

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
003	memo	Saunders to Rostow [sanitized per RAC 9/00] [dup. of #4, NSF, CF, Jordan, "Informal Visit of King Hussein", Box 148]	S	2	11/8/67	A
004	memo	Rostow to the President [Dup. #35, this file] [Dup. #88, NSF, Memos to the President, "Vol. 50," Box 25]	S	1	11/8/67	A
006a	memo	Rostow to the President [Dup. #12, NSF, Memos to the President, "Vol. 49," Box 25]	S	1	11/7/67	A
010	memo	Saunders to Rostow	S	1	11/5/67	A
033	memo	Memo for HAK or President	S	2	11/8/67	A
035	memo	Rostow to the President [Dup. #4, this file]	S	1	11/8/67	A
039	memo	Memorandum for the Record [Dup. #7a, NSF, Country File, "Jordan, Informal Working Visit of Hussein," Box 148]	S	2	11/6/67	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders

Folder Title "Visit of KING HUSSEIN of Jordan, 11/6-9/67"

Box Number 3

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9/9/2009


Initials

Hussein Visit

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November 22, 1967

~~SECRET~~

Lois:

Hussein

You should probably put a copy of the attached in your files. It is the only record we will have in the White House of the President's meeting with King Hussein on November 8.

Hal Saunders

~~SECRET~~

Cy, Memo for the Files from Lucius D. Battle, 11/11/67,
Subj: Meeting Between President Johnson, King Hussein
and Secretary Rusk on Wednesday, November 8, at 5:30 p. m.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *ry*, NARA, Date 9-1-09

Hussein Visit
2

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

November 8, 1967

WWR:

The attached record of the Rusk-Hussein conversation Monday arrived after you had gone up to lunch.

I don't think it's essential that it go to the President. It is general luncheon conversation and does not cover the real issue of our support, which the Secretary covered in his half hour alone with the King. We've already told the President about that in our memo, and the Secretary will have covered the necessary points at lunch.

However, you will want the flavor of this yourself.

Hal Saunders

Att: Memcon between King Hussein, Amb. Sharaf of Jordan, Secretary Rusk et al, 11/6/67, Subj: American-Jordan Talks on Middle East Situation (Cy #8)

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#2)
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *cbp/ckh* NARA, Date *6-21-05*

MEMO FOR DICK MOOSE

November 8, 1967

SUBJECT: Press Backgrounding on Hussein

I assume George will have to say something. I think the line to take is this:

1. King Hussein is here to discuss the basic elements of our position and his position on how to achieve a lasting peace. It's important to avoid any misunderstanding on either side. The King has been to other major capitals (Moscow, Cairo, Paris, Bonn, London) and it's natural that he should want to come here and see exactly where we stand. So this is a talk on basics, not in any way a negotiation on tactics. Tactics continue to be handled in New York.

2. Will they talk about military aid? They may, but the main concern is how to get a peace settlement. All other issues are secondary to that.

Hal Saunders

Hussein Visit
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~~SECRET~~

November 7, 1967

WWR:

Because the situation and everyone in State has been moving so fast, we are not going to get final briefing material for the President's talk with Hussein until tomorrow morning.

I think we ought to at least give the President a chance to ponder the attached memo overnight. The briefing book is for your reference but I certainly don't recommend giving it to the President. Then I would hope you will have this subject on the agenda at lunch tomorrow.

Hal Saunders

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By , NARA, Date 9-1-09

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

November 7, 1967

SUBJECT: Briefing for Robert Pierpoint, CBS News

At the request of Dick Moose, I gave Bob Pierpoint a short background briefing on King Hussein's visit at 6:00 p. m. this evening.

The main point, I told him, was that King Hussein is here to discuss basic long-term issues, not the tactical situation in New York. The Arabs have felt since mid-June that our position on the Middle East is essentially pro-Israeli. He will seek here reassurance that we have not deserted our Arab friends and that we are still pursuing a balanced policy in the Middle East.

