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June 25, 1967

KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, JUNE 28, 1967

Background Paper

JORDAN'S ECONOMIC SITUATION

Area: 37,300 square miles (East and West Bank)
(approximately same as Indiana)

Population: 1.9 million (East and West Bank)

Recent Growth: Foreign aid has enabled Jordan, though not economically viable, to show rapid growth in the past several years. U.S. help has played the key role. Living standards have improved generally. One major adverse factor has been recurring drought, another the scarcity of natural resources. Infrastructure development has received considerable attention with good results.

Economic Structure: Agriculture is the heart of the economy, giving livelihood to two-thirds of the people. Dry farming predominates, with wheat and barley the chief crops, but the irrigated area under cultivation has more than doubled since 1955. Improvement in yields on irrigated lands, producing mainly vegetables and fruits, is striking. The most notable agricultural project is the expanding East Ghor irrigation scheme, made possible by U.S. aid, using Yarmouk River water on lands in the Jordan valley lying east of the Jordan River.

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Known exploitable mineral resources are phosphate and potash from the Dead Sea, the latter still undeveloped. Phosphate production has tripled since 1960.

Manufacturing is of secondary importance and has very limited potential for development. Apart from an oil refinery and a cement factory, the existing manufacturing establishments are small, processing local food and animal products and making light consumer goods.

Jordan has consistently run a large deficit in commodity trade. Imports were about \$184 million in 1966 and were only one-half covered by growing foreign exchange earnings from tourism, remittances, agricultural produce and phosphates.

Jordan's national development program concentrates on agriculture, import-substitution industries and mining, and tourism, but the country's economic limitations and the large refugee population make progress slow and difficult.

U.S. Assistance: U.S. aid began in 1952 with technical assistance projects, and since 1957 we have been the major foreign contributor. The U.S. in FY 1967 contributed \$32 million* in cash grants and special Letters of Credit to support Jordan's budget. We also gave \$3.6 million in development grants. Together, this \$36 million constitutes almost one-third of the government budget. Surplus foods under PL-480 have served to make up the country's food shortage, while additional indirect aid takes the form of U.S. support of UNRWA for Jordan's Palestinian refugees.

* \$2 million of this has not been released.

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U.S. economic assistance (\$517 million through 1966) has created a base for continued economic growth. The Jordanian response has been gratifying. We have been able to make steady, though gradual, reductions in budget support. This required the Jordanians to increase domestic revenues, improve the management of their financial and institutional resources, and engage in sound planning with heavy emphasis on income-producing activities. While the U.S. is Jordan's chief source of foreign aid, other important suppliers are the United Kingdom, West Germany and Kuwait.

Future Prospects: With the remarkable advancement of the last decade, the prospects of Jordan's achieving economic independence were beginning to look brighter. The recent hostilities have left Jordan with grave economic problems, resulting principally from the loss of the West Bank which contained well over one half of the country's foreign exchange earning assets. With the loss of West Bank markets for Jordan's small industrial establishment, business activity is depressed. Jordan's principal banks had branch offices and substantial lines of credit on the West Bank. Israeli occupation of the West Bank has left these financial institutions in uncertain condition. Tourism, Jordan's principal foreign exchange earner, is at a standstill and Jordan may lose as much as 75% of its tourist trade if the West Bank sites are lost. Jordan also faces the care and feeding of thousands of evacuees from the West Bank. Until the fate of the West Bank is determined, it is difficult to predict Jordan's economic future other than it will require substantial economic assistance.

NESA/GTIC/AID:RFitzmaurice/
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Cleared by:
NEA - Mr. Davies
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June 25, 1967

KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN

INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, JUNE 28, 1967

Background Paper

JORDAN'S WEST BANK

The West Bank of Jordan and the Gaza Strip are the only parts of Palestine not absorbed into Israel when the state was created. The West Bank was annexed to Jordan by resolution of a council of West Bank leaders in 1950. The U.S. has never recognized this annexation de jure in the absence of an overall settlement but for 17 years we have recognized Jordan's de facto sovereignty over the West Bank. It contains approximately 47% of Jordan's population, 1/3 of Jordan's agricultural land, and accounted for at least 75% of Jordan's earnings from tourism and 70% of Jordan's remittances from Jordanians working abroad. These were Jordan's two most important sources of foreign exchange earnings. We have extended development loans for West Bank projects and our AID program has recognized the West Bank as part of Jordan. The West Bank is now occupied by Israeli defense forces. Even apart from the new influx of refugees to the East Bank, the Israeli occupation has crippled the Jordanian economy.

The King has made it clear that he cannot compromise on the question of the return of the West Bank to Jordan.

There are basically four alternatives for its future disposition:

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1) Return to Jordan with appropriate arrangements for demilitarization, access to the Holy Places by adherents of all religious faiths and with minor border adjustments to rationalize the 1948 armistice line.

2) Create a semi-independent Palestine state with responsibility for defense and foreign affairs reserved to the Government of Israel.

3) Return to Jordan but with arrangements for economic unity with Israel.

4) Outright annexation by Israel.

In terms of United States interest, alternative (1) is the most desirable. This would preserve the US commitment on territorial integrity and would make possible the future development of Jordan as a viable political and economic entity. It would probably preserve the relatively moderate and pro-Western regime of King Hussein in Jordan.

Alternative (2) would have the advantage of providing a more defensible perimeter for Israel but would be widely interpreted as incompatible with the United States commitment on territorial integrity. It would antagonize the Arabs, jeopardize King Hussein's regime in Jordan and threaten other U S interests in the area such as oil and transportation rights. It would also reduce U S influence among the moderate Arab states and limit the U S Government's ability to exercise this influence in the Arab capitals at a time when a constructive U.S presence would be most useful in dealing with the aftermath of the Israeli-Arab hostilities.

Alternative (3) would have the advantage of reuniting the West Bank and perhaps all of Jordan with the Mediterranean coastal plain. It would be a significant step in breaking the Arab boycott of Israel. It is doubtful, however, that King Hussein would accept such an arrangement. If he did, his regime might be overthrown. If such an arrangement were forced on Jordan, Jordan as well as Israel might then be boycotted by the other Arab states.

