

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
011	memo	M. Bundy to the President	S	2	6/27/67	A
015	bio	Biographic Sketch (exempt per RAC 5/03)	C	2	undated	A
043a	photo	King Husayn (sanitized per RAC 9/00) [Dup. #50, NSF, Country File, "Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, 6/67," Box 148	C	1	1967	A
045a	photo	Minister of Education Tuqan (sanitized per RAC 9/00) [Dup. #53, NSF, Country File, "Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, 6/67," Box 148	C	1	1953	A
048	photo	Brig. Gen. Khammash (sanitized per RAC 9/00) [Dup. #56, NSF, Country File, "Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, 6/67," Box 148	C	1	1967	A

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Folder Title "Visit of King Hussein of Jordan, 6/28/67"

Box Number 2

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9/24/2009


Initials

June 28, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR DICK MOOSE

If the President does not go to the Islamic Center, a good part of our purpose might be accomplished if George were able simply to release the attached statement by the President at 4 p. m. this afternoon. The language is just about the same as what I cleared earlier with Mac Bundy with just enough changes to fit the new situation.

Harold H. Saunders

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June 28, 1967

SUGGESTED PRESS RELEASE ON THE TENTH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE OPENING OF THE
ISLAMIC CENTER, WASHINGTON, D. C.
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, 1967

Ten years ago today President Eisenhower took part in the dedication ceremonies of the Washington Islamic Center. Since then it has served not only as a place of prayer and worship but also as a center for the improvement of understanding among peoples.

We in the West recognize a great debt to the Islamic world. Its discoveries in medicine and astronomy and its contributions in art, science and commerce have enriched our own civilization.

Today in marking the tenth anniversary of this place of religious devotion and compassion, our minds turn to the human beings who are the main victims of tragic wars in the Middle East. I believe the occasion is appropriate to rededicate ourselves to bringing justice and hope to those people.

Yesterday, on behalf of the United States Government, I announced a program of emergency relief for the refugees, and I understand that the Center is a collecting point for private contributions to that cause. I know that my fellow Americans will support all efforts to help those in need.

But emergency relief is not enough. It is time that all peoples of the Middle East--with the world's help--transform these refugees of nearly twenty years into men, women and children with a future.

- 2 -

New homelessness must not be created; old homelessness must be ended. There will be no peace unless this problem is attacked with new energy by all, and, certainly, primarily by those who are immediately concerned.

Lyndon B. Johnson

Hussein Visit
& Laraki Visit

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 28, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR DICK MOOSE

1. Attached, in case I didn't give you one, is a copy of the rough press guidelines we sent to the President as possible guidance to George in backgrounding after the Hussein lunch. This, of course, has no status without the President's approval, but it may help you to have it on hand since it is cleared by State and by Mac Bundy.

2. As far as Laraki is concerned, I suggest that generally anything good enough for Hussein is good enough for Laraki. However, if you want a precise short statement, I would suggest the following:

"They talked about problems of particular interest to the Arab countries in the light of recent developments in the Middle East."

I understand that State would like to have it emphasized that Laraki has come to the White House as the personal emissary of King Hassan and at the King's suggestion. Since I know George will welcome the opportunity to tell the whole truth for a change, I wanted you to have this for a four o'clock briefing or for tomorrow morning.

3. In case you didn't see it, attached also is the New Delhi release on Ray Hare.

Harold H. Saunders

Att: Cy, McGeorge Bundy Memo for the President, 6/28/67,
Subj: Press Guidance for Hussein Visit

Wire copy, New Delhi 8905, 6/28/67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By Chm/s, NARA, Date 9-3-09

Hussein Visit

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June 28, 1967

Mr. President:

If you decide to go to the Islamic Center with Hussein this afternoon, the attached brief remarks would be useful.

McGB

SUGGESTED REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OPENING OF THE
ISLAMIC CENTER, WASHINGTON, D. C. ON
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, 1967

Ten years ago President Eisenhower took part in the dedication ceremonies of this Center. I am glad to have a chance to mark this anniversary with His Majesty, King Hussein.

We in the West recognize a great debt to the Islamic world. Its discoveries in medicine and astronomy and its contributions in art, science and commerce have enriched our own civilization.

Today at this place of religious devotion and compassion, our minds turn to the human beings who are the main victims of tragic wars in the Middle East. I believe the place and the time are appropriate to rededicate ourselves to bringing justice and hope to those people.

Yesterday, on behalf of the United States Government, I announced a program of emergency relief for the refugees, and I understand that this Center is a collecting point for private contributions to that cause. I know that my fellow Americans will support all efforts to help those in need.

But emergency relief is not enough. It is time that all peoples of the Middle East--with the world's help--transform these refugees of nearly twenty years into men, women and children with a future.

- 2 -

New homelessness must not be created; old homelessness must be ended. There will be no peace unless this problem is attacked with new energy by all, and, certainly, primarily by those who are immediately concerned.

June 28, 1967

SUGGESTED PRESS GUIDANCE FOR THE MEETING
BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
ON JUNE 28, 1967

The President and His Majesty King Hussein I exchanged views on the problems arising out of the recent hostilities in the Near East.

King Hussein expressed deep concern at the plight of the refugees, thanked the United States for assistance contributed to the refugees and hoped the United States would do its utmost to relieve the suffering. The President noted that the United States had been a major contributor to the support and rehabilitation of the Palestine refugees. He emphasized our acute concern with the welfare of the refugees, both those displaced by the fighting of 1948 and those who have left their homes as a result of the recent hostilities. While noting that the USG had established a \$5 million reserve fund for emergency relief for the refugees, he emphasized the need for a permanent solution to the refugee problem.

Both King Hussein and the President agreed that any resolution of the present crisis must be based on justice and the interest of all parties concerned. King Hussein insisted that a first step must be the withdrawal of Israeli forces back to the boundaries pertaining before June 4. The President referred to the five points which he made in his speech of June 19. He expressed the hope that measures could now be taken to implement these points and arrive at a just

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#22)

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By *clm/jc*, NARA, Date 6-15-05

settlement including the withdrawal of the Israeli forces. He described our basic objective as the achievement of a more durable and more stable situation than that existing prior to June 5. He reaffirmed our views on the territorial integrity and political independence of all states.

Both agreed that Jerusalem as a Holy Place for three great religions deserved special attention. Both agreed that there must be appropriate consultation with religious leaders and others who are deeply concerned before any unilateral action is taken on the status of Jerusalem.

The President reaffirmed the deep interest of the United States Government in Jordan and its people. He expressed the hope that the friendly relations between the two countries would be strengthened and informed the King that the United States Government intended to continue its economic assistance to Jordan.

Although there was not an identity of views on all issues, the exchange was of real value.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

June 27, 1967

SUBJECT: Possibility of Visiting Washington Mosque with Hussein

Tomorrow is the Tenth Anniversary of President Eisenhower's opening of the Washington Islamic Center. He made a general speech about our hopes for a future of "peace under one God."

