HAVE SIGNED THE NPT
(On 1 July 1968 unless otherwise indicated)

- | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. U.S. | 43. Lebanon |
| 2. Afghanistan | 44. Lesotho - July 9 |
| 3. Austria | 45. Liberia |
| 4. Barbados | 46. Libya - July 19 |
| 5. Belgium - Aug. 20 | 47. Luxembourg - Aug. 14 |
| 6. Bolivia | 48. Malagasy Republic - Aug. 22 |
| 7. Botswana | 49. Malaysia |
| 8. Bulgaria | 50. Maldive Islands - Sept. 11 |
| 9. Cameroon - July 17 | 51. Mauritius |
| 10. Canada - July 23 | 52. Mexico - July 26 (ratified) |
| 11. Ceylon | 53. Mongolia |
| 12. Chad | 54. Morocco |
| 13. Republic of China | 55. Nepal |
| 14. Colombia | 56. Netherlands - Aug. 20 |
| 15. Congo (Kinshasa) - July 22 | 57. New Zealand |
| 16. Costa Rica | 58. Nicaragua |
| 17. Cyprus | 59. Nigeria (ratified) |
| 18. Czechoslovakia | 60. Norway |
| 19. Dahomey | 61. Panama |
| 20. Denmark | 62. Paraguay |
| 21. Dominican Republic | 63. Peru |
| 22. Ecuador - July 9 | 64. Philippines |
| 23. El Salvador | 65. Poland |
| 24. Ethiopia - Sept. 5 | 66. Romania |
| 25. Finland | 67. San Marino |
| 26. Gambia - Sept. 20 | 68. Senegal |
| 27. Ghana | 69. Somali Republic |
| 28. Greece | 70. Sweden - Aug. 19 |
| 29. Guatemala - July 26 | 71. Syria |
| 30. Haiti | 72. Togo |
| 31. Honduras | 73. Trinidad & Tobago - Aug. 20 |
| 32. Hungary | 74. Tunisia |
| 33. Iceland | 75. USSR |
| 34. Iran | 76. UAR |
| 35. Iraq | 77. UK (ratified) |
| 36. Ireland (ratified) | 78. Upper Volta - Nov. 25 |
| 37. Ivory Coast | 79. Uruguay |
| 38. Jordan - July 10 | 80. Venezuela |
| 39. Kenya | 81. Vietnam |
| 40. Republic of Korea | 82. Yemen Arab Rep. - Sept. 23 |
| 41. Kuwait - Aug. 15 | 83. Yugoslavia - July 10 |
| 42. Laos | |

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1968 NOV 27 PM 3 31

RECEIVED
BOSTON'S OFFICE

24

TEXT OF NPT

25
June 14, 1968

Text of Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

ARTICLE V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

ARTICLE VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

ARTICLE VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

ARTICLE VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into

force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to

all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in _____ at _____ this _____
of _____.

26

Circulars

ORIGIN/ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

DEF 18-6

MPT

4-3

RM/R	REP	AF
1		5
ARA	EUR	PE
10	5	EA
NEA	CU	INR
7		5
	P	IO
SP	2	5
L	ACDA	SCF
	17	4
	OUT GIPM	45
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AGR	COM	FRB
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TR	XMB	AIR
		5
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
3	10	5
OSD	USIA	NSA
34	10	3
NSC		REC
4		8

Original to be Filed in _____ Decentralized Files.

FILE DESIGNATION

CA-10061

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NO.

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS

INFO: US Mission GENEVA
 US Mission NATO
 US Mission VIENNA for IAEA
 USUN New York

FROM : Department of State

DATE:

AUG 8 7 44 PM '68

SUBJECT: Signatures at Washington of Non-Proliferation Treaty

REF :

Posts of all States which have not yet signed in Washington the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are requested to inform the Foreign Office of the following: Since July 1, when 56 States signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in Washington, the following 10 additional States have signed in Washington: Cameroon, Canada, Congo (Kinshasa), Ecuador, Guatemala, Jordan, Lesotho, Libya, Mexico, and Yugoslavia. One State - Ireland - has deposited its instrument of ratification in Washington. On the occasion of signing, the Mexican Ambassador presented a note stating the understanding of the Mexican Government concerning the Treaty and requesting that the text thereof be communicated to the States having the right to become parties to the Treaty.

For the Embassy's convenience in communicating this information, there are enclosed for transmittal to the Foreign Office copies of (1) a list of all the countries which have signed in Washington and (2) the note of July 26, 1968 from the Mexican Ambassador to the Secretary of State (with English and French translations by the Department's Division of Language Services).

Signatory States are being informed of the foregoing by circular note to the Chiefs of Mission at Washington. This airgram is accordingly being transmitted to posts of those States for information purposes only.

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FORM 4-63 DS-323

In Out

Drafted by: <i>em</i> L:L/T:EMcDowell:eec x5727	Drafting Date: 8-8-68	Content and Classification Approved by: <i>OCB</i> L/T:CIBevans
Clearances: ACDA - Mr. Stein	ARA - Mr. Monsma	EA - Mr. LaRoche
AF - Mr. Ruchti	EUR/RPM - Mr. Collins	NEA/RA - Mr. Buckle

LS - Mrs. Woerheide (info)

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Posts of non-signatory States may at their discretion take this opportunity to make appropriate representations to urge signature in Washington at an early date.

FOR BERN: You should transmit the information to the Government of Liechtenstein as well as the Government of Switzerland.

FOR MADRID: You should request the Foreign Office to have the Spanish Ambassador, Cairo, pass copy of Mexican note to UAR on behalf of the United States Government.

FOR PRETORIA: The note from the Republic of Korea, stating that its signature does not imply recognition of any territory or regime not previously recognized by it, is not being circulated to non-signatory States.

RUSK

Enclosures:

1. List
2. Note of July 26, 1968
from Mexican Ambassador
(with translations)

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Signatories at Washington to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons

July 1 - 31, 1968

United States of America	Ireland
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Ivory Coast
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Jordan
Afghanistan	Kenya
Austria	Republic of Korea
Barbados	Laos
Bolivia	Lebanon
Botswana	Lesotho
Bulgaria	Liberia
Cameroon	Libya
Canada	Malaysia
Ceylon	Mauritius
Republic of China	Mexico
Colombia	Morocco
Congo (Democratic Republic of)	New Zealand
Costa Rica	Nepal
Cyprus	Nicaragua
Czechoslovakia	Nigeria
Dahomey	Norway
Denmark	Panama
Dominican Republic	Paraguay
Ecuador	Peru
El Salvador	Philippines
Finland	Poland
Ghana	Romania
Greece	San Marino
Guatemala	Senegal
Haiti	Somali Republic
Honduras	Togo
Hungary	Tunisia
Iceland	Uruguay
Iran	Venezuela
	Republic of Viet-Nam
	Yugoslavia

COPY

EMBAJADA DE MEXICO

3461
Washington, D.C.,
26 de julio de 1968

Señor Secretario:

Al firmar el Tratado Sobre la no Proliferación de las Armas Nucleares anexo a la resolución 2373 (XXII) aprobada por la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas el 12 de junio de 1968, tengo el honor de declarar que el Gobierno de México entiende:

1.- Que, en virtud de lo que se estipula en el Artículo Séptimo del Tratado, ninguna de las disposiciones del mismo deberá interpretarse en el sentido de afectar en manera alguna los derechos y obligaciones de México en su carácter de Estado Parte en el Tratado para la Proscripción de las Armas Nucleares en la América Latina (Tratado de Tlatelolco), abierto a firma el 14 de febrero de 1967 y sobre el cual la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas adoptó la Resolución 2286 (XXII) de 5 de diciembre de 1967; y

2.- Que actualmente todo explosivo nuclear es susceptible de usarse como arma nuclear y que no hay ningún indicio de que en un futuro próximo se puedan fabricar explosivos nucleares que no sean potencialmente armas nucleares. Sin embargo, si los adelantos tecnológicos llegaran a modificar esa situación, habría que enmendar las disposiciones pertinentes del Tratado, de acuerdo con el procedimiento que el mismo establece.

Mi Gobierno desea que el de Vuestra Excelencia, en su carácter de Gobierno depositario del Tratado, al informar a los Estados facultados para llegar a ser Partes en el Tratado de la firma del mismo por el Gobierno de México, tenga a bien comunicarles igualmente el texto de la presente declaración.

Aprovecho la oportunidad para reiterar a Vuestra Excelencia las seguridades de mi más alta consideración.

/s/ Hugo B. Margáin
Hugo B. Margáin

Excelentísimo señor Dean Rusk
Secretario de Estado
Washington, D.C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Division of Language Services

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Enclosure 2
Page 2

(Translation)

EMBASSY OF MEXICO
No. 3461

Washington, D.C.
July 26, 1968

Mr. Secretary:

In signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons annexed to Resolution 2373 (XXII), approved by the United Nations General Assembly on June 12, 1968, I have the honor to state that the Government of Mexico understands:

1. That, in view of Article VII of the Treaty, none of the provisions of the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of Mexico as a State Party to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty), opened for signature on February 14, 1967 and on which Treaty the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2286 (XXII) of December 5, 1967; and

2. That, at the present time, any nuclear explosive device may be used as a nuclear weapon, and that there is no indication that in the near future it will be possible to manufacture nuclear explosive devices that are not potentially nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, if technological progress should change that situation, it would be necessary to amend the pertinent provisions of the Treaty, in accordance with the procedure established therein.

My Government requests that Your Excellency's Government, as the Depositary Government of the Treaty, in informing the States having the right to become Parties to the Treaty of its signature by the Government of Mexico, be good enough to communicate to them also the text of this declaration.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

/signed/ Hugo B. Margáin
Hugo B. Margáin

His Excellency
Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Division of Language Services
(Translation)

AMBASSADE DU MEXIQUE

3461

Washington, D.C.

le 26 juillet 1968

Monsieur le Secrétaire d'Etat,

En signant le Traité sur la Non-Prolifération des Armes nucléaires figurant en annexe de la Résolution 2373 (XXII), approuvée par l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies le 12 juin 1968, j'ai l'honneur de déclarer que le Gouvernement du Mexique entend ce qui suit:

1. En vertu de l'Article VII du Traité, aucune des dispositions dudit Traité ne sera interprétée comme affectant d'une manière quelconque les droits et obligations du Mexique en tant qu'Etat Partie au Traité d'Interdiction des Armes nucléaires en Amérique latine (Traité de Tlatelolco) ouvert à la signature le 14 février 1967, traité au sujet duquel l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies a adopté la Résolution 2286 (XXII) du 5 décembre 1967; et

2. A l'heure actuelle, tout explosif nucléaire est susceptible d'être utilisé comme arme nucléaire et rien n'indique que dans le proche avenir il sera possible de fabriquer des explosifs nucléaires qui ne soient pas potentiellement des armes nucléaires. Néanmoins, au cas où les progrès technologiques aboutiraient à une modification de cet état de choses, il serait nécessaire de procéder à l'amendement des dispositions pertinentes du Traité, conformément à la procédure prévue audit Traité.

Le Gouvernement du Mexique souhaite que le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis, en sa qualité de Gouvernement dépositaire du Traité, en informant les Etats ayant la faculté de devenir Parties au Traité de la signature dudit Traité par le Gouvernement du Mexique, veuille bien leur communiquer également le texte de la présente déclaration.

Veillez agréer, Excellence, l'assurance renouvelée de ma plus haute considération.

[signé] Hugo B. Margáin
Hugo B. Margáin

Son Excellence
Monsieur Dean Rusk
Secrétaire d'Etat
Washington, D.C.



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DRAFTED BY: EUR/RPM:RDCOLLINS
APPROVED BY: EUR - MR. SPRINGSTEEN

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SUBJECT: LEGISLATIVE RECORD ON NPT - PRESIDENT'S TRANSMITTAL
LETTER

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
FORWARDING THE NPT TO THE SENATE:

BEGIN TEXT

THE WHITE HOUSE,
JULY 9, 1968.

TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:

I AM TRANSMITTING HERewith, FOR THE ADVICE AND CONSENT
OF THE SENATE TO RATIFICATION, THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLI-
FERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

THIS TREATY WAS OPENED FOR SIGNATURE ON JULY 1, 1968
IN WASHINGTON, LONDON AND MOSCOW. NINETY-FIVE MEMBERS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS HAD VOTED TO COMMEND IT, AND TO REQUEST THAT IT
BE OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE
DATE.

ON JULY 1 IT WAS SIGNED IN WASHINGTON BY THE UNITED STATES

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OF AMERICA, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND 53 OTHER STATES. MANY OTHERS HAVE INDICATED THEIR INTENTION TO SIGN IT PROMPTLY.

I CONSIDER THIS TREATY TO BE THE MOST IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT LIMITING NUCLEAR ARMS SINCE THE NUCLEAR AGE BEGAN. IT IS A TRIUMPH OF SANITY AND OF MAN'S WILL TO SURVIVE.

THE TREATY TAKES A MAJOR STEP TOWARD A GOAL THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN SEEKING FOR THE PAST TWENTY-TWO YEARS. BEGINNING WITH THE MCMAHON ACT IN 1946, OUR STATUTES HAVE FORBIDDEN THE TRANSFER OF OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO OTHERS.

IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE COMPLEMENTED THOSE OF THE CONGRESS. EVER SINCE THE BARUCH PLAN OF 1946, WE HAVE SOUGHT TO ACHIEVE AN INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS ON THIS SUBJECT.

IN MAKING THE FIRST UNITED STATES TEST BAN PROPOSAL, PRESIDENT EISENHOWER NOTED THAT HIS PURPOSE WAS TO CURTAIL THE UNCONTROLLED SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

WHEN PRESIDENT KENNEDY ANNOUNCED THE SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION OF THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY IN 1963, HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT IT WOULD BE THE OPENING WEDGE IN A CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE POINTED OUT THAT A NUMBER OF OTHER NATIONS COULD SOON HAVE THE CAPACITY TO PRODUCE SUCH WEAPONS, AND URGED THAT WE USE WHATEVER TIME REMAINED TO PERSUADE SUCH COUNTRIES NOT TO FOLLOW THAT COURSE.

IN 1964, IN THE FIRST MESSAGE I SUBMITTED TO THE GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, I PROPOSED AN AGREEMENT THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS NOT BE TRANSFERRED TO NON-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES, AND THAT ALL TRANSFERS OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES TAKE PLACE UNDER INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS.

IN 1966, THE UNITED STATES SENATE CLEARLY SHOWED ITS SUPPORT FOR NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD A NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. NINETY-NINE SENATORS DECLARED THEMSELVES IN FAVOR OF THE PASTOREI RESOLUTION (SENATE RESOLUTION 179). IT COMMENDED SERIOUS AND URGENT EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS LIMITING THE SPREAD OF

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT SUPPORTED ADDITIONAL EFFORTS BY THE PRESIDENT WHICH WERE APPROPRIATE AND NECESSARY FOR THE SOLUTION OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS.

THE TREATY I AM SUBMITTING TO YOU TODAY IS THE PRODUCT OF THESE EFFORTS BY THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BRANCHES. ITS PROVISIONS ARE DESCRIBED IN DETAIL IN THE ACCOMPANYING REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

ITS CENTRAL PURPOSE IS TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ITS BASIC UNDERTAKING WAS DELIBERATELY PATTERNED AFTER UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY LEGISLATION, WHICH FORBIDS TRANSFERS OF OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO OTHERS. THE TREATY NOT ONLY MAKES SUCH A PROHIBITION BINDING ON ALL NUCLEAR POWERS; IT REINFORCES THE PROHIBITION BY BARRING NON-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES FROM RECEIVING THEM FROM ANY SOURCE, FROM MANUFACTURING OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRING THEM, AND FROM SEEKING OR RECEIVING ANY ASSISTANCE IN THEIR MANUFACTURE.

THE TREATY, HOWEVER, DOES MORE THAN JUST PROHIBIT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT WOULD ALSO PROMOTE THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES UNDER SAFEGUARDS.

THIS IS THE GOAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA), WHICH RESULTED FROM PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S "ATOMS FOR PEACE" PLAN. THE IAEA IS CHARGED WITH THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR SAFEGUARDS UNDER THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. IT ALREADY HAS CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE IN APPLYING SAFEGUARDS UNDER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION IN THE CIVIL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY.

I BELIEVE THAT THIS TREATY WILL GREATLY ADVANCE THE GOAL OF NUCLEAR COOPERATION FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES UNDER INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS.

IT WILL REQUIRE THAT ALL PARTIES WHICH EXPORT NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT TO NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES MAKE SURE THAT SUCH MATERIALS, AND THOSE USED OR PRODUCED IN SUCH EQUIPMENT, ARE UNDER INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS.

IT WILL REQUIRE ALL NON-NUCLEAR PARTIES TO ACCEPT INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS ON ALL PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES WITHIN THEIR TERRITORIES, UNDER THEIR JURISDICTION, OR CARRIED OUT UNDER

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THEIR CONTROL ANYWHERE.

IT WILL HELP INSURE COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, AND THE EXCHANGE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL INFORMATION ON SUCH PEACEFUL APPLICATIONS.

IT WILL ENABLE ALL COUNTRIES TO ASSIST NON-NUCLEAR PARTIES TO THE TREATY WITH THEIR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES, CONFIDENT THAT THEIR ASSISTANCE WILL NOT BE DIVERTED TO THE MAKING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

IT OBLIGATES THE NUCLEAR-WEAPONS PARTIES TO MAKE POTENTIAL BENEFITS FROM ANY PEACEFUL APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS AVAILABLE -- ON A NON-DISCRIMINATORY BASIS, AND AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE COST-- TO PARTIES TO THE TREATY THAT ARE REQUIRED TO GIVE UP THE RIGHT TO HAVE THEIR OWN NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES.

BY 1985 THE WORLD'S PEACEFUL NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS WILL PROBABLY BE TURNING OUT ENOUGH BY-PRODUCT PLUTONIUM FOR THE PRODUCTION OF TENS OF NUCLEAR BOMBS EVERY DAY. THIS CAPABILITY MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO RESULT IN THE FURTHER SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE NUCLEAR ANARCHY, AND THE ENERGY DESIGNED TO LIGHT THE WORLD COULD PLUNGE IT INTO DARKNESS.

BUT THE TREATY HAS A SIGNIFICANCE THAT GOES BEYOND ITS FURTHERANCE OF THESE IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES NUCLEAR POLICY. IN THE GREAT TRADITION OF THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY, IT REPRESENTS ANOTHER STEP ON THE JOURNEY TOWARD WORLD PEACE. I BELIEVE THAT ITS VERY ACHIEVEMENT, AS WELL AS ITS PROVISIONS, ENHANCES THE PROSPECTS OF PROGRESS TOWARD DISARMAMENT.

ON MONDAY, JULY 1--AS THIS TREATY WAS SIGNED ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES--I ANNOUNCED THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS IN THE NEAREST FUTURE ON THE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF BOTH OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS, AND SYSTEMS OF DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES. THUS THERE IS HOPE THAT THIS TREATY WILL MARK THE BEGINNING OF A NEW PHASE IN THE QUEST FOR ORDER AND MODERATION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

I URGENTLY RECOMMEND THAT THE SENATE MOVE SWIFTLY TO ENHANCE

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OUR SECURITY AND THAT OF THE ENTIRE WORLD BY GIVING ITS CONSENT
TO THE RATIFICATION OF THIS TREATY.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

END TEXT RUSK

NOTE: POUCHED MOSCOW BY OC/T.

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DRAFTED BY: ACDA/IR:EAWALKER
APPROVED BY: ADCa/IR A SAMEUL DE PALMA
ACDA/IR - MR. NEEDLE

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TO ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS
ALL AMERICAN REPUBLIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS
ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS
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REFERENCE: STATE 188827

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF US DECLARATION MADE JUNE 17 IN THE UN
SECURITY COUNCIL IN EXPLANATION OF US VOTE ON SECURITY COUNCIL
RES. 255, JUNE 19, 1968:

BEGIN TEXT

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES NOTES WITH APPRECIATION

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THE DESIRE EXPRESSED BY A LARGE NUMBER OF STATES TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

WE WELCOME THE WILLINGNESS OF THESE STATES TO UNDERTAKE NOT TO RECEIVE THE TRANSFER FROM ANY TRANSFEROR WHATSOEVER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES OR OF CONTROL OVER SUCH WEAPONS OR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES DIRECTLY, OR INDIRECTLY; NOT TO MANUFACTURE OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES; AND NOT TO SEEK OR RECEIVE ANY ASSISTANCE IN THE MANUFACTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES.

THE UNITED STATES ALSO NOTES THE CONCERN OF CERTAIN OF THESE STATES THAT IN CONJUNCTION WITH THEIR ADHERENCE TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, APPROPRIATE MEASURES BE UNDERTAKEN TO SAFEGUARD THEIR SECURITY. ANY AGGRESSION ACCOMPANIED BY THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD ENDANGER THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF ALL STATES.

BEARING THESE CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND, THE UNITED STATES DECLARES THE FOLLOWING:

AGGRESSION WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, OR THE THREAT OF SUCH AGGRESSION, AGAINST A NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE WOULD CREATE A QUALITATIVELY NEW SITUATION IN WHICH THE NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES WHICH ARE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD HAVE TO ACT IMMEDIATELY THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TAKE THE MEASURES NECESSARY TO COUNTER SUCH AGGRESSION OR TO REMOVE THE THREAT OF AGGRESSION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, WHICH CALLS FOR TAKING "COLLECTIVE MEASURES FOR THE PREVENTION AND REMOVAL OF THREATS TO THE PEACE, AND FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF ACTS OF AGGRESSION OR OTHER BREACHES OF THE PEACE". THEREFORE, ANY STATE WHICH COMMITS AGGRESSION ACCOMPANIED BY THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR WHICH THREATENS SUCH AGGRESSION MUST BE AWARE THAT ITS ACTIONS ARE TO BE COUNTERED EFFECTIVELY BY MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER TO SUPPRESS THE AGGRESSION OR REMOVE THE THREAT OF AGGRESSION.

THE UNITED STATES AFFIRMS ITS INTENTION, AS A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, TO SEEK IMMEDIATE SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE, IN ACCORDANCE

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WITH THE CHARGER, TO ANY NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE PARTY TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT IS A VICTIM OF AN ACT OF AGGRESSION OR AN OBJECT OF A THREAT OF AGGRESSION IN WHICH NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE USED.