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Alternative (4) has some adherents within Israel but it seems likely that the Israelis would prefer some variation of alternatives (1), (2) or (3). Alternative (4) would be the least desirable in terms of U.S. interests, and would create a difficult problem for Israel in maintaining internal security among the hostile West Bank Arab population. It would be feasible only if the Israelis were willing to change the Jewish character of their state and create a truly secular state embracing both Jews and Arabs.

A more comprehensive study of West Bank alternatives is included as Annex 1.

NEA/ARN/MWwiley:jh

Cleared by NEA - Mr. Davies
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KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN

INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, JUNE 28, 1967

BACKGROUND PAPER

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

Numbers Involved. Between 100,000 and 150,000 West Bankers have fled to Jordan's East Bank. At least half of this figure and probably more are UNRWA-registered 1948 refugees. The large refugee camps in the Jericho area, which normally house some 70,000 refugees, are now practically empty. There has been relatively little movement of UNRWA-registered refugees from other areas of the West Bank.

The exodus to the East Bank has taken place in two waves: the first was in the immediate aftermath of hostilities and was followed by a lull during which little movement took place. In the last week the flow eastward has again increased. Our most recent estimate (from Jordan) is that for the past several days about 3000 refugees have crossed the Jordan River daily.

Israeli Policy on West Bank. In general, Israeli treatment of the West Bank population has been orderly and humane. We are not aware of any deliberate Israeli program to force the West Bankers out. In practice, however, there have been some unfortunate isolated incidents, such as the eviction of Arabs from their homes in certain parts of the old city of Jerusalem. While the town of Qalqilya on the Jordan-Israel border is badly damaged and now uninhabited, we have no information to confirm press reports that the Israelis are deliberately razing it.

More important than these localized incidents, however, is the fact that the Israelis are making it extremely easy for West Bankers to leave and have barred any from returning. Subtle pressure may also be exercised at local initiative. For those wishing to leave, the Israelis are providing immediate transportation and requiring a minimum of exit formalities.

General Conditions on the West Bank. Food is apparently in fairly good supply although there are some shortages such as cooking fuel. UNRWA is maintaining its normal operations with the full cooperation of the Israeli authorities. Because of the sharp reduction in tourist

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travel, there is widespread joblessness, which may lead to further pressures for emigration. A related problem is the dependence of many West Bankers on remittances from relatives working in other Arab countries, which at present are probably not getting into areas under Israeli control.

Conditions on East Bank. The Jordanian Government, with UNRWA's assistance, now seems to be bringing some order to relief operations. They have established nine camps for the displaced West Bankers. Five of these will be administered by UNRWA for UNRWA-registered 1948 refugees. Food stocks and medical supplies appear adequate for the time being. There will be a pressing need for more tents. UNRWA is the best equipped to coordinate relief operations and Commissioner General Michelmore has indicated he is prepared to undertake the task if the General Assembly will give him the mandate. We have told our UN delegation we would have no objection to a resolution along these lines being considered by the Swedes, providing that it is clear the additional mandate would be for short-term emergency relief only.

The Jordanian Government has expressed concern at the Israeli refusal to allow any return flow to the West Bank and is reportedly considering a "peace march" to the Jordan River of 10,000 West Bankers who wish to return to their homes.

ICRC and other Agencies. The International Committee of the Red Cross is channeling relief supplies received from national Red Cross societies to the areas of need. A large number of other voluntary agencies are continuing and expanding their relief operations.

US Actions on Refugee Problem. We have provided 5,000 tents to Jordan (cost, including transportation, about \$750,000) and are considering other forms of assistance. We are continuing our PL-480 assistance to Jordan as well as to UNRWA. We have expressed on several occasions to the Israeli Government our concern that it take no action to increase the flow of displaced persons to the East Bank, and that it permit a reverse flow of refugees. We have just instructed our Embassy in Tel Aviv to do this again, suggesting that the Israelis set up procedures to slow down departures and to allow West Bank residents to return. We are also considering the desirability of urging the UN Secretary General to appoint a prominent international figure to head a team to survey the situation of displaced persons on the East Bank as well as the Arab populace in areas under Israeli control.

Clearances:

- UNP - Mr. Paolozzi (draft) ²⁶
- ARN - Mr. Wiley (draft) ²⁴
- IAI - Mr. Atherton ²⁸

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June 26, 1967

KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, JUNE 28, 1967

Background Paper

The International Status of Jerusalem

Background: In 1949 the UN General Assembly, led by the traditional Catholic countries, adopted a resolution which provided that Jerusalem should be placed under a "permanent international regime... administered by the UN". We and the British voted against the 1949 resolution on the grounds that it was impractical; and we would evidently have been glad to settle for some kind of "functional" as opposed to "territorial" internationalization, i.e., an international arrangement merely to insure protection of and access to the Holy Places. However, since then we have considered ourselves bound by this resolution, and have refused to recognize de jure Israeli or Jordanian sovereignty over the parts of the city that they respectively occupied.

Past Precedents: The emphasis on administration of matters concerning the Holy Places up till now has been on the "status quo". The Turkish and later British administrators of the city found that any change in the status quo could produce such a violent international storm (such as the Crimean War) that they made every effort to enforce rigorous adherence to the letter of the status quo (which has often been quite difficult to document).

Recent Status : The truce line of 1949 left the great bulk of the Holy Places on the Jordanian side (the "Old City"). Since then there have been few major controversies concerning them except for the denial of access to Israelis and most Jewish tourists. The Jordanian governors have in general adhered scrupulously to the status quo with this important and regrettable exception.

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The Present Problem: Regardless of who administers the Old City, he will have to face the problem of inextricable locations of the Holy Places of three faiths. For example, the Muslim Haraam al-Sharif is placed almost vertically on top of the Jewish Wailing Wall. The rights claimed by various nations and faiths, particularly Jewish and Muslim, continue to arouse intense passion. (King Hussein's grandfather Abdullah considered Jerusalem the pearl of his kingdom, and the Muslims in general consider Jerusalem one of the three holiest cities in the Muslim world).

