

MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

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/

Tuesday, July 2, 1968

*Rec'd
6/2/68*

Mr. President:

The initial reaction has been overwhelming to yesterday's signing of the NPT and, especially, to your announcement of the upcoming discussions with the Soviet Union.

Yesterday's Congressional Record contains supportive and laudatory comments from 13 Senators: Mansfield, Pastore, Bayh, Brewster, Anderson, Hart, Sparkman, Nelson, McGee, Byrd (W. Va.), Williams (NJ), Mondale and Harris and from 5 Representatives: Albert, Morgan, Holifield, Price and Cohelan.

Senator Thurmond expressed his opposition to the NPT. Congressman Findley questioned the wisdom of secret negotiations with the Soviet Union on disarmament.

Today's newspapers generally carry favorable editorial and columnist comments. We and the Agencies involved (mainly State and ACDA) are making sure that these editorials and columns will be made available to Members of Congress.

Walt
W. Rostow

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1 July 1968

Walt:

I discussed the strategic arms limitation problem with Harold Brown Saturday and he asked that I give him an outline of the points I had made for his personal use.

Although the attached paper is very rough, you might find it useful if you get into any discussion of this subject in the next few days. By next week the community should have a specific proposal out for consideration, and I will have a more detailed paper available for you.

Spurgeon
Spurgeon Keeny

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July 1, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY BROWN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-344
By cb, NARA, Date 6-1-95

Harold -

As you requested at our meeting on Saturday, I have outlined below for your personal information the thoughts I expressed concerning a possible agreement with the Soviets to limit offensive and defensive strategic weapon systems. The principal issues and my comments thereon are as follows:

I. Fixed Land Based Offensive Missile Systems:

1. Should agreement deal with launchers or missiles?

Comment: Must deal with launchers if we are to rely on unilateral intelligence.

2. Should IRBM's be included as well as ICBM's?

Comment: Yes. Necessary to maintain overall NATO vs. Warsaw balance and probably politically necessary to get NATO's support. Also increases total number of Soviet launchers under agreement which makes U.S. predominance in sea based systems more plausible.

3. Can we rely on unilateral intelligence against launchers?

Comment: Little question we can deal with present systems. However, one must anticipate that opponents to such an agreement will advance the thesis that the Soviets are capable, if they are willing to pay the cost, of building launch sites which would be undetected; for example, totally contained inside existing structures, etc. While it will not be possible to answer all of the "big hole" proposals, I believe that the possibility of some such clandestine construction is an acceptable risk, given the very high levels of strategic armaments. This sort of thing would obviously be more significant if there were substantial reductions in force levels.

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4. Should we freeze levels at present number of operational sites or should we let the Soviets complete sites already under construction?

Comment: One might consider starting with the first position for negotiating purposes; however, I am sure we would have to go to second position and would favor starting there to emphasize seriousness of our intent. In order to avoid Soviets starting new sites during negotiations, agreement should have cut off new construction of ^{the} say 1 August 1968. We should also consider whether desirable to have understanding on total site number, such as 1100.

II. Sea Based Strategic Systems:

1. Should missile submarines be covered by the agreement?

Comment: Yes! We should insist on it. Since we have a substantial lead in this category it is obviously to our interest to limit further expansion.

2. Should Soviet subs with aerodynamic missiles be included even though they are assigned a tactical mission?

Comment: Yes. These subs could certainly be used against strategic targets, and their inclusion brings up the Soviet force levels to minimize the existing disparity in this category.

3. Can we rely on unilateral intelligence against submarines?

Comment: Little question that we can deal with present systems as now operated. As with fixed land based sites, proposals will be advanced as to how Soviets could beat unilateral intelligence. However, I believe that our capabilities to detect sophisticated attempts at violation at sea are at least as good, if not better, than with fixed sites on land. In any event, here again theoretical possibility of some clandestine construction is an acceptable risk given high levels of strategic forces.

4. Should we freeze levels at present number of operational subs or should we let Soviets complete subs now under construction?

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Comment: Same as I(4). In addition, we might require Soviets to state how many were in fact under construction to avoid subsequent claim on their part that everything in next five-year plan was actually "under construction".

III. Mobile Land Missiles:

1. Should mobile strategic missiles be included in agreement?

Comment: I think they should be since an arms race in this area could defeat purpose of rest of agreement; however, this presents serious problems for verification which will have to be carefully considered (see below).

2. Should IRBM's be covered as well as ICBM's?

Comment: Yes, for reasons given in I(2) above although this presents a serious complication since Soviets already have mobile IRBM's deployed (see below).

3. Can we rely on unilateral intelligence?

Comment: I believe that we can, provided mobile ICBM's are completely prohibited so that existence of a single one constitutes a violation. The problem is considerably complicated by the fact that the Soviets already have deployed some mobile IRBM's. Therefore, a critical problem is whether mobile ICBM's can be differentiated from mobile IRBM's. Problem of determining the actual force level of Soviet mobile IRBM's will be very difficult. Unless the Soviets agree to eliminate these weapons, which is very unlikely, we should press them to propose method to reassure us that they are not increasing this force.

IV. Strategic Aircraft:

1. Should strategic aircraft be included in the agreement?

Comment: We should avoid this if possible since it will be very difficult to define. However, if Soviets insist, we might consider an agreed number within which two sides could build what they wanted. Quantitatively, if not qualitatively, the present positions are actually not so different here.

2. If included, could this be monitored by unilateral intelligence?

Comment: Yes, provided categories were clearly defined.

V. ABM:

1. What form should the ABM limitation take?

Comment: The most realistic approach would probably be to limit both sides to a force of say 1000 launchers and associated radars. This would be consistent with our limited deployment plans and would cover Moscow and Tallinn deployments. If Soviets could "convince" us that Tallinn does not in fact have significant ABM capability, they would, of course, then be free to substantially expand Moscow or Moscow follow-on system. If the Soviets insist on freezing on the basis of present construction and convince us that Tallinn has no ABM capability, we would have to assess the desirability of abandoning SENTINEL and leaving Soviets with a token ABM defense at Moscow. Although this would leave us without a thin anti-Chinese damage denial defense, this would probably be the best arrangement as far as the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance is concerned.

2. Can we rely on unilateral intelligence against ABM's?

Comment: We should be able to do this if agreement covers radars as well as launch sites. However, this may prove more difficult than strategic systems, given the large number of existing air defense systems and the fact that new air defense systems will presumably not be included in the agreement.

VI. Technological Improvements - MIRV's, etc.:

1. Should the agreement include limitation on new technological improvements such as MIRV's?

Comment: No. This would be extremely difficult to monitor convincingly by unilateral intelligence and would be extremely difficult to sell within the U.S. Government given the advanced state of development of the Poseidon and Minuteman III programs. Both sides would therefore be

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able to develop the qualitative aspects of existing systems. This would put a premium on R&D within existing force level ceilings. If the Soviets insist on including MIRV's in the agreement, we should put the burden on them as to how they propose to monitor it since it would presumably require a degree of on-site inspection totally unacceptable to them at this point.

Please excuse the rough form of these comments, but as you know, I am rushing to leave to drive the family to Vermont.

signed

Spurgeon Keeny

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OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
UPON SIGNING OF THE
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
THE EAST ROOM

AT 11:45 A.M. EDT

Secretary Rusk, Your Excellencies, Honored Members of Congress, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen:

This is a reassuring and hopeful moment in the relations among nations.

We have come here today to the East Room of the White House to sign a treaty which limits the spread of nuclear weapons.

More than 55 nations are here in Washington this morning to commit their governments to this treaty. Their representatives are also signing today in Moscow and in London. We hope and expect that virtually all the nations will move in the weeks and months ahead to accept this treaty which was commended to the world by the overwhelming majority of the members of the United Nations General Assembly.

The treaty's purposes are very simple:

- To commit the nations of the world which do not now have nuclear weapons not to produce or receive them in the future;
- To assure equally that such nations have the full peaceful benefits of the atom; and
- To commit the nuclear powers to move forward toward effective measures of arms control and disarmament.

It was just a year ago that Chairman Kosygin and I agreed at Glassboro that we would work intensively in the time ahead to try to achieve this result.

After nearly a quarter century of danger and fear -- reason and sanity have prevailed to reduce the danger and to greatly lessen the fear. Thus, all mankind is reassured.

As the moment is reassuring, so it is, even more, hopeful and heartening. For this treaty is evidence that amid the tensions, the strife, the struggle and scrow of these years, men of many nations have not lost the way -- or have not lost the will -- toward peace. The conclusion of this treaty encourages the hope that other steps may be taken toward a peaceful world.

It is for these reasons -- and in this perspective -- that I have described this treaty as the most important international agreement since the beginning of the nuclear age.

MORE

It enhances the security of all nations by significantly reducing the danger of nuclear war among nations.

It encourages the peaceful use of nuclear energy by assuring safeguards against its destructiveness.

But, perhaps most significantly, the signing of this treaty keeps alive and keeps active the impulse toward a safer world.

We are inclined to neglect and to overlook what that impulse has brought about in recent years. These have been fruitful times for the quiet works of diplomacy. After long seasons of patient and painstaking negotiation, we have concluded, just within the past five years,

- The Limited Test Ban Treaty
- The Outer Space Treaty
- And the treaty creating a nuclear-free zone in Latin America.

The march of mankind is toward the summit -- not the chasm. We must not, we shall not, allow that march to be interrupted.

This treaty, like the treaties it follows, is not the work, as Secretary Rusk said, of any one particular nation. It is the accomplishment of nations which seek to exercise their responsibilities for maintaining peace and maintaining a stable world order. It is my hope -- and the common will of mankind -- that all nations will agree that this treaty affords them some added protection. We hope they will accept the treaty and thereby contribute further to international peace and security.

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As one of the nations having nuclear weapons, the United States -- all through these years -- has borne an awesome responsibility. This Treaty increases that responsibility -- for we have pledged that we shall use our weapons only in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

Furthermore, we have made clear to the United Nations Security Council what I would like to repeat today: if a state which has accepted this Treaty does not have nuclear weapons and is a victim of aggression, or is subject to a threat of aggression, involving nuclear weapons, the United States shall be prepared to ask immediate Security Council action to provide assistance in accordance with the Charter.

In welcoming the Treaty that prevents the spread of nuclear weapons, I should like to repeat the United States commitment to honor all our obligations under existing treaties of mutual security. Such agreements have added greatly, we think, to the security of our nation and the nations with which such agreements exist. They have created a degree of stability in a sometimes unstable world.

This Treaty is a very important security measure. But it also lays an indispensable foundation:

-- for expanded cooperation in the peaceful application of nuclear energy.

-- for additional measures to halt the nuclear arms race.

We will cooperate fully to bring the Treaty safeguards into being. We shall thus help provide the basis of confidence that is necessary for increased cooperation in the peaceful nuclear field. After the Treaty has come into force we will permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply its safeguards to all nuclear activities in the United States -- excluding only those with direct national security significance. Thus, the United States is not asking any country to accept any safeguards that we are not willing to accept ourselves.

As the Treaty requires, we shall also engage in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The needs of the developing nations will be given especially particular attention.

We shall make readily available to the non-nuclear treaty partners the benefits of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. And we shall do so without delay and under the Treaty's provisions.

At this moment of achievement and great hope, I am gratified to be able to report and announce to the world a significant agreement -- an agreement that we have actively sought and worked for since January, 1964.

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Agreement has been reached between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States to enter in the nearest future into discussions on the limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles.

Discussion of this most complex subject will not be easy. We have no illusions that it will be. I know the stubborn, patient persistence that it has required to come this far. We do not underestimate the difficulties that may lie ahead. I know the fears, the suspicions, and the anxieties that we shall have to overcome. But we do believe that the same spirit of accommodation that is reflected in the negotiation of the present Treaty can bring us to a good and fruitful result.

Man can still shape his destiny in the nuclear age -- and learn to live as brothers.

Toward that goal -- the day when the world moves out of the night of war into the light of sanity and security -- I solemnly pledge the resources, the resolve, and the unrelenting efforts of the people of the United States and their government.

END

(AT 11:58 A.M. EDT)

JULY 1, 1968

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

REMARKS OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE
AMBASSADOR SIR PATRICK DEAN, UNITED KINGDOM
AMBASSADOR ANATOLI DOBRYNIN, SOVIET UNION
AT SIGNING OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
THE EAST ROOM

AT 11:30 A.M. EDT

SECRETARY RUSK: Mr. President, Your Excellencies, Honored Senators and Members of Congress, Distinguished Guests:

The treaty we are signing today is a result of efforts extending back to the dawn of the atomic age.

At that time, when the United States was the sole possessor of nuclear weapons, we felt that even one nuclear power was one too many.

Beginning with the Baruch Plan in 1946, we have persisted in our efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons. This treaty is not the work of any one country but is, in fact, the product of all nations which shared our concerns over the danger of nuclear proliferation.

Agreement has not been easy where basic security, the technological and economic interests of so many nations are deeply involved. Yet our collective and persistent determination has today been crowned with success.

If I might say a personal word to you, Mr. President, I know that you must take genuine, personal satisfaction in the important step which we are taking today. No one knows better than I your own personal determination to do everything you can to insure that the atom be used for the enrichment of man, rather than for his destruction. Your closest colleagues know of the many long hours which you personally have devoted to the achievement of this Non-Proliferation Treaty.

If this treaty succeeds, as we think it can and will, future generations will be grateful to you for what you have done during your Presidency to make it possible.

I wish to express my appreciation to Your Excellencies, the Ambassadors, for the prompt actions which your governments have taken in being among the first to sign this treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In compliance with the resolution adopted by the General Assembly of June 12th, which recommended that the treaty be open for signatures at the earliest possible date, the depository governments agree that no time should be lost in moving to the last stage of this historic effort.

We know that there are many other countries which shared the conviction which your governments are expressing today in signing this treaty, but have not yet been able to complete the procedures they must follow to authorize signature.

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Bearing in mind that 95 delegations voted for the Assembly resolution, we fully anticipate that the treaty will be signed by an overwhelming number of nations and we hope that this treaty will be ratified and entered into force promptly.

We are convinced that this Non-Proliferation Treaty, like the other nuclear arms control agreements which have been concluded in recent years, is not an end in itself, but a major step toward a more secure and rational world of peace and stability.

AMBASSADOR SIR PATRICK DEAN: Mr. President, Mr. Secretary, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen:

It has been nearly five years since the last major advance in the field of arms control and disarmament, the conclusion of the partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Today we are here to add another stone to the edifice which one day we all pray will insure lasting peace to mankind through complete and general disarmament. This Non-Proliferation Treaty is yet another measure, like the Test Ban Treaty and the agreements on outer space, for the control of the weapons of mass destruction that it is now within the power of men to make and use.

The treaty has been long in the making and it is a great achievement. The British Government has labored from the beginning in the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee, and later in the General Assembly, to produce a result that all countries can accept. They pay tribute to the collaboration between the United States and the Soviet Union which has done so much to make this possible.

They welcome, too, the spirit of understanding among so many of the non-nuclear weapons countries. They are confident that this treaty will receive the widest acceptance and so help to create an atmosphere in which further measures for the control and reduction of armaments, especially of nuclear weapons, can be fruitfully pursued.

The 18-Nation Disarmament Committee is meeting again in Geneva in the middle of this month. There is a great deal still for it to do.-

You, Mr. President, and Mr. Kosygin on the Soviet side, have pointed the way. Let us not waste the spirit of cooperation which has grown from the negotiations of this treaty, but put it to use in the solution of other problems of arms control and disarmament that still affect the world.

AMBASSADOR ANATOLI DOBRYNIN: Mr. President, Secretary Rusk, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen:

The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the signing of which commences today, is an important international agreement.

The conclusion of the treaty marks significant progress toward the complete delivery of mankind from the nuclear threat and, thus, it is a major success for the cause of peace.

The very fact that the treaty has been commended by the overwhelming majority of the United Nations members and is going to be signed by a great number of states is convincing proof of their capability to find mutually acceptable solutions of most vital and most complicated international problems.

The bringing about of the treaty is the result of persistent and prolonged efforts of a number of states with the Soviet Union and the United States playing a prominent role.

So the treaty, which actually meets the views and wishes of the whole international community, rests on a suitable and reliable basis.

The treaty follows the positive pattern of the Moscow treaty banning nuclear tests and the treaty prohibiting the use of outer space for military purposes, and provides one more practical step toward limiting the arms race, and creates more favorable conditions for progress in disarmament.

Under the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, each party undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith for effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament.

To attain this great goal, my government -- as Prime Minister Kosygin emphasized today in Moscow on the occasion of signing of this treaty -- is ready to make new efforts and new contributions.

Thank you very much.

MORE

(AT 11:45 A.M. EDT)

JULY 1, 1968

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Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

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PLENIPOTENTIARIES WHO HAVE PRESENTED
AUTHORIZATION TO SIGN THE TREATY OF THE
NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
AT WASHINGTON JULY 1, 1968

United States of America

Secretary of State Dean Rusk

Director of Arms Control & Disarmament Agency William C. Foster

United Kingdom

His Excellency Sir Patrick Dean, G. C. M. G

Ambassador E. and P.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

His Excellency Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

Ambassador E. and P.

Nepal

Mr. Jai P. Rana

First Secretary

Somalia

His Excellency Yusuf O. Azhari

Ambassador E. and P.

Iceland

Mr. Hordur Helgason

Charge d'Affaires ad interim

Afghanistan

His Excellency

Abdullah Malikyar

Ambassador E. and P.

Laos

His Excellency Khamking Souvanlasy

Ambassador E. and P.

Tunisia

The Honorable Hamed Ammar

Charge d'Affaires ad interim

Ireland

His Excellency William P. Fay

Ambassador E. and P.

Austria

Dr. Gerald Hinteregger

Charge d'Affaires ad interim

Dominican Republic

His Excellency Dr. Hector Garcia-Godoy

Ambassador E. and P.

Ghana

His Excellency Ebenezer Moses Debrah

Ambassador E. and P.

More

San Marino

Dr. Franco Fiorio
Honorary Consul General

Haiti

His Excellency Arthur Bonhomme
Ambassador E. and P.

Cyprus

Mr. Costas Papademas
Charge d'Affaires ad interim

Republic of China

His Excellency Chow Shu-kai
Ambassador E. and P.

Morocco

His Excellency Ahmed Osman
Ambassador E. and P.

Botswana

Mr. Phineas P. Makepe
Charge d'Affaires ad interim

Paraguay

His Excellency
Dr. Raul Sapena Pastor
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Iran

His Excellency Hushang Ansary
Ambassador E. and P.

Greece

Mr. Michael-George A. Mazarakis
Counselor

Malaysia

His Excellency Tan Sri Ong Yoke Lin, P. M. N.
Ambassador E. and P.

Hungary

Mr. Sandor Jozan
Charge d'Affaires ad interim

Colombia

His Excellency Dr. Hernan Echavarria
Ambassador E. and P.

New Zealand

His Excellency Frank Corner
Ambassador E. and P.

Romania

His Excellency Corneliu Bogdan
Ambassador E. and P.

More

Liberia

His Excellency S. Edward Peal
Ambassador E. and P.

El Salvador

His Excellency Colonel Julio A. Rivera
Ambassador E. and P.

Panama

His Excellency Jorge T. Velasquez
Ambassador E. and P.

Norway

His Excellency Arne Gunneng
Ambassador E. and P.

Jordan

Dr. Waleed M. Sadi
Charge d'Affaires ad interim

Bolivia

His Excellency Julio Sanjines-Goytia
Ambassador E. and P.

Mauritius

His Excellency Guy Balancy
Ambassador E. and P. to the United Nations

Denmark

The Honorable Flemming Agerup
Charge d'Affaires ad interim

Senegal

His Excellency Sheikh Ibrahima Fall
Ambassador E. and P.

Czechoslovakia

His Excellency Dr. Karel Duda
Ambassador E. and P.

Lebanon

Mr. Soleiman Farah
Charge d'Affaires ad interim

Poland

His Excellency Jerzy Michalowski
Ambassador E. and P.

Nigeria

His Excellency Joseph T. F. Iyalla
Ambassador E. and P.

Bulgaria

His Excellency Dr. Luben Guerassimov
Ambassador E. and P.

Venezuela

His Excellency Dr. Enrique Tejera-Paris
Ambassador E. and P.

More

Nicaragua

His Excellency Dr. Guillermo Sevilla-Sacasa
Ambassador E. and P.

Peru

His Excellency Celso Pastor
Ambassador E. and P.

Costa Rica

Mr. Ricardo Lara
Charge d'Affaires ad interim

Viet-Nam

Mr. Nguyen Hoan
Charge d'Affaires ad interim

Uruguay

His Excellency Juan Felipe Yriart
Ambassador E. and P.

Ceylon

His Excellency Oliver Weerasinghe, O. B. E.
Ambassador E. and P.

Togo

Mr. Michel M. Kekeh
Charge d'Affaires ad interim

Finland

His Excellency Olavi Munkki
Ambassador E. and P.

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Philippines

His Excellency Salvador P. Lopez
Ambassador E. and P.

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FBIS 34

SUMMARY OF SOVIET MEMORANDUM

MOSCOW TASS INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN ENGLISH 1234 GMT 1 JUL 68 L

(TEXT) MOSCOL--THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT FOLLOWING THE CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY ON PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IT IS NECESSARY TO AGREE AT AN EARLIEST DATE ON THE BAN ON THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. "SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE A SERIOUS DETERRENT FOR ALL THOSE WHO WOULD WISH TO RESORT TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS," SAYS A SOVIET GOVERNMENT MEMORANDUM PUBLISHED HERE.

THE USSR GOVERNMENT, WHICH SUBMITTED TO THE 22D SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY A DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SUGGESTS THAT THE DRAFT CONVENTION SHOULD BE URGENTLY DISCUSSED BY THE 18-NATION COMMITTEE AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS ON THE CONVOCAATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR ITS SIGNING.

DESIRING TO DELIVER MANKIND FROM THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT "PROPOSES THAT ALL NUCLEAR POWERS SHOULD FORTHWITH ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS ON STOPPING THE MANUFACTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE REDUCTION OF THEIR STOCKPILES, AND SUBSEQUENT COMPLETE PROHIBITION AND DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DECLARES ITS READINESS TO START SUCH NEGOTIATIONS WITH ALL OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS AT ANY TIME."

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DECLARES ITS READINESS TO UNDERTAKE AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH STATES CONCERNED ON MUTUAL LIMITATION AND SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC MEANS OF DELIVERY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE MEMORANDUM SAYS THAT THIS WOULD BE A MEASURE LEADING TO THE REMOVAL OF THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR.

(MORE)

01 JUL 1303Z JRC/JWR

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FBIS 38

FIRST ADD 34 (SUMMARY OF SOVIET MEMORANDUM)

XXX OF NUCLEAR WAR.

(TEXT) THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT PROPOSES THAT FLIGHTS BEYOND NATIONAL BORDERS OF BOMBERS WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BOARD BE BANNED WITHOUT DELAY. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT POINTS OUT THAT FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW SUCH FLIGHTS OF BOMBERS ARE DEVOID OF SENSE AND ONLY AGGRAVATE INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS. IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ALSO PROPOSES THAT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE REACHED TO STOP PATROLLING BY SUBMARINES CARRYING NUCLEAR MISSILES WITH THE RANGE OF SUCH MISSILES COVERING NATIONAL BORDERS OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES.

"THE SOVIET UNION," THE MEMORANDUM STRESSES, "HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE A STEADFAST ADVOCATE OF THE PROHIBITION OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS, BELIEVING THAT THE BANNING OF ALL TESTS WILL PROMOTE THE CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE AND THE SLACKENING OF THE ARMS RACE. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO REACH WITHOUT DELAY AGREEMENT ON THE BANNING OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS ON THE BASIS OF USING NATIONAL MEANS OF DETECTION TO CONTROL THE BAN."

THE MEMORANDUM POINTS OUT THAT SOME COUNTRIES, FIRST OF ALL THE UNITED STATES, DO NOT CARRY OUT THE IMPORTANT DECISION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY WHICH HAS CALLED ON ALL THE NATIONS FOR STRICT OBSERVANCE BY ALL STATES OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE GENEVA PROTOCOL OF 1925 FOR THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL METHODS OF WARFARE. WHAT IS MORE, THE UNITED STATES USES CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN ITS AGGRESSIVE WAR IN VIETNAM. IN VIEW OF THAT, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT PROPOSES TO CONSIDER WAYS AND MEANS OF SECURING OBSERVANCE BY ALL STATES OF THE GENEVA PROTOCOL.

THE MEMORANDUM STRESSES THE SERIOUS DANGER FOREIGN MILITARY BASES IN THE TERRITORIES OF OTHER STATES PRESENT TO PEACE. THIS IS CONVINCINGLY PROVED BY THE CONTINUED AGGRESSIVE WAR OF THE UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM AND BY THE TENSION AND CONFLICTS IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD WHERE FOREIGN BASES ARE SITUATED. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT PROPOSES THAT THE 18-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT SHOULD GIVE URGENT CONSIDERATION TO THE QUESTION OF THE ELIMINATION OF FOREIGN MILITARY BASES.

(MORE)

01 JUL 1341Z JRC/JWR

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FBIS 39

SECOND AND LAST ADD 34 (SUMMARY OF SOVIET MEMORANDUM)

XXX FOREIGN MILITARY BASES.

(TEXT) THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS IN FAVOR OF ESTABLISHING NUCLEAR FREE ZONES IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD, WHICH WOULD "LIMIT EFFECTIVELY THE AREA OF STATIONING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND BE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF PREVENTING THEIR DIRECT OR INDIRECT PROLIFERATION." THE MEMORANDUM POINTS OUT THAT NOT ONLY GROUPS OF STATES BUT ALSO INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES MAY ASSUME OBLIGATIONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DENUCLEARIZED ZONES.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ALSO SUPPORTS PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MEASURES FOR REGIONAL DISARMAMENT AND FOR THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS IN VARIOUS REGIONS OF THE WORLD, INCLUDING THE MIDDLE EAST.

THE MEMORANDUM FURTHER SAYS THAT THE PROGRESS OF RESEARCH AND THE PROSPECTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SEABED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR "MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF A TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE FORMALIZATION OF SUCH A REGIME AS WOULD INSURE THE UTILIZATION OF THE SEABED BEYOND THE LIMITS OF THE PRESENT TERRITORIAL WATERS SOLELY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES."

"IN PROPOSING THE ABOVE MEASURES, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DRAWS ATTENTION TO THE NEED FOR MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO ACHIEVE CONCRETE RESULTS IN SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DEEMS IT NECESSARY TO GIVE A NEW IMPETUS TO THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS QUESTION IN THE 18-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT. AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS IN FAVOR OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S DECISION ON HOLDING A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE AND IS CONFIDENT THAT THE CONVENING OF SUCH A CONFERENCE WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE SOLUTION OF THIS MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM CONFRONTING MANKIND."

"THE SOVIET UNION IN COOPERATION WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND WILL ALL PEACE-LOVING STATES WILL WORK FOR REMOVING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR, FOR CURBING THE FORCES OF AGGRESSION, AND FOR IMPLEMENTING A BROAD PROGRAM OF DISARMAMENT. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CALLS UPON ALL STATES TO DO ALL THAT IS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT ON URGENT MEASURES FOR STOPPING THE ARMS RACE AND ON DISARMAMENT."

(ENDALL)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

9437

June 28, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

The attached draft statement has been prepared for the use of the President on the occasion of the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It has been cleared by Secretary Rusk and Secretary Clifford.

John P. Walsh

John P. Walsh
Deputy Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Draft Statement.

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MAR. 19, 1983.

BY 18 ON 4-25-94

CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

N O D I S

68a

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
AT
SIGNING OF NPT

This historic occasion marks a major step in mankind's efforts to master the destructive force of the atom and to assure that it will be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. As the number of nuclear powers and the capacity for mass destruction has increased over the past twenty years, nations have become acutely aware that nuclear catastrophe could be averted only by decisive, rational action. Today the forces of reason and sanity have prevailed as we have taken this momentous action to limit the further spread of nuclear weapons.

The Treaty which is now open for signature is the result of years of patient and careful deliberation. It represents a delicate balancing of national interests required in the larger quest for a world in which the nuclear spectre will be removed. This Treaty is not

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DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING, CANCELLED PER E. O. 12958,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 16, 1993.

BY plg/deh ON 3/4/94

CONFIDENTIAL

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the work of any one nation but is in fact the product of all nations which have sought to exercise their responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and a stable world order. This Treaty is the most important international agreement in the field of disarmament since the nuclear age began. It will enhance the security of nations by materially reducing the danger of nuclear warfare. It will facilitate cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through confidence inspired by effective safeguards. And it will provide a strong impetus for the nuclear powers to proceed with negotiations to end the nuclear arms race.

As the Treaty has neared fruition, nations have once again examined their fundamental interest in determining their position on adherence. It is my earnest hope that all nations will conclude that this Treaty will afford them added protection from the threat of nuclear warfare and that it will contribute substantially to international peace and security.

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The United States has always been deeply cognizant of the awesome responsibility it bears as one of the nuclear weapon powers. We recognize that this Treaty places an even greater obligation on this country to assure that this power is used justly and wisely. We welcome this obligation and, as reaffirmed in the Preamble of the Treaty, we solemnly pledge that we will always use this power in conformity with the UN Charter.

This Treaty itself will enhance the security of all parties. In addition, we have made clear in the United Nations Security Council that we are prepared, as a permanent member of the Security Council, to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance in accordance with the Charter to any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty that is a victim of an act of aggression, or an object of a threat of aggression, in which nuclear weapons are used. Moreover, in welcoming the Non-Proliferation Treaty, I ~~wish to~~ reaffirm that the United States remains fully committed to fulfilling its obligations under existing treaties of mutual security. ✓

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Such arrangements have provided a significant measure of security for the United States and other parties to these treaties. They have created a degree of stability in an often unstable world.

In addition to its importance as a security measure, this Treaty will lay an indispensable foundation for expanded cooperation in the peaceful application of nuclear energy and for additional measures to halt the nuclear arms race.

We will cooperate fully to bring treaty safeguards into being in order to provide that necessary basis of confidence which will contribute toward increased cooperation in the peaceful nuclear field. The United States is not asking any country to accept safeguards that we are unwilling to accept ourselves. When safeguards are applied under the Treaty, the United States will permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply its safeguards to all nuclear activities in the United States -- excluding only those with direct national security significance.


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In carrying out the Treaty purposes with respect to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, we shall, as the Treaty requires, facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The needs of the developing nations will be given particular attention. We shall make available to the non-nuclear treaty partners -- without delay, and under the Treaty's provisions -- the benefits of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

Finally, this Treaty is a major and necessary step in the effort to halt the nuclear arms race. It follows logically from the important agreements concluded in the past ^{few} [five] years -- the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty, and the Treaty of Tlatelolco. We can now proceed with hope and confidence to the next stage. As the Treaty specifies, we will pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an



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-6-

early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

We have stated repeatedly our willingness to engage in discussions with the Soviet Union regarding steps to curtail the strategic arms race. I am, therefore, particularly gratified to announce today that an arrangement has been reached between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States to enter in the nearest future into discussions on the limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles.

We have no illusions that the path to agreement in this complex and sensitive field will be easy. But, with the same determination and spirit of accommodation shown in the negotiation of the Treaty we are signing today, I am convinced that mutually beneficial agreement can be achieved.

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The nations of the world have made their will manifest in this Treaty. They have determined that the nuclear arms race must be ended. The nuclear-weapon powers must act boldly to assure that this goal is achieved. For our part, I solemnly affirm that the United States will do all in its power to realize the great promise of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which points to a world free of the evil of nuclear weapons -- a world in which the atom will be used only for the benefit of mankind.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



9445

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

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(Handwritten initials)

June 29, 1968

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Attached is an informal translation of the memorandum on disarmament measures which was handed to Mr. Bohlen this morning by the Soviet Charge d'Affaires. The latter indicated that the memorandum would be published in Moscow on July 2 or 3.

BHR

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Informal Translation.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-342
By 148, NARA, Date 12-6-94

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~ UNTIL PUBLICATION BY USSR

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

69a
DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-342

By lig, NARA, Date 12-6-94

Memorandum of the Government of the USSR on several urgent measures with regard to curbing the arms race and on disarmament.

From the very first days of its existence the Soviet Government has put forward as a basis of its foreign policy line the struggle against the imperialist policy of aggression and wars and has stood for the safeguarding of peace among people. Following the course pointed out by V. I. Lenin, the Soviet Government persistently and consistently has stood for the implementation of a broad program of measures in the area of curbing the arms race and of disarmament and for putting into effect a plan for general and complete disarmament.

The active struggle of socialist countries, of all peace loving states has permitted the implementation of a number of practical steps directed toward the limitation of the race of nuclear arms and toward disarmament. After the Moscow treaty on banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere and outer space and under water there followed the Treaty on Principles of activity of states in outer space, banning nuclear weapons in the cosmos. Now there has been worked out and ready for signature a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which has great significance for the course of strengthening peace and which creates favorable conditions for the further struggle for curbing the arms race, for implementing effective measures in the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. The interest of insuring peace demands further steps directed toward the curbing of the arms race and toward disarmament. This is all the more important since as a result of the activation of aggressive forces, tension in international relations has increased, the aggressive war of America in Vietnam is expanding, the occupation by Israel of the territory of a number of Arab states seized by force continues.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~ UNTIL PUBLICATION BY USSR

Following the conclusion of the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons the Soviet Government proposes that agreement be reached on bringing into force as soon as possible the following urgent measures on termination of the arms race and ^{on}disarmament.

1. Prohibition of Use of Nuclear Weapons

From the time the nuclear weapon came into being, the Soviet Union has consistently stood for the prohibition and complete liquidation of this weapon of mass destruction. An important step toward resolution of this task, toward elimination of the threat of nuclear war would be the conclusion of an international agreement on banning the use of nuclear weapons. Such an agreement would be a serious restraining factor for all those who might contemplate unleashing nuclear weapons. In the presence of suspicions by some states of the intentions of other states to use nuclear weapons, this agreement would facilitate improvement of the international atmosphere.

In order to facilitate the earliest resolution of this problem, the Government of the USSR has introduced at the 22nd Session of the General Assembly a draft convention on prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. A significant majority of delegations to the Assembly supported the idea of the necessity of concluding such an international convention. The Assembly called upon all states to study the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons proposed by the Soviet Union, as well as other proposals which might be made on this question and to carry on discussions in the 18 Nation Committee on Disarmament or directly among states concerning the conclusion of an appropriate convention through calling an international conference.

For the purpose of a practical resolution of the question of banning the use of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Government proposes that the 18 Nation Committee discuss as a matter of first priority the draft convention on banning the use of nuclear weapons and exchange views on the calling of an international conference for signature of the corresponding convention.

2. Measures to end the production of nuclear weapons, reduction and liquidation of stockpiles.

In an effort to ^{relieve} ~~remove~~ mankind ^{of} ~~from~~ this danger of nuclear war, the Soviet Government proposes to all nuclear powers that they immediately enter into negotiations on the termination of production of nuclear weapons, reduction of stockpiles and eventually a complete ban and liquidation of nuclear weapons under appropriate international control. The Soviet Government declares its readiness to begin at any time such negotiations with all other nuclear powers. In this, the Soviet Government proceeds from the assumption that in the course of such negotiations agreement could be reached on a whole complex of measures leading to the destruction of nuclear weapons as well as on several directed toward this aim.