THE UNITED STATES REAFFIRMS IN PARTICULAR THE INHERENT RIGHT, RECOGNIZED UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER, OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE IF AN ARMED ATTACK, INCLUDING A NUCLEAR ATTACK, OCCURS AGAINST A MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, UNTIL THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS TAKEN MEASURES NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

THE UNITED STATES VOTE FOR THE RESOLUTION BEFORE US AND THIS STATEMENT OF THE WAY IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES INTENDS TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS ARE BASED UPON THE FACT THAT THE RESOLUTION IS SUPPORTED BY OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHO ARE NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES AND ARE ALSO PROPOSING TO SIGN THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND THAT THESE STATES HAVE MADE SIMILAR STATEMENTS AS TO THE WAY IN WHICH THEY INTEND TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER. END TEXT

DECONTROL UPON RECEIPT. KATZENBACH

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RSC 01, SCI 05, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, NSA 02, SAH 02, /179 R

DRAFTED BY: ACDA/IR: EAWALKER
APPROVED BY: ACDA/IR: SDEPALMA
ACDA/IR: JAPRESEL
ACDA/GC: CVANDOREN

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TO ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS
ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS
ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS
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USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL FLORENCE
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XMT USMISSION NATO
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FOLLOWING IS FINAL TEXT OF "TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS" TO BE OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN CAPITALS OF
DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS JULY 1ST: BEGIN TEXT

THE STATES CONCLUDING THIS TREATY, HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO
AS THE "PARTIES TO THE TREATY",

CONSIDERING THE DEVASTATION THAT WOULD BE VISITED UPON ALL

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MANKIND BY A NUCLEAR WAR AND THE CONSEQUENT NEED TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO AVERT THE DANGER OF SUCH A WAR AND TO TAKE MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD THE SECURITY OF PEOPLES,

BELIEVING THAT THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD SERIOUSLY ENHANCE THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR,

IN CONFORMITY WITH RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY CALLING FOR THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF WIDER DISSEMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,

UNDERTAKING TO COOPERATE IN FACILITATING THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY SAFEGUARDS ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES,

EXPRESSING THEIR SUPPORT FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND OTHER EFFORTS TO FURTHER THE APPLICATION, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM, OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SAFEGUARDING EFFECTIVELY THE FLOW OF SOURCE AND SPECIAL FISSIONABLE MATERIALS BY USE OF INSTRUMENTS AND OTHER TECHNIQUES AT CERTAIN STRATEGIC POINTS,

AFFIRMING THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE BENEFITS OF PEACEFUL APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, INCLUDING ANY TECHNOLOGICAL BY-PRODUCTS WHICH MAY BE DERIVED BY NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES FROM THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES, SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES TO ALL PARTIES TO THE TREATY, WHETHER NUCLEAR-WEAPON OR NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES,

CONVINCED THAT, IN FURTHERANCE OF THIS PRINCIPLE, ALL PARTIES TO THE TREATY ARE ENTITLED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FULLEST POSSIBLE EXCHANGE OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION FOR, AND TO CONTRIBUTE OR IN COOPERATION WITH OTHER STATES TO, THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE APPLICATIONS OF ATOMIC ENERGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES,

DECLARING THEIR INTENTION TO ACHIEVE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE THE CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND TO UNDERTAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES IN THE DIRECTION OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT,

URGING THE COOPERATION OF ALL STATES IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECTIVE,

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RECALLING THE DETERMINATION EXPRESSED BY THE PARTIES TO THE 1963 TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER IN ITS PREAMBLE TO SEEK TO ACHIEVE THE DISCONTINUANCE OF ALL TEST EXPLOSIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR ALL TIME AND TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS TO THIS END,

DESIRING TO FURTHER THE EASING OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION AND THE STRENGTHENING OF TRUST BETWEEN STATES IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE CESSATION OF THE MANUFACTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE LIQUIDATION OF ALL THEIR EXISTING STOCKPILES, AND THE ELIMINATION FROM NATIONAL ARSENALS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE MEANS OF THEIR DELIVERY PURSUANT TO A TREATY ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT UNDER STRICT AND EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL,

RECALLING THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, STATES MUST REFRAIN IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY ARE TO BE PROMOTED WITH THE LEAST DIVERSION FOR ARMAMENTS OF THE WORLD'S HUMAN AND ECONOMIC RESOURCES,

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

ARTICLE I

EACH NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE PARTY TO THE TREATY UNDERTAKES NOT TO TRANSFER TO ANY RECIPIENT WHATSOEVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES OR CONTROL OVER SUCH WEAPONS OR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES DIRECTLY, OR INDIRECTLY, AND NOT IN ANY WAY TO ASSIST, ENCOURAGE, OR INDUCE ANY NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE TO MANUFACTURE OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES, OR CONTROL OVER SUCH WEAPONS OR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES.

ARTICLE II

EACH NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE PARTY TO THE TREATY UNDERTAKES NOT TO RECEIVE THE TRANSFER FROM ANY TRANSFEROR WHATSOEVER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES OR OF CONTROL OVER SUCH WEAPONS OR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES DIRECTLY, OR

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INDIRECTLY; NOT TO MANUFACTURE OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES; AND NOT TO SEEK OR RECEIVE ANY ASSISTANCE IN THE MANUFACTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES.

ARTICLE III

1. EACH NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE PARTY TO THE TREATY UNDERTAKES TO ACCEPT SAFEGUARDS, AS SET FORTH IN AN AGREEMENT TO BE NEGOTIATED AND CONCLUDED WITH THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND THE AGENCY'S SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM, FOR THE EXCLUSIVE PURPOSE OF VERIFICATION OF THE FULFILLMENT OF ITS OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED UNDER THIS TREATY WITH A VIEW TO PREVENTING DIVERSION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FROM PEACEFUL USES TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES. PROCEDURES FOR THE SAFEGUARDS REQUIRED BY THIS ARTICLE SHALL BE FOLLOWED WITH RESPECT TO SOURCE OR SPECIAL FISSIONABLE MATERIAL WHETHER IT IS BEING PRODUCED, PROCESSED OR USED IN ANY PRINCIPAL NUCLEAR FACILITY OR IS OUTSIDE ANY SUCH FACILITY. THE SAFEGUARDS REQUIRED BY THIS ARTICLE SHALL BE APPLIED ON ALL SOURCE OR SPECIAL FISSIONABLE MATERIAL IN ALL PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF SUCH STATE, UNDER ITS JURISDICTION, OR CARRIED OUT UNDER ITS CONTROL ANYWHERE.

2. EACH STATE PARTY TO THE TREATY UNDERTAKES NOT TO PROVIDE: (A) SOURCE OR SPECIAL FISSIONABLE MATERIAL, OR (B) EQUIPMENT OR MATERIAL ESPECIALLY DESIGNED OR PREPARED FOR THE PROCESSING, USE OR PRODUCTION OF SPECIAL FISSIONABLE MATERIAL, TO ANY NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES, UNLESS THE SOURCE OR SPECIAL FISSIONABLE MATERIAL SHALL BE SUBJECT TO THE SAFEGUARDS REQUIRED BY THIS ARTICLE.

3. THE SAFEGUARDS REQUIRED BY THIS ARTICLE SHALL BE IMPLEMENTED IN A MANNER DESIGNED TO COMPLY WITH ARTICLE IV OF THIS TREATY, AND TO AVOID HAMPERING THE ECONOMIC OR TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARTIES OR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING THE INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT FOR THE PROCESSING, USE OR PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ARTICLE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SAFEGUARDING SET FORTH IN THE PREAMBLE OF THE TREATY.

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4. NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES PARTY TO THE TREATY SHALL CONCLUDE AGREEMENTS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THIS ARTICLE EITHER INDIVIDUALLY OR TOGETHER WITH OTHER STATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. NEGOTIATION OF SUCH AGREEMENTS SHALL COMMENCE WITHIN 180 DAYS FROM THE ORIGINAL ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THIS TREATY. FOR STATES DEPOSITING THEIR INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION OR ACCESSION AFTER THE 180-DAY PERIOD, NEGOTIATION OF SUCH AGREEMENTS SHALL COMMENCE NOT LATER THAN THE DATE OF SUCH DEPOSIT. SUCH AGREEMENTS SHALL ENTER INTO FORCE NOT LATER THAN EIGHTEEN MONTHS AFTER THE DATE OF INITIATION OF NEGOTIATIONS.

ARTICLE IV

1. NOTHING IN THIS TREATY SHALL BE INTERPRETED AS AFFECTING THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ALL THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY TO DEVELOP RESEARCH, PRODUCTION AND USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION AND IN CONFORMITY WITH ARTICLES I AND II OF THIS TREATY.

2. ALL THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY UNDERTAKE TO FACILITATE, AND HAVE THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN, THE FULLEST POSSIBLE EXCHANGE OF EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS AND SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL INFORMATION FOR THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY. PARTIES TO THE TREATY IN A POSITION TO DO SO SHALL ALSO COOPERATE IN CONTRIBUTING ALONE OR TOGETHER WITH OTHER STATES OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES, ESPECIALLY IN THE TERRITORIES OF NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES PARTY TO THE TREATY, WITH DUE CONSIDERATION FOR THE NEEDS OF THE DEVELOPING AREAS OF THE WORLD.

ARTICLE V

EACH PARTY TO THE TREATY UNDERTAKES TO TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO ENSURE THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS TREATY, UNDER APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION AND THROUGH APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES, POTENTIAL BENEFITS FROM ANY PEACEFUL APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES PARTY TO THE TREATY ON A NON-

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DISCRIMINATORY BASIS AND THAT THE CHARGE TO SUCH PARTIES FOR THE EXPLOSIVE DEVICES USED WILL BE AS LOW AS POSSIBLE AND EXCLUDE ANY CHARGE FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES PARTY TO THE TREATY SHALL BE ABLE TO OBTAIN SUCH BENEFITS, PURSUANT TO A SPECIAL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT OR AGREEMENTS, THROUGH AN APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL BODY WITH ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION OF NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES. NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT SHALL COMMENCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE TREATY ENTERS INTO FORCE. NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES PARTY TO THE TREATY SO DESIRING MAY ALSO OBTAIN SUCH BENEFITS PURSUANT TO BILATERAL AGREEMENTS.

ARTICLE VI

EACH OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY UNDERTAKES TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH ON EFFECTIVE MEASURES RELATING TO CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AT AN EARLY DATE AND TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, AND ON A TREATY ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT UNDER STRICT AND EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL.

ARTICLE VII

NOTHING IN THIS TREATY AFFECTS THE RIGHT OF ANY GROUP OF STATES TO CONCLUDE REGIONAL TREATIES IN ORDER TO ASSURE THE TOTAL ABSENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES.

ARTICLE VIII

1. ANY PARTY TO THE TREATY MAY PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THIS TREATY. THE TEXT OF ANY PROPOSED AMENDMENT SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO THE DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS WHICH SHALL CIRCULATE IT TO ALL PARTIES TO THE TREATY. THEREUPON, IF REQUESTED TO DO SO BY ONE-THIRD OR MORE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY, THE DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS SHALL CONVENE A CONFERENCE, TO WHICH THEY SHALL INVITE ALL THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY, TO CONSIDER SUCH AN AMENDMENT.

2. ANY AMENDMENT TO THIS TREATY MUST BE APPROVED BY A MAJORITY OF THE VOTES OF ALL THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY, INCLUDING THE VOTES OF ALL NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES PARTY TO THE TREATY AND ALL OTHER PARTIES WHICH, ON THE DATE THE AMENDMENT IS CIRCULATED, ARE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE INTERNATIONAL

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ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. THE AMENDMENTS SHALL ENTER INTO FORCE FOR EACH PARTY THAT DEPOSITS ITS INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION OF THE AMENDMENT UPON THE DEPOSIT OF SUCH INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION BY A MAJORITY OF ALL THE PARTIES, INCLUDING THE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION OF ALL NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES PARTY TO THE TREATY AND ALL OTHER PARTIES WHICH, ON THE DATE THE AMENDMENT IS CIRCULATED ARE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. THEREAFTER, IT SHALL ENTER INTO FORCE FOR ANY OTHER PARTY UPON THE DEPOSIT OF ITS INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION OF THE AMENDMENT.

3. FIVE YEARS AFTER THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THIS TREATY, A CONFERENCE OF PARTIES TO THE TREATY SHALL BE HELD IN GENEVA, SWITZERLAND, IN ORDER TO REVIEW THE OPERATION OF THIS TREATY WITH A VIEW TO ASSURING THAT THE PURPOSES OF THE PREAMBLE AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY ARE BEING REALIZED. AT INTERVALS OF FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER, A MAJORITY OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY MAY OBTAIN, BY SUBMITTING A PROPOSAL TO THIS EFFECT TO THE DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS, THE CONVENING OF FURTHER CONFERENCES WITH THE SAME OBJECTIVE OF REVIEWING THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY.

ARTICLE IX

1. THIS TREATY SHALL BE OPEN TO ALL STATES FOR SIGNATURE. ANY STATE WHICH DOES NOT SIGN THE TREATY BEFORE ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 3 OF THIS ARTICLE MAY ACCEDE TO IT AT ANY TIME.

2. THIS TREATY SHALL BE SUBJECT TO RATIFICATION BY SIGNATORY STATES. INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION AND INSTRUMENTS OF ACCESSION SHALL BE DEPOSITED WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, WHICH ARE HEREBY DESIGNATED THE DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS.

3. THIS TREATY SHALL ENTER INTO FORCE AFTER ITS RATIFICATION BY THE STATES, THE GOVERNMENTS OF WHICH ARE DESIGNATED DEPOSITARIES OF THE TREATY, AND FORTY OTHER STATES SIGNATORY TO THIS TREATY AND THE DEPOSIT OF THEIR INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION. FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS TREATY, A NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE IS ONE WHICH HAS MANUFACTURED AND EXPLODED

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A NUCLEAR WEAPON OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE PRIOR TO JANUARY 1, 1967.

4. FOR STATES WHOSE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION OR ACCESSION ARE DEPOSITED SUBSEQUENT TO THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THIS TREATY, IT SHALL ENTER INTO FORCE ON THE DATE OF THE DEPOSIT OF THEIR INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION OR ACCESSION.

5. THE DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS SHALL PROMPTLY INFORM ALL SIGNATORY AND ACCEDING STATES OF THE DATE OF EACH SIGNATURE, THE DATE OF DEPOSIT OF EACH INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION OR OF ACCESSION, THE DATE OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THIS TREATY, AND THE DATE OF RECEIPT OF ANY REQUESTS FOR CONVENING A CONFERENCE OR OTHER NOTICES.

6. THIS TREATY SHALL BE REGISTERED BY THE DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 102 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

ARTICLE X

1. EACH PARTY SHALL IN EXERCISING ITS NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY HAVE THE RIGHT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE TREATY IF IT DECIDES THAT EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS, RELATED TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS TREATY, HAVE JEOPARDIZED THE SUPREME INTERESTS OF ITS COUNTRY. IT SHALL GIVE NOTICE OF SUCH WITHDRAWAL TO ALL OTHER PARTIES TO THE TREATY AND TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL THREE MONTHS IN ADVANCE. SUCH NOTICE SHALL INCLUDE A STATEMENT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS IT REGARDS AS HAVING JEOPARDIZED ITS SUPREME INTERESTS.

2. TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY, A CONFERENCE SHALL BE CONVENED TO DECIDE WHETHER THE TREATY SHALL CONTINUE IN FORCE INDEFINITELY, OR SHALL BE EXTENDED FOR AN ADDITIONAL FIXED PERIOD OR PERIODS. THIS DECISION SHALL BE TAKEN BY A MAJORITY OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY.

ARTICLE XI

THIS TREATY, THE ENGLISH, RUSSIAN, FRENCH, SPANISH AND CHINESE TEXTS OF WHICH ARE EQUALLY AUTHENTIC, SHALL BE DEPOSITED IN THE ARCHIVES OF THE DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS. DULY CERTIFIED

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COPIES OF THIS TREATY SHALL BE TRANSMITTED BY THE DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE SIGNATORY AND ACCEDING STATES.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF THE UNDERSIGNED, DULY AUTHORIZED, HAVE SIGNED THIS TREATY.

DONE IN-----AT-----THIS-----
OF-----.

END TEXT

DECONTROL ON RECEIPT. KATZENBACH

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INFO IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, OST 01, AEC 11, SCI 05, AF 09, ARA 08, EA 10, EUR 15, NEA 13, SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, NASA 04, OIC 05, /163 R

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IO - MR. ALLEN
L - MR. SALANS
EUR - MR. SPRINGSTEEN
EA - MISS MCNUTT
ARA - MR. MONSMA
NEA - MR. BOGOSIAN
WHITE HOUSE MR. KEENY
S/S - MR. SHEPARD

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-342
By , NARA, Date 12-6-94

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TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE

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GENEVA, WARSAW, BUDAPEST, PRAGUE, SOFIA AND BUCHAREST FOR INFO
ROUTINE; ALL OTHERS ACTION IMMEDIATE.

SUBJECT: SIGNATURE OF NPT

1. GA RES COMMENDING NPT, ADOPTED ON JUNE 13, QUOTE
REQUESTS THE DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS TO OPEN THE TREATY FOR
SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE.
UNQUOTE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH US IN NEW YORK, SOVIETS HAVE URGED
THAT TREATY BE OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN WASHINGTON, MOSCOW

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AND LONDON NOT LATER THAN JULY 1. WE HAVE AGREED TO TAKE SOUNDINGS TO ASCERTAIN WHICH COUNTRIES WOULD BE PREPARED TO SIGN AT THIS TIME.

2. EMBASSIES ARE REQUESTED TO TAKE SOUNDING AT APPROPRIATE LEVELS IN FONOFFS TO ASCERTAIN IF HOST GOVTS COULD BE READY TO SIGN ON JULY 1. WE ARE NOT NOW FORMALLY PRESSING FOR JULY 1, SINCE AS A RESULT OF THESE SOUNDINGS WE MAY DECIDE, TOGETHER WITH SOVIETS AND UK, TO MAKE STRONG PITCH FOR SLIGHTLY LATER DATE. WE ARE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN HAVING REACTIONS FROM GOVTS WHICH CO-SPONSORED UNGA RES AND JAPAN, FRG, SOAFRICA, AUSTRALIA, ISRAEL AND PAKISTAN. IN ANY CAPITALS WHERE EMBASSIES BELIEVE THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF HOST GOVERNMENT GIVING CONSIDERATION TO JULY 1 SIGNING DATE AND THAT SOUNDINGS MAY PREJUDICE GOVERNMENTS' CONSIDERATION OF SLIGHTLY LATER DATE, OR WHERE IT IS CLEAR GOVERNMENT HAS NO PRESENT INTENTION OF SIGNING, EMBASSIES MAY REFRAIN FROM TAKING SOUNDING BUT SHOULD IN THIS CASE PROVIDE US WITH THEIR ANALYSIS OF HOST GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE.

3. FOR BONN: YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR IN APPROACHING FRG THAT OUR PRESENT UNDERSTANDING FRG POSITION IS THAT AS STATED BY BRANDT FRG WOULD BE NEITHER FIRST NOR LAST TO SIGN, AND OUR INCLUSION FRG IN WORLDWIDE CONSULTATION RE DATE OF OPENING TREATY FOR SIGNATURE SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED AS US PRESSURE. REGARDLESS OF GERMAN INTENTIONS RE SIGNING ON ANY OF DATES UNDER CONSIDERATION WOULD WELCOME ANY VIEWS FRG MAY HAVE RE DESIRABILITY OPENING FOR SIGNATURE ON JULY 1 AS OPPOSED OTHER POSSIBLE DATES.

4. FOR USUN: YOU SHOULD INFORM SOVIETS AND BRITISH OF NATURE OF SOUNDINGS WE ARE TAKING AND EXPRESS HOPE THAT THEY ARE TAKING SIMILAR SOUNDINGS.

5. FOR LONDON: YOU SHOULD DISCUSS WITH FONOFF NATURE OF OUR REACTIONS AND REQUEST THAT FONOFF KEEP US INFORMED OF ANY REACTIONS WHICH THEY RECEIVE.

6. FYI. CO-SPONSORS OF UN RES WERE: AFGHANISTAN, AUSTRIA, BARBADOS, BELGIUM, BOLIVIA, BULGARIA, BYELORUSSIAN SSR, CANADA, COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, CZECH, DENMARK, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, FINLAND, GUATEMALA, HUNGARY, ICELAND, IRAN, IRAQ, IRELAND, ITALY, LEBANON, MAURITIUS, MEXICO, MONGOLIA, MOROCCO, NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, NICARAGUA, NIGERIA, NORWAY, PARAGUAY, PERU, PHILIPPINES,

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POLAN, SOMALIA, SUDAN, SYRIA, UKRAINIAN SSR, USSR, UAR, UK, US,
URUGUAY, VENEZUELA, YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC, AND LIBERIA. END
FYI. GP-3. RUSK

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By ing, NARA, Date 9-13-94

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ORIGIN ACDA 16

INFO ARA 08, IO 13, SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CIAE 00, AEC 11, DODE 00,
GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NASA 04, NSAE 00, NSC 10, OIC 05, OST 01,
P 04, RSC 01, SCI 05, SP 02, SS 20, CPR 02, 118 R

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ACDA/IR - MR. NEIDLE
ARA/LA/IPA - MR. MONSMA

.....
O R 281704Z JUN 68 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY KINGSTON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN
INFO USMISSION GENEVA

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DISTO

SUBJECT: NPT SIGNING

1. UNDERSTAND FROM WASHINGTON EMBASSIES THAT NO RPT NO INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED REGARDING THEIR PARTICIPATION NPT SIGNING CEREMONY JULY 1. USG DESIRES MAXIMIZE NUMBER PARTICIPANTS THIS HISTORIC OCCASION.

2. REQUEST YOU MAKE FURTHER APPROACH HOST GOVTS IN EFFORT ENCOURAGE THEIR PARTICIPATION WHITE HOUSE CEREMONY. IN THIS REGARD YOU MAY FIND IT USEFUL MENTION WE NOW ANTICIPATE APPROXIMATELY THIRTY-FIVE TO FORTY STATES SIGN JULY 1. INCLUDING PROBABLY BARBADOS, BOLIVIA, COLOMBIA, DOM. REP, ECUADOR, EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, NICARAGUA, PARAGUAY.

3. SPANISH TEXT NPT SENT PER STATE 190000 DTD JUNE 25.
GP-3.
RUSK

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INFO OIC 05, H 02, NEA 13, NSC 10, NASA 04, INR 07, P 04, CIAE 00, EUR 15,
DODE 00, SP 02, SCI 05, SS 20, AEC 11, AF 09, GPM 03, SC 01, SAH 03, L 03,
ARA 08, EA 10, IO 13, USIA 12, OST 01, RSC 01, NSA 02, MM 01, /185 R

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ACDA/IR: MR GLEYSTEN

ACDA/ST: DR SCOVILLE

ACDA/GC: MR BUNN

NEA/RA: COL FREDERICH S

EUR/RPM: MR COLLINS

EA/RA: MISS MCNUTT

ARA: MR MONSMA

L/SPA: MR FUTERMAN

IO: MR POPPER

AEC: MR LABOWITZ

DOD: COL HUMPHRIES

AF/AFI: COL MEGNA

R 200136Z JAN 68

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS

ALL AMERICAN REPUBLIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS

ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS

ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS

AMEMBASSY BERN 0000

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0000

AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0000

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AMEMBASSY MADRID 0000

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0000

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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0000
USMISSION BERLIN 0000
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 0000
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 0000
USMISSION GENEVA 0000
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0000
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0000
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 0000
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0000
AMEMBASSY SOFIA 0000
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0000

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IAEA NATUS DISTO BUSEC

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

ADDIS ABABA, LAGOS, MEXICO, NEW DELHI, RANGOON, RIO DE JANEIRO,
FOR INFO.

NATUS/DISTO/BUSEC/IAEA

REF: CA-1545

SUBJECT: AIDE MEMOIRE ON JANUARY 18, 1968 DRAFT NPT

REVISED IDENTICAL DRAFTS OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
WERE PRESENTED BY THE US AND SOVIET CO-CHAIRMEN FOR CON-
SIDERATION BY THE ENDC ON JANUARY 18 (STATE 101302). THESE
DRAFTS REVISE AND COMPLETE THE ARTIAL DRAFT TEXT PRESENTED
ON AUGUST 24, 1967.