Prospects for the Immediate Future: The confrontation of the international community with Israel over its holding of the Old City of Jerusalem in particular will be one of the most bitterly contested in the forthcoming attempt at a settlement. The Vatican has already publicly reasserted its position that all of Jerusalem should be placed under an international regime as a separate territory. Privately the Vatican has informed us that such a "corpus separatum" should be established "at least in the Old City". This position is bound to have an effect on the position taken in the UN by the traditionally Catholic powers, in particular France which has maintained an historic vital interest in the status of Christendom in Jerusalem. The British have already demanded that the Israelis give up the Old City. King Hussein received a very sympathetic hearing on this question when he addressed the General Assembly on June 26.

The feasibility of various plans now being proposed for the status of the Old City of Jerusalem will depend upon the degree to which the Israelis evacuate the West Bank. Obviously it would be next to impossible to attempt to maintain an "international" enclave in the midst of Israeli-held territory against the wishes of a powerful and victorious Israeli Army. (Furthermore, we cannot give serious consideration to proposals to continue to attempt to persuade the Israelis to submit their "New City" portion of Jerusalem, which they have held since 1948, to internationalization.) If, however, the Israelis evacuate the West Bank they will still be determined to hold on to all of Jerusalem, particularly because of the Wailing Wall.

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We have indications that King Hussein, if he got the Old City back, would be willing to permit access to the Old City to all faiths, including Jewish. Although the return of the Old City to Jordan under these circumstances would be the most desirable from the US point of view, the Israelis are unlikely to settle for this. In that event, one of the most feasible compromises might still be territorial internationalization of the Old City and its immediate environs such as the Mount of Olives, with equal access by all faiths administered by a UN High Commissioner and an equitable distribution of the all-important tourist revenues. However, the problems of any such administration will be so great that its constitution should be worked out with the greatest possible degree of consent by both Israel and Jordan.

^{new}
NEA/ARN/LLKinsolving:sdj
6/26/67

Clearance:

NEA/ARN - R.B. Houghton ^{new}
NEA/IAI - A.L. Atherton ^{new}
IO/UNP - S.C. Campbell
NEA - R.P. Davies ^{new}

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ANNEX 1

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June 25, 1967

KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, JUNE 28, 1967

KING HUSSEIN'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS ISRAEL PRIOR
TO THE HOSTILITIES OF JUNE 5 AND HIS ACTIONS
THEREAFTER VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL

The Israeli attack at Samu in November 1966 caused King Hussein to change completely his estimate of Israeli intentions toward Jordan.

The Israeli attack at Samu, which was in retaliation for acts of infiltration which the Government of Jordan was making every effort to curb, led the King to conclude that Israel (a) no longer had an interest in the preservation of his regime and (b) harbored the desire to obtain control over the West Bank. Hussein could not believe that the internal upheaval which occurred in Jordan following the Samu attack had not been anticipated by the Israelis. Hussein also concluded that an Israeli objective was to try to line the United States up entirely on the side of Israel - to remove, so to speak,

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the U.S. foot in both camps - on the theory that from Israel's point of view maximum security for Israel would be obtained by the wholehearted commitment by the United States to Israel.

All efforts in the months following Samu to dislodge these ideas from the King's mind proved to no avail.

When Nasser occupied Sharm al-Shaykh Hussein concluded that a conflict was inevitable. He thought that if the conflict occurred quickly - i.e. within a week of Nasser's occupation of Sharm al-Shaykh - Jordan might be able to lie low and escape major involvement. By the second week of UAR occupation of Sharm al-Shaykh Hussein concluded that Jordan could not escape the coming conflict, no matter how much the Government of Jordan might wish to do so. Hussein also concluded in the coming conflict Israel would pursue what he considered to be her objectives of taking the West Bank. He was in fact fearful that Israel might not attack Nasser or Syria at all but would instead attack Jordan with the objective of taking over the West Bank. He cited to himself the examples of 1956 and 1966, when the Israelis were making noise against Jordan (1956) and Syria (1966), but instead attacked Egypt (1956) and Jordan (1966).

Hussein called in the American Ambassador to ask him if the U.S. commitment to the territorial integrity of Jordan encompassed the dispatch of U.S. forces to Jordan within six hours of an Israeli attack against the West Bank. The American Ambassador replied that our guarantee of the territorial integrity of Jordan meant exactly what it said but that details of how it would be implemented would have to be

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decided at the time in the light of circumstances then existing. Hussein replied that unless there were American military intervention within hours of an Israeli attack, the Israelis would be able to exact what for Hussein would be an intolerable price for withdrawal.

Hussein's trip to Cairo was made in the context of obtaining military protection for the West Bank. Hussein believed that in signing the defense pact he would deter the Israelis from attacking the West Bank. He told the American Ambassador that he agreed to put Jordanian forces under Egyptian control in the event of hostilities so that, in the event of a military reverse, Nasser and not he would have to take the blame. Hussein had no idea that a military reverse would be of the proportions that actually occurred, nor did he envisage that the signing of the defense pact with Nasser would not have the result of deterring the Israelis, but rather the reverse.

Jordanian military strategy laid down by Glubb Pasha and followed by the Jordan Army ever since was essentially a defensive one. It was, given the size of the Jordan Army, well conceived, and General Khammash, Chief-of-Staff of the Jordan Army told the Ambassador that he calculated Jordan might hold the West Bank for as long as one week against a major Israeli onslaught. (The strategy was that if the West Bank could be defended for one week, outside intervention would have the opportunity to materialize.)

On Monday, June 5, the first day of the war, when the Jordanian forces had been put under the command of General Abdul Monem Riadh, the Egyptian General who had been Chief-of-Staff of the United

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Arab Command and who had been sent to Amman for the purpose of taking command of the Jordan forces in the event of hostilities, Nasser sent an order to Amman ordering the Jordan Army to abandon its defensive positions and to launch a major offensive against Israel. Nasser told Amman (a) that his forces were already invading Israel and (b) his air force would furnish the necessary air cover. The truth was, of course, that Nasser's forces were being routed and his air force had been destroyed. Presumably Nasser gave the order for the Jordanian offensive in an effort to try to draw the Israelis off his back. Nasser's order was complied with by General Riadh and King Hussein. The defensive positions were torn apart and an offensive was launched. In the course of this, Jordanian forces were withdrawn from the Jenin area to take part in the offensive, the Israelis streamed through the Jenin opening, Jordanian forces hastily turned around to return to Jenin but ran out of gasoline before they could get there, and the Jordan military debacle on the West Bank was under way.