3. Limitation and subsequent reduction of means of delivery of strategic weapons.

The Soviet Government proposes agreement on concrete steps in the area of limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Government in this proceeds from the assumption that destruction of the whole arsenal of strategic means of delivery and, in any case, the reduction of this arsenal to an absolute minimum, with the retention, and this only temporarily, of only a strictly limited quantity of such means, would

be a measure conducive to elimination of the threat of nuclear war.

The Soviet Government declares **its** readiness to conduct an exchange of opinions with interested states on mutual limitations and subsequent reduction of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

4. Prohibition of flights of bombers with nuclear weapons on board beyond national boundaries.

Limitation on operating areas for ballistic missile submarines.

The Soviet Government has several times called attention of governments of other states and world public opinions to the danger which is represented by flights of bombers with nuclear weapons on board beyond national boundaries. The catastrophes which have taken place involving American bombers with nuclear weapons on board beyond the national boundaries of the USA ~~has~~ ^{have} given rise to legitimate alarm on the part of various countries. There is no guarantee that a routine ~~in time a~~ catastrophe involving a bomber armed with nuclear bombs would not cause a nuclear explosion with all the consequences that would flow from this. In the present tense situation such an explosion could ignite a whole chain of serious developments, could lead to a conflict, danger for all mankind. From the military point of view, these flights of bombers make no sense in the context of the existence of nuclear missiles. They can have only one purpose: to increase international tension, without considering the consequences of such a dangerous practice.

The Soviet Government proposes an immediate ban on flights beyond national boundaries of bombers with nuclear weapons on board. The Soviet Government also proposes, for the purpose of lessening the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war, that agreement be reached on ending patrols by ballistic missile submarines armed with nuclear missiles within the limits of range of these missiles from the borders of contracting ~~states~~ ^{parties.}

5. Prohibition of Underground Tests of Nuclear Weapons

The Soviet Union has been and remains a firm supporter of the prohibition of all tests of nuclear weapons and considers a prohibition of all tests would serve the interests of strengthening peace and weakening the arms race. The Soviet Government is ready without delay to agree on a prohibition of underground tests of nuclear weapons on the basis of the use of national means of detection for verification of such a prohibition.

6. Prohibition of the Use of Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons

The Soviet Government has repeatedly drawn the attention of nations to the threat that the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons represents to mankind. Reflecting the general concern of peoples in connection with this threat, the XXI Session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution which contains a summons to strict observance by all nations of the principles of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, condemns all actions contradictory of this purpose, and proposes to all nations accession to the Geneva Protocol.

However, some nations, and first of all the United States of America, do not fulfill this important decision of the General Assembly. Moreover, the USA uses chemical weapons in its aggressive war in Vietnam. In view of this, the Soviet Government proposes that the ENDC review the paths and means of ensuring the fulfillment by all nations of the ~~xxx~~ Geneva Protocol on the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

7. The Elimination of Foreign Military Bases

Foreign military bases on others' territories constitute a serious danger to peace. Such bases serve as sources for the outbreak of military conflicts, and threaten the freedom and independence of peoples. The continuing United

States of America aggressive war in Vietnam as well as tension and conflicts in other regions of the world where foreign bases are located convincingly testify to this.

The Soviet Government proposes, in conformity with the instructions of XXI Session of the United Nations General Assembly, promptly to examine in the ENDC the question of the elimination of foreign military bases.

8. Regional Disarmament Measures

The Soviet Government supports the creation of nuclear free zones in various regions of the world. In this it proceeds from the assumption that the formation of such zones must effectively limit the sphere of deployment of nuclear weapons and in full measure be responsive to the task of preventing their direct or indirect proliferation.

The Soviet Government considers that obligations in the establishment of nuclear free zones may be undertaken not only by groups of states encompassing entire continents or large geographic regions but also by more limited groups of states or even individual nations.

The Soviet Government similarly supports proposals for ^{the} realization of measures of regional disarmament and reduction of armament in various regions of the world, including the Near East. The question of such measures for limitation of the arms race in the Near East could be examined, naturally, only on condition of the elimination of the aftermath of the Israeli aggression against the Arab states, and first of all, the full withdrawal of Israeli troops from the territory of Arab nations occupied by them.

9. The Peaceful Use of the Bed of Seas and Oceans

The interests of reducing the arms race are served by limiting military use of those environments in which man lives and functions, and by preventing such use of new environments of human activity. The Soviet Government has

consistently exerted and exerts efforts to the achievement of these goals and states with satisfaction that important practical steps in this direction are the appropriate limitations fixed by the Antarctic Agreement and the Agreement on the Principles Governing the Activity of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other ~~Heavenly~~ Celestial Bodies.

The course of exploration and the prospects for mastering the bed of seas and oceans permit the question to be raised of a timely establishment in appropriate form of a regime which would ensure the use of the sea bottom beyond the limits of existing territorial waters solely for peaceful purposes. The same would prohibit, in particular, the creation of stationary installations of military designation on the sea bottom, as well as other activities of a military character. The Soviet Government proposes to begin in the ENDC talks on the question of the use of the sea bottom beyond the limits of existing territorial waters solely for peaceful purposes.

In proposing the above-mentioned measures, the Soviet Government directs attention to the need for making every effort to achieve concrete results in the resolution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Government deems it necessary to activate negotiations on this question in the 18 Nation Committee on Disarmament. Meanwhile, it stands for the implementation of the decision of the United Nations General Assembly on calling a world disarmament conference and expresses its conviction that the calling of such a conference would facilitate a resolution of this most important task confronting mankind.

Guided by its line of principle in questions of the struggle for peace, the Soviet Union in cooperation with socialist countries, with all peace loving states will press for the elimination of the threat of nuclear war, for the leashing of forces of aggression, for the implementation of a broad program of disarmament. The Soviet Government appeals to all states to do everything possible for the ^{attainment} ~~advancement~~ of agreement on the urgent steps of terminating the arms race and on disarmament.

ACTION

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ / NODIS

Saturday, June 29, 1968 - 8:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

*Rec'd in Pres's office
10:10 a*

Herewith (Tab A) draft remarks for the NPT signing on Monday. It has been cleared by Sec. Rusk and Sec. Clifford. It is classified at the moment because of the paragraph on page 6 announcing the talks.

If you wish to put this in the hands of speech writers, the sentence at the bottom of page 3 and top of page 4 should, if possible, not be altered. It is the exact language Sec. Rusk recommended and you cleared ~~before~~ reaffirming our existing mutual security treaties and our continuing loyalty to them -- an essential element in the NPT effort.

You will also be interested in the attached cable indicating the possibility Dobrynin will be here briefly on Monday for the NPT signing. (Tab B)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By Jrg, NARA, Date 3/4/94

W. W. Rostow

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N O D I S

70-b

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
AT
SIGNING OF NPT

This historic occasion marks a major step in mankind's efforts to master the destructive force of the atom and to assure that it will be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. As the number of nuclear powers and the capacity for mass destruction has increased over the past twenty years, nations have become acutely aware that nuclear catastrophe could be averted only by decisive, rational action. Today the forces of reason and sanity have prevailed as we have taken this momentous action to limit the further spread of nuclear weapons.

The Treaty which is now open for signature is the result of years of patient and careful deliberation. It represents a delicate balancing of national interests required in the larger quest for a world in which the nuclear spectre will be removed. This Treaty is not

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING, CANCELLED PER E. O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MAR. 16, 1983.

BY pl/dch ON 3/4/94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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the work of any one nation but is in fact the product of all nations which have sought to exercise their responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and a stable world order. This Treaty is the most important international agreement in the field of disarmament since the nuclear age began. It will enhance the security of nations by materially reducing the danger of nuclear warfare. It will facilitate cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through confidence inspired by effective safeguards. And it will provide a strong impetus for the nuclear powers to proceed with negotiations to end the nuclear arms race.

As the Treaty has neared fruition, nations have once again examined their fundamental interest in determining their position on adherence. It is my earnest hope that all nations will conclude that this Treaty will afford them added protection from the threat of nuclear warfare and that it will contribute substantially to international peace and security.

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The United States has always been deeply cognizant of the awesome responsibility it bears as one of the nuclear weapon powers. We recognize that this Treaty places an even greater obligation on this country to assure that this power is used justly and wisely. We welcome this obligation and, as reaffirmed in the Preamble of the Treaty, we solemnly pledge that we will always use this power in conformity with the UN Charter.

This Treaty itself will enhance the security of all parties. In addition, we have made clear in the United Nations Security Council that we are prepared, as a permanent member of the Security Council, to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance in accordance with the Charter to any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty that is a victim of an act of aggression, or an object of a threat of aggression, in which nuclear weapons are used. Moreover, in welcoming the Non-Proliferation Treaty, I wish to reaffirm that the United States remains fully committed to fulfilling its obligations under existing treaties of mutual security.

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-4-

Such arrangements have provided a significant measure of security for the United States and other parties to these treaties. They have created a degree of stability in an often unstable world.

In addition to its importance as a security measure, this Treaty will lay an indispensable foundation for expanded cooperation in the peaceful application of nuclear energy and for additional measures to halt the nuclear arms race.

We will cooperate fully to bring treaty safeguards into being in order to provide that necessary basis of confidence which will contribute toward increased cooperation in the peaceful nuclear field. The United States is not asking any country to accept safeguards that we are unwilling to accept ourselves. When safeguards are applied under the Treaty, the United States will permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply its safeguards to all nuclear activities in the United States -- excluding only those with direct national security significance.

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-5-

In carrying out the Treaty purposes with respect to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, we shall, as the Treaty requires, facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The needs of the developing nations will be given particular attention. We shall make available to the non-nuclear treaty partners -- without delay, and under the Treaty's provisions -- the benefits of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

Finally, this Treaty is a major and necessary step in the effort to halt the nuclear arms race. It follows logically from the important agreements concluded in the past five years -- the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty, and the Treaty of Tlatelolco. We can now proceed with hope and confidence to the next stage. As the Treaty specifies, we will pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an

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-6-

early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

We have stated repeatedly our willingness to engage in discussions with the Soviet Union regarding steps to curtail the strategic arms race. I am, therefore, particularly gratified to announce today that an arrangement has been reached between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States to enter in the nearest future into discussions on the limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles.

We have no illusions that the path to agreement in this complex and sensitive field will be easy. But, with the same determination and spirit of accommodation shown in the negotiation of the Treaty we are signing today, I am convinced that mutually beneficial agreement can be achieved.

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-7-

The nations of the world have made their will manifest in this Treaty. They have determined that the nuclear arms race must be ended. The nuclear-weapon powers must act boldly to assure that this goal is achieved. For our part, I solemnly affirm that the United States will do all in its power to realize the great promise of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which points to a world free of the evil of nuclear weapons -- a world in which the atom will be used only for the benefit of mankind.

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1968 JUN 29 08 07

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-342
By 129, NARA, Date 12-6-94

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ACTION ACDA 16

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOW 4440

REF MOSCOW 4378

1. DOBRYNIN LAST NIGHT AGAIN INQUIRED WHO WOULD SIGN NPT FOR US. PLEASE ADVISE URGENTLY.
2. HE SAID IT WOULD BE DECIDED THIS MORNING WHETHER HE WOULD RETURN TO WASHINGTON SOLELY TO TAKE PART IN SIGNING. IF SO HE WOULD RETURN TO MOSCOW SOMETIME NEXT WEEK TO COMPLETE HIS CONSULTATION HERE.
THONPSON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE SENT: 6/27/68

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FROM: _____
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FORM 6-65 **DS-406** RETAINED BY ADDRESSEE FOR 3 YEARS



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 28, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

*attachment
sent Prov
6/29/68*

The attached draft statement has been prepared for the use of the President on the occasion of the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It has been cleared by Secretary Rusk and Secretary Clifford.

John P. Walsh
John P. Walsh
Deputy Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Draft Statement.

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MAR. 16, 1983.

BY lg ON 4-25-94

CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS

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IN REPLY REFER TO:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 28, 1968

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Davis

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: July 1 Ceremony on Non-Proliferation Treaty

Scenario

→ To files
Davis
7/10/68

The planning for the ceremony of signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to be held in the East Room of the White House next Monday, July 1 at 11:30 a.m., is reflected in the following scenario:

1. The Ambassadors and other representatives of States that have submitted to the Department of State documents authorizing them to sign are being invited to participate with the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. in the signature of the treaty.
2. The President will be seated at a table to the north of the rostrum.
3. Participants who will sign the treaty will be seated at tables on each side of the rostrum as follows (a seating chart is attached at Tab A):

North tables - right to left.

U.S. - The Secretary of State (at the right of the President)
- The Director of ACDA

U.K.	Finland
U.S.S.R.	Tunisia
Nepal	Ireland
Somalia	Philippines
Iceland	Austria
Afghanistan	Dominican Republic
Laos	Ghana

(Others to be added here when authorizations to sign are received.)

South tables - Left to right.

(Names of countries to be added when their authorizations received.)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-342
By *inf*, NARA, Date 12-6-94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. Name plates for the U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R. and each of the other countries will be placed on the front of the tables in line with the chairs for their respective representatives.

5. The Legal Adviser of the Department of State, Mr. Leonard C. Meeker, will inform the President that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is ready to be signed.

30

6. In view of the likelihood that more than/countries will participate in the signing ceremony, the signature pages will be removed from the treaty and placed before the signers by members of the Department's treaty staff. This procedure will make it possible to complete the signing of the treaty in less than five minutes.

7. After signature of the treaty has been completed, Mr. Meeker will so inform the President and the Secretary of State. The Secretary will proceed to the rostrum and make a few remarks regarding the treaty. Ambassador Dean of the U.K. and Chargé d'Affaires Tcherniakov of the U.S.S.R. will also speak briefly at the rostrum.

8. The President will then make such remarks as he considers appropriate at the rostrum. A draft of suggested remarks has been forwarded separately.

BHR

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Tab A - Seating chart

RECEIVED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

TOP SECRET - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 1968 JUN 29 AM 9 30
TOP SECRET - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Attachments:

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
BENJAMIN H. RUST

JHR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (TOP SECRET)

approval of the program. A draft of suggested remarks
8. The President will then make such remarks as he considers

appropriate at the ceremony.
and should, if feasible, deliver remarks of the U.S.S.R. will also
few remarks regarding the treaty. Immediately prior to the U.S.S.R.
State. The Secretary will proceed to the ceremony and make a
Mr. Meeker will so inform the President and the Secretary of
1. After signature of the treaty has been completed,

then five minutes.
make it possible to complete the signing of the treaty in less
members of the Department, a treaty staff. This procedure will
be removed from the treaty and placed before the signers by
participants in the signing ceremony, the signature pages will
6. In view of the likelihood that ~~some of the~~ committees will

30

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is ready to be signed.
Meeker will inform the President that the Treaty on the
2. The legal adviser of the Department of State, Mr. Leonard C.

will then the credits for such respective representatives.
other committees will be placed on the front of the treaty in
4. Name places for the U.S., U.S.S.R., U.S.S.R. and each of the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


71a

71-b

Tunisia
 Finland
 Laos
 Afghanistan
 Iceland
 Somali
 Nepal
 USSR
 UK
 Foster
 Rusk
 The President

Rostrum

Ireland



Dotted lines indicate tables to be added if number of signers exceeds 21.

June 27, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

N O D I S

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6/28/68
98

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
AT
SIGNING OF NPT

This historic occasion marks a major step in mankind's efforts to master the destructive force of the atom and to assure that it will be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. As the number of nuclear powers and the capacity for mass destruction has increased over the past twenty years, nations have become acutely aware that nuclear catastrophe could be averted only by decisive, rational action. Today the forces of reason and sanity have prevailed as we have taken this momentous action to limit the further spread of nuclear weapons.

The Treaty which is now open for signature is the result of years of patient and careful deliberation. It represents a delicate balancing of national interests required in the larger quest for a world in which the nuclear spectre will be removed. This Treaty is not

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING, CANCELLED PER E. O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MAR. 16, 1983.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY Q/dch ON 3/4/94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

the work of any one nation but is in fact the product of all nations which have sought to exercise their responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and a stable world order. This Treaty is the most important international agreement in the field of disarmament since the nuclear age began. It will enhance the security of nations by materially reducing the danger of nuclear warfare. It will facilitate cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through confidence inspired by effective safeguards. And it will provide a strong impetus for the nuclear powers to proceed with negotiations to end the nuclear arms race.

As the Treaty has neared fruition, nations have once again examined their fundamental interest in determining their position on adherence. It is my earnest hope that all nations will conclude that this Treaty will afford them added protection from the threat of nuclear warfare and that it will contribute substantially to international peace and security

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

The United States has always been deeply cognizant of the awesome responsibility it bears as one of the nuclear weapon powers. We recognize that this Treaty places an even greater obligation on this country to assure that this power is used justly and wisely. We welcome this obligation and, as reaffirmed in the Preamble of the Treaty, we solemnly pledge that we will always use this power in conformity with the UN Charter.

This Treaty itself will enhance the security of all parties. In addition, we have made clear in the United Nations Security Council that we are prepared, as a permanent member of the Security Council, to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance in accordance with the Charter to any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty that is a victim of an act of aggression, or an object of a threat of aggression, in which nuclear weapons are used. Moreover, in welcoming the Non-Proliferation Treaty, I wish to reaffirm that the United States remains fully committed to fulfilling its obligations under existing treaties of mutual security.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4-

Such arrangements have provided a significant measure of security for the United States and other parties to these treaties. They have created a degree of stability in an often unstable world.

In addition to its importance as a security measure, this Treaty will lay an indispensable foundation for expanded cooperation in the peaceful application of nuclear energy and for additional measures to halt the nuclear arms race.

We will cooperate fully to bring treaty safeguards into being in order to provide that necessary basis of confidence which will contribute toward increased cooperation in the peaceful nuclear field. The United States is not asking any country to accept safeguards that we are unwilling to accept ourselves. When safeguards are applied under the Treaty, the United States will permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply its safeguards to all nuclear activities in the United States -- excluding only those with direct national security significance.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

In carrying out the Treaty purposes with respect to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, we shall, as the Treaty requires, facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The needs of the developing nations will be given particular attention. We shall make available to the non-nuclear treaty partners -- without delay, and under the Treaty's provisions -- the benefits of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

Finally, this Treaty is a major and necessary step in the effort to halt the nuclear arms race. It follows logically from the important agreements concluded in the past five years -- the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty, and the Treaty of Tlatelolco. We can now proceed with hope and confidence to the next stage. As the Treaty specifies, we will pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-6-

early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

We have stated repeatedly our willingness to engage in discussions with the Soviet Union regarding steps to curtail the strategic arms race. I am, therefore, particularly gratified to announce today that an arrangement has been reached between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States to enter in the nearest future into discussions on the limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles.

We have no illusions that the path to agreement in this complex and sensitive field will be easy. But, with the same determination and spirit of accommodation shown in the negotiation of the Treaty we are signing today, I am convinced that mutually beneficial agreement can be achieved.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-7-

The nations of the world have made their will manifest in this Treaty. They have determined that the nuclear arms race must be ended. The nuclear-weapon powers must act boldly to assure that this goal is achieved. For our part, I solemnly affirm that the United States will do all in its power to realize the great promise of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which points to a world free of the evil of nuclear weapons -- a world in which the atom will be used only for the benefit of mankind.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLEARANCES

ACDA/D - Mr. Foster
G/PH - Mr. Shaw
EUR - Mr. Springsteen
IO - Mr. Sisco
S/S

73
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 24, 1968

NOTE FOR MR. ROSTOW

Walt--

Attached for your reference is the final text of the NPT in the form in which it will be signed on July 1st.

Spurgeon
Spurgeon Keeny

Att.

73a

June 14, 1968

Text of Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

have agreed as follows:

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

ARTICLE V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

ARTICLE VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

ARTICLE VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

ARTICLE VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into

force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to

all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in _____ at _____ this _____
of _____.

ARTICLE X

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

74

June 19, 1968
11: 55 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR Walt Rostow

Walt: I expect Leonard Marks will be in touch with you about this. I will keep it in our channels also. I have passed a copy to Nat Davis as well.

Charles
Charles Maguire



30

74a

6/18/68
2:30

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON

DIRECTOR ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 17, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

THROUGH: Mr. Charles Maguire
The White House

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-346 and WH Guidelines, 7/24/83
By mg, NARA, Date 9-2-94

Your speech on the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty at the United Nations General Assembly received extensive comment in the world press as evidence of "U. S. determination to help implement the treaty rapidly." A summary of representative comments is attached.

At this time, I would like to recommend that you plan on addressing the opening of the U. N. General Assembly this fall, using the occasion for a major speech on disarmament.

At Glassboro you indicated your willingness to begin discussions with the Soviet Union on scaling down the nuclear arms race. At the General Assembly you can present specific U. S. proposals on how this might be done.

The General Assembly would be a particularly appropriate forum for you to make such a speech. It would also be fitting for you to pay a final official visit as President to the United Nations to dramatize both the desire of the United States for peace and your personal role as peacemaker.

If you agree, the opening of the General Assembly and your speech would make an excellent event for a worldwide television broadcast through the global communications satellite system. By fall all parts of the world will have earth stations capable of receiving television programs, and this presentation would be an historic event.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have not joined the communications satellite consortium, but can receive television programs by land connections with Western Europe. Accordingly, if they are willing to join in a network, it would be possible for arrangements to be made.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


- 2 -

It also occurred to me that Premier Kosygin might be planning on attending the opening of the UNGA this fall. If so, his presentation would receive the same kind of attention and would be a further endorsement for the Eastern Europeans to join the worldwide network.



Leonard H. Marks

Discuss with Walt Rostow _____



Disapprove _____

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

Britain: "President's Powerful Plea"

London's conservative Daily Express highlighted the President's "powerful plea" that no time be lost in further scaling down the nuclear arms race. The independent London Times observed that the President's U..N. visit emphasized the importance the U.S. accorded to the treaty.

France: "A Real Effort"

Paris' Catholic La Croix declared that the treaty text "represents a real effort to avoid a nuclear confrontation." It said President Johnson appeared to be "a spokesman" for the two great powers when he "pledged to comply diligently with provisions of the text."

The pro-government financial daily, Le Nouveau Journal of Paris, wrote:

"President Johnson is pleased...The U. N. vote conveys the impression that the Assembly favors a rapprochement between the U.S. and the USSR...The rumor is already spreading that President Johnson may go to Moscow in order to continue the 'Glassboro talks' with Mr. Kosygin there.

"Why should not Moscow and Washington, taking advantage of the impetus which the U. N. vote gives to Russian-American rapprochement, directly discuss the problem of Viet-Nam? It is Moscow which holds the key to Ho Chi Minh's military power..."

"Walt, why don't we have some type of
statement to put out on this. Maybe we can
send a wire to Goldberg commending him
on this."

76

LBJ/LET
6/10

Done 6/12/68

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*rec
6-10-68
7:30 P*

*(2)
76a*

Monday, June 10, 1968
7:25 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the Committee I vote
in the UN on the NPT.

There is some hope the vote can
be improved in the General Assembly
later in the week.

Significant abstentions are marked.

*HAVE W.W. ROSTOW
STATEMENT TO
PUT OUT ON THIS
OR WIRE TO Gold BOLT
COMMENDING HIM*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 10, 1968

NPT
76-6

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Walt--

Committee I of the UNGA this afternoon adopted the Resolution commending the Non-Proliferation Treaty to all states and requesting that it be opened for signature at the earliest possible date. The vote for the Resolution was 92 in favor, 4 opposed, 22 abstaining, and 6 not present. Several of the countries, abstaining or not present, will probably vote in favor of the Resolution in the Plenary Session of the UNGA later this week.

The countries opposed were:

Albania	Tanzania
Cuba	Zambia

The countries abstaining were:

Algeria	France	Niger
Argentina	Gabon	Portugal
Brazil	Guinea	Rwanda
Burma	India	Saudi Arabia
Burundi	Malawi	Sierra Leone
Central African Rep.	Mali	Spain
Chad	Mauritania	Uganda
Congo (Brazzaville)		

Countries not present were:

Cambodia	Dominican Rep.
Cameroon	Gambia
Costa Rica	Haiti

Spurgeon
Spurgeon Keeny

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

77

June 10, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. W. W. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: NPT Vote

The First Committee of the UNGA voted on the Non-Proliferation Treaty a few minutes ago. The result was 92 in favor, 4 against (Cuba, Albania, Zambia and Tanzania) and 22 abstentions.

The most significant abstentions were France, India and Brazil. Eleven of the others were French-speaking African countries and three others were English-speaking African countries. The others were: Argentina, Burma, Portugal, Saudi Arabia and Spain.


Nathaniel Davis

INFORMATION

NPT

78

[Handwritten signature]

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, June 9, 1968 -- 9:25 a.m.

Mr. President:

Arthur Goldberg tells me his impression of the attached conversation with Kuznetsov was that he was probing for a summit meeting in Geneva as a by-product of an NPT signing there.

He did not pursue; and he does not like Geneva for the NPT, for the same reasons as Sec. Rusk.

But worth considering if further exchanges indicate any progress in engaging Moscow on Vietnam.

Arthur also has the idea you might address the UN Assembly next Thursday, probable final day for NPT. (See cable B, attached.)

W. W. Rostow

State 179496 to USUN NY
State 179495 to USUN NY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-344
By 06, NARA, Date 6-1-95

WWRostow:rln

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-342
By ijg, NARA, Date 12-6-94

NODIS

FOLLOWING MESSAGE WAS DRAFTED BY AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG WHILE
IN WASHINGTON.

YESTERDAY I TENDERED A WORKING LUNCHEON IN HONOR
OF THE FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KUZNETSOV
AND HIS SOVIET COLLEAGUES WHO HAVE BEEN WORKING JOINTLY WITH
US AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO OBTAIN ENDORSEMENT OF THE
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.

AS INSTRUCTED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN THE
COURSE OF THE LUNCHEON I TOLD KUZNETSOV THAT OUR DECIDED
PREFERENCE WAS THAT THE TREATY BE SIGNED IN THE THREE
DEPOSITARY CAPITALS -- WASHINGTON, GENEVA AND LONDON IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRECEDENT OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY
RATHER THAN IN GENEVA AS PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED BY THE SOVIETS.
KUZNETSOV REPLIED THAT WHILE THE SOVIETS PREFERRED GENEVA
THEY WOULD ACQUIESCE IN OUR PREFERENCE FOR SIGNATURE
IN THE THREE DEPOSITARY CAPITALS IF WE INSISTED UPON THIS
PROCEDURE. IN THE COURSE OF HIS STATEMENT KUZNETSOV MENTIONED
THAT ONE OF THE ADVANTAGES OF THE GENEVA SITE WOULD BE THAT
IT WOULD PERMIT THE SIGNING TO TAKE PLACE AT A COMMON SITE
WHERE OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS COULD BE REPRESENTED AT A
HIGH-REPEAT HIGH-LEVEL. IN LIGHT OF THE INSTRUCTION
TO ME TO STATE OUR DECIDED PREFERENCE FOR SIGNING
OF THE THREE DEPOSITARY CAPITALS I DID NOT PROBE WHAT
KUZNETSOV PRECISELY MEANT WHEN HE SAID THAT SIGNING IN GENEVA
WOULD PERMIT HIGH LEVEL SIGNATURES AND INFERENTIALLY A HIGH
LEVEL MEETING BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS.
HIS REMARK, HOWEVER, SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN LIGHT OF A PREVIOUS
STATEMENT BY HIM TO BE ON AN EARLIER OCCASION THAT
FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO WAS CONSIDERING SIGNING FOR THE
SOVIET GOVERNMENT IF THE SIGNATURES WERE AFFIXED IN
GENEVA. IF DESIRED I CAN READILY ASCERTAIN FROM HIM PRECISELY
WHAT HE HAD IN MIND SINCE THE MATTER HAS BEEN LEFT THAT THE
SIGNING WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE THREE DEPOSITARY CAPITALS UNLESS
I ADVISE KUZNETSOV DURING THE COURSE OF THE NEXT WEEK THAT
OUR GOVERNMENT HAS RECONSIDERED ITS DECISION IN THE
MATTER.

I SHALL DO NOTHING FURTHER WITH RESPECT TO THE SIGNING
UNLESS I RECEIVE OTHER INSTRUCTIONS. RUSK
BT

~~SECRET~~

~~NODIS~~

RECEIVED
WHCA

1968 JUN 9 00 55

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~~SECRET~~ STATE 179495

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-342
By ms, NARA, Date 12-6-94

NODIS

FOLLOWING MESSAGE WAS DRAFTED BY AMB. GOLDBERG WHILE IN WASHINGTON. IT NOW APPEARS THAT THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WILL ENDORSE A NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY ON MONDAY BY AT LEAST 100 AFFIRMATIVE VOTES. SINCE THE FIRST COMMITTEE IS COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL MEMBER STATES THIS MEANS THAT THE TREATY, ABSENT UNFORSEEN CIRCUMSTANCES, WILL BE ENDORSED BY THE SAME OVERWHELMING VOTE IN THE PLENARY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY PROBABLY ON THURSDAY, JUNE 13. THIS PLENARY SESSION ENDORSING THE TREATY WILL WIND UP THE SESSION WHICH FOLLOWING THE VOTE AND STATEMENTS EXPLAINING THE VOTE WILL THEN CONCLUDE ALSO PROBABLY ON THE SAME DAY.

I SHOULD LIKE TO PUT FORWARD A SUGGESTION FOR THE PRESIDENT'S CONSIDERATION THAT THE PRESIDENT CONSIDER ADDRESSING THE ASSEMBLY FOLLOWING THE FAVORABLE VOTE ON THE TREATY. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT AN ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT ON THIS OCCASION WILL BE WELL RECEIVED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

IT IS UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS FROM THE OUTSET STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE CONCLUSION OF THIS TREATY AND THAT THE TREATY IS IN LARGE MEASURE A PRODUCT OF HIS STRONG ENDORSEMENT.

IF THE PRESIDENT IS FAVORABLY DISPOSED I SHOULD BE ADVISED AS EARLY AS MAY BE SO THAT I CAN MAKE APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. I CANNOT AT THIS MOMENT INSURE THE EXACT SCHEDULE AND PARTICULARLY THAT THE WIND UP WILL BE ON THURSDAY. IT MAY BE ON FRIDAY BUT I AM VIRGUALLY CERTAIN THAT IT WILL BE ON EITHER ONE OF THESE TWO DAYS AND I WILL BE ABLE TO ADVISE DEFINITELY AS TO THE DATE BY NOT LATER THAN TUESDAY OF NEXT WEEK.
BT

~~SECRET~~

~~NODIS~~

5/12/68

NPT
79

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

From Bromley Smith
To Walt Rostow

This is a review of the ~~the~~
non-proliferation ~~the~~ debate in the UN
which ~~the~~ Sisco did for Secretary Rusk.

*(send attached pages as
edited)*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE7240 79a
MAY 10 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S *QKA*

FROM: IO - Joseph J. Sisco *J. Sisco*

SUBJECT: Review of NPT Debate in UN
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

P After 29 speakers in the First Committee debate on the draft NPT, the various positions are beginning to fall into categories. *P* A majority (about 20 countries) support the present draft treaty and General Assembly endorsement at this session. *P* A smaller, but influential, group including Sweden, Italy, Japan and Brazil have emphasized the importance of agreeing on an NPT now, but suggest a number of improvements. *P* ~~Some~~ Some African states do not believe the NPT has to be acted on at this session.

We can, on balance, have cause for satisfaction with the course of events. *P* The resolution endorsing the NPT now has 26 co-sponsors. Opposition to the Treaty remains somewhat in disarray. There seems to be a common assessment in the corridors that we have 80-100 votes for the endorsing resolution. *P* Our objective for the balance of the session will be to ensure that the various groups of countries objecting to the NPT gain no headway. If possible, of course, we want to bring them all along. *P* The most troubling recent development has been our inability to gain vocal Latin American support for the Treaty, even though many of them have assured us privately they would vote for it. Mexico has now sought Latin American support for a group of amendments to the Treaty. In a conversation May 10, Garcia Robles assured Ambassador Goldberg that his intention is not to submit formal amendments but only to help us toward a broadly supported endorsement at this

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session. ^PWe have opposed any amendments, feeling that this would open the gates to a multitude of suggestions and endless negotiations. Because of this, we are seeking to short-circuit the Mexican effort. Nevertheless, the Mexican initiative seems to have stimulated others, such as Ghana, to take up their drafting pencils. [#]The next week, therefore, may confront us with a wave of new proposals.

#

~~TO: UNP: Chigoblin:~~
~~TO: UNP: Edelmann: rsw~~
~~5/10/68~~

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DE WTE 1865

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NY 94-344
By cb, NARA, Date 6-1-95

79-b

FROM BROMLEY SMITH
TO WALT ROSTOW
CITE CAP81078

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1968 MAY 12 19 06

68 MAY 12 PM 3:53

SUNDAY

THIS IS A REVIEW OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION DEBATE IN THE UN WHICH SICSO DID FOR SECRETARY RUSK.

AFTER 29 SPEAKERS IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE DEBATE ON THE DRAFT NPT, THE VARIOUS POSITIONS ARE BEGINNING TO FALL INTO CATEGORIES.

1. A MAJORITY (ABOUT 20 COUNTRIES) SUPPORT THE PRESENT DRAFT TREATY AND GENERAL ASSMEBLY ENDORSEMENT AT THIS SESSION.
2. A SMALLER, BUT INFLUENTIAL, GROUP INCLUDING SWEDEN, ITALY, JAPAN AND BRAZIL HAVE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF AGREEING ON AN NPT NOW, BUT SUGGEST A NUMBER OF IMPORVEMENTS.
3. SOME AFRICIAN STATES DO NOT BELIEVE THE NPT HAS TO BE ACTED ON AT THIS SESSION.

WE CAN, ON BALANCE, HAVE CAUSE FOR SATISFACTION WITH THE COURSE OF EVENTS.

THE RESOLUTION ENDORSING THE NPT NOW HAS 26 CO-SPONSORS. OPPOSITION TO THE TREATY REMAINS SOMEWHAT IN DISARRAY. THERE SEEMS TO BE A COMMON ASSESSMENT IN THE CORRIDORS THAT WE HAVE 80-100 VOTES FOR THE ENDORSING RESOLUTION.

OUR OBJECTIVE FOR THE BALANCE OF THE SESSION WILL BE TO ENSURE THAT THE VARIOUS GROUPS OF COUNTRIES OBJECTING TO THE NPT GAIN NO HEADWAY. IF POSSIBLE, OF COURSE, WE WANT TO BRING THEM ALL ALONG.

THE MOST TROUBLING RECENT DEVELOPMENT HAS BEEN OUR INABILITY TO GAIN VOCAL LATIN AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE TREATY, EVEN THOUGH MANY OF THEM HAVE ASSURED US PRIVATELY THEY WOULD VOTE FOR IT. MEXICO HAS NOW SOUGHT LATIN AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR A GROUP OF AMENDMENTS TO THE TREATY. IN A CONVERSATION MAY 10, GARCIA ROBLES ASSURED AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG THAT HIS INTENTION IS NOT TO SUBMIT FORMAL AMENDMENTS BUT ONLY TO HELP US TOWARD A BROADLY SUPPORTED ENDORSEMENT AT THIS SESSION.