When Pierpoint asked about military aid, I said that Hussein's major concern here was with getting a peace settlement. Although he might discuss aid questions in passing, they were largely symbols in his mind of the basic US-Jordanian relationship and clearly secondary to his concern for achieving a settlement. Therefore, I did not see aid questions as being a major part of his talks.

Pierpoint asked what the President is expected to say to Hussein. I said I obviously could not say. But our purpose while the King is here is to make clear our basic position. That position is the one outlined by the President on 19 June and is designed to be neither pro-Arab nor pro-Israeli but in favor of a lasting peace settlement.

Pierpoint asked about our pressing for "direct negotiations." I explained that this phrase, as the Israelis use it, is not part of our position. Our position is that, as the President said, "The parties to the conflict must be the parties to the peace." We have no stake in the mechanics of peace negotiations settlement, but we deeply believe that if there is to be a lasting settlement, its terms must come from the parties themselves one way or another.

I specifically cautioned Pierpoint against using the word "neutrality" in describing our position. I also suggested that he not try to link the aid question in any way with progress toward a peace settlement. I told him these issues were in two different leagues, and it would be a mistake to make one seem conditioned on the other. He seemed to grasp the essence of our position.

orig. to Dick Moose 11/9/67.

Harold H. Saunders

Hussein Visit
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~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR WWR

November 6, 1967

SUBJECT: Hussein-Rusk Talk

Harry Symmes has dictated a long memcon which probably won't be over till late in the evening. He did, however, give me a brief rundown of the subjects covered:

--Refugees. The King agreed that, if given a private choice, most of the refugees would choose resettlement. He wouldn't commit himself on whether we could begin doing things now to move toward that end, but he left the impression that he'd be willing to consider.

--Arms. The King accepted the idea of arms control in the context of a settlement, regretted the timing of our resumption of military shipments to Israel. The Secretary explained the Congressional problem, partly in terms of the Arabs' having upset the delicate pre-June balance of arms in the area by their own acts. Mentioned our opposition to nuclear weapons in the area. Discussed Soviet intent in rearming the Arabs.

--UN. The Secretary said we're prepared to use our muscle in support of a settlement when there is something definite to support. But our position alone could not settle the problem; the parties had to come to terms somehow.

--Hussein said it was important to define withdrawal now so there is no misunderstanding later. The Secretary gave him about the same answer Goldberg had.

--Hussein and Sisco discussed the difference between Hussein's claim that he and Nasser got a go-ahead at Khartoum to work out a political settlement and the way the Arabs have been acting as a group in New York. We thought it important for Hussein to lead and bring other Arabs with him rather than letting them limit him as they had in July.

--Soviet intent uncertain.

--UAR. Nothing new. We want good relations. If they can't say anything nice about us, they could at least keep quiet.

--Economic. Hussein described the dislocation resulting from loss of the West Bank.

The above is rough and does not include the Secretary's private half hour alone with the King. However, it does sketch the range of luncheon conversation. Harry said the atmosphere was excellent.

Hal Saunders

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Authority NLJ02-154 (#222)
By ebm/jes, NARA, Date 6-21-05

~~SECRET~~

Hussein Visit
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#8)
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By ebm/jw, NARA, Date 6-21-05

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR WWR

November 6, 1967

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Hussein

Attached is the final version going to Secretary Rusk for his 12:30 p. m. and lunch meetings with Hussein today. We hope to have the President's briefing memo here by noon tomorrow. Then the Secretary could give the President a final up-dating at the Wednesday lunch.

The overriding issue is how hard we'll press Israel for a satisfactory settlement. He says he needs a UN umbrella to negotiate under and yesterday's talk with Goldberg was his way of saying he could work with our resolution. What he really wants to know is whether we'll press the Israelis in a negotiation.