Hussein is today very bitter - bitter against United States; bitter against the Soviet Union; bitter against Nasser; bitter against the other Arabs; and, above all, bitter against himself. He evidently had no military staff in Cairo - at least he had no method of checking on Nasser's statement of Monday, June 5 that the UAR was invading Israel and that the UAR was in a position to provide air cover to the Jordan Army. When Hussein speaks, as he does in private, of the irresponsibility of Arab leaders, he includes himself, not for signing the pact with Nasser, which he still feels that in the circumstances he had no other choice but to do, but for his failure to ascertain Nasser's military position when Nasser ordered the Jordanian offensive.

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Ambassador Burns:dmg

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June 26, 1967

KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, JUNE 28, 1967

Study Paper - Jordan's West Bank

I ALTERNATIVES FOR WEST BANK

A. Return to Jordan with appropriate arrangements for demilitarization, access to Holy Places and minor border adjustments. These arrangements to be supervised by an increased UN presence.

B. Create a semi-independent Palestinian state with responsibility for defense and foreign affairs reserved to the Government of Israel.

C. Return to Jordanian sovereignty but with arrangements for economic unity with Israel.

D. Outright annexation to Israel.

II DISCUSSION: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF ALTERNATIVES

A. Return to Jordan with appropriate arrangements.

1. Advantages:

a. The USG commitment concerning territorial integrity would be honored.

b. Israel's chances for ultimate acceptability in the Middle East would be increased.

c. Arab hostility towards the West would be reduced, provided the Soviets could not claim responsibility for the withdrawal.

d. The threat to other U.S. interests in the area, e.g. oil, transportation rights, would be reduced.

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e. Jordan would have a better chance of developing into an economically viable independent state.

f. The relatively stable leadership of King Hussein would probably be preserved in the sensitive area along Israel's eastern border.

g. Continued existence of Jordan as a moderate independent state would serve to prevent effective encirclement of Israel by a ring of USSR supported Arab states espousing the militant Arab nationalist line.

2. Disadvantages:

a. Israel's expectations have been aroused by the successes achieved in the recent hostilities. Even with United Nations supervised assurances of West Bank demilitarization and free access to the Holy Places, the Government of Israel may now be reluctant to give back the territory acquired.

b. Without considerable territorial alterations, the existing separation of the West Bank from its natural markets and ports on the Mediterranean coastal plain would be perpetuated.

c. The undesirable status quo on the refugee problem would be continued.

d. It may be difficult to obtain adequate UN surveillance forces.

Comment: In weighing the advantages and disadvantages of returning the West Bank to Jordan it is important to keep in mind the fundamental attitudes which characterize the parties to the conflict. It would be dangerous to assume that the recent round of hostilities has changed these basic attitudes which have been the root cause of the Arab-Israel conflict for the last 19 years. The Arabs have suffered a substantial military defeat including the loss of large quantities of military equipment but their basic strengths vis-a-vis Israel, e.g., sheer numbers, territory in depth, and overwhelming unanimity of opinion, have remained substantially intact. The humiliation suffered in the recent hostilities will have the effect of reinforcing the previous unfortunate states-of-mind of the Arab public and will probably only deepen their thirst for revenge. The Israelis do not have sufficient manpower or financial resources to control effectively any

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substantial portion of the hostile Arab populations of the Eastern Arab world nor can they change the Arab attitudes merely by destroying the aircraft and tanks of the Arab armies. Since neither side has the force to alter the existing deadlock, the only long-term solution lies in a change in attitudes by one or both parties to the dispute.

The long-range goal of Israel is acceptance in the Eastern Arab World. Absorption of the West Bank by Israel would reduce Israeli chances of attaining this goal as such action would confirm the Arab's worst fears concerning Israeli territorial ambitions. On the other hand, a return of the West Bank to Jordan could constitute a modest first step in the direction of Israel's ultimate acceptance by discrediting the widely held Arab belief that Israel is a dangerous, expansionist state.

The USG also has an important interest in maintaining stability in the Middle East and thus avoiding a confrontation with the USSR. Israeli territorial expansion by right of conquest, regardless of the provocations suffered by Israel prior to the outbreak of hostilities, would confirm existing Arab attitudes and probably hasten the date of the next outbreak of violence.

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B. Create a Palestinian state with defense and foreign affairs responsibilities reserved to the Government of Israel.

1. Advantages:

a. The West Bank would regain its natural economic ties with the Mediterranean coastal plain of Palestine.

b. Israel would acquire a more defensible perimeter and its consequent improved sense of security would reduce the risk of Israeli pre-emptive military action.

c. No agreement from the Arab states would be required. Israel could deal directly with the Arab leaders of the population who are already under Israeli military control.

d. This arrangement would restore contact between the Israeli-Arabs and their Palestinian brethren in the new state.

e. It would remove the adverse economic and military consequences of the irrationalities of the previous Israeli-West Bank armistice line.

f. It would provide a new framework to approach the refugee problem and give the Palestinians a sense of national identity, albeit in a state under Israeli influence and ultimate control.

2. Disadvantages:

a. The Arab world, and probably most of the international community, would consider that the U.S. had failed to honor its commitment for the maintenance of territorial integrity in the Middle East.

b. Since it appears unlikely that the other Arab states would consent to such an arrangement, it would be generally interpreted within the Arab world as Israeli expansion and further absorption of the Arab population into Israel. The residents of the new Palestinian state would suffer from the same psychological problems of divided loyalties as those which have plagued the Israeli-Arabs. In Arab eyes, the new state would be linked with Israel and would probably be cut off from access to any surrounding Arab country.