WE HAVE OPPOSED ANY AMENDMENTS, FEELING THAT THIS WOULD OPEN THE GATES TO A MULTITUDE OF SUGGESTIONS AND ENDLESS NEGOTIATIONS. BECAUSE OF THIS, WE ARE SEEKING TO SHORT-CIRCUIT THE MEXICAN EFFORT. NEVERTHELESS, THE MEXICAN INITIATIVE SEEMS TO HAVE STIMULATED OTHERS, SUCH AS GHANA, TO TAKE UP THEIR DRAFTING PENCILS.

THE NEXT WEEK, THEREFORE, MAY CONFRONT US WITH A WAVE OF NEW PROPOSALS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

80

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

sup

Monday, April 29, 1968 -- 12:50 p. m.

Mr. President:

With respect to the proposed approach to the Soviet Union on strategic weapons, you should know that the State Department memorandum is incorrect in stating that Sec. Clifford is aboard. The situation is that he is still considering the matter.

You may wish to have a meeting later in the week.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-344
By cg, NARA, Date 6-1-95

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 23, 1968

NPT
81

Mr. President:

After reviewing the JCS objections, Sec. Rusk recommends (Tab A) that you approve the present authorization for Amb. Goldberg to announce that the US is prepared to include a limited non-first-use statement in its declaration of security assurances if this issue becomes a focal point of criticism of the NPT package in the UNGA debate. Providing the UK and Soviet Union agree on the wording, the US would include the following specific statement:

"The United States affirms its intention to refrain from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State, Party to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, that is not engaged in an armed attack assisted by a nuclear-weapon State."

The JCS objections (Tab B) to this, or any other form of non-first-use statement, are primarily based on the arguments that any such declaration "weakens the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent, reduces military flexibility, and establishes a precedent that could lead to further restrictions on US nuclear options." Sec. Rusk believes that such a statement may prove of major importance in achieving the NPT and would not, in practice, adversely affect US security interests. Sec. Clifford has not yet taken a position on the issue.

The proposed non-first-use statement was first approved for contingency use in the fall of 1966 at the UNGA by the attached cable (Tab C) to Sec. Rusk and yourself. Although it was thought at the time that this would become a major issue in connection with a resolution on non-proliferation, the issue did not come to a head and the statement was not made. The JCS also opposed the statement then, but the cable was cleared by Sec. McNamara.

Earlier this year, we attempted unsuccessfully to obtain Soviet agreement on this formulation of a non-first-use statement as part of our security assurance declarations. When we finally agreed with the Soviets to omit any non-first-use statements from our declarations, Amb. Foster informed the Soviets that we reserved the right to present our formulation during the UNGA debate.

Even if we introduce the statement into the UNGA debate, it is judged very unlikely that it will end up in our final declaration since we have made this contingent upon Soviet agreement on the wording and the Soviets have consistently opposed our formulation.

Atts. (3)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-344
By 06, NARA, Date 6-1-95

W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

81a

TAB

"A"

81-6

TAB

"B"

81-c

TAB

"C"

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

84

~~SECRET~~

81-d

CALL 53337
FOR MMCC/HC
SERVICE

FILE 172

Origin ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL PRIORITY

NOV 10 277
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-342

By , NARA, Date 12-6-94

STATE 76255

LIMDIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY

~~LIMDIS~~

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Following are instructions which we are proposing to send
USUN re non-aligned resolution on non-proliferation, in
particular that part dealing with non-use of nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear states.

BEGIN TEXT. 1. US Del. should vote affirmatively for
aligned NP res.

2. Operative para 3 which "invites the nuclear weapon
powers to give an assurance that they will not use, or abet
to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states" provides
opportunity for US Govt state public position regarding use of
nuclear weapons which of particular timeliness in view possible
developments in NPT negotiations.

3. We believe that pressure to gain security assurances
through proposals to limit use of nuclear weapons, such as

ACDA/IR:ANG:icld

Drafted by ACDA/DD:LNW:llor:sv 10/31/66

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by

The Acting Secretary

Clearances:

ACDA-ASPL:ehor

EOB - Secretary McNamara (in substance)

S/S-Mr. McCall

ACDA/ISA-Mr. McNaughton

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~~SECRET-LIMDIS~~

Kosygin proposal for clause in NPT, has been growing and is likely increase considerably as impression grows that conclusion of NPT is becoming imminent. Accordingly, we wish take this opportunity to state conditions, as formulated by United States, under which United States would limit use of nuclear weapons. Since operative para 3 of NP res "invites the nuclear weapon powers to give an assurance", we believe US Govt can properly respond with unilateral assurance formulated in fashion acceptable to US Govt. Having made public statement, we would then impress upon others as necessary that we do not intend agree to assurances provision in NPT.

4. In explaining affirmative vote of the US, you should state that the US fully understands the security concerns of non-nuclear weapon states which undertake not to obtain their own nuclear weapons. You should state that the US has previously recognized this concern, quoting from President Johnson's statement of October 18, 1964, that non-nuclear weapon states "can be sure that, if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, then they will have it". You should then point out that it is particularly appropriate for the UN, which was founded for purpose of maintaining international peace and security, to consider question of security

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~~SECRET-LIMDIS~~

for non-nuclear states, and to do so at time when there appears to be increasing opportunity to conclude a non-proliferation treaty. You should express conviction of the US that a non-proliferation treaty will advance the security of all states, nuclear and non-nuclear. You should then state on behalf of the US Govt that the US, taking into account all of these considerations and in view of the invitation contained in operative para 3 of the resolution, declares its intention to refrain from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon state that is party to a general non-proliferation treaty and that is not engaged in an act of aggression supported by a nuclear weapon state. Finally, you should reaffirm US dedication to purposes and principles of UN Charter and state conviction that both NPT and policy just enunciated by US will strengthen UN.

5. In advance of making above statement, you should explain to US allies and others, in your discretion, US thinking behind decision to make statement. In addition to drawing on considerations in para 3, you should stress following:

- a. US Govt wishes create most favorable climate for maximum adherence to possible non-proliferation treaty.

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b. US Govt believes UN is proper forum for consideration question security assurances for non-nuclear weapon states and does not intend agree to incorporating assurances clause in text of non-proliferation treaty.

c. Qualification that non-nuclear weapon state must not be engaged in act of aggression supported by nuclear weapon state is essential for US. If questioned about desirability of using words or concepts inherently vague, i.e., "aggression" and "supported by nuclear weapon-state", you may explain that the US would make its own determinations, should this ever be necessary, and that this is situation which exists under present circumstances.

d. No implications should be drawn re US policies in Vietnam. END TEXT

Joint Chiefs ~~have~~ expressed their opposition to the Kosygin proposal or any variation thereof. Their opposition was based on the reason that such a non-use assurance could provide an impetus toward total prohibition of nuclear weapons and that the total impact ~~impact~~ could alter the current military balance to the detriment

~~SECRET-LIMDIS~~

of the US." They also said that a vote for the resolution would "offset the deterrent effect of US nuclear power and free the non-nuclear states for aggression without fear of nuclear reprisals."

Secretary of Defense and ACDA support affirmative vote indicated in above instructions, as do I.

Believe NP resolution in question will be adopted overwhelmingly. All other parts of resolution are free of problems for US. Adoption of this resolution permits US to declare in its own terms the conditions under which it willing to refrain from using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries. Such a declaration should encourage accession to NPT. Moreover, of more immediate importance, it would give US grounds for resisting proposals for other, disadvantageous limitations on use of nuclear weapons. Extent of limitation on US nuclear deterrent resulting from terms of proposed resolution plus declaration would not be significant: Restriction would not apply in the event of any war in Europe in which Soviets gave their support; for declaration to apply to North Korea and North Vietnam they would have to become parties to NPT and would have to keep CHICOMS and Soviets from giving them support in any hostilities; and perhaps most important, question of whether an aggression has taken

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Telegram

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SEOUL

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place and whether a nuclear weapon state is providing support
would be subject to US determination.

I would propose to send the instructions/at the appropriate time
if necessary
if you do not indicate non-concurrence. It now appears, however, very
unlikely that vote will come this week.

GP-3

END

~~SECRET-LINDIS~~



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UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

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83

MAR 14 1968

Mr. Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
The White House

Dear Walt:

As you may be aware, Alvin Weinberg has recently written to Glenn Seaborg concerning a suggestion of Spurgeon Keeny of ways in which we may improve the prospects of India's signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. A number of cables have come out of New Delhi indicating that Dr. Vikram A. Sarabhai, Chairman of the Indian AEC, is one of the principal opponents of the Treaty in India and, therefore, a main obstacle to India signing the Treaty. Spurgeon's suggestion, as I understand it, is that Alvin might indicate to Sarabhai that there will be no U. S. assistance to India on Agro-Industrial complexes if India does not sign the NPT.

I have some doubt whether Sarabhai's attitude is as pivotal in the determination of the Indian position on the NPT as some of the messages have indicated. Based on my own conversations with Sarabhai, I recognize that he has deep reservations about the wisdom of India signing the Treaty, but I suspect that he is far from alone in holding this attitude. Nevertheless, I agree that it would be in our interests if Sarabhai's attitude could be influenced in a positive direction and Spurgeon's suggestion, therefore, seems to me to be an interesting one. I would like to give you some comments on it, based in part on my visit to India last fall during which I had extensive discussions with Sarabhai and others on Agro-Industrial complexes and related items.

Interestingly enough, my visit was preceded by a Times of India editorial, which contended -- erroneously, of course, -- that the purpose of my visit was to offer India assistance on Agro-Industrial complexes as an inducement to India's signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As a result of the flurry occasioned by this editorial, Sarabhai felt that it was necessary to issue a denial and to state that the Indian Government intended on its own initiative, and not as a joint project, to make a study of Agro-Industrial complexes. We had, in fact, expected to propose a joint study and these plans were overtaken by the incident which I have just described. In some respects, I believe that a study undertaken by India itself, with U. S. technical advice as now agreed

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MR. WALE W. KOSLOW

-2-

upon, is a better approach even from the U. S. standpoint than a joint study. Nevertheless, the incident indicates the extreme sensitivity which the Indians have to the application of "pressure" on an issue such as the NPT and the need for considerable caution on our part in adopting such a strategy.

Notwithstanding the sensitivity of this issue, I do not believe we should discount the possibility that, at an appropriate time, we can use our ability to assist projects such as Agro-Industrial complexes as a means of encouraging India to sign the NPT. I recall a speech by Mr. Holifield, a copy of which is attached, before the Atomic Industrial Forum in which he endorsed the principle of substantial economic incentives to countries willing to place their nuclear programs under safeguards. However, I believe several points should be borne in mind before deciding to make such an approach to the Indians.

1. The amount of leverage which we enjoy simply by the provision of a modest amount of technical advice to India on its study of Agro-Industrial complexes is not likely to influence their decision on a major national issue such as adherence to the NPT. If such leverage is to be useful, it must be of a much greater degree, specifically, our willingness to provide considerable economic support to the actual realization of an Agro-Industrial center.

2. Because of Indian sensitivity, the timing and manner of approach are crucial. I believe that it would be a mistake for any such approach to be made now when the NPT has not been open for signature and when Indian claims of being pressured might actually jeopardize our success in reaching agreement upon the text of a Treaty which can be signed. On the other hand, if the Treaty is completed and signed by a substantial number of countries, I believe it would be feasible to inquire in a low-key manner, in the course of technical discussions, as to the extent to which assurances of technical and economic help in the atomic energy field might influence Indian attitudes on the Treaty. This could undoubtedly best be done not in terms of a proposal by the Executive Branch, but rather by calling to the attention of Sarabhai and others the existence of such views on the part of some people in the United States, such as those expressed in Mr. Holifield's speech.

I would be interested in your comments on this matter.

Sincerely yours,
Signed Jim Ramey

James T. Ramey
Commissioner

Enclosure:
11/15/65 Holifield Speech

NOV 12 1965
KOSLOW'S OFFICE
RECEIVED

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~TOP SECRET~~

WASHINGTON

March 4, 1968

NPT

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NOTE FOR MR. ROSTOW

Walt--

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-344
By Cl, NARA, Date 6-1-95

Following up on our conversation Friday on the status of our approaches to the Soviets on strategic arms talks, I am attaching for your information the draft of a proposed statement for Ambassador Thompson to give the Soviets -- presenting a specific proposal (see last two pages).

The statement was submitted to Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara last Wednesday (February 28) for their consideration, but as far as I know no action has been taken. The paper, which has been very closely held, was prepared jointly by State (G/PM) and Defense (ISA) and grew out of the discussions I had with Garthoff, Warnke, and Halperin last spring. I understand that it now has the support of Nitze and Bohlen. I also know that Butch Fisher supports it although ACDA has formally developed a different proposal.

I think this is a good approach to this problem. If we really want to pursue this issue (and I think we should), we should challenge the Soviets with a concrete proposal. This proposal represents a significant, practical step which doesn't demand too much of either side. I think it should be possible to sell it to the JCS and at the same time present it as a reasonable proposition to the Soviets. The objection will be raised by professional arms controllers that the proposal would be unsatisfactory to the Soviets (and in due course to ourselves) since it does not control qualitative improvements such as MIRVs. However, I am afraid we cannot handle the qualitative question politically (with the JCS) or technically (with only unilateral intelligence) and believe, therefore, that we should proceed one step at a time. If the Soviets want to bring up the MIRV question, we should let them do it and make proposals as to how to handle the problem.

I want to emphasize that this has not yet been discussed with anyone connected with the JCS. The plan has been for Clifford and Nitze to deal directly with Wheeler on it if they and Rusk decide to support the proposal.

~~TOP SECRET~~ NODIS
attachment (undated).

Spurgeon
Spurgeon Keeny

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DRAFT INITIAL PRESENTATION TO SOVIET DELEGATION

85

Although the United States Government initially proposed discussions on strategic anti-ballistic missile systems because of our belief that deployment of such systems, even if justified in military terms, could not help but spur on a new cycle of the strategic nuclear arms race, as we noted in the very first exchange of views ~~that~~ We agreed with the suggestion of the Soviet Government that such discussions should include offensive strategic nuclear missile delivery systems as well as anti-missile defense systems. This has remained throughout, and continues to be, the position of the United States Government.

The United States Government has proposed these talks with the framework of the ^{of Sept 1961} Agreed Principles and as offering the best means to begin to make progress towards general and complete disarmament. As we have noted earlier, we believe that it should be possible to reach agreement more quickly on important limited measures curbing the strategic arms race, without waiting for agreement on all of the difficult problems inevitably involved in a program for general and complete disarmament. We believe that measures to curb the strategic arms race would help pave the way for substantial reductions leading toward general and complete disarmament and would have great value in themselves since they would avoid a further costly and possibly dangerous spiral of strategic arms deployment. It may not prove easy to find mutually acceptable limitations, but we are prepared to work earnestly toward that end, and we assume that you will as well. We take as our point of departure the assumption that measures

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-342

By mp, NARA, Date 12-6-94

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designed to hold down expanded deployment of strategic offensive and defensive missile systems would have to be designed to insure the security of each side, and not to create or to institutionalize an advantage for one or the other side.

Among other considerations which lead us to the conclusion that it will probably not be possible for some time to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament, or indeed on very far-reaching arms reductions, is the fact that agreement would have to be reached among a number of states. It should, however, be possible for our two countries alone to agree on steps to curtail the strategic arms race, and even to make reductions in existing forces, without the necessary participation of others. Moreover, early agreement between our two countries would be of great value in increasing the likelihood that other countries would sign and continue to adhere to the nonproliferation treaty. We will be demonstrating that we are moving toward disarmament as we are committed by the treaty to try to do. This agreement would also facilitate other measures designed to prevent proliferation and pave the way for general and complete disarmament.

~~We greatly regret that~~ Over a year has passed since we first proposed these discussions. Not only is any delay regrettable, but the problem which we are facing is becoming ever more difficult. However, our task is to take account of the existing situation in devising mutually acceptable measures to curtail the strategic arms race. As each month goes by, the existing situation is one of greater armaments on both sides. An agreement a year ago, when the United States first proposed talks, might have prevented the increases on both sides which

have taken place over the past year. An agreement today to curtail future deployments would have the same effect as an agreement a year from now to effect a reduction in deployed weapons; it would also be much easier to negotiate, and would result in important savings of resources for us both.

Given the nature of contemporary strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems and the many factors affecting and determining military capability, it would be futile for us to attempt to define such concepts as "superiority" for one or the other side, or "parity." These notions have little meaning in a situation, such as the present, in which each of us is certain that the other has the capability under any circumstances to inflict unacceptable damage. We believe that it will be more fruitful to discuss concrete measures. We recognize that some appropriate adjustments in the present forces of each side might be necessary and would still be consistent with our common objective of providing assurance to both sides that their security will be maintained or enhanced, while at the same time avoiding possibly disruptive effects and the great costs of a continuation of the strategic arms race.

The United States is prepared to consider the possibilities of placing maximum reliance on unilateral means of verification of limitations on deployment of strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems. We are prepared to work with the Soviet representatives in devising a program of limitation on deployment for which unilateral means of verification alone would suffice. At the same time, if we can reach agreement on a broader range of limitations for which additional verification would be

required, we would be prepared to include the minimum inspection necessary for effective verification. Our position on this subject is flexible and is governed by the principles that verification of compliance with agreed undertakings is necessary, that maximum reliance should be placed on unilateral ability to verify compliance, but that when additional procedures for verification are necessary they must of course be provided.

With all of the above considerations in mind, the United States ~~representatives~~ suggests that considerations be given to cessation of the initiation of construction of any additional strategic offensive missile launchers. This category of weapon should include strategic missiles of medium and intermediate range (ranges greater than 1,000 km), as well as longer-range intercontinental missile systems. If the agreement were to be limited to fixed land-based missile systems, we would be prepared to rely exclusively on unilateral means of verification. However, in such a case, it would have to be understood that any expansion of the number of sea-based or mobile land-based strategic missile launchers could require the other side to withdraw from the agreement. Consideration might, therefore, be given to a more comprehensive limitation on all strategic missile launchers which we believe could require provision for verification that no additional seaborne or mobile land-based strategic missile launchers were in fact being deployed.

The situation with respect to strategic defensive anti-missile systems is more complex. The fact that a few other countries are acquiring strategic missile systems requires our two countries to have certain relatively limited anti-missile deployments. Moreover, for example, the

Soviet Union has been widely deploying a strategic defensive system, the full role and capability of which is not entirely clear. So long as there is any significant uncertainty with respect to such deployments, it is evidently a matter of prudence to take account of the possibility that such a system has an anti-ballistic missile capability. In general, it would seem that the most feasible limitation on strategic anti-missile defensive systems would be an agreed number of anti-missile launchers ^{and associated radars} which each side could have. As in the case of strategic offensive missile systems, we believe that unilateral means of verification would provide assurance with respect to the scale of deployment of fixed land-based defensive anti-ballistic missile launchers, ^{as associated radars} Land-mobile or sea-based anti-ballistic missile systems would not be covered by an agreement relying on unilateral verification, they could be included if the necessary verification were provided for, and if not, it would be recognized that each side would retain the right to withdraw from the agreement if the other side undertook ^{additional} ~~nonprohibited~~ ^{this} deployments of a kind which circumvented the agreed limitation.

[The United States representatives will welcome the comments of the Soviet ^{Government} ~~representatives on these observations and proposals.~~]

Apprx text

The US govt has presented this in the expectation that talks will shortly be held to discuss these matters.

86
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Feb. 26, 1968

NOTE FOR MR. ROSTOW

Walt-

I think you will be interested in
the attached fascinating develop-
ment in the NPT saga.

Spurgeon
Spurgeon Keeny

Att. :
BUCHAREST 1145

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-342
By ijg, NARA, Date 12-6-94

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FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2020
INFO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 033

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUCHAREST 1145

LIMDIS

1. DEPUTY FONMIN MALITA, IN CHARGE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, SUMMONED ME TO FONOFF AT NOON FEB 26 TO MAKE FOLLOWING ORAL REQUEST.
2. MALITA SAID ROMANIAN GOVT WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS DIRECTLY WITH THE GOVT OF THE US PROBLEMS OF NON-DISSEMINATION AND THE DRAFT NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. ROMANIAN GOVT WOULD LIKE TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE WITH FULL POWERS TO DISCUSS THESE QUESTIONS DIRECTLY WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE, IF POSSIBLE, AT END OF THIS WEEK.

PAGE 2 RUFUHT 1145 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
MALITA ADDED "TIMING IS IMPORTANT TO US" AND THEREFORE ROMANIANS WOULD LIKE DISCUSSION THIS WEEK.

3. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTIONS, MALITA SAID ROMANIANS HAD NOT YET DECIDED WHOM THEY WOULD SEND, BUT HIS PERSONAL ASSUMPTION WAS THAT IT WOULD BE ONE OF THE "LEADERS" OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY (PRESUMABLY A DEPUTY FONMIN) WHO WOULD PROBABLY BE ACCOMPANIED ONLY BY ONE EXPERT AND AN INTERPRETER. THEY WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH SECRETARY RUSK AS FAR AS HE IS ABLE TO RECEIVE THEM AND WITH ANY OTHERS HE MIGHT DESIGNATE FOR EXTENDED DISCUSSIONS.

4. WHEN I STATED ASSUMPTION ROMANIANS WISHED TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 BUCAR 01145 261150Z

DISCUSS THEIR VIEWS AND OBJECTIONS TO DRAFT NON-
PROLIFERATION TREATY AS EXPRESSED IN GENEVA AND OB-
SERVED THAT US REPRESENTATIVE HAD ATTEMPTED TO ANSWER
SOME OF THESE POINTS LAST WEEK, MALITA REPLIED THAT
AT THIS STATE ROMANIANS FEEL IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE
DIRECT CONVERSATIONS WITH US RATHER THAN FURTHER PUBLIC

PAGE 3 RUFUHT 1145 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
EXCHANGES.

5. TO MY QUESTION WHETHER ROMANIANS INTENDED TO HAVE
DIRECT CONVERSATIONS WITH SOVIET GOVT, MALITA REPLIED
SOMEWHAT EVASIVELY THAT ROMANIANS HAD HAD AND WILL HAVE
CONVERSATIONS WITH SOVIETS IN GENEVA AND IN "OTHER
PARTS".

6. COMMENT: I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT WE AGREE TO RE-
CEIVE IN WASHINGTON ROMANIAN REPRESENTATIVES FOR THIS
PURPOSE AND IF AT ALL POSSIBLE THE SECRETARY AGREE TO
MEET WITH THEM AT LEAST AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TALKS.

7. I PROMISED TO LET MALITA KNOW AS SOON AS REPLY
HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM WASHINGTON.
DAVIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL LIMDIS~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 9, 1968

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NOTE FOR MR. ROSTOW

Walt--

As background for your dinner tonight at the Roumanian Embassy, I am attaching two items of current interest:

- (1) the text of the twelve questions on the NPT asked by the Roumanians at the ENDC; and
- (2) an article on Miss Hustiu, the eleven-year-old Roumanian figure skater at the Winter Olympics.

Spurgeon
Spurgeon Keeny

Attachments



Department of State

TELEGRAM

87a

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NPT
Roumania

PAGE 01 GENEVA 02477 061846Z

80

ACTION ACDA 20

INFO ARA 08, EUR 15, IO 13, AEC 11, AF 09, CIAE 00, DODE 00, EA 10, GPM 03,
H 02, INR 07, L 03, NASA 04, NEA 13, NSAE 00, NSC 10, OIC 05, OST 01,
P 04, RSC 01, SAH 03, SC 01, SCI 05, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, RSR 01, MM 01

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FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6728
INFO AMBASSY BONN 889
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 976
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 45
AMEMBASSY LONDON 1190
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 567
AMEMBASSY NATO 148
AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO 134
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 500
AMEMBASSY PARIS 1406
AMEMBASSY ROME 767
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 402
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 301
USUN NY 1612

BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

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- LEONHART
- ROCHE
- SAUNDERS
- TAYLOR

Roumania Question

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Department of State

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SUBJECT: 362ND PLENARY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN CHAIR

1. ECOBESCO (ROMANIA) SAID HE WANTED CLARIFICATION FROM COCHAIRMAN ON CERTAIN NPT QUESTIONS OF "VITAL IMPORTANCE":
 1. WHY DOES TEXT CONTAIN NOTHING ON SECURITY ASSURANCES, WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF NPT AND ARE NECESSARY UNTIL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS? ARE NUCLEAR POWERS DISPOSED TO UNDERTAKE NEVER AND UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES TO USE OR THREATEN TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST STATES NOT POSSESSING THEM?
 2. ARE NUCLEAR POWERS DISPOSED TO PUT NPT IN FRAMEWORK OF SERIES OF MEASURES LEADING TO CESSATION OF PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, CTB, AND REDUCTION AND ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR STOCKPILES AND DELIVERY VEHICLES? HOW COULD WE JUSTIFY ABSENCE SUCH A LEGAL OBLIGATION? WHY ARE PERIODIC REVIEW CONFERENCES NOT INCLUDED IN NPT?
 3. WHY DOES ART X, PARA 1 STILL REQUIRE STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR WITHDRAWAL IN NOTICE TO SECURITY COUNCIL? WHAT IS LEGAL BASIS FOR THIS? LIMITED TEST BAN, OUTERSPACE, AND LATIN AMERICAN NFZ TREATIES DO NOT HAVE SIMILAR OBLIGATION. IS IT INTENTION FOR BODY TO WHICH NOTICE SUBMITTED TO ISSUE JUDGMENT ON NOTICE.
 4. WHAT IS POLITICAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL BASIS OF AUTHORS' POSITION RE CONTROL? WHY IS CONTROL APPLIED SOLELY TO ART II, RE OBLIGATIONS OF NON-NUCLEARS, AND NOT ALSO ART I RE OBLIGATIONS OF NUCLEARS? HOW CAN IT BE ADMITTED THAT ALL STATES, MIDDLE OR SMALL, WILL BE SUBJECT INSPECTION, BUT NOT FIVE NUCLEAR STATES? HOW IS IT POSSIBLE EQUATE SUCH PROFOUNDLY DISCRIMINATORY CONCEPT WITH SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF STATES?
 5. RE ART I, WHAT GUARANTEE IS THERE THAT FORCES OF NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND WHO PARTICIPATE IN JOINT TRAINING WITH MILITARY FORCES OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES, WILL

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NOT HAVE ACCESS TO, POSSESSION, OR CONTROL OF THESE WEAPONS?

6. RE ART III, WHAT IS MEANING OF EXPRESSION QTE SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM UNQTE OF THE IAEA. IS THIS PRESENT SYSTEM 94 9/E WHICH WILL BE CONTINUALLY AMPLIFIED? IF LATTR IS ANSWER, WHAT IS JUSTIFICATION?

7. WHAT IS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXPRESSION QTE SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM UNQTE OF THE IAEA AND QTE THE SAFEGUARDS REQUIRED BY THIS ARTICLE UNQTE?

8. WHAT IS MEANT BY QTE ALL PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES UNQTE? HOW SHOULD ONE UNDERSTAND REQUIREMENT FOR SAFEGUARDS TO APPLY TO QTE ALL SOURCE OR SPECIAL FISSIONABLE MATERIAL IN ALL PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES UNQTE?

9. WHAT IS INTENDED BY APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO ALL SOURCE OR SPECIAL FISSIONABLE MATERIAL QTE WHETHER IT IS BEING PRODUCES, PROCESSED OR USED IN ANY PRINCIPAL NUCLEAR FACILITY OR IS OUTSIDE ANY SUCH FACILITY UNQTE? SPECIFICALLY WHAT IS MEANING OF QTE PRINCIPAL NUCLEAR FACILITY UNQTE AND QTE OUTSIDE ANY SUCH FACILITY UNQTE.

10. IF EXCLUSIVE PURPOSE OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS IS TO GUARANTEE AGAINST DIVERSION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, AS STATED IN ART III, PARA 1, WHY DO THESE SAFEGUARDS APPLY TO QTE ALL SOURCE OR SPECIAL FISSIONABLE MATERIAL IN ALL PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES UNQTE?

11. HOW CAN SAFEGUARDS BE APPLIED TO ALL PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES WITHOUT HAMPERING ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PARTIES, WHICH ARE TO BE PROTECTED PER PARA 3? HOW CAN THESE SAFEGUARDS BE RECONCILED WITH PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF STATES?

12. WHY SHOULDN'T EXPORT PROVISIONS OF PARA 2 APPLY EQUALLY TO EXPORTS TO NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES?

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2. IN GENERAL STATEMENT RE NPT STATUS, DEPALMA (US) RECALLED NON-PROLIFERATION HAS BEEN DISCUSSED OVER SEVEN YEARS. PRESENT TEXT SUBJECT OF LONG, COMPLEX DISCUSSIONS. CONSIDERABLE PART OF CO-CHAIRMENS TASK HAS NOT BEEN RECONCILIATION OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM BUT RATHER EFFORT ON THEIR PART AS CO-CHAIRMEN TO DRAFT AGREED TEXT WHICH WOULD MEET VARIETY OF VIEWS EXPRESSED BY A LARGE NUMBER OF NON-NUCLEAR STATES. US CONVINCED WE NOW AT DECISIVE STAGE AND ALL SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON FINAL POINTS TO EXPEDITE UNGA CONSIDERATION AND ENTRY INTO FORCE. NPT AROSE FROM DESIRES OF NON-NUCLEARS AND WOULD NOT HAVE REACHED PRESENT STAGE IF IT DID NOT REFLECT WIDELY FELT NEEDS OF NON-NUCLEARS.

3. NPT WILL BE CATALYST TO HASTEN AGREEMENT ON MEASURES TO HALT NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. HOWEVER, PROVISIONS ON DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS ARE NOT LIKE COMMERCIAL QUID PRO QUO. US SUPPORTS SUCH PROVISIONS BECAUSE WE BELIEVE IT IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST TO HALT NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. THOUGH SECURITY BENEFITS HARD TO MEASURE, IMBALANCE IF ANY WEIGHTED IN FAVOR ON NON-NUCLEARS WHO WILL BE AVOIDING RISKS FROM THEIR NON-NUCLEAR NEIGHBORS, ACQUIRING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. PRESENT ART VI WILL GIVE IMPETUS TO DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS, BUT IS DRAFTED SO AS NOT TO CREATE OBSTACLES TO NPT.

4. NPT WILL ALSO PROVIDE IMPETUS TO COOPERATION IN PEACEFUL APPLICATIONS NUCLEAR ENERGY. NPT SAFEGUARDS WILL REMOVE SUSPICIONS THAT COULD HINDER SUCH COOPERATION AS QUANTITIES OF PLUTONIUM AMOUNT IN WAKE OF INCREASING NUMBER NUCLEAR REACTORS. DEPALMA CONCLUDED BY EXPRESSING HOPE ALL MEMBERS ENDC WILL MAKE FURTHER COMMENTS ASAP. HE QUOTED PRESIDENT'S JAN 18 STATEMENT THAT DRAFT NPT REPRESENTS MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENT IN MEETING LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF OTHER NATIONS.

5. IN PROCEDURAL DEBATE, CARACCIOLLO (ITALY) SUGGESTED THAT LISTING BE DRAWN UP OF ALL PROPOSAL PREVIOUSLY MADE ON NPT. REASONS SHOULD BE GIVEN WHY SOME PROPOSALS COULD NOT BE INCORPORATED IN NPT TEXT. THIS WOULD FACILITATE DISCUSSION AND PREVENT OMISSIONS.

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TELEGRAM

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ENDC MANDATE ON NPT IN UNGA RES 2346 CALLED FOR GIVING CONSIDERATION TO ALL PROPOSALS SUBMITTED TO ENDC AND TO VIEWS OF MEMBER STATES IN 22ND UNGA.

6. BLUSZTAJN (POLAND) SAW NO POSSIBILITY OF DRAFTING WORKING PAPER AS PROPOSED BY ITALY. NEW DRAFT NPT CANCELS PREVIOUS AMENDMENTS WHICH BASED ON NPT DRAFTS NO LONGER CURRENT. DELS SHOULD STUDY NEW DRAFT TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT ACCEPTABLE OF WHETHER NEW AMENDMENTS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED. CARACCILO DISAGREED THAT PRESENT DRAFT ELIMINATES PROPOSALS PREVIOUSLY PRESENTED. DE ARAUJO CASTRO (BRAZIL) AGREED WITH ITALIAN SUGGESTION, AND SAID ENDC HAD COLLECTIVE MANDATE FROM UNGA. ROSHCIN (USSR) SUPPORTED POLISH STATEMENT, STRESSING THAT IT WOULD BE "LEGALLY ERRONEOUS" TO CONSIDER AMENDMENTS TO TEXTS THAT HAD BEEN "WITHDRAWN." NEXT MEETING FEB 8, 10:30 AM

EXEMPT MACE

NNN

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1-25-68
theabouts

NPT



URGENT
KIESINGER

BONN, WEST GERMANY, JAN. 23 (REUTERS)--CHANCELLOR
KURT GEORG KIESINGER SAID TODAY THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT
COULD NOT ACCEPT A U.S.-SOVIET DRAFT
TREATY TO HALT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

(MOR) JA/PM 5:50P

FIRST ADD BONN KIESINGER X X X WEAPONS.

IMPROVEMENTS IN THE LATEST DRAFT INTRODUCED THIS MONTH
AT THE GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE WERE NOT SUFFICIENT FOR
BONN TO BE ABLE TO SAY IT COULD ACCEPT THE TREATY, HE
TOLD A MEETING OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC JOURNALISTS.

BUT WEST GERMANY HOPED THAT AN ACCEPTABLE TEXT COULD
EMERGE FROM THE PRESENT DRAFT, HE SAID.

NOTICEABLE IMPROVEMENT OVER PREVIOUS DRAFTS WERE PARTLY
DUE TO INTENSIVE TALKS BETWEEN BONN AND WASHINGTON, HE SAID.
(MORE) JA/PM 5:54P

SECOND ADD BONN KIESINGER X X X SAID.

WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN GUNTHER DIEHL SAID LAST
WEEK THAT SUCCESSIVE DRAFTS IMPROVED IN THAT MORE
CONSIDERATION WAS PAID TO THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF
NON-NUCLEAR POWERS, PARTICULARLY ON CONTROL PROVISIONS.
JA/PM 5:50P

89

NPT

INFORMATION

~~Mr. Smith~~ S
~~Mr. [unclear]~~
file

Thursday, January 25, 1968 -- 10:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a report of telephone conversation from the German Embassy, of yesterday:

Minister Georg von Lilienfeld telephoned to say their press officer is sending to George Christian a report informing him of what Chancellor Kiesinger actually said yesterday about the NPT. The news report yesterday (Jan. 23) that the Chancellor had termed the treaty "unacceptable" was incorrect. He had, on the whole, welcomed the progress made in Geneva, had said there were some essential improvements, but that he thought the draft could still be improved a little bit -- that in its present form, and as of today, the question whether the treaty should be signed didn't pose itself. In other words, it wasn't quite as bad as it looked yesterday.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

Cy. sent George Christian

I don't care who signs it. I just want to dramatize it -- with the highest level I can here.

LBJ/mf
6-21-68
8:45p

6/24/68
Mr Rostow notified Ben Reed.
cy sent Jim Jones asking for
times. cy sent W. Davis + cy to
S. Keating. new

ACTION

90a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, June 21, 1968
6:00 p. m.

Rec'd 6:45p

MR. PRESIDENT:

Just to be absolutely sure, do I read
the attached to mean that Secretary Rusk
will sign at a White House ceremony?

W. W. Rostow
W. W. Rostow

Yes _____

No _____

Handwritten notes:
Ker...
L...
a...
L...
o...
i...