The answer proposed (para. 3) is about what Arthur Goldberg has already told him and what the Secretary has told others: When you're ready to negotiate, we'll put our weight behind an equitable settlement. We don't have a blueprint and we know there will have to be territorial adjustments, but we believe the West Bank should go back to Jordan. Jerusalem is tougher, but we'll do what we can.

The two subsidiary issues are military and economic aid. These are important mainly as symbols of our continued interest, though military aid also plays a role in preserving the King's political base.

Nick Katzenbach Saturday was reluctant to see us promise too much on military aid. Clearly, we can't do anything until we see movement toward a settlement. Even then, it's questionable whether pro-Israeli sentiments here would permit us to send enough (i. e. more than radios and trucks) to make it worth our taking the heat for sending anything. So we propose saying frankly: Not now, but we hope later if there's movement toward a settlement.

There's a big hassle between State and AID on economic aid. AID can't justify paying the final \$6.2 million installment of CY 1967 budget support, given Arab contributions. AID proposes saying we'll help get ready for post-settlement economic development by a series of studies now--probably about \$3 million--without mentioning a price tag. State argues vehemently for saying this aid would equal the budget support we're dropping. I think State has closed its eyes to the imaginative way we could dress this up. But we'll see how the Secretary handles it.

cc: Nat Davis
McGeorge Bundy

Hal Saunders

~~SECRET~~

Hussein
visit
x P.S. 11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, October 31, 1967

Mr. President:

Secretary Rusk has asked me to let you know his personal feelings about your seeing King Hussein. He had hoped to mention this at lunch today, but there wasn't time.

He appreciates your desire to keep these visitors to a minimum and concurs in your not trying to have Hussein to lunch if you feel that makes too heavy a load. However, he does feel it's important for you to see Hussein while he is here. Therefore, he would like your permission to extend an invitation for an office meeting.

Hussein will land in New York November 2 and will come to Washington November 6. He will see Arthur Goldberg in New York, and Secretary Rusk would talk to him here before he saw you. Hussein is set to speak to the Press Club and to meet with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

I would like to add my own endorsement. Hussein is uncertain about our position, and a talk with you would significantly reassure him. We'll have precious little to maintain our ties with him, since Congress will make military and economic aid difficult. Yet he is the Jordanian most likely to negotiate peace with Israel. A peace settlement would be such a great achievement that I think he warrants this investment of your time.

I gather Jim Jones is tentatively holding 5:30 p. m. on November 8 open pending your decision.

W. W. Rostow

I'll see him at 5:30 p. m. on the 8th ✓

See me ✓

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#10)
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By cbm/jws, NARA, Date 6-21-05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Hussein Visit

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 31, 1967

MEMO FOR WWR

SUBJECT: Hussein Visit at Lunch Today

I understand from John Walsh that Secretary Rusk is primed to raise the question of Hussein's seeing the President at lunch today. In view of your crowded agenda, I imagine there is danger that this subject would be overlooked. I hope you will be able to keep that from happening.

Hussein arrives in New York on Thursday. Already the press is carrying unfortunate stories that "it is expected" that the King will see the President. This can only get messier as the week goes on.

We all expect that the lunch for the King is unlikely, given the President's current desire to keep visitors to a minimum. However, I have laid the groundwork for the Jordanians to expect the least by telling the Jordanian ambassador when he calls on Friday that we were having a very difficult time with the President's crowded schedule. Therefore, we have an ideal base for going back and saying we are sorry that we can't do more but the Jordanian request just came too late in the game. However, with Eban having just been in and with the King having seen DeGaulle and other top people in Europe, I don't see how we can avoid him here.