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c. There is no apparent responsible Palestinian leadership. Local Arab leaders who acquiesce in such an arrangement would be branded as Quislings and traitors in the other Arab countries.

d. Since Jordan would no doubt feel obliged to boycott the new Palestinian state, Jordan's economic future would become very problematical. The tourist attractions on the West Bank and Palestinian remittances are Jordan's two most important foreign exchange earning assets. The loss of these assets would be approximately offset by the termination of imports now consumed on the West Bank. As a result, the new political entity on the East Bank would require economic assistance at about the same level as that previously given to the entire state of Jordan even though the new state would contain only 53% of Jordan's population. In addition, the West Bank would require a considerable input of capital from either the U.S. or Israel. The \$200 million in foreign exchange reserves now backing the Government of Jordan would not be available to buttress the new political structure established on the West Bank. Unless Israel is willing to devote considerable resources to underwriting the economy of the new West Bank state, the total economic assistance required from the United States for both the East and West Banks would probably be substantially in excess of the present level of aid to Jordan. If the U.S. does not continue to support the East Bank at the level which it now supports all of Jordan, the economy would deteriorate with a probable increase in internal instability.

e. The general level of hostility toward Israel and the West would increase in the Arab world with consequent jeopardy to other U.S. interests in the area, such as oil and transportation rights.

f. Arab bitterness toward Israel would increase with a consequent reduction in Israel's ultimate chances for acceptance as part of the Middle East.

g. The permanent loss of the West Bank would create grave risks for Hussein's survival. The educated elites of the East Bank who dominate the civil service and the powerful merchant community contain many Palestinians. The continued loyalty of these elites to Hussein would be seriously shaken if he loses the rest of their Palestinian homeland.

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The officer corps of the Army is composed primarily of East Bank residents who traditionally look down on the Palestinians, but the loss of the West Bank would nevertheless be considered humiliating by the armed forces. The officer corps would question the wisdom of the King's policy of relying on the USG as his primary source of support. The possibility of a coup d'etat would increase. The result would probably be an Arab nationalist-type military regime patterned after those in the UAR, Iraq, or Syria. If such a regime assumes power, Israel would be ringed with Arab nationalist regimes probably supported by the USSR. Polarization would increase between the Israel-U.S. camp and the Arab-USSR camp with a consequent increased risk of a U.S. - USSR confrontation. Absorption of the East Bank into a neighboring state is another possibility. This would be resisted by the various groups who have an interest in Jordan's existing national entity, i.e., elements of the Army, the civil service, the merchant community and, of course, the regime. Annexation might be attempted in conjunction with an overthrow of Hussein's regime. The dislocations created by such an attempt would result in an unstable situation with Israel and the rival Arab claimants all moving to protect their interests. If Saudi Arabia absorbed the East Bank, the Saudi regime would be under great pressure to assume a more aggressive stance towards Israel. This inhibition on Feisal's moderation would not be in U.S. interests in view of our major oil holdings in Saudi Arabia.

h. U.S. prestige, now heavily committed to King Hussein, would suffer and our opponents throughout the world would use Hussein as an example of how we treat our friends.

i. Although the creation of a Palestinian state would provide an opportunity for a new approach to the refugee problem, in fact nothing significant would change unless Israel also opened its borders to the Palestinian refugees. Under the Jordan regime, the West Bank refugees already had access to the West Bank area and were given full citizenship rights. The USG provided economic assistance to the West Bank to the maximum extent consistent with the upper limit of the capital absorption rate. The re-establishment of economic ties between Israel and the West Bank might boost the economy but this would be off-set to a considerable extent by the cutting of economic ties between the West Bank and the rest of the Arab world as it appears very likely that the West Bank area would become subject to the Arab boycott.

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Comment: The proposal to establish the West Bank as an independent state with an economic link to Israel and with defense and security responsibilities reserved to the Government of Israel would have obvious short-term advantages for the Israelis but would have serious disadvantages for U.S. interests in the area. It would give Israel strategic control of the West Bank area while simultaneously placing the cost of providing relief for the displaced Palestinian Arabs on the U.S. In the longer range this arrangement would reduce Israeli chances for acceptance as it would increase the bitterness and hostility of the Arab populations. It would thus further postpone the day of a permanent solution to the problem of the Middle East. It would reduce our ability to exert influence in the Arab capitals at a time when this influence is most needed to deal with the problems created by the Arab-Israeli conflict.

C. Return to Jordanian sovereignty but with arrangements for economic unity with Israel.

1. Advantages:

- a. The West Bank would regain its natural markets and trade links with the Mediterranean coastal plain.
- b. The East Bank of Jordan might also be drawn into commercial relations with Israel through West Bank middlemen.
- c. The economies of all three areas would benefit and the Arab boycott of Israel would be breached.
- d. The expanding economies would provide opportunities for de facto absorption of the refugee population into economically productive employment.
- e. The first step, i.e. the establishment of trade relations between the West Bank and Israel, could be accomplished unilaterally by Israel during the interim period of de facto Israeli military occupation of the West Bank.
- f. The return of the West Bank to Jordan would honor the U.S. commitment on territorial integrity.

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-8-

2. Disadvantages:

a. For the Government of Jordan to accept such an arrangement, i.e. trade between Israel and any area under Jordanian sovereignty, would quite likely result in its overthrow. Although the de facto Israeli occupation would provide an opportunity to establish these economic links without the acquiescence of Hussein, the principle of an economic boycott of Israel is well established in the Arab consensus. If Hussein resumes sovereignty over the West Bank at some later date, he could ignore this consensus only at great risk.

b. A successor regime would probably be even less inclined to establish trade relations with Israel.

c. If force or the threat of force were used by the Israelis to establish and maintain a regime in Amman willing to accept trade relations with Israel, such a regime would probably be considered by the other Arab countries as an Israeli puppet government and Jordan would be boycotted. Such a regime would also evoke strong internal opposition and would probably have considerable difficulty maintaining internal security.

d. Although the outcome of the hostilities has left Jordan in a position where Israel and the USG could apply considerable pressure to force the acceptance of such an arrangement, it would not be in US interests to risk the future of Hussein's regime. He has recently reiterated his statements calling for a unified Arab policy. If he accepts an arrangement with Israel which diverges sharply from the Arab consensus he would lose the support of his people and would probably be overthrown by his army.

e. If Hussein is overthrown a USSR supported Arab-nationalist type regime would be the likely successor. U.S. influence in Jordan would be reduced or abolished and Israel would risk a more effective USSR supported Arab "encirclement". This, in turn, would increase the possibility of a US-USSR confrontation in the Middle East.