It has occurred to us that you and King Hussein might make a quick swing by the Mosque after your talk tomorrow. This would be a dramatic pro-Arab gesture. Since the Mosque is the receiving point for private American contributions for refugee relief, you might in your remarks recall the USG emergency relief program being announced this afternoon and urge private Americans to show their usual generosity to people in distress.

If you like this idea, we would lay it on informally and tentatively. We might want to sound out Hussein or alert the Arab ambassadors to be there. We would want USIA and press coverage. But we would like to know tonight in order to turn the necessary wheels.

Mac Bundy thinks this is a good idea.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Approve tentatively; I'll decide with Hussein _____

*Jordan
Visit*

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Approve tentatively; I'll decide with Hussein _____

Hussein Visit
7

Pls. return to
HHSaunders, Rm. 372-a
EOB when signed.

MEMORANDUM FOR MARVIN WATSON

June 27, 1967

SUBJECT: Luncheon for King Hussein

The President has agreed to a small working luncheon for King Hussein on Wednesday, 28 June.

My recommendation for the guest list would be as follows, but I would appreciate your checking with the President:

Under Secretary Katzenbach (Secretary Rusk will be hosting a lunch for the Thai King and Queen.)

Secretary McNamara

McGeorge Bundy

Walt Rostow

Findley Burns, the President's Ambassador to Hussein

Mac Bundy's notion and mine is to keep it as small as possible since, at present count, there will only be four Jordanians--King Hussein, Foreign Minister Ahmad Tuqan, Major General Amir Khammash (chief of staff) and Jordanian Ambassador in Washington, Farhan Shubeilat.

However, other possibilities would include George Christian, Gene Rostow and Bill Macomber (former US Ambassador in Jordan who knows the King intimately and has performed two special missions to him since November).

Since this is strictly a working session, I anticipate no formal arrival statement and no formal toast at lunch. However, we will provide a paper on press guidance for the President and Hussein to approve for George Christian.

The King has asked--and we strongly recommend--that he have an opportunity for a private talk alone with the President. There are things he will want to say that he can't say in front of any other Jordanian.

W. W. Rostow

MEMORANDUM FOR McGEORGE BUNDY

June 27, 1967

SUBJECT: Hussein Lunch Guest List

The President has approved the following guest list for tomorrow's lunch:

The President
Under Secretary Katzenbach
Secretary McNamara
McGeorge Bundy
Walt Rostow
Findley Burns, the President's Ambassador to Hussein
George Christian
William Macomber

King Hussein
Foreign Minister Ahmad Tuqan
Major General Amir Khammash, Chief of Staff
Jordanian Ambassador to Washington, Farhan Shubellat

Harold H. Saunders

Hussien Visit
x Jordan 9

June 27, 1967

WWR:

You may want to settle this
with the President yourself at
lunch.

HHS

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MEMORANDUM FOR MARVIN WATSON

June 27, 1967

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W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 27, 1967

TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH KING HUSSEIN

King's State of Mind

The King is still emotionally disturbed by recent events, although more composed than he was, and perhaps undecided as well between his traditional moderation and the mood of Arab nationalism and unity of early June. He is bitter towards the West, USSR, Nasser, other Arab leaders and toward himself above all because of the debacle. At bottom, he probably wants to be moderate and realistic in his approach to problem, but he is afraid to risk positions drastically at variance with present extremist Arab opinion. He has been proposing an Arab Summit Conference, which Nasser and some others have been avoiding. His object has been to challenge Nasser at such a meeting, and more Arab opinion towards moderation. Hussein will visit Nasser on his way home. He has made a number of inconsistent statements in recent days, but he handled himself yesterday on television with care and skill. He is enjoying the praise he has received in Arab circles for fighting bravely, and is probably unaware of the depth of the bitterness he created by making a deal with Nasser, and by attacking Jerusalem.

The message he takes away will inevitably be one for Nasser and other Middle Eastern leaders.

His Objectives

To determine U. S., Soviet, and Israeli position towards Jordan and himself, especially with regard to our economic and military assistance program and our position on boundary problems for Jordan. He has publicly committed himself to the return of the West Bank and of Jerusalem; but he appears not to have the slightest notion of how to do so.

Our Objectives

1. To affirm our continued interest in him and in his country. It is basic that he be encouraged to stand up now for himself and for Jordan, not for the loose and divided Arab community as a whole.
2. To make it clear again that we did not know of the onset of hostilities, that we tried to prevent them, using the same words with the UAR and with Israel, and that we were not involved, directly or indirectly.

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By cbj/ia, NARA, Date 6-15-01

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3. To inform him we intend to continue our economic and some of our military assistance programs for him, and for other moderate states in the Middle East, and to make sure he understands the extent of our present assistance to such states.

4. To discuss with him our basic objective of achieving a more durable and more stable situation than that existing prior to June 5, and make clear that our commitments on territorial integrity will be fulfilled in that context.

5. To assure him of our support for a just and permanent solution for the refugees.

6. To ask for his views on possible solutions for the West Bank and Jerusalem problems, and on the future relationship between Israel and Jordan more generally, as well as his opinion on broader issues involved in the conflict.

Talking Points

His Majesty may be assured of continued United States support both for Jordan and for himself, and for other Arab nations which adopt constructive policies. We regret the tragic events of early June, the mistakes made, the death and destruction that ensued; it is imperative that we work together to see if a better and more durable settlement can be reached. Reiterate again that we strongly advised Israel and UAR not to start hostilities, that we did not know of the outbreak of hostilities in advance, and that our posture has been and remains even-handed.

His Majesty may be assured that we intend to continue our economic assistance programs. We are also prepared to resume some military assistance but we are not yet clear on either the scale nor the type of equipment. We wish to avoid an arms race and are consequently urgently reviewing the supply of lethal equipment such as aircraft and tanks to all Middle Eastern states.

The states of the Middle East, with the help of the world community, must find an answer to the refugee problem. We should be most interested in the King's views on this subject, from the point of view of Jordan's national interest. Our objective, difficult as it may be of achievement, is a durable peace permitting all states to develop the full extent of their potentialities.

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If he asks which kind of refugee plan we support, we suggest that you answer that it is too soon to choose. If Jordan and Israel could establish an economic link between their two countries, and perhaps others as well, the refugee problem would have a completely new appearance. If, however, progress of this kind proves impossible, we shall have to fall back on one or another of the older plans for resettlement.

As for Jerusalem, again, we have advised Israel against unilateral action to settle the status of Jerusalem. We recognize and share the interest of the three great religions in the Holy Places. As the King knows, we have never agreed either with Israel or with Jordan about the status of Jerusalem. And during the period of Jordanian control there were legitimate grievances on the part of all three religions. An arrangement should be worked out now which takes fully into account all interests in the problem. We stand ready to play our full part in such a negotiation.