90-b

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 20, 1968

*Rec'd
85
Jun 21 - Fri*

Mr. President:

In connection with arrangements for the signing of the NPT on July 1 in Washington, London, and Moscow, the British have asked for guidance as to who will sign for the United States. Normally, such a treaty would be signed at the SecState/FonMin level although there are rare precedents -- such as the signing of the UN Charter -- for signature by Heads of State. State recommends, therefore, that Sec. Rusk and Amb. Foster sign for the United States and that we so inform the British and the Soviets.

You, of course, have the option of a ceremony at the White House or in the Department of State.

Walt
W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

White House ceremony _____

State Dept. ceremony _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-344
By CB, NARA, Date 6-1-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

NPT 91

~~SECRET~~

Friday, January 19, 1968
7:50 p.m.



Mr. President:

Herewith a proposed telegram in which Tommy Thompson would raise both the ABM and Middle Eastern issues with Kosygin on your behalf, using the NPT and your letter of May 22 as a peg.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-344
By cb, NARA, Date 6-1-95

WWRostow:rln

XX
1/18/68

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

DRAFT TELEGRAM

ACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW
INFO: " London
STATE
NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-342
By ijp, NARA, Date 12-6-94

Request you seek early appointment with Kosygin to make following statement: (If Kosygin not available within next day or so, you should see Gromyko and ask him to transmit to Kosygin soonest.)

BEGIN TEXT. The President has asked me to convey to the Chairman personally his gratification at recent development in Geneva which enabled our two representatives to table complete identical texts of a non-proliferation treaty on January 18. The President regards this as encouraging evidence that we can overcome differences in viewpoint and other obstacles in reaching agreement on an issue vital to the preservation of peace. He is confident that it will now be possible to move forward towards prompt approval of the draft treaty within the ENDC and the UN in order that it may be signed and brought into force at the earliest practicable time.

The President has asked me, at the same time, to convey to the

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

Chairman his sense of urgency over two related pressing issues, namely, progress towards limiting the strategic nuclear arms race, and restraint in the delivery of armament to the nations of the Middle East.

The President recalls that, in his letter of May 22, 1967, to the Chairman, he had expressed the conviction that our task of persuading the non-nuclear powers to accept a non-proliferation treaty would be greatly eased if you and we could demonstrate concurrently our will and ability to bring the nuclear arms race under better control. This remains his strong view.

Furthermore, both our nations are now expending enormous resources in the development and deployment of offensive and defensive strategic weapons systems which, by their impact on the security requirements of both countries, compel an ever-widening spiral of armament from which neither nation can expect to derive any greater security. On the contrary, with the rapid development of technology and the massing of increasingly complex arrays of weapons, the danger increases. The President has asked me to make clear that in proposing discussions between our Governments on this issue, he in no way seeks military advantage; on the contrary, he seeks a solution through a limitation on arms based upon full appreciation by

each side of the national interests and security of the other--a security which he is convinced will not be served by a continuation of our present course. The President believes, therefore, it is in our mutual interest to begin official talks now in order to resolve this problem at the earliest practicable moment.

On the question of arms to the Middle East, the Chairman will have received by now Ambassador Dobrynin's report of his conversation with Secretary Rusk on January 9. This matter, too, is urgent and the President has asked me to stress his deep concern at the impact that continued arms traffic may have on the Middle East situation. We know from past experience that resort to arms is an ever-present danger in the Middle East. Not only does such action not resolve the problem, but it poses the danger of the spread of war beyond the confines of the area. The President has watched with growing concern the extensive delivery of arms to the area from the Soviet Union. The United States is under considerable pressure, as a consequence, to take matching

action. Despite this pressure, my Government has exercised great restraint, most recently in its agreement to provide Israel with only limited numbers of aircraft, without new models, and only in continuation of our agreement with Israel of 1966. By agreeing only to this limited extension of the 1966 agreement and by deferring decision on the introduction of new advanced aircraft into the area, we have exercised restraint and it is the President's earnest hope that this will be reciprocated by the Soviet Government. In this way our two governments could assist Ambassador Jarring in carrying out his vital mission and thus make a substantial contribution to prospects for a just and peaceful settlement in the Middle East. END TEXT.

For Ambassador Bruce: You should bring this message to the attention of Prime Minister Wilson prior his departure for Moscow.

EUR/SOV

1/18/68

JAN 18 1968

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Draft Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples;

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to this Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing

diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the

Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty.

ARTICLE V

Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to cooperate to insure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. It is understood that non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty so desiring may, pursuant to a special agreement or agreements, obtain any such benefits on a bilateral basis or through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States.

ARTICLE VI

Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures regarding cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

ARTICLE VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

ARTICLE VIII

1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of _____,

which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear-weapon States signatory to this Treaty, and 40 other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a Conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in _____ at _____ this _____
of _____.

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[Faint handwritten notes and signatures are visible in this section, including the number '50' and various illegible markings.]

- ① DMZ must be respected - '54
- ② Gu at of Laos & stop "withholding" '62
- ③ I want 1 vote cast for
- ④ 20% of pop. under VC control must go under ~~the~~ cust. system if there is to be peace
- ⑤ Prepared for mutual talks with a view of NLF

SV must wait out future
this electoral process -

FBIS 52

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION DRAFT TREATY

MOSCOW TASS INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN ENGLISH 1605 GMT 18 JAN 68

1-18-68

93

NPT
90

(TEXT) GENEVA--THE 18-NATION DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE RESUMED ITS PROCEEDINGS AT THE PALACE OF NATIONS TODAY AFTER A MONTH'S BREAK.

THE USSR DELEGATION INTRODUCED AT THIS MEETING THE TEXT OF A DRAFT TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT THE DRAFT TREATIES WHICH THE COMMITTEE HAD BEFORE IT DID NOT INCLUDE ARTICLE THREE ON INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OVER OBSERVANCE OF THE TREATY.

SPEAKING AT TODAY'S MEETING, USSR REPRESENTATIVE A.A. ROSHCHIN EMPHASIZED THAT THE DRAFT TREATY PRECLUDES "ANY POSSIBILITY OF ANY PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE WORLD."

ARTICLE THREE ON CONTROL, HE CONTINUED, INSURES THAT ALL PARTIES DISCHARGE THEIR COMMITMENTS UNDER THE TREATY.

IT ENVISAGES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL BY THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY "WHICH SHALL BE APPLIED ON ALL SOURCE OR SPECIAL FISSIONABLE MATERIAL IN ALL PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF SUCH STATE, UNDER ITS JURISDICTION, OR CARRIED OUT UNDER ITS CONTROL ANYWHERE."

A SPECIAL PROVISION OF ARTICLE THREE INSURES THE UNHAMPERED USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES BY ALL PARTIES TO THE TREATY.

ROSHCHIN ALSO SAID THAT THE SOVIET-REVISED DRAFT TREATY ALSO INCLUDES SEVERAL NEW ARTICLES AND PROVISIONS, ELABORATED WITH DUE ACCOUNT FOR CONSIDERATIONS AND PROPOSALS VOICED IN THE 18-NATION COMMITTEE AND OUTSIDE IT, SPECIFICALLY, AT THE 22D SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ESEMBLY.

IN THIS CONNECTIO, THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE DWELT ON THE INCLUSION IN THE DRAFT TREATY OF PROVISIONS FOR THE PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, CLOSE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY AND SUBSEQUENT STEPS IN NUCLEAR AND GENERAL DISARMAMENT, AND THE TERMS OF THE TREATY'S VALIDITY. THE SOVIET SIDE, ROSHCHIN STRESSED IN CONCLUSION, WILL EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO SECURE AN EARLY CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY FOR THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

AN ANOLOGOUS NONPROLIFERATION DRAFT TREATY WAS SUBMITTED TODAY BY THE U.S. DELEGATION.

A MESSAGE FROM UN SECRETARY GENERAL U THANT WAS READ AT THE MEETING. IT STRESSES THE IMPORTANCE OF SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF NONPROLIFERATION AND EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT THE COMMITTEE WLL SUBMIT THE DRAFT TREATY TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHORTLY.

18 JAN 1902Z BE/TW

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 18, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Subject: Background on the Revised Non-Proliferation Treaty

In response to your request for background on the issues connected with the revised NPT, I am attaching a paper prepared by ACDA that summarizes the situation reasonably well. Note in particular the three principles (bottom of page 2 and top of page 3) that Fisher told the Committee today have guided our formulation of Article III. Note the second sentence in Principle 1 that was added at Rusk's direction in the final negotiations with the Soviets.

Also attached is the complete text of the revised draft treaty as presented in Geneva today. I suggest you note the following points:

Articles I and II

These two articles, which contain the basic obligation of the treaty on nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states, are unchanged from the previous draft.

Article III

You should read this text carefully. The first sentence (underlined) is the so-called November 2 language that was suggested by the Germans.

Article IV

Paragraph 2 of this article has been added to make it more forthcoming.

Article V

This is a new article insuring that the benefits of the peaceful uses of atomic energy will be made available under appropriate procedures. Previously, this was simply referred to in the preamble to the treaty.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-344

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ By cb, NARA, Date 6-1-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Article VI

This hortatory article looking to further disarmament measures incorporates material that previously appeared only in the preamble.

Article VII

This new article specifically permits regional agreements, such as the Latin America Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Article VIII

The amendments article has been changed to provide that amendments shall only apply to those parties that ratify them. (Previously, any amendment that survived the extremely demanding requirements became automatically binding on all parties.)

Article IX

The requirement is now fixed that the treaty will enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear-weapon states signatory to the treaty and 40 other states signatory to the treaty.

Article X

A new paragraph has been added to the duration article (see para. 2) essentially limiting the treaty to 25 years. Note exact wording here.

Moreover, the article continues to state (para. 1) that each party has the right to withdraw at any time "if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country."

Spurgeon
Spurgeon Keeny

Atts.:

1. Background Paper
2. Draft Text of NPT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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BACKGROUND ON REVISED NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY PRESENTED
TO ENDC, January 18, 1968

The United States and the Soviet Union today presented to the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva a revised text of the draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. This is a new and completed version of the partial draft tabled at the Conference on August 24, 1967. At that time the identical texts put forth by the U.S. and Soviet Co-Chairmen of the Conference were incomplete. Article III was left blank because of failure to agree on provisions to govern safeguards over peaceful nuclear activities. The gap has been filled in today's draft.

In addition, the revised draft contains several amended articles and three new articles: these deal with the peaceful applications of nuclear energy (Article IV), access to the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions (Article V), and obligations to pursue negotiations on measures of disarmament measures (Article VI). The amendments clause has been redrafted to provide that amendments enter into force only for those parties that accept them (Article VIII). The number of ratifications necessary to bring the treaty into force has been fixed at forty (Article IX). In response to the desires of many non-nuclear countries, the co-drafters have provided for a review of the treaty 25 years after its entry into force "to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely" (Article X).

The Geneva Conference, which reconvened January 18 after a month's recess, will return to its consideration of the draft under a deadline fixed by the 22nd UN General Assembly, which has asked the Committee for a report "on or before March 15, 1968".

In an attempt to achieve a draft treaty to present to the General Assembly, the ENDC spent more time in session during 1967 than at any time in its six-year history. Following the presentation to the Committee of the August 24 draft, eight of the seventeen members participating filed formal amendments. For the most part these amendments reflected three areas of concern among the non-nuclear states: the Treaty's relationship to the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; the

need for positive steps by the nuclear powers towards disarmament; and the desire for assurances against nuclear intimidation. Proposals were also made for amendments on such questions as limiting the treaty's duration, periodic review, and the number of ratifications required to put the treaty into force.

The revised treaty draft does not deal with security assurances. Mr. Fisher noted today that this remaining area of concern is still being studied by the Co-Chairmen who "remain mindful of their pledge to provide the Committee with a recommendation for dealing with this complex and difficult problem."

Today's revised draft represents the Co-Chairmen's attempt to meet, insofar as possible, the concerns expressed by other delegations to the Conference. Ambassador Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Leader of the United States Delegation told the Conference today, "We believe that the proposals we are making today will carry us a long way toward that final completion of the treaty which we seek."

The newly agreed Article III is designed to provide a practical and effective safeguards article which takes into account the interests of all countries desiring to adhere to the treaty.

Article III safeguards are intended solely to verify the treaty obligations that nuclear material is not diverted to weapons. Safeguards will be those set forth in agreements to be negotiated between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA - located in Vienna) and signatory states. These agreements must be negotiated in accordance with the IAEA Statute and its safeguards system.

Mr. Fisher explained to the Conference that three principles have guided the formulation of the draft Article III:

1. Safeguards should be of such a nature that all parties can have confidence in their effectiveness. This means that agreements negotiated by the IAEA must enable the international

agency to carry out its responsibility of providing assurance that no diversion of nuclear material is taking place.

2. Safeguards agreements can be negotiated with the IAEA individually or together with other parties. In other words, agreements can be entered into with "another international organization," whose work is related to the IAEA's, such as a regional safeguards system.

3. The IAEA should make use of existing records and safeguards, so as to avoid unnecessary duplication "provided that under such mutually agreed arrangements the IAEA can satisfy itself that nuclear material is not diverted."

JAN 18 1968

95

Draft Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to this Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

New
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing

diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the

Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

New

2. All the Parties to the Treaty have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty.

ARTICLE V

New

Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to cooperate to insure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. It is understood that non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty so desiring may, pursuant to a special agreement or agreements, obtain any such benefits on a bilateral basis or through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States.

ARTICLE VI

New

Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures regarding cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

ARTICLE VII

New

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

ARTICLE VIII

1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of _____,

which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear-weapon States signatory to this Treaty, and 40 other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a Conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

New

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in _____ at _____ this _____
of _____.

JANUARY 18, 1968

Office of the White House Press Secretary
-----THE WHITE HOUSE 96STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE
PRESENTATION TO THE 18-NATION DISARMAMENT
COMMITTEE OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

The White House was informed at 4:25 a. m. this morning that the USSR would join the United States as Co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to submit to the Committee today a complete draft treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. The President issued the following statement:

I am most heartened to learn that the Soviet Union will join the United States as Co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, to submit a complete text of a treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and that this draft treaty will be submitted today to the Committee in Geneva. This revised text includes an agreed safeguards article and other revisions that will make the treaty widely acceptable.

We have worked long and hard in an effort to draft a text that reflects the views of other nations. I believe the draft presented today represents a major accomplishment in meeting these legitimate interests.

The text submitted today must now be considered further by all governments. Following its review by the Conference in Geneva, it will be considered by the General Assembly in the spring. It is my fervent hope that I will be able to submit it to the Senate of the United States for its advice and consent this year.

The draft treaty text submitted today clearly demonstrates an important fact. In the face of the differences that exist in the world, the two nations which carry the heaviest responsibility for averting the catastrophe of nuclear war can, with sufficient patience and determination, move forward. They can move forward toward the goal which all men of good will seek -- a reversal of the arms race and a more secure peace based on our many common interests on this one small planet.

I believe history will look on this treaty as a landmark in the effort of mankind to avoid nuclear disaster while ensuring that all will benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

This treaty will be a testament of man's faith in the future. In that spirit I commend it to all.

#

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NPT

97

Wednesday, January 17, 1968
3:40 p. m. *Rec'd 2:55 p.*

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have just informed Jim Jones of the following after talking with Butch Fisher:

1. He will stand by until 8:00 p. m. our time in case the Soviets deliver a response on their own initiative.
2. He does not feel that pressing them would accelerate matters; and he fears that if he explained why he was pressing them they would perceive a bargaining advantage and give him an answer we would not like.
3. But he is prepared to go with the following language:

On the basis of a communication from Ambassador Fisher in Geneva today, I am encouraged to believe that a draft treaty can be laid before the conference there in the near future. Therefore, I hope to be able to present that treaty to the Senate this year for its approval.

W.W.R.

98

January 17, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO : SS - Mr. Read

FROM : ACDA - Mr. Weiler

SUBJECT: Possible Presidential Statement if the NPT is Tabled

Attached is a suggested text for a Presidential statement tomorrow in the event that a US-Soviet agreement is reached in the morning.

I realize that the pressure of events tonight and in the morning may not make a Presidential statement possible. However, we did want you to have a suggested draft for consideration.

We think a Presidential statement would be helpful.

I have not had a chance tonight to clear this with anyone other than George Bunn.

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
 NEJ 94-343
 By Wig, NARA, Date 9-13-94

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-343

By *if*, NARA, Date 9-13-94

POSSIBLE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON NPT
FOR JANUARY 18, 1968

As I indicated in my State of the Union Message last night __. The United States and the Soviet Union as Co-Chairmen of The Eighteen-Nation Committee today submitted to the conference in Geneva the text of the inspection provision for the draft treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. The lack of agreement on this article is what has prevented agreement on a complete draft treaty for so many months. The revised draft presented today contains this and a number of other changes which we hope will make the treaty widely acceptable.

On December 2, I announced that when safeguards were applied under the non-proliferation treaty to non-nuclear countries, the United States would permit the IAEA to apply its safeguards to all nuclear activities in this country -- excluding only those with direct national security significance. This offer, made with the full support of the American nuclear and electric power industries, has made it possible to achieve a consensus among our allies on the inspection provision which the Soviet Union has now accepted.

This provision will mean that the world can be sure that fissionable materials are not being diverted from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons.

The revised draft treaty reflects the serious effort made by the Co-Chairmen to take into account the views of other nations. We have worked long and hard in an effort to meet the requests that have been made by other nations that the treaty more fully meet their interests and give more explicit assurances that their peaceful nuclear activities will be protected. I believe the draft tabled today represents a major accomplishment in meeting the legitimate requests that have been submitted since August 24 of last year.

Finally, the treaty text submitted today clearly demonstrates an important fact. In the face of the differences that exist in the world, the two nations who carry the heaviest responsibility for averting the catastrophe of nuclear war can, with sufficient

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- 2 -

patience and determination, move forward. They can move forward toward the goal which all men of good will seek -- a reversal of the arms race and a more secure peace based on our many common interests on this one small planet.

The text submitted today will now be considered further by all governments. Following its review by the Conference in Geneva it will be considered by the General Assembly in the Spring. It is my fervent hope that after the General Assembly's consideration of the treaty I will be able to submit it to the Senate of the United States for its advice and consent.

This treaty will be a testament of man's faith in the future. In that spirit I commend it to all.

* * *

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

January 17, 1968

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM

TO : SS - Mr. Read
FROM : ACDA - Mr. Weiler
SUBJECT: Possible Presidential Statement if the NPT is Tabled

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
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By ijg, NARA, Date 9-13-94

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-343

By , NARA, Date 9-13-94

~~SECRET~~

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FOR JANUARY 18, 1968

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Finally, the treaty text submitted today clearly demonstrates an important fact. In the face of the differences that exist in the world, the two nations who carry the heaviest responsibility for averting the catastrophe of nuclear war can, with sufficient

~~SECRET~~

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- 2 -

patience and determination, move forward. They can move forward toward the goal which all men of good will seek -- a reversal of the arms race and a more secure peace based on our many common interests on this one small planet.

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This treaty will be a testament of man's faith in the future. In that spirit I commend it to all.

* * *

~~SECRET~~

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JANUARY 9, 1969

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100

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

FOR THE PRESS

FROM: Tom Johnson
Acting Press Secretary

I was asked yesterday and again this morning for the President's views on NPT.

The President has authorized me to issue the following statement in response to these questions:

The President has been increasingly concerned, since he submitted the Non-Proliferation Treaty to the Senate last July, about the effects here and abroad of delaying ratification of the treaty. It is our strong hope that all nations will sign, ratify and adhere to the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

#

ACTION

101

Thursday, January 9, 1969 - 10:45 am

Mr. President:


When I conveyed your view to the State Department, Sec. Rusk approved the following statement. He believes that George Christian or Tom Johnson should give this response, if he is questioned at the 11:00 a.m. briefing. State could then refer to the White House statement at its noon briefing.

[Handwritten signature]

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

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January 9, 1969

101a

The President has been increasingly concerned, since he submitted the Non-Proliferation Treaty to the Senate last July, about the effects here and abroad of delaying ratification of the treaty. It is our strong hope that all nations will sign, ratify and adhere to the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Walt for Rostow

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 20, 1967

102

NOTE FOR MR. ROSTOW

Walt--

With reference to your question just before your departure for Australia concerning Rusk's discussions with Brandt on the NPT, the only report that I have seen is covered in para. 5 of the attached cable.

As I believe Rusk indicated to you on the telephone, the conversations did not result in any change in the FRG's position on the NPT.

Spurgeon
Spurgeon Keeny

Att. :
USNATO 1010

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-344

By CG, NARA, Date 6-1-95



Department of State

TELEGRAM

NPT

102a
31

~~SECRET~~ 859

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-342
By sp, NARA, Date 12-6-94

PAGE 01 NATO 01010 131327Z

44
ACTION EUR 20

INFO IO 15, MM 01, SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CCO 00, SP 02, SS 20, GPM 03,
SC 01, NSC 10, RSC 01, L 03, H 02, P 04, CIA 04, INR 07, NSAE 00, DOD 01,
ACDA 16, NEA 15, E 15, SCI 05, AEC 11, OST 01, CEA 02, TRSY 08, COM 08,
AID 28, RSR 01, /204 W

0 131034Z DEC 67
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 769
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 247
AMEMBASSY PARIS 201
AMEMBASSY BONN 279
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 51
USMISSION GENEVA 52
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 191

FILE COPY

Brandt-Rusk TALKS

- ~~BOWLER~~
- ~~BUDGET~~
- ~~DAVIS~~
- ~~FRID~~
- ~~GINGBICH~~
- ~~HAMILTON~~
- ~~JESSUP~~
- ~~JOHNSON~~
- ~~JORDEN~~
- ~~KEENE~~ ✓
- ~~LEONHART~~
- ~~ROCHE~~
- ~~SAUNDERS~~
- ~~TAYLOR~~

DEC 10 3 46 PM '67
RECEIVED

~~SECRET~~ USNATO 1010
NATUS/DISTO/BUSEC
SECTO 016

SUBJECT: NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING; US-FRG BILATERAL DEC. 12
1. QUADRIPARTITE DINNER OUTLOOK;

PAGE 2 RUFHNA 1010 ~~SECRET~~
THE SECRETARY ASKED FOREIGN MINISTER BRANDT WHETHER HE HAD ANYTHING SPECIAL TO DISCUSS IN PREPARATION FOR THE QUADRIPARTITE DINNER. BRANDT SAID THE SOVIET NOTE WOULD BE DISCUSSED.

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 NATO 01010 131327Z

FRG HAD NO FIRM VIEWS BUT BELIEVED THAT A SHORT REPLY SHOULD BE MADE. THE SECRETARY REFERRED TO THE US GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON THE SUBJECT AND FOREIGN MINISTER BRANDT SAID HE APPRECIATED IT. IT WAS AGREED THAT NATURE OF RESPONSE AND ITS COORDINATION WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED DURING THE QUADREPARTITE DINNER. BRANDT SAID THAT STATE SECRETARY DICKWITZ WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH TSARAPKIN VERY SHORTLY TO EXPLORE WHETHER SOVIETS STILL INTERESTED IN PURSUING CONVERSATIONS. BRANDT WAS SURPRISED AT THE SOVIET NOTE AND FELT IT INDICATED CONFUSION ON THE SOVIET PART. FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE ONE HAND GROMYKO HAD RECENTLY SAID THAT RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA WAS A TEST OF FRG'S POLICY RE RELATIONS WITH EAST, BUT WHEN BRANDT TOLD SOVIETS ABOUT YUGOSLAVIA TSARAPKIN EXPRESSED INDIFFERENCE. THE SECRETARY THOUGHT THE SOVIETS WERE UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM THE EAST GERMANS.

2. EEC:

TURNING TO THE EEC, THE SECRETARY ASKED HOW BRANDT SAW THE

PAGE 3 RUFHNA 1010 ~~SECRET~~

MEETING ON DECEMBER 18 AND 19. BRANDT SAID IN HIS VIEW THE COUNCIL WILL GO ON DISCUSSING THE COMMISSION REPORT UP TO LAST POINT OF BEGINNING NEGOTIATIONS. THE FIVE AND THE COMMISSION WILL BE READY TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS NOW AND THE FRENCH MAY SAY "NO" "OR TOO EARLY". THE FIVE WILL THEN ASK THE FRENCH WHAT SHOULD BE DONE AND STRESS THAT A UNILATERAL VETO WILL DAMAGE THE EEC AS IT EXISTS AND IMPEDE FURTHER PROGRESS. BRANDT SAID THAT THE SITUATION IN BRUSSELS WAS ALREADY SOMEWHAT DEPLORABLE SINCE THINGS HAVE NOT BEEN MOVING. THIS MUST BE POINTED OUT TO COUVE. SECRETARY RUSK CONSIDERED IT IMPORTANT THAT THE FIVE ARE IN FAVOR OF BRITAIN'S ENTRY SINCE MOMENTUM IN THE UK WOULD ERODE IF THE FIVE DO NOT MAKE THEIR POSITION CLEAR. THE FAILURE TO DO SO COULD CAUSE A PROBLEM OF PUBLIC MORALE AND NOT JUST IN BRITAIN. BRANDT CONFIRMED THAT DE GAULLE'S RECENT PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT WAS MORE NEGATIVE THAN IN LILLE A WEEK BEFORE. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THE BEST COURSE FOR THE US WAS TO STAY OUT OF THE MATTER. HE SAID THAT IN LONDON THE GOVERNMENT PREFERS A "NO" ANSWER TO A "YES" UNDER CONDITIONS. THE SECRETARY SAID THE FRG MIGHT HAVE TO HELP THE BRITISH. BRANDT AGREED THAT THIS MIGHT BE THE CASE AFTER DECEMBER 19.

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 NATO 01010 131327Z

PAGE 4 RUFHNA 1010 ~~SECRET~~

3. FRG DEFENSE BUDGET:

THE SECRETARY TURNED TO DEFENSE PROBLEMS AND SAID HE GATHERED GERMAN PROBLEMS WITH DEFENSE BUDGET WERE BEING WORKED OUT. BRANDT MENTIONED THE DEFENSE DEBATE AND SAID THAT BY JANUARY THE MOD WOULD BE READY WITH ITS PLANS. THE US AND FRG WOULD HAVE CONSULTATIONS IN FOREIGN MINISTRY CHANNELS BEFORE ANYTHING IS DONE. THE SECRETARY OUTLINED THE CLOSE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE US TROOP SITUATION IN EUROPE AND WHAT ITS ALLIES WERE DOING. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE FRG OFFER FOR CONSULTATIONS. HE KNEW THAT THIS WAS A GERMAN AFFAIR BUT IT AFFECTS THE US.

4. MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS:

THE SECRETARY ASKED WHETHER TSARAPKIN GOT INTO MUTUAL TROOP WITHDRAWALS. BRANDT SAID HE WOULD BE DISCUSSING IT AT THE QUADRI PARTITE DINNER BUT HE FELT THAT THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE A NEGATIVE REPLY TO ANY WESTERN INITIATIVE. THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT IF THE US RAISED THE QUESTION WITH THE SOVIETS, IT WOULD BE NEGATIVE. IT WAS LESS CERTAIN THIS WOULD BE THE CASE IF IT WAS RAISED BY SOMEONE ELSE. IN THIS CONNECTION, BRANDT SAID

PAGE 5 RUFHNA 1010 ~~SECRET~~

TSARAPKIN HAD NOT TALKED ABOUT NATO ALTHOUGH THIS HAD EARLIER BEEN A MAJOR POINT AT ISSUE.

5. NPT:

ON NPT, THE SECRETARY TOLD BRANDT WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A TREATY CONCLUDED SINCE TIME IS RUNNING ON. AT THE SAME TIME WE WANTED A TREATY THAT PEOPLE CAN FEEL COMFORTABLE WITH. WE HAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE HEADWAY WITH OUR ALLIES, BUT STILL HAVE NO AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS. HE BELIEVED THAT SOME OF THE ARGUMENTS PRESENTED WERE MORE OF PRETEXT THAN REASONS AND HE DID NOT CONSIDER EVERYTHING IN THE FRG AIDE-MEMOIRE OF NOV. 21 HELPFUL. WE WOULD HOPE TO

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04 NATO 01010 131327Z

GET SOMETHING SATISFACTORY ON SAFEGUARDS AND WOULD DO WHAT WE CAN TO GET SOMETHING ON DURATION. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT AS HE UNDERSTOOD ITS FAILURE TO HANDLE SAFEGUARDS PROPERLY COULD DESTROY EURATOM. BRANDT POINTED OUT THAT ACCORDING TO THE EURATOM TREATY, MEMBERS CANNOT ENTER INTO ANOTHER TREATY INCONSISTENT WITH THE EURATOM TREATY. ONE DRAFT THIS AUTUMN WAS CONSIDERED INCONSISTENT. THERE WAS ALSO THE FRENCH PROBLEM. AS LONG AS THERE WERE EURATOM SAFEGUARDS, THE FRENCH WOULD HAVE SAFEGUARDS. HOWEVER WERE THERE

PAGE 6 RUFHNA 1010 ~~SECRET~~

NO AGREEMENT BETWEEN EURATOM AND IAEA, AND IF FRANCE HAD NO SAFEGUARDS, MANY FIRMS MIGHT WANT TO MOVE TO FRANCE. THIS WOULD BE INTOLERABLE FOR THE FRG. THE SECRETARY WAS SURPRISED THAT THE SAFEGUARDS WOULD BE SUCH A FACTOR FOR INDUSTRY UNLESS THE FIRM WERE UP TO SOME MISCHIEF. ASSISTANT SECRETARY LEDDY ALSO RECALLED THAT THE FRENCH COULD HAVE A PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR SUPPLIES. BRANDT COMMENTED THAT THE FRENCH WERE ALREADY AWARE OF THIS. IN FACT HE SAID THAT THE FRENCH WERE NOT INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING THE NPT. THE FRENCH HAD TOLD THE FRG TO DO WHAT THEY WISHED AND TALK TO THE FRENCH AFTER THEY HAD DECIDED WHAT TO DO. BRANDT WAS UNCERTAIN AS TO WHETHER THE FRENCH WOULD ULTIMATELY OPPOSE AN ARRANGEMENT SATISFACTORY TO THE FIVE. HE EXPLAINED IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO ALTER THE EURATOM TREATY BUT BELIEVED SOMETHING COULD BE WORKED OUT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EURATOM TREATY AS IT STANDS. BRANDT REFERRED TO TALKS WITH EKLUND OF IAEA AND DISCUSSION OF THE VERIFICATION POSSIBILITY. THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT THESE LINES SHOULD BE EXPLORED. AMBASSADOR MCGHEE WONDERED WHETHER THE SAFEGUARDS COULD NOT BE EXPLORED IN ADVANCE BETWEEN EURATOM AND THE IAEA.

PAGE 7 RUFHNA 1010 ~~SECRET~~

SINCE WE HAVE ANNOUNCED WE WOULD ACCEPT IAEA, WE WILL ALSO HAVE TO LOOK AT THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF ARRANGEMENTS WITH IAEA. BRANDT WAS PLEASED OVER THE PROPOSALS ON PEACEFUL USES AND THE TIES BETWEEN THE TREATY AND FUTURE DISARMAMENT. IF

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 05 NATO 01010 131327Z

ARTICLE III AND THE DURATION ISSUE WERE SETTLED, IT WOULD
BE HELPFUL TO HIS FRG COLLEAGUES.
BEFORE CLOSING THE DISCUSSION, ASSISTANT SECRETARY LEDDY
ASKED ABOUT GERMAN REACTION TO AILLERET ARTICLE. BRANDT SAID
THERE HAD NOT BEEN MUCH REACTION. HE HAD HEARD DE GAULLE
HAD NOT AUTHORIZED THE ARTICLE.
GP-3 RUSK

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

December 4, 1967

MEMORANDUM TO MR. WALT ROSTOW
The White House

SUBJECT: Report to the President

In accordance with the President's letter of December 12, 1966, I submit herewith a personal report to the President on non-proliferation treaty negotiations.

/s/ Adrian S. Fisher
Acting Director

Adrian S. Fisher
Acting Director

Attachment:
Report to the
President.

~~SECRET~~ When separated from attachments
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NOV 20 1967

ROBINSON OFFICE
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This document consists of 3 pages.
Number 2 of 10 copies, Series A.

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

103a

~~SECRET~~

December 5, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

We have had no further word from our Allies regarding the alternative formulations of the first sentence of Article III since the November 30 meeting of the North Atlantic Council when a number of them gave us their reactions. At that time it appeared that those allies who are not members of EURATOM could accept any of the alternatives. This is also true of Japan, whose views we also solicited. The Netherlands representative in NAC highlighted the point that the November 2 draft is no longer a viable alternative. However, there has been no clear indication of the FRG's views.

Mr. Foster succeeded, with Roshchin's cooperation, in keeping the ENDC in session until the middle of December. The other ENDC delegations were willing to go along with this on the assumption that this would facilitate the efforts of the Co-Chairmen to reach agreement on Article III before the ENDC recesses.

If we are unable to table an Article III before the ENDC recesses, there is likely to be a sense of heightened frustration on the part of the non-aligned delegations

The President,
The White House.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-343
By rip, NARA, Date 9-13-94

~~SECRET~~

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification.

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

who have been kept waiting, first by the Soviet delay in agreeing to tabling a draft treaty with a blank Article III until August 24, and later by the delay in an evolution of a definitive Western position on Article III, a phase we are still in.

Ambassador Cleveland has been instructed to tell his colleagues that we would like to have the definitive views of the EURATOM countries, and especially those of the FRG and Italy, at the Council meeting scheduled for December 6 in order to permit us to determine if there is a basis for tabling an Article III before the ENDC has to recess in mid-December.

If the FRG and Italy do not give us their views at the December 6 NAC meeting, or if they insist that we continue to push the November 2 language which the Soviets reject, the completion of the NPT will have to be put off until next year.

Official reaction in the FRG and Italy to your December 2 speech offering to place U. S. peaceful facilities under IAEA safeguards has been very favorable.

We hope the speech will help in producing a more favorable position on Article III in these countries.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ Adrian S. Fisher
Acting Director

Adrian S. Fisher
Acting Director

Enclosure:

Alternatives for First
Sentence of Article III

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Alternatives for First Sentence of Article III

1. November 2 US Draft (rejected by Soviets but most acceptable to EURATOM allies)

"1. ...undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system..."

2. November 9 Soviet Delegation Proposal (not clear whether now acceptable to Soviets; not clear whether acceptable to FRG; apparently rejected by Italy; acceptable to most other allies)

"1. ...undertakes to accept safeguards, in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system, as set forth in an agreement to be concluded with the IAEA..."

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 4, 1967

104

NOTE FOR MR. *✓* ROSTOW

Walt--

Attached for your signature is a memo for the President on the McGhee NPT cable we discussed at staff meeting this morning. Ed Fried and Dick Ullman concur.

Also attached to your carbon of the memo are copies for your information of the other cables referred to in the text.

Spurgeon
Spurgeon Keeny

Atts. :
Memo for the Pres att'g
Bonn 5839
Bonn 5840
Bonn 5842
Nato 815

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *AB*, NARA, Date 4-25-94

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4590

NPT

105



UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

December 4, 1967

Kenny

MEMORANDUM TO MR. WALT ROSTOW
The White House

SUBJECT: Report to the President

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Adrian S. Fisher

Adrian S. Fisher
Acting Director

Attachment:
Report to the
President.