Another subject. You will also note from the attached that the Israeli press is on to the idea of an Eshkol visit. I notice from the AP that the Israeli embassy had denied that they had any official knowledge of an Eshkol visit. However, when the Jewish press here gets hold of this, I can see the heat rising on this subject too. But this is not a subject for your lunch today.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#12)

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By ebw/jw, NARA, Date 6-21-05

Hal Saunders

Att: Tel Aviv 1355, 10/30/67

cc: Dick Murre

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Hussein visit
x P.S.
13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, October 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment for King Hussein

King Hussein arrives in New York on November 2nd and will stay at least until the 10th. Since his trip to Moscow, he has been to see Nasser again and is stopping in Algiers, Madrid, Paris, Bonn, and London on the way here. He is coming largely in hopes of seeing you. Attached is Nick Katzenbach's recommendation that you invite him for a small working lunch on November 7 or 8 as you did in June.

I hate to involve you so deeply. However, I believe your role is crucial for these reasons:

- Your relationship with him will be our main, if not our only important tie with him in the weeks ahead. We have just announced releasing military shipments to all the friendly Arabs except Jordan, and we'll have trouble completing our budget support commitment for this year because the sizeable Arab donations have put Jordan in pretty good financial shape.
- Despite the Israelis' bitter feelings about him, he's still the best bet to work out a settlement with Israel. He may not settle alone, but for the moment he seems to be carrying Nasser's proxy.
- He feels we've let him down, and the Soviets have made him attractive aid offers. He has worked hard to get the Arabs behind a position he thinks meets our objectives. Secretary Rusk and Arthur Goldberg may be able to persuade him we haven't changed our tune, but there's really no substitute to his hearing it from you.

Therefore I recommend you have him for a working meal, but offer these options:

- Working lunch if we can find a date. (You are booked for lunch on November 7 and 8.) _____
- Working dinner on 7 or 8 November _____
- Office meeting only _____ ✓
- Prefer not to see him _____ ✓

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#13)
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By abm/jw, NARA, Date 6-21-05

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET/EXDIS ATTACHMENTS

*Hussein
visit
14*

November 7, 1967

TO: Mr. Hal Saunders
The White House *HP*
FROM: Mr. John P. Walsh
Deputy Executive Secretary

Attached herewith are two
copies of the briefing book
prepared for the Hussein Visit
other documentation will follow.

Attachments:

As stated

SECRET/EXDIS ATTACHMENTS

KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT
November 6-9, 1967

I N D E X

Tab

Schedule of Appointments

GENERAL

Talking Points

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C.

VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES OF HIS MAJESTY HUSSEIN I,
KING OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

November 2 - 10, 1967

November 2 to
November 5 - - - - At New York

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 6

- 12:30 p.m. Meeting with Secretary Rusk at the Department of State.
Luncheon with Secretary Rusk
- 7:30 p.m. Small reception by International Relations Club, Georgetown University
- 8:00 p.m. Address to the faculty and students, Georgetown University.

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 7

- 12:10 p.m. Luncheon at the National Press Club.
- 4:00 p.m. Meeting with the House Foreign Affairs Committee
- 7:30 p.m. Dinner with the Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs.

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 8

- 3:30 p.m. Meeting with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
- 5:30 p.m. Meeting with President Johnson
- 8:00 p.m. Private dinner at Jordan Embassy

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 9

2:15 p.m. EST	Depart Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, aboard a <u>United States Air Force special flight.</u>
3:00 p.m. CST	Arrival at O'Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois.
5:30 p.m.	Reception, dinner and address at Northwestern University.

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 10

a.m.	Departure from O'Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois.
p.m.	Arrival at John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York.

The date of departure from the United States will be announced later.

KING HUSSEIN'S ENTOURAGE*

His Majesty King Hussein I

Maj. Gen. Nasir bin Jamil, Chief Military Aide to His Majesty

Abdul Moneim Rifa'i, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

Abdul Hamid Sharaf, Jordanian Ambassador to the U.S.

Zayd Rifa'i, Chief of Royal Cabinet

Col. Zayd Shakir, aide-de-camp

Dr. Shawkat Sati, His Majesty's personal physician

Col. Anwar Muhammad, aide-de-camp

Capt. Mahmud Jamal, aide-de-camp

1st Lt. Fakhri Islam, aide

1st Lt. Muhammad Fu'ad, aide

1st Lt. Atallah Miqbil, aide

2nd Lt. Sulaiman Marzouq, aide

* In order of precedence.