The United States commitment to the territorial integrity of all states of the area is valid. We have acted in the past in support of this principle in behalf of many Middle Eastern states, including the UAR, Lebanon, and others. We shall do so in the future.

However, there must be a realistic approach to the problems of the area, taking fully into account the political consequences of Nasser's folly, the hostilities themselves, and the strong Soviet pressures.

We have been assured by Israel that its ultimate purposes are moderate, and that territorial claims will be subordinated to the goal of achieving peace. As the King realizes, the most difficult territorial problems are those between Jordan and Israel, in view of the past history of the West Bank, and the controversies over its legal status, which have never been finally resolved. Israel has not reached a conclusion on these questions. This is the moment to influence that conclusion.

Against this background, Israel's reluctance to yield territory unless it has some tangible assurances as to its own integrity is understandable from its point of view. There are many ways in which this condition can be satisfied. We have strongly advised the Israelis that we are unwilling to accept fait accompli solutions, and urged them not to take unilateral action either about the West Bank or about Jerusalem. We have intervened energetically to persuade Israel to encourage residents of the West Bank to remain in their homes, and to allow West Bank residents on the East Bank to return.

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On the other hand, it is not practical after all that has happened to ask the Israelis to withdraw until the main terms of a political settlement are clearly agreed, at least in private. We have been thinking, for example, that at some point in the settlement process the Security Council or the General Assembly could declare that the state of war between Israel and other Middle Eastern states is ended, and that no one can legitimately claim rights of belligerency any longer. Such a declaration could be acknowledged by each government, thus starting a movement in the right direction.

While, as you have said, the continuance of hostilities and near hostilities in the Middle East has become a world problem not a regional one, we do not feel that the United States Government is in a position itself to initiate moves for a settlement of this problem. In this situation the attitudes of Jordan and Israelis are paramount. There is little the international community can do until both sides approach the problem of settlement on realistic terms. We are willing to help the parties reach agreement. But nothing can be done until they accept their own responsibilities.

In this setting, it would be helpful and important to hear King Hussein's views on the main outstanding issues between Israel and Jordan, and on the five principles you announced on June 19. How does he see the future of Jordan's relationship with Israel?

In the light of his answer, you may wish to draw on the covering memorandum, encouraging the King to explore the possibilities of agreement with Israel. We are ready to help in private. You should let him understand the risks for him and for Jordan of allowing the situation to drag on indefinitely in its present pattern.

You might ask the King for his ideas on a possible private intermediary. We are inclined to think that the Shah would be a candidate to consider. The Turkish Foreign Minister would also be a possibility.

In the meantime, we hope both Israel and Jordan will cooperate to deal with the present situation on the West Bank humanely. The people should be helped in their present plight.

We hope that Jordan and Israel will both follow a two-pronged policy in the period ahead: trying as hard as they can for a basic settlement, and making arrangements which ensure the welfare of the

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local population in the meantime, and do not prejudice a constructive outcome.

The King will undoubtedly want to know--as Nasser will--your views on a wider range of topics.

I recommend that you stress these additional points:

(1) a condition of peace can be approached in stages, and does not necessarily require a treaty of peace in the first instance. There is no treaty of peace as yet between Germany and the Soviet Union, regrettable as that fact is.

(2) an end of all claims of belligerent rights should open the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal forthwith. The world community would expect the UAR to meet its clear responsibilities under international law.

(3) we deeply regret the decision of certain countries to break diplomatic relations with us. We should be glad to resume normal and friendly relations with them when conditions are appropriate on both sides.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Hussein
Visit*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

susp 12

CONFIDENTIAL

June 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Announcing King Hussein's Visit

With King Hussein coming here Wednesday for lunch, we have to decide when to announce his visit. The main issue is how you want your announcement to relate to his UN speech, probably at 3:30 p. m. today. He may have to say some things that we won't necessarily like. Mac Bundy thinks that, for that reason, it might be better for us to announce tomorrow so both speech and announcement won't end up in the same papers. But you may want to squelch press speculation by announcing sooner. I see three choices:

1. Get it out by special White House announcement early this afternoon, so the invitation will be on the record before Hussein speaks.
2. Announce at George's 4:00 p. m. press briefing this afternoon.
3. Wait until George's 11:00 a. m. session tomorrow.
4. You could do it yourself if you have a press conference.

I would suggest a very simple announcement here with advance notice to Hussein on timing: "King Hussein of Jordan will visit Washington for an exchange of views with the President on Wednesday, June 28. Details are being arranged."

W. Rostow

Announce immediately _____
 At 4:00 p. m. today _____
 I'll do it _____
 At 11:00 a. m. tomorrow _____

Text OK _____
 See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (411)
 NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
 By *ebm/jw*, NARA, Date *6-15-05*

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Hussein Visit

ls. return to HHSaunders
372-a EOB when signed.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 24, 1967

TO: Jim Jones
FOR: The President
FROM: Walt Rostow

The President agreed last week to see Jordan's King Hussein after Hussein speaks at the UN General Assembly 26 June.

Secretary Katzenbach recommends that the President see him either Wednesday or Thursday, 28 or 29 June, and that the President consider having a very small--say just the Tuesday lunch members--working luncheon for him.

If we could set a time today, we would settle the details with Hussein in New York tomorrow. He arrives there tonight and will spend Sunday with his staff.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/s*, NARA, Date 9-3-09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Hussein Visit
x Jordan

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 24, 1967

TO: Jim Jones
FOR: The President
FROM: Walt Rostow

The President agreed last week to see Jordan's King Hussein after Hussein speaks at the UN General Assembly 26 June.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *Chr/18* NARA, Date 9-3-09

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN

June 26, 1967

INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, JUNE 28, 1967

Background Paper

Status of our Jordanian Aid Programs

Economic Assistance

We assume that for the present it is not possible to carry out economic assistance activities on the West Bank. The continuation of aid to Jordan might involve budget support, East Bank Development Loan and technical assistance projects, and PL-480 activities, if the political situation permits.

Budget Support

Thirty million dollars has been provided for budget support for FY 1967. An additional \$2 million was agreed to for political reasons related to the Samu raid in November, 1966. An agreement was signed on May 4, 1967 for the \$2 million but the transfer has been administratively delayed since the onset of hostilities. Consideration of further budget support is postponed pending review of the total situation. Total planned budget support for FY 1968 as presented to Congress is \$24.5 million.

Development Loans

Of the existing loan projects, with one exception, all are located wholly or in part on the West Bank. The Bethlehem/Jerusalem Road (\$1.6 million) and the Jerusalem airport (\$1.8 million) are both in occupied territory and we are delaying further implementation. The telecommunications project (\$6.3 million) involves both banks. With some modification part of it might be carried out on the East Bank. The bid period for the equipment is being extended to provide time for review.