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-9-

Comment: This proposal, although it has some attractive features, is not realistic in light of existing Arab attitudes towards Israel. An attempt to force its acceptance could mean the end of the Hashemite regime. The successor regime would probably be a radical Arab nationalist type military dictatorship or an Israeli sponsored puppet regime. In the latter case Israel would have considerable difficulty maintaining such a regime in the face of overwhelming popular opposition and Jordan would probably be cut off from all contact with the other Arab countries.

D. Outright annexation to Israel.

1. Advantages:

a. Outright annexation would bring Israeli efficiency to the West Bank in dealing with the administration of refugee relief and economic development.

b. Annexation would also provide the same advantages as those which would be attained by alternative (b).

2. Disadvantages:

a. The hostile Arab reaction against both Israel and the U S. would be even greater than that which would be evoked by the creation of an independent state linked to Israel with defense arrangements.

b. Annexation would create a difficult problem for the Israeli Government in maintaining internal security among the West Bank Arab population.

c. It would be an even more obvious violation of the U.S. commitment on territorial integrity than would the adoption of alternative (b).

Comment: Although there may be elements within Israel who are now advocating total annexation of the West Bank, it seems more likely that the Government of Israel would find it more in its interests to advocate some arrangement along the lines of alternatives (a), (b) or (c). Complete

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- 10 -

annexation and a bi-national state would be feasible only if the Israelis were willing to change the nature of the state of Israel from a Jewish state to a secular state. It seems unlikely that the Israelis would accept such a proposal.

MWW
NEA/ARN/MWWiley:jh
6/25/67

Clearances: Task Force- Amb. Porter
NEA/ARN- Robert B Houghton

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39

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

June 26, 1967

TO : M - Mr. Rostow

FROM : NEA - Lucius D. Battle *LD*
L - Leonard C. Meeker *LC*

SUBJECT: Political and Legal History of the West Bank
and Jerusalem - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

Your memorandum of June 26, 1967, requested a short memorandum summarizing the political and legal history of the West Bank, including Jerusalem, and the position our Government has taken on it.

Historical Background

Prior to 1948, the area comprising the West Bank, Jerusalem and Israel, were included in the territory of the British mandate of Palestine. Following announcement by the British of their intention to terminate the mandate, the future of the area was debated at length in the United Nations. On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly adopted a partition plan which:

- (1) called for termination of the mandate as soon as possible but in any case no later than 1 August 1948;
- (2) provided for the creation of an independent Arab state with specified boundaries including the West Bank territories;
- (3) provided for creation of an independent Jewish state with specified boundaries;

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#44)

State Dept. Guidelines

By *cbm/pjd*, NARA, Date *6-15-05*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

- (4) provided for a Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem.

The mandate terminated on May 14, 1948, at which time hostilities between Arab and Jewish forces occurred. These hostilities were eventually terminated by the General Armistice Agreement (GAA) of April 3, 1949 (insofar as Israel and Jordan were concerned).

The GAA of April 3, 1949, provided for Armistice Demarcation Lines, the basic purpose of which was "to delineate the lines beyond which the Armed Forces of the respective Parties shall not move."

West Bank

Articles V and VI of the GAA delineated the ADL's and provided that the West Bank area would be within the area of control of Jordan.

Jerusalem

Article V(b) provided that the ADL in the Jerusalem sector should correspond to lines established in a November 30, 1948 cease-fire agreement which conformed generally to military positions held by the respective sides on that date, the Jordanians holding the old city and adjacent territory.

Duration of Territorial Delineations

Article V(2) of this same GAA states:

"The Armistice Demarcation Line is not to be construed in any sense as a political or territorial boundary, and is delineated

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without prejudice to rights, claims and positions of either Party to the Armistice as regards ultimate settlement of the Palestine question."

Action of Parties

Subsequent to the GAA, both Israel and Jordan asserted positions with respect to the areas under their respective control which the United States considered inconsistent with the GAA/s and did not recognize.

West Bank

In 1950, Jordan purported to annex the portion of Palestine under its de facto control and notified the United States through the Legation at Amman. The United States merely acknowledged receipt of the notification. The other Arab states took action in the Arab League critical of Jordanian annexation. The British Government announced de jure recognition. On April 26, 1950, the Secretary was questioned concerning the matter at a press conference and stated: ". . . it has a bearing on efforts we have made through the U.N. to solve the Palestine matter. We are studying it from that standpoint and I think that is all I can say about it at the present time."

The United States has, accordingly, considered the West Bank legally under the control of Jordan pursuant to the GAA and having the full sanction of the United Nations. We have not extended de jure recognition to Jordanian claims to sovereignty.

Jerusalem

United States policy with regard to Jerusalem has been geared to the corpus separatum proposal of the

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-4-

1947 U.N. resolution and a reaffirming resolution in 1949. Accordingly, while we have acknowledged de facto Israel and Jordanian control in the respective sectors, we have not accepted their claims with respect to sovereignty.

Israel Sector of Jerusalem

In 1952 the Israelis announced their intention to move their Foreign Ministry from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. On July 9, 1952, we gave them an Aide Memoire stating that we would "not view favorably the transfer" since the United States adhered to the view that there should be a special international regime for Jerusalem acceptable to Israel and Jordan. The Aide Memoire also reasoned that "the U.S. Government believes that the United Nations should have an opportunity to reconsider the matter with a view to devising a status for Jerusalem which will satisfactorily preserve the interests of the world community and the states directly concerned." This statement was released publicly soon afterwards. It was reiterated in 1953 in a press conference by the Secretary. In a speech in 1955 the Secretary stated that "the U.S. would give its support to a UN review of the Status of Jerusalem problem." There have been no major U.S. public policy pronouncements since then.

Jordan Sector of Jerusalem

As noted above the U.S. has refused to acknowledge the Jordanian claim with respect to the Arab Sector.

Jerusalem has been treated as a separate consular district distinct from Israel or Jordan and we have succeeded by and large in maintaining the above position.

L/NEA:DAWehmeyer:dmg 6/26/67

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41

THIS PAPER WILL BE FURNISHED

WHEN AVAILABLE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

42

June 28, 1967

TO: Walt W. Rostow
The White House

FROM: *for* Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

For inclusion in the three briefing books you received for use during King Hussein's visit. This should be put under the Public Statements tab.