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~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

TALKING POINTS

What Hussein Wants

Hussein comes here worried, and with a sense of grievance.

He is willing to negotiate with the Israeli, but not without the cover of a UN resolution. He believes he has helped prepare the way for such a resolution -- first by obtaining a moderate Arab position at the Khartoum summit, then by promoting a text drawn from the US five points and the US-Soviet agreement. Now, he feels, we are upping the ante in New York and backing off, as the Israeli position has become harder. This -- combined with our failure to reinstate the military aid program -- leads him to question whether the US is still interested in Jordan and in a political settlement. He has been to Moscow to get Soviet backing for a settlement, and received there offers of economic and military aid. Hussein is coming to Washington not only seeking reassurance, but to make a new calculation of how far he can depend on the United States. In specific, Hussein will want to know:

-- What kind of a resolution do we want in New York and what are we willing to do to get it?

-- What is our position on Jerusalem and the West Bank, and what are we willing to do to back it up?

-- How do we see the future of US/Jordan relations?

Do we still have an interest in a moderate Jordan, and if so, what are our intentions on military and economic aid?

What We Want

We have made a new calculation of what the Jordanian connection is worth. In essence Hussein is valuable to us because of the -- possibly indispensable -- role he can play in

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Authority NLJ 99-268 (#27)
By cbw/jis, NARA, Date 6-21-05

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

starting and sustaining negotiations for a general political settlement between Israel and its neighbors. Beyond that, Hussein has been known for ten years as a US protege. If he fails to survive, or turns away from us towards Moscow, our prestige in the area -- and the confidence of other moderate regimes in us -- will suffer. The balance of power in the Arab world would shift sharply away from moderation. Given the existing limits to our access in the area, the loss would be serious.

Our objective in these talks is to keep Hussein on course towards a UN resolution and direct or indirect negotiations with Israel. Because of attitudes in Congress on arms and the AID budget problem, we have nothing tangible to offer him now as evidence of support. (Indeed, we will have to tell him we are altering the nature of our economic support.) But we must convince him that we want a settlement equitable to both sides, and are willing to use our influence to get it. In order to do so, we must first make certain that he has no misconceptions of what we are up to in New York. We must also explain more definitely than so far what our position is regarding his territorial problems. And we must reaffirm that despite our difficulties we wish to continue our close and friendly relationship with Jordan.

Hussein will be skeptical. Since we have only assertions and not action to offer him, our success will depend on how convinced he is that we will act on those assertions to obtain a balanced settlement. If he is not convinced, the immediate danger is that Hussein will conclude that there is no future in negotiation. If Jordan gives up, no Arab country is likely to pursue negotiations. The delay -- given the Israelization of Jerusalem -- would be very damaging.

Consequences of Failure to Reach a Settlement

You should know that the Israeli evaluation of Hussein does not jibe with ours. Israeli representatives have gone out of their way to give us the impression Israel is writing

Hussein down, and maybe off. Their motive may be to make sure Hussein comes to the bargaining table alone; or their view may reflect a much diminished interest in negotiations. Manifestly they do not want continued close US/Jordan relations. We shall have to have this out with the Israelis.

Whatever the chances of settlement -- and as of now it is hard to be sanguine -- failure would be costly to us. Arab/Israeli tension would heighten, terrorism increase, the arms race accelerate, as both sides prepared for a new round. The United States could not stand aside, and probably could not avoid closer identification with Israel. The long-term risk of a confrontation with the Soviet Union would grow.

Talking Points

1. We both want to create conditions in which negotiations can start. Your efforts at Khartoum and afterwards have made an important contribution. For our part we have taken the lead in New York in working for a UN resolution. We have also tried to protect an environment favorable to negotiation by intervention on both sides in such questions as the movement of refugees, the terrorist problem, the opening of banks. We interceded strongly with Foreign Minister Eban of Israel on these problems two weeks ago.