The only existing loan project located entirely on the East Bank is the North Shouna Road project in the Jordan Valley. This involves primarily local currency and work can be resumed.

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Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (F-28)
State Dept. Guidelines
By cbu/jw, NARA, Date 6-5-05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

There are two proposed new loans which have been under study. An electric power loan (\$16 million) involves both banks and will need to be modified if restricted to the East Bank. The Potash Loan (\$15,450,000) is part of a package involving IBRD/IDA, Kuwaiti Fund, W. R. Grace Company and Tenneco. The Project is on the East Bank but its implementation will depend on the reestablishment of conditions satisfactory to the participants.

Technical Assistance

Much of the Technical Cooperation program remains valid. As the situation permits, work may continue on projects including: East Ghor irrigated agriculture development, a feasibility study of a dam on the Zerka River to develop irrigation, studies of other East Bank water resources, public administration projects in Amman and tourism.

We are reviewing the Public Safety Program, in particular a request for equipment to strengthen the public security force.

PL-480

Problems of disaster relief are the subject of a separate paper. A \$9.8 million UNRWA program for Palestine refugees for FY 1968 is before the Interagency Staff Committee. The Voluntary Agencies have an advance equal to one quarter of last year's program pending approvals for FY 1968. There do not appear to be any immediate shortages of food although there are no doubt serious distribution problems.

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KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN

INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, JUNE 28, 1967

Background Paper

MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND SALES TO JORDAN

GRANT AID : Following the termination of the United Kingdom subsidies to Jordan in March 1956, King Hussein turned to the U.S. as a major source of military equipment. During 1957 the U.S. provided Jordan with \$7 million in ground force equipment and in 1958 furnished \$3 million in air force equipment. Numerous additional requests for military assistance were subsequently instituted by the Government of Jordan. As a sequel to these requests, King Hussein specifically asked that the U.S. send a military survey mission to Jordan to conduct an on-the-spot survey of the requirements of the Jordan Arab Army, which took place in October 1958.

As a result of the findings of this mission and U.S. policy decisions with respect to military assistance for Jordan, the United States has programmed through FY 1967 \$53.2 million in grant military assistance for Jordan. This includes an augmentation to the FY 67 program which the U.S. delivered on an expedited basis as a result of King Hussein's plea for assistance following the Israeli raid on Samu in November 1966.

Included in the grant aid programs for Jordan have been 145 medium tanks, 100 armored personnel carriers, 130 artillery pieces (all types), 127 2-1/2 ton and over vehicles, and 168 vehicles under 2-1/2 tons. In addition, we have furnished 4 C-47 aircraft and 12 Hawker-Hunter aircraft.

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

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or State Guidelines
Authority: (450) DOD Directive 5200.30
By cbm/jw, NARA, Date 6-15-05

The proposed program for FY 1968 in the amount of \$1.9 million covers training, maintenance, spares and other services. Approximately \$5 million remains in the grant aid pipe line for Jordan. Most of this is in the nature of spares and automotive supplies; however, there are 35 vehicles of various sizes.

SALES (Ground Force Equipment) : On 18 March 1965 the United States agreed to sell to Jordan ground force equipment amounting to \$44.5 million, with delivery during CY 1965, 1966 and 1967, and a provision for \$15 million in credit. Some of the major items in the package are : 100 M-48 tanks, 50 armored personnel carriers, 20 M-42 SP 40 mm AA guns, 1550 commercial type vehicles, ammunition, small arms, signal and engineer equipment. This sale was contingent on Jordan's agreement not to accept any Soviet type equipment into its inventory. The agreement provides for possible additional future sales of ground equipment.

SALES (F-104A/B Aircraft) : The U S. and Jordan agreed on 29 March 1966 to the sale of twelve F-104 A/B aircraft and supporting defense articles and services. The agreement allowed Jordan to exercise an option to purchase an additional 24 F-104 A/B aircraft if it satisfied certain conditions. Total cost of the 36 aircraft, together with supporting defense articles and services, is \$54.6 million. This option was designed to meet a U.S. desire to limit the sale to 12 aircraft and yet to permit Jordan to demonstrate that it had met in substance a United Arab Command requirement of 36 aircraft. Because of financial restraints, Jordan was unable to exercise its option on 1 January 1967 to purchase 24 additional aircraft. Jordan has agreed to purchase an additional six aircraft and has been granted an option, to be exercised by 31 March 1968, for 18 additional aircraft. The delivery schedule for the first 12 aircraft is:

2 F 104B's in July 1967
2 F-104A's in September 1967
2 F-104A's in October 1967
2 F-104A's in November 1967
2 F-104A's in December 1967
2 F-104A's in January 1968

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OTHER SALES : During FY 1962-1964 the U.S. implemented miscellaneous sales to Jordan in the amount of \$2.4 million. These sales included spare parts, training, ammunition and communications equipment.

PIPELINE: Ground Force Equipment : The undelivered portion in the ground force package is approximately \$9 million and includes spare parts for weapons, tanks, armored personnel carriers and other vehicles. Prior to the current crisis, it was forecast that most of this equipment would be delivered by the end of CY 1967.

PIPELINE: F-104 A/B Aircraft : Approximately \$3 million in equipment has been delivered to Jordan. This includes spare parts; ammunition, ground support equipment and other communications equipment. None of the aircraft has been delivered. However, 47 Jordanians are undergoing training in the U.S. in connection with the F-104 program .

STATUS OF DELIVERIES : Grant aid and sales to Jordan were suspended as a result of the hostilities. We are now resuming shipments of both grant and sales programs for Jordan, except for ammunition, F 104 aircraft and all equipment relating to F-104 aircraft. A decision on the F-104 aircraft has been deferred subject to a high policy review.

King Hussein has asked the U.S. for an agreement in principle that he can still look to the U.S. for arms procurement. Hussein has been informed that the U.S. has made no decision in principle against supplying arms to Jordan.

DOD/ISA/CQuinn:jh

Cleared by: NEA - Mr. Davies
NEA/ARN-Mr. Houghton

S/S-S:Lannon Walker, Room 7237, Ext. 4155

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June 28, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: Walt Rostow

SUBJECT: Press Guidance for Hussein Visit

The attached is not intended for release. We provide it simply as a working base for you and King Hussein to use in laying out the guidelines for George Christian and others in backgrounding the press afterward.

The Jordanians did not want to agree to anything like the attached until the King saw you. However, I suspect they just don't understand the problem George has. We think we've written something that the King can live with, but you can give him a crack at it.