THE FOLLOWING AIDE-MEMOIRE, CONTAINING AN EXPLANATION OF
THE JANUARY 18 DRAFT, SHOULD BE CONVEYED TO FONOFF AT AP-
PROPRIATE LEVEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

AIDE MEMOIRE

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THE US AND SOVIET CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE EIGHTEEN NATION DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE ON JANUARY 18, 1968 PRESENTED THE ATTACHED DRAFT NPT TO THE RESUMED CONFERENCE OF THE ENDC. THIS DRAFT, WHICH IS A REVISION OF AN EARLIER VERSION OF AUGUST 24, 1967, REFLECTS CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF USEFUL SUGGESTIONS MADE IN THE ENDC AND BY OTHER GOVERNMENTS. THE TEXT NOW REPRESENTS A COMPLETE TREATY. THE DRAFT TEXT IS A RECOMMENDATION FOR DISCUSSION AND NEGOTIATION IN THE ENDC AND FOR CONSIDERATION OF ALL GOVERNMENTS. THE TEXT WILL BE CONSIDERED AT A RESUMED SESSION OF THE UNGA TO BE HELD LATER.

THE US GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT THE ATTACHED TEXT REPRESENTS A MAJOR STEP TOWARD WIDESPREAD AGREEMENT ON A TREATY TO HALT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THAT THE ENDC SHOULD NOW PROCEED TO PREPARE A COMPLETE AND DEFINITIVE TEXT FOR RECOMMENDATION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BUT NO LATER THAN MARCH 15, 1968, PURSUANT TO GA RESOLUTION 2346(XXII).

ALTHOUGH THE REVISED DRAFT DOES NOT DEAL WITH SECURITY ASSURANCES, THE CO-CHAIRMEN REMAIN MINDFUL OF THEIR PLEDGES TO PROVIDE THE COMMITTEE WITH A RECOMMENDATION FOR DEALING WITH THIS QUESTION.

AGREEMENT BY THE CO-CHAIRMEN ON A SAFEGUARDS ARTICLE (ARTICLE III) HAS BEEN REACHED AFTER COMPLEX AND EXTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS. THE US GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN GREATLY ENCOURAGED BY STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT IN THE ENDC FOR A SAFEGUARDS ARTICLE WHICH IS BASIC TO THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY. THE US GOVT CONSIDERS EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS IN THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY TO BE OF SUCH GREAT IMPORTANCE THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON ANNOUNCED ON DECEMBER 2 THE INTENTION OF THE US TO PERMIT THE IAEA TO APPLY ITS SAFEGUARDS -- WHEN SUCH SAFEGUARDS ARE APPLIED UNDER THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY -- TO ALL ITS NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES, EXCLUDING ONLY THOSE HAVING DIRECT NATIONAL SECURITY SIGNIFICANCE. THIS OFFER DEMONSTRATES THE CONFIDENCE OF THE US THAT SAFEGUARDS WILL NOT IMPOSE INDUSTRIAL, ECONOMIC OR OTHER BURDENS ON TREATY SIGNATORIES.

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THE SAFEGUARDS ARTICLE WILL SERVE TO VERIFY THAT NO DIVERSION OF SOURCE OR SPECIAL FISSIONABLE MATERIAL FROM PEACEFUL USES TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAS TAKEN PLACE. THE EXTENSIVE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS CALLED FOR BY THE TREATY WILL PROVIDE A SIGNIFICANT IMPETUS FOR ACCELERATED COOPERATION AMONG PARTIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR RESEARCH AND INDUSTRY SINCE THERE WILL BE MORE WIDESPREAD CONFIDENCE INTERNATIONALLY IN PROVIDING SOURCE AND SPECIAL FISSIONABLE MATERIAL, SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT AND INFORMATION TO NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES.

UNDER ARTICLE III, SAFEUARDS WILL BE APPLIED ON ALL SOURCE OR SPECIAL FISSIONABLE MATERIAL EMPLOYED IN PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES OF NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON PARTIES. THESE SAFEGUARDS ARE INTENDED SOLELY TO VERIFY THE FULFILLMENT OF OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED UNDER THE TREATY AND SHALL BE AS SET FORTH IN AN AGREEMENT NEGOTIATED AND CONCLUDED WITH THE IAEA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATUTE OF THE IAEA AND THE IAEA'S SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM.

THE REFERENCE TO AGENCY'S SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE III SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS INCORPORATING THE PRESENT IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM DOCUMENTS IN THE TREATY. ACCORDINGLY, AN AMENDMENT TO THE NPT WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED FOR REVISION OF THESE IAEA DOCUMENTS. THE PREAMBLE OF THE TREATY EXPRESSES SUPPORT FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TO FURTHER THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS WITHIN THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM WHICH ALSO PROVIDES FOR PERIODIC REVIEW IN LIGHT OF FURTHER EXPERIENCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS.

SAFEGUARDS ARE TO BE IMPLEMENTED IN A MANNER TO AVOID HAMPERING THE ECONOMIC OR TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARTIES OR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES.

AGREEMENTS BY NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES WITH THE IAEA MAY BE MADE EITHER INDIVIDUALLY OR TOGETHER WITH OTHER STATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATUTE OF THE IAEA. THE STATUTE PERMITS THE IAEA TO ENTER INTO AGREEMENTS, CONCERNING THE SAFEGUARDS OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES, WITH ANOTHER INTERNATIONAL

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ORGANIZATION, THE WORK OF WHICH IS RELATED TO THE IAEA AND THE MEMBERSHIP OF WHICH INCLUDES THE PARTIES CONCERNED.

THE US HAS BEEN GUIDED BY THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES IN THE FORMULATION OF ARTICLE III.

1. THERE SHOULD BE SAFEGUARDS FOR ALL NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON PARTIES OF SUCH NATURE THAT ALL PARTIES CAN HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THEIR EFFECTIVENESS. THEREFORE SAFEGUARDS ESTABLISHED BY AN AGREEMENT NEGOTIATED AND CONCLUDED WITH THE IAEA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATUTE OF THE IAEA AND THE AGENCY'S SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM MUST ENABLE THE IAEA TO CARRY OUT ITS RESPONSIBILITY OF PROVIDING ASSURANCE THAT NO DIVERSION IS TAKING PLACE.

2. IN DISCHARGING THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE III, NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON PARTIES MAY NEGOTIATE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS WITH THE IAEA BILATERALLY OR TOGETHER WITH OTHER PARTIES, AND SPECIFICALLY, AN AGREEMENT COVERING SUCH OBLIGATIONS MAY BE ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE IAEA AND ANOTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION THE WORK OF WHICH IS RELATED TO THE IAEA AND THE MEMBERSHIP OF WHICH INCLUDES THE PARTIES CONCERNED.

3. IN ORDER TO AVOID UNNECESSARY DUPLICATION, THE IAEA SHOULD MAKE APPROPRIATE USE OF EXISTING RECORDS AND SAFEGUARDS, PROVIDED THAT UNDER SUCH MUTUALLY AGREED ARRANGEMENTS THE IAEA CAN SATISFY ITSELF THAT NUCLEAR MATERIAL IS NOT DIVERTED TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES.

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ARTICLE IV HAS BEEN REVISED TO MAKE IT MORE POSITIVE AND TO MAKE EVEN MORE EXPLICIT THE RIGHTS OF SIGNATORIES TO USE NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF THE REVISED ARTICLE IS IDENTICAL TO THE FIRST PHRASE OF THE PREVIOUS DRAFT. THE SECOND PARAGRAPH REVISES AND STATES POSITIVELY THE RIGHTS OF PARTIES TO PARTICIPATE IN SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGES. IT ALSO AFFIRMS THE OBLIGATION OF THE PARTIES TO COOPERATE IN ASSISTING IN FURTHERING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR

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PAGE 06 STATE 102128

PEACEFUL PURPOSES. IT PROVIDES THAT SUCH COOPERATION MAY BE UNDERTAKEN ALONE, WITH OTHER STATES, OR WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. THE FINAL PHRASE OF PARAGRAPH TWO STRESSES THAT SUCH COOPERATION SHOULD BE DIRECTED SPECIALLY TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEACEFUL APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN THE TERRITORIES OF NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES PARTIES TO THE TREATY.

#####

ARTICLE V OF THE PRESENT DRAFT REPLACES THE EIGHTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH OF THE PREVIOUS DRAFT DEALING WITH THE APPLICATIONS OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. THIS ARTICLE TRANSFORMS THE PREVIOUS DECLARATION OF INTENTION INTO A FORMAL COMMITMENT TO COOPERATE TO ENSURE THAT POTENTIAL BENEFITS FROM ANY PEACEFUL APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS BE MADE AVAILABLE TO NON-NUCLEAR PARTIES. BENEFITS MAY BE MADE AVAILABLE EITHER BILATERALLY OR THROUGH APPROPRIATE MULTILATERAL PROCEDURES. THE NEW LANGUAGE MAKES CLEAR THAT THE BENEFITS FROM PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION APPLICATIONS MUST BE MADE AVAILABLE TO NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON PARTIES ON A NON-DISCRIMINATORY BASIS AND THAT THE CHARGE FOR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES USED SHOULD BE AS LOW AS POSSIBLE EXCLUDING ANY CHARGE FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEVICES. MOREOVER, NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON PARTIES WHO SO DESIRE MAY OBTAIN THESE BENEFITS FROM NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES THROUGH AN APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL BODY WHICH WOULD INCLUDE ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION OF THE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES.

#####

ARTICLE VI OF THE PRESENT DRAFT IS A NEW ARTICLE UNDER WHICH EACH PARTY TO THE TREATY ASSUMES THE UNDERTAKING TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING THE CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND DISARMAMENT, AS WELL AS ON A TREATY ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT UNDER STRICT AND EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL. NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE CAN PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY AND NEED NOT BE INCLUDED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A TREATY ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT THE EXISTING PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS ON THIS SUBJECT WERE NOT DELETED.

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A NEW ARTICLE VII HAS BEEN ADDED REPLACING THE LAST PRE-AMBULAR PARAGRAPH OF THE PREVIOUS DRAFT. IT STATES THE PRINCIPLE THAT NOTHING IN THE TREATY AFFECTS THE RIGHTS OF ANY GROUP OF STATES TO CONCLUDE REGIONAL TREATIES IN ORDER TO ASSURE THE TOTAL ABSENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES. THE EXPRESSION OF THIS PRINCIPLE IN THE OPERATIVE SECTION OF THE TREATY UNDERLINES ITS IMPORTANCE.

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ARTICLE VIII, WHICH CONTAINS PROCEDURES FOR AMENDMENT OF THE TREATY, HAS BEEN REVISED SO THAT AMENDMENTS WOULD ENTER INTO FORCE ONLY FOR THOSE PARTIES WHICH ACCEPT THEM.

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ARTICLE IX PROVIDES THAT THE TREATY WILL ENTER INTO FORCE AFTER DEPOSIT OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION BY ALL NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES SIGNATORY TO THE TREATY AND 40 OTHER STATES SIGNATORY TO THE TREATY. AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION, THE US GOVT CONCLUDED THAT RATIFICATION BY THIS NUMBER OF STATES WOULD PERMIT ENTRY INTO FORCE WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME. THIS WOULD AVOID DELAY IN FURTHERING THE OBJECTIVE OF HALTING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

#####

THE PROVISION ON DURATION OF THE TREATY, ARTICLE X, HAS BEEN AMENDED IN LIGHT OF CONCERN EXPRESSED BY SOME COUNTRIES OVER A TREATY OF UNLIMITED DURATION. ALTHOUGH MINDFUL OF THE STRENGTH OF ARGUMENTS FOR A TREATY OF UNLIMITED DURATION, THE CO-CHAIRMAN HAVE INCLUDED PROVISION FOR A CONFERENCE TO MEET 25 YEARS AFTER THE TREATY HAS ENTERED INTO FORCE TO DECIDE WHETHER THE TREATY SHALL CONTINUE IN FORCE INDEFINITELY OR SHALL BE EXTENDED FOR AN ADDITIONAL FIXED PERIOD OR PERIODS. THIS DECISION SHALL BE TAKEN BY A MAJORITY OF PARTIES TO THE TREATY. THE CO-CHAIRMAN RECOGNIZED THE WIDE-SPREAD DESIRE THAT THE TREATY BE ASSURED AN

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ADEQUATE DURATION IN ORDER THAT CONFIDENCE WOULD BE CREATED ON WHICH OTHER VITAL NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT MEASURES COULD BE BASED.

FOR USUN; MISSION SHOULD CONVEY AIDE-MEMOIRE TO SYG AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC DECONTROL. RUSK

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G. Sant'Kearney
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F.S.

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

December 12, 1968

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-343

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

By , NARA, Date 9-13-94

Subject: Summary of 90-Day Transition Paper on NPT

The attached transition paper was prepared by ACDA and cleared with the Department of State. It recommends that: early Senate advice and consent be sought; that deposit of the US instrument of ratification not be delayed; and that we exert continued diplomatic efforts to gain maximum worldwide adherence to the NPT.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty has been signed by 84 countries, of which only 3, including the UK, have ratified.

The favorable support that had been building up for the Treaty received a severe setback with the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in August. Of non-nuclear countries considered technically capable of developing nuclear weapons, only Canada, Sweden, and the Benelux countries have signed so far. Non-signers include Australia, Brazil, the FRG, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, Pakistan, and South Africa.

A number of key non-signers have informed us that they are awaiting US ratification before they sign.

The NPT is a multilateral instrument whose entry into force is in the US interest, regardless of Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe. Early Senate action has become essential to give the Treaty new impetus to encourage a new series of signatures, as well as ratifications. Delay would give further excuse for not adhering to countries like Israel, where a decision to go nuclear is still a very real possibility.

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Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

DATE: 12/12/68
BY: [Signature]
FOR: [Signature]
SUBJECT: [Signature]

THE DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF

December 13, 1968

UNITED STATES VINE CONGRESS AND ORGANIZATIONAL VICES

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[Handwritten notes and signatures]

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- 2 -

Any expansion of the nuclear weapons club would deal our efforts to curb nuclear proliferation a serious if not fatal blow.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended that the President take into consideration the status of the Treaty action by "near-nuclear" countries before depositing the instrument of ratification. Earlier we told our Euratom allies we would take into account the status of their safeguards negotiations with the IAEA in deciding when to complete our ratification. However, the Czech events and consequent delay in Senate action and failure of the FRG and Italy to sign have produced a log-jam. Euratom negotiations with the IAEA cannot start until the FRG and Italy sign the Treaty. These countries are unlikely to do so until the US Senate acts and any doubt is removed that the new Administration is fully behind the Treaty.



Adrian S. Fisher
Acting

Attachment:

"Ninety-Day" Transition Paper - The Non-Proliferation Treaty

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M. Walsh

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"Ninety-Day" Transition Paper

The Non-Proliferation Treaty

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-343
By ing, NARA, Date 9-13-94

Problem

1. To achieve early US Senate advice and consent to ratification of the Non-proliferation Treaty.
2. To decide the appropriate time for deposit of the US instrument of ratification.
3. To exert continued efforts to gain maximum world-wide adherence to the Treaty.

Discussion

The Non-proliferation Treaty was opened for signature on July 1, 1968, in the three depositary capitals, Washington, London, and Moscow. The Treaty will go into effect after its ratification by the three depositary states and forty other countries. As of November 25, 84 nations (not including the GDR whose signature in Moscow we do not recognize) had signed the Treaty, of which three have also deposited their instruments of ratification. The UK ratified on November 27. Norway, Denmark and a few other countries not having nuclear weapons potential are expected to ratify in December 1968.

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Declassified at 12 year
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automatically declassified

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The favorable support that had been building up for the Treaty received a severe setback with the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in August. Since that time, the number of new signatories has slowed to a trickle. Most countries considered technically capable of developing nuclear weapons are unlikely to have signed by January 20, 1969. Of this advanced category only Canada, Sweden, and the Benelux countries have signed so far. Non-signers still include Australia, Brazil, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, Pakistan, and South Africa.

(B) The reasons for delay or refusal to sign vary. They include the desire to register disapproval over events in Czechoslovakia (Italy planned to sign on August 26, 1968, and Switzerland shortly thereafter, but the August 21 invasion caused a postponement of these plans); an unwillingness to sign until some crucial neighboring country does also (Pakistan's only stated reason for not signing); a basic desire not to renounce the nuclear option at this time (India, and possibly Israel, may be considered in this category); reluctance to assume the obligations of the Treaty without

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over to p. 3

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cont

some specific evidence in return of progress in achieving other national policy goals (the FRG position, in seeking an abatement of Soviet blackmail threats and hostile propaganda); substantive difficulties with some aspect of the Treaty (Brazil's concern with peaceful nuclear explosions); prestige reasons; ^{of Jimmy's judgment} the delay in US Senate approval of the Treaty, ^{had been critical but as an excuse and an inhibition on our diplomacy} and the awaiting of the new US Administration (Japan and others have indicated their delay is related to US action).

A

On September 17, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations voted 13 to 3 (with 3 abstentions) to recommend Senate advice and consent. However, the Committee Report of September 26 also ["]urges the President, once the Senate has acted, to consider delaying the process of depositing the United States instrument of ratification until such time as he has received positive assurances that a majority of those countries nearest to a nuclear weapons capability intend to adhere to the Treaty." A minority report recommended delay in Senate consideration of the Treaty for the purpose of resolving certain substantive questions and as a means of demonstrating the harmful effects of Soviet military action against Czechoslovakia upon US relations with the Soviet Union.

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In the end-of-session press for adjournment, the Senate did not bring the Treaty to a vote, but at this time of writing the prospects for advice and consent early next year appear good. In November Senator Mansfield announced plans to place the Treaty before the Senate as soon as possible after Congress reconvenes. Senate approval could thus conceivably come even before inauguration of the new President on January 20.

Courses of Action

1. Senate Advice and Consent. If the Senate has not yet acted, it is recommended that the new administration give urgent priority to gaining prompt US Senate advice and consent to ratification of the Non-proliferation Treaty.

The NPT is a multilateral instrument whose entry into force is in the US interest, regardless of Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe. Early Senate action has become essential to give the Treaty sufficient new international impetus so that most of those technically advanced countries towards which the Treaty is principally directed will sign and so that the Treaty can go into effect without inordinate delay. Delay on our part would be taken by many as an indication of wavering of US support for the basic objectives of the Treaty.

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It would have no appreciable moderating effect upon Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia. Delay could cause the Treaty to be overtaken by other unforeseen events, and thereby reduce the prospects for progress on related measures for controlling the arms race. Protracted delay would give a further excuse for not adhering to the Treaty to countries like Israel, where a future decision to go nuclear is still a very real possibility. Any expansion of the nuclear weapons club would deal our efforts to curb nuclear proliferation a serious if not fatal blow.

2. Deposit of Instrument of Ratification. Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia removed the momentum which the NPT acquired with the substantial number of initial signatories and subsequent signatures before August 21, action by the US to complete ratification probably is more necessary now than otherwise would have been the case to restore momentum to the Treaty. Although Senate consent to the Treaty would be viewed by some countries as a sufficient basis for them to sign or ratify the Treaty themselves, delay in the deposit of the US instrument of ratification might be interpreted as an indication that the new administration has reservations about

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the Treaty and could be used as a pretext for certain countries to delay further their signature or ratification. Additionally, it is doubtful that the Soviet Union will ratify until the US does.

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations recommended that the President take into consideration the status of Treaty action by "near-nuclear" countries before depositing the instrument of ratification. We told our allies who are members of EURATOM that we would take into account the status of their safeguards negotiations with the IAEA in deciding when to complete our ratification. This was done at the time that Article III on safeguards was being negotiated. Since then it has become clear that EURATOM probably will not commence negotiations with the IAEA until all five of its non-nuclear members have signed the NPT. Italy and the FRG have not yet done so. Although Italy may sign relatively soon, there seems little prospect that the FRG will do so at an early date. Early completion of US ratification thus may become necessary to stimulate new momentum. If we are to consider doing this, however, it would be necessary, given out statement to EURATOM mentioned above (US Aide Memoire,

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November 13, 1967) that we would consult with the EURATOM countries, to inform them of our intention to deposit our ratification promptly and to obtain their views about the status of EURATOM-IAEA negotiations.

It does not seem feasible or desirable to coordinate the timing of our ratification with that of the other depositary states. The UK has acted independently. Soviet spokesmen have indicated that the USSR will not ratify until the FRG has done so. However, it is possible that the USSR will wish to ratify promptly after the US has done so, particularly if the Soviets calculate that this would serve to hasten the FRG's adherence to the Treaty.

Avoidance of a coordinated formal ceremony in Washington and Moscow to deposit our instruments of ratification seems preferable on its own merits. We do not wish to underline the distinction between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states any more than necessary. Moreover, independent action by the US would blur the fallacious impression which persists among critics of the Treaty that it somehow represents a form of US-Soviet collaboration. Nevertheless, it would be prudent to approach the USSR bilaterally before completion of US

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ratification to determine what Soviet intentions are regarding their own ratification.

3. Additional Signatories. Assuming favorable US Senate action on the NPT early next year, the first ninety days of the new administration should be a crucial period in gaining the adherence to the NPT of many of the principal non-nuclear weapon countries whose signatures are still outstanding. Favorable Senate action will give us a stronger position than we have had in recent months from which to press for additional signatures. Australia, Japan, Italy and Switzerland have informed us explicitly that they are awaiting Senate action before determining what further action to take themselves. Although Sweden signed, it has informed us it will not ratify until the US does. Owing to the far-reaching implications to their national policy of the obligations these and other non-nuclear weapons countries will assume under the Treaty, continued diplomatic efforts on the part of the US will be required if we, as the principal Treaty sponsor, are to succeed in making the NPT truly world-wide. Experience with similar treaties in which the US has played a leading role suggests that continuing, discreet prodding is needed to assure ratification by other governments without inordinate delay.

ACDA/IR:HSMal in:GGleysteen

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Clearances:

ACDA/D	-	Mr. Foster
ACDA/DD	-	Mr. Fisher
ACDA/IR	-	Mr. Gleysteen (Draft)
ACDA/GC	-	Mr. Van Doren (Draft)
ACDA/ST	-	Mr. Rochlin (Draft)
ACDA/WEC	-	Col. Richards (Draft)
ACDA/E	-	Mr. Alexander (Draft)
EUR	-	Mr. Springsteen (Draft)
G/PM	-	Mr. Shaw (Draft)
L	-	Mr. Carter (Draft)
NEA/IAI	-	Mr. Sterner (Draft)

ACDA/IR:HSMalin:CGleysteen

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O\BN - Mr. [unclear] (12/12/68)

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VCDV\RED - Mr. [unclear] (12/12/68)

VODV\EL - Mr. [unclear] (12/12/68)

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1968 NOV 29 17 04

FROM BROMLEY SMITH
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO WALT ROSTOW
CITE CAP82813

68 NOV 29 PM 12:09
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

FS

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

HEREWITH MEMORANDA OF SECRETARY RUSK'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR ROBERT MURPHY THIS MORNING.

QUOTE

I TALKED TO AMBASSADOR MURPHY THIS MORNING BY TELEPHONE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND MR. NIXON'S ATTITUDE TOWARD IT. I TOLD HIM THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS VERY MUCH CONCERNED ABOUT THE SLIPPAGE OF TIME. IF THE MATTER WERE HELD OVER UNTIL JANUARY, THERE WOULD BE A NUMBER OF NEW SENATORS AND THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE DEMANDS FOR A NEW SET OF HEARINGS AND THAT THE MATTER MIGHT WELL GO OVER FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. DURING THIS PERIOD, OPPOSITION TO THE TREATY IN CERTAIN KEY COUNTRIES COULD JELL AND VARIOUS HORSES MIGHT ESCAPE FROM THE STABLE. CLEARLY THE POSSIBILITY OF A SUCCESSFUL SPECIAL SESSION OF THE SENATE WOULD TURN CRUCIALLY ON MR. NIXON'S ATTITUDE. IF HE WISHED THE NPT TO MOVE FORWARD PROMPTLY, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR HIM TO SAY SO AND MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE SENATE THAT THAT IS HIS VIEW. IF MR. NIXON WOULD PREFER THAT THE MATTER BE DELAYED THAT IS SOMETHING THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD WISH TO TAKE FULLY INTO ACCOUNT. UNDER THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH WE ALL FIND OURSELVES, THE ATTITUDE OF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT THEREFORE BECOMES VERY IMPORTANT EVEN THOUGH HE DOES NOT YET CARRY OFFICIAL RESPONSIBILITY.