2. Hope your talks with Arthur Goldberg have cleared up any misunderstanding on what our intentions are in New York.

3. We hope for quick action on a resolution. We agree with you that time is not on the side of a peaceful settlement. We understand your need for a Security Council resolution before undertaking negotiations.

When you are ready to negotiate either directly or indirectly, we are prepared to put our weight behind an equitable solution. We have no precise blueprint for a settlement.

But we do believe that it should involve the return of the West Bank to Jordan. In order to obtain this the West Bank would probably have to be demilitarized. Territorial adjustments would have to be made around boundary lines as they stood before the war. The boundaries must be permanent.

Jerusalem is tougher for a variety of reasons including our historical position with which you are familiar. As we have stated publicly, we do not accept Israel's unilateral action. We are prepared to use our influence to see what arrangements can be worked out. We believe Jerusalem should be a city with free access to all and that the interests of the three great religions and the interest of the inhabitants must be protected. It may be that these objectives could best be achieved through some form of international or other status involving participation of Jordan. But we do not exclude the possibility of an agreement between Israel and Jordan that would meet Jordan's political, economic and religious interests. In the context of peace, we can envision Jerusalem becoming the focus of a new and profitable relationship between the economies of Jordan and Israel. These might include bilateral trade, increased tourism across newly opened borders, duty-free access by Jordan to the Mediterranean, improved use of the Jordan waters.

4. You will appreciate that we cannot speak for the Israelis nor do we have unlimited influence over them. What we have said reflects our thinking alone.

5. We are seriously disturbed by the arms race in the Middle East. Congress is concerned about our general arms policy as well as that for the Middle East area. We have tried to find a formula for curbing the arms race and accordingly refrained from June until October from supplying arms to the area. Unfortunately our hands were forced by a heavy Soviet arms influx. As we are concerned with an arms balance in the area, we accordingly had to sell arms to Israel. We recognize Jordan's legitimate requirements for some arms and sincerely regret that strong feelings in Congress make it difficult for

us to carry out a military assistance program for Jordan in the absence of negotiations for a settlement. With a settlement we should be able to provide reasonable quantities of arms. However, given Congressional sentiment on this question and the serious trouble we are having in getting a foreign aid bill out of the Congress, we cannot resume any arms supply to Jordan at this particular time. We would hope that favorable developments looking towards a settlement might permit us to resume some shipments of military equipment other than major combat items in the fairly near future. In the interim we are prepared to support certain of Jordan's arms requests from Western European suppliers.

6. We do appreciate your situation and ask your patience a while longer. I think you know the temper of this country. There is much unhappiness about the events of June 5. I believe we can overcome these difficulties. I am sure I am telling you nothing you do not already know when I say that a decision of Jordan to obtain arms in the Soviet Union would make close US/Jordani cooperation of the sort we have enjoyed much more difficult.

7. Although we understand you do not wish to discuss economic matters, we do want to assure you of our continued active interest in Jordan's economic development and viability. We want to continue to participate in your development effort. I want you also to know that we are discussing ways of helping you get the Potash project under way as soon as possible. The nature of our assistance must, however, reflect your mounting reserves of foreign exchange, the sizeable contributions from other Arab states and our own stringent budgetary situation. We would like to discuss these matters with your Government.

8. I know you share our continuing concern at the possibility of an outbreak of fighting as a result of terroristic activity. We commend your wisdom in trying to convince other Arab states of the folly in using this tactic. We know you

will continue to do everything you can to control infiltration from Jordan. We on our side have been pressing restraint on the Israelis and emphasized the dangers of retaliation. We are nonetheless worried by the consequences, should the Syrians persist in using this weapon.