McGeorge Bundy

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Hussein visit
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D. C.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL

VISIT TO WASHINGTON, D.C. OF HIS MAJESTY HUSSEIN I, KING OF THE HASHEMITE
KINGDOM OF JORDAN

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
Wednesday, June 28, 1967

Departure from Andrews Air Force Base

Note: The American party traveling aboard the Jet Star should be at Andrews Air Force Base no later than 9:50 a.m. (See Enclosure No. 1 - Passengers aboard the aircraft)

10:00 a.m. EDT Departure of the Jet Star from Andrews Air Force Base.

Aircraft Commander: Major Francis Long
Stewart: Sergeant Travous
Aircraft Number: 612491

10:50 a.m. EDT Arrival at the Marine Air Terminal, LaGuardia Airport, New York.

Departure from New York

(See Enclosure No. 2 - Passengers Aboard the aircraft)

12:00 noon EDT Departure from the Marine Air Terminal, LaGuardia Airport, New York.

1:00 p.m. EDT Arrival at the Military Airlift Command Terminal, Washington National Airport, Washington, D.C.

Upon arrival at the airport, Ambassador Burns and Mr. Whitehead will descend the stairway. His Majesty and party will follow.

Welcoming Committee

His Excellency Farhan Shubeilat
Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

The Arab Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions at Washington

(continued)

Welcoming Committee (continued)

Mr. Chester C. Carter
Deputy Chief of Protocol of the United States

Mr. Rodger P. Davies
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

1:10 p.m. His Majesty and party will depart from National Airport. Suggested car seating is as follows:

Car No. 1 - His Majesty
Foreign Minister Ahmed Tuqan
General Amir Khammash
Ambassador Shubeilat
Mr. Carter

State Depart- Ambassador Burns
ment Car

1:25 p.m. Arrival at the Southwest Gate of the White House and proceed to the Diplomatic Entrance.

1:30 p.m. President Johnson will give a luncheon for His Majesty at the White House.

p.m. Departure from the White House and proceed to the Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2319 Wyoming Avenue Northwest.

His Majesty will return to New York later in the day.

Welcoming Committee

His Excellency Lawrence Shubeilat
Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan
The Arab Office of Diplomatic Relations
Washington

(continued)

ENCLOSURE NO. 1

Passengers Aboard the Aircraft from Andrews Air Force Base

The Honorable Findley Burns, Jr.
American Ambassador to the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan

Mr. Ben Whitehead
Protocol Officer
Department of State

ENCLOSURE NO. 2

Passengers Aboard the Aircraft from New York City and Return

His Majesty Hussein I
King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

His Excellency Anmed Tuqan
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan

Major General Amir Khammash
Chief of Staff
Jordanian Air Force

The Honorable Findley Burns, Jr.
American Ambassador to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Mr. Ben Whitehead
Protocol Officer
Department of State

Mr. William DeFossett
Security Officer
Department of State

Mr. Ralph Laurello
Security Officer
Department of State

KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT
June 28, 1967

I N D E X

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GENERAL

President's Briefing Memorandum

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PUBLIC STATEMENT

Draft Joint Communique

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

King HUSSEIN	A
Foreign Minister TUQAN	B
Chief of Staff KHAMMASH	C

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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June 27, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Suggested Talking Points for Meeting
with King Hussein

We attach suggested talking points for your visit with King Hussein, now scheduled for Wednesday. After Bill Macomber's talk with the King, we recommend that you see him alone, at least for a brief period. It will be easier for the King to talk about reality without any witnesses but yourself, and especially without Arab witnesses.

The talks with King Hussein could be crucial to the process of achieving a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The King is approaching a fork in the road. It should not be impossible for him to choose the right course. If he does so, that fact would be a real beginning, breaking up the hitherto rigid Arab line against peace. If he is convinced that such a peaceful solution is impossible, the tide could run in the wrong direction from our point of view.

The Soviets are already consolidating Nasser in Egypt. Nasser is in touch with us, but we doubt that he will have an acceptable deal to offer. Therefore the Jordanian problem remains the most hopeful opening for us.

There is a difference of view between those who counsel moving ahead with Jordan now, and those who advise waiting

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By cbm/ps, NARA, Date 6-15-05

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for the dust to settle. We recommend taking advantage of the King's presence to open the possibility of prompt action on his part with Israel, directly or through an intermediary -- perhaps the Shah, perhaps an American. Our stake in the possible success of these negotiations, difficult as they will be, makes it advisable to consider an American intermediary if the King requests one. A delay, which the Israelis favor, could result in freezing the situation on the West Bank into a pattern of Israeli control which it would be nearly impossible to change later.

The problems between Israel and Jordan -- the West Bank and Jerusalem -- are more difficult than any of the other issues between Israel and her neighbors, except for the overriding and fundamental problem of obtaining Arab recognition for Israel's right to exist. But there are also greater opportunities, because a Jordan-Israel solution would hold out the hope of transforming the refugee problem, and that of Jerusalem, which are at the heart of the conflict.

Our talks with Israeli representatives in New York and here persuade us that the Israelis are willing to make a pretty favorable deal with King Hussein, provided he accepts the idea of peace. You should not, we think, sponsor or propose any particular bargain, or be drawn into the details of any possible plan. But we do recommend that you be prepared to advise and encourage King Hussein to explore the possibility of negotiations with the Israelis, directly or through an intermediary. (You should know that the King has negotiated secretly with the Israelis in the past, e.g., meeting Eban on the Riviera. This information is of the greatest sensitivity).

The basic territorial problem dividing Israel and Jordan is the West Bank area. The West Bank was part of the Palestine Mandate given up by the British in 1947. It came under Jordanian control as a result of the hostilities in 1948, and the subsequent declaration of Palestinian notables of their wish to adhere to Trans-Jordan. We have never

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recognized Jordanian sovereignty over the West Bank; instead we have recognized the area as being under Jordanian control pursuant to the General Armistice Agreement. We have taken an even more reserved position about Jordanian control in the Old City of Jerusalem and about the whole position in Jerusalem. Our Ambassador to Jordan, for example, does not show the flag while driving in the Old City. A memorandum on the history and legal position of the area is included as a Background Paper in your book.

The Israelis tell us they have not yet finally made up their minds on the position they will take with regard to the West Bank generally, and Jerusalem in particular. So far, we have advised them not to take unilateral actions, nor to present the world with a fait accompli.

The Israelis point out that they have a national security interest in keeping the West Bank out of unfriendly or aggressive hands; that they tried to prevent King Hussein from entering the war and sought a cease fire even after he had taken offensive action; and that their occupation of the West Bank was unanticipated and is unwanted. They were particularly aggrieved by his attack in Jerusalem, where they took heavy casualties because they refrained from the use of air power. On the other hand, they say, these events occurred, a new situation has emerged, and they are still not clear what policy King Hussein represents today. They stress that the City of Jerusalem cannot be divided again, and that the Holy Places must be accessible to all.