AMBASSADOR MURPHY SAID THAT HE HAD TALKED TO MR. NIXON AT SOME LENGTH ABOUT THIS MATTER ON WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 27TH. HE SAID THAT MR. NIXON'S ATTITUDE WAS QUITE CLEAR, NAMELY, THAT THIS IS THE PRESIDENT'S RESPONSIBILITY. MR. NIXON FACES SOME REAL PROBLEMS AMONG MEMBERS OF HIS OWN PARTY ON THE SUBJECT. MURPHY SAID THAT MR. NIXON "WILL NOT EXPRESS ANY HOPES OR TAKE PART IN ANY DEBATE" ON THE SUBJECT. HE WILL "NOT INTERFERE OR TAKE AN ACTIVE PART". MURPHY SPECIFICALLY SAID THAT MR. NIXON "WILL NOT EXPRESS HOPE OF RATIFICATION IN A SPECIAL SESSION".

AFTER ASCERTAINING THAT THE ABOVE QUOTATIONS WERE ACCURATE (AT LEAST AS FAR AS AMBASSADOR MURPHY'S WORDS WERE CONCERNED), WE PASSED ON TO ANOTHER SUBJECT.
END QUOTE

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-344

By Cb, NARA, Date 6-1-95

From Rowley Smith
To T to President
Info Walt Rostow

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

~~SECRET- EYES ONLY~~

Herewith memorandum of Secretary Rusk's

36a

November 29, 1968
9:20 a. m.

~~MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR
ROBERT MURPHY *this morning*~~

quote I talked to Ambassador Murphy this morning by telephone on the subject of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Mr. Nixon's attitude toward it. I told him that the President was very much concerned about the slippage of time. If the matter were held over until January, there would be a number of new Senators and there would probably be demands for a new set of hearings and that the matter might well go over for several months. During this period, opposition to the Treaty in certain key countries could jell and various horses might escape from the stable. Clearly the possibility of a successful special session of the Senate would turn crucially on Mr. Nixon's attitude. If he wished the NPT to move forward promptly, it would be important for him to say so and make it clear to the Senate that that is his view. If Mr. Nixon would prefer that the matter be delayed that is something that the President would wish to take fully into account. Under the special circumstances in which we all find ourselves, the attitude of the President-elect therefore becomes very important even though he does not yet carry official responsibility.

Ambassador Murphy said that he had talked to Mr. Nixon at some length about this matter on Wednesday, November 27th. He said that Mr. Nixon's attitude was quite clear, namely, that this is the President's responsibility. Mr. Nixon faces some real problems among members of his own party on the subject. Murphy said that Mr. Nixon "will not express any hopes or take part in any debate" on the subject. He will "not interfere or take an active part". Murphy specifically said that Mr. Nixon "will not express hope of ratification in a special session".

After ascertaining that the above quotations were accurate (at least as far as Ambassador Murphy's words were concerned), we passed on to another subject. *end quote*

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Authority NLT 94-344
By *g/cb*, NARA, Date *11/13/01*

Rec'd
Dean Rusk

~~S:DR:jmr~~

J. S. KIMMITT
SECRETARY

United States Senate

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY FOR
THE MAJORITY

November 27, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: Senator Mansfield

FROM: Stan Kimmitt

At your direction, all current Democratic Senators were called on November 26 and asked, "Are you in favor of or against a special session to consider the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty?" Those who answered in favor were further queried as to their recommendation for a time for such a session.

The cumulative results were as follows:

17 - definitely in favor
33 - against
4 - no position
8 - unable to be contacted

This totals 62 other than yourself.

Names and comments are attached.

*Salpee, - Please call Mike Navatos
& give this to him for immediate
referral to the President.*

M. M.

*NPT
37*

*sent Ranch via wire
CAPS 2 795*

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Senators in favor of a special session with individual
comments:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>COMMENT</u>
Brewster	At any time
Clark	After December 6
Fulbright	If President-elect Nixon and Senator Russell concur
Gore	Soon
Gruening	Anytime
Hart	Anytime
Inouye	Soon
Kennedy	Soon
McGee	Anytime
Mondale	Anytime
Morse	Soon
Moss	Anytime
Pastore	"It won't work"
Pell	"If we can pass it"
Proxmire	Anytime
Randolph	Anytime
Young	Soon

Senators not in favor of a special session.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>COMMENT</u>
Anderson	
Bayh	Will cooperate
Bible	
Burdick	Will cooperate
Byrd (Va.)	Will cooperate
Cannon	
Church	Will cooperate
Dodd	
Eastland	
Ervin	
Harris	
Hartke	
Hill	Will cooperate
Holland	
Hollings	
Jackson	
Jordan	
Long (Mo.)	Will cooperate
Long (La.)	
McCarthy	Doesn't really care
McGovern	Will cooperate
McIntyre	
Metcalf	
Monroney	Will cooperate
Montoya	
Nelson	Will cooperate
Ribicoff	Will cooperate
Russell	Feels that in view of the security implications, hearings should be held by the Armed Services Committee prior to floor action.
Spong	Will cooperate
Symington	
Talmadge	
Tydings	
Byrd (W. Va.)	Will cooperate

Following Senators gave qualified answers to the question of a special session.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>COMMENT</u>
Muskie	He is doubtful that it will be successful unless President-elect Nixon assures Republican cooperation. He leaves it to your good judgment.
Hayden	Is not knowledgeable on the subject and leaves it to your judgment.
Sparkman	Will support you in any action you take.
Stennis	Needs further time to study the matter (in confidence, I believe that means he must first speak with Russell who is in Puerto Rico).

The following Senators were unable to be reached.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>COMMENT</u>
Bartlett	In hospital in Cleveland.
Ellender	In the Far East. Will return December 21, 1968.
Lausche	No answer.
Magnuson	Did not return our call.
McClellan	Did not return our call.
Smathers	Did not return our call.
Williams	Did not return our call.
Yarborough	In Viet Nam.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

Rd Dow

3586

38

November 25, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JAMES JONES
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Non-Proliferation Treaty

In response to the President's request, the following is our analysis, made by the Disarmament Agency and our Congressional Relations Office, of the effect personnel changes in the next Senate will have on the vote to approve the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Of the fourteen new Members of the Senate, we believe there will be eight whose votes will be the same as their predecessors. We believe there are six who might vote differently from their predecessors and here our best estimate is that there would be a net loss of one or possibly two.

These conclusions are contingent upon the continued active support for the Treaty by the President and upon President-elect Nixon also taking an affirmative stance in its behalf.

John P. Walsh
John P. Walsh

Deputy Executive Secretary

111
39
—


Monday, November 25, 1968

In response to the President's request, the following is our analysis made by the Disarmament Agency and the Congressional Liaison office and the effect of personnel changesⁱⁿ the next Senate will have on the vote to approve the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Of the 14 new members, we believe there will be 8 whose votes will be the same as their predecessors. We believe there are 6 who might vote differently from their predecessors. And our best estimate is that there would be a net loss of 1, or possibly 2.

These conclusions are contingent upon the continued active support for the treaty by the President and upon President-elect Nixon also taking an affirmative stance in its behalf.

cy - Keeney 11/26



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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15364

November 25, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: UK Ratification of NPT

The British Government has now acted to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Embassy in Washington is in receipt of the British instrument of ratification for deposit here. The Embassy has suggested that they bring the instrument to the Department for deposit this week.

The Soviets have not yet proposed to deposit their instrument. It is, of course, uncertain as to when the United States will be in a position to do so.

If all three Governments had now ratified the NPT, we would probably wish to arrange a ceremony for joint deposits. Since this is not the case, we plan to proceed with deposit of the British instrument. Indeed, we cannot properly decline to receive it if they wish to deposit at this time.

The British instrument will be deposited here at the State Department at 4 p.m., Wednesday, November 27. We plan appropriate press coverage and announcement of the event.

John P. Walsh
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-342
By mg, NARA, Date 12-6-94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED
ROSTOV'S OFFICE

1968 NOV 26 PM 3 15

ВН 11-0
ИВВВ ДМС
ИВ
11-315
КО ИВВВ
DECLASSIFIED

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Вен. ГИИИ Н. Косов

[Handwritten signature]

the above.
We have understood these concerns and announcements of
the State Department as of 11:30 AM, December 21.
The British Government will be advised here as

at this time.
Probably desire to receive it in the near future to discuss
with the British Government. Indeed, we cannot
discuss it since this is not the case. We have to discuss
the matter before we can discuss it in detail for the
if all three governments had not received the NPL

which states will be in a position to do so.
The State Department is of course, interested in the
The State Department has not yet proposed to discuss this

week.
Using the information to the Department for discussion this
for discussion here. The Bureau has suggested that this
is in receipt of the British Government of information
non-disclosure areas, and the Bureau in Washington
The British Government has not acted to receive the

subject: UK participation of NPL

THE WHITE HOUSE
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MILT M. ROSSON



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 22, 1968



MEMORANDUM FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Handwritten notes]

1968

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

1:20 PM -- Monday,
November 11, 1968*Ridstow*

41

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Dr. Ridrick, the Senate Parliamentarian, advises that the NPT, carries over into the new session of the Congress without need for action again by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The rules of the Senate, however, give the Foreign Relations Committee the option to hold additional hearings in January, or to acquiesce in a request from Majority Leader Mansfield to proceed to immediate consideration of the Treaty by the Senate without delay.

I talked to Senator Mansfield on Saturday prior to his departure for the NATO Parliamentarians Conference in Brussels, and it is his plan to suggest to the Foreign Relations Committee, of which he is a member, that it authorize the Senate to proceed to the consideration of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the first order of business immediately after the new Senate Committees are organized.

I have also discussed the Treaty with Senator Aiken, the ranking Republican (in the new session) on the Foreign Relations Committee, who told me he will support Mansfield in his effort to bring about Senate ratification of the NPT without delay -- and without additional hearings.

Mike Manatos

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~
NPT
42
/

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, October 10, 1968 -- 2:30 pm

Mr. President:

*Reid
2:40p*

Herewith Butch Fisher and Bill Foster make available to you their views on the Presidential statement on the NPT. Sec. Rusk was anxious that you get them directly.

If you should wish to talk with Butch, he is, of course, available at any time.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *g/rq* NARA, Date *3/4/94*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 10, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Senate Ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

I have discussed a proposed Presidential statement on the Non-Proliferation Treaty with Bill Foster, who is in New York as a member of the United States Delegation to the United Nations. He and I both strongly urge that you issue a statement as soon as possible.

We do so in full recognition of the difficulties that the Senate majority leadership is having at this eleventh hour in its deliberations. At the same time we are of the view that even if stalling tactics should require the Senate to put off action until next year, the treaty would be no worse off than if the Leadership did not bring it up at all.

We urge this course of action in view of our deep convictions that you, as President, should counter any interpretation abroad that the United States has lost interest in the treaty. Without a statement, enemies of the treaty will strengthen their positions, and borderline countries may be pushed one step closer toward the development of nuclear weapons.

Adrian S Fisher

Adrian S. Fisher
Acting

Encl: Proposed Statement.
(CONF. until released)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-343
By *ijg*, NARA, Date 9-13-94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ until released)

PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

1. We have worked over these many years for a Non-Proliferation Treaty for one basic reason: it is in the interest of the United States and the people of the United States, including generations unborn. Every American President who has borne responsibility in the nuclear age has known that the danger to the United States would multiply as additional nations built nuclear weapons and there were additional fingers on nuclear triggers.

2. Our work with the Soviet Union on the Non-Proliferation Treaty was not a matter of detente and bridge-building: it was a matter of carrying out a United States interest which the Soviet Union happened to share for its own reasons.

3. If the United States does not proceed to ratify this Treaty promptly, the forces at work in other countries against the Treaty will quickly gain strength. If this Treaty does not go into effect soon there will be an increasing number of countries who will see it in their national interest to make the decision to go nuclear. Some may be about to do so. This is perhaps understandable on narrow nationalist grounds; although in every case it is our objective judgment that their security would be diminished,

(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ until released)

not increased, by developing small national nuclear capabilities. But so far as the United States is concerned, additional nuclear powers could force upon us this dilemma:

-- either withdrawing our influence and commitment from areas of the world which are vital to our interests; or

-- having other nations trigger nuclear conflict which could involve us.

4. Those who would now postpone action by the United States on the Non-Proliferation Treaty must assume, in my judgment, the grave responsibility for risking its failure.

I cannot guarantee that if we now go forward to ratify the Treaty in the Senate that we can bring other nations along. But I can tell you that our chance of doing so will be greatly reduced and the kind of world we want for our children and grandchildren may, after years of patient and devoted work on the Treaty, slip away from us.

As President, I cannot see this happen without calling to the attention of the Leaders of the Senate the consequences of a postponement, as Secretary Rusk, Secretary Clifford, Bill Foster and I have done on many occasions. I understand the shortness of time and the pressures that are inevitable in a Presidential election year. But I ask you to pause; to consider the stakes; and to act now with the highest interests of the nation in mind.

OCTOBER 11, 1968

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION
TREATY

AT 12:11 P.M. EDT

We have been trying for a number of years to reduce the threat that some day, some where, a limited nuclear war could break out -- one that would grow to involve the major powers in a world-wide catastrophe.

Now, for years our negotiators have been working with those of many other nations trying to hammer out language that is acceptable to the nuclear and the non-nuclear powers alike.

Finally, we have reached agreement on a treaty -- a treaty that will halt the spread of nuclear weapons.

When I went before the United Nations last June, just prior to its vote on that treaty, I described it then as a triumph of sanity and of man's will to survive. The treaty was overwhelmingly approved in the United Nations by a vote of 95 to 4.

Now that treaty is before the United States Senate for ratification.

We worked for this treaty for so many years for one basic reason: to make the world safer for ourselves and to make it safer for every other nation that lives daily with the threat of nuclear disaster.

Every American President who has borne responsibility in the nuclear age has known that the danger to the United States would multiply as additional nations built or secured nuclear weapons -- as additional fingers were placed on nuclear triggers.

We negotiated with the Soviet Union on the language of this treaty -- not as a gift to the Soviet Union, nor as a matter of bridge building between us -- but because we were seeking a result, a result in our own interest which they happened to share for their own reasons.

MORE

NPT
43

If we had permitted our views of totalitarian communism to control every aspect of our relations with the communist states, we would not have joined them in a treaty forbidding the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. And the air, therefore, today would be filled with poisonous radiation.

The test of whether we make any international agreement should be whether that international agreement served our interests and whether it serves the interests of world peace.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty -- like the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty -- clearly and obviously meets that test. If we do not proceed to ratify this treaty promptly, the forces at work against it in the other countries, in my judgment, are going to quickly gain strength. And if the treaty does not go into effect soon, then an increasing number of countries will see it in their national interest to go nuclear. Some may be about to do so now.

This is perhaps understandable on narrow nationalist grounds. But in every case it is our judgment that their security would be diminished and not increased by their developing some small national nuclear capability.

Insofar as the United States is concerned, the advent of new nuclear powers could force upon us this dilemma: Either withdrawing our influence and commitment from areas of the world which are vital to our interests or having other nations trigger a nuclear conflict which could involve us.

And those who now argue for postponing ratification of the treaty must assume a grave responsibility for its failure and for presenting our country with that dilemma.

I cannot guarantee that our early action will bring a particular nation or group of nations along with us. But I can tell you that our chance of doing so will be greatly reduced and the world that our children inhabit made far more perilous if we fail to act soon.

As President, I cannot see this happen, without at least calling to the attention of the leaders of the Senate, as I have done, the serious consequences of postponement of this action in the Senate regardless of who requests it.

I know that the pressures of the election are upon us. But so are the responsibilities that we were all elected to fulfill.

MORE

So, I hope -- and I can only hope -- that the Senate will act now with the highest interests of the nation in mind.

But if the members of the Senate find it either undesirable or impossible to remain and pass upon this treaty now, I shall, after consulting with other leaders -- here and in the world and leaders of the Senate -- seriously consider calling the Senate into special session.

I consider the adoption of this treaty that important to the security of our nation -- and that important to peace in the world.

END

(AT 12:19 P.M. EDT)

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 9, 1968

*Rec'd
SP*

*NPT
44*

Mr. President:

I am informed by Adrian Fisher, ACDA, that Senator Russell's position on the Non-Proliferation Treaty was misrepresented yesterday in the attached dispatches (AP 155 and 156). Senator Russell told Bill Darden, Chief of Staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee, that Jack Bell of the AP had not gotten the story quite right and that he (Senator Russell) still is favorably inclined toward the treaty although he did not think it should be put to a vote now.

I would also note that the position of the JCS was misrepresented in the same dispatch (AP 156). The alleged reluctance of the JCS toward the treaty, referred to in the penultimate paragraph, is not correct. It is in fact clearly contradicted by General Wheeler's statement, quoted in the last paragraph, agreeing with the objectives of the treaty and supporting its ratification.

W. W. Rostow

Att. - AP 155-156

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-344
By cb, NARA, Date 6-1-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

155

NUCLEAR TREATY (TOPS 123)

WASHINGTON (AP)-SEN. RICHARD B. RUSSELL, D-GA.,
CAST A CLOUD OVER ANY EARLY SENATE CONSIDERATION OF THE
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY TODAY WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT
THAT HE IS UNSATISFIED WITH ITS TERMS AND OPPOSES ACTION ON IT
NOW. 44a

RUSSELL, WHO HEADS THE INFLUENTIAL SENATE ARMS SERVICES
COMMITTEE, SAID IN AN INTERVIEW THAT DOES NOT BELIEVE THE
TREATY--DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS--
SUFFICIENTLY PROTECTS AMERICAN INTERESTS.

"IT HAS NO INSPECTION PROVISIONS WORTHY OF THE NAME," HE SAID.
"IT WOULD NOT PROTECT US AT ALL. IT WOULD NOT PREVENT THE RUSSIANS
FROM SETTING UP NUCLEAR DEVICES IN EGYPT, FOR EXAMPLE.

"I AM OPPOSED TO ACTING ON IT UNTIL THERE CAN BE FURTHER
INVESTIGATION OF ITS TERMS."

THE TREATY PROVIDES FOR AN 18-MONTH PERIOD IN WHICH THE
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY WOULD SEEK TO WORK OUT
INSPECTION PROCEDURES TO CHECK ON WHETHER ITS PROVISIONS WERE
BEING CARRIED OUT.

RUSSELL SPOKE OUT SHORTLY AFTER SENATE DEMOCRATIC LEADER MIKE
MANSFIELD OF MONTANA HAD PROMISED A FINAL DECISION THIS WEEK ON
WHETHER TO BRING UP THE TREATY. IT HAS PREVIOUSLY APPROVED SEPT. 17 BY
THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE BY A 13-3 VOTE, WITH THREE
ABSTENTIONS.

CZ/PD523PED 10/8

156

WASHINGTON--ADD NUCLEAR TREATY (155)

MANSFIELD TOLD A REPORTER THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON WANTS
SPEEDY ACTION ON THE TREATY BUT HAD LEFT IT UP TO THE MAJORITY
LEADER TO DECIDE ON THE TIMING.

SENATE REPUBLICAN LEADER EVERETT M. DIRKSEN OF ILLINOIS TOLD A
NEWS CONFERENCE HE HAS NO OBJECTION TO ITS CONSIDERATION NOW.

DIRKSEN CONCEDED THAT THE SOVIET ACTION IN EASTERN EUROPE
WOULD BE LIKELY TO "INSPIRE SOME MEMBERS TO VOTE AGAINST THE
TREATY" AT THIS POINT. HE NOTED THAT ISRAEL, SWEDEN, ITALY, WEST
GERMANY, RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE NOT RATIFIED IT YET.

DIRKSEN SAID THAT IN HIS OPINION THE TREATY HAS "NO REAL
INSPECTION POWER AND WE ARE NOT GETTING ANYTHING WE DON'T ALREADY
HAVE." BUT HE ADDED HE BELIEVES IT WOULD ACT AS A "PSYCHOLOGICAL
FORCE" AGAINST THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

RUSSELL'S OPPOSITION TO THE TREATY'S TERMS APPEARED TO REFLECT
THE RELUCTANCE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

GEN. EARLE G. WHEELER, CHAIRMAN OF THE CHIEFS, SUMMED THIS UP WHEN
HE TOLD THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE THAT THE MILITARY
LEADERS "ARE IN AGREEMENT WITH THE EXPRESSED OBJECTIVES OF THIS
TREATY AND SUPPORT RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY AS NOT INIMICAL TO
U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS."

CZ/PD527PED 10/8

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

45

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 10, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Senate Ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

I have discussed a proposed Presidential statement on the Non-Proliferation Treaty with Bill Foster, who is in New York as a member of the United States Delegation to the United Nations. He and I both strongly urge that you issue a statement as soon as possible.

We do so in full recognition of the difficulties that the Senate majority leadership is having at this eleventh hour in its deliberations. At the same time we are of the view that even if stalling tactics should require the Senate to put off action until next year, the treaty would be no worse off than if the Leadership did not bring it up at all.

We urge this course of action in view of our deep convictions that you, as President, should counter any interpretation abroad that the United States has lost interest in the treaty. Without a statement, enemies of the treaty will strengthen their positions, and borderline countries may be pushed one step closer toward the development of nuclear weapons.

Adrian S. Fisher
Acting

Encl: Proposed Statement.
(CONF. until released)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-343

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By ij, NARA, Date 9-13-94

(CONFIDENTIAL until
released)

45a

PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT
ON NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

1. We have worked over these many years for a Non-Proliferation Treaty for one basic reason: it is in the interest of the United States and the people of the United States, including generations unborn. Every American President who has borne responsibility in the nuclear age has known that the danger to the United States would multiply as additional nations built nuclear weapons and there were additional fingers on nuclear triggers.

2. Our work with the Soviet Union on the Non-Proliferation Treaty was not a matter of detente and bridge-building: it was a matter of carrying out a United States interest which the Soviet Union happened to share for its own reasons.

3. If the United States does not proceed to ratify this Treaty promptly, the forces at work in other countries against the Treaty will quickly gain strength. If this Treaty does not go into effect soon there will be an increasing number of countries who will see it in their national interest to make the decision to go nuclear. Some may be about to do so. This is perhaps understandable on narrow nationalist grounds; although in every case it is our objective judgment that their security would be diminished,

(CONFIDENTIAL until
released)

not increased, by developing small national nuclear capabilities. But so far as the United States is concerned, additional nuclear powers could force upon us this dilemma:

-- either withdrawing our influence and commitment from areas of the world which are vital to our interests; or

-- having other nations trigger nuclear conflict which could involve us.

4. Those who would now postpone action by the United States on the Non-Proliferation Treaty must assume, in my judgment, the grave responsibility for risking its failure.

I cannot guarantee that if we now go forward to ratify the Treaty in the Senate that we can bring other nations along. But I can tell you that our chance of doing so will be greatly reduced and the kind of world we want for our children and grandchildren may, after years of patient and devoted work on the Treaty, slip away from us.

As President, I cannot see this happen without calling to the attention of the Leaders of the Senate the consequences of a postponement, as Secretary Rusk, Secretary Clifford, Bill Foster and I have done on many occasions. I understand the shortness of time and the pressures that are inevitable in a Presidential election year. But I ask you to pause; to consider the stakes; and to act now with the highest interests of the nation in mind.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

46
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(13) (PS)

Wednesday, October 2, 1968 3:45 p.m.