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Number ___ of ___ copies, Series A.

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

105a



OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

December 5, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

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The President,
The White House.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-343
By lig, NARA, Date 9-13-94

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification.

~~SECRET~~

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- 2 -

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Adrian S. Fisher
Acting Director

Enclosure:

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Sentence of Article III

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"1. ... undertakes to accept IAEA safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be concluded with the IAEA in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA..."

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 1, 1967

NPT
106

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Larry Eagleburger called to say that State would not be sending a memo on Congressional consultations related to our offer to put U. S. peaceful nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. The memo they were planning to send turned out to be nothing more than a rehash of a William Foster to the President memo dated April 6, 1967. There have been no State consultations since that date; therefore nothing new to report. Presumably, Foster's memo is available to us.

AEC, however, has been consulting on the Hill and with private industry. AEC is now preparing a memo on these consultations. (The knowledgeable individual at AEC is a Mr. Raney [sp?]). Larry fears AEC is not moving rapidly enough on the memo.

Another point Larry raised was our need to consult with the FRG, UK and Italians after the President's final decision, but prior to any public announcement by the President concerning submission to IAEA safeguards. This is particularly urgent with the Italians given their NPT views and Saragat's participation with the President on the satellite hook-up.



Richard Moose

MEMORANDUM

19
NPT
107

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ps
12-2-67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, December 1, 1967
7:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

You should know that, in addition to confirming the support of Senator Pastore and Congressman Holifield for the IAEA proposal, we tried to run down Senator Hickenlooper and Senator Gore for a final check. Both are out of town and could not be reached. The record shows that when the matter was raised with them in April of this year (Tab A, page 3), Senator Gore "indicated general agreement" -- Senator Hickenlooper expressed interest but did not commit himself, to which Bill Foster then added the judgment, "He will support the idea because of his past support for IAEA safeguards."

With Pastore and Holifield aboard, as well as U. S. industry (see Tab B), Nick Katzenback is informing the Italians, British, and Germans of this passage in your talk tomorrow.

W.R.

Attachments

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-344
By dg, NARA, Date 6-1-95

107a

A



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

1146

107-b

April 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Offer to Put U.S. Peaceful Nuclear
Facilities under IAEA Safeguards (C)

I concur in the attached recommendation from
Bill Foster.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Attachment:

Memo fm. Wm.C.Foster

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-342
By ijg, NARA, Date 12-6-94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Group 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1146

107c



UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

April 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Offer to Put U.S. Peaceful Nuclear
Facilities under IAEA Safeguards (C)

In the course of our intensive consultations during the last few weeks, many of the non-nuclear-weapon countries, including many of our important NATO allies, have expressed concern that the proposed safeguards requirements in our draft non-proliferation treaty might hinder their peaceful nuclear programs and leave them vulnerable to industrial espionage. It might help to overcome these objections if the United States were to invite the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply its safeguards on a broad scale to U.S. peaceful nuclear facilities. The justification for the exclusion of any U.S. facilities from the IAEA safeguards offer would be only on military or security grounds and not for any commercial reasons. Such an offer would be made to apply at such a time as mandatory safeguards as specified in the non-proliferation treaty are applied to non-nuclear-weapon states.

I recommend that you approve a statement to this effect to be made at such time as would best help to achieve a satisfactory safeguards article in the treaty. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission concur in this recommendation.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-343

By ing, NARA, Date 9-13-94

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

This concept has been discussed by the Atomic Energy Commission with representatives of the major U.S. industrial and utility concerns involved in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Many of these representatives think it is quite a good thing to do in order to achieve an effective worldwide safeguards system, although some of them point out that there will be problems in implementation of the offer which will have to be worked out in the course of negotiating the necessary arrangements with the International Atomic Energy Agency. These arrangements will not only advance our national interest in achieving safeguards, but will promote industrial interests by establishing conditions which favor the widest possible export of nuclear materials and equipment under safeguards.

It is our intention in making this offer to rely upon the voluntary cooperation of the U.S. nuclear industry in implementing it, and our consultations have given us confidence that this cooperation will be forthcoming. However, if it becomes necessary in a few instances to rely on the Commission's regulatory powers to require the participation in the inspection system by specific companies, the Attorney General would have to determine whether the Commission's current authority extends to requiring a licensee to open his facilities to inspection by an organization other than the Commission or other U.S. agencies. If not, some clarifying legislation might be necessary to ensure enforcement in the unlikely event that the Commission's authority in this field were challenged.

The British have indicated privately to us that if the United States were to make such an offer, the United Kingdom would do likewise.

The proposed offer has been discussed with Senator Pastore and Representative Holifield of the Joint Committee

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

on Atomic Energy, who concur. Senator Gore, Chairman of the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, indicated general agreement. Senator Hickenlooper expressed interest but did not commit himself; in my judgment, he will support the idea because of his past support for IAEA safeguards, because what we are planning appears reasonable under the circumstances, and because it would not adversely affect industrial uses of atomic energy. Senators Mansfield and Dirksen were both noncommittal, but I think they will rely on the views of Senators Pastore and Hickenlooper, respectively.

William C. Foster

William C. Foster

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REGIONAL OFFICE
RECEIVED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

107-d

B



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

107-2

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-347

By cb, NARA, Date 9-1-95

December 1, 1967

The Honorable Walt Rostow
Special Assistant to the President

Dear Mr. Rostow:

I have been requested by Secretary Katzenbach to advise you of the procedures followed in clearing the proposed announcement by the President tomorrow that the United States is prepared to place a broad range of its civilian nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards if an effective NPT is achieved. Glenn Seaborg is enroute to Chicago at present.

The original decision to make this offer was reached after extensive consultation with U.S. industry and, following this, with Congressional leaders. For example, on March 23, 1967, the Commission and members of the staff, as well as representatives of ACDA, and the Department of State met with a representative group from the American nuclear industry to discuss the proposed offer in extensive detail. The industrial representatives that participated were from the American Public Power Association, the Atomic Industrial Forum, the Edison Electric Institute, General Electric, Westinghouse, Babcock and Wilcox, Combustion Engineering, Nuclear Fuel Services Incorporated, the Allied Chemical Corporation, and the Yankee Atomic Electric Corporation. In addition, the Commission consulted with the Board of Directors of the Atomic Industrial Forum. The decision to make the offer was approved by the President on April 9 pursuant to a recommendation made by Mr. Foster of ACDA in a memorandum dated April 6. Mr. Foster's memorandum, which is appended,* indicates which Congressional leaders were consulted at the time.

The offer has already been communicated to the NATO Council, to Japan and perhaps other principal potential signatories of the NPT. The offer has not, however, been publicly disclosed. It had been the thinking of ACDA that formal public announcement should take place at a propitious time during the NPT negotiations when it

x For ready reference. grr

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Honorable Walt Rostow - 2 -

might have the maximum effect in contributing to the momentum of the negotiations. ACDA (Mr. Fisher) has specifically concurred in the proposed announcement by the President tomorrow.

I have spoken to Senator Pastore today, who confirmed that Glenn informed him of the proposed announcement on November 27, and that he gave Glenn his approval. Glenn's notes also indicate that he reached Congressman Holifield and informed him of the proposal on the same day.

U.S. industry is also generally aware of the U.S. decision to make this offer since it was made clear during our consultations with industry that this would be our decision in the absence of any unforeseen difficulties. U.S. industry is not of course informed of the proposed announcement by the President tomorrow in view of the restrictions on the disclosure of this information.

Sincerely yours,

Jim Ramey

James T. Ramey
Commissioner

Enclosure:
Memorandum from William Foster
to the President

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

107-f

Enclosure A

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

April 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Offer to Put U.S. Peaceful Nuclear
Facilities under IAEA Safeguards (C)

In the course of our intensive consultations during the last few weeks, many of the non-nuclear-weapon countries, including many of our important NATO allies, have expressed concern that the proposed safeguards requirements in our draft non-proliferation treaty might hinder their peaceful nuclear programs and leave them vulnerable to industrial espionage. It might help to overcome these objections if the United States were to invite the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply its safeguards on a broad scale to U.S. peaceful nuclear facilities. The justification for the exclusion of any U.S. facilities from the IAEA safeguards offer would be only on military or security grounds and not for any commercial reasons. Such an offer would be made to apply at such a time as mandatory safeguards as specified in the non-proliferation treaty are applied to non-nuclear-weapon states.

I recommend that you approve a statement to this effect to be made at such time as would best help to achieve a satisfactory safeguards article in the treaty. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission concur in this recommendation.

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-343
By iq, NARA, Date 9-13-94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

This concept has been discussed by the Atomic Energy Commission with representatives of the major U.S. industrial and utility concerns involved in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Many of these representatives think it is quite a good thing to do in order to achieve an effective worldwide safeguards system, although some of them point out that there will be problems in implementation of the offer which will have to be worked out in the course of negotiating the necessary arrangements with the International Atomic Energy Agency. These arrangements will not only advance our national interest in achieving safeguards, but will promote industrial interests by establishing conditions which favor the widest possible export of nuclear materials and equipment under safeguards.

It is our intention in making this offer to rely upon the voluntary cooperation of the U.S. nuclear industry in implementing it, and our consultations have given us confidence that this cooperation will be forthcoming. However, if it becomes necessary in a few instances to rely on the Commission's regulatory powers to require the participation in the inspection system by specific companies, the Attorney General would have to determine whether the Commission's current authority extends to requiring a licensee to open his facilities to inspection by an organization other than the Commission or other U.S. agencies. If not, some clarifying legislation might be necessary to ensure enforcement in the unlikely event that the Commission's authority in this field were challenged.

The British have indicated privately to us that if the United States were to make such an offer, the United Kingdom would do likewise.

The proposed offer has been discussed with Senator Pastore and Representative Holifield of the Joint Committee

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

on Atomic Energy, who concur. Senator Gore, Chairman of the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, indicated general agreement. Senator Hickenlooper expressed interest but did not commit himself; in my judgment, he will support the idea because of his past support for IAEA safeguards, because what we are planning appears reasonable under the circumstances, and because it would not adversely affect industrial uses of atomic energy. Senators Mansfield and Dirksen were both noncommittal, but I think they will rely on the views of Senators Pastore and Hickenlooper, respectively.

William C. Foster

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 30, 1967

108

S

NOTE FOR MR. ROSTOW

Walt--

Attached is an important cable, that you may not have seen, giving Cleveland precise instructions on what to say on the NPT's Article III in the NAC meeting today.

I understand that this cable represents Rusk's personal decision, after extensive discussions night-before-last with Leddy, Fisher, et al., as to how to proceed on Article III.

Also attached is a cable giving Cleveland additional important instructions for the meeting today on the "duration" issue and our thinking on the continuation of the ENDC and a possible special UNGA session on the NPT early next year.

Spurgeon
Spurgeon Keeny

Atts. :
STATE 76022 to NATO 11/29
STATE 76628 to NATO 11/29

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-344
By cb, NARA, Date 6-1-95

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

NPT
TELEGRAM
108a 29

~~SECRET~~ 937

PAGE 01 STATE 76022

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ORIGIN SS 70

INFO MM 01/071 R

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-342
By ijp, NARA, Date 12-6-94

DRAFTED BY:EUR:JLEDDY/ACDA:ASFISHER
APPROVED BY:S/S - MR. READ

R 290121Z NOV 67
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION NATO 0546
INFO USMISSION GENEVA 0707
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0946

~~SECRET~~ STATE 76022

LIMDIS

DISTO

FOR NOVEMBER 30 NAC DISCUSSION YOU SHOULD MAKE FOLLOWING STATEMENT, CAREFULLY DRAFTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SECRETARY'S WISHES. OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO ELICIT DEFINITIVE VIEWS NATO ALLIES SO WE CAN OBTAIN CONSENSUS IN ORDER TO PROCEED WITH NEGOTIATIONS.

SPEAKING FOR THE US AS A MATTER OF ITS OWN NATIONAL OBJECTIVES UNDER THE TREATY, WE COULD, OF COURSE, ACCEPT ANY OF THE THREE

PAGE 2 RUEHC 76022 ~~SECRET~~

DRAFTS NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION. WE HAVE A DIFFERENT ROLE AS CO-CHAIRMAN WHERE WE MUST SEEK A DRAFT WHICH WILL COMMAND WIDEST POSSIBLE ACCEPTANCE BY THE PRINCIPAL NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR POWERS. THIS IS THEREFORE A MATTER UPON WHICH WE NEED YOUR

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 76022

JUDGEMENT.

THE NOVEMBER 2 DRAFT CONTAINS THE MAXIMUM SUPPORT WHICH WE CONSIDER FEASIBLE FOR THE FIVE EURATOM PRINCIPLES. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE HAVE BEEN PRESSING THIS DRAFT ON THE SOVIETS UP TO THE POINT OF A PERSONAL EFFORT BY THE SECRETARY WITH GROMYKO. THUS FAR THE SOVIETS HAVE REFUSED. THERE IS THE NOVEMBER 9 COUNTER-DRAFT PROPOSED BY THE SOVIETS. HOWEVER, WHEN WE INDICATED TO THE SOVIETS THAT WE CONTINUED TO FAVOR THE NOVEMBER 2 DRAFT, THE SOVIET DELEGATION WITHDREW SUPPORT FROM THE NOVEMBER 9 ALTERNATIVE, BUT SINCE THE SOVIETS EARLIER INDICATED SUPPORT OF THE NOVEMBER 9 VERSION, WE DO NOT RULE OUT THEIR ACCEPTING IT IN FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. THE NOVEMBER 9 DRAFT MAY THEREFORE BE WORTH TRYING ON BUT IN CONSIDERING WHETHER TO DO SO WE WOULD LIKE THE VIEWS OF ALL OF OUR NATO ALLIES ESPECIALLY THOSE WHO ARE MEMBERS OF EURATOM. THEREFORE, IF YOU HAVE ANY SPECIFIC

PAGE 3 RUEHC 76022 ~~SECRET~~

PROBLEMS WITH THE NOVEMBER 9 DRAFT, WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING YOUR
INDIVIDUAL VIEWS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

RUSK

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-343

By WJ, NARA, Date 9-13-94

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 01 STATE 76628

85

ORIGIN ACDA 16

INFO EUR 20, IO 15, MM 01, SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, SS 20, GPM 03, SP 02,
SC 01, L 03, H 02, NEA 15, EA 15, ARA 15, AF 15, RSC 01, P 04, NSC 10,
CIA 04, INR 07, NSAE 00, DOD 01, SCI 05, OIC 05, AEC 11, NASA 04, OST 01,
/196 R

DRAFTED BY: ACDA/IR CGLEYSTEN
APPROVED BY: EUR SPRINGSTEEN
EUR/RPM COLLINS
ACDA/GC BUNN
IO/UNP HELMAN
EUR/RPE BILTCHICK

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TO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE 0567
INFO USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0717

~~SECRET~~ STATE 76628

NATUS/DISTO

REF: A) STATE 76022; B) US NATO 688

SUBJECT: NOV 30 NAC MEETING - NPT

YOU SHOULD LEAD OFF DISCUSSION OF NPT WITH PRESENTATION
CONTAINED IN REFTEL A. THEN, YOU SHOULD FOLLOW-UP WITH STA-
TUS REPORT ON OTHER MATTERS MENTIONED IN REFTEL B.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 76628

REGARDING DURATION, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT AMBASSADOR FOSTER HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO TAKE THIS ISSUE UP WITH SOVIET

PAGE 2 RUEHC 76628 ~~S E C R E T~~
CO-CHAIRMAN. HOWEVER, WE DOUBT SOVIETS WILL ABANDON THEIR POSITION ON UNLIMITED DURATION UNTIL CO-CHAIRMEN CAN AGREE ON LANGUAGE TO BE TABLED ON ARTICLE III. LIKewise SOVIETS NOW UNWILLING TO DISCUSS PERIODIC REVIEW CONFERENCES OR CHANGING THE AMENDMENTS CLAUSE. WE INTEND TO TAKE UP LATTER TWO QUESTIONS AGAIN WITH SOVIETS BEFORE TREATY COMPLETED IN INTEREST OF GAINING BROADER INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR IT.

UNLESS PRESSURES FROM NON-ALIGNED BECOME IRRESISTIBLE FOR RECESS, WE SHALL ATTEMPT TO KEEP ENDC IN SESSION INTO DECEMBER IN ORDER TO COMPLETE NPT FOR PRESENTATION TO UN. WE RECOGNIZE THAT IT NOW NO LONGER REALISTIC TO EXPECT UN DISCUSSION OF NPT BEFORE UNGA RECESSES ON DECEMBER 19 AND ARE THINKING IN TERMS OF SPECIAL UNGA TO CONSIDER NPT DRAFT AT BEGINNING OF NEXT YEAR.

RE URTEL 707, WE UNABLE AT THIS TIME TO GO BEYOND WHAT YOU WERE AUTHORIZED TO DRAW FROM STATE 73186 (PENULTIMATE PARA).

GP-3. RUSK

PAGE 3 RUEHC 76628 ~~S E C R E T~~

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MEMORANDUM

NPT
109

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

November 14, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-344
By CG, NARA, Date 6-1-95

Subject: US and Soviet Texts of Article III of NPT

At your request, I have compared the US and Soviet texts for the first sentence of Article III of the NPT and outlined the arguments for and against standing on our version as opposed to accepting the Soviet version. The issue takes on particular significance since, with Ambassador Roshchin's statement that he would recommend acceptance of the rest of our Article III, the first sentence appears to be the only remaining substantive disagreement between ourselves and the Soviets on the present draft.

The first sentence in the new US version of Article III reads as follows:

"Each non-nuclear-weapon state party to the treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA in accordance with the statute of the IAEA and the agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

The re-wording of this first sentence as proposed by Ambassador Roshchin is as follows:

"Each non-nuclear-weapon state party to the treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, in accordance with the statute of the IAEA and the agency's safeguards system, as set forth in an agreement to be concluded with the IAEA for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

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-2-

In comparing the two texts, it should be noted that the ordering of phrases in the US version is such that the "statute of the IAEA" generally modifies the procedure whereby the agreement will be "negotiated and concluded." In the Soviet version, the phrases are ordered so that the "statute of the IAEA" modifies the safeguards which are to be accepted. There is a difference of opinion as to how different the two versions would be as a practical matter since EURATOM and IAEA would have to work out subsequent arrangements in any event, and we have presented our interpretations as to the actual meaning of Article III. There is also an additional minor difference in that the Soviets have dropped the words, "negotiated and," from the phrase, "negotiated and concluded," on the grounds that they were superfluous.

The principal arguments (by EUR and others) for insisting on our present first sentence are:

- It is more responsive to German and EURATOM concerns that they might be subjected to IAEA as well as EURATOM safeguards and provides them with a better base from which to negotiate with the IAEA;
- It very closely parallels the operative wording of the first sentence in the FRG's "illustrative" text; and
- It is most important that we make, and convince EURATOM we are making, a real effort to obtain the best negotiable language from their point of view in order to make it as easy as possible for them to accept the treaty.

The principal arguments (by ACDA and others) for accepting the Soviet first sentence are:

- The new Article III with the revised Soviet first sentence still protects the Five Principles set forth by EURATOM;
- Even with the Soviet language, the new Article III goes considerably beyond the language we committed ourselves to seek in our aide memoire to NATO countries last month, or that anyone except the Germans asked us to attempt to negotiate;

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-3-

- Since both the US and Soviet texts are ambiguous as to the exact relationship between IAEA and EURATOM, the actual relationship will have to be negotiated subsequently between EURATOM and IAEA. In this connection, our interpretation of the meaning of Article III, which the Soviets have apparently agreed not to challenge, will be more critical than the actual wording of Article III in determining the meaning of the treaty.

- Appearing to give special consideration to EURATOM in connection with IAEA will present problems in dealing with such countries as Japan and India who will consider it discriminatory against them.

- It is in our interest as well as the Soviets' interest to move as quickly as possible in order to have a completed draft to present to the UNGA and it is not clear how much time will be lost in this largely semantic debate.

As you know, after carefully considering the pros and cons of accepting the Soviet counter-proposal, Secretary Rusk decided to stand on our present wording and communicated this decision to Gromyko. In his initial response to Rusk's message (see attached), Gromyko took a very negative view of the proposal and appeared to move back from Roshchin's offer. Whether this is simply the natural response of a tough negotiator or an indication that the Soviets are prepared to wait us out on this remains to be seen.

For my own part, I believe we should probably have accepted the Soviet proposal since I am seriously concerned about the effects of further delay on the prospects of the NPT and do not believe that the value of our sentence on the acceptability of the treaty to the Germans is nearly so great as some would argue. At the same time, I recognize the force of the contrary point of view and believe that, were it not for the pressure of time, there is no question that the proper negotiating tactic would be to stand on our present language.

Now that we have accepted whatever risks there are in delay, I believe that our present negotiating tactic will still probably result in early agreement with the Soviets on Article III. Since the Soviets have indicated their willingness to accept as much of our language

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-4-

on Article III as they have, I believe that there is a reasonable chance that they will accept our first sentence as well, in order to achieve early agreement. If, on the other hand, they decide to dig in on this issue, I believe that, when it becomes apparent that this sentence is the only remaining difference in the treaty, pressure will build up within NATO and EURATOM itself for us to accept the Soviet language. Then, if we wish to reconsider our position, we can be responsive to our allies and at the same time take full credit with the Germans for having made a valiant effort on their behalf to achieve the specific language they recommended.

Spurgeon
Spurgeon Keeny

Attachment:
MOSCOW 1775 dtd 11/13/67

cc: ERFried/RHULLmann

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① Keenny
② Fried

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 01775 131749Z

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6603

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 1775

EXDIS

FOR SECRETARY

SUBJ: NPT

REF: STATE 68054

1. I CALLED ON GROMYKO 3 PM TODAY AND DELIVERED YOUR ORAL MESSAGE PER REFTEL.

2. GROMYKO SAID HE FULLY CONVERSANT WITH ALL PROPOSALS AND

PAGE 2 RUEHCR 1775FD ~~SECRET~~
SUGGESTIONS, BUT DID NOT RPT NOT MENTION ROSHCIN'S NOV 9 PROPOSAL FOR REVISION FIRST SENTENCE. THIS MAY MEAN THAT MOSCOW UNWILLING GO EVEN AS FAR AS ITS DELEGATION'S SUGGESTED "COMPROMISE".

3. GROMYKO SAID THAT WHILE SOVIETS WOULD IN A FEW DAYS PRESENT THEIR VIEWS ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF PROBLEM, HE WANTED ME TRANSMIT TO YOU HIS VIEWS ON WHAT HE CALLED MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION OF VERIFICATION. REPEATING SOVIET ARGUMENT THAT SOME EURATOM MEMBERS, IN PARTICULAR FRG, SEEKING SELF-INSPECTION RATHER THAN "HONEST" INTERNATIONAL CONTROL BY IAEA, GROMYKO ACCUSED THEM OF

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NIJ 94-342
By ms, NARA, Date 12-6-94

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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 01775 131749Z

NOW ATTEMPTING TO BLACKMAIL USSR. HOWEVER, SUCH ATTEMPTS FUTILE AS USSR HAS NO INTENTION TO SUCCUMB. USSR DOES NOT LIKE VERIFICATION "EN FEMILLE" AND THEREFORE POSITION THOSE EURATOM MEMBERS UNACCEPTABLE. SOVIET VIEW IS THAT BOTH US AND USSR SHOULD DO EVERYTHING TO BRING ABOUT AGREEMENT ON BASIS OF WHAT HAS BEEN AGREED BETWEEN US. IT DIFFICULT BELIEVE US CANNOT CONVINCE SOME OF ITS ALLIES THAT THEY SHOULD NOT OBSTRUCT NPT, JEOPARDIZE THIS GREAT UNDERTAKING, AND THUSISK CONSEQUENCES ENSUING THEREFROM.

4. I POINTED OUT THAT EVEN IF ONE CHOSE TO CALL EURATOM

PAGE 3 RUEHCR 1775FD ~~SECRET~~

ARRANGEMENTS SELF-INSPECTION, EFFECTIVENESS SUCH INSPECTION WOULD BE VERIFIED BY IAEA. MOREOVER, EURATOM MEMBERS THEMSELVES WOULD WANTBE SURE THAT THERE ARE NO LOOPHOLES. THIS SHOULD TAKE CARE OF ANY WORRY SOVIETS MIGHT HAVE ABOUT FRG.

5. WHEN I EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT SOVIETS, WHO WERE EARLIER PREPARED HAVE NO INSPECTION AT ALL, SHOULD NOT TAKE SUCH ADAMANT POSITION ON ISSUE AND THUS RISK BREAKDOWN NEGOTIATIONS, GROMYKO ASSERTED SOVIET FAILURE RAISE VERIFICATION ISSUE INITIALLY DID NOT MEAN THEY DID NOT INTEND BRING IT UP AT ALL. GROMYKO SAID HE DID NOT WISH DISCUSS WHETHER OR NOT EURATOM SAFEGUARDS EFFECTIVE. AS A MATTER OF PRINIPLE, USSR OPPOSES SELF-INSPECTION. IF EURATOM WISHED CONTINUE OWN SAFEGUARDS IN ADDITION TO THOSE BY IAEA, SOVIETS WOULD NOT OBJECT. IN ANY EVENT, IAEA VERIFICATION EURATOM SAFEGUARDS WOULD INVOLVE MERELY CHECKING PAPERS, AND ARRANGEMENT US HAD REGARDED AS UNSATISFACTORY IN CONTEXT PROPOSALS FOR REDUCTION MILITARY BUDGETS.

6. I POINTED OUT THAT SOVIET-PROPOSED ARRANGEMENTS FOR VERIFICATION REDUCTION MILITARY EXPENDITURES WOULD MEAN INSPECTION

PAGE 4 RUEHCR 1775FD ~~SECRET~~

BY A COUNTRY OF ITSELF, WHEREAS NPT ARRANGEMENT WOULD INVOLVE NOT ONLY SEVERAL COUNTRIES INSPECTING ONE ANOTHR BUT ALSO IAEA. I ALSO NOTED THAT NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES WERE PARTICULARLY RESENTFUL

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PAGE 03 MOSCOW 01775 131749Z

OF FACT SAFEGUARDS WOULD BE APPLICABLE ONLY TTO THEM; THIS CONNECTION, I OBSERVED US HAD INDICATED WILLINGNESS ACCEPT SAFEGUARDS. AS TO MY REMARK THAT SOVIETS HAD BEEN WILLING DROP VERIFICATION, IT DID NOT MEAN THAT US WOULD BE WILLING DO SO. HOWEVER, I RECALLED THAT SOVIETS HAD SPECIFICALLY SAID THEY WOULD BE PREPARED ACCEPT TREATY WITHOUT CONTROL ARTICLE.

7. GROMYKO CONCLUDED BY STATING OUR POSITION COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED EVEN IF ONE TOOK MOST LIBERAL ATTITUDE. USSR NOT MEMBER EURATOM AND EURATOM WANTS EXCLUDE USSR FROM VERIFICATION. EURATOM SHOULD UNDERSTAND TREATY SHOULD BE BASEDN COMPROMISE. USSR ALREADY MADE CONCESSIONS RE BASIC ARTICLES I AND II. HE WANTED ME INFORM YOU OF SOVIET VIEW THAT VERIFICATION SHOULD BE EFFECTIVE AND THAT ANY DOUBTS ON THIS SCORE WOULD ONLY UNDERMINE ANY TREATY. HE COMMENTED GOOD PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE OVER PAST SEVERAL MONTHS; IN FACT HE HAD THOUGHT AGREEMENT ON VERIFICATION ALSO NEAR, AND WAS SURPRISED THIS NOT SO, PERHAPS AS RESULT INTERVENTION SOME "WISE MEN" IN

PAGE 5 RUEHCR 1775FD ~~SECRET~~

BONN OR ELSEWHERE. FINALLY, HE SAID SOVIETS STUDYING "OBJECTIVELY" NUCLEAR FUEL ASPECT BUT HE NOT PERPARED SPEAK ON IT NOW.

8. I SAID I WOULD OF COURSE REPORT HIS VIEWS TO YOU, BUT OBSERVED YOU WOULD CERTAINLY BE DISAPPOINTED.

9. DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS DESIRED.

GP-3. THOMPSON

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~~EXDIS~~

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This document consists of 2 pages. Number 4 of 9 copies. Series A.

~~SECRET~~

110
~~1. Foster~~ NPT
2. Keating
3. R.L.

November 14, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

Following the "green light" given by NAC on October 31 to the US to resume negotiations with the Soviet Co-Chairman on Article III of the NPT, a new Article III was submitted to the Soviets on November 2. This new draft is designed to protect to the maximum extent possible the 5 Principles of the Euratom "Five".

After his return to Geneva Mr. Foster met with Ambassador Roshchin and strongly urged Soviet acceptance of the November 2 draft.

At a later Co-Chairmen's meeting on November 9, Roshchin said that if it were impossible for the US to reconsider its approach he would recommend to Moscow the US November 2 draft provided that the first sentence could be revised (see Enclosure). This revision would state that "safeguards" required by the treaty, rather than the conclusion of an IAEA "agreement" setting forth such safeguards, would have to be "in accordance with the IAEA Statute and safeguards system". In other significant respects, the rest of the November 2 draft would remain unchanged.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-343
By ijg, NARA, Date 9-13-94

The President,
The White House.

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GROUP 1
Excluded from auto-
matic downgrading and
declassification.

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-2-

Mr. Foster said he would report, but could not recommend Roshchin's proposal to Washington.

Ambassador Thompson saw Gromyko on instructions on November 13 and urged Soviet reconsideration of the US November 2 draft, pointing out that the NPT should have as many adherents as possible and that in our view the November 2 draft might command the support of non-nuclear weapon states whose signatures are essential to the success of the NPT. Gromyko indicated he was familiar with the problem, but said the Soviets could not accept a safeguards article which would amount in the Soviet view to self-inspection by Euratom.

At the NAC meeting today there was only a preliminary discussion of the above developments, since delegations were uninstructed. However, in his summation Brosio repeated his formula of October 31 about the US having a "green light" to continue negotiations with the Soviets.

Faithfully yours,

Signed

Herbert Scoville, Jr.

Herbert Scoville, Jr.
Acting Director

Enclosure:

US Draft Article III,
November 2, 1967

cc: The Secretary of State

ACDA/IR:CGleysteen
ACDA/GC:GBunn
ACDA/ST:HScoville

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STATE DEPT. OFFICE
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U.S. Article III of November 2, 1967
with Soviet rearrangement of first sentence
suggested on November 9, 1967

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, in accordance with the statute of the IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system,^{1/} as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or

^{1/} In the November 2 U.S. text, the underlined phrase followed the "concluded with the IAEA" and preceded the phrase beginning "for the exclusive purpose of ...". The Soviet suggested deletion of "negotiated and" is not regarded as significant.

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-2-

technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the IAEA to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the statute of the IAEA. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-342
By 110, NARA, Date 12-6-94

PAGE 01 BONN 04957 081614Z

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ACTION EUR 20

INFO IO 15, SSO 00, NSCE 00, NSAE 00, CCO 00, USIE 00, ACDA 17, AEC 11,
NASA 04, SCI 05, P 04, INR 07, CIA 04, SP 02, SS 20, GPM 03, SC 01,
NSC 10, RSC 01, L 03, H 02, OST 01, RSR 01, DOD 01, NEA 15, /147 W

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FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHCC IMMEDIATE 5878
AMEMBASSY PARIS 2330
AMEMBASSY LONDON 1536
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 999
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 577
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 202
INFO USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 554
USMISSION NATO 86
USUN NEW YORK 115

~~SECRET~~ BONN 4957

BUSEC/DISTO/IAEA

SUBJ: NPT

REF: BONN'S 4900, PARIS' 6210

1. IN OUR DISCUSSION YESTERDAY WITH AMB SCHNIPPENKOEETTER (FONOFF DISARMAMENT REP), REPORTED IN REPTEL, WE MADE AN EFFORT TO GET TO BOTTOM OF THE GERMAN CONCERN OVER ARTICLE III OF NPT. WE HEARD MANY

PAGE 2 RUFHOL 4957 ~~SECRET~~
FAMILIAR ARGUMENTS WHICH, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS I BELIEVE, AMOUNTED

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 BONN 04957 081614Z

ONLY TO WORDS-- PARTICULARLY THOSE INVOLVING THE WORD "DISCRIMINATION".

SCHNIPPENKOETTER'S ARGUMENT RAN--EURATOM IS BASED ON NON-DISCRIMINATION.

ANY DISCRIMINATION INTRODUCED THROUGH ARTICLE III IN FAVOR EITHER OF FRANCE OR RUSSIA WOULD CHANGE THIS BASIS. IN ANSWER TO MY QUERIES SEEKING TO DETERMINE WHAT DISCRIMINATION WOULD INVOLVE IN PRACTICAL TERMS-- THE ARGUMENT WAS USED THAT SUBJECTING EURATOM NUCLEAR INDUSTRY TO "DOUBLE CONTROLS", WOULD FORCE IT TO GO WHERE THERE IS LESS CONTROL, I.E., FRANCE WHERE THERE WILL BE ONLY EURATOM-- OR POSSIBLY SOME DAY NO CONTROL. IT WOULD INCREASE THE DANGER OF INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE AND THE COST OF INSPECTION.

2. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION SCHNIPPENKOETTER FINALLY ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT THESE ARGUMENTS WERE NOT VALID AND THAT THE REAL GERMAN CONCERN WAS POLITICAL, I.E. WOULD A EURATOM-IAEA AGREEMENT PROVIDE A JUSTIFICATION FOR FRANCE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE EURATOM TREATY? SCHNIPPENKOETTER SEEMED TO BE DEEPLY TROUBLED BY A FEAR OF THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF A FRENCH WITHDRAWAL FROM EURATOM--AS AN INTERGRATED EUROPEAN ENDEAVOR. PERHAPS UNSAID WAS ALSO THE FEAR THAT FRANCE WOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS SITUATION AND DO THINGS WHICH GERMANY, HAVING SUBJECTED HERSELF TO IAEA AS WELL AS EURATOM CONTROLS

PAGE 3 RUFHOL 4957 ~~SECRET~~

COULD NOT DO. EURATOM COULD PUT UP WITH A DISCRIMINATION IMPOSED BY THE FRENCH THEMSELVES, BUT IT COULD NOT PUT UP WITH ANY NEW DISCRIMINATION IMPOSED BY NPT, I.E. PRESUMABLY GIVING FRANCE FREEDOM FROM IAEA CONTROLS WHILE SUBJECTING THE OTHER FIVE TO THEM.

3. ONE OF SCHNIPPENKOETTER'S GREATEST FEARS WAS THE PRESENT AMBIGUITY IN THE POSITION OF FRANCE. HE DID NOT CONSIDER FRENCH SILENCE IN LUXEMBOURG ON OCT. 24 OR IN BRUSSELS AT THE NAC MEETING ON OCT 31 AS ASSURANCE OF FRENCH APPROVAL OF AN ARTICLE III BASED ON THE 5 PRINCIPLES. THIS APPEARS TO BE CONFIRMED BY PARIS'S REFTEL OF NOV. 7 IN WHICH COUVE IS REPORTED BY AMB BOHLEN AS REFUSING TO MAKE ANY COMMITMENT REGARDING FRANCE'S DECISION, ON THE EURATOM-IAEA RELATIONSHIP PRIOR TO THEIR HAVING AN AGREED TEXT. ACCORDING

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 BONN 04957 081614Z

TO SCHNIPPENKOETTER, THIS MEANS THAT THE FIVE WILL HAVE NO ASSURANCE BEFORE COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO NPT, THAT FRANCE WILL NOT DECLARE IT IN VIOLATION OF THE EURATOM TREATY AND USE IT AS AN EXCUSE TO BREAK UP EURATOM.