There is a good deal of talk in Israel and among Palestinian Arabs about the possibility of an autonomous Arab state on the West Bank, federated with Israel, and of comparable status for the Gaza Strip. Both Dayan and Ben Gurion have suggested such an approach. Some Palestinians are reported to be interested in the possibility. There are rumors of possible meetings of Arab notables. There is always a possibility that such

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meetings could be stage-managed by the Israelis to come up with a statement or even a declaration calling for a separation of the West Bank from Jordan. Such a procedure would follow that of Jordan in annexing the West Bank in the first place.

There would be political danger if Israel tried to set up a semi-autonomous Arab State on the West Bank by unilateral action. Such a step would make general Arab-Israeli peace more difficult to imagine, and would create a new Arab grievance.

We do not see any possibility that King Hussein could negotiate with Israel, and then accept a state of peace with Israel, unless he retained political control over the West Bank area, subject at most to minor boundary rectifications, and an international solution for Jerusalem.

But it is possible that over time an economic link could develop between Israel and Jordan as a whole. This would leave the two states of Israel and Jordan politically independent but with open cooperative economic relationships. A development of this kind should make it easier to solve the issue of Jerusalem, which could become a focus of economic exchange, rather than a salient on a nervous frontier. It could transform the refugee problem into a problem of regional economic development. And by providing an economic opportunity for the refugees, it would begin to relieve the other Middle Eastern states of the burden of the idea that somehow, some day, Arab loyalty requires them to help liberate Palestine and restore the refugees to their rightful property.

We therefore conclude that at this stage the optimum plan should include these elements: (1) economic links between Israel and the whole of Jordan; (2) the West Bank under the sovereignty of Jordan, subject, however, (3) to boundary adjustments and (4) a special agreement about Jerusalem, and (5) an end to the state of war, demilitarization of the West Bank, and normal relations. We gather from a conversation

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
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between Evron and Walt Rostow that Israel is thinking along similar lines.

We should have no illusion: the odds are against Hussein accepting this sort of package at an early date. But it is worthwhile encouraging him to explore the possibilities.

The Israelis would probably accept some such approach in the near future. They might even accept a less ambitious solution that left the West Bank in Jordanian hands, except for an agreement on Jerusalem.

If the present situation continues very long, however, King Hussein should understand that his risks with regard to the West Bank probably increase. At the moment, he could probably get political control of most of the West Bank, in exchange for a favorable long-term economic arrangement, and a new status, perhaps condominium, in Jerusalem. Later on, such a deal might well become more difficult.



Acting Secretary

Attachment:

Suggested Talking Points.

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TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH KING HUSSEIN

King's State of Mind

The King is still emotionally disturbed by recent events, although more composed than he was, and perhaps undecided as well between his traditional moderation and the mood of Arab nationalism and unity of early June. He is bitter towards the West, USSR, Nasser, other Arab leaders and toward himself above all because of the debacle. At bottom, he probably wants to be moderate and realistic in his approach to problems, but he is afraid to risk positions drastically at variance with present extremist Arab opinion. He has been proposing an Arab Summit Conference, which Nasser and some others have been avoiding. His object has been to challenge Nasser at such a meeting, and more Arab opinion towards moderation. Hussein will visit Nasser on his way home. He has made a number of inconsistent statements in recent days, but he handled himself yesterday on television with care and skill. He is enjoying the praise he has received in Arab circles for fighting bravely, and is probably unaware of the depth of the bitterness he created by making a deal with Nasser, and by attacking Jerusalem.

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The message he takes away will inevitably be one for Nasser and other Middle Eastern leaders.

His Objectives

To determine U.S., Soviet, and Israeli position towards Jordan and himself, especially with regard to our economic and military assistance program and our position on boundary problems for Jordan. He has publicly committed himself to the return of the West Bank and of Jerusalem; but he appears not to have the slightest notion of how to do so.

Our Objectives

1. To affirm our continued interest in him and in his country. It is basic that he be encouraged to stand up now for himself and for Jordan, not for the loose and divided Arab community as a whole.

2. To make it clear again that we did not know of the onset of hostilities, that we tried to prevent them, using the same words with the UAR and with Israel, and that we were not involved, directly or indirectly.

3. To inform him we intend to continue our economic and some of our military assistance programs for him, and for other moderate states in the Middle East, and to make sure he understands the extent of our present assistance to such states.

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4. To discuss with him our basic objective of achieving a more durable and more stable situation than that existing prior to June 5, and make clear that our commitments on territorial integrity will be fulfilled in that context. Our most important purpose in these talks will be to make sure that he faces the reality of the situation, the fact that he initiated hostilities with Israel, and our overriding purpose to eliminate the claim of belligerency as a threat to world peace.

5. To assure him of our support for a just and permanent solution for the refugees.

6. To ask for his views on possible solutions for the West Bank and Jerusalem problems, and on the future relationship between Israel and Jordan more generally, as well as his opinion on broader issues involved in the conflict.

Talking Points

His Majesty may be assured of continued United States support both for Jordan and for himself, and for other Arab nations which adopt constructive policies. We regret the tragic events of early June, the mistakes made, the death

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and destruction that ensued; it is imperative that we work together to see if a better and more durable settlement can be reached. Reiterate again that we strongly advised Israel and UAR not to start hostilities, that we did not know of the outbreak of hostilities in advance, and that our posture has been and remains even-handed.

His Majesty may be assured that we intend to continue our economic assistance programs. We are also prepared to resume some military assistance but we are not yet clear on either the scale nor the type of equipment. We wish to avoid an arms race and are consequently urgently reviewing the supply of lethal equipment such as aircraft and tanks to all Middle Eastern states.

The states of the Middle East, with the help of the world community, must find an answer to the refugee problem. We should be most interested in the King's views on this subject, from the point of view of Jordan's national interest. Our objective, difficult as it may be of achievement, is a durable peace permitting all states to develop the full extent of their potentialities.

If he asks which kind of refugee plan we support, we suggest that you answer that it is too soon to choose. If

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Jordan and Israel could establish an economic link between their two countries, and perhaps others as well, the refugee problem would have a completely new appearance. If, however, progress of this kind proves impossible, we shall have to fall back on one or another of the older plans for resettlement.

As for Jerusalem, again, we have advised Israel against unilateral action to settle the status of Jerusalem. We recognize and share the interest of the three great religions in the Holy Places. As the King knows, we have never agreed either with Israel or with Jordan about the status of Jerusalem. And during the period of Jordanian control there were legitimate grievances on the part of all three religions. An arrangement should be worked out now which takes into account all interests in the problem. We stand ready to play our full part in such a negotiation.

The United States commitment to the territorial integrity of all states of the area is valid. We have acted in the past in support of this principle in behalf of many Middle Eastern states, including the UAR, Lebanon, and others. We shall do so in the future.

However, there must be a realistic approach to the problems of the area, taking fully into account the political consequences

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of Nasser's folly, the hostilities themselves, and the strong Soviet pressures. Our commitment to the first principle of your speech of June 19 must be the goal and test of all plans for the achievement of peace.