Rec'd
4:30p

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk called about the NPT on the assumption that the Senate has been sadly cleared by the withdrawal of Abe's name. He said:

-- He understands that Mike Mansfield is making a nose count on the NPT among the Democrats in the Senate:

-- He wondered if you might not ask Dirksen to make a nose count among the Republicans.

Sec. Rusk feels that, aside from the foreign policy advantage, you have worked so hard on the NPT that it would be good to get it through in this session if there were enough votes to make the concurrence of the Senate solid.

W. W. Rostow
W. W. Rostow

ACTION
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

47

3:20 pm

Tuesday, October 1, 1968
3:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk's proposed language for a critical passage in his General Assembly speech on Wednesday.

Walt W. Rostow

Approved _____

Approved as amended _____

Call me _____

MEMORANDUM

INFORMATION

3
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NPT
48

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(85)
Friday, September 27, 1968 -- 6:40 p.m.

Rec'd
7p

Mr. President:

You may be interested in the following.

The Non-Nuclear Conference today voted 79-0 in favor of the attached resolution which "urges governments of USSR and US to enter at an early date into bilateral discussions on limitation of offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles." All NATO allies present, including Federal Republic of Germany, voted in favor of the resolution.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-344
By cb, NARA, Date 6-1-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ps

49

Tuesday, Sept, 17, 1968
11:15 a. m.

Rec'd 11:45 a

MR. PRESIDENT:

Sect. Rusk reports as follows on UPI 12:

1. Aiken's statement was made yesterday. Foster has since seen him and reassured him.
2. The cause of Aiken's anxiety was some very loose testimony by Commissioner Tape of the AEC who implied that the Non-Proliferation Treaty involved a "big giveaway."
3. Aiken has assured Foster that he will vote for the Treaty.
4. Foster reports to Sect. Rusk that all the Democrats are present today, plus four Republicans. A quorum exists. Foster believes they will vote the NPT out of committee.

W. W. Rostow

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET-NODIS~~Thursday
August 29, 1968*you told Foster*

Mr. President:

In the attached memorandum, Sec. Rusk submits for your approval the Initial Presentation (Tab A) of the US position and the Basic Position Paper (instructions for the delegation) (Tab B) for use in the strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. These papers have been unanimously agreed upon by the Committee of Principals (Rusk, Clifford, Wheeler, Foster, Helms, Tape for Seaborg, Hornig, and myself). The papers are based on the specific proposal, which was previously submitted to you with the unanimous endorsement of the Committee of Principals.

The preparation and agreement on these papers are a further example of the excellent intra-governmental cooperation that has been achieved on this subject.

In view of the great importance of this proposal, I urge you to read the two papers in their entirety.

I call your particular attention to the manner in which the difficult question of verification is dealt with in the Initial Presentation, page 6-7 (para. 12-14) and in the Position Paper, page 2 (para. 7). The basic proposal has been developed on the basis that we could agree to rely exclusively on verification by "national" means, which is now the agreed term to describe all intelligence resources that do not involve direct access to Soviet territory. However, in keeping with the desire of OSD and the JCS that an effort be made to obtain some inspection, the Initial Presentation calls for consideration of procedures for "selective direct observation on US and Soviet territory," which is the new term for "on-site inspection," as a desirable means of increasing the confidence of each side in the agreement. In the Position Paper, the delegation is instructed that "This concept should be pursued during these portions of the negotiation, but not to the extent of prejudicing the negotiations or precluding, if so instructed, reliance solely on national means of verification."

~~TOP SECRET-NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-344
By cb, NARA, Date 6-1-95

I also call your attention to the instructions to the delegation in the Position Paper, page 8-9 (para. 4) on how to handle the extremely difficult and important issue of the Tallinn SAM system. The resolution of this problem in the negotiations to our satisfaction is central to the acceptability of the agreement. Moreover, this can establish the necessary precedent for a continuing dialogue on how to deal with suspicious or controversial problems which arise under an agreement.

You should also be aware of the question of the form of the agreement in the Position Paper, page 14 (para. 1). Although there is complete agreement on the instructions to the delegation to defer this issue, this bypasses a substantive issue since the JCS believe that any agreement should be in the form of a treaty while Sec. Rusk wishes to maintain the option for consideration of less formal understandings.

I recommend that you tentatively approve these two papers as the basis for further preparations for the talks.

W. W. Rostow
W. W. Rostow

Att. :
Memorandum fm Sec. Rusk
dtd 8/27/68 with Tabs A & B

Tentatively approve Initial
Presentation and Basic
Position Paper _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

*Mr Rostow notified State,
also, Mr Keating*

2615

50a



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~

August 27, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Strategic Arms Talks with the Soviets (U)

Recommendation

That you approve the attached Initial Presentation of the U.S. position and Basic Position Paper for use in the discussions with the Soviet Union.

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Discussion

The Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals has prepared an initial presentation of the U.S. position and a basic position paper for the strategic arms talks with the Soviets. These papers, which have been concurred in by the Executive Committee, are based on the proposal forwarded to you on August 15. If you concur, these papers will be used as a basis for further preparations for the discussions and would be available at such time as you deem it desirable to initiate talks with the Soviet Union.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

Attachments:

- 1. Tab A - Initial Presentation.
- 2. Tab B - Basic Position Paper.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-342
By *wp*, NARA, Date 12-6-94

1968 AUG 28 10 10 00

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICE

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~

GROUP 1

~~TOP SECRET - MODIS~~
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ROSTOV'S OFFICE

GROUP 1

1968 AUG 28 AM 10 06

~~TOP SECRET - MODIS~~
15-9-84
INFORMATION
G.O. 13386, Sec. 34
DECLASSIFIED

- 3. Top B - Basic Position Paper.
- 1. Top A - Initial Presentation.

Attachments:

Dear Sir
[Handwritten Signature]

During the past few years the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union has been characterized by a period of détente. This period has been characterized by a series of agreements and understandings between the two superpowers. The Executive Committee of the Commission of Experts has been established to monitor the implementation of these agreements and to report to the Commission of Experts. The Commission of Experts is a joint body of the United States and the Soviet Union, established in 1975. Its mandate is to monitor the implementation of the agreements and to report to the Commission of Experts. The Commission of Experts is a joint body of the United States and the Soviet Union, established in 1975. Its mandate is to monitor the implementation of the agreements and to report to the Commission of Experts.

Discussion

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

During the past few years the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union has been characterized by a period of détente. This period has been characterized by a series of agreements and understandings between the two superpowers. The Executive Committee of the Commission of Experts has been established to monitor the implementation of these agreements and to report to the Commission of Experts. The Commission of Experts is a joint body of the United States and the Soviet Union, established in 1975. Its mandate is to monitor the implementation of the agreements and to report to the Commission of Experts.

Recommendation

Subject: Strategic Arms Talks with the Soviets (U)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

August 31, 1968

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WASHINGTON
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

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August 24, 1968

STRATEGIC MISSILE TALKS
INITIAL PRESENTATION OF US POSITION

1. On behalf of my Government, I wish to express deep satisfaction that representatives of the United States and the Soviet Socialist Republics are now meeting to discuss the limitation and eventual reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles.

2. There is perhaps no more important step in the field of foreign relations which our two Governments might take than to reach an agreement of this kind. Such an agreement would enhance the security of both sides, could permit each side to devote to peaceful endeavors substantial resources which could be saved from future military expenditures, and would contribute to world stability overall. It would also constitute a most important step in fulfillment of the obligations undertaken by our Government under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 89-152
By *plup* NARA, Date 3/4/94

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downgrading and
declassification.

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Treaty. Thus, early agreement between our two countries would be of great value in increasing the likelihood that other countries would ratify and adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

3. The United States has presented to the Soviet Union over the past year and a half several messages relating to the subject of these talks. It remains the position of the United States Government that our discussions should include both offensive strategic nuclear missile delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles.

4. We believe that it is important, and should be possible, to reach agreement on limited measures curbing the strategic arms race, without resolving all of the difficult problems inevitably involved in a program for general and complete disarmament. We believe that the first step in achieving meaningful strategic arms limitations should be to restrain further increases of strategic missile forces. Such a step would be of value in avoiding a further costly and possibly dangerous upward spiral of strategic missile deployments, and would help pave the way for reduction of strategic arms.

5. It should be possible for our two countries alone to agree on steps to curtail the strategic arms race.

6. The problem we are facing is urgent. As each month goes by, armaments increase and grow more complex on both sides. An agreement should be easier to negotiate today before further deployments take place than it will in the future, and it could result in important savings of resources.

7. We recognize that achieving strategic arms limitations which meet our separately perceived requirements of national security is a complex task, given the nature of contemporary strategic offensive and defensive missile systems and the many factors affecting and determining military capabilities. Our two nations have different levels and kinds of strategic weapons systems and we may not necessarily share identical evaluations regarding the utility and roles of these systems. Moreover, we recognize that in reaching an agreement some adjustments from currently deployed strategic forces may be necessary. However, we believe that equitable and mutually beneficial strategic arms limitations can be attained.

8. We believe that the US and the Soviet Union have the following strategic arms limitation objectives in common:

-- To achieve and maintain a stable US-Soviet strategic deterrent relationship by agreed limitations on the deployment of offensive and defensive strategic missiles.

-- To enhance the credibility and effectiveness of our efforts to prevent the destabilizing actions of other nations by demonstrating US and Soviet willingness to limit their strategic missile forces.

-- To provide assurance to each of us that our security will be maintained, or enhanced, while at the same time avoiding the tensions, uncertainties, and costs of an unrestrained continuation of the strategic arms race.

-- To improve US-Soviet understanding by establishing a continuing process of meaningful discussion of issues arising from our strategic relationship.

9. With all of the above considerations in mind, the United States proposes an agreement comprising the following basic elements. The U.S. Delegation will be prepared to discuss these elements in greater detail at an appropriate time after hearing the views of the Soviet Government.

10. The United States suggests cessation of the initiation of construction of additional strategic offensive land-based

ballistic missile launchers. This weapon category should include launchers for offensive ballistic missiles of intermediate and medium range (i.e., missiles with ranges greater than 1,000 km), as well as for longer-range intercontinental missiles. There should also be a prohibition on the further construction and deployment of strategic offensive missile-launching submarines, and on installing on surface ships facilities for firing offensive ballistic missiles. The difficulties in verifying limitations on specific numbers of deployed mobile land-based strategic offensive missiles and launchers are such that the United States proposes that there be a complete ban on mobile, land-based strategic offensive missile systems.

11. The situation with respect to strategic defensive anti-ballistic missile systems is more complex. It would seem that the most feasible limitation on strategic anti-missile defensive systems would be a set and equivalent number of fixed anti-ballistic missile launchers and associated missiles which each side could deploy. The U.S. also proposes that the deployment of mobile ABM launchers and associated missiles be totally prohibited.

12. There must, of course, be adequate verification of any agreement. In previous discussions leading up to these talks, we have indicated that the United States is prepared to rely to the maximum possible extent on verification by national means available to the two governments in order to verify an agreement limiting the deployment of strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons systems, and we indicated that major steps in limiting the deployment of strategic missile systems should be possible on that basis.

13. An agreement of the scope just outlined may, however, involve certain aspects which will be difficult to verify with full confidence through national means alone. To meet these potential problems the United States believes that consideration should be given to supplementing national means of verification by some mutually arrived at arrangements for reassurance. Such agreed procedures would increase the confidence of each government in the other's compliance with the agreement and could permit a more comprehensive agreement. Therefore, we should explore at an early stage of our discussions what supplementary means of reassurance could be agreed.

14. It would appear that arrangements involving agreed procedures for selective direct observation on U.S. and Soviet territory are the best way of providing this reassurance; there may be other means of contributing to reassurance. The essential point is that each state needs to be able to satisfy itself that the other state is living up to the agreement.

15. The United States Government believes these talks can lead to an agreement beneficial to both sides. By our agreement, we could demonstrate to the world at large that our two nations, each endowed with great military power, can act to limit that power. The U.S. Delegation would welcome hearing your comments on the U.S. proposal and any other views the Soviet Delegation is prepared to advance. We hope the Soviet Delegation will agree that the position we have outlined today provides a sound basis for an agreement.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NHJ 95-314

By iaq, NARA, Date 1-26-96

August 24, 1968

STRATEGIC MISSILE TALKS

BASIC POSITION PAPER

(Instructions for the Delegation)

General

Introduction

1. This paper presents guidelines governing the U.S. position during the first phase of U.S. - Soviet talks on strategic missile limitations.

2. It is not possible to draw up a detailed scenario covering the talks; much will depend on initial Soviet reaction and how we choose to respond to it. It is also for this reason that, with few exceptions, no attempt has been made to spell out alternate U.S. positions, which will have to be developed later through normal U.S. Government procedures.

Tactics

3. This paper deals with the major issues likely to arise in connection with the presentation of our proposal. A certain amount of discussion and clarification of individual features, in isolation from other factors, will be necessary. However, we wish to stress in the discussions that the U.S. proposal should be viewed as a comprehensive entity. We wish to avoid conceding to the Soviets the advantage of concentrating on the inequities of this or that measure. We should point out that, because of the asymmetries in the respective strategic postures of the U.S. and USSR, it would be unrealistic and unnecessary

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to strive for equality in each category of strategic weapons. Rather, we should accept existing asymmetries as a point of departure and strive for an agreement which, in its overall effect, would satisfy the security interests of each side.

4. The Delegation should proceed with due caution in presenting the U.S. position. We do not wish to engage in a protracted discussion of generalities, but neither do we wish to show our entire hand without having first obtained at least a general impression of the Soviet approach.

5. After settling on formalities, the Delegation should give the "Initial Presentation of U.S. Position" (see separate paper) which contains, in general skeleton form, the outlines of the U.S. proposal.

6. It should be emphasized that, in the ensuing discussion of the U.S. position, the Delegation is not required to present the totality of the position as it is written below for a particular category of weapons in its initial presentation. It may wish to withhold some of the details, particularly on highly technical matters, until later stages in the negotiations.

7. After an exchange of initial views on the proposed force limitations, the Delegation should explore the problem of verification. The U.S. proposal has been drawn up on the assumption that in each instance we could agree to exclusive reliance on national means of verification. We should first, however, make a concerted effort to gain Soviet agreement to additional means of providing reassurance. Specifically, we should propose that both sides agree to arrangements for supplementary procedures involving agreed procedures for selective direct observation on Soviet and U.S. territory for those restrictions which cannot otherwise be verified with high confidence. The Delegation should concentrate its efforts on those items for which supplementary procedures will be demonstrably useful in increasing the confidence that the agreement is being complied with. This concept should be pursued during these portions of the negotiation, but not to the extent of prejudicing the negotiations or precluding, if so instructed, reliance solely on national means of verification. The Delegation should also explore other means of providing reassurance. (Studies are underway to define these items and procedures, and the results will be made available to the Delegation.)

U.S. Verification Capability

8. The judgments of the Intelligence Community on our ability to monitor Soviet compliance with the proposed agreement are contained in SNIE 11-13-68 and various supplementary documents which are available to the Delegation.

U.S. and Soviet Forces

9. The Delegation has available to it a series of Intelligence Community reports and DOD official documents showing the currently existing and possible future Soviet and U.S. strategic systems.

Specific Items in Proposal

I. Fixed Land-Based ICBM Launchers

U.S. Position

1. The proposal would require cessation of the initiation of construction of any additional strategic offensive land-based missile launchers as of September 1, 1968. The Soviet Union would be permitted to complete the launchers which it is constructing as of that date. Beyond that date, however, it would not be allowed to initiate further deployment of fixed ICBM launchers. Under no circumstances would either side be permitted to deploy more than 1,200 ICBM launchers. Building of additional silos, enlarging of existing silos, changing basic external configuration of silos and other launchers, and the relocation of launchers would be prohibited. No additional restrictions would be imposed upon technological improvements of launchers or missiles already deployed, including increasing the hardness of existing silos and deployment of MIRV's, or the retrofitting of existing launchers with new missiles.

Development of U.S. Position

2. In presenting this position, the Delegation will probably wish to withhold discussion of the technical details concerning the issue of technological improvements until a general understanding is reached on the basic proposition.

3. At some point it should be made clear to the Soviets that the prohibition on additional deployments applies to the deployment of new launchers for partial or multiple orbit strategic missile systems.

II. Fixed Land-Based IRBM/MRBM Launchers

U.S. Position

1. Further construction of fixed land-based launchers for IRBM/MRBM (ranges greater than 1,000 km.) would be prohibited. The retrofitting of existing IRBM/MRBM launchers to accommodate ICBM missiles would be prohibited. The installation of ICBM missiles on IRBM/MRBM launchers would be prohibited as would the conversion of IRBM/MRBM missiles to ICBM missiles. Building of additional silos, enlarging of existing silos, changing basic external configuration of silos and other launchers, further hardening of launchers, and the relocation of launchers would be prohibited. No additional restrictions would be imposed upon technological improvements of launchers or missiles already deployed or the retrofitting of existing launchers with new missiles or intermediate or medium range.

Development of U.S. Position

2. As in the case of ICBM launchers, the Delegation will probably wish to withhold discussion of technological improvements until a general understanding is reached on the basic proposition set forth in the first sentence of the above paragraph.

3. The U.S. Delegation may, at its discretion, point out that the Soviet Union at the present time has deployed a large number of this type of missile which presumably are targetted at Western Europe. The United States has no such missiles at its disposal. Thus, the inclusion of this category of missiles in a mutual "freeze" agreement would concede to the Soviet side a certain advantage. This is one of the asymmetries in the Soviet and U.S. strategic forces which an arms limitation agreement must take into account.

If we are willing to concede an advantage to the Soviets in this category of weapons, they should be prepared to tolerate a certain advantage to the U.S. in another category.

III. Mobile Land-Based Strategic Offensive Missile Systems

1. The proposal would impose a complete ban on mobile land-based, strategic offensive missile systems (ranges greater than 1,000 km.). Missile systems with such ranges carried by waterborne vehicles on inland waterways would also be prohibited. Any such existing systems would be destroyed.

Development of U.S. Position

2. The Delegation should stress that prohibition should be placed on mobile land-based offensive systems, since under conditions of a ban on further deployment of fixed ICBM launchers, the arms race could be diverted to the deployment of mobile systems, thus negating the value of the agreement.

3. In justifying a total ban, the Delegation should point out that verification by external means of an agreement limiting mobile missile systems to a specific number would be difficult. The possibilities of concealment and redeployment are obvious. However, verification of a total ban would be very much simpler, as the detection of any such system or part thereof clandestinely produced or deployed would be more likely and thus establish a violation.

4. The Delegation should point out, at some appropriate stage, that the ban, in addition to prohibiting production and deployment, also would prohibit the testing of missiles in a mobile system configuration. This ban would otherwise not extend to R&D.

IV. Mobile Sea-Based Strategic Offensive Missile Systems

1. The proposal would ban the construction of additional strategic offensive missile launching submarines or of additional launchers in existing submarines. This prohibition should apply to all submarines with ballistic missile or cruise missile launchers. Such submarines under construction as of September 1, 1968, could be completed, subject to agreement on their number.

There would be no limitation on the characteristics of SLBM's or SLCM's, or on retrofitting missile submarines with new or larger missiles of the type with which they are equipped, i.e., ballistic or cruise missiles. The fitting out of surface ships with facilities for firing offensive ballistic missiles would be prohibited.

Development of U.S. Position

2. In initially presenting the above position, the Delegation should omit any reference to the completion of the construction of submarine starts underway, and refer simply to a "prohibition on the further construction and deployment of strategic offensive missile-launching submarines," as stated in the Initial U.S. Presentation. The reason for this caution is the uncertainty concerning the exact number of such submarines the Soviets have under construction; we wish to avoid leaving them an open field for their making exaggerated claims in this regard which would be difficult to refute with hard evidence.

3. The U.S. can accept the completion of the ballistic missile submarines the Soviets have under construction as of September 1, 1968, provided a satisfactory understanding were reached on the exact number. If the Soviets raise the issue of completing submarines under construction, the U.S. Delegation should ask the Soviets to indicate the number of submarines under construction. The Delegation should seek instructions based on the number indicated by the Soviets.

4. Even with this understanding, Soviet negotiators would almost certainly object to the U.S. proposal on the grounds that it preserved a distinct advantage for the U.S. and cut short a major Soviet weapons expansion program. Our response should be that certain asymmetries are inevitable in an arms limitation agreement of this sort. Just as we accept the preponderance of Soviet IRBM/MRBM launchers, they should accept the imbalance of SLBM forces. We should also point to the substantial Soviet force of submarine-based cruise-type missiles which can be directed at land targets and which have no U.S. equivalent.

5. The proposal contemplates an understanding concerning the problem of the growing obsolescence of existing submarines over an extended period of time. The proposed form of such an understanding would be to provide that there would be no initiation of construction for replacement of ballistic or cruise missile submarines within the first five years of the agreement. During that period, the two sides would undertake to reach agreement on rules governing subsequent replacement of submarines. In the absence of a supplementary agreement on such rules, each side may replace submarines after five years from the date of the initiation of the agreement provided that replacement does not increase the total number of submarines or of launchers for submarine-launched ballistic missiles or cruise missiles.

6. The Soviets may raise this issue themselves as, over the short run at least, they would benefit more from a replacement program (many of their missile-launching submarines are obsolescent) than would the U.S. The Delegation, therefore should not initially raise the issue but should await a Soviet initiative. But the Delegation should raise the issue at some point if the Soviets do not.

7. In presenting the U.S. proposal, the Delegation should make clear that we consider strategic ballistic and cruise missiles (launched from submarines) of any range as falling within the definition of offensive strategic weapons whose launchers are subject to the limitation. Antisubmarine weapons would not be considered strategic missiles. New ballistic missiles may be retrofitted in ballistic missile submarines and new cruise missiles but not ballistic missiles in cruise missile submarines.

8. While cruise missiles carried on submarines can be defined as having strategic capabilities, those on surface vessels are more difficult to use for strategic purposes. Therefore, no restrictions would be imposed on cruise missiles aboard surface vessels. The proposal would, however, prohibit the installation of facilities for firing offensive ballistic missiles on surface ships.

V. ABMs

U.S. Position

1. The proposal would ban the deployment of more than a set and equivalent number of fixed, land-based anti-ballistic missile launchers and associated anti-ballistic missiles, including reload missiles.

A total prohibition on deployment of mobile ABM systems, both land-based and sea-based, would be imposed. There would be no other constraints on the characteristics of the ABM systems deployed.

Development of U.S. Position

2. For your information, with regard to the numerical limit on ABM launchers, we do not yet have a position. We wish to see if the Soviets accept our proposal in principle, or if they present an alternative proposal. If an understanding is reached on the principle of set and equivalent numbers of anti-ballistic missile launchers and missiles, we would then discuss the precise numerical limit.

3. There are two reasons why we believe this to be the most feasible approach. On the one hand, each side has announced plans to deploy, or is deploying ABMs. These circumstances, as well as the nuclear forces of third countries, must be taken into account. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that an unchecked race between our two countries in the deployment of ABMs would create pressures on both sides to increase their strategic offensive forces, thus making meaningless or impossible any arms limitations in this latter respect.

4. The Soviet Union has been widely deploying a strategic air defense system called the SA-5 or Tallinn system. It is generally agreed in the US Intelligence Community that the Tallinn system does not at present have an ABM capability (except possibly for a limited self-defense capability, such as the Nike-Hercules or any other air-defense missile). However, since it is conceivable that it could be augmented and

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converted to acquire such a capability, a discussion of the capabilities and purposes of this system would be in order. The Delegation should seek to elicit information on the Tallinn system to assure us that it is not and will not be upgraded into an ABM system. Our main aim would be to satisfy ourselves that the Tallinn system is not and will not be upgraded into an ABM system without our knowledge. If we cannot satisfy ourselves on this matter, then Tallinn systems must be limited and included in the agreed Soviet ABM level. As a means of gaining assurance regarding Tallinn, we should raise the question of radars and attempt to obtain as part of an understanding that replacement of the Tallinn site radars, for example, would be prohibited if Tallinn is to be treated as air defense.