4. ONE EXPLANATION FOR THE GERMAN SENSITIVITY ON THIS POINT MAY BE THE INCREASING CONCERN OVER THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH FRANCE, RECENTLY DESCRIBED IN BONN'S 4851 AND COMPANION AIRGRAM OF NOV. 3. ALTERNATIVELY, OR AS A COROLLARY, IT MAY BE THE FEAR THAT FRANCE,

0-83 4 RUFHOL ~~SECRET~~

HAVING ACHIEVED ITS OWN MILITARY NUCLEAR CAPABILITY WHICH GERMANY CANNOT HOPE FOR WILL, IN ADDITION, BE FREED FROM CONTROL IN THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR FIELD. THIS THE GERMANS MIGHT REASON WOULD GIVE FRANCE ANOTHER ADVANTAGE VIS-A-VIS GERMANY AND THE OTHER NON-NUCLEAR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, BOTH IN FUTURE COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY AND AS A BASIS OF PRESTIGE AND INDEPENDENCE OF POLITICAL ACTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING.

COMMENT:

WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN EMBASSY PARIS'S COMMENTS ON OUR ANALYSIS OF THE GERMAN CONCERN ABOUT THE FRENCH POSITION ON NPT. DOES EMBASSY PARIS CONSIDER THIS CONCERN JUSTIFIED AS TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT FRANCE MIGHT UTILIZE AN NPT AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW FROM EURATOM? ARE THERE STEPS WHICH THE US MIGHT TAKE TO DISSUADE THE FRENCH FROM SO DOING, E.G. A CLEAR STATEMENT TO COUVE THAT THE SUPPLY OF US FUEL WILL REMAIN DEPENDENT ON ACCEPTANCE OF EITHER EURATOM SAFEGUARDS OR OTHER SAFEGUARDS ACCEPTABLE TO IAEA? IS THERE ANY WAY AN EARLY CLARIFICATION OF THE FRENCH POSITION CAN BE INDUCED--WHICH, IF FAVORABLE, WOULD GREATLY ASSIST IN OBTAINING GERMAN APPROVAL TO NPT? MCGHEE

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

November 9, 1967

NOTE FOR MR. ROSTOW

Walt--

I think you will be interested in the attached cable reporting a McGhee-Schnippenkoetter discussion that illustrates the level of "confusion" of German thinking about Article III of the NPT.

Ambassador McGhee reports that Ambassador Schnippenkoetter's real concern is that the French would raise legalistic objections concerning a EURATOM-IAEA agreement as their justification for withdrawing from EURATOM. This argument, which is repeatedly made by the Germans, insists on ignoring the simple fact that this action on the part of France would probably deny France future US supplies of U-235 and plutonium on which the French peaceful atomic energy program is dependent.

France presently purchases its supplies of U-235 and plutonium for civilian purposes from us through EURATOM with the assurance that the supplies will be subject to EURATOM safeguards. Quite aside from the question of the NPT, if France terminated its arrangements with EURATOM, existing contracts would terminate and future sales would depend on the negotiation of new bilateral arrangements between the US and France in which the French would be entirely dependent on our willingness to accommodate them. Moreover, a serious question would exist as to whether the French could retain the plutonium and U-235 that we have already sold to them. Partly at my insistence, the contract for the sale of plutonium that France now purchases from us through EURATOM was written in a form that gives us rights of recapture. The legal question as to our recapture rights on U-235 previously sold to France through EURATOM is not entirely clear.

McGhee was sent a special instruction to make this point clear when he delivered our aide memoire on Article III last month. From the attached cable, it appears that he missed a golden opportunity to get this point across to Schnippenkoetter and it is not entirely clear to me that McGhee understands the situation. I believe it is important that the Germans understand that we do not intend to make it easy for France

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-344

By cb, NARA, Date 6-1-95

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-2-

to withdraw from EURATOM and that the easiest way to do this is to tell the Germans. While I don't necessarily object to McGhee's suggestion that we also make this rather self-evident point to the French (although in that case it might appear to be something of a gratuitous threat to the French since they have given no indication that they are in fact considering withdrawing from EURATOM), I don't think that discussions with the French would be a substitute for discussing this simple point directly with the Germans. I have suggested to EUR (and I think they agree) that in answer to McGhee's request for comments they suggest he clear up this particular point with Schnippenkoetter.

Spurgeon
Spurgeon Keeny

Att. :
BONN 4957 dtd 11/8

cc: ERFried/RHullman -w/att.
CEJohnson -w/att.

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INFORMATION

MPT
112

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, November 8, 1967
8:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

I prepared this note on the assumption that Sec. Rusk would wish to report on the Non-Proliferation Treaty at lunch today.

He feels that, despite some alarmist cables from Amb. McGhee, there is no reason to do so at the moment.

Nevertheless, you may wish to read this note as background.

W. W. Rostow

*Example attached at Tab A.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By SP/rg, NARA, Date 3/4/94

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-344
By cb, NARA, Date 6-1-95

112a

Tuesday, November 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Germany and the N. P. T.

This is a good time to get Secretary Rusk's appraisal of where we are going on the N. P. T. Last week we made good progress on Article III (the safeguards clause):

- The Euratom countries could not get together on their own Article III (only the Germans presented an "illustrative" draft) and contented themselves with giving us five "principles," which we probably can live with.
- We were able to hand to the Russians at Geneva on Thursday a revision of their own draft Article III incorporating much of the five Euratom principles, plus some key language from the German "illustration." Preliminary Russian reaction was reasonably forthcoming.

We still must be particularly careful with the Germans. There is a strong possibility that they will not ratify the N. P. T. even if (as seems likely) they grudgingly sign it. German adherence, however, is vital to the success of the Treaty. Yet we cannot afford to put so much pressure on them that we give nationalists an easy means of attacking Germany's U. S. ties. The political situation comes down to this:

- Attitudes among top German politicians and officials range from total hostility, represented by people like Strauss and the right-wing press, to grudging acceptance, represented by Kiesinger and Brandt.
- The basic German dissatisfaction with the Treaty makes it easier for people like Strauss to propagate the view that the N. P. T. represents a U. S. -Soviet "deal" made behind Germany's back at her expense.
- The N. P. T. is not yet a big public issue; so far the issues it presents have been too complex to capture popular attention. We

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can be grateful, in fact, that opposition has focussed on Article III, perhaps the most complicated aspect of the Treaty, rather than on basic principles. Nevertheless, the danger we face is that someone like Strauss will try to blow the Treaty up into a nationalist issue.

We do not yet know how the Russians will finally react to our revised Article III. If they insist on their original formulation we will face a dilemma:

- We must push the Russians hard to meet German concerns regarding Article III. Not to do so would give the Germans an excuse for rejecting the Treaty, and would seriously damage our relations with them. (We can ease things some by close and high-level consultations.)
- On the other hand, an impasse with the Russians now would probably make it impossible to put a draft Treaty before this year's UN General Assembly and thus could delay the Treaty for as much as a year, if not kill it altogether.

You will want to get Secretary Rusk's assessment of these risks.

W. W. Rostow

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Type for the President
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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-342
By 118, NARA, Date 12-6-94

PAGE 01 BONN 04773 01 OF 02 022014Z

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ACTION

INFO EUR 20, IO 15, ACDA 17, GPM 03, SC 01, RSC 01, USIA 12, H 02, NSC 10,
L 03, INR 07, P 04, CIA 04, DOD 01, SP 02, SS 20, NSAE 00, RSR 01, SCI 05,
SAH 03, AEC 11, NASA 04, OST 01, EA 15, SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, /162 W

O P 021803Z NOM 67 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5812
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 971
AMEMBASSY PARIS 2292
AMEMBASSY LONDON 1905
USMISSION GENEVA 546
USMISSION NATO 063
AMEMBASSY ROME 716
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 562
AMCONSUL HAMBURG 563

~~SECRET~~

Keeny
Rostow
Another storm warning

Text of cable from Amb. McChes (G)

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BONN 4773

BUSEC/DISTO

SUBJ: POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE NPT

Non proliferation Treaty

BICS

1. I HAVE JUST LEARNED THAT ON OCTOBER 31, THE DAY OF THE

NATO Advisory Committee

PAGE 2 RUFHOL 4773/1 ~~SECRET~~

NAC MEETING, CHANCELLOR KIESINGER SUMMONED AMBASSADOR
SCHNIPPENKOETTER FOR A LENGTHY DISCUSSION BECAUSE OF HIS
DEEP CONCERN OVER THE NPT. THE CHANCELLOR WAS EVIDENTLY
DISTURBED THAT THE FRG AGREEMENT TO GO ALONG WITH EURATOM'S
FIVE PRINCIPLES WITHOUT INSISTING ON SPECIFIC LANGUAGE MAY

West German

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PAGE 02 BONN 04773 01 OF 02 022014Z

Christian Democrats

HAVE CONSTITUTED A DANGEROUS CONCESSION. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT SCIENCE MINISTER STOLTENBERG AND OTHER CDU ELEMENTS SO ADVISED HIM. IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT JUST AFTER THE EURATOM MINISTERIAL DECISION STOLTENBERG HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE IN WHICH HE LAID DOWN VERY STRICT REQUIREMENTS FOR AN ACCEPTABLE ARTICLE III (~~BONN 4716~~) AND, IN EFFECT, REJECTED A RESERVATIONS PROCEDURE. WE ARE TOLD THAT SCHNIPPENKOETTER PERSUADED THE CHANCELLOR ONLY WITH THE GREATEST DIFFICULTY TO GO ALONG WITH THE CONOFF'S AGREEMENT TO PERMIT THE US TO PROCEED TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVS ON THE BASIS OF THE FIVE PRINCIPLES.

2. I BELIEVE THE CHANCELLOR'S CONCERN IS SYMPTOMATIC OF

PAGE 3 RUFHOL 4773/1 ~~SECRET~~

THE SITUATION WE NOW FACE LOCALLY. I AM THEREFORE SETTING OUT BELOW SOME OF THE GERMAN DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS WHICH LEAD ME TO CONCLUDE THAT UNLESS WE NOW PROCEED WITH GREAT CAUTION IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVS AND INSURE THAT BASIC GERMAN INTERESTS AND CONCERNS ARE MET, THE NPT CAN CONSTITUTE A SERIOUS THREAT TO US-FRG RELATIONS AND THE FUTURE POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF THE FRG, MUCH MORE SERIOUS, FOR EXAMPLE THAN THE EFFECTS OF THE OFFSET ISSUE.

3. AMONG GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NPT THERE EXIST VARIOUS LEVELS OF SOPHISTICATION. REGARDLESS OF THEIR DEGREE OF UNDERSTANDING, HOWEVER, ALL VOCAL ELEMENTS OPPOSE THE TREATY IN ITS PRESENT FORM. A GENERAL IMPRESSION HAS TAKEN ROOT THAT: (A) THE TREATY SYMBOLIZES AN UNWRITTEN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE US AND USSR, WHEREIN WE SEEK A POLITICAL QUID PRO QUO FROM THE SOVIETS AT GERMANY'S EXPENSE; (B) AN NPT WILL RESULT IN SERIOUS HANDICAPS FOR GERMAN NUCLEAR RESEARCH AND COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITIES AND (C) IT WILL RESULT IN A SETBACK FOR THE EUROPEAN MOVEMENT. EVEN THOSE WHO AGREE THAT PROLIFERATION

PAGE 4 RUFHOL 4773/1 ~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 03 BONN 04773 01 OF 02 022014Z

IS DANGEROUS AND SHOULD BE AVOIDED, DOUBT THAT THE PROPOSED TREATY WILL BE EFFECTIVE IN PREVENTING IT. NO LEADING POLITICIAN HAS PUBLICLY ADVOCATED THAT THE FRG SHOULD SIGN THE TREATY IN ITS PRESENT FORM.

4. THE ARGUMENT THAT SIGNATURE OF THE NPT IS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO ADVANCE THE GOVERNMENT'S NEW POLICY TOWARD THE EAST, ALTHOUGH PROBABLY PERSUASIVE TO SOME MEMBERS IN THE SPD INCLUDING BRANDT, DOES NOT OPERATE EFFECTIVELY ON THE CDU/CSU, WHICH HAS MISGIVINGS ABOUT CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE EASTERN POLICY IN ANY EVENT. THE TWO POWERFUL OFTEN OPPOSING WINGS OF THE PARTY, HEADED BY STRAUSS AND SCHROEDER REPRESENTING RESPECTIVELY THE FORMER GAULLISTS AND THE ATLANTICISTS, -- AGREE IN REJECTING THE NPT, AND BOTH HAVE MISGIVINGS CONCERNING THE NEW EASTERN POLICY, AT LEAST ITS ALL-GERMAN ASPECT. STRAUSS AND HIS FOLLOWERS FEAR THAT THE TREATY WOULD PRECLUDE THE CREATION OF A EUROPEAN NUCLEAR FORCE WHICH THEY CONSIDER A NECESSARY STEP TOWARD EUROPEAN UNITY. SCHROEDER'S GROUP PROBABLY CONCLUDES THAT AN NPT WOULD RESULT IN A WEAKENING OF ATLANTIC TIES THROUGH SHARPER DELINEATION

PAGE 5 RUFHOL 4773/1 ~~SECRET~~
BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR STATES.

5. AS THE EMBASSY'S REPORTING INDICATES, THE GERMAN PRESS RANGES FROM SKEPTICISM TO OUTRIGHT HOSTILITY TO THE TREATY -- WITH THE LATTER ATTITUDE PREDOMINATING. THE SPRINGER PRESS, WHICH ALONE AMONG THE MAJOR PUBLIC GERMAN MEDIA HAS SUPPORTED OUR POLICY IN VIET NAM, IS AMONG THE MOST OUTSPOKEN IN ITS OPPOSITION TO THE NPT. THERE ARE THROUGHOUT THE PRESS DIRE WARNINGS OF A MAJOR BREACH IN CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE US AND GERMANY OVER THE NPT.

6. SPRINGER'S INFLUENTIAL DIE WELT ON OCTOBER 31, 1967 (BONN'S 4715) STATED: ... "WHETHER OR NOT THE NPT COMES INTO BEING, IT HAS ALREADY FULFILLED ITS MAIN PURPOSE FOR THE RUSSIANS, NAMELY TO ACCELERATE THE EROSION OF EUROPEAN CONFIDENCE IN THE USA. THAT CONFIDENCE COULD

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PAGE 04 BONN 04773 01 OF 02 022014Z

NOT BE FULLY RESTORED EVEN BY A FAILURE OF THE TREATY, AFTER AMERICA HAD BEEN READY IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE KREMLIN, TO SUBJECT THE DEFENSE SYSTEMS OF ITS ALLIES TO A KIND OF DISCRIMINATION WHICH HAS NO PRECEDENT IN

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PAGE 01 BONN 04773 02 OF 02 021946Z

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ACTION ACDA 17

INFO EUR 20, IO 15, GPM 03, SC 01, RSC 01, USIA 12, H 02, NSC 10, L 03, INR 07,
P 04, CIA 04, DOD 01, SP 02, SS 20, NSAE 00, RSR 01, SCI 05, SAH 03,
AEC 11, NASA 04, OST 01, EA 15, SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, /162 W

O P 021803Z NOV 67 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5313
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 972
AMEMBASSY PARIS 2293
AMEMBASSY LONDON 1906
USMISSION GENEVA 547
USMISSION NATO 064
AMEMBASSY ROME 717
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 563
AMCONSUL HAMBURG 564

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 BONN 4773

BUSEC/DISTO

SUBJ: POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE NPT

THE RELATIONS AMONG ALLIES. IT SEEMS THAT RANKING MEN IN

PAGE 2 RUFHOL 4773/2 ~~SECRET~~
WASHINGTON ARE STILL UNCLEAR ABOUT THE DEEPER CONSEQUENCES
OF THIS COURSE. MEANWHILE THEY OUGHT TO HAVE RECOGNIZED
THAT THEY CAN HAVE ONLY ONE THING: EITHER THE NPT OR AN
ATLANTIC POLICY..."

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PAGE 02 BONN 04773 02 OF 02 021946Z

7. REGARDLESS OF THE CHANCELLOR'S OWN FEELINGS ON THE NPT -- AND THEY HAVE NEVER REALLY BEEN VERY POSITIVE -- HE WILL HAVE TO PAY HEED TO THE SENTIMENT WITHIN HIS PARTY, WHICH WILL BE STRONGLY AGAINST A TREATY WHICH FAILS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT MAJOR GERMAN CONCERNS. THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY BIRRENBACH (~~BONN'S 4048~~), WHO IS THE LEADER OF HIS PARTY ON THIS ISSUE, ARE RESTRAINED IN COMPARISON WITH THE VIEWS OF THE CDU/CSU RANK-AND-FILE. THE FEAR OF GERMANY'S BEING ISOLATED ON THIS ISSUE IS SHARED BY BOTH MEMBERS OF THE COALITION, AND MAY IN THE END PROVE TO BE CONTROLLING REASON WHY THE FRG WILL ADHERE TO THE NPT. I WOULD CONSIDER IT MOST DANGEROUS, HOWEVER, IF WE TRIED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ~~THE~~ FRG'S APPARENT ISOLATION IN EURATOM. THE EFFECT ON ~~THE~~ FRG'S RELATIONS WITH THE US AND ON ITS FUTURE ORIENTATION, IF

PAGE 3 RUFHOL 4773/2 ~~SECRET~~

IT WERE FORCED BY A WORLD OPINION WE HAVE GENERATED TO SIGN A TREATY WHICH THEY FEEL DOES NOT PROTECT BASIC GERMAN INTERESTS WOULD, I BELIEVE, BE VERY DANGEROUS. IF IT IS TO SIGN, THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT REQUIRES A TREATY WHICH IT CAN DEFEND PUBLICLY. THIS CAN BEST BE ACCOMPLISHED BY RELYING, TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE, ON THE DRAFT LANGUAGE PROPOSED BY ~~THE~~ FRG. IT IS OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT WE DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO COUNTER THE PRESENT DEEP CONCERNS IN GERMANY OVER THE NPT, THROUGH CAREFUL HANDLING OF THE NEXT STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS -- IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 20, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ~~R~~OSTOW

Attached are some papers sent over by State as background for your meeting with German Science Minister Stoltenberg at 10:00 am tomorrow. As previously arranged, Mr. Ullman and I will also be present. Given Stoltenberg's interest in the NPT, perhaps you should also invite Mr. Keeny.


Edward R. Fried



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 19, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Unclassified upon removal of attachments)

MEMORANDUM TO:

Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger,
National Security Council,
Executive Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

In reference to the appointment between German Science Minister Stoltenberg and Mr. Rostow at 10:00 A.M., September 21st, attached please find a copy of the briefing memorandum prepared for Under Secretary Katzenbach.

Minister Stoltenberg will be accompanied by Minister Georg von Lilienfeld of the German Embassy, Mr. Harry Obst of the Department of State Language Services, and Mr. Edwin Crowley, State Department German Affairs.

Oswald H. Ganley

Oswald H. Ganley
Chief, Technology Division
Office of General Scientific Affairs
International Scientific and Technological Affairs

Attachment:
Katzenbach memorandum and 3
attachments
TAB A - Biographic Data
TAB B - NPT Paper
TAB C - General Background Paper

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Unclassified upon removal of attachments)



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

113-b

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: The Under Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: SCI - J. W. Joyce

SUBJECT: Your Appointment with German Science Minister
Gerhard Stoltenberg - BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-342
By ijp, NARA, Date 12-6-94

You are meeting with Minister Stoltenberg at 11:00 A.M. September 18. The Minister is in Washington for two days of a long-planned visit for exchange of views with high level officials of the government. In addition to yourself he will see in the Department Dr. Joyce and Mr. Leddy; Walt Rostow, AEC Chairman Seaborg and NASA Administrator Webb. A biographical sketch of the Minister is attached (TAB A). Stoltenberg at 38 is the youngest member of the Cabinet (CDU) and he is considered to have considerable influence in the Cabinet as evidenced by an increase in the Science budget, particularly for Space Research at a time of general budgetary cuts. He has been mentioned as a potential successor to Schroder as Minister of Defense.

Minister Stoltenberg will be accompanied by Mr. Knoerich his personal assistant, and by Minister von Lillienfeld (Chargé) and Mr. W. Opfermann, Scientific Attache, German Embassy, Washington. Whether others of Dr. Stoltenberg's party will wish to accompany him is not known. Department officers to be present are Dr. Joyce, Acting Director, SCI; Mr. Edwin Crowley, Acting Country Director, German Affairs; and Mr. Culver Gleysteen, Deputy Assistant Director International Relations Bureau, ACDA.

Issues

Minister Stoltenberg has indicated that he wishes to discuss with you the following two topics.

- I. Present Status of NPT Negotiations
- II. U.S. German Cooperation in Scientific Research

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I. NPT Recommended Position

1. The attached paper (TAB B) discusses the present U.S. position on the NPT and particularly the question of the Soviet Compromise Article III proposal on safeguards which is of special interest to Minister Stoltenberg.

2. As a member of the European communities and through its own national program the FRG is deeply involved in the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy. Over the past ten years, the U.S. and the FRG have developed close collaboration in several areas of research and development in the nuclear field. This is expected to continue. During the course of consultation with FRG on the NPT, the Germans sought firm assurances on future supplies of nuclear fuel for peaceful uses. To meet this desire, Secretary Rusk wrote a letter to Brandt with as broad an assurance as was possible. This appears to have satisfied the immediate FRG concern. We are now seeking legislation to authorize an increase in the ceilings for the supply of plutonium and enriched uranium provided in the EURATOM Cooperation Act.

3. On August 24, 1967 the German Embassy raised with Mr. Leddy in an informal way the question of permanent representation of Germany on the IAEA Board of Governors. You could tell Stoltenberg, if he raises the issue, that the Germans appear to have several valid reasons for desiring a permanent seat, but the problem is a complicated one. We are still studying the first two alternatives suggested by the FRG, both of which involve amending the IAEA Statute, and have reached no conclusion as yet. As for the third alternative--Germany to rotate successively in three Board of Governor seats occupied by Western Europeans--it would seem necessary for the FRG to obtain the acquiescence of the countries directly involved.

Because of U.S. adherence to the principle of area choice in IAEA Board designations, we cannot undertake to sponsor the FRG candidacy among these European states. However, if these countries agree to include the FRG in their rotation arrangement, we would certainly support their choice.

II. US - FRG Scientific Cooperation

We believe the Germans are generally satisfied with the number and quality of cooperative research programs, but Minister Stoltenberg may possibly raise with you the question of a

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- 3 -

US - FRG bilateral research cooperative agreement similar to the one we recently signed with the Italians.

Recommended Position

We have active fruitful cooperative programs with the FRG which are of mutual advantage and meet the present needs of both countries. (TAB C) You can assure the Germans that any specific proposal for cooperation in the scientific field will be given most careful consideration.

Concurrences:

EUR/GER - Mr. Crowley EUR - Mr. Stoessel ACDA - Mr. Stillman

Attachments:

Tab A - Biographic Data
Tab B - NPT Paper
Tab C - General Background Paper

SCI:OHGanley:rms Ext. 4630 9/15/67

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113-c

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

STOLTENBERG, Gerhard (Gerd)

Federal Minister for Science

Dr. Gerhard Stoltenberg succeeded Hans Lenz of the FDP as Federal Minister for Science. At thirty-seven the youngest member of the present cabinet, Stoltenberg has been a CDU Bundestag deputy since 1957 and served briefly last year as Director of Economic Policy for Friedrich Krupp in Essen. Like Defense Minister von Hassel, Stoltenberg is a member of the CDU's Protestant wing, headed by Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder.

The son of a Lutheran clergyman, Stoltenberg was born on September 29, 1928, in Kiel. During 1952-53 he visited the United States on an exchange grant and spent some time at Harvard University. He was awarded his Dr. Phil. Habil. degree (qualifying him to teach at the university level) in 1960 and then became a lecturer (Dozent) on modern history at the University of Kiel.

Stoltenberg began his political career in 1947. With von Hassel's assistance, Stoltenberg was elected to the Bundestag from the Schleswig-Eckernfoerde district in 1957 and became a member of the Budget Committee and an alternate member of the Defense Committee and the Committee for All-German Affairs.

Although Stoltenberg has devoted himself primarily to party organizational work, he is reported to have a good understanding of foreign and domestic problems and has shown great interest in European integration. He has been cooperative in his dealings with U.S. officials and is described as genial, interesting, intelligent, and hard-working. Although not a "spellbinder", he is regarded as an effective public speaker. In addition to his 1952-53 trip to the United States, Stoltenberg visited this country for two weeks in September 1964 as a CDU observer of the U.S. elections.

A big man (about six feet two inches tall) with graying hair, Stoltenberg is married but no information is available on his family. He drinks Scotch and enjoys reading, music, sailing, and skiing. Stoltenberg has a very good knowledge of English.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-345

By CL, NARA, Date 8-23-94

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-342
By W.P., NARA, Date 1-9-95

VISIT OF MINISTER STOLTENBERG
SCIENCE MINISTER OF THE FRG

Non-Proliferation Treaty

An identical draft NPT was tabled by the US and USSR Co-Chairmen at Geneva on August 24. Article III covering safeguards was not included in this draft subject to further private discussions between the Co-Chairmen.

1. Safeguards Article

The Soviets have given us a compromise version of Article III which we feel represents substantial movement on their part toward permitting a role for EURATOM safeguards subject to IAEA verification -- a principle which we have asserted in our version which was approved in the NAC last April. We submitted this Article to the NAC on September 6. Discussion in NAC on September 13 indicated a desire of members to maintain and even increase momentum toward agreement on Article III although the Germans still have some reservations. No final NAC consensus is expected before September 20.

Ambassador Schnippenkoetter, FRG Foreign Office, discussed the Soviet Article III extensively with Mr. Foster in Geneva. The Article must now be considered by the German Defense Council and Cabinet before a position is taken -- hopefully within a week.

Schnippenkoetter informed Mr. Foster that the FRG would not take an independent stand because it is community-minded and consequently will not make a decision until the

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GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified

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- 2 -

question has been run through community institutions. (In NAC we are urging the Community Five to come to governmental positions as quickly as possible, without awaiting Commission review and judgment on the Soviet proposal.) During the NAC meeting of September 13, Ambassador Grewe did not express the position taken by Schnippenkoetter regarding awaiting EC action. As to the substance of the Soviet proposal, the latter said that although it indicates some movement toward compromise with their proposal they are still troubled that Soviet text does not indicate clear acceptance of concept of verification; that it does not expressly provide for Commission negotiating agreement with IAEA as agent for Five, and that the formulation is a step backward in the sense of calling for safeguarding facilities as well as nuclear materials.

When Rostow and Schaetzel saw EC Commissioner Rey on September 12, they were informed that the EC Commission would give immediate consideration to the compromise Article III. This is an indication that the new Commission may be more sympathetic to the NPT than the former Commission.

2. Amendments Procedure

Contrary to our expectations the Soviets have indicated a preference in the draft NPT to be tabled in the ENDC for the second of two alternative amendments clauses. It provides a veto for all parties having membership on the IAEA Board of Governors but binds all parties to the amendment whether or not they accepted it. We obtained a "green light" from the NAC on June 15 to table either this or the first amendments alternative, which would have given a veto only to the nuclear weapon parties but made amendments binding only on those accepting them. We then told the Soviets that although we prefer the first amendments procedure, we could accept the second. The FRG Foreign Office subsequently indicated that this second alternative was not acceptable to Germany.

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- 3 -

We believe that as a practical matter FRG interest in protecting itself against future amendments involving more extensive and unwanted obligations under the treaty will be equally served by this alternative. Both the U.S. and UK are permanent members of the IAEA Board; there are normally two or three members from Community nations (including the FRG on a rotational basis); and it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which all members of the Western Alliance would approve an NPT amendment to which Germany alone took exception. However, if wide-spread opposition to the present amendments clause develops in the ENDC we may need to re-examine our position.

The FRG has requested our support for permanent representation on the Board of Governors of the IAEA either by amendment of the statute or informal arrangement. Although this request was made before the NPT amendment procedure was tabled, the two matters are related. We are sympathetic to the German request, but we do not have much hope that this could be effected at this time since amendment of the statute would disrupt a delicate balance on the Board of Governors. We would have no objection, however, if the Germans are able to obtain agreement among other countries to permit them to occupy a rotating seat on a permanent basis.

3. Duration of the Treaty

The Chancellor has strong personal convictions that the NPT should be of limited duration (20-25 years) so that he will not be compelled to bind his country for the indefinite future. His central preoccupation concerns the possibility, however remote, that NATO and American security commitments may some day end, leaving the FRG to face a nuclear-armed USSR from a position of permanent inferiority. He also seems convinced that a limited-duration treaty would take the steam out of domestic opponents of the NPT. He does not accept the argument that a treaty of limited duration would result in a race for the bomb. He believes this would not happen if the period is long enough and if suitable rules are laid down.

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- 4 -

Secretary Rusk informed Foreign Minister Brandt at the time of the Chancellor's visit that, although we preferred a treaty of unlimited duration, we would consider a proposal for limiting duration if this is necessary to obtain widespread support for the treaty. The Secretary told Brandt that it was doubtful, however, if the Soviets would consider a duration period shorter than 20-25 years. When the subject of duration has arisen the Soviets have said, perhaps facetiously, they would not mind a duration of 1000 years.

4. Nuclear Fuel Supply

During the course of consultation with the FRG on the NPT, the Germans sought firm assurances on future supplies of nuclear fuel for peaceful uses. To meet this desire Secretary Rusk wrote a letter to Brandt with as broad an assurance as was possible. This appears to have satisfied the immediate FRG concern. In this connection, as desired by the FRG, we now are seeking legislation to authorize an increase in the ceilings for the supply of plutonium and enriched uranium provided in the EURATOM Cooperation Act.

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Drafted by: ACDA/IR:AMStillman
ACDA/IR:RHKranich

Cleared by: RPM - Mr. Baker
RPE - Mr. Biltchik
GER - Mr. Malin

September 14, 1967

113-e

VISIT OF MINISTER STOLTENBERG
SEPTEMBER 1967

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION

The Germans share general European concern with the so-called "technological gap". Concern with this "gap" led to the establishment of a study group under Dr. Hornig, the President's Science Advisor, whose report is due early in September. Multilateral activity on the "gap" is centered in the OECD, where a working party is examining the problem on an industry-by-industry basis to learn how technological advances are developed and what the factors are that determine when and where they are exploited. German views on the "gap" appear to be closer to those of the United States than are the views of a number of other European countries. The Germans realize that the solution of this problem lies at least partly in greater integration in Europe, better management, and better education.

As elsewhere in Europe, however, German concern over the technological gap affects attitudes toward investment by American companies. German concern is concentrated in specific areas, notably the computer field and aerospace industry. In the case of computers, the FRG is in the process of formulating a national plan for the promotion of home-grown computer development. The FRG has also recently announced an expanded program of space research; and in making recent budgetary decisions for the future, care was taken not to restrict outlays for scientific research.

We have an active and fruitful program of cooperation in the scientific and technological field with the Federal Republic, including frequent exchanges between high-level figures in the science fields. Dr. Hornig, while in Bonn in late June and early July, discussed a broad range of scientific subjects, including the "gap". In return, Stoltenberg, the FRG Minister of Scientific Research, will be in Washington in mid-September.

In addition to normal exchanges and cooperation between the American and German scientific communities, we are pursuing cooperation under President Johnson's offer to Chancellor Erhard in December, 1965, in the field of natural resources. As a part of that

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(DECONTROLLED after 12-31-71)

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program, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Weaver had hoped to head an urban planning group which will visit Germany in the autumn. (Congressional business has forced last minute cancellation of Secretary Weaver's plans.) We are also pursuing a modest program of cooperation in the space field in accordance with the President's 1965 offer.

The FRG has an ambitious program of development in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. Much of its success has been due to US-German bilateral cooperation. Our bilateral agreement, however, will expire in August and our cooperation with the FRG will be incorporated as a part of the US-EURATOM Agreement. We do not expect this arrangement to have any effect on the magnitude of our cooperation with the FRG.

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SCI:OHGanley:rms;EUR/GER:EDCrowley:ms
Sept 11, 1967 Ext 4630

Clearances: EUR/RPE - Mr. Rogers
EUR/GER - Mr. Puhan
EUR - Mr. Leddy

114

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJL 94-344
By cb, NARA, Date 6-1-95

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, September 5, 1967
12:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk may wish to raise at lunch today the question of the proposed Soviet compromise Article III.

We intend to lay it before the North Atlantic Council at a meeting tomorrow, Sept. 6.

Sec. Rusk may wish to take the occasion to outline the situation now surrounding the NPT and the likely time table of events.

W. W. Rostow

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WWRostow:rlh

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United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Washington

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September 5, 1967

TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM: Adrian S. Fisher, Acting Director
SUBJECT: Talking Points for your lunch with the President today.
Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty, Article III Proposal.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94 343
By ig, NARA, Date 9-13-94

The Soviets have proposed a compromise Article III dealing with safeguards which represents movement from their earlier position. The key to their suggested language is their willingness to have non-nuclear weapons states enter into safeguards agreements with the IAEA "either individually or together with other states as provided in the statute of the IAEA" and the statement that the "exclusive purpose" for which IAEA safeguards are to be accepted is "verification of the fulfillment of the obligations assumed under this treaty."

These two factors appear to indicate that the Soviets are prepared to permit arrangements under which IAEA could make use of the EURATOM system in performing the task of "verification" under such an Article. The Soviets also appear willing to have an Article III which permits the EURATOM countries to negotiate with IAEA through EURATOM.

The new Soviet article also contains a two-year implementation period after the treaty's entry into force within which agreements with IAEA could be negotiated.

We have told the Soviets that, while we are anxious to resolve the Article III problem before the non-proliferation treaty is discussed in the U. N. General Assembly we would now have to obtain the views of our allies on the Soviet compromise proposal. We now propose to discuss the matter at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council to be held tomorrow, September 6.

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

WASHINGTON

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September 5, 1967

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Typed for Pres

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E.O. 12336, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-343

By mg, NARA, Date 9-13-94

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

BACKGROUND PAPER ON NON-PROLIFERATION

It has been the policy of every American national Administration since the end of World War II to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

The Baruch plan in 1946 proposed an international authority to own or control all "dangerous" atomic materials from the mines to the finished products.

The first Western nontransfer measure was part of a package proposal submitted by Canada, France, the United States, and Britain to the five-nation subcommittee of the U. N. Disarmament Commission on August 29, 1957. It provided for a cutoff in the production of fissionable materials for weapons; following the cutoff each party would undertake "not to transfer out of its control any nuclear weapons, or to accept transfer to it of such weapons," except under arrangements which would assure their use only for defensive purposes.

On September 20, 1957, the Soviet Union proposed at the United Nations an agreement "not to allow the installation of any atomic military units or of any types of atomic or hydrogen weapons beyond their national frontiers and not to place these weapons at the disposal of any other states or commands of military blocs."