9. We agree that a solution to the refugee problem is essential to a permanent settlement. We have been actively studying the problem and are prepared to devote substantial resources to a settlement of the problem. A final solution would probably involve some repatriation, resettlement and compensation. We would be interested in hearing any ideas which the King might suggest for best dealing with the refugee problem, including interim measures which might be taken to provide dignity and a sense of self-sufficiency to the refugees even in advance of a settlement of the overall problem.

M:TOEnders/NEA:ARN:RHoughton
11/5/67

~~SECRET~~

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KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, NOVEMBER 6-9, 1967

CONSULTATIONS ON A UN RESOLUTION

At the close of the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly in July, the US and USSR delegations agreed, ad referendum, on language for a draft resolution on the Middle East. The key element was a statement of principle that Israeli withdrawal should be linked to an end to belligerency by the Arabs, although the word "belligerency" was not specifically used. There was an additional paragraph which stressed the need for efforts to solve all aspects of the problem, in particular those of refugees and of guaranteeing freedom of transit through international waterways.

The resolution was not accepted by the Arabs and, as a result, the Soviet Union would not proceed with it in July.

In September we were consulted by others about the possibility of using this draft resolution with the addition of appointment of a UN intermediary, as a basis for Security Council action. The Arabs then seemed inclined to acquiesce in such an approach to the problem. We discovered, however, that the Soviets had not only distributed incorrect versions of the US-USSR language to the Arabs, but had also failed to explain in distributing the texts that understandings on interpretation were involved. (The US told the USSR at the outset of the July discussions, for example, that an end to belligerency meant the Suez Canal would be opened to Israeli shipping; therefore the final paragraph only referred to "guaranteeing" the freedom of transit.) The Arabs were thus given a false impression by the Soviets of what the July US-USSR understanding had been. As a result they gained the impression as consultations in New York proceeded that the US was going back on its earlier agreement, whereas it was the Soviets who were backing out.

In light of these indications of differing views regarding the US-USSR draft language, the United States considered it essential that if a resolution based on this language was to be adopted by the Security Council, all should agree in advance on what it meant. Otherwise we feared that the resolution would hinder rather than facilitate a settlement.

Efforts in September and early October to develop an agreed text and agreed interpretation based on the US-USSR language were unsuccessful. The non-permanent members of the Security Council then made a fresh start on the problem.

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By *cbm/ls*, NARA, Date 6-21-05

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The United States supported this effort by the non-permanent members. We understood that, rather than trying to develop a resolution which would in effect legislate a solution, they would draft a resolution containing 1) a statement of general principles which would be generally accepted, and 2) a request for appointment of a UN representative to serve as the intermediary to discuss specific issues with the parties in an effort to help them work out the details of a settlement. In our view, the important thing is that such a resolution provide a formula acceptable to the parties so that they will cooperate with the UN intermediary. We believe the draft suggested by Canada and Denmark to the other non-permanent Security Council members is better designed to gain this end than the draft suggested by India, but we have supported efforts to develop from the two texts something which will be acceptable to both sides. If the non-permanent Council members can arrive at no agreement, the permanent members, in particular the US and USSR, expect to be asked to resume their efforts to devise a formulation acceptable to the other Council members and the parties.

Positions of the Parties. All of the Arabs (with the possible exception of Syria and Algeria) now appear to be prepared to accept inclusion in a UN resolution of the concept of an end to the state of belligerency with Israel and acknowledgment of Israel's right to exist. They have generally insisted, however, that the resolution also contain a formulation on Israeli withdrawal that specifies return to the pre-June 5 lines. They also desire a linkage in the resolution between the questions of opening the Suez Canal to all ships (including Israeli) and of a solution of the refugee problem. The third main difficulty is the Arab desire that the role of the UN representative to be confined to implementing the principles set forth in the resolution, and that he not be given wide latitude to discuss all issues with the parties in an effort to assist them in working out the details of a settlement.