5. In discussing the equivalence of the U.S. and Soviet ABM limitations, the question of reload would have to be considered. If the Soviets deployed Moscow-type ABM launchers having one reload, they might be limited to a lesser number of launchers than we would deploy. On the other hand, the Soviets could agree to deploy an equal number of non-reloadable launchers.

6. Although we consider that radars for ABM systems are a significant item in dealing with the ABM question, the present proposal does not provide any such limitation because of concern over possible erroneous categorization of radars. The problems of limitations on ABM radars and the relationship of radars to preventing the upgrading of the Tallinn anti-aircraft system to provide it with a significant ABM capability must be studied further and will have to be among the subjects discussed with the Soviets during the negotiations.

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VI. Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft Systems

The U.S. Position

1. The proposal would not include limitations on aircraft or anti-aircraft systems.

Development of U.S. Position

2. Both President Johnson and Premier Kosygin have described the subject of the discussions as concerning both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles. Thus, we cannot exclude a discussion of strategic bombers if the Soviets raise the subject.

3. The U.S. Delegation should not refer to bombers unless the Soviets do so. If they raise the issue, the Delegation should say that the U.S. does not believe that bombers should be limited at this time. The Delegation should explain that there is a wide variety of performance characteristics of the aircraft at the disposal of the US and USSR, and it would be difficult to agree on a definition of "strategic" aircraft. Moreover, the strategic effect of these aircraft depends to a large degree on the missions assigned to them. This is a variable factor, subject to change within a very short period of time, and hence less susceptible to a formal agreement.

4. Bombers have not figured importantly in the increase of either side in strategic nuclear delivery capabilities in recent years. In fact, both US and Soviet intercontinental bomber forces have been decreasing in size even without any agreement or limitation on reduction of bombers. Consideration of bomber limitations would also raise the complex issue of air defense.

5. Thus, the US should seek to persuade the Soviets to restrict initial discussion to land and seabased missile and anti-ballistic missile limitations, excluding or if not, possibly deferring, the question of possible aircraft (including air to surface missiles) limitations. If the Soviets present a specific proposal on bomber limitation, the Delegation

should say that it will refer the proposal to Washington for consideration.

6. Upgrading of Air Defense systems to give them an ABM capability would be prohibited.

VII. Technological Improvements

The U.S. Position

1. There would be no prohibition of technological improvements within the constraints of the agreement.

Development of U.S. Position

2. Technological improvements in the characteristics of ballistic missiles and launchers have--and will have--an effect on the strategic balance. These include, for example, the size of warheads or throw weight of launchers, the accuracy of missiles, the number of warheads carried by a missile, penetration aids, and the hardening of missile warheads.

3. The Soviets may well raise the question of the announced U.S. MIRV programs. They are likely to cite American sources in support of the argument that MIRVs will give the U.S. an advantage, and that they should be prohibited. The Soviets probably will refer to the commencement of U.S. MIRV testing and may demand that the U.S. stop testing immediately. The U.S. should note that this testing was part of a continuing development program which had been planned for a long time and which would continue for several years before the development was complete. Since the Soviets had continued their development and testing of new systems during the year and a half since President Johnson had proposed the talks, we saw no reason why the U.S. should have altered its plans in anticipation of these discussions. Should the Soviets press this issue, the U.S. should respond by inquiring whether the Soviet Union sees a practical way to provide verification for any limitations on MIRVs and other technological

improvements. Any specific Soviet proposal that the U.S. halt MIRV testing or deployment must be referred to Washington for consideration.

VIII. Provisions for Revision and Withdrawal

The U.S. Position

1. Either party may propose revision of the agreement if it believes that conditions affecting the agreement have changed. The two parties shall meet from time to time to discuss the operation of the agreement and possible revisions.

2. Nine years after entry into force of this agreement the two parties shall meet for a formal review of the operation of the agreement with a view to assuring that the purposes of the agreement, with any revisions that may have been made during the period, are being realized. In the absence of agreement by the two parties on the continued operation of the agreement with necessary revisions, either party may withdraw by giving six months' notice prior to 10 years from the day of entry into force of the agreement. Otherwise, the agreement shall be automatically renewed for another ten years, at which time this review procedure shall be repeated.

3. Either party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the agreement at any time if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the agreement have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.

Development of U.S. Position

4. The U.S. Delegation should at an early stage in the discussion indicate that the agreement will have to include provision for revision and withdrawal procedures. The presentation of our specific proposal can await progress in determining areas of agreement on limitations.

5. The U.S. Delegation should indicate to the Soviets that either side would have the right to withdraw from the agreement unless adequate revisions can be negotiated, and

in the absence of such revisions the United States must be prepared to exercise its right of withdrawal from the agreement. The following are illustrative grounds for revision or withdrawal from the agreement:

(1) if the capability of any third country reaches the point where either party to the agreement believes that its security is threatened;

(2) if either side believes that extraordinary events have undermined the stability of the agreement;

(3) if there is evidence of evasion of the terms of the agreement;

(4) if either party takes action which interferes significantly with the other's verification capability or otherwise adversely affects the capability of the other party to verify compliance with the agreement.

IX. Reductions

The U.S. Position

1. The proposal is not designed to achieve reductions in existing strategic forces.

Development of U.S. Position

2. The U.S. Delegation should, in its opening statement, express its conviction that agreement now on measures to curb the strategic arms race not only could lead to substantial savings of national resources to both sides in terms of avoidance of future expenditures but also would help pave the way for substantial reductions of forces in being. The U.S. would be prepared, at an appropriate stage, to discuss such reductions. But we must acknowledge that an agreement designed to achieve reductions in strategic forces, involving as it would great uncertainties for both sides, would be more difficult to achieve than an agreement on leveling off the strength of these forces, which we now propose. The U.S. is convinced that the necessary first step is an agreement on restricting the present arms race.

X. Modalities

The U.S. Position

1. Discussion of the form that an agreement might take should be deferred until we have a clearer picture of what such an agreement might cover. Although it is normal practice to embody disarmament agreements in treaty form, other forms of agreement should not be excluded at this time. Should the Soviets raise the subject, the Delegation should seek instructions.

2. The Soviets have already agreed to bilateral discussions, and presumably they will stick to this formula. We should oppose any effort they might make to include British or French forces in an agreement, to shift the discussions into the ENDC, or otherwise to broaden the bilateral discussions and eventual agreement.

3. In addition to the provisions for revision and withdrawal discussed in Section VIII above, the Delegation should make clear the right to call for consultations with respect to developments which may raise the question of possible violation by the other party. Some organizational arrangement such as a standing US-USSR commission would be desirable to provide consultation on a continuous basis.

Put this on my desk.

LBJ/jim j.
8/10/67
11:19 pm

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, possibly reading "LBJ" or similar, written over the typed text.

FG

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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CONFIDENTIAL

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Thursday, August 10, 1967
7:20 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a proposed Foster
statement, now being checked out for
tomorrow. We can come to grips with
it tomorrow.

W. W. Rostow
W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *J/rg*, NARA, Date 3/4/94

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*file
dealt with
8/11/67*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 10, 1967, Thurs., 6:00 PM

51-6

Mr. President:

Pursuant to your request, Bill Foster has prepared the attached statement on the Non-Proliferation Treaty which he proposes to make to the press following his meeting with you tomorrow morning.

ACDA is advising the Soviet delegation in Geneva that we will make a press statement and will inform us if there is an adverse reaction.

Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr.
Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr.

Att.

Approve Statement /
Disapprove _____
Discuss _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By plg NARA, Date 3/4/94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT STATEMENT BY MR. FOSTER UPON LEAVING WHITE HOUSE

I have been discussing with the President the progress in the negotiation of the non-proliferation treaty at Geneva. In particular, I have been discussing with him the fact that I have been advised that it is possible that we may, during the coming week, be able to submit a draft non-proliferation treaty for the consideration of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee now meeting in Geneva. For that reason, I am returning immediately to Geneva in the hopes that we can work out the final details for the joint submission of such a treaty by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

51-d



OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

August 10, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William C. Foster *W.C.F.*

SUBJECT: Proposed Submission by the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R. of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty to the
Geneva Conference

I am transmitting this memorandum directly for your evening reading, since we will be discussing it tomorrow morning.

I am concurrently transmitting it to the Secretary.

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DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING, CANCELLED PER E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MAR. 19, 1983.

BY *Rg* ON 4-25-84

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-343
By [signature], NARA, Date 9-13-94

August 10, 1967

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proposed Submission to the Geneva
Conference of a Non-Proliferation
Treaty by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

As I informed you today, the Soviets have indicated they are prepared, jointly with the United States, to table the draft non-proliferation treaty contained in Enclosure A. With one exception, this draft is identical with that which I was authorized on June 16 to inform the Soviet Delegation that the U.S. would be prepared to jointly submit to the Geneva Conference. This is the same draft which was the basis of the discussion between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko at their meeting on June 27. This is also the draft that we have discussed with our NATO allies.

In accordance with our proposal, the Soviets are prepared to table with Article III, entitled International Safeguards, left blank.

The one exception relates to the preambular paragraph dealing with the relationship of a non-proliferation treaty to eventual nuclear disarmament in the context of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The Soviet changes in our preambular language are shown in Enclosure B. I see no objection to these changes in what is essentially a hortatory clause. The text of the new Soviet preambular paragraph is based both on the U.S. - Soviet September 1961 Joint Statement on Agreed Principles negotiated by Mr. McCloy

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
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and Mr. Zorin and the U.S. April 1962 Draft Outline for a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

A further point I should mention is that in the treaty text we recommended to the Soviets we had two alternative versions of the amendments clause. The first alternative provides only the nuclear weapon parties with a veto on amendments, but does not oblige any party to accept amendments which it does not approve. The second alternative provides a veto for the nuclear weapons parties and all other parties who are members of the IAEA Board of Governors, but also provides that once adopted amendments are applicable to all. We have told the Soviets, as well as our allies, that while we would prefer the first alternative either one would be acceptable to us. The Soviets have now indicated that they are prepared to accept the second alternative.

I recommend that you authorize me to inform the Soviets we are prepared to submit jointly with them the attached draft of the non-proliferation treaty with Article III blank. I will forward tomorrow a proposed Presidential statement which you may wish to give at the time the treaty is jointly presented.



William C. Foster

Enclosures A and B

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

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A

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This document consists of
5 pages. No. 4 of
50 copies, Series A.

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TEXT OF DRAFT TREATY ON THE
NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

August 10, 1967

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that in furtherance of this principle, all Parties are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-343

By ijp, NARA, Date 9-13-94

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified.

of scientific information for, and to contribute, alone or in cooperation with other states, to the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions should be available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between states, in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Noting that nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

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ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

(International Control)

ARTICLE IV

Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty, as well as the right of the Parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of information for and to contribute, alone or in cooperation with other states, to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

ARTICLE V

1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such an amendment.

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2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

ARTICLE VI

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of _____, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear-weapon States signatory to this Treaty, and _____ other signatories to this Treaty, and the deposit of their instruments of ratification.

For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE VIII

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

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ENCLOSURE B

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"Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between states, /thus facilitating/ in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,"

Brackets indicate deletion from June 7, 1967 text;
underlining indicates addition

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-343
By ijg, NARA, Date 9-13-94

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EXDIS

DISTO

SUBJ: CO-CHAIRMAN MEETING ON NPT

SUMMARY:

1. AT CO-CHAIRMEN MEETING CALLED BY SOVIETS ON AUGUST 10 ROSHCIN READ OFF STATEMENT REGARDING NPT TEXT REPORTED GENEVA 4116. SOVIETS AGREED ACCEPT SECOND ALTERNATIVE ON AMENDMENTS GIVING VEToes TO ALL IAEA BOARD MEMBERS. SECURITY ASSURANCES SHOULD BE DISCUSSED FURTHER BETWEEN TWO

PAGE 2 RUFHGV 480/1 ~~SECRET~~

DELEGATIONS AFTER TABLING, BUT NO ARTICLE THIS SUBJECT NEED BE IN NPT. SOVIETS HAVE IN MIND JOINT STATEMENT, DECLARATIONS, OR UN RESOLUTION. SOVIETS ACCEPTED US PREAMBULAR PROVISION ON RESEARCH ON INSTRUMENTED SAFEGUARDS. PREAMBULAR PROVISION ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT REVISED SLIGHTLY ALONG LINES 1961 JOINT DEMARCHE TO WASHINGTON AND INQUIRED WHETHER SOVIETS HAD ANY SPECIAL VIEWS ABOUT TIMING. SOVIETS INDICATED THEY HAVE IN MIND EARLY TABLING AT ENDC BUT BALL NOW IN OUR COURT. BUNN SAID FOSTER RETURNING ASAP.

DETAILS:

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-342
By , NARA, Date 12-6-94

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2. ROSHCHIN SAID THAT APART FROM ART III, THERE FIVE PROBLEMS WITH NPT REMAINING TO BE SETTLED: THREE SUBSTANTIVE AND TWO PREAMBULAR.

3. IT IS IMPORTANT ESTABLISH PROCEDURE UNDER WHICH NO AMENDMENTS COULD ENTER INTO FORCE WITHOUT PRIOR CONSENT

PAGE 3RUFHGV 480/1 ~~SECRET~~

NUCLEAR WEAPON PARTIES. SOVIETS WILLING CONSIDER ALSO GIVING VETO TO NON-NUCLEAR STATES AND HENCE WILLING ACCEPT SECOND PROVISION SUBMITTED BY US DEL JUNE 17 GIVING VETO ALSO TO MEMBER IEA BOARD GOVERNORS (REPORTED EARLIER IN GENEVA 4116 ON BASIS JUNE 7 CO-CHAIRMAN MEETING). ADVANTAGE OF THIS WAS THAT AMENDMENTS WOULD BE OBLIGATORY FOR ALL PARTIES AND PREVENT WEAKENING OF OBLIGATIONS THROUGH NON-ACCEPTANCE OF AMENDMENTS IF THEY NOT OBLIGATORY.

4. ROSHCHIN SAID THAT PROVISION ON PEACEFUL APPLICATION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY CONTAINED AS ART IV IN US JUNE 17 DRAFT (GENEVA 4116) ACCEPTABLE TO SOVIETS.

5. ROSHCHIN SAID THAT SECURITY GUARANTEES TO NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES SHOULD BE DISCUSSED FURTHER BETWEEN CO-CHAIRMAN. HE NOTED THAT SOVIET IDEAS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO US AS TREATY PROVISION BUT COULD BE PRESENTED BY JOINT STATEMENT, DECLARATIONS, OR UN RESOLUTION.

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6. ROSHCHIN SAID SOVIETS ACCEPTED LANGUAGE ON PREAMBULAR PROVISION ON INSTRUMENTED SAFEGUARDS RESEARCH IN OR " SUBMITTED BY US JUNE 17" (GENEVA 4116).

7. ROSHCHIN PRESENTED NEW PROVISION ON

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NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT MEASURES, AS FOLLOWS: "DESIRING TO FURTHER THE EASING OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION AND THE STRENGTHENING OF TRUST BETWEEN STATES IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE CESSATION OF THE MANUFACTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE

LIQUIDATION OF ALL THEIR EXISTING STOCKPILES, AND THE ELIMINATION FROM NATIONAL ARSENALS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE MEANS OF THEIR DELIVERY PURSUANT TO A TREATY ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT UNDER STRICT AND EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL",. ROSHCHIN SAID SOVIETS BELIEVE THIS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER PREVIOUS FORMULATION IN THAT IT LINKS ELIMINATION OF NATIONAL STOCKPILES DIRECTLY TO GCD. ROSHCHIN SAID SOVIET ADDITIONS TO EXISTING PREAMBULAR LANGUAGE DRAWN FROM TWO DOCUMENTS: 1962 US OUTLINE ON GCD (62 DOCS, DISARM. P. 279, PARA IA2(B).) AND 1961 JOINT STATEMENT AGREED PRINCIPLES DRAWN UP BY MCCLOY AND ZORINI (61 DOCS DISARM. P. 440, PARA 3B) . ROSHCHIN ADDED THAT REFERENCE TO NON-

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS MASS DESTRUCTION HAD BEEN ELIMINATED SUSLOV ADDED THAT NEW SOVIET ADDITIONS TO PREAMBULAR WERE "VERY IMPORTANT" TO THEM.

8. BUNN SAID HE WOULD REPORT SOVIET STATEMENT TO WASHINGTON AND OFFICIAL RESPONSE WOULD BE MADE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE SAID HE ASSUMED SOVIETS WILLING TABLE BLANK SAFEGUARDS ARTICLE WHICH CO-CHAIRMEN WOULD CONTINUE DISCUSS TO MAKE FURTHER EFFORT REACH AGREEMENT BEFORE TABLING SAFEGUARDS ARTICLE TO ENDC. ROSHCHIN RESPONDED THAT EXCHANGES OF VIEWS ON SAFEGUARDS SHOULD CONTINUE SINCE SAFEGUARDS ARTICLE SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN TREATY, BUT SOVIETS WILLING NOW PRESENT DRAFT NPT WITH BLANK III.

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~~SECRET~~ GENEVA 480 SECTION 2 OF 2

EXDIS

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SUBJ: CO-CHAIRMAN MEETING ON NPT

9. BUNN SAID HE THOUGHT IT IN INTEREST OF BOTH US AND SOVIETS TO DISCOURAGE OTHER DELEGATIONS FROM TABLING ART III OF THEIR OWN, TO WHICH ROSHCIN ASSENTED.

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10. BUNN SAID HE WANTED CLARIFY STATEMENT MADE ABOUT SECURITY ASSURANCES. WHEN WE SAID SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR PROVISIONS IN TREATY ON ASSURANCES UNACCEPTABLE TO US THIS DID NOT MEAN WE WOULD CONSIDER INCLUDING SAME TEXT IN JOINT STATEMENTS OR UN RESOLUTION. PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD ALSO MADE PROPOSAL. PERHAPS DRAFT PROVIDED BY SOVIETS TO JHA LAST APRIL CAME CLOSER TO SOMETHING WHICH BOTH SIDES MIGHT ACCEPT THAN ANY OTHER DRAFT WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BY US AND USSR. WE MIGHT WISH BUILD ON THIS.

11. ROSHCIN SAID US AND USSR SHOULD CONTINUE EXCHANGES. SOVIET POSITION IS EXACTLY THAT EXPRESSED IN NEW YORK LAST FALL AND MORE RECENTLY IN RUSK-GROMYKO DISCUSSIONS. HE SAID HE KNEW WE OBJECTED TO KOSYGIN PROPOSAL. THIS WOULD NOT BE

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IN DRAFT WE TABLE AT ENDC AND CO-CHAIRMAN WOULD TAKE UP DISCUSSION ON SECURITY ASSURANCES AT A LATER TIME.

12. SUSLOV ADDED THAT TASK OF TWO DELEGATIONS WAS TO WORK OUT SOMETHING ON SECURITY ASSURANCES ACCEPTABLE TO

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US, USSR, AND ALSO TO NON-NUCLEAR POWERS. THIS SHOULD BE SUBJECT OF BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS.

13. BUNN SAID HE HAD CALLED AMB. FOSTER TO REPORT TO HIS ROSHCIN'S TELEPHONE CALL EARLIER IN DAY AND THAT FOSTER WOULD COME BACK IMMEDIATELY AFTER SENATE HEARINGS.

IF THEY WERE COMPLETED FRIDAY, FOSTER WOULD BE HERE IN TIME FOR WORK ON MONDAY. THERE WAS JUST A CHANCE HEARINGS MIGHT CONTINUE ON MONDAY IN WHICH EVENT FOSTER MIGHT BE SLIGHTLY DELAYED.

14. ROSHCIN ASKED WHETHER WE WISHED RAISE OTHER MATTERS. BUNN SAID WE WANTED TO BE CLEAR ON WHETHER SOVIETS INTEND TABLE DRAFT AT ENDC IN NEAR FUTURE. ROSHCIN SAID THIS WAS SOVIET WISH, BUT BALL NOT IN OUR COURT.

15. BUNN ASKED WHAT SOVIETS THOUGHT OF IDEA MENTIONED EARLIER BY US INFORMALLY OF INDICATING THAT VIEWS OF NON-ENDC GOVTS ON NPT MIGHT BE CIRCULATED BY CO-CHAIRMEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH ENDC PROCEDURE. ROSHCIN REPLIED HE WAS

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NOT COMPETENT DECIDE THIS QUESTION WHICH MIGHT COMPLICATE MATTERS AND RAISED QUESTION OF ENDC STRUCTURE.

16. BUNN SAID ITS PROPOSAL IN LINE WITH EXISTING PROCEDURE, CITING SPECIFIC EXAMPLES WHERE CO-CHAIRMEN HAVE

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CIRCULATED VIEWS OF NON-MEMBERS. WE DON'T WANT TAMPER WITH PROCEDURE BUT SIMPLY REMIND OTHER GOVTS OF AVAILABILITY OF EXISTING PROCEDURE IN ORDER THAT NON-ENDC COUNTRIES WILL NOT LATER COMPLAIN THAT THEIR VIEWS WERE NOT HEARD ON IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL TREATY.

17. SUSLOV SAID HE THOUGHT NON-ALIGNED EIGHT WERE VERY REPRESENTATIVE SEGMENT OF NON-ALIGNED WORLD. THOSE GOVTS WHICH AGAINST NPT WILL NOT CHANGE THIER MINDS ABOUT IT DURING ONE MONTH WHILE ENDC DISCUSSES DRAFT. THEY WILL THEREFORE RESUBMIT THEIR VIEWS TO UNGA. ROSHCHIN SAID OUR INVITATION WOULD RESULT IN REPRODUCTION OF A LOT OF PAPER AND MIGHT REQUIRE ANSWERS. WE SHOULD NOT INVITE CHANGES IN DRAFT.

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18. WE RESPONDED THAT STATEMENTS OF NON-ENDC GOVTS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY REQUIRE COMMENT ANY MORE THAN SOME SPEECHES GIVEN IN ENDC REQUIRE COMMENT. WE ALSO SAID THAT IF WE ANNOUNCED THIS PROCEDURE, IT WOULD BE DONE ONLY ONCE AND IN LOW KEY, ALTHOUGH WE WERE THINKING ALSO OF TELLING GOVTS WITH WHICH WE HAVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS THAT PROCEDURE EXISTS FOR TRANSMITTING VIEWS TO ENDC AFTER NPT TABLED. WHEN WE WOULD WANT TO MAKE DRAFT TEST AVAILABLE TO THEM.

19. AT CONCLUSION ROSHCHIN SAID SOVIETS LOOK FORWARD TO TABLING NPT VERY SOON BUT HE THOUGHT DISCUSSION OF DATES SHOULD BE DEFERRED UNTIL WE HAVE AGREED ON JOINT DRAFT TEXT.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-343
By ijp, NARA, Date 9-13-94

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REF: STATE 19165

FOR FOSTER FROM BUNN

Rostow

1. WE MET WITH ROSHCHIN AND SOVIET NPT NEGOTIATING TEAM AT 10 A.M. BUNN READ OFF DRAFT PRESS STATEMENT PER PARA 1 REFTEL, THEN READ PARA 2 SAYING IT WAS MESSAGE FROM FOSTER TO ROSHCHIN.