Beginning in 1958, Ireland sponsored a number of U. N. General Assembly resolutions to prevent further nuclear dissemination. The latest of these (the so-called "Irish Resolution," No. 1665, unanimously adopted by the U. N. General Assembly December 4, 1961) calls upon all states, particularly the nuclear powers, "to use their best endeavors to secure the conclusion of an international agreement containing provisions under which the nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons, and provisions under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire

control of such weapons."

Both the U.S. and the Soviet draft treaties on general and complete disarmament, tabled in the ENDC in 1962, contain provisions banning the dissemination of nuclear weapons by the nuclear powers and acquisition by other states.

In his message of January 21, 1964, to the Geneva Conference, President Johnson urged agreement on a series of measures designed to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. These included:

- An agreement prohibiting the transfer of nuclear weapons into the national control of states not now controlling them;
- The application of effective international safeguards to all transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes; and
- An undertaking by the major nuclear powers to accept international safeguards over their peaceful nuclear activities -- the same inspection they recommend for non-nuclear states.

The Soviet Union also proposed non-dissemination as a separate (pre-disarmament) measure. Non-dissemination was the sixth item in its nine-point memorandum presented to the ENDC on January 28, 1964.

On February 6, 1964, the United States representative told the ENDC that the United States would have private discussions with the Soviet Union in an effort to reach agreement on a declaration based on the Irish Resolution.

The Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, meeting in Cairo in October of 1964, issued a declaration which "underlines the great danger in the dissemination of nuclear weapons and urges all states, particularly those possessing nuclear weapons, to conclude non-dissemination agreements..."

The Government of India submitted a memorandum to the United Nations Secretary General on October 10, 1964, proposing "non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" as a supplementary agenda item for that year's session of the General Assembly. The memorandum called attention to the "urgency and importance of concluding an agreement."

On June 15, 1965, the U.N. Disarmament Commission (the full U.N. membership, meeting in New York) passed a resolution by an overwhelming vote (83-1 with 18 abstentions) urging, among other things, that the 18-Nation Committee reconvene without delay and give priority attention to a treaty or convention to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons.

In his July 27, 1965, message to the ENDC President Johnson instructed the American Delegation "to seek agreements that will limit the perilous spread of nuclear weapons and make it possible for all countries to refrain without fear from entering the nuclear arms race."

On August 17, 1965, the United States tabled its Draft Treaty to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. This document set out specific terms for an agreement for the first time. The United States amended this draft in March of 1966 in an attempt to clarify the language relating to control over nuclear weapons for allied defense arrangements. The Soviet Union presented its version of a draft non-proliferation treaty in the Twentieth United Nations General Assembly in September of 1965. This document was subsequently presented to the ENDC January 27, 1966.

The eight non-aligned members of the ENDC sponsored resolutions in the U.N. General Assembly sessions of 1965 and 1966 urging "all states to take all necessary steps for

the earliest conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty." Both resolutions were adopted overwhelmingly.

Intensive bilateral talks were begun between the United States and the Soviet Union following the adjournment of the ENDC in August of 1966, beginning with discussions between the ENDC Co-Chairmen. In October, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko met with President Johnson and with Secretary Rusk in Washington. Following these talks the ENDC Co-Chairmen renewed bilateral talks in New York.

In the General Assembly session in the fall of 1966, the Soviet Union sponsored a resolution calling for the renunciation by states of actions hampering the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The U.S. joined in co-sponsoring this resolution. It was adopted by the General Assembly with only one dissenting vote (Albania) and one abstention (Cuba).

By February 21, 1967, the date on which the ENDC reconvened, the United States and the Soviet Union had reached general agreement on the provisions of a new draft treaty. As the two principals moved closer to completion of a treaty, the non-nuclear-weapon states began to re-examine its implications for each of them in terms of basic political, security, and economic objectives. A variety of questions and hesitations arose, and intensive consultations took place in many capitals to reassure government officials of the non-nuclear-weapon states that the treaty would not be inimical to their interests.

In order that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union could consult their respective allies as well as non-aligned countries, the ENDC was recessed on March 23. On April 20, the North Atlantic Council approved the United States intention to resume discussions with the Soviet Union, based on draft formulations which had been worked out during consultations with our allies. The ENDC was reconvened on May 18, and talks have continued between the Co-Chairmen since that date.

The question of a non-proliferation treaty was discussed by President Johnson and Chairman Kosygin during their two-part talks at Glassboro, N.J. on June 23 and 25. In a public statement following the first meeting, President Johnson said, "We

agreed that it is now very important to reach international agreement on a nonproliferation treaty." In his press conference on Sunday night, June 25, Chairman Kosygin said, "As regards...the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, we believe that there has been a significant move forward in that respect. ...we are continuing our efforts aimed at finding a solution to this problem. I want to say that the Soviet Union is interested achieving a situation where there should be no dissemination of nuclear weapons. And we believe that the United States is seeking the same goals, as are the majority of the nations of the world."

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Washington, D. C.
June 26, 1967

STATEMENT BY WILLIAM C. FOSTER,
UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
EIGHTEEN NATION DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE (ENDC)
AT THE
325TH PLENARY MEETING IN GENEVA, THURSDAY, AUGUST 24, 1967

Mr. Chairman:

A major milestone on the path toward achievement of a non-proliferation treaty is marked today.

An important initial milestone was the unanimous adoption of the Irish Resolution in 1961 (UNGA Res. 1665). Public debate, here and in New York, private negotiations and additional action by the General Assembly and the UN Disarmament Commission followed in the succeeding years.

1965 was marked by the public presentation of concrete treaty texts, by the submission of an eight-nation joint memorandum on non-proliferation, and by the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 2028. As a result, multilateral negotiations in this committee and in the General Assembly took on new meaning.

Given this new direction and impetus, the 1966 negotiations in this Committee succeeded in identifying with greater clarity the major obstacles to agreement. At the end of the ENDC session that year the eight-nation joint memorandum made the following comment:

"The eight delegations regret that it has not so far been possible to arrive at an agreement on a treaty acceptable to all concerned. They are deeply conscious of the danger inherent in a situation without an agreement that prevents proliferation of nuclear weapons. They view with apprehension the possibility that such a situation may lead not only to an increase of nuclear arsenals and to a spread of nuclear weapons over the world, but also to an increase in the number of nuclear weapon Powers, thus aggravating the tensions between States and the risk of nuclear war.

"The eight delegations are aware that a main obstacle to an agreement has so far been constituted by differences concerning nuclear armaments within alliances, a problem mainly discussed between the major Powers and their allies."

Today, for the first time, conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty is within reach. The members of this Committee, all of whom helped bring the negotiations to this point, share in the achievement we mark today. As will be seen from a careful examination of the draft, it is based upon the principles enunciated in the joint memoranda and Resolution 2028.

The draft non-proliferation treaty we are presenting today is a recommendation for discussion and negotiation in the ENDC and for the consideration of all governments. We have worked long and hard over it. We have sought to take into account the interests of all potential adherents. This draft reflects constructive suggestions made by other delegations here and by other governments. We could not, of course, expect governments to be committed to this draft at this point since all governments would want to be able to consider improvements which might be suggested here.

We recognize the interest of governments not represented on this Committee to have their views on the non-proliferation treaty draft made known during this next and crucial stage in the elaboration of the treaty. A procedure already exists for the circulation within the Committee of the views of non-members.

Let me now present a brief explanation of the provisions of the draft.

Article I deals with the obligations of nuclear-weapon states. First, they cannot transfer nuclear weapons, or control over them, to any recipient whatsoever. Second, they

cannot assist non-nuclear-weapon states to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. Third, these prohibitions are applicable not only to nuclear weapons but also to other nuclear explosive devices.

Article II deals with the obligations of non-nuclear-weapon states and is the obverse of Article I. First, such states cannot receive the transfer of nuclear weapons, or control over them, from any transferor whatsoever. Second, they cannot manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, or seek or receive assistance for such manufacture. Third, these prohibitions are applicable not only to nuclear weapons but also to other nuclear explosive devices.

We have already made clear the reasons for including such devices in the prohibitions of the treaty. These devices could be used as nuclear weapons and the technology for making them is essentially indistinguishable from that of nuclear weapons.

The United States recognizes that the benefits which may some day be realized from nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should be available to the non-nuclear states. In his message of February 21 to the ENDC, President Johnson stated, and I quote, "The United States is prepared to make available nuclear explosive services for peaceful purposes on a non-discriminatory basis under appropriate international safeguards. We are prepared to join other nuclear states in a commitment to do this." My delegation has elaborated on this proposal in interventions at our 295th and 303rd meetings.

We are pleased that the Preamble of the draft non-proliferation treaty contains a forthright provision on peaceful nuclear explosions. It states, and I quote, "Potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions should be available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon parties on a non-discriminatory basis and the charge to such parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development."

Article III, the safeguards article, has been left blank although there are several references to safeguards in the Preamble. The Article is blank because the Co-chairmen have not yet been able to work out a formula which would be acceptable to all states which wish to support this treaty. The Co-chairmen are continuing their consultations with a view to drafting an agreed text for this Article. In the meantime, I hope that ENDC plenary discussion will focus on the provisions which have been submitted today with the safeguards discussion being deferred for the time being while the Co-chairmen work on the problem.

Article IV results from many suggestions by non-nuclear-weapon countries that the treaty contain an article on peaceful uses of atomic energy. Indeed, the idea for such an article was originally derived from the treaty of Tlatelolco, Mexico. The article describes two recognized rights of parties with respect to peaceful uses. First, it makes clear that nothing in the treaty draft interferes with the right of the parties to develop their research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in compliance with Articles I and II, which, of course, include provisions on peaceful nuclear explosive devices. Second, it recognizes the right of the parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other states to, the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. These two rights are specific elaborations of the principle, stated in the Preamble, "That the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology...should be available for peaceful purposes to all parties, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon states." As the Preamble also makes clear, this principle includes not only modern reactor technology and the like, but "any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon states from the development of nuclear explosive devices."

These provisions make clear that the treaty would promote, not discourage, national development and international cooperation with respect to peaceful applications of atomic

energy. This applies to research, production and use as well as to information, equipment and materials.

Article V deals with amendments and review. Paragraph 1 states how amendments may be initiated and is derived from the Test Ban Treaty. Paragraph 2 describes how amendments enter into force.

It provides that an amendment must be approved by a majority of the parties who are members of the IAEA Board of Governors.

The last paragraph of Article V provides for a conference after five years to review the treaty's operation with a view to assuring that its purposes and provisions are being realized. This will provide an opportunity for non-nuclear and nuclear-weapon states alike to assess whether the treaty is accomplishing its primary purpose of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and also its purposes of easing international tensions and facilitating agreement on cessation of the nuclear arms race and on disarmament. The review conference is thus relevant to the question of further measures of disarmament, a question which has been of such interest to many members of this Committee.

The draft also contains preambular provisions on arms control and disarmament, including a declaration of intention to achieve a cessation of the nuclear arms race at the earliest possible date. The "declaration of intention" form was of course suggested in the eight-nation joint memorandum on non-proliferation of last August. In a similar vein, a later preambular paragraph calls for the cessation of production of nuclear weapons, and the elimination of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles from national arsenals, pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

These preambular provisions state the purposes of the treaty. Steps toward achievement of these purposes would be reviewed by the review conference to which I have referred.

Thus, while no specific obligation for nuclear disarmament would appear, the preambular provisions combined with the review paragraph in Article V would provide the most realistic approach to this problem.

We share the general desire for early progress to halt the nuclear arms race and to begin the process of reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons from national arsenals. The United States has proposed, and will continue to pursue, various measures to achieve these objectives. But we all know why it would not be feasible to incorporate specific obligations to this end in the treaty itself. The differences that have prevented agreement on these measures have not as yet been resolved. Any attempt to incorporate specific nuclear arms limitation obligations in the treaty would inevitably also inject these differences into the consideration of the treaty itself and could only jeopardize its prospects.

Let us therefore agree to pursue these nuclear arms limitations measures with a greater sense of urgency and, I would hope, in a spirit of greater cooperation. Let us also all agree that this treaty must be regarded as a step toward the achievement of these other necessary measures. We are convinced that the treaty will create a more favorable environment for agreement on them. That is why we believe we must concentrate now on ways to expedite and facilitate the conclusion of this treaty and avoid actions which would delay or jeopardize it. The situation requires that our efforts be focused on achieving a realistic agreement as soon as possible.

Article VI contains signature and entry into force provisions derived from those of the Test Ban Treaty. It would require that a certain number of non-nuclear-weapon states in addition to the nuclear-weapon signatories would have to ratify before the treaty would enter into force. We have not expressed a view on the precise number. The United States believes it should be sufficiently large so that the treaty will begin to achieve its purposes when it enters into force.

Article VII states that the treaty shall be of unlimited duration. It contains a withdrawal clause similar to that of the Test Ban Treaty with one significant improvement. The notice of withdrawal, together with a statement of reasons therefor, would be submitted to the UN Security Council as well as to the parties. The withdrawal provision is central to this treaty. States will adhere to the treaty if they believe it is consistent with their security interests. Under the proposed clause, a party can cease to be bound by the treaty if it decides that its supreme interests have been jeopardized by extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty.

Article VIII provides depositary procedures for the treaty text. It also states that the treaty will be equally authentic in each of the five official languages of the United Nations.

We recognize that the problem of security assurances, which is of concern to some non-aligned countries, remains to be considered. The United States maintains the view that this is a matter which, because of its complexity and the divergent interests involved, cannot be dealt with in the treaty itself. We are, however, exploring various possible solutions, including action which could be taken in the context of the United Nations, whose primary purpose is the maintenance of peace and security. We expect that the Co-chairmen will be exploring this problem further with a view to presenting recommendations to this Committee in the course of our consideration of the treaty.

Mr. Chairman, if the draft presented today leads to a generally accepted treaty, our generation will pass on a gift to future generations. Such a treaty will lessen the danger of nuclear war. It will stimulate widespread, peaceful development of nuclear energy. It will improve the chance for nuclear disarmament. It will help reduce tensions. Like the test ban and outer space treaties, it will constitute a major step toward a more peaceful world. It will be a treaty for all of us -- but most of all for our children and our grandchildren.

Mr. Chairman, the future safety of mankind requires prompt action to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. An unprecedented opportunity to do so now awaits us. Let us seize this opportunity while we can.

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August 24, 1967

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DRAFT TREATY ON THE
NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty,"

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to this Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and

to contribute, alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions should be available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Noting that nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

(International Control)

ARTICLE IV

Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty, as well as the right of the Parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

ARTICLE V

1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

ARTICLE VI

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of _____, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear-weapon States signatory to this Treaty, and _____ other States signatory to this Treaty, and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force

of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE VIII

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in _____ at _____ this ____ day
of _____, ____.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, August 10, 1967

rec'd 146 pm

5

Mr. President:

Bill Foster called to say that the Russians have informed him that they are prepared to table the NPT jointly with us with a blank Article III.

There are two Soviet proposed amendments to work out; but they look to Foster manageable.

He will inform the Gore sub-committee tomorrow morning; testify before the Appropriations sub-committee tomorrow afternoon; return to Geneva, leaving Dulles at 8:00 p.m. Saturday.

Now the game will move ^(to) the non-nuclear powers; and some months of negotiations lie ahead. But it is something of an event.

He is, of course, available if you wish to see him.

W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-344
By cb, NARA, Date 6-1-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CHAIRMAN
POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL

120

July 3, 1967

✓
Walt:

Secret attachment

In re Willy Brandt's speech (see attached telegram), you may be interested in the attached papers by Miriam Camps and Zbig Brzezinski.

They treat the inter-relation between German reunification, European security, Atlantic ties, and Western European integration. We will be discussing them this Thursday in the Inter-Agency Planning Group.

They are both thoughtful views of a perplexing problem, and well worth weekend reading.

^{HP}
Henry Owen

Mr. Rostow

RECEIVED
Secret attachment

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Info

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DPA CARRIES STORY OF INTERVIEW FORMIN BRANDT GAVE EDITOR IN CHIEF BARSIG OF DEUTSCHLANDFUNK JULY 2. HIGHLIGHTS OR INTERVIEW ARE:
1. BRANDT BELIEVES IT POSSIBLE THAT, IN AN EVENTUAL EUROPEAN PEACE SETTLEMENT, NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT WILL BE EITHER DISPENSED WITH AND REPLACED BY SOMETHING NEW OR BROUGHT INTO A NEW RELATIONSHIP. HE CAME OUT IN FAVOR OF A REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EEC AND THE COMECON.
2. THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM CANNOT BE COMPLETELY DONE AWAY WITH; RATHER IT MUST BE INTERTWINED WITH THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.
3. THERE SHOULD BE AN INTERNATIONALLY BINDING DECLARATION OF RENUNCIATION OF FORCE WITH RESPECT TO THE SOVIER UNION AND EAST EUROPE, WHICH SHOULD EMBRACE ALSO THE QUESTIONS RESULTING FROM THE DIVISION OF GERMANY.

RSR
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PAGE 2 RUFKC 06 UNCLAS
4. RENUNCIATION OF ATOM WEAPONS.
5. BALANCED, EQUIVALENT REDUCTION OF THE LEVEL OF TROOPS IN EAST AND WEST.
6. A EUROPEAN LAW FOR THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES (VOLKSGRUPPENRECHT) IS ALSO PART OF A EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT.
7. HUMAN RIGHTS SHOULD BE NOT ONLY PROCLAIMED BUT ALSO PRACTICED.
8. IT IS AN ILLUSION TO THINK THAT THE STATIONING OF TROOPS WILL GO ON FOR 20 MORE YEARS IN THE PRESENT FORM.
9. MOSCOW IS NOT THE ONLY KEY TO THE SOLUTION OF THE GERMAN PROBLEM. EAST BERLIN PLAYS A ROLE ALSO. MCGHEE
BT

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

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
June 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM TO - S/P - Mr. Owen

I have put down in the attached memorandum a few preliminary thoughts on the relationship between further integration in Western Europe and German reunification.

I had hoped to develop a paper along these lines a good deal further before I left S/P. But mid-term planning took over.

I am circulating this draft despite its present preliminary and unfinished form because I think a discussion of this question internally in S/P might be useful before I leave and prior to the UK-German-US planning talks.


Miriam Camps

cc: Mr. Bowie
Mr. Yager
Mr. Doherty
Mr. Brzezinski
Mr. Magill

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-342
By ijg, NARA, Date 12-6-94

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-342

MEMORANDUM

By ijp, NARA, Date 12-6-94

120-c

SUBJECT: The Relationship between further
Integration in Western Europe and
German Reunification

Problem

Although we have maintained since the early fifties that there was no conflict between the pursuit of European union among the Western European countries and German reunification, this proposition has always been questioned by some people. Until recently, however, the prospect of German reunification on any conditions that might be acceptable to the Federal Republic and ourselves has been so remote that any possible conflict between the two goals was felt by most people to be irrelevant. This situation is clearly changing and as discussions of detente, "bridge-building," and European security conferences grow, the nature of the relationship between further progress in consolidating Western Europe and in reaching a lasting settlement in Central Europe is bound to increase.

Discussion

There is a broad spectrum of conceivable eventual "solutions" for the German problem, ranging from a continuation or even hardening of the present division, with

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West Germany becoming progressively more integrated into a highly structured Western European grouping and Eastern Germany into an Eastern European grouping, to, at the other extreme, a reunified, neutralized Germany not belonging to any security group.

Both these extremes can probably be ruled out. In the fifties and early sixties it was frequently said that the Germans needed to see progress either toward German reunification or towards Western European integration, the implication being that these were acceptable alternatives. Would the development of unity in Western Europe still seem to the Germans to be an adequate substitute for progress toward reunification? Conceivably it might still do the trick if the process were rapid, dramatic and far-reaching, and came reasonably soon. But spectacular progress of that kind is not in the cards. In the Federal Republic, as elsewhere in Western Europe, there is still strong support for and belief in the goal of European unity. But it is seen as the culmination of a long process of evolution, not as something that might well be established overnight, almost by fiat, by a few determined heads of state. In contrast, the new sense of movement in the East has given the prospect of some

progress toward German reunification a reality that it has lacked heretofore. It seems probable, therefore, that although the Federal Republic might eventually accept as satisfactory an arrangement that stopped short of formal reunification, an appreciable improvement of the relationship between East and West Germany is today an essential ingredient of a satisfactory settlement - so far as the Federal Republic is concerned - even on the most optimistic assumptions that can reasonably be made about the progress of Western European unification.

At the other extreme, it seems probable that the recreation of a single German state embracing the GDR and the Federal Republic can also be ruled out as highly unlikely to be regarded as an acceptable solution either by the Soviet Union or any of Germany's neighbors, east or west. A condition of such reunification would clearly be some form of neutralization. But it is difficult to see any form of neutralization to which the West Germans would consent which would be regarded by the Soviet Union as sufficiently fool-proof. A strong, dynamic reunited Germany "loose" in the middle of Europe is not likely to appeal to any of Germany's neighbors - East or West.

The area in which eventual solutions to the division of Germany are likely to be found, therefore, would seem to lie between these two extremes. In narrowing down the probable options, it is useful to look at what seem likely to be the limiting factors that any settlement will have to satisfy:

1. The Federal Republic will want to remain part of the EEC: it is now too integrated with its Western neighbors and has too much to lose to make breaking out of the Community a feasible proposition. It can also be assumed that the EEC will become not simply a customs union but will acquire, over time, the characteristics of an economic union, at least.

2. There will have to be freedom of movement for goods, people, capital and culture between the two parts of Germany.

3. The Soviet Union and other Eastern European states will have to feel that the final settlement is one in which the restraints on the Germans are sufficient to eliminate any possibility of future German aggression.

4. The Soviet Union will have to feel that the move to the new situation can be explained to its own people and to the Communist world generally in positive

terms, i.e., not simply as the loss of East Germany to the Western camp.

5. The US and the Western European countries will have to feel that the settlement is one that is not only acceptable to the Federal Republic but is one that promises stability in Central Europe.

Other points could be listed. But these key ones are enough to underline several facts:

1. That a settlement presupposes a substantial decline in East-West tension and further progress toward a normalization of relationships between East and West.

2. That a settlement also presupposes a considerably greater improvement in economic conditions in East Germany than has yet taken place; otherwise freedom of movement would lead to too great a movement of persons.

3. That a settlement requires a framework for the coming together of East and West Germany that gives promise of exercising the only kind of restraint on Germany that would be politically possible for that country to accept, i.e., restraint through non-discriminatory integration in a larger whole.

4. That a settlement requires a modification of Soviet and US military arrangements in East and West Germany respectively.

Points three, four and five are interrelated. They also bear directly on the question addressed in this paper: the relationship of the process of Western European integration to the problem of German reunification. Taken together, these points suggest that the framework will have to be a highly structured one with a defense establishment of its own in order (a) to "contain" Germany and (b) to be a group which is sufficiently strong and independent so that both the US and the Soviet Union can modify their defense arrangements with West and East Germany respectively, without creating a dangerous and destabilizing vacuum, and without either major power having to accept a major extension of the other's power in Europe.

This kind of economic-political-defense Community could conceivably develop in Western Europe after de Gaulle leaves and after British entry into the EEC. It is almost inconceivable that this kind of development could take place on an all-European basis. This is so for several reasons, the most important being that the Soviet Union is unlikely to be willing to see the Eastern European countries participate fully in an highly integrated group of which it is not a member, and the Western European

countries are unlikely to welcome "integration" with the Soviet Union.

Although it is probably unreal to suppose that the Soviet Union would agree to the complete absorption of Eastern Germany by a Western European Community, it is not impossible that enough cooperation could eventually take place between Eastern Germany and a structured, cohesive Western European group to satisfy the German need for progress toward reunification. This would, however, seem to require (1) a "normalization" of the relationships between the countries of Eastern and Western Europe and a higher level of trade in both directions, so that an improved relationship between East and West Germany could simply be an intensification of an existing pattern of relationship (2) an improvement in the economic, social and political conditions in East Germany, so that freedom of movement would not invite a mass movement of people; and (3) the further development of the EEC, so that the relationship between that group and East Germany could be a sufficiently far-reaching one to satisfy German needs for something that gives them most of the practical benefits of reunification. An "association" arrangement between East Germany and the Community obviously cannot extend

benefits to Eastern Germany that the members of the Community do not enjoy among themselves. Moreover, an "association" arrangement that provided fewer benefits than full membership might make the arrangement considerably easier for the Soviet Union to accept.

To recapitulate: a settlement in Central Europe seems unlikely unless both the Soviet Union and the United States are prepared to modify their commitments and their military establishments in the two parts of Germany. So long as the Soviet Union is regarded as a hostile power, this could probably safely be done, from a US standpoint, only if the Federal Republic were part of a strong European group which would continue to maintain a defense link with the US. The new defense relationship would run between the European Community and the US, not, as at present, on an essentially bilateral basis between the US and Germany. The Soviet Union might, in fact, not be wholly against such a link as an additional guarantee of control over West Germany. However, at a minimum, the Soviet Union would need to be able to point to the European Community as an entity that was independent of the US and to the physical removal of US troops from West Germany as a rationale for removing its own troops from East Germany.

The Soviet Union would obviously be unlikely to accept any link between East Germany and a strong Western European group until the relationships between Western Europe and Eastern Europe and Western Europe and the US have developed far enough so that Western Europe is seen not as wholly dependent on the US but as a power group in its own right.*

The foregoing may sound like a prescription for a third-force Europe. It is not a prescription, but an attempt to show that a highly-integrated, independent, Western Europe may, in fact, be - from our standpoint - the best road to German reunification.

Whether the US would be prepared to accept a European Community which was this "independent" is a question that we have, as a Government, thus far been able to avoid examining, partly

*Whether or not the Soviet Union would ever be prepared to contemplate such an arrangement if the European Community went nuclear is a question that I cannot answer, although a strong presumption exists that it would prefer a position in which Western Europe remained dependent in this area on the US. It is clear that the effect any decision on their nuclear future will have on the prospects for German reunification looms large in the calculations of the Federal Republic. Perhaps, at some stage, a European Community would decide that it was desirable for this and other reasons to stay out of the nuclear defense field. If we remove the possibility of choice from the European Community we may advance other objectives but at a cost to the Community's eventual bargaining power.

because of the lack of movement^{in the East}, partly because of slow progress in the West. We can probably rely on these two factors for a few more years, possibly indefinitely.

Conclusion

I personally think it is more in the long-term interest of the US that Western Europe should move in the direction outlined above, i.e., toward cohesion, strength, and "independence" - despite the obvious risks and difficulties - than in either of the two most likely other directions: (1) toward increasing dependence on the US, or (2) toward an accommodation with the East built not around strength and cohesion in Western Europe but on disintegration in the West, neutralism, and loose ECE-type all-European structures. I do not expect rapid progress. But the countries of Western Europe are today groping among these three possible lines of development. General de Gaulle has stimulated the debate, but he has also confused it by setting up an antithesis between an "independent" Europe and a Europe that is willing to work closely with the United States. This is, rightly, seen by many Europeans to be a false antithesis and one which they reject. We have at times added to the confusion by ourselves reacting against signs of "independence" as

being implicitly anti-American. We are, unfortunately, likely to continue to do so.

If the general conclusion of this paper is accepted, it suggests the following in policy terms:

1. continued support for West European integration, even at the price of growing "independence."
2. continued support for British entry.
3. a relaxed attitude toward "association" arrangements between the EEC and the neutrals and, later, the Eastern European countries.
4. continuation of our policy of encouraging expansion of trade and cultural contacts and of seeking better ^{understanding} political/with the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union.
5. accepting the fact that the process of "normalization" of relations may well go somewhat faster between Western Europe and the Eastern European countries than between the US and Eastern Europe.
6. continuing to maintain NATO as a healthy alliance but being willing to see the relationship between the US and the European component adjusted as cohesion grows in Western Europe.

7. accepting the central role that Western Europe must play in any lasting settlement of the German problem but using NATO as the primary vehicle for keeping US and Western European thinking on this subject from diverging.

8. recognizing that the preconditions for a settlement - Western European integration and the improvement in East-West relationship - are likely to be very slow in maturing and recognizing that there is little that we can usefully do to force the pace.

S/P:Miriam Camps:June 21, 1967

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

121

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~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

June 29, 1967

FROM: S/P - Z. Brzezinski
SUBJECT: German Reunification

The enclosed memorandum contains:

Page 1 - Is the Reunification of Germany in the US Interest?

Page 2 - Three Improbable Futures

Page 7 - The More Probable Future

Page 10 - Prerequisite Changes in the East

Page 11 - Stages and Timing

Page 13 - The Long-Range US Interest

Annex I - Some statistical comparisons between the UK, France, and the two Germanies combined, pertinent to the discussion on p.1.

Annex II - Chancellor Kiesinger's speech of June 17, 1967, with some noteworthy passages marked on pp 3,5, and 7.

Attachment:
Memo as stated.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-342
By Lij, NARA, Date 12-6-94

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PRELIMINARY TEXT

MEMORANDUM

FROM : Z. Brzezinski

SUBJECT: German Reunification

The purpose of this memorandum is to outline the conditions in which the existing division of Germany may either be ended or, more likely, transformed into something more palatable to the Germans.

1. Is the Reunification of Germany in the US Interest?

Prompt reunification of Germany, even if possible, is not in the United States interest. The sudden emergence of a powerful and potentially dominant Germany would simply destroy the process of West European integration. It would reawaken most of the old fears and antagonisms. It would create new instabilities. It would drive the East Europeans back into a tight Moscow embrace. It could push the West Europeans into a Soviet-encouraged neutralism. The fact is that the Europeans, except for the Germans, do not want the reunification of Germany.

In any case, reunification of Germany in the near future is clearly not in the cards. Thus the real question to be put is whether Germany's eventual reunification is in the US interest.

If the answer is negative with regards to prompt reunification, it is logical to ask at what point could it become positive: 5 years from now, 10 years, 20 years? In other words, at what point would the negative consequences of German reunification cease to apply?

It would seem that the following two basic conditions would have to be present, to override the disturbing effects of reunification:

1. West Europe will have had to reach such a point of economic integration and political unity that the appearance

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of a much more powerful Germany would not revive old fears. Integration will have become such that no one unit could use its resources to impose economic or political domination;

2. East-West relationship will have had to been changed to a point that reunification would not create a major shift in power in favor of the West. In other words, there will be such a degree of East-West cooperation that "reunification" will not really have much significance for the East-West balance of power.

It follows that reunification of Germany is in the US interest only if it happens a very long time from now--if ever at all.

It does not follow, however, that the United States should not continue favoring Germany's reunification publicly or that it should cease its efforts to bring it about. Since in any case it seems extremely unlikely that efforts to bring about the restoration of Germany as a single nation-state are likely to succeed in the near future, there is little risk in remaining committed publicly to German reunification and seemingly involved in efforts to bring it about.

Not to do so would push the Germans into solitary, unilateral initiatives, destructive of Western unity and subject to exploitation by the Soviets. Moreover, some eventual change in the present status of Germany will be necessary if the European cold war is to be ended and a lasting settlement reached. An artificially divided Germany requires a divided Europe.

Probably, both from the European and the American points of view, it would be best if at the time of some eventual settlement the Germans were no longer to insist on a single nation-state of the post-1870 type, which has proven too powerful for the European system to absorb.

Our policy, accordingly, must have three objectives:

1. Promoting Western unity--which means keeping the Germans committed to it and the West in turn committed to the goal of Germany's reunification;

2. Promoting closer all-European cooperation, especially between Eastern and Western Europe--which means pacifying East European fears of Germany;

3. Improving gradually the US-Soviet relationship--which means eventually ending a situation in which both are tempted to exploit the German issue against each other.

The pursuit of these goals will require some deception. On the overt level, the United States may find it advisable to gradually shift from emphasis on German reunification to stress on German self-determination. At the same time closer West-East German ties will begin to accustom the Germans to the existence of two German states. Eventually, the concept of reunification may be redefined to mean something quite different than the 1870 solution.

2. Three Improbable Futures

Before sketching out the conditions in which Germany may regain some form of unity, it may be useful to outline the circumstances in which--in this writer's view--it is least probable that Germany will be reunited. Basically, this involves three alternative settings:

a. Hostile confrontation of the two blocs--i.e., "Cold War";

b. Dissolution of alliances in the context of detente--i.e., the de Gaulle and Ceausescu futures;

c. East Germany absorbed somehow by a politically, economically and militarily integrated Western European community--i.e., the traditional Atlanticist school of thought.

The above are listed in the order of their improbability. The first seems the least probable, the third the least improbable--but still highly improbable. It is sometimes a useful exercise--and good discipline--to quantify one's predictions; thus I would roughly rate a as ten percent probable (or 10 to 1 odds against); b twenty percent (5 to 1 against);

c thirty percent (3 to 1 against). To anticipate my later argument, let me say quite frankly that I would only give roughly a 50-50 chance of success (even money) to my own preferred scenario for German reunification, one which is essentially a variant of c above, discussion of which follows later.

Let me first dispose of the three mirages, referred to above.

The first--the cold war approach--requires relatively little discussion. To the extent that anyone ever seriously believed that Germany could be reunited in the context of a hostile East-West confrontation, the events of the last fifteen years have clearly proven this approach to be unrealistic. German reunification is no closer--indeed, it is even less likely--today than it was when Stalin died or when NATO decided to permit West Germany's rearmament. No Western government today subscribes to the notion that there can be no detente unless there is first progress on the question of German reunification; not even the Government of FRG. Unless suddenly and unexpectedly the Soviet Union collapses, this approach is dead.

The second approach--the dissolution of alliances school of thought is quite popular today. It is easy to see why. Many are tired with the cold war. NATO appears old-fashioned--primarily an agency of the cold war. There is a facile, simple-minded attraction to the Ceausescu-de Gaulle argument: abolish the cold war by abolishing the blocs, or vice versa.

Yet that argument is not only deceptively attractive; it is dangerously wrong. In fact, a detente with the East sought by a loosely organized Europe could only lead to acceptance by the West of the status quo, in particular the acceptance of two German states. A politically fragmented Western Europe would be a Europe incapable of steering in a common direction on behalf of commonly shared goals. Detente for the sake of detente could be the only common denominator of a policy that would be tantamount to Western rivalry in seeking to improve relations and to develop advantageous trade with the East.

Accordingly, it is probably true that a loosely organized Europe, primarily as a free trade area, lacking an integrated political and defense structure, not tied closely to the United States, could more easily reach a detente with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. For the East, accommodation with such a Europe would not require any substantial ideological evolution, especially since no special concessions or adjustments in the Eastern position would be required. The Communist elites, not fearing such a Europe, would probably be quite responsive to Western overtures because they could thus have their cake and eat it, too; they could savor the tangible benefits of closer economic contacts with the West without any substantial change in the over-all political situation.

In this connection, it is important to bear in mind that the present Communist elites, especially the East European ones, are in the first stage of post-peasant political awakening. By and large, their political attitudes are a curious mixture of some Communist formulae and of rather primitive and intense nationalism. Their general outlook is basically parochial and conservative. A detente that perpetuates their domestic dictatorship and leaves the European political map unchanged would thus be for them the ideal solution.

Whether a detente of this kind would be stable is another matter. There are strong reasons for skepticism. It would mean a re-creation of a Europe based on the old principle of state supremacy, with a major European nation, the German one, condemned to division. In those circumstances frustration in West Germany would almost certainly ensue. Having attained neither national unity nor fulfillment in a larger European community, the Germans could be expected to seek accommodation with the Soviet Union. Irrespective of original Soviet motives--even if it is assumed that Moscow was sincerely seeking a stable detente in Europe--the temptation to exploit German frustrations could be too strong for Moscow to resist. The result could be a new phase in European instability, new international rivalries, new tensions.