King Hussein is prepared to acquiesce in a resolution that does not refer to a date or to Israel in connection with withdrawal. He has indicated general Arab willingness to go along with this. He also does not insist on linkage of the Suez opening with a refugee settlement, though the UAR, supported by the Soviets, has continued to urge this in talks with us. Hussein's position on the role of the UN representative is not clear, but there is no doubt that the King would expect the UN emissary to seek Israeli withdrawal from Arab territory.

Israel would prefer to negotiate directly with the Arabs but is apparently willing to cooperate with a UN intermediary providing that the resolution under which he is appointed does not in any way prejudice the Israeli position.

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Best from its point of view would be a resolution doing nothing more than appointing the intermediary. It believes that principles, if stated, should be general and should not be presented as instructions to the intermediary. Israel has asserted privately that it will not cooperate with an intermediary appointed under a resolution, such as the Indian draft, which does not meet these requirements.

Israel specifically rejects any formulation which would appear to commit it in advance to withdrawal from all the occupied territory. It insists that withdrawal should only be to negotiated and mutually-recognized national borders, and has implied that in some areas it would expect such borders to diverge significantly from the pre-June 5 boundaries.

The Israeli position has been that the Suez Canal, when it is opened, must be opened to all ships, including Israeli. It rejects the idea that passage of Israeli ships through the canal should be linked to a solution of the refugee problem.

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KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, NOVEMBER 6-9, 1967

JERUSALEM

Background. United States policy with regard to Jerusalem has been based on the corpus separatum provisions in the 1947 UN General Assembly partition resolution and a 1949 resolution reaffirming these provisions. Accordingly, while we have acknowledged de facto Israeli and Jordanian control in the respective sectors, we have not accepted their claims with respect to sovereignty over the city. These considerations remain the basis for our position concerning the future of Jerusalem.

On July 4 and 14, 1967, the UN General Assembly adopted two Pakistani-sponsored resolutions on Jerusalem. The first, inter alia, called upon Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem. (Adopted 99 to 0, with 20 abstentions.) The second resolution deplored the failure of Israel to implement the July 4 resolution and reiterated the earlier requests to Israel. (Adopted 99 to 0, with 18 abstentions.) The United States abstained on both resolutions. On July 14 Ambassador Goldberg explained that the United States had been unable to support the resolution because it believed that one aspect of the problem of Jerusalem should not be considered as an isolated issue, separate from the other elements of Jerusalem and of a peaceful settlement in the Near East. He also said that the administrative measures taken by the Government of Israel could not be considered other than interim and provisional and as not prejudging the final and permanent status of Jerusalem. Since July we have made no further public statements regarding Jerusalem.

Present situation. It is now clear that the Israelis consider themselves sovereign in the unified city and are proceeding to the full exercise of the rights that flow therefrom. Foreign Minister Eban's disclaimers that Israel had foreclosed a Jerusalem settlement which would recognize international interests must be interpreted in this context. Subsequent to the June decrees extending Israeli laws and municipal regulations, further steps have been quietly taken to assert Israeli control over municipal, postal and transportation services, currency, taxes, and customs duties, and to set up Israeli institutions and businesses in the Old City. Since the general strike in August there has been no serious demonstration of mass discontent, although there is considerable evidence of latent opposition to Israeli occupation.

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Prospects for agreement. The Israeli seizure and subsequent attitude have made plain that the pre-war status quo cannot be readily restored. We ourselves would not favor return to a physically divided city. It is equally certain that the Israelis would not accept internationalization of the entire city. On the other hand, the Arabs will never agree to peaceful settlement in the area which permits unqualified Israeli sovereignty over the entire city.

It seems probable that the Jordanians would rank their preferences for a Jerusalem solution in the following order:

1. Return to the pre-war status quo, probably conceding Israeli access to the Wailing Wall and other Jewish Holy Places.
2. An open city under GOI-GOJ condominium.
3. Internationalization of all Jerusalem.
4. Internationalization of the Old City.

The question of Jerusalem is probably the most difficult of the Arab-Israeli issues to resolve, and it is evident that no agreement among the parties on the future of the city is probable except in the context of an overall settlement.

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