We have been assured by Israel that its ultimate purposes are moderate, and that territorial claims will be subordinated to the goal of achieving peace. As the King realizes, the most difficult territorial problems are those between Jordan and Israel, in view of the past history of the West Bank, and the controversies over its legal status, which have never been finally resolved. Israel has not reached a conclusion on these questions. This is the moment to influence that conclusion.

Against this background, Israel's reluctance to yield territory unless it has some tangible assurances as to its own integrity is understandable from its point of view. There are many ways in which this condition can be satisfied. We have strongly advised the Israelis that we are unwilling to accept fait accompli solutions, and urged them not to take unilateral action either about the West Bank or about Jerusalem. We have intervened energetically to persuade

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Israel to encourage residents of the West Bank to remain in their homes, and to allow West Bank residents on the East Bank to return.

On the other hand, it is not practical after all that has happened to ask the Israelis to withdraw until the main terms of a political settlement are clearly agreed, at least in private. We have been thinking, for example, that at some point in the settlement process the Security Council or the General Assembly could declare that the state of war between Israel and other Middle Eastern states is ended, and that no one can legitimately claim rights of belligerency any longer. Such a declaration could be acknowledged by each government, thus starting a movement in the right direction.

While, as you have said, the continuance of hostilities and near hostilities in the Middle East has become a world problem not a regional one, we do not feel that the United States Government is in a position itself to initiate moves for a settlement of this problem. In this situation the attitudes of Jordan and Israelis are paramount. There is little the international community can do until both sides approach the problem of settlement on realistic terms. We are willing to help the parties reach agreement. But nothing

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can be done until they accept their own responsibilities.

In this setting, it would be helpful and important to hear King Hussein's views on the main outstanding issues between Israel and Jordan, and on the five principles you announced on June 19. How does he see the future of Jordan's relationship with Israel?

In the light of his answer, you may wish to draw on the covering memorandum, encouraging the King to explore the possibilities of agreement with Israel. We are ready to help in private. You should let him understand the risks for him and for Jordan of allowing the situation to drag on indefinitely in its present pattern.

You might ask the King for his ideas on a possible private intermediary. We are inclined to think that the Shah would be a candidate to consider. The Turkish Foreign Minister would also be a possibility. We should not exclude an American intermediary, if he wishes to have one designated.

In the meantime, we hope both Israel and Jordan will cooperate to deal with the present situation on the West Bank humanely. The people should be helped in their present plight.

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We hope that Jordan and Israel will both follow a two-pronged policy in the period ahead: trying as hard as they can for a basic settlement, and making arrangements which ensure the welfare of the local population in the meantime, and do not prejudice a constructive outcome.

The King will undoubtedly want to know -- as Nasser will -- your views on a wider range of topics.

I recommend that you stress these additional points:

(1) a condition of peace can be approached in stages, and does not necessarily require a treaty of peace in the first instance. There is no treaty of peace as yet between Germany and the Soviet Union, regrettable as that fact is.

(2) an end of all claims of belligerent rights should open the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal forthwith. The world community would expect the UAR to meet its clear responsibilities under international law.

(3) we deeply regret the decision of certain countries to break diplomatic relations with us. We should be glad to resume normal and friendly relations with them when conditions are appropriate on both sides.

In the case of Nasser, there are special problems, which will require special consideration.

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June 24, 1967

KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT JUNE 28, 1967

Background Paper

King Hussein's Position

Fluent in English, the 31-year-old Hussein, although not without his limitations, is capable, courageous, proud, and realistic. He has matured and aged considerably since you last saw him in Washington in April, 1964. He has demonstrated considerable political skill in weathering fourteen turbulent years on the throne. He is perhaps facing the most serious test of his ability to survive in weeks ahead.

At the moment he is bitter towards the West, the USSR, the other Arab countries and, above all, against himself because of the recent debacle which Jordan has suffered. He nonetheless seems to have retained his balance, his moderation and his realism in his approach to the problem of reconstruction ahead. In order to survive, however, he has had to cast his lot with the other Arab states. He must consequently avoid positions drastically at variance with the Arab consensus. He would rapidly lose the support of his population and his army if he publicly endorsed positions counter to prevailing Arab positions. He is all too keenly aware that Arab incompetence shares a major responsibility for the recent overwhelming Arab defeat. His visit has the full support of Nasser and he may well be talking for the other Arab states when he talks with you. After his return he hopes to visit Cairo and Baghdad where he will report the results of his visit here.

He still sees his future linked with the West and particularly with the United States. He is presently uncertain what our position towards him and Jordan is. This is presumably a basic objective of his talks with you. He is particularly concerned with the fate of the West Bank and the Arab sector of Jerusalem which represents half the assets of his Kingdom and which he has publicly stated must revert to Jordan.

Outside of the economic importance of the West Bank to his Kingdom, he will probably lose the confidence of his people and his policy of alignment with the United States will lose credibility if he does not get back the West Bank and Jerusalem under some satisfactory arrangement.

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By ebm/is, NARA, Date 6-15-05

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He and other high officials of the Jordan Government have persistently sought clarification of the meaning of our commitment to the territorial integrity and political independence of all the states of the Near East. In the light of our close association with him over the past ten years he will rightly or wrongly expect our support in obtaining the return of this area. He is realistic enough to realize that there will be a price for the return which is of course the nub of the issue.

He will also be seeking assurances that we will continue to extend economic assistance to Jordan and we can probably meet at least in part his desires in this field. More difficult will be his probable request for U. S. support in reconstructing his army. The army is, as you know, one of the keystones of Hussein's support in Jordan. He will also want to replace his air force which was destroyed during the conflict. We can argue that he does not need an air force as he could not possibly afford one large enough to defend Jordan against Israel. This misses the point. He must have an air force to hold his own with his own military and with the other states of the area. The key issue here will be our previous commitment to supply him with F-104's. We can stall for the moment on the grounds that to avoid an arms race we are urgently reviewing the sales of lethal weapons to all states of the area. We cannot postpone this decision indefinitely. He has already been offered military assistance by the USSR and although he has not accepted the offer and does not want to accept the offer, he will be faced with an agonizing dilemma if we are not willing to assist him.

He will also be interested in knowing what our intentions are with respect to helping those members of his population which have fled from the West Bank. We have already given tents and are studying other means of being helpful. We can ask him what specific needs he has.

Whatever posture we take we must bear in mind that it will be transmitted back as the U. S. position to Nasser and other leaders in the Middle East.

Drafted by: NEA/ARN:RBHoughton:gs 6/24/67 Clearance: NEA:RPDavies

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KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN

June 26, 1967

INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, JUNE 28, 1967

Background Paper

Status of our Jordanian Aid Programs

Economic Assistance

We assume that for the present it is not possible to carry out economic assistance activities on the West Bank. The continuation of aid to Jordan might involve budget support, East Bank Development Loan and technical assistance projects, and PL-480 activities, if the political situation permits.