This brings us to the third approach, one with which this writer is partially in agreement. There can be little doubt

that an integrated Europe is bound to cause an important evolution in Communist perspectives. Indeed, some Communist countries have already recognized that they have at least an economic stake in Western unity. Eastern European trade with West Europe is the primary source of hard currency for Communist economies, and thus the development of a prosperous European economic community has become a factor in the further economic development of the Communist states. In time, a changed economic perspective could lead to a changed perspective in politics. Eventually, the Communist elites may come to see an integrated Western Europe, one which absorbs German energies and ambitions, as something in their interest as well.

There is already considerable evidence that not all East Europeans welcome a Communist policy designed to split the West and to detach Europe from the United States. A number of voices have been heard in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia to the effect that such a policy is shortsighted, and that it will result in a revival of German nationalism.

The development of greater appreciation in the East for the common European stake in greater West European integration will be furthered if such a more integrated West were to consciously strive, bilaterally and multilaterally, to develop cooperative East-West relationships. Participation of the Communist states especially in a wider multilateral framework of East-West cooperation would be bound to have a Europeanizing impact on the Communist elites themselves. It would help to develop in the East a European-minded technical and economic elite, and eventually encourage also the appearance of a more broadminded, less parochial attitude within the political elite itself. Moreover, since multilateral cooperation is incompatible with a high degree of internal state-controlled and centralized planning, pressures for domestic liberalization would be intensified. Thus greater involvement of the East European states in institutional and multilateral forms of cooperation with an integrated Western community would help the internal processes of evolution in the East, all of which cumulatively would promote the emergence of a new political attitude.

Eventually, the Communist elites would become less inclined to see their security as dependent on the maintenance of the present European status quo. With the political issue of Germany losing its importance, with ideological erosion reducing the doctrinal Communist stake in a Communist East Germany, the problem of the division in Europe would become more susceptible to peaceful change.

However, one very important qualification has to be introduced into this discussion. The Soviet Union is not going to let East Germany simply slide over into a Western community that--from its point of view--can become easily dominated by a powerful and rearmed Germany. Such a change would mean a fundamental shift in the balance of power, not to speak of the loss of Soviet control over the very important economic resources of East Germany. West German access to nuclear weapons would inevitably intensify Soviet fears, phobias, and insecurity. This is even more true of the East Europeans. There is simply no realistic reason convincing enough to justify an argument that the Soviet Union would permit East Germany to become a member of a politically, economically, and militarily integrated Western Europe.

3. The More Probable Future

Soviet concerns are likely to be somewhat reduced--and Soviet willingness to countenance some form of German reunification (see below) raised to about 50-50--if such a Europe includes a special security arrangement that precludes West German participation in a Western European nuclear force and includes an internationally accepted ceiling on German military strength, and if East German ties with West Germany do not exclude a special relationship both to the Soviet Union and to whatever remains by then of the Communist economic community (CEMA).

In brief, some form of German reunification may take place if the following conditions are met:

a. A more united Western Europe continues to exert a magnetic attraction on the East Europeans. Hence it will be important for Western European integration and political unification to move forward;

b. Greater Eastern involvement in multilateral East-West cooperation has the effect of Europeanizing the Eastern elites;

c. UK entry into Europe, and continued US military presence in Western Europe, offset the Eastern fear of Europe's domination by Germany;

d. Western European defense and security arrangements--including perhaps a European defense force--do not include West German access to nuclear weapons: hence a defense community, with a special clause providing for self-imposed German abstinence in the nuclear field, relating that abnegation to German reunification (perhaps allowing a lapse in, say, twenty years, if no progress towards reunification has been made);

e. Increased East-West collaboration, including US-Soviet, transforming over time the existing confrontation into cooperation, thereby diminishing the ideological, political, and security preoccupation of all concerned with the sharp dividing line in the heart of Europe;

f. East-West security arrangements and territorial guarantees, reducing the felt fears on both sides, especially through an agreement concerning some limits on force levels in Central Europe.

In such a setting, restoration of freedom to one third of the German people will not be interpreted as a threat by the other Europeans, particularly by those in the East. In that context, a new status for East Germany will become possible and acceptable to both sides.

Its basic ingredients can be tentatively sketched out as follows:

i) An economic Bund between FRG and GDR for internal purposes. Currency, flow of capital, joint enterprises, mixed commissions (in effect, all-German economic ministries), etc. This arrangement could be negotiated by FRG and GDR bilaterally or, alternatively, as part of a broader arrangement, as per ii) below.

ii) The international aspects of the German economic Bund could perhaps be regulated in the following manner: a peace "protocol" between World War II allies and existing two German authorities, providing for the economic Bund for ten years, to be followed by a formal peace treaty creating a loose German confederation for another ten years, to be followed by national plebiscite on a new constitution.

iii) Till the last stage, continued presence of limited Soviet (or Warsaw Pact) garrisons in East Germany, subject (as NATO forces in FRG) to supervision by a European Security Commission, created jointly by NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

iv) Formal commitment by both FRG and GDR that a reunified Germany will not seek to alter existing external German frontiers. This would be especially important in overcoming Polish and Czechoslovak fears.

v) An internationally more secure East German Government will be more likely to tolerate a wider margin of internal freedom, thereby alleviating the lot of the East German population and eliminating one of West German objections to two states.

vi) Relatively free flow of people between both parts of Germany, especially in view of closer economic ties.

vii) By virtue of participation in the German economic Bund, GDR will obtain some form of associate membership in the EEC, presumably going beyond the preferential agreements which by then the EEC may have negotiated with Yugoslavia and perhaps even Czechoslovakia, Hungary or Poland.

viii) Since withdrawal of the GDR from CEMA would make shambles of Eastern European cooperation, continued GDR participation in some forms of Eastern European economic cooperation and perhaps even CEMA is to be expected. For example, there is no inherent incompatibility between a GDR relationship with the EEC, by means of a German economic Bund, and GDR participation in Intermetal. This is shown by current

Yugoslav efforts to develop a working relationship both with the EEC and CEMA. Moreover, Austria at some point may also have such multiple links.

4. Prerequisite Changes in the East

Assuming that the West moves towards greater unity; that this unity includes increasing absorption of West Germany economically and politically into a larger entity; assuming a special defense arrangement for Western Europe, with a somewhat different status in the nuclear field for Germany; and assuming progress in the East-West relations, major changes in the East will still be required before real progress towards the kind of resolution of the European problem that has been outlined above will be possible. The following changes will have to take place before the East is prepared to consider a significant change in the status of East Germany:

a. Ideological Evolution: The erosion of the more militant aspects of Marxism-Leninism will permit the Communist leaders to view greater unity in the West not as a threat to themselves but as logical and even positive development, inherent in modern economic and social organization. The Sino-Soviet dispute and domestic pressures in the Soviet Union both conspire to bring on such a changed perspective.

b. Political Moderation: Although for a long time to come the Soviet Union and most of the East European states will remain single-party dictatorships, their systems will become more tolerant of political and intellectual dissent, thereby also weakening the role of ideology. Yugoslavia is a pioneer in this respect. Czechoslovakia may be the next to follow. The evolution of single-party dictatorships in Mexico and Spain--mutatis mutandi--may serve as an example.

c. Internal Economic Reforms: Progressive decentralization of the Communist economies will facilitate international economic cooperation, hitherto handicapped by centralized national planning. It will also facilitate the emergence of a more independent, technologically oriented economic elite, likely to have a strong interest in economic cooperation with Western Europe and the United States.

d. Regional Economic Cooperation: CEMA will abandon its efforts at economic integration of Eastern Europe and even Mongolia with the Soviet Union. Rather, it will concentrate on the promotion of trade and exchange of technological know-how. Clearing and convertibility will be arranged. More important will be the proliferation of more specialized subregional arrangements among the East European states, such as Intermetal. Closer industrial and energy cooperation is to be expected among East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

e. Alliance: The Warsaw Pact will not be formally disbanded, but Soviet troops will be withdrawn from Poland and Hungary. The alliance will serve as a symbol of political interdependence: for the Soviet Union as a guarantee of minimal political loyalty, for the East European Communist elites as a safeguard against the eruption of domestic pressures into revolution. Otherwise, the East European regimes would be quite independent, and their own estimate of their interest will be determining in their foreign relations.

5. Stages and Timing

East-West reconciliation will not be achieved by a single act of settlement, nor will Germany's reunification be an event isolated in time; a process of growing together of the East and the West and of the existing two German entities will be required. This process will have economic, cultural, political, and security aspects to it.

The process of growing together in part will be a spontaneous one; in a large measure, however, it will have to be stimulated by deliberate initiatives designed to undo gradually the partition of Europe.

Extensive development of East-West bilateral ties began in the late-fifties and early-sixties. It is to be expected that, in the late-sixties and early-seventies, there will be an expansion not only in these bilateral relationships but a significant development in East-West multilateral economic cooperation.

It is reasonable to expect that in the years 1966-1970 the ECE will become active in developing and regulating East-West economic and technical cooperation. OECD may also become involved in assisting East-West scientific and technological collaboration.

It is not unreasonable to expect that in the early-1970's a special East-West economic assembly, perhaps sponsored by OECD, ECE and CEMA, will have been created. It will foster joint East-West ventures and communications, technological cooperation, etc.

It is also reasonable to expect in the course of the next five years surplus labor force will be permitted to flow Westward from the East, with considerable social-cultural impact on its return home.

During the same period, most of the East European states and the Soviet Union will have become associated with GATT and IMF, in addition to perhaps negotiating special agreements with EEC. By approximately 1972, Yugoslavia may become an associate member of the EEC.

It is to be expected that the next five years will see some movement towards the creation of an East-West Political Assembly, for the purpose of discussing directly, and on a continuing basis, East-West issues. It could also become a forum for the development of a common attitude towards the problems of the third world. Even more rapid may be the gradual involvement of the Communist states in the specialized functions of the Council of Europe.

Although the security issue remains the hardest nut to crack, it is to be expected that gradual progress in this field will also develop. Given sufficient initiative on the part of the West, by the early-1970's a European Security Commission based on the two alliances may have been established, for the purpose of monitoring troop movements in Central Europe and for making periodic inspections of troop postures. Reciprocal troop withdrawals from Germany may take place even earlier than that, as well as some discussions concerning the definition of mutually acceptable limits on German military development, compatible with German non-nuclear defense commitments to Western Europe or, if it still exist, NATO.

Given the new FRG policy towards the East, and following Ulbricht's death, an expansion in all-German links is to be expected. This may be roughly expected during the late-1960's and early-1970's. It will probably take the form of mixed commissions, economic ties, the introduction of common currency, joint German development of mail, telephone and television service, exchanges between the two electric power markets, etc.

All of the foregoing will gradually create the pre-conditions for more formal and systematic all-German economic relations, perhaps in the form of an economic Bund, and including also a formal GDR relationship with the Common Market even while retaining its membership in CEMA and some obligations to the East European states. Assuming favorable developments in the economic, political, and security fields, such indirect form of German "reunification" may become a reality by the mid- or late-seventies.

6. The Long-Range US Interest

The foregoing analysis of European trends is compatible with what is considered by this writer to be the fundamental US interest in Europe; namely, the creation of a framework of stability in which our more specific Atlantic objectives and our broader global interests can be furthered.

World order has been fragmented during the 20th Century primarily by conflicts among the more advanced states. Termination of these conflicts is the first order of business if new international stability is to be achieved. On the basis of that stability a constructive response can be mounted to the problems of the third world.

Accordingly, we must aim for such a set of relationships among the developed nations that is most likely to minimize conflicts, tensions, and fears among them. Looking a decade and a half ahead, it would seem that this objective is most likely to be achieved if the developed nations come to be linked in larger, more integrated communities, cooperating with one another, but not confronting each other on the basis of hostile alliances.

In other words, not dissolution of the two existing European alliances into the traditional multi-state system but neither the emergence of two tightly knit blocs, facing each other across the Elbe; not preoccupation with the division of Germany but concentration on the larger task of ending the partition of Europe, within the context of which the German problem can be somehow resolved.

A stabler solution, and one seemingly in keeping with present trends, would involve a structure based on four units, of differing degrees of homogeneity:

a. The US, tied by an Atlantic political, economic, and military alliance to Western Europe, participating in some all-European activities and institutions, and having also special bilateral arrangements with the Soviet Union;

b. An integrated Western European community, linked by the aforementioned alliance to the United States, but also maintaining extensive institutional multilateral ties with Eastern Europe and, probably to a somewhat lesser extent, to the Soviet Union;

c. Eastern Europe, increasingly engaging in its own forms of regional cooperation but, given its historical stage of development, probably rather less homogeneously organized than Western Europe, cooperating extensively in East-West institutions, tied also by military and political alliance with the Soviet Union;

d. The Soviet Union, tied closely to Eastern Europe, participating in various East-West European cooperative institutions, as well as enjoying special bilateral arrangements with the United States, probably especially in such matters as space, advanced weapons, and arms control.

	FRANCE	U. K.	GERMANY COMBINED	FRG	GDR
Population	48,922,000	54,595,000	73,867,000	56,839,000	17,028,000
Steel (thousand metric tons)	19,780	26,651	35,989	31,597	4,392
Pig Iron (thousand metric tons)	16,082	17,551	25,275	23,015	2,260
Coal (metric tons)	50,030	196,734	145,044	142,704	2,340
Electric Energy (million kwh)	93,779	182,848	212,113	161,081	51,032
Petroleum (thousand metric tons)	46,790	54,687	57,701	54,215	3,486
Cement (thousand metric tons)	21,542	16,966	39,399	33,632	5,767
Sulphuric acid (100% H ₂ SO ₄)	2,702	3,185	4,253	3,316	937
Motor vehicles (passenger & commercial)	1,612.4	2,332.3	3,008.2	2,904.0	104.2
University students					
Technical)					
Higher)	1,203,943	1,821,275	3,067,237	2,432,255	634,982
Special)					

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 SUBJ: KIESINGER'S SPEECH ON JUNE 17
 FOR THE SECRETARY
 PART ONE OF TWO

THE FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION OF THE SPEECH CHANCELLOR KIESINGER
 DELIVERED AT A MEMORIAL PROGRAM AT THE BUNDESHAUS ON JUNE 17:
 QUOTE:

EXCELLENCIES, LADIES, AND GENTLEMEN: WE OBSERVE GERMAN
 UNITY DAY FOURTEEN 14YEARS AFTER THAT ABORTIVE ATTEMPT TO OVERCOME
 THE PARTITION OF OUR NATION THROUGH A DESPERATE UPRISING
 OF PLAIN PEOPLE. TO MILLIONS OF YOUNG GERMANS WHAT HAPPENED AT
 THE TIME IS HISTORY ABOUT WHICH THEY KNOW ONLY BY HEARSAY, NOTHING
 MORE THAN WHAT THEY LEARN ABOUT THE TWO WORD WARS, THE
 HITLER ERA, THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC, AND THE PERIOD PRIOR TO IT.

BUT THERE IS ONE STATE OF AFFAIRS WHICH ALL OF US, YOUNG
 AND OLD, HAVE ON OUR MINDS: THE FACT THAT BEYOND THE ELBE RIVER
 GERMAN PEOPLE HAVE TO LIVE UNDER A POLITICAL SYSTEM FOISTED UPON
 THEM, IN A STATE OF SEPARATION FROM THEIR FELLOW COUNTRYMEN IN THE
 WESTERN PART OF GEMANY. SHOULD THIS VISIBLE STATE OF AFFAIRS NO
 LONGER BE REGARDED AS A THORN IN OUR HEARTS BY MANY OF US?

THERE IS A KIND OF RESIGNATION WHICH BORDERS ON CYNICISM,
 A KIND OF INDIFFERENCE BORDERING ON LACK OF CONSCIENCE, AND A
 KIND OF NAIVETE BORDERING ON FOOLHARDINESS. BUT THERE ARE ALSO
 SMOOTH MODES OF THINKING AND A COMFORTABLE CULT OF PHRASES WHICH
 REPLACES TOILSOME POLITICAL THINKING AND ACTION WITH RESOUNDING
 WORDS, AND THERE IS NO OTHER OCCASION MORE APT TO LEAD THOSE WHO ARE

SUSCEPTIBLE TO SUCH PRACTICES TO ENGAGE IN SUCH FOOLHARDINESS THAN
 THE ANNUAL RETURN OF THIS MEMORIAL DAY. IT IS NOT MY INTENTION
 TO COMMIT THIS MISTAKE DURING THIS CEREMONY AT THE GERMAN
 BUNDESTAG WHICH HAS ALREADY BECOME A TRADITION.

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WE ARE BEST ABLE TO DO JUSTICE TO SEVENTEEN 17 JUNE FIFTY-THREE 1953 AND THE VICTIMS IT CLAIMED IF WE SERIOUSLY AND HONESTLY TURN OUR ATTENTION TO THE GREAT CAUSE WHICH INVOLVED THE PEOPLE IN THE OTHER PART OF GERMANY AT THE TIME, THE FREEDOM AND UNITY OF OUR PEOPLE. SERIOUSLY AND HONESTLY, THIS DOES NOT RPT NOT MEAN THAT WE, AS THE RULERS OVER THERE AND IN MOSCOW COUNSEL US TO DO

RECOGNIZE THE ALLEGED REALITIES BY CONFIRMING THEM POLITICALLY AND UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. BUT IT DOES MEAN THAT WE VIEW WITHOUT BLINKERS WHAT DOES EXIST, ALSO WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN THE PAST FOURTEEN 14 YEARS.

I RESIST THE TEMPTATION OF HISTORICAL RETROSPECTION, FOR SUCH RETROSPECTION COULD NOT BE CONFINED TO DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TWO PARTS OF GERMANY, BUT WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER THE COURSE OF WORLD POLITICIS OVER ALL THESE YEARS WITH WHICH THE GERMAN PROBLEM HAS BEEN INVOLVED FROM THE OUTSET TO THIS HOUR.

WE KNOW THAT NO KIND OF FORCE, NEITHER INTERNAL NOR EXTERNAL, CAN SOLVE THE GERMAN PROBLEM. IN A WORLD IN WHICH THE ENTIRE PEACEN CAN BE THREATENED FROM ANY PONT OF OUR PLANET, FORCE AS THE LAST RESORT OF POLITICIS IS ANYWAY BECOMING AN INCREASINGLY

OBJECTIONAL BE PHENOMENON. HENCE OUR OFFER OF AN EXCHANGE S OF DECLARATIONS CONCERNING THE REUNCIATION OF FORCE IS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE WHICH INCLUDES THE GERMAN PROBLEM BUT IS NOT RPT NOT CONFINED TO IT.

THUS, BECAUSE WE WANT PEACE, WE ALSO SEEK TO SOLVE THE GERMAN PROBLEM WITH THE MEANS OF PEACE.

THE EAST ACCUSES US OF INTENDING TO "INCORPORATE" THE OTHER PART OF GERMANY. WE INTEND TO DO NOTHING OF THE SORT. THE RULERS IN THE OTHER PART OF GERMANY BLUNTLY PROCLAIM THAT, AS A PRECONDITION FOR EVENTUAL REUNIFICATION, THEY INSIST ON ADJUSTMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC'S SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORDER TO THEIR SYSTEM, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE PEOPLE HERE WANT OR REJECT IT. WE, HOWEVER, SAY QUITE CLEARLY THAT WE DO NOT WANT TO SPEAK FOR OUR FELLOW COUNTRYMEN OVER THERE, THAT WE DO NOT RPT NOT WANT TO FORCE THEM TO ACCEPT ANYTHING CONTRARY TO THEIR WISH AND WILL

ONLY AS LONG AS THEY ARE UNABLE TO MAKE THEIR OWN FREE DECISION, SHALL

WE SPEAK FOR THEM AND SHALL NOT CEASE SPEAKING FOR THEM.

THIS IS THE CORE OF OUR REUNIFICATION POLICY, AND IT IS THEREFORE ALSO THE CORE OF OUR DEBATE WITH THOSE RESPONSIBLE IN THE OTHER PART OF GERMANY AND WITH ALL THOSE WHO SUPPORT THEM OR CONTROL THEM. THIS IS NOT RPT NOT ARROGANCE, AS WE ARE ACCUSED OF BUT IT IS OUR DUTY IN CONSCIENCE.

IF THAT BE SO, IF POLITICAL POSITIONS ARE IN SUCH SHARP CONFRONTATION, WE MUST HONESTLY ASK OURSELVES WHETHER THERE IS ANY POINT AT ALL IN TRYING TO OBTAIN A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. WHETHER INSTEAD

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OF AROUSING FALSE HOPES WE MUST WAIT UNTIL HISTORY PRODUCES A REDEEMING SOLUTION, AND UNTIL SUCH TIME CONFINE OURSELVES TO PRESERVING WHAT IS LEFT US, OUR OWN FREEDOM AND THE REFUSAL OF THE FREE WORLD TO RECOGNIZE A SECOND GERMAN STATE.

SUCH A PURELY DEFENSIVE POLICY, IN MY FIRM CONVICTION AND THE CONVICTION OF THE GRAND COALITION GOVERNMENT, WOULD GET US INTO MORE AND MORE TROUBLE FROM YEAR TO YEAR. NOT RPT NOT ONLY WOULD IT NOT RPT NOT ADVANCE US A SINGLY STEP, IT WOULD NOT RPT NOT EVEN BE ABLE TO PRESERVE WHAT IT IS INTENDED TO PRESERVE, FOR TIME IS NOT ON OUR SIDE.

HENCE THIS GOVERNMENT DECIDED TO PURSUE A NEW, MORE FLEXIBLE POLICY TOWARD THE EAST, BOTH TOWARD OUR EASTERN NEIGHBORS AND, AS FAR AS INTRA-GERMAN RELATIONS ARE CONCERNED, TOWARD THOSE RESPONSIBLE IN THE OTHER PART OF GERMANY. BOTH POLICIES ARE ASPECTS OF ONE POLITICAL CONCEPT WHICH RESTS ON THE

PREMISE THAT EUROPE CANNOT FOREGO DESIGNING A FUTURE PEACE ORDER THAT WILL OVERCOME ITS POLITICAL DIVISION UNDER WHICH THE GERMAN PROBLEM, TOO, CAN FIND ITS JUST SOLUTION.

WHOEVER FINDS THIS TO BE UTOPIAN HOULD CONSIDER WHAT IT WOULD MEAN TO FOREGO SUCH A DESIGN.

IN POLITICS, CERTAINLY, THE FAUSTIAN DICTUM, "I LOVE HIM WHO DEMANDS THE IMPOSSIBLE", MUST NOT BE APPLIED. BUT THE SHORTSIGHED OR FAINT-HEARTED WILL OFTEN VIEW AS IMPOSSIBLE WHAT PROVES POSSIBLE TO THE BOLD. TO HAVE A SURE EYE FOR WHAT IS POSSIBLE NOT ONLY MEANS TO AVOID HOPELES ADVENTURES; IT ALSO MEANS TO FIND OUT WHAT IS REALLY POSSIBLE, EVEN IF OTHERS ARE UNABLE TO SEE. NO GREAT POLICY WAS STARTED DIFFERENTLY. THE ROAD TO THIS PRAEFUL EUROPEAN ORDER MAY BE, NO WILL BE LONG AND TROUBLESOME. PERHAPS IT WILL NOT LEAD US TO THE DESIRED GOAL; WE CANNOT RULE OUT THIS POSSIBILITY OF FAILURE. BUT IT IS THE ONLY ROAD PROMISING US A CHANCE OF SUCCESS.

I DID NOT EXPECT OUR NEW POLICY TO IMMEDIATELY FALL ON OPEN EARS IN THE EAST. AS LONG AS THEY OVER THERE BANK ON OUR CAPI- TULATION, THEY WILL SHOW THEMSELVES INACCESSIBLE, PORTRAYING OUR POLICY AS CRAFTY MANEUVERS, DESIGNED TO UNDERMINE THE SOLIDARITY OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES, AND TO ISOLATE ULBRICHT AND HIS REGIME. WE SHALL NOT BE PERTURBED THEREBY. SHOULD SOME QUARTERS IN THE EAST BELIEVE THEY NEEE THIS ABSURD, DISTORTED PICTURE OF A REVENGE-SEEKING GERMANY IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN A JEOPARDIZED SOLIDARITY, WE HAVE SOMETHING BETTER TO OFFER: THE IMAGE OF A

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PEOPLE STRUGGLING TO GAIN CONFIDENCE, INTERESTED IN PAVING THE WAY FOR A NEW POLITICAL CLIMATE OF UNDERSTANDING AND, WHEREVER POSSIBLE, COLLABORATION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND WITH THE EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

THE TACTIC, OF DEMANDING, AS A PRECONDITION FOR COOPERATION OR EVEN FOR TALKS, COMPLETE SUBMISSION OF THE OTHER SIDE TO ONE' OWN POSITION MUST GIVE RISE TO THE IMPRESSION THAT IT IS DESIGNED TO PREVENT TALKS AND COOPERATION.

WE, BY CONTRAST, CONSIDER IT WISE TO BEGIN BY SEEKING COMMON GROUND AND TO LEAVE THE PRINCIPAL POINTS AT ISSUE IN ABEYANCE FOR THE TIME BEING. THIS APPROACH, WHICH IS AN IMPORTANT INSTRUMENT IN A POLICY OF RELAYING TENSIONS, HAS STOOD ITS TEST IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATION.

WE ARE ALSO ENCOURAGED TO PURSUE THIS POLICY IN VIEW OF EFFORTS BY OTHER PEOPLE TO RELAY TENSIONS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. RELAXATION MUST NOT BE RESIGNATION OR ACCEPTANCE OF THE STATUS QUO. WHEREVER IN THE WORLD A STATUS QUO POLICY, IN FACE OF CONFLICTING VITAL INTEREST OF THE PEOPLES CONCERNED, IS MISUNDERSTOOD FOR LASTING SETTLEMENT, A SORE IS CREATED WHICH MAY BECOME EPIDEMIC. HENCE WE MUST SEEK METHODS OF DETENT WHICH NARROW DOWN THE SEAT OF THE DISEASE THROUGH PATIENT THERAPY AND, EVENTUALLY, ELIMINATE IT. HENCE WE SHALL CONTINUE IN OUR THERAPEUTIC EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH MORE HEALTHY RELATIONS WITH THE COUNTRIES AND PEOPLE OF EASTERN EUROPE. WE SHALL PERSISTENTLY ASK FOR UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT OF THESE EFFORTS FOR REAL DETENTE, FOR THE GRADUAL OVERCOMING OF DIFFERENCES, AND FOR A LASTING PEACE IN EUROPE--IN THE WEST AND IN THE EAST, AND AMONG THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT NATIONS.

END PART ONE

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SUBJ: KIESINGER'S SPEECH ON JUNE 17
FOR THE SECRETARY
PART TWO OF TWO
QUOTE

THE FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION OF THE SPEECH CHANCELLOR KIESINGER
DELIVERED AT A MEMORIAL PROGRAM AT THE BUNDESHAUS ON JUNE 17:

QUOTE:

SINCE, AS I SAID AT THE OUTSET, IT IS A MATTER OF REFLECTING
ON THE GERMAN PROBLEM SERIOUSLY AND HONESTLY, WE CAN NOT AVOID
THE QUESTION, HOW OUR POLICY OF RELAXING TENSIONS AS A PRECON-
DITION OF OVERCOMING THE DIVISION OF EUROPE IS TO BE RECONCILED
WITH OUR COMMITMENT TO THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AND WITH OUR EFFORTS
TOWARD EUROPEAN UNIFICATION. DOES NOT THE ONE EXCLUDE THE OTHER?
IS THERE NOT HERE A CONTRADICTION IN THOUGHT AND IN ATTITUDE
AFFECTING OUR ENTIRE POLICY?

GERMANY, A REUNITED GERMANY, IS AT A CRITICAL SIZE. IT IS
TOO LARGE NOT TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE BALANCE OF FORCES, BUT
TOO SMALL TO KEEP THE FORCES AROUND IT IN BALANCE. CONSEQUENTLY
IT IS, IN FACT, DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE THAT A UNITED GERMANY,
GIVEN A CONTINUATION OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN
EUROPE, COULD EASILY ASSOCIATE ITSELF WITH ONE SIDE OR THE
OTHER. FOR JUST THAT REASON, THE GROWING TOGETHER OF THE TWO
PARTS OF GERMANY CAN ONLY BE VISUALIZED IF IT IS EMBEDDED IN
A PROCESS OF OVERCOMING EAST-WEST CONFLICT IN EUROPE.

THE FEDREP OF GERMANY, LIKE ITS ALLIES, CAN CONDUCT A FARSIGHTED
POLICY OF DETENTE ONLY ON THE BASIS OF ITS OWN FREEDOM AND
SECURITY. THE ATLANTIC AND THE EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE
MUST THEREFORE DEPEND UPON EACH OTHER TODAY AS BEFORE. BUT

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OUR ALLIANCES AND OUR COMMUNITIES HAVE NO AGGRESSIVE AIM. THEY WOULD LOSE THEIR POINT IF THEY WERE TO SUCCEED IN SECURING A LONG ARMISTICE IN SOME AREA CRITICAL TO THE POWER-POLITICAL BALANCE, BUT IF AT THE SAME TIME TENSIONS WERE TO ACCUMULATE, AND THEIR EVENTUAL DISCHARGE WERE TO BE ALL THE MORE DESTRUCTIVE.

ON THAT ACCOUNT, DEVELOPMENTS MUST LEAD DIRECTLY TO A BALANCING OF INTERESTS BETWEEN THE ALLIANCES IN WEST AND EAST, AND FINALLY TO A COOPERATION BETWEEN THEM -- AN INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION, CONSIDERING THE CRISIS-PRODUCING SITUATIONS IN ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD AND THE RAPID CHANGES EVERYWHERE, WHICH MUST BECOME FATAL THREATS IF, LIKE UNLEASHED STORM TORRENTS, THEY SWEEP EVERYTHING AND EVERYONE ALONG WITH THEM. IN LIGHT OF THESE CHANGES IN OUR WORLD, MANY OLD CONFLICTS AND ANTAGONISMS ALREADY SEEM SENSELESS; TOMORROW THEY COULD REVEAL THEMSELVES AS SUICIDAL, FOR THERE ARE INDICATIONS OF POSSIBLE CONFLICTS, COMPARED WITH WHICH THOSE OF TODAY SEEM VIRTUALLY HARMLESS. WE MUST HOPE THAT THIS INSIGHT WILL INCREASINGLY INFLUENCE POLITICAL THINKING AND POLICY MAKING IN BOTH EAST AND WEST. WITHIN THIS CONTEXT THE SOLUTION OF THE GERMAN QUESTION ALSO FINDS ITS PLACE, AND OUR RELATIONSHIP TO THE OTHER PART OF GERMANY MUST BE REFLECTED UPON WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS. THE REUNIFICATION OF OUR PEOPLE CANNOT BE ACHIEVED, AS MATTERS STAND, THROUGH DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND OF THE AUTHORITIES IN THE OTHER PART OF GERMANY -- IF ONLY BECAUSE THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL RECOGNITION OF A SECOND GERMAN STATE, IN SHORT, CONFIRMATION OF GERMANY'S PARTITION, IS BEING DEMANDED OF US.

HOWEVER THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT IN WHICH THE GERMAN PROBLEM IS INTERWOVEN DOES MAKE DISCUSSION NECESSARY WITH THAT RPT WITH THAT POWER WHICH DIRECTS AND SUPPORTS THE REGIME IN THE OTHER PART OF GERMANY, AND AGAINST WHOSE WILL -- THE 17TH OF JUNE 1953 AS A BITTER PROOF OF THAT -- GERMAN UNIFICATION WILL NOT SUCCEED.

BUT WHAT IS POSSIBLE BETWEEN US AND THE AUTHORITIES IN THE OTHER PART OF GERMANY, ARE DISCUSSIONS AND AGREEMENTS TO ANELIORATE THE HARDSHIPS CREATED BY THE ENFORCED DIVISION AND TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN, ECONOMIC, AND SPIRITUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GERMANS --WHICH SHALL PREVENT THE GERMAN PEOPLE FROM BECOMING YEAR BY YEAR MORE ALIENATED FROM EACH OTHER. THIS INNER RELAXATION, OR DE-POISONING, WOULD CORRESPOND TO THE SPIRIT OF OUR OVERALL POLICY FOR A FUTURE ORDER OF PEACE IN EUROPE, AND COULD SERVE TO HELP ACHIEVE THAT GOAL. THIS INTENTION WAS ALSO

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REFLECTED IN THE GOVERNMENT'S DECLARATION OF APRIL 12 OF THIS YEAR, AND AAS EXPRESSED ONCE AGAIN IN MY ANSWER TO THE LETTER HERR STOPH SENT ME AFTER OUR DECLARATION OF APRIL 12. UNFORTUNATELY, THE LETTER FROM EAST BERLIN AGAIN CONTAINED A DEMAND FOR RECOGNITION OF THE DIVISION OF OUR FATHERLAND, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME IGNORING OUR PROPOSAL TO DISCUSS THOSE QUESTIONS WHICH UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES MIGHT BE CONSIDERED WITH SOME PROSPECT OF SUCCESS.

THEREFORE I REPEAT THAT WE WILL NOT BE DRAWN INTO PSEUDO-NEGOTIATIONS WHICH COULD ONLY FURTHER THE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF EAST BERLIN, WHICH HAS THUS FAR BEEN REFUSED BY THE FREE WORLD. HOWEVER, WE ARE READY AT ANY TIME FOR SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS OF SERIOUS POSSIBILITIES FOR RESOLVING INNER-GERMAN MATTERS WHICH WOULD SERVE THE PURPOSES CITED BY ME. MAY THEY OVER THERE (IN EAST GERMANY), MAY THE SOVIET UNION TOO, MAY OUR OTHER EASTERN NEIGHBORS RECOGNIZE, THAT OUR PROPOSALS CONSTITUTE AN HONEST AND IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TOWARD THE PREPARATION OF A EUROPEAN PEACE, WHICH ALL PEOPLES DESIRE. WE ALL - IN THE EAST AS IN THE WEST -- FACE A WORLD SITUATION FOR WHICH THERE IS NO MODEL AND NO PRECEDENT. IF EVER THE TERM "HISTORY TEACHER OF LIFE" COULD APPLY, TODAY HISTORY AS INSTRUCTOR LEAVES US IN THE LURCH; INDEED, IT MAY BE THAT IT EVEN OBSCURES OUR VIEW OF THE FUTURE, WHICH DEMANDS ENTIRELY NEW IDEAS, NEW PROPOSALS, NEW AND UNPREJUDICED INITIATIVES FROM ALL THOSE CONCERNED. ALFRED AEBER'S PHRASE ABOUT "FAREWELL TO THE PAST" MUST BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY AND MORE DEEPLY COMPREHENDED THAN HE HIMSELF UNDERSTOOD IT 20 YEARS AGO, BY US AND BY THE OTHERS. HERE, AS WELL AS THERE, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO DEPART FROM ESTABLISHED PATHS OF THOUGHT AND INTENTION, IF WE ARE ALL NOT TO FALL DEFENSELESS VICTIMS TO THE HISTORY OF THE FUTURE, BUT RATHER, DESPITE ALL PRESSURES OF DEVELOPING EVENTS, MASTER AND FORM THEM.

END OF TEXT

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WCGHEE

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