42a

SUGGESTED JOINT COMMUNIQUE FOR THE MEETING BETWEEN
THE PRESIDENT AND KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN ON JUNE 28, 1967

The President and His Majesty King Hussein I exchanged views on the problems arising out of the recent hostilities in the Near East.

King Hussein expressed deep concern at the plight of the refugees, thanked the United States for assistance contributed to the refugees and hoped the United States would do its utmost to relieve the suffering. The President noted that the United States had been a major contributor to the support and rehabilitation of the Palestine refugees. He emphasized our acute concern with the welfare of the refugees, both those displaced by the fighting of 1948 and those who have left their homes as a result of the recent hostilities. He noted that the USG was contributing a total of \$5 million for emergency relief for the refugees through UNRWA and other means.

Both King Hussein and the President agreed that any resolution of the present crisis must be based on justice and the interest of all parties concerned. King Hussein insisted that a first step must be the withdrawal of Israeli forces back to the boundaries pertaining before June 4. The President referred to the five points which he made in his speech of June 19. He expressed the hope that measures could now be taken to implement these points and arrive at a just settlement including the withdrawal of the Israeli forces. He described our basic objective as the achievement of a more durable and more stable situation than that existing prior to June 5. Our commitments on territorial integrity would be fulfilled in that context.

Both agreed that Jerusalem as the repository of shrines of three great religions deserved special attention. Both agreed that the future legal status of Jerusalem must be decided on the basis of international consultation and agreement.

The President reaffirmed the deep interest of the United States Government in Jordan and its people. He expressed the hope that the friendly relations between the two countries would be strengthened and informed the King that the United States Government intended to continue its economic assistance to Jordan.

Although there was not an identity of views on all issues, the exchange was most beneficial, clarifying the positions of the two countries.

Drafted by: NEA - Mr. Houghton Cleared by: NEA - Mr. Davies

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43a



JORDAN
HUSAYN, KING.

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1967



SANITIZED
Authority NLS 034-002-1-2
By [Signature] NARA, Date 9/23/09

44

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King HUSAYN I

Husayn I, born in Amman in 1935, ascended the throne at the age of 18. By 1956 he began to assume an increasingly active role in affairs of state, and his success in quelling sporadic civil disorder in Jordan won him considerable world acclaim for his courage and skill. His genius for survival - especially after the Samu raid and the recent hostilities - and the support of the Army and Bedouin tribes have enabled him to contain Jordan's dissident elements.

The 1964 rapprochement between Husayn and Nasser began to crumble in 1965, and by 1966 Husayn was virulently attacked by Cairo press and radio. The tensions of last month forced Husayn into a military pact with the UAR. Despite the defeat of Jordanian forces by Israel, his relations with Nasser are currently friendly, and he remains popular in his own country.

King Husayn is friendly, courteous and personable, but somewhat shy. Generally capable of resolute and determined action, he occasionally shows evidence of emotionalism. Our Embassy's relations with the King and his Cabinet have been close and highly satisfactory.

He is a qualified jet and helicopter pilot and is particularly attracted to daring sports, such as "go-kart" racing and water-skiing.

Husayn's grandfather, King Abdullah, was assassinated in 1951; his father abdicated because he was mentally disturbed. Divorced from his first wife, Husayn married Antoinette Gardiner, the daughter of a British military adviser, in 1961. He has two sons by his present wife - now known as Princess Muna - and a daughter by his first wife.

In 1965 the King by-passed his own sons to make his youngest brother, Hassan, Crown Prince.

Husayn made official visits to the U.S. in 1959 and 1964. He speaks fluent English.

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Authority *NLS 99-268 (#51)*
By *cbm/is*, NARA, Date *6-15-05*

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
45a



JORDAN
TUQAN, AHMAD. MINISTER OF EDUCATION.

1953

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Authority NLJ034-002-13
By SP NARA, Date 9/23/09

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46

Ahmad TUQAN

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Ahmad Tuqan, 67, is a Palestinian whose main interest in the past has been education. He served briefly as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1950 and has also been Minister of Public Works and Reconstruction, Communications and Education. He has represented Jordan on the Mixed Armistice Commission and at the UN; from 1964 to 1966 he was with the IBRD. It is doubtful whether he will exert much influence on foreign policy; in the past, the King and the Prime Minister have handled nearly all of Jordan's foreign affairs.

Tuqan was educated at the American University of Beirut and Oxford. He is considered industrious, efficient, and honest. He has always been cordial and helpful to Americans. Tuqan's wife is from a prominent Jordanian family. His English is excellent.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#54)
State Dept. Guidelines
By cbm/jw, NARA, Date 6-15-05

47

C



JORDAN
KHAMMASH, BRIG. GEN. AMIR. DIRECTOR OF PLANS AND ORGANIZATION, JAA.
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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SANITIZED
Authority NLJ 034-002-14
By [Signature] NARA, Date 9/23/09

49

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Amir KHAMMASH

Chief of Staff, Jordan Arab Army

Major General Khammash, King Husayn's military adviser and primary military purchasing negotiator, was named Chief of Staff in 1965. Openly pro-West and an admirer of the U.S., he nevertheless enjoyed good relations with the staff officers of the United Arab Command, attempting to accommodate the UAC's decisions without shifting Jordan's political alignment. Thus, Nasser and the UAC reluctantly agreed to support Jordan's policy of dependence upon Western sources of supply for military equipment. He is loyal to the King and is an important influence on him. He frequently accompanies the King on official visits, and he has visited the U.S. several times to purchase military equipment.

Born in Jordan in 1924, Khammash attended British military schools. He was the first Jordanian graduate of the U.S. Army Command and Staff College (1959). He is an artillery officer and also a military pilot.

Khammash is likeable, handsome, bright, and assertive. He is able, a hard driver, and an indefatigable worker. He is reported to enjoy good rapport with just about everyone.

Khammash is married and has three children. Although a Sunni Moslem, he smokes and drinks sparingly. His English is fluent.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4(#57)
State Dept. Guidelines
By cbm/jid NARA, Date 6-15-05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, June 27, 1967
7:00 PM~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Handling Hussein

Hussein visit

I hold to the view that our main purpose must be to let him down as gently as we can from his present conviction that you must pull his chestnuts out of the fire for him. I very much like Walt's suggestion of a way to make this point and I attach my copy of his memorandum.