Budget Support

Thirty million dollars has been provided for budget support for FY 1967. An additional \$2 million was agreed to for political reasons related to the Samu raid in November, 1966. An agreement was signed on May 4, 1967 for the \$2 million but the transfer has been administratively delayed since the onset of hostilities. Consideration of further budget support is postponed pending review of the total situation. Total planned budget support for FY 1968 as presented to Congress is \$24.5 million.

Development Loans

Of the existing loan projects, with one exception, all are located wholly or in part on the West Bank. The Bethlehem/Jerusalem Road (\$1.6 million) and the Jerusalem airport (\$1.8 million) are both in occupied territory and we are delaying further implementation. The telecommunications project (\$6.3 million) involves both banks. With some modification part of it might be carried out on the East Bank. The bid period for the equipment is being extended to provide time for review.

The only existing loan project located entirely on the East Bank is the North Shouna Road project in the Jordan Valley. This involves primarily local currency and work can be resumed.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#28)
State Dept. Guidelines
By cbm/jw, NARA, Date 6-15-05

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There are two proposed new loans which have been under study. An electric power loan (\$16 million) involves both banks and will need to be modified if restricted to the East Bank. The Potash Loan (\$15,450,000) is part of a package involving IBRD/IDA, Kuwaiti Fund, W. R. Grace Company and Tenneco. The Project is on the East Bank but its implementation will depend on the reestablishment of conditions satisfactory to the participants.

Technical Assistance

Much of the Technical Cooperation program remains valid. As the situation permits, work may continue on projects including: East Ghor irrigated agriculture development, a feasibility study of a dam on the Zerka River to develop irrigation, studies of other East Bank water resources, public administration projects in Amman and tourism.

We are reviewing the Public Safety Program, in particular a request for equipment to strengthen the public security force.

PL-480

Problems of disaster relief are the subject of a separate paper. A \$9.8 million UNRWA program for Palestine refugees for FY 1968 is before the Interagency Staff Committee. The Voluntary Agencies have an advance equal to one quarter of last year's program pending approvals for FY 1968. There do not appear to be any immediate shortages of food although there are no doubt serious distribution problems.

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KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN

INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, JUNE 28, 1967

Background Paper

MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND SALES TO JORDAN

GRANT AID : Following the termination of the United Kingdom subsidies to Jordan in March 1956, King Hussein turned to the U.S. as a major source of military equipment. During 1957 the U.S. provided Jordan with \$7 million in ground force equipment and in 1958 furnished \$3 million in air force equipment. Numerous additional requests for military assistance were subsequently instituted by the Government of Jordan. As a sequel to these requests, King Hussein specifically asked that the U.S. send a military survey mission to Jordan to conduct an on-the-spot survey of the requirements of the Jordan Arab Army, which took place in October 1958.

As a result of the findings of this mission and U.S. policy decisions with respect to military assistance for Jordan, the United States has programmed through FY 1967 \$53.2 million in grant military assistance for Jordan. This includes an augmentation to the FY 67 program which the U.S. delivered on an expedited basis as a result of King Hussein's plea for assistance following the Israeli raid on Samu in November 1966.

Included in the grant aid programs for Jordan have been 145 medium tanks, 100 armored personnel carriers, 130 artillery pieces (all types), 127 2-1/2 ton and over vehicles, and 168 vehicles under 2-1/2 tons. In addition, we have furnished 4 C-47 aircraft and 12 Hawker-Hunter aircraft.

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The proposed program for FY 1968 in the amount of \$1.9 million covers training, maintenance, spares and other services. Approximately \$5 million remains in the grant aid pipe line for Jordan. Most of this is in the nature of spares and automotive supplies; however, there are 35 vehicles of various sizes.

SALES (Ground Force Equipment) : On 18 March 1965 the United States agreed to sell to Jordan ground force equipment amounting to \$44.5 million, with delivery during CY 1965, 1966 and 1967, and a provision for \$15 million in credit. Some of the major items in the package are : 100 M-48 tanks, 50 armored personnel carriers, 20 M-42 SP 40 mm AA guns, 1550 commercial type vehicles, ammunition, small arms, signal and engineer equipment. This sale was contingent on Jordan's agreement not to accept any Soviet type equipment into its inventory. The agreement provides for possible additional future sales of ground equipment.

SALES (F-104A/B Aircraft) : The U S. and Jordan agreed on 29 March 1966 to the sale of twelve F-104 A/B aircraft and supporting defense articles and services. The agreement allowed Jordan to exercise an option to purchase an additional 24 F-104 A/B aircraft if it satisfied certain conditions. Total cost of the 36 aircraft, together with supporting defense articles and services, is \$54.6 million. This option was designed to meet a U.S. desire to limit the sale to 12 aircraft and yet to permit Jordan to demonstrate that it had met in substance a United Arab Command requirement of 36 aircraft. Because of financial restraints, Jordan was unable to exercise its option on 1 January 1967 to purchase 24 additional aircraft. Jordan has agreed to purchase an additional six aircraft and has been granted an option, to be exercised by 31 March 1968, for 18 additional aircraft. The delivery schedule for the first 12 aircraft is:

2 F 104B's in July 1967
2 F-104A's in September 1967
2 F-104A's in October 1967
2 F-104A's in November 1967
2 F-104A's in December 1967
2 F-104A's in January 1968

OTHER SALES : During FY 1962-1964 the U.S. implemented miscellaneous sales to Jordan in the amount of \$2.4 million. These sales included spare parts, training, ammunition and communications equipment.

PIPELINE: Ground Force Equipment : The undelivered portion in the ground force package is approximately \$9 million and includes spare parts for weapons, tanks, armored personnel carriers and other vehicles. Prior to the current crisis, it was forecast that most of this equipment would be delivered by the end of CY 1967.

PIPELINE: F-104 A/B Aircraft : Approximately \$3 million in equipment has been delivered to Jordan. This includes spare parts, ammunition, ground support equipment and other communications equipment. None of the aircraft has been delivered. However, 47 Jordanians are undergoing training in the U.S. in connection with the F-104 program .

STATUS OF DELIVERIES : Grant aid and sales to Jordan were suspended as a result of the hostilities. We are now resuming shipments of both grant and sales programs for Jordan, except for ammunition, F 104 aircraft and all equipment relating to F-104 aircraft. A decision on the F-104 aircraft has been deferred subject to a high policy review.

King Hussein has asked the U.S. for an agreement in principle that he can still look to the U.S. for arms procurement. Hussein has been informed that the U.S. has made no decision in principle against supplying arms to Jordan.

DOD/ISA/CQuinn:jh

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