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2. ROSHCHIN ASKED WHETHER SOVIETS COULD REGARD US DEL AS HAVING ACCEPTED STIPULATIONS PRESENTED BY HIM YESTERDAY. BUNN REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT IN POSITION TO CONVEY THIS INFORMATION TO SOVIET DEL AND OFFICIAL US REPLY WOULD BE GIVEN AFTER FOSTER RETURN TO GENEVA, AUGUST 13.

3. ROSHCHIN SAID IT WOULD BE HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE TO MAKE DISCLOSURE TO PRESS BEFORE CO-CHAIRMEN AGREEMENT ON TEXT NPT REACHED. WOULD PUT HIMSELF AND HIS DELEGATION IN DIFFICULT POSITION AND EVEN COULD CREATE SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR NPT PROJECT. HE "STRONGLY INSISTED" THAT THERE BE NO PUBLICITY BEFORE AGREEMENT.

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HE SAID SOVIETS HAVE THEIR OWN PROBLEMS WITH PUBLIC AND WITH ALLIES. HUS PRESS STATEMENT WOULD PUT TWO GOVTS IN "UNEQUAL POSITION". ROSHCIN SAID THERE SHOULD FIRST BE AGREEMENT ON TEXT, AFTER WHICH OTHER PROBLEMS COULD BE DISCUSSED. HE SAID HE THOUGHT NEARLY ALL PROPOSED PRESS STATEMENT COULD BE ACCEPTED BUT HE WOULD NOT BE IN POSITION TO SAY SO UNTIL HE RECEIVED WORD ABOUT OUR AGREEMENT ON TEXT.

4. SUSLOV SAID THAT US CONSULTATIONS WITH ITS ALLIES WERE OUR BUSINESS WITH WHICH SOVIETS DID NOT WISH INTERFERE. HOWEVER AGREEMENT BETWEEN CO-CHAIRMEN INVOLVES MOSCOW AS MUCH AS WASHINGTON.

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5. BUNN SAID THAT HE WOULD REPORT ABOVE IMMEDIATELY TO FOSTER, ALTHOUGH HE THOUGHT COURSE OF ACTION HE HAD OUTLINED COULD NOT BE HALTED.

6. AT END OF MEETING BUNN HANDED ROSHCIN COPY OF NPT DRAFT TEXT INCORPORATING CHANGES IN TEXT REPORTED GENEVA 4116 PROPOSED BY SOVIETS YESTERDAY, SAYING WE WANTED SOVIETS TO CONFIRM THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THEIR POSITION CORRECTLY. DOCUMENT WAS HEADED QUOTE DRAFT NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SUBMITTED BY THE CO-CHAIRMEN TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATIONS COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT UNQUOTE. ROSHCIN SAID HE WOULD LET US KNOW BEFORE NOON WHETHER SOVIETS HAD ANY COMMENTS ON THIS PAPER.

7. SHUSTOV LATER TELEPHONED GLEYSTEN THAT SOVIET DEL AGREES WITH DRAFT TEXT AS PRESENTED BY BUNN WITHOUT ANY CHANGES BUT WOULD LIKE TO ADD FOLLOWING AFTER FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE VIII:

QUOTE IN WITNESS WHEREOF THE UNDERSIGNED, DULY QUTHORIZED HAVE SIGNED THIS TREATY.

QUOTE DONE IN AT THIS DAY OF , ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTY . UNQUOTE.

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THIS COPY FOR _____

NEWS CONFERENCE
(Geneva Nonproliferation Treaty)

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH THE PRESIDENT, AND
AMBASSADOR WILLIAM C. FOSTER.

12:00 Noon, EDT

AUGUST 11, 1967

FRIDAY

THE PRESIDENT: I just had a very extended, interesting and, I think, very satisfactory and hopeful meeting with Ambassador Foster. As you know, he is one of our most devoted public servants. For many years he has served his country with great credit. He is returning to Geneva tomorrow.

We look forward to the conclusion of a very long exercise of wisdom, patience, and dedication upon Mr. Foster's part.

Thank you.

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: Gentlemen, I have a very brief statement.

As you have just learned, I have been discussing with the President the progress on the negotiation of a nonproliferation treaty at Geneva. In particular, I have been discussing with him the fact that I have been advised that it is possible we may very soon be able to table a draft nonproliferation treaty for the consideration of the 18-nation Disarmament Committee now meeting in Geneva.

For that reason, I am returning to Geneva in the hope that we can work out the final solution of the problems concerning the tabling of a draft nonproliferation treaty before the committee.

I will be happy to answer questions.

Q What do you mean by "tabling"? What is the meaning of the term?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: The tabling in this sense is not in the legislative sense. It means that hopefully the draft treaty will be presented before the plenary meeting of the 18-nation Disarmament Committee by the two co-chairmen of the committee, namely, the Soviet representative and myself.

Q Does it mean when you table -- you must have tabled 18 drafts by now -- that you have worked the bugs out and you are coming in with a common agreed treaty on which the other nations are now invited to vote?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: No. They are invited to consider, negotiate and present their ideas, because this

MORE

draft has not yet been shown to anyone other than the allies of the two co-chairmen.

Q And the bugs of the two co-chairmen have been worked out?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: Yes.

Q You say you just learned. Is this sort of a rush trip back? Is something new happening?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: I came back for some other reason. I am testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee this afternoon in order to attempt to get money to continue the operations of my agency. But during my visit here I got a message that I should return urgently to Geneva.

Q From the Soviet Union?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: Yes.

Q Mr. Ambassador, is this, then, the first time that the Soviet Union and the United States have finally reached agreement on this treaty?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: We are in the process of the final solution of the problems. I hope very soon, as stated in the statement, that this will be tabled as an agreed draft for consideration by the 18-nation Disarmament Committee.

Q Like the provision for inspection, which was the principal stumbling block, as I understand it. What are you going to do about that?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: That would not necessarily be the major stumbling block. It is probable that the committee will not have concluded that full discussion when it is tabled.

Q I didn't quite understand. You will not have concluded on inspection?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: No, sir. I doubt that. I think that will be a blank.

Q The problem is still unresolved as to whether the inspection will be done as the Russians want it, by the Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, or as the Western powers want it, through the EURATOM; is that right?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: That is still a matter of debate and discussion.

Q It has been my understanding that the United States and the Soviet Union were fairly close to agreement on this. The problem has been with our allies, the West Germans. Can you tell us anything about what our situation with the West Germans is?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: I will let you speculate on that, sir. We are now near to the U.S.-USSR tabling of the proposed nonproliferation treaty.

Q You have to leave a major section blank. Why is this such a step forward?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: It is a step forward to get another 10, 12, or 15 points.

Q Are there any other blanks?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: The most important things are to (1) limit the further spread by the nuclear powers of nuclear weapons to others; and the second would be the agreement of the non-nuclear powers not to acquire. Safeguards are important collaterally but they aren't the key items on this discussion.

Q Mr. Ambassador, I am not quite clear on what happens with a treaty that has blanks in it. Does this mean that the other 18 nations will be allowed to fill in that blank?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: We will suggest a continued discussion by the co-chairmen of that point.

Q You say that agreement has been reached on two points, to limit the further spread by nuclear powers and the agreement of non-nuclear powers not to acquire.

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: I am saying that these are provisions of the treaty. I am not saying there is an agreement. No agreement has been reached by the non-nuclear nations. The point is to get this before the non-nuclear nations so they will have their chance to consider and negotiate.

Q You say this has only been seen by the Soviet Union and the United States and their allies. How many of the 18 nations does this leave that have not seen this yet?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: Eight non-aligned, representing all the non-aligned of the world, and they were chosen because they represented the great geographic areas -- Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and non-aligned Western Europe.

Q Are you at liberty to say what has changed since you came here that brought about this call for you to go back?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: This has been a development process which appears to be nearing its conclusion. I left Geneva on Wednesday to come back to testify. I stated that I would probably be in the United States some time unless something developed, in which case I would return promptly. I am returning promptly after word from the Soviet Union.

Q Can you tell us what that development was, sir?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: I don't think this is a development. I think this is a continuous process.

Q Is it a concession?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: No, I don't say it is a concession. We are nearing an agreement after many months of discussion between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Q You said you were returning after word from the Soviet Union.

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: That is correct.

Q Isn't it correct, sir, that the Soviet Union was not in agreement when you left Geneva on submitting a draft treaty with this inspection provision?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: They have not yet advised us that they were prepared to discuss this final tabling.

Q What prevents you now, sir, from saying that you will table this resolution in Geneva?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: I am here. He is there. Before we can do this, I must be together with him.

Q It is only a question of form?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: I will just leave it at my statement.

Q Mr. Ambassador, what is the status of the discussion about on-site inspection versus the claim of some scientists like the Swedish scientist saying it is not needed?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: This is a comprehensive test ban. This would follow on, hopefully. You see, we have always said that the achievement of a nonproliferation treaty would form a base on which other measures might take place, one of which certainly would be the comprehensive test ban which we have been pushing now for many years.

MORE

Q Mr. Ambassador, there was a question, I believe India in particular was concerned about getting some kind of assurances of protection in case she signs this agreement. She is concerned about the Communist Chinese nuclear development. What sort of assurances are going to be put into the treaty for countries like India? Have you crossed that bridge yet?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: We have stated in our presentations at the plenary conferences that we believe assurances are too complicated a subject since each nation has a different problem to be included in the non-proliferation treaty but we are quite willing to discuss that as a separate project. In fact, we have said this at the General Assembly and have said it for two or three years.

We have also reiterated the fact that there is on the table or there is in existence -- I won't use that word table again because that is confusing -- an assurance by the President of the United States which he set forth in October of 1964 within 48 hours of the first Chinese explosion that the United States would provide immediate assistance to those non-nuclear nations threatened by nuclear blackmail that asked for this assistance from the United States.

We have said further at the U.N. that we would be very happy to broaden that assurance by an appropriate U. N. resolution which reiterates the U.N. obligations. To put this however into a treaty becomes too complicated and both we and the Soviet Union have agreed that this is an additional discussion which should take place after the treaty is tabled.

Q Mr. Ambassador, what are the mechanics after the resolution is tabled?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: The first mechanics will be to let the rest of the world make comments on what is in the treaty since as I said only the allies of the two co-chairmen have seen the actual draft. There have been many speculations which have taken place many of which have been misdirected or misinformed.

This for the first time will give an opportunity for these other nations to see whether the provisions of the treaty are such that they are consistent with their security and their principles.

So that the first thing will be an opportunity to explore, explain, develop and consider and hopefully to get broad agreement on such a treaty. Then I would hope that the committee itself, the 18-nation committee, in which only 17 nations are present, would recommend this treaty to the General Assembly -- that is the first committee of the General Assembly -- with the view to getting the broad signatures which would be required before the treaty comes into effect.

Q But the treaty would be possibly recommended and even signed with this provision blank?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: I wouldn't say signed. I would

hope that before it goes to the General Assembly the blank would be filled. I am quite optimistic that it will be.

Q That is the blank on the inspection?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: We call it safeguard rather than inspection.

Q Mr. Ambassador, you mentioned a co-chairman. Who is the co-chairman?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: Ambassador Alexei Roshchin.

Q Mr. Ambassador, I want to be sure that I understood you right. Did you say that when you left Geneva the Soviet Union at that point had not yet advised you that they were willing to table a treaty with the inspection provision left blank and that since then you have been advised that they are willing to do that now?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: No, that is not quite precise. I said that when I left they were not able at that point to say they were authorized to table a draft treaty. That did not include the other addition which you made, because there are other questions in addition to the question of the blank articles.

Q Can you tell us what those other questions were that they have now satisfied themselves on?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: No, this is part of the negotiating process.

Q But the inspection provision would be one of the things?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: Yes.

Q There was also quite a deal of speculation earlier this year about the attitude of the West German government and the problem it was having with some of its own people who were reluctant to see it join in such a treaty. They were concerned about Germany abandoning its right to have international power. You know the people in Germany who took that attitude.

Do you have any feeling now on what the prospects are for the Kiesinger government accepting this?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: As you are aware this whole process has been discussed extensively with all of our allies individually and also collectively at the North Atlantic Council in Paris and now will be in Brussels.

This present draft which I hope will be agreed on and presented very soon is one that they are thoroughly conversant with and as expressed by the various members of the North Atlantic Council we had a green light to table this type of document.

Q Mr. Ambassador, when will you be back in Geneva?

MORE

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: Sunday at noon.

Q Are you going to appear before the Senate committee first?

AMBASSADOR FOSTER: I am appearing before the Senate Appropriations Committee this afternoon. That is the subcommittee.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(AT 12:15 P.M. EDT)

DRAFT STATEMENT BY MR. FOSTER UPON LEAVING WHITE HOUSE

I have been discussing with the President the progress in the negotiation of the non-proliferation treaty at Geneva. In particular, I have been discussing with him the fact that I have been advised that it is possible that we may, very soon, be able to submit a draft non-proliferation treaty for the consideration of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee now meeting in Geneva. For that reason, I am returning to Geneva in the hopes that we can work out the final solution of the problems concerning the tabling of a ^{draft} non-proliferation treaty before the Committee.

August 11, 1967

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

51-N

8/11/67

Today at Geneva the United States and the Soviet Union are together submitting to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament a draft treaty to stop the dangerous spread of nuclear weapons.

For more than twenty years, the world has watched with increasing apprehension as nuclear weapons have spread. Today, for the first time, we have within our grasp a way to arrest this dangerous development.

Since 1945, five nations have come into possession of this dread capability. We believe now -- as we did then -- that even one such nation is too many. But the issue is not whether one or five have nuclear weapons while others do not. The issue is whether all nations will agree to prevent a bad situation from becoming worse. The issue is whether all nations will recognize that we have reached a new moment of choice. The issue is whether we will now choose to stop a further drift into danger.

The submission of a draft treaty by the United States and the Soviet Union brings us to the final and most critical stage of our effort. The draft will be available for consideration by all governments, as well as for negotiation by the Conference.

If we are to agree on a treaty, it must be one that is responsive to the needs and problems of all the nations of the world -- great and small, aligned and non-aligned, nuclear and non-nuclear, highly industrialized and less developed.

It must enhance, not diminish, the security of all.

It must encourage, not hinder, the development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

It must provide adequate assurances against the corruption of the peaceful atom to its use for weapons of war.

I am firmly convinced that we are today offering an instrument to satisfy all these requirements. It can mitigate the danger of nuclear war. It can stimulate the peaceful development of nuclear energy. It can greatly improve the chances for nuclear disarmament.

If we now go forward to completion of a worldwide agreement, we will pass on a gift of great benefit to the generations who follow us. Failure to complete our work without further delay will be interpreted by our children and our grandchildren as a betrayal of conscience in a world that needs all of its vital resources and talents to serve life, not death.

The world does not need -- and does not want -- more and more nuclear weapons in the hands of more and more nations. The world needs -- and has a right to -- sustenance and shelter and security.

I have provided the United States representative, William C. Foster, with instructions which reflect our sense of urgency, our firm dedication to the task, and our determination to ensure that a fair and effective treaty is concluded.

The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament now has before it the opportunity to make a cardinal contribution to man's future safety and peace. For I am convinced that men of reason will reject the idea that they are powerless to prevent the further uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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9 July 1968

MEMO FOR MR. ROSTOW

General Ginsburgh and I met with Kybal last week to discuss his work on strategic arms limitations. Attached are some comments on a study which he left with us.



WILLIAM L. LEMNITZER

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Xerox copy

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-344
By cb, NARA, Date 6-1-95

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Comments on Kybal's "Technical Considerations on Strategic
Nuclear Force Limitations"

1. Kybal analyzes the potential stability of a special bilateral arms limitation which constrains only the total number of offensive/defensive missile launchers on each side. In addition, he examines the effectiveness of possible unilateral remedies to maintain the stability of such an agreement.

2. Kybal's conclusions can be summarized as follows:

- a. Bilateral agreements can be very broad or general.
- b. No great differentiation between launchers, whether in size, capability, or even mission, need be made.
- c. Any arms control limitation should begin at high, rather than low, force levels.
- d. Nuclear stalemate can be preserved, in terms of assured destruction by the retaliating nation.
- e. Unilateral remedial actions can be taken, under the total missile launcher limitation, to prevent or greatly moderate stability failure.
- f. A high degree of stability can be achieved by selecting the proper mix of offensive and value defensive missiles; such stability would permit reliance on unilateral surveillance means for verification.
- g. Steps can be taken to avoid the necessity of pre-impact launch (PIL) by the retaliator, thereby reducing the possibility of war by accident or miscalculation.
- h. The stabilizing character of active defenses of land-based offensive missiles suggests that such special defenses be excluded from any arms limitation agreement.
- i. The close coupling between the duration of limitation agreement and technological progress requires a provision for periodic renegotiation.

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3. The type of arms limitation analyzed by Kybal has great merit in its simplicity. However, he has introduced a fatal flaw with the assumption that either nation would accept a deterrent-only (assured destruction) strategy which, if deterrence failed, would result in the destruction of perhaps 12% of the values of the aggressor; at the same time, he does not address the level of destruction risked by the retaliator. If the damage levels were sufficiently disparate, the potential aggressor nation might well feel free to pursue adventures of lesser risk while relying on "brinksmanship" and a confidence, perhaps ill-placed, in the "hole card" of pre-emptive strike as a last resort. A nation with a preference for a retaliatory strategy, on the other hand, might not consider the prospect of mutual destruction, with his own being greater than that inflicted on the enemy, worth the risk of opposing such adventures. Another oversimplification is the elimination of bombers and air defenses from consideration.

4. However, the study does shed useful light on a number of aspects of strategic force systems, their interactions, and their methods of employment. Some of the more noteworthy points are:

a. The chief parameter of the offensive forces is considered to be the counterforce effectiveness, measured in terms of missile silos destroyed per missile expended; values of less than one for current missiles permit stability, but MIRV technology might produce values as high as 8 to 40, which could be very destabilizing.

b. The chief defensive parameter is considered to be the number of whole missile payloads destroyed per defensive missile and generally is less than unity. If technology permitted a value of greater than unity, Kybal asserts that an "unwelcome" stability could result because defense-dominance would eliminate deterrence. This view highlights the basic argument between the Assured Destruction and Complete Disarmament proponents.

c. Dummy silos could be stabilizing, but the possibility of covert treaty violation would require substantial on-the-spot verification rights.

d. Sea- or land-based mobile missiles ("untouchables") could be stabilizing and, in addition, could reduce the opposing offensive threat by forcing a mix of offensive and defensive missiles within the over-all limitation; however, the risk of some technological breakthrough making them vulnerable argues against a preponderance of such launchers in the total mix.

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e. Active missile defense of cities, particularly if equipped with a preferential defense capability, can be highly stabilizing; however, development of a rapid missile strike reporting technique could reveal to the aggressor which targets are being defended and could permit more efficient offensive tactics. As in the case of MIRV, strike reporting technique is a destabilizing factor.

f. Active preferential defense of land-based launchers, however, is less sensitive to the strike reporting technique than is urban defense; as a result, such defense can be sufficiently stabilizing so as to avoid the necessity of pre-impact launching by a retaliator, at least for one or several waves of attack on the offensive forces.

5. On balance, Kybal's analysis provides a useful "first-look" into a specific type of potential arms limitation proposal.

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WILLIAM L. LEMNITZER

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Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:

I am transmitting herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

This treaty was opened for signature on July 1, 1968 in Washington, London and Moscow. Ninety-five members of the United Nations had voted to commend it, and to request that it be opened for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date.

On July 1 it was signed in Washington by the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and 53 other states. Many others have indicated their intention to sign it promptly.

I consider this treaty to be the most important international agreement limiting nuclear arms since the nuclear age began. It is a triumph of sanity and of man's will to survive.

The treaty takes a major step toward a goal the United States has been seeking for the past twenty-two years. Beginning with the McMahon Act in 1946, our statutes have forbidden the transfer of our nuclear weapons to others.

In the Executive branch, efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons have complemented those of the Congress. Ever since the Baruch Plan of 1946, we have sought to achieve an international consensus on this subject.

In making the first United States test ban proposal, President Eisenhower noted that his purpose was to curtail the uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons.

When President Kennedy announced the successful negotiation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, he expressed the hope that it would be the opening wedge in a campaign to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. He pointed out that a number of other nations could soon have the capacity to produce such weapons, and urged that we use whatever time remained to persuade such countries not to follow that course.

In 1964, in the first message I submitted to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, I proposed an agreement that nuclear weapons not be transferred to non-nuclear countries, and that all transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes take place under international safeguards.

In 1966, the United States Senate clearly showed its support for negotiations toward a non-proliferation treaty. Ninety-nine Senators declared themselves in favor of the Pastore resolution (Senate Resolution 179). It commended serious and urgent efforts to negotiate international agreements limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. It supported additional efforts by the President which were appropriate and necessary for the solution of nuclear proliferation problems.

(MORE)

The treaty I am submitting to you today is the product of these efforts by the legislative and executive branches. Its provisions are described in detail in the accompanying report of the Secretary of State.

Its central purpose is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Its basic undertaking was deliberately patterned after United States atomic energy legislation, which forbids transfers of our nuclear weapons to others. The treaty not only makes such a prohibition binding on all nuclear powers; it reinforces the prohibition by barring non-nuclear countries from receiving them from any source, from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring them, and from seeking or receiving any assistance in their manufacture.

The treaty, however, does more than just prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons. It would also promote the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under safeguards.

This is the goal of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which resulted from President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" plan. The IAEA is charged with the primary responsibility for safeguards under the non-proliferation treaty. It already has considerable experience in applying safeguards under international agreements for cooperation in the civil uses of nuclear energy.

I believe that this treaty will greatly advance the goal of nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes under international safeguards.

It will require that all parties which export nuclear materials and equipment to non-nuclear-weapon states for peaceful purposes make sure that such materials, and those used or produced in such equipment, are under international safeguards.

It will require all non-nuclear parties to accept international safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities within their territories, under their jurisdiction, or carried out under their control anywhere.

It will help insure cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the exchange of scientific and technological information on such peaceful applications.

It will enable all countries to assist non-nuclear parties to the treaty with their peaceful nuclear activities, confident that their assistance will not be diverted to the making of nuclear weapons.

It obligates the nuclear-weapon parties to make potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions available -- on a non-discriminatory basis, and at the lowest possible cost -- to parties to the treaty that are required to give up the right to have their own nuclear explosives.

By 1985 the world's peaceful nuclear power stations will probably be turning out enough by-product plutonium for the production of tens of nuclear bombs every day. This capability must not be allowed to result in the further spread of nuclear weapons. The consequences would be nuclear anarchy, and the energy designed to light the world could plunge it into darkness.

But the treaty has a significance that goes beyond its furtherance of these important aspects of United States nuclear policy. In the great tradition of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, it represents another step on the journey toward world peace. I believe that its very achievement, as well as its provisions, enhances the prospects of progress toward disarmament.

(MORE)

On Monday, July 1, -- as this treaty was signed on behalf of the United States -- I announced that agreement had been reached with the Soviet Union to enter into discussions in the nearest future on the limitation and reduction of both offensive nuclear weapons systems, and systems of defense against ballistic missiles. Thus there is hope that this treaty will mark the beginning of a new phase in the quest for order and moderation in international affairs.

I urgently recommend that the Senate move swiftly to enhance our security and that of the entire world by giving its consent to the ratification of this treaty.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
July 9, 1968.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
~~Counselor and~~ Chairman
Policy Planning Council
Washington

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July 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: After NPT, What?

You may be interested in the attached
paper by Dick Rosecrance entitled, "After
NPT, What?"

¹⁰⁰
Henry Owen

Attachment:
Copy No. 47
May 28, 1968

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July 28, 1968
Copy No. 41
Attachment:

Henry Owen
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before by disk possession entitled, "After
you may be interested in the attached

Subject: After NYL' MRCZ

THE WHITE HOUSE
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOV

July 8, 1968



Washington
Policy Planning Council
Special Assistant
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-342

By sig, NARA, Date 12-6-94

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL

AFTER NPT, WHAT?



May 28, 1968

GROUP 3
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AFTER NPT, WHAT?

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May 28, 1968

AFTER NPT, WHAT?

Introduction

After the NPT has been signed and ratified, there will remain many pressures to "go nuclear." Certain important national actors will not sign the treaty; the Chinese nuclear program will go forward apace with security implications for several non-nuclear countries including Japan, India, and Australia. Despite the worldwide benefits that may accrue in slowing down the overt nuclear arms spread, moreover, many nations will develop their peaceful programs to the point where a bomb can be assembled and detonated in short order.

The United States has limited influence on this process. Legally, states are entitled under the NPT to proceed a considerable distance toward satisfying the requirements of a potentially military nuclear program. Nor can we be sure that states will not withdraw from the treaty as their neighbors reveal or augment bomb capabilities. This is true partly because one of the major motivations for nuclear status is prestige, not security. Further U.S. arrangements to provide for the security of a non-nuclear power could make it seem more dependent, thus reducing its prestige. A national nuclear program, on the other hand, is often seen by its possessor to enhance national status.

The United States should nonetheless stand ready to help where it can, consistent with its own interest. This would not mean an extension of security guarantees. It could mean assistance to conventional forces; or possibly extend to cooperative provision of defensive nuclear forces on a joint basis, with U.S. retention and control of warheads and a veto on firing arrangements. It should also recognize that a major retraction or withdrawal of U.S. presence and influence around the world could only accelerate the development of national nuclear capabilities.

I. Nuclear

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I. Nuclear "Pregnancy"

Even after the NPT is signed and ratified, nations will be allowed to proceed with peaceful nuclear power programs that may have implicit military objectives. It is no longer necessary to point out that the basic "secrets" of bomb technology and manufacture are already widely known. Production reactors, chemical separation plants, even detonation mechanisms are already well understood by a considerable number of states. Broadly speaking, the nations with the most developed peaceful programs will be nearest to a military bomb capability. It is therefore possible for a nation to proceed a considerable distance toward a bomb capability, to achieve an advanced state of nuclear "pregnancy", while remaining within the strictures of the NPT.

Just how far a state may go is partly indicated in the following hypothetical examples:

A. It has already been established that a state may stockpile Plutonium 239 or U-233 without violating international or bilateral agreements on peaceful use. The stockpile itself, of course, must be under safeguards; its accumulation, on the other hand, may be explained and justified by the need to accumulate fuels for advanced reactors.

B. It is likely, that a number of states will experiment with fast reactor assemblies. Under certain circumstances experimentation with such assemblies will give knowledge relevant to bomb assemblies.

C. It is possible that some states will try to develop implosion techniques using conventional explosives. While such techniques could not be used on a fissionable core, considerable information concerning the compressing impact of implosion could be given by experiments using natural uranium. These experiments might be justified as giving information on physical states of elements of high atomic weight under various external constraints.

D. It

D. It is fully recognized that Article III Paragraph 2 of the NPT "does not deal with such military applications of nuclear energy as nuclear propulsion of warships. Therefore, nothing in the treaty would prohibit the provision of nuclear fuel for this purpose, nor would this activity be subject to safeguards prescribed in Article III of the draft treaty which provides for the application of safeguards on all source of special fissionable materials in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of any non-nuclear weapon party, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere." (State 130374.) Since the safeguards of the Treaty only apply to "peaceful" activities, experiments with nuclear propulsion for warships may proceed unabated. It is possible, though unlikely, that a state might use reactors on a military vessel for nuclear production purposes.

The construction of an experimental or prototype nuclear explosive device would be covered by the term "manufacture" as would the production of components which could only have relevance to a nuclear explosive device," (State 162721) and would be prohibited under the treaty. Work on components which could be justified in other terms, however, would not be prohibited.

After the NPT, many nations can be expected to take advantage of the terms of the treaty to produce quantities of fissionable material. Plutonium separation plants will be built; fast breeder reactors developed. It is possible that experimentation with conventional explosives that might be relevant to detonating a nuclear bomb core may take place. In this way, various nations will attain a well-developed option on a bomb. A number of nations will be able to detonate a bomb within a year following withdrawal from the Treaty; others may even shorten this period. In the Far East at least, the progress of the Chinese nuclear effort will stimulate the nuclear programs of India, Japan and Australia; each of these nations may be expected to put itself in a position to achieve a bomb within months of withdrawal from the NPT.

II. Limited

II. Limited U.S. Leverage

The United States has limited leverage to halt or slow down future proliferation. This is true for a number of reasons:

A. As has been pointed out, states may proceed quite far toward a nuclear capability even under the NPT.

B. Attempts to develop an international consensus against further spread have had the paradoxical impact, at least in some cases, of making states more reluctant to give up the benefits of nuclear status.

C. The attempt to foreshadow penalties on states who go nuclear or withdraw from the NPT could well turn out to be counterproductive:

1. The threatened withdrawal of economic or military aid programs would be likely to have minimum effect.

2. Advance indication that states which go nuclear could lose their security guarantee could have the perverse impact of hastening national nuclear forces. U.S. guarantees could be cast into doubt.

D. There is some evidence that status and prestige are as important in fostering proliferation as security motivations. It is therefore not clear that the maintenance of existing U.S. guarantees or the extension of new ones will reliably proscribe further nuclear spread. The French after all, decided to go nuclear despite the NATO guarantee. There are political and international pressures for further proliferation in Asia and the Pacific despite U.S. deterrence of China. Indeed, further U.S. arrangements to provide for the security of non-nuclear powers could make them seem more dependent on the United States. This could have the ultimate impact of strengthening their incentives for a national nuclear capability.

Given

Given the strides toward a military nuclear program which can be made consistent with NPT, given also the developing resistance to US-Soviet attempts to halt the spread, the United States has limited leverage to slow down or control the proliferation process.

III. The Use of U.S. Leverage

There are, nonetheless, a number of things which the U.S. can do to keep the proliferation process within bounds:

A. Perhaps the most important single factor deterring widespread proliferation is the U.S. presence. If the U.S. were radically to change its base structure, or to revamp and retract its political commitments overseas, the pressures toward proliferation would increase many fold. In those areas of the globe where nuclear weapons capabilities are now being contemplated, one of the major imponderables is the future role of the United States. Where U.S. commitments already exist, as in Australia and Japan, there is a measure of uncertainty about how long they will last. In the Middle East, Israel wonders how reliable U.S. support would be. If the United States were not to continue to exert a major role overseas, several nations would likely to decide to protect themselves through nuclear systems of their own. The U.S. presence then has a stabilizing influence on proliferation.

B. The U.S. should not, however, extend a series of bilateral guarantees to potential nuclear states. Such guarantees, unlike the Security Council resolution put forward with the Soviets, could have the impact of committing or involving the United States in the quarrels of third parties; it could have the impact of setting us against the Soviets in some instances. While guarantees would inevitably extend the U.S. presence, and would thereby militate against the nuclear spread, they would also greatly circumscribe our freedom of action. Especially insofar as defended powers wished to specify the conditions under which we would

respond

respond to an attack upon them, the extension of guarantees could be more onerous to us than formal alliance relationships. If, on the other hand, guarantees did not make such formal specifications, they would offer little direct advantage to their possessors beyond what would be conveyed and implicit in the U.S. presence.

C. The U.S. could also assist non-nuclear powers by making available supplies of conventional arms. In certain cases, the incentives to nuclear status are partly dependent upon conventional balances; if these balances are upset, a power might be tempted to acquire nuclear weapons. In certain circumstances, as for example in the Israeli case, the U.S. might help to postpone nuclear decisions by assisting a state's conventional position. Tel Aviv is unlikely to declare for a nuclear capability as long as it has conventional superiority.

D. A final bargaining counter which the U.S. could conceivably offer would be cooperative provision of defensive nuclear systems. Such an arrangement could not be expected to apply to those nations whose ambitions are for greater international status or prestige, for they would reinforce dependence on the U.S. It seems unlikely, moreover, that they would be sought by nations who did not already enjoy the protection of the U.S. alliance; unless American offensive nuclear weapons already furnished a strategic umbrella, defensive nuclear weapons might not be viewed as a sufficient deterrent to attack. Non-aligned powers would therefore be least likely to opt for such an alternative. Where American strategic protection was already a fact of life, however, U.S.-provided defensive nuclear systems could add an additional reinsurance. Further, there may be some foreign publics that would like to benefit from the same type of protection (or even greater protection) than that provided the U.S. by the Sentinel system. Access to such systems, moreover, could have the impact of delaying national capabilities, for they would inevitably tie the U.S. even more closely to the security of the allied state. They might thereby increase the credibility of the U.S. guarantee.

IV. Conclusion

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A. The diffusion of nuclear capabilities is not likely to be halted once and for all by the NPT. Even under the NPT nations will proceed to develop their reactor programs to the point where a military nuclear option could be taken up in short order. In some cases, this option will be years; in some cases months; in others even weeks.

B. There is little that the U.S. can do beyond what it has already done to halt the proliferation process. Our assistance to other states will not always be a reliable deterrent to proliferation, because one of the major incentives to proliferation is increased international status and prestige.

C. The United States should nonetheless stand ready to help where it can. This would not mean an extension of security guarantees to other states, implicating the third-area conflicts, and possibly fomenting confrontations with the Soviet Union. It could mean assistance to conventional forces; in special cases it might mean cooperative provision of defensive nuclear systems. Probably the most important counter which the U.S. has to affect proliferation, however, is the American presence. A major retraction of that presence, an opting out, could bring a very rapid spread of nuclear weapons to other powers.

S/P:RNRosecrance:jls

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1968 JUL 12 PM 3 41

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POSTW. S. OFFICE

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

55

Wednesday, July 3, 1968

Rec'd
"50 a"

Mr. President:

Yesterday's Congressional Record bears further witness to the favorable response to the signing of the NPT and the announcement of US-USSR bilateral talks.

Senators Proxmire, Clark, McGee and Yarborough praised the events of Monday in terms of "historic" and "monumental."

Supportive statements in the House came from Representatives Anderson, Nedzi, Rooney, Patten, Frelinghuysen, Fraser and Gallagher. Only Representative Hosmer took a negative position.

Walt
W. W. Rostow

MEMORANDUM

INFORMATION

NPT
56

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

*Rec'd
7/1/68
9:16 AM
(7)
(PS)*

Monday, July 1, 1968 -- 3:00 p.m.

*Rec'd
4:50*

Mr. President:

I sent your speech, with a note saying the President wished me to forward it, to the following:

Charles Bartlett
Philip Potter
Boyd France
Tom Lambert
Tom Vail
David Brinkley
Marvin Kalb
Roscoe Drummond
Robert Spivack
Joseph Alsop
Clayton Fritchey
Crosby Noyes
Max Frankel
David Lawrence
Kenneth L. Fox

John Steele
Lloyd Norman
James Reston
Robert Donovan
John Scali
John Hightower
William S. White
William Stringer
Jack Leacacos
Joe Kraft
Phil Geyelin
Carl Rowan
Richard L. Wilson
Drew Pearson

W. W. Rostow

cy DAVIS

57
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THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS WERE RECEIVED FROM THE PRESIDENT:

"I TOLD THEM TO INVITE THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE IN THE SENATE AND THEY JUST INVITED SENATOR RUSSELL AND SENATOR STENNIS. I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE OTHER MEMBERS, DEMOCRATES AND REPUBLICANS INVITED IF THERE IS AT ALL ROOM. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO HAVE THE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE, AT LEAST A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF THEM FROM THE HOUSE, INCLUDING BOTH CHAIRMAN MAYHON AND CHAIRMAN HAYDEN AND ANY OTHERS IF THEY HAVE ROOM AND ARE NOT CROWDED. I WOULD INVITE ALL MEMBERS OF THE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE, BOTH COMMITTEES, AND ALSO THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES. THEY ARE ALSO IMPORTANT IN THIS. THIS IS ANTI MISSILE, MISSILE AND WE DO NOT HAVE ANYONE IN THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES. I DON'T UNDERSTAND WHO GOT UP THIS LIST, BUT THEY SURE HAVEN'T GOT THE RIGHT ONES ON IT. THEY OUGHT TO GET THE INVITATIONS IN THE OFFICE BY 8:00 OR 8:30, BUT NOT LATER THAN 9:00. IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO TELL THEM THEY ARE INVITED AND THE PRESIDENT HOPES THEY CAN COME. INVITE MEMBERS OF THE ARMED SERVICES AND AT LEAST A HALF DOZEN OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES AND ALL THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES. I DON'T KNOW IF THE VICE PRESIDENT IS ON THAT LIST OR NOT BUT HE SURE OUGHT TO BE. I'M SURE ALL SECRETARIES AND PROPER CABINET OFFICERS, BOTH STATE AND DEFENSE, ARE ON THE LIST. BE SURE A WIRE GOES OUT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT IN WAVERLY, MINNESOTTA."

List of Countries to Sign NPT as of 9:00 A. M. , 1 July 1968
(50 Certain, 6 Possible)

58

USA	Romania
UK	Liberia
USSR	El Salvador
Nepal	Panama
Somalia	Norway
Iceland	Jordan (?)
Afghanistan	Bolivia
Laos	Mauritius
Finland	Denmark
Tunisia	Senegal
Ireland	Czechoslovakia
Philippines	Lebanon
Australia	Poland
Dominican Republic	Nigeria
Ghana	Bulgaria
San Marino	Venezuela
Haiti	Nicaragua
Cyprus	Peru
Republic of China	Costa Rica
Morocco	Vietnam
Botswana	Uruguay
Paraguay	Ceylon
Iran	Togo
Greece	
Malaysia	
Hungary	Korea (?)
Colombia	Barbados (?)
New Zealand	Kenya (?)
	Ivory Coast (?)
	Dahomey (?)

Korea (definite)
Barbados (definite)
Kenya (definite)

Hondorus (?)

Ivory Coast (at White House)
Dahomey (at White House)

FOR AUTOMATIC RELEASE AT 11:30 A. M.

JULY 1, 1968

Stevenson

Office of the White House Press Secretary

59

X 3039

THE WHITE HOUSE

TEXT OF THE REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
AT THE SIGNING OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION
TREATY

As Delivered was
very close to this

LS
7/1/68

This is a reassuring and hopeful moment in the relations among nations.

We have come today to sign a Treaty which limits the spread of nuclear weapons.

More than fifty nations are here in Washington to commit their governments to this Treaty. Their representatives are also signing today in Moscow and in London. We hope and expect that virtually all the nations will move in the weeks and months ahead to accept this Treaty which was commended to the world by the overwhelming majority of the members of the United Nations General Assembly.

The treaty's purposes are simple:

-- to commit the nations of the world which do not now have nuclear weapons, not to produce or receive them in the future;

-- to assure equally that such nations have the full peaceful benefits of the atom;

-- and to commit the nuclear powers to move forward towards effective measures of arms control and disarmament.

Just a year ago, Chairman Kosygin and I agreed at Glassboro that we would work intensively in the time ahead to achieve this result.

After nearly a quarter century of danger and fear -- reason and sanity have prevailed to reduce the danger and to lessen the fear. All mankind is reassured.

As the moment is reassuring, so it is, even more, hopeful and heartening. For this Treaty is evidence that amid the tensions, the strife, the struggle and sorrow of these years, men of many nations have not lost the way -- or the will -- toward peace. The conclusion of this Treaty encourages the hope that other steps may be taken toward a peaceful world.

It is for these reasons -- and in this perspective -- that I have described this treaty as the most important international agreement since the beginning of the nuclear age.

It enhances the security of all nations by significantly reducing the danger of nuclear war among nations.

It encourages the peaceful use of nuclear energy by assuring effective safeguards against its destructive use.

But, perhaps most significantly, the signing of this Treaty keeps alive and active the impulse toward a safer world.

- MORE -

We are inclined to neglect and overlook what that impulse has brought about in recent years. These have been fruitful times for the quiet works of diplomacy. After long seasons of patient and painstaking negotiation, we have concluded, just within the past five years,

-- the Limited Test Ban Treaty

-- the Outer Space Treaty

-- and the Treaty creating a nuclear-free zone in Latin America.

The march of mankind is toward the summit -- not the chasm. We must not, we shall not allow that march to be interrupted.

This Treaty, like the treaties it follows, is not the work of any one nation. It is the accomplishment of nations which seek to exercise their responsibilities for maintaining peace and a stable world order. It is my hope -- and the common will of mankind -- that all nations will agree that this Treaty affords them added protection. We hope they will accept the Treaty and thereby contribute further to international peace and security.

As one of the nations having nuclear weapons, the United States -- all through these years -- has borne an awesome responsibility. This Treaty increases that responsibility -- for we have pledged that we shall use our weapons only in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

Furthermore, we have made clear to the United Nations Security Council what I would repeat today: if a state which has accepted this Treaty does not have nuclear weapons and is a victim of aggression, or is subject to a threat of aggression, involving nuclear weapons, the United States shall be prepared to ask immediate Security Council action to provide assistance in accordance with the Charter.

In welcoming the Treaty that prevents the spread of nuclear weapons, I repeat the United States commitment to honor all our obligations under existing treaties of mutual security. Such agreements have added greatly to the security of our nation and the nations with which such agreements exist. They have created a degree of stability in an often unstable world.

This Treaty is an important security measure. But it also lays an indispensable foundation:

-- for expanded cooperation in the peaceful application of nuclear energy.

-- and for additional measures to halt the nuclear arms race.

We will cooperate fully to bring the Treaty safeguards into being. We shall thus help provide the basis of confidence necessary for increased cooperation in the peaceful nuclear field. After the Treaty has come into force we will permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply its safeguards to all nuclear activities in the United States -- excluding only those with direct national security significance. Thus, the United States is not asking any country to accept any safeguards we are not willing to accept ourselves.

As the Treaty requires, we shall also engage in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The needs of the developing nations will be given particular attention.

We shall make readily available to the non-nuclear treaty partners the benefits of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. And we shall do so without delay and under the Treaty's provisions.

At this moment of achievement and hope, I am gratified to be able to report and announce to the world a significant agreement -- an agreement I have actively sought and worked for since January 1964:

Agreement has been reached between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States to enter in the nearest future into discussions on the limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles.

Discussion of this most complex subject will not be easy. We have no illusions that it will be. I know the stubborn, patient persistence it has required to get this far. I know the difficulties that lie ahead. I know the fears, suspicions, and anxieties we shall have to overcome. But I believe that the same spirit of accommodation shown in the negotiation of the present Treaty can bring us to a good result.

Man can still shape his destiny in the nuclear age -- and learn to live as brothers.

Toward that goal -- the day when the world moves out of the night of war into the light of sanity and security -- I solemnly pledge the resources, the resolve, and the unrelenting efforts of the people of the United States and their government.

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60
FBIS 29 (SEE 25,26)

TEXT OF KOSYGIN TREATY SPEECH

MOSCOW TASS INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN ENGLISH 1024 GMT 1 JUL 68 L

(SPEECH DELIVERED BY PREMIER KOSYGIN AT NUCLEAR WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION TREATY SIGNING CEREMONY)

(TEXT) MOSCOW--COMRADES, GENTLEMEN: PERMIT ME, ON THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, TO EXPRESS PROFOUND SATISFACTION OVER THE FACT THAT THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AN IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENT COMMENDED BY THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF UN MEMBERS, COMMENCES TODAY. THE CONCLUSION OF A TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS A MAJOR SUCCESS OF THE CAUSE OF PEACE. SINCE THE FIRST EMERGENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE SOVIET UNION HAS FIRMLY AND CONSISTENTLY COME OUT FOR DELIVERING MANKIND FROM THE NUCLEAR THREAT. THE TREATY IS AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD THIS GOAL, SINCE IT BARS FURTHER PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THUS REDUCING THE DANGER OF AN OUTBREAK OF A NUCLEAR WAR.

THE PARTICIPATION OF A GREAT NUMBER OF STATES IN THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY TODAY IS CONVINCING PROOF THAT STATES ARE CAPABLE OF FINDING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS OF COMPLICATED INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE FOR ALL MANKIND. THE PREPARATION OF THE TREATY REQUIRED GREAT EFFORTS AND PROLONGED NEGOTIATIONS, AND INVOLVED NUCLEAR AND NONNUCLEAR, BIG AND SMALL, DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING NATIONS, AS WELL AS COUNTRIES BELONGING TO DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS. THE TREATY REFLECTS NUMEROUS WISHES AND PROPOSALS EXPRESSED BY STATES, AND TAKES INTO ACCOUNT VARIOUS POINTS OF VIEW ON THE SOLUTION OF THE NONPROLIFERATION PROBLEM. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, ALL THE STATES APPROVING IT HAVE AGREED ABOUT THE MAIN THING: THE NECESSITY OF BARRING FURTHER PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

A SIGNIFICANT SUPPLEMENT TO THE TREATY IS FURNISHED BY THE RECENTLY ADOPTED SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION ON SECURITY ASSURANCES FOR NONNUCLEAR WEAPON COUNTRIES PARTY TO THE TREATY. AS WAS STATED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT INTENDS TO COMPLY WITH THIS DECISION UNSWERVINGLY.

FIVE YEARS AGO, HERE IN MOSCOW, WE SIGNED THE TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS IN THREE ENVIRONMENTS. FOLLOWING THAT THE TREATY PROHIBITING THE USE OF OUTER SPACE FOR MILITARY PURPOSES WAS CONCLUDED. TOGETHER WITH THE TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THESE ARE PRACTICAL STEPS TOWARD LIMITING THE ARMS RACE AND CREATING MORE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, ASSIGNING GREAT SIGNIFICANCE TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHEREBY ITS PARTIES UNDERTAKE TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH ON EFFECTIVE MEASURES RELATING TO CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, DECIDED AND SENT TO ALL GOVERNMENTS A MEMORANDUM ON SOME URGENT MEASURES FOR STOPPING THE ARMS RACE AND FOR DISARMAMENT. THIS MEMORANDUM INCLUDES SUCH MEASURES AS PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, CESSATION OF THE MANUFACTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND REDUCTION AND DESTRUCTION OF THEIR STOCKPILES, LIMITATION AND SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION OF MEANS OF DELIVERY OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS, AND OTHERS.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE MEMORANDUM, AS IT IS AIMED AT STRENGTHENING PEACE. SIMULTANEOUS OR STAGE-BY-STAGE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEASURES FOR DISARMAMENT PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE A SERIOUS CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CESSATION OF THE ARMS RACE AND FOR A RADICAL SOLUTION OF THE DISARMAMENT PROBLEM.

MAY I EXPRESS A HOPE THAT THE MEMORANDUM WILL RECEIVE DUE CONSIDERATION FROM THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE WORLD, THAT IT WILL BE A SUBJECT OF COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION IN THE 18-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT WHICH IS GOING TO RESUME ITS WORK SHORTLY, AND THAT THIS WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE SPECIFIC RESULTS IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT WHICH THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD ARE LONGING FOR.

1 JUL 1138Z COZ/TRW

Rd Stewart

FBIS 45 (OUT OF SEQUENCE)

MOSCOW TASS INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN ENGLISH 1530 GMT 1 JUL 68 L

(COMING SOVIET-AMERICAN TALKS)

(TEXT) MOSCOW--AN UNDERSTANDING HAS BEEN REACHED BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES TO OPEN EARLY TALKS ON A COMPREHENSIVE LIMITATION AND RESTRICTION BOTH OF SYSTEMS OF DELIVERING OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, IT IS OFFICIALLY REPORTED HERE.

01 JUL 1540Z AL/PDS