Two other things you can do for the King are to listen to his story and show him your own personal sympathy and kindness. I strongly endorse the Department's notion that you should have your main talk with him alone, and I also agree with the notion of a quick unscheduled visit to the Islamic Center on its tenth anniversary.

In addition, you can assure the King that economic assistance -- at levels still to be settled -- will continue (except where we have had to suspend particular projects on the West Bank). The level of budget support for this year was \$32 million and the level for FY 68 is \$24 million, but in fact, the King's needs cannot yet be predicted because of the West Bank occupation.

On military assistance, I think Hussein will accept the notion that there can be no immediate question of combat airplanes (he had a bargain for twelve F-104's) or of early new arms shipments. But renewal of existing MAP commitments is up for your approval in tonight's reading along with similar small packages for other moderate Arabs.

In sum, I would stay within the State talking points and not press the King toward bargaining with the Israelis (along the lines of the State covering memo) -- unless he gives you an opening. We do not want him telling other Arabs that the U. S. is impossible. The fact is that if he will take us at our word, our five principles have quite a lot for him -- especially territorial integrity and justice for the refugees. He wants straight withdrawal, and you are quite right to insist on withdrawal from danger. A formula that is good enough for Kosygin is good enough for Hussein.

McG. B.
McG. B.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4(h)

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By *cbm/jw*, NARA, Date 6-15-05.~~SECRET~~

Mr Bundy

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, June 27, 1967 -- 3:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

Here is one way to introduce your position to Hussein, if you can get him off by himself:

I was unable to prevent Nasser from pushing UNEF aside and closing the Gulf of Aqaba.

I was unable to prevent the Russians from giving the Syrians and the Egyptians inaccurate information in mid-May on Israeli mobilization.

I was unable to prevent you from signing a 5-year pact with Nasser; accepting an Egyptian commander; accepting Iraqi troops in your country; accepting Egyptian commando units to attack Israeli airfields.

I thought I had a promise from Eban and the Israelis that we had at least another week to work out a way of settling the Aqaba question; but I assure you I had not one moment's warning that the war would break out on June 5.

I could not prevent Nasser from telling you that he had achieved great victories on June 5 and that you would have UAR air support; I could not prevent you from attacking Israel.

I could help bring about a cease-fire. There were ways in which I can help bring about peace in the Middle East if there is a will for peace in the Middle East. But I cannot get the Israelis out of the West Bank unless there are serious things that you are prepared to do in return. What those are you probably know better than I.

If I have any advice for you, it is this: Do not rely on any outside force to solve this problem for you; neither the United Nations General Assembly, nor the UAR, nor the Russians, nor the Americans.

But, if you are willing to seek a solution, then there are ways others can help, as intermediaries, with economic resources, with persuasion of the other party, etc.

W. W. Rostow

I am, of course, sending along this note to Mac Bundy so that you can have his comment on this approach.

WWRostow:rla

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Cy sent to Mr George Bundy

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLT 91-140 (#7)
By *dmj/ju/lsp* NARA, Date 6-25-05

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Hussein Dist 2408
6/24/67
Moore
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See memo from Rostow to Jim Jones for the President

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 23, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with King Hussein of Jordan


Recommendation

That you agree to meet with King Hussein of Jordan on either Wednesday, June 28 or Thursday, June 29 and consider having a small working luncheon for the King.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

You have indicated that you wish to meet with King Hussein of Jordan while he is here during the UNGA session. The King plans to arrive in New York Saturday evening, June 24. He will address the General Assembly on Monday, June 26 and has expressed a desire to meet with you at your convenience in Washington after having addressed the General Assembly.

If you agree to meet King Hussein either on Wednesday, June 28 or Thursday, June 29, we will work out the arrangements with the King after he arrives in New York.



Acting Secretary

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

215074

INDICATE: COLLECT
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Origin ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN FLASH
NEA

Info: SS STATE 215074
GPM

H Ref: Amman's 4560
AF

EUR 1. President would be pleased to receive King during his visit US with
IO time to be agreed upon after King's arrival in New York.
P You should point out to King that he

USIA 2. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ has unique opportunity make contribution toward
NSC resolution present crisis by giving moderate and statesmanlike
INR exposition Arab point of view.
CIA
NSA

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KATZENBACH

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#18)
State Dept. Guidelines
By ebm/jw, NARA, Date 6-15-05

Drafted by: NEA/ARN:RBHoughton/mc 6/23/67	Tel. Ext. 5617	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: THE ACTING SECRETARY
Clearances: NEA - Rodger P. Davies Protocol - Mr. Carter (in substance) S/S - Mr. McCall		WH - Mr. Saunders

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INDICATE: COLLECT
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Origin
NEA

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN

MAY 17 11 15 AM '67

Hussein visit

Info:

STATE 195-918

Amman 3338

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USIA
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1. NAM Executive Committee has reversed previous decision and decided extend invitation to King Hussein to speak at December meeting in New York. NAM will proceed to confirm invitation to King Hussein through their own channels, probably after consulting with ~~Fistere~~ Fistere.
2. Department relieved that potentially embarrassing situation avoided.

GP 3

- BATOR
- BOWDLER
- BUDGET
- DAVIS
- GINSBURGH
- HAMILTON
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- JORDEN
- KEENE
- KOMER
- MOYERS
- TAYLOR
- WRIGGINS

Moose
V P

END

RUSK

Drafted by: NEA/ARN/MWiley:jh 5/17/67	Tel. Ext. 3236	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA/ARN- Robert B. Houghton
Clearances:		

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *chm/ls*, NARA, Date 9-3-09

54

ADDRESSEE: OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENTS

S/S 6127
S/S 6361

April 30, 1964

*Returned to McGeorge Bundy
D. Line amended
5/4/64*

*1. Koww
2. Ret.*

*Hussein
Visit*

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Memoranda of Conversation
between the President and
King Hussein of Jordan.

Enclosed for White House approval prior
to distribution are the Memoranda of Con-
versation between the President and King Hussein
of Jordan.

The President's remarks are sidelined in
blue.

B. H. Read
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

As stated.

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENTS