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KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, NOVEMBER 6-9, 1967

REFUGEES

Background. Jordan continues to be faced with an extremely serious refugee problem. Since hostilities some 200,000 persons have fled from the occupied West Bank to the East Bank, about half of whom are registered UNRWA refugees. About 55,000 refugees are now in temporary tent camps. Some 200-300 persons each day continue to cross into Jordan from the West Bank and Gaza.

While counselling GOJ restraint in their public statements on the problem, we have strongly urged the Israelis to allow the return of these new refugees. Thus far, Israel has not processed the great bulk of applications for return (and apparently does not intend to do so). Only some 14,000 people have actually moved back. The Israelis have a family reunification scheme which could lead to the return of several thousands more. We have felt, however, that Israeli has not been responsive enough on the overall problem, and we are continuing to press them on this issue. The Jordanian Government and UNRWA have expressed concern that, with winter coming on, many of the new refugees will suffer cold and disease because of a lack of proper shelter.

U.S. assistance to refugees. In June the U.S. agreed to furnish 10,000 tents plus the cost of air transportation in response to requests from the GOJ for shelter to meet the needs of the new refugees. We also provided small cooking stoves and offered to furnish blankets and household utensils for the refugees. On June 27 the President authorized a reserve of \$5 million to meet urgent relief needs of victims of the hostilities; \$2 million were immediately assigned to UNRWA for its emergency program. A total of \$340,000 has been contributed to the Red Cross for its work in the area.

In addition, NEED (Near East Emergency Donations) has undertaken a private campaign for funds to assist Arab refugees, particularly those displaced by the recent conflict. Thus far NEED has contributed \$2.5 million to UNRWA primarily for the emergency relief of the new displaced persons on the East Bank. King Hussein participated in the ceremony at which the first NEED check for \$1 million was presented to UNRWA.

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Prospects for settlement of refugee problem. President Johnson's 5 points of June 19 specifically included "justice for the refugees." We have resisted efforts by the UAR to link the refugee problem to the Suez Canal issue, believing that an association of these problems could only impede progress toward a general settlement. On the other hand, we envisage that a comprehensive peace settlement will contain provisions or guidelines for the implementation of a satisfactory solution to the problem posed by the refugees from the June 1967 conflict, as well as for the problem of the 1.3 million refugees from the 1948-49 conflict.

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KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, NOVEMBER 6-9, 1967

KING HUSSEIN'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS ISRAEL PRIOR TO
THE HOSTILITIES OF JUNE 5 AND HIS ACTIONS THEREAFTER
VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL

The Israeli attack at Samu in November 1966 caused King Hussein to change completely his estimate of Israeli intentions toward Jordan.

The Israeli attack at Samu, which was in retaliation for acts of infiltration which the Government of Jordan was making every effort to curb, led the King to conclude that Israel (a) no longer had an interest in the preservation of his regime and (b) harbored the desire to obtain control over the West Bank. Hussein could not believe that the internal upheaval which occurred in Jordan following the Samu attack had not been anticipated by the Israelis. Hussein also concluded that an Israeli objective was to try to line the United States up entirely on the side of Israel -- to remove, so to speak, the U.S. foot in both camps -- on the theory that from Israel's point of view maximum security for Israel would be obtained by the wholehearted commitment by the United States to Israel.

All efforts in the months following Samu to dislodge these ideas from the King's mind proved to no avail.

When Nasser occupied Sharm al-Shaykh Hussein concluded that a conflict was inevitable. He thought that if the conflict occurred quickly -- i.e., within a week of Nasser's occupation of Sharm al-Shaykh -- Jordan might be able to lie low and escape major involvement. By the second week of UAR occupation of Sharm al-Shaykh Hussein concluded that Jordan could not escape the coming conflict, no matter how much the Government of Jordan might wish to do so. Hussein also concluded in the coming conflict Israel would pursue what he considered to be her objectives of taking the West Bank. He was in fact fearful that Israel might not attack Nasser or Syria at all but would instead attack Jordan with the objective of taking over the West Bank. He cited to himself the examples of 1956 and 1966, when the Israelis were making noise against Jordan (1956) and Syria (1966), but instead attacked Egypt (1956) and Jordan (1966).

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Hussein called in the American Ambassador to ask him if the U.S. commitment to the territorial integrity of Jordan encompassed the dispatch of U.S. forces to Jordan within six hours of an Israeli attack against the West Bank. The American Ambassador replied that our guarantee of the territorial integrity of Jordan meant exactly what it said but that details of how it would be implemented would have to be decided at the time in the light of circumstances then existing. Hussein replied that unless there were American military intervention within hours of an Israeli attack, the Israelis would be able to exact what for Hussein would be an intolerable price for withdrawal.

Hussein's trip to Cairo was made in the context of obtaining military protection for the West Bank. Hussein believed that in signing the defense pact he would deter the Israelis from attacking the West Bank. He told the American Ambassador that he agreed to put Jordanian forces under Egyptian control in the event of hostilities so that, in the event of a military reverse, Nasser and not he would have to take the blame. Hussein had no idea that a military reverse would be of the proportions that actually occurred, nor did he envisage that the signing of the defense pact with Nasser would not have the result of deterring the Israelis, but rather the reverse.

Jordanian military strategy laid down by Glubb Pasha and followed by the Jordan Army ever since was essentially a defensive one. It was, given the size of the Jordan Army, well conceived, and General Khammash, Chief of Staff of the Jordan Army, told the Ambassador that he calculated Jordan might hold the West Bank for as long as one week against a major Israeli onslaught. (The strategy was that if the West Bank could be defended for one week, outside intervention would have the opportunity to materialize.)

On Monday, June 5, the first day of the war, when the Jordanian forces had been put under the command of General Abdul Monem Riadh, the Egyptian General who had been Chief of Staff of the United Arab Command and who had been sent to Amman for the purpose of taking command of the Jordan forces in the event of hostilities, Nasser sent an order to Amman ordering the Jordan Army to abandon its defensive positions and to launch a major offensive against Israel. Nasser told Amman (a) that his forces were already invading Israel and (b) his air force would furnish the necessary air cover. The truth was, of course, that Nasser's forces were being routed and his air force had been destroyed. Presumably Nasser gave the order for the Jordanian offensive in an effort to try to draw the Israelis off his back.

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Nasser's order was complied with by General Riadh and King Hussein. The defensive positions were torn apart and an offensive was launched. In the course of this, Jordanian forces were withdrawn from the Jenin area to take part in the offensive, the Israelis streamed through the Jenin opening, Jordanian forces hastily turned around to return to Jenin but ran out of gasoline before they could get there, and the Jordan military debacle on the West Bank was under way.

Hussein is today very bitter -- bitter against United States; bitter against the Soviet Union; bitter against Nasser; bitter against the other Arabs; and, above all, bitter against himself. He evidently had no military staff in Cairo -- at least he had no method of checking on Nasser's statement of Monday, June 5, that the UAR was invading Israel and that the UAR was in a position to provide air cover to the Jordan Army. When Hussein speaks, as he does in private, of the irresponsibility of Arab leaders, he includes himself, not for signing the pact with Nasser, which he still feels that in the circumstances he had no other choice but to do, but for his failure to ascertain Nasser's military position when Nasser ordered the Jordanian offensive.

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KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, NOVEMBER 6-9, 1967

MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND SALES TO JORDAN

Grant Aid. Following the termination of the United Kingdom subsidies to Jordan in March 1956, King Hussein turned to the U.S. as a major source of military equipment. During 1957 the U.S. provided Jordan with \$7 million in ground force equipment and in 1958 furnished \$3 million in air force equipment. Numerous additional requests for military assistance were subsequently received from the Government of Jordan. As a sequel to these requests, King Hussein specifically asked that the U.S. send a military survey mission to Jordan to conduct an on-the-spot survey of the requirements of the Jordan Arab Army. This took place on October 1958. As a result of the findings of this mission and U.S. policy decisions with respect to military assistance for Jordan, the United States programmed through FY 1967 \$53.2 million in grant military assistance for Jordan.

Included in the grant aid programs for Jordan have been 145 medium tanks, 100 armored personnel carriers, 130 artillery pieces (all types), and 295 vehicles. In addition, we have furnished 4 C-47 aircraft and 12 Hawker-Hunter aircraft.

The proposed program for FY 68 in the amount of \$1.9 million covers training, maintenance, spares and other services. Only the training portion of this program, \$.2 million, is being implemented. Currently 18 students are participating in MAP grant training courses. In addition, 23 students are training in connection with military sales contracts.

Sales (Ground Force Equipment). On 18 March 1965 the United States agreed to sell to Jordan ground force equipment amounting to \$44.5 million, with delivery during FY 1965, 1966 and 1967, with a provision for \$15 million in credit. Some of the major items in the package are: 100 M-48 tanks, 50 armored personnel carriers, 20 M-42 SP 40 mm AA guns and 1550 commercial-type vehicles. This sale was contingent on Jordan's agreement not to accept any Soviet type equipment into its inventory. The agreement provided for possible additional future sales of ground equipment.

Sales (F-104A/B aircraft). The US and Jordan agreed on 29 March 1966 to the sale of twelve F-104 A/B aircraft and supporting defense articles and services. The agreement allowed Jordan to exercise an option to purchase

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an additional 24 F-104 A/B aircraft if it satisfied certain conditions. Total cost of the 36 aircraft, together with supporting defense articles and services, was \$54.6 million. This option was designed to meet a U.S. desire to limit the sale to 12 aircraft and yet to permit Jordan to demonstrate that it has met in substance a United Arab Command requirement of 36 aircraft. Because of financial restraints, Jordan was unable to exercise its option on 1 January 1967 to purchase 24 additional aircraft. As the result of a successful fund raising campaign by Hussein during the spring of 1967, the Jordanians orally agreed to purchase six of the 24 aircraft covered by the option and were granted a new option for the remaining 18. The first 12 aircraft were to have been delivered between July 1967 and January 1968.

Other Sales. During FY 62-1964 the US implemented miscellaneous sales to Jordan in the amount of \$2.4 million. These sales included spare parts, training, ammunition and communications equipment.

Pipeline: Grant Aid. Approximately \$3.7 million remains in the funded pipeline for Jordan. Most of this is in the nature of training ammunition, communications equipment, miscellaneous equipment, vehicles and spare parts.

Pipeline (Ground Force Equipment). The undelivered materiel portion in the ground force package is approximately \$7.0 million and includes spare parts for weapons, tanks, armored personnel carriers and other vehicles. Prior to the current crisis, it was forecast that most of this equipment would be delivered by the end of 1967. In view of recent battle losses in tanks and combat vehicles, Jordan has expressed a desire to substitute other equipment (small arms, ammunition, communications and engineering equipment, spares and miscellaneous equipment) for spare parts no longer required.

Pipeline: F-104 A/B Aircraft. Approximately \$4.1 million in equipment has been delivered to Jordan. This includes spare parts, ammunition, ground support equipment and other communications equipment. Except for the FAA type communications equipment, which was destroyed by the Israeli air strikes during 5-10 June, the F-104 A/B type equipment shipped is in good condition.

Status of Deliveries. Grant materiel aid and sales to Jordan were suspended as a result of the hostilities. Earlier this year King Hussein asked the U.S. for an agreement that in principle he could still look to the US for arms procurement. Hussein was informed that the US had made no decision in principle against supplying arms to Jordan.

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Given Congressional sentiment on this question, we cannot resume any arms supply to Jordan at this particular time. With a settlement of the Middle East crisis, however, we should be able to provide Jordan with reasonable quantities of arms. We would hope that favorable developments might permit us to resume some shipments of military equipment, other than major combat items, in the fairly near future. As a first step we should have to consult again with the Congress. In the interim we are prepared to support certain of Jordan's requests from Western European suppliers.

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KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, NOVEMBER 6-9, 1967

JORDAN POTASH PROJECT

Background. Over the past five years negotiations have been underway on a \$103 million Jordan Potash Project involving the construction of a potash extraction facility with a capacity of 1.2 million metric tons annually at the southern end of the Dead Sea. Financing plans involve the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Kuwait Government, private U.S. (W.R. Grace and Co. and Tenneco) and Jordanian firms, and AID Development Loan funds. Action on the project, for which AID had planned to authorize a \$15.5 million Development Loan in May 1967, has been delayed because of the political situation.

The Jordanian Government, the Arab Potash Company, the IBRD and IFC and, presumably, the Kuwait Fund are prepared to proceed with their respective commitments. However, in October AID was advised by IFC that due to the present political situation, W.R. Grace and Co. has withdrawn from the project. Grace still considers the project to be technically sound and would be prepared to review their position if political conditions improve. The GOJ is anxious to move ahead on the project and we expect the King to raise this subject during his visit.

Current Status. IFC and AID are exploring ways to proceed with the project. AID is prepared to participate with the GOJ in initiating the experimental construction phase if a well supervised construction program can be designed that can eventually be incorporated into the project.

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KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, NOVEMBER 6-9, 1967

CROW CONSTRUCTION COMPANY CLAIM
JERUSALEM AIRPORT LOAN

Background. The William Crow Construction Company of New York was working on the Jerusalem Airport in Jordan under an AID financed loan project when war broke out. Subsequently, about \$800,000 worth of their equipment was brought under Israeli control. \$700,000 worth of this equipment was later recovered and returned to Crow and has since been stored near Amman.

Under Crow's contract with Jordan, there is a very broad war damage clause and Crow has been attempting to recover from Jordan payment for work done through June 5, the value of the missing and damaged equipment, as well as losses sustained due to cessation of work under the force majeure provisions of the construction contract. Crow is required to pursue and preserve his administrative and legal remedies against Jordan before calling on his insurance contract with AID. We are advised Crow is submitting a claim along the following lines:

a) Work completed through June 5 and demobilization	466,900
b) Expenses of recovering equipment and moving to Amman	25,100
c) Overhead from June 5 (\$14,500 per month)	72,500
d) Downtime from June 5 (\$41,227 per month)	206,135
e) Loss of equipment due to war	133,912
f) War and depreciation from use by occupying forces	40,000
g) Repairs to recovered equipment	28,000
Estimated Total	\$972,547

Crow lists items e, f, and g as applicable against the specific risk guarantees, leaving \$770,635 to be covered by Jordan.

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William Crow has just returned from Jordan where he met with high level officials. He was unable to reach any kind of satisfactory settlement, not even the payment for work completed through June 5.

Current status. Crow is seeking Congressional intervention, in particular he has asked Congressman Ogden Reid to intercede with AID to stop budget support assistance to Jordan until some agreement is reached. To prevent adverse Congressional and public opinion at this particular time, it would be desirable if arrangements could be worked out whereby Jordan would pay for the work completed through June 5 and Crow and Jordan negotiate the remaining items of the claim.

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KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, NOVEMBER 6-9, 1967

Background Paper

JORDAN'S ECONOMIC SITUATION

Area: 37,300 square miles (East and West Bank)
(approximately same as Indiana).

Population: 1.9 million (East and West Bank).

Recent Growth: Until the June war Jordan was second only to Israel among Near Eastern countries in the rapidity of its economic growth and had attained a level of per capita GNP equal to or slightly better than Turkey, Syria and Iraq. Economic conditions were depressed by the war and GNP growth has slowed if not halted since. Economic aid from the U.S. and others (including the wealthy Arab states) has played a key role in Jordan's economic expansion and has been more than ample both before and since the war, as is evidenced by Jordan's increasing foreign exchange reserves. Because of drastically reduced demands for imports, reserves have grown much more rapidly since the war.

Economic Structure: Agriculture is the heart of the economy, giving livelihood to two-thirds of the people. Dry farming predominates, with wheat and barley the chief crops, but the irrigated area under cultivation has more than doubled since 1955. Improvement in yields on irrigated lands, producing mainly vegetables and fruits, is striking. The most notable agricultural project is the expanding East Ghor irrigation scheme, made possible by U.S. aid, using Yarmouk River water on lands in the Jordan valley lying east of the Jordan River.

The only known exploitable mineral resources are phosphate and potash from the Dead Sea. Manufacturing has very limited potential for development.

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Future Prospects: With the remarkable advancement of the last decade, the prospects of Jordan's achieving economic independence were beginning to look brighter. The recent hostilities have left Jordan with grave economic problems. With the loss of West Bank markets for Jordan's small industrial establishment, business activity is depressed. Jordan's principal banks had branch offices and substantial lines of credit on the West Bank. Israeli occupation of the West Bank has left these financial institutions in uncertain condition. Tourism, Jordan's principal foreign exchange earner, is at a standstill and Jordan may lose as much as 75% of its tourist trade if the West Bank sites are lost. Jordan also faces the care and feeding of thousands of evacuees from the West Bank. Until the fate of the West Bank is determined, it is difficult to predict Jordan's economic future.

However, Jordan's difficulties have left it, at least temporarily, in better financial shape than before. Although loss of the West Bank deprived Jordan of about 50% of its potential foreign exchange earnings, it relieved Jordan of a like amount of import demand. The combination of reduced import demand on the East Bank (due to depressed conditions there) and increased aid from its wealthy Arab allies raised Jordan's already high foreign exchange reserves nearly \$60 million the first two months after the war and they are still rising.

As a consequence of the Khartoum meeting in August, Jordan received commitments for assistance from other Arab states which, if they are honored, will further enhance its financial situation. The principal challenge will be to reinvigorate the stagnating economy and restore confidence in the development potential of the country so that available resources will be put to good use.

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KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, NOVEMBER 6-9, 1967

U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

U.S. Assistance, FY 1952-1967. U.S. economic assistance totalling \$51/ million from 1952 through 1967 created a base for continued economic growth. The Jordanians increased domestic revenues, improved the management of their financial and institutional resources, and engaged in sound planning with heavy emphasis on income-producing activities.

The U.S. in FY 1967 provided \$32 million in grant budget support. We also gave \$3.9 million in technical assistance. This \$36 million constitutes almost one-third of the government budget. We also provided PL 480 wheat and flour. U.S. support of UNRWA for Jordan's Palestinian refugees constitutes a form of indirect aid.

U.S. Assistance in FY 1968. In FY 1968 the U.S. is providing technical assistance as feasible and has made one budget support payment of \$6.2 million.

Following the June war, contributions from other Arab states as well as rising foreign exchange reserves have enhanced Jordan's financial position. Further budget support from the U.S. at this time is not justifiable on economic grounds.

We are hopeful that the government will focus its attention on efficient utilization of its resources for economic development purposes. We are prepared to make a small amount of grant funds available which could be used for sector studies in agriculture or vocational education, or for other studies such as development of data for a comprehensive ground water development program. We are encouraging the Jordanians to plan ahead for activities in the post settlement period.

Should the need for supplemental U.S. funds develop and subject to availability of funds, we will be prepared to consider further assistance providing the Jordanians have committed their own resources including aid from the Arab states to development. We have contingency plans in the event Arab subsidies to Jordan stop.

We will consider Government of Jordan requests for PL 480 programs.

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King HUSSEIN I

Hussein I, born in Amman in 1935, ascended the throne at the age of 18. By 1956 he began to assume an increasingly active role in affairs of state, and his success in quelling sporadic civil disorder in Jordan won him considerable world acclaim for his courage and skill. His genius for survival -- especially after the Samu raid and the recent hostilities -- and the support of the Army and Bedouin tribes have enabled him to contain Jordan's dissident elements.

The 1964 rapprochement between Hussein and Nasser began to crumble in 1965, and by 1966 Hussein was virulently attacked by Cairo press and radio. The tensions of last May forced Hussein into a military pact with the UAR. Despite the defeat of Jordanian forces by Israel, his relations with Nasser are currently friendly, and he remains popular in his own country.

King Hussein is friendly, courteous and personable, but somewhat shy. Generally capable of resolute and determined action, he occasionally shows evidence of emotionalism. Our Embassy's relations with the King and his Cabinet have been close and highly satisfactory.

He is a qualified jet and helicopter pilot and is particularly attracted to daring sports, such as "go-kart" racing and water-skiing.

Hussein's grandfather, King Abdullah, was assassinated in 1951; his father abdicated because he was mentally disturbed. Divorced from his first wife, Hussein married Antoinette Gardiner, the daughter of a British military adviser, in 1961. He has two sons by his present wife -- now known as Princess Muna -- and a daughter by his first wife.

In 1965 the King by-passed his own sons to make his youngest brother, Hassan, Crown Prince.

Hussein made official visits to the U.S. in 1959 and 1964, and a working visit in June, 1967. He speaks fluent English.

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Sharif NASIR bin Jamil

Chief Military Aide to King Hussein

Major General Sharif Nasir bin Jamil, King Hussein's uncle, is one of the King's closest advisers, friends and supporters. One of the most hated and feared men in Jordan, Nasir's notorious illegal traffic of arms and drugs have placed a strain on his relationship with Hussein. An ultra-conservative monarchist who realizes that his own tenure is in direct relationship to the King's, he is also one of the regime's strongest bulwarks and is known to maintain an extensive intelligence network within the Jordan Arab Army (JAA). The recent move of the King to have Nasir "kicked upstairs" by appointing him Chief Military Aide and to have his former position (Deputy Commander in Chief of the JAA) abolished, has long been considered the most difficult step Hussein would face in reforming the Jordan Government.

A competent soldier and leader of men, Nasir is respected as a commander and for his ability to "play the game." Even those officers who hate Nasir and all he represents acknowledge respect for him as a soldier. Nevertheless, his image has been poor throughout Jordan, especially on the West Bank.

He first earned Hussein's complete trust in 1957 when he helped uncover the assassination plot against the King by former Chief of Staff 'Ali Abu Nuwar and his supporters. A short time later he was named chief of the Royal Guard Regiment, charged with palace security. He rose through the military ranks, was named commander of the East Front Command (the most important single Jordanian field command) in the September 1962 army reorganization and was selected as former Commander in Chief Habis Majali's deputy on 4 May 1965.

Nasir was born on 10 May 1926 in either Amman or Alexandria. He is descended from the Prophet in the Hashemite line; his great-grandfather was Sharif 'Ali, the Amir of Mecca. Nasir is also the younger brother of Queen Zayn, King Hussein's mother. General Nasir is pro-West, anti-Communist and anti-Nasir. He has never forgiven the Iraqis for overthrowing the Hashemites in 1958 and remains an adamant, implacable opponent of any "republican" regime in Baghdad.

Sharif Nasir studied in Alexandria and Jordan; he claims to have graduated from the Iraqi Royal Military Academy in 1948 with degrees in Arab, English and French. He served in the Iraqi Army for two years, reportedly with the Rammaha Division in North Africa. When his brother-in-law, Talal, became King of Jordan (1951), Sharif Nasir returned to Amman and joined the Arab Legion. During Talal's reign Nasir was royal military aide, technical member of the general staff of the 1st Armored Car Brigade and supervisor of

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the Armored Car Training Center. With Hussein's ascension, Nasir was named aide-de-camp and chief of the royal household.

Nasir has two children, Jamil and Zayn, by his first wife. In September 1966 he married Hind Ibrahim Mango, the attractive, well-educated 20-year-old daughter of a businessman. Nasir is a Sunni Muslim but he is not known for his regular attendance at religious services. He drinks and smokes and is congenial and hospitable. Nasir is an avid sportsman, likes hunting, horse racing and fast cars, in addition to women and gambling. He is always pleasant and affable with Americans. He speaks English and French in addition to his native Arabic.

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Abdul Moneim RIFA'I

Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

Abdul Moneim Rifa'i was appointed Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in the 18 October 1967 Cabinet. Highly regarded by US officials, Rifa'i has served in numerous diplomatic posts in the past. Immediately prior to his recent appointment he was Ambassador to the UAR and a delegate to the 1967 emergency session of the UN. He served as head of the Jordanian representation in the UN from 1959 to 1965. Rifa'i, who is pro-West, is easily one of Jordan's most sophisticated, cultured officials. In the UN, where he had a carte blanche degree of autonomy, Rifa'i became noted for his moderate and unemotional approach to the Palestine and Yemen issues. He is considered to be frank, friendly and approachable although vain and possessing a mind of his own.

Rifa'i was born in Tyre, Lebanon on 21 March 1915 to a prominent Sunni Muslim family originating in the Hejaz. In 1937 he graduated from the American University of Beirut with degrees in Arabic literature and political science. The following year Rifa'i entered the services of the royal court as private secretary to King 'Abdullah, assistant royal chamberlain and secretary general of Transjordan. Abdul Moneim was extremely close to the palace during this period and was able to establish his own reputation as a qualified official. Rifa'i's diplomatic experience began in 1945 when he was named consul in Cairo. In 1946 he was named consul general in Damascus and Beirut.

In 1949 Rifa'i was appointed counselor of legation in Washington and official observer at the UN General Assembly; the following year he became Minister to Iran and Pakistan. He returned to the US in September 1953 as a Minister; that December he became Ambassador to the US, serving concurrently as Jordan's first Permanent Representative to the UN. In April 1957, Rifa'i was named Ambassador to Egypt and, three months later, Ambassador to Lebanon. In 1958 Rifa'i served as Ambassador to the UK for a short time. He was then appointed director of national guidance.

In May 1959 Rifa'i became Permanent Representative to the UN. Two years later he was recalled but was returned to the position in February 1962. From that time until 1965 Rifa'i had almost complete authority in determining Jordan UN tactics. His recommendations regarding UN matters generally became Jordanian policy. Other Arab representatives at the UN also sought his advice on delicate questions. In early 1963 Rifa'i was given the additional assignment chief of the Jordan delegation to the Arab League. Rifa'i became Hussein's key man in the negotiations toward a rapprochement with the UAR. Rifa'i remained at the UN until August 1965 when he was transferred to the Foreign Ministry.

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In June 1967 Rifa'i returned to the UN as one of Jordan's delegates to the emergency session following the Arab-Israeli War. That month he was named Permanent Representative-delegate to the UN. In October he was one of the four delegates selected by the Arab members to negotiate in their behalf in the UN.

A pleasant man with a friendly and unaffected manner, Rifa'i enjoys social life and is an amusing conversationalist. A widely read Arab poet, Rifa'i published a poem in 1967. Rifa'i is divorced and has one son who was born in 1952. The Minister speaks Arabic, English, French and some Turkish and Persian.

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Abdul Hamid SHARAF

Ambassador to the US

Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharaf served as Minister of Information from 1965 to June, 1967 when he was appointed Ambassador to the US, and has survived several cabinet changes. He is described as pro-West, but not hesitant to criticize Western policy. As a follower of former Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal, Sharaf himself has no political following; he relies chiefly on his own ability and experience to keep himself in office.

Sharaf was born in Baghdad, Iraq, in 1939 to an Iraqi branch of the Hashemite family. However, he is not particularly close to his cousin, King Hussein. Sharaf's father served briefly as Regent of Iraq before the British occupation of that country in 1941. Abdul Hamid attended the American University of Beirut (AUB), earning a BA in philosophy in 1959 and an MA in international relations in 1962. He was given the position of chief of the Arab and Palestine Affairs Section of the Foreign Ministry's Department of Political Affairs in 1962. In 1963 Sharaf was named to a committee investigating the effectiveness of the Hashemite Broadcasting Service (HBS); that April he was appointed its director general. Sharaf was transferred to the Prime Ministry in April 1964. A few weeks later he was named chief of the Royal Cabinet, the post he held until his August 1965 appointment as Minister of Information.

Despite his youth Sharaf has been a member of several official Jordanian delegations to other international conferences. He came to the US as a student in 1960 to do research and returned in 1962 as a delegate to the UN General Assembly.

A Sunni Muslim, Sharaf claims descent from the Prophet and has the title Sharif (the Honorable), which precedes his name. He is described as quiet, serious, courteous and an interesting conversationalist with a good sense of humor. Embassy officials who have dealt with Sharaf have found him frank, cooperative and friendly, his chief negative qualities being arrogance and condescension.

In 1965 Sharaf married Layla Najjar, a Lebanese Druze, who worked for the Lebanese television industry. Mrs. Sharaf is also a graduate of AUB. The Sharafs have a son, Nasir, born in 1966. Abdul Hamid Sharaf's hobbies include reading, painting, swimming and horseback riding. He is a Mason. Sharaf speaks good English in addition to his native Arabic. He smokes and drinks moderately.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 99-268 (#55)
By cbm/jis, NARA, Date 6-21-05

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Zayd RIFA'I

Chief of Royal Protocol

Zayd Rifa'i, the eldest son of the late Prime Minister Samir al-Rifa'i, is the young US-educated Chief of Royal Protocol. The Rifa'i family position is undoubtedly responsible for Zayd's various governmental appointments and his future in the government will depend to a great extent upon the family's political fortunes. Rifa'i, in the Foreign Ministry, was extremely cooperative with US officials. He is believed to be pro-American.

Rifa'i was born in Amman in 1936. He attended Victoria College in Egypt for his secondary schooling (1949-1953) and graduated from Harvard University in 1956 with an AB degree. His first Foreign Ministry assignment (1957) was to the embassy in Beirut where he served under his uncle, Ambassador Abdul Moneim Rifa'i, currently Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. The following year he received the first of his many appointments as a member of the Jordanian delegations to the UN General Assembly. By 1960 Rifa'i was chief of the UN and International Affairs Section of the Ministry. He returned to New York in 1965 and 1967 as a member of the Jordanian delegation to the UN. Rifa'i was assigned to the embassy in London as first secretary in 1962. Rifa'i returned to Amman and the Foreign Ministry in January 1964, served as assistant chief of the Royal Diwan during the early summer and, in August, became Chief of Royal Protocol. In April 1965 he returned to the Foreign Ministry where he served as chief of the Economic Section and then Chief of the Foreign Department. Rifa'i returned to his former position, Chief of Royal Protocol, in 1966.

Rifa'i is a pleasant, well-mannered, good-looking young man. In November 1959 he married Carola Collier, a British subject he met in New York City. This marriage apparently did not last; in 1965 Rifa'i reportedly stated he intended to marry a Jordanian citizen living in Beirut. A son, Samir, was born to the Rifa'is in the summer of 1966. Rifa'i speaks English and some French in addition to his native Arabic.

DECLASSIFIED (#57)
Authority State Dept. Guidelines
By cbm/jw, NARA, Date 6-21-05

~~SECRET~~

Hussein visit
x mc9/B

Wednesday, Nov. 8, 1967
4:15 p. m.

33a

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Talking Points for King Hussein, 5:30 p. m.

Here is the file of background material for your talk with Hussein, including (Tab A) the cable from Arthur Goldberg that Secretary Rusk mentioned at lunch.

*Saturday-Sunday
Goldberg-Hussein conversation*

In brief, we recommend you make these points:

1. Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Goldberg have told you in detail of their conversations with His Majesty.
2. You wish to reaffirm what they have told him: We are prepared to make a maximum diplomatic and political effort to obtain for Jordan the best possible deal in a settlement with Israel. (The exact language Secretary Rusk used is at Tab B) *attached.*
3. Our ability to make good on this reassurance will depend on what kind of arrangement comes out of the UN. We need a resolution that both sides will work with. Anything else would be no more than a hollow tactical victory.
4. We hope His Majesty can persuade his Arab colleagues to accept a workable resolution. (We do not think the Indian draft is workable. We think ours is.)
5. Time is not on the side of peace. What we can do today we may not be able to do 2 or 3 months from now.

If he asks about military aid, you might explain your tough problem in bringing Congress along. You have to say honestly that we can't resume military shipments now, but you hope the situation will improve if there's some movement toward a settlement. Meanwhile, you hope he'll be able to buy what he needs in Western Europe. His turning to Moscow at this stage of the game would just kill chances of progress toward a settlement and make it very hard for us to help.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#3)
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *cbu/jw* NARA, Date *6-21-05*



Department of State

g/s
Shaw 336
TELEGRAM
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~~SECRET~~ 494

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ACTION SS 25

INFO SSO 02, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /025 W

O P 040513Z NOV 67 ZFF4
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8279
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 692

1. Jordan
12. Bundy folder 23

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 3 USUN 1973

EXDIS

AMB GOLDBERG, ACCOMPANIED BY SISCO AND PEDERSEN, CALLED ON KING HUSSEIN NOV 3. RIFAI AND SHARAF ALSO PRESENT ON JORDANIAN SIDE. PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENT AS RESULT OF MTG WAS THAT KING AGREED, DESPITE DETERMINED EFFORT BY RIFAI TO TRY TO GET US TO NEGOTIATE ON BASIS INDIAN TEXT, TO RECEIVE OUR SPECIFIC VIEWS ON A NEW DRAFT RES. WE WILL MEET WITH KING HUSSEIN AGAIN ON SATURDAY AT 4:30 IN ORDER TO DISCUSS A SPECIFIC TEXT. BEFORE GOING SO, HOWEVER, WE WILL BE MEETING WITH EBAN SATURDAY AM ON SPECIFIC LANGUAGE OF A NEW TEXT WE WILL DEVELOP.

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ALSO APPARENT FROM DISCUSSION IS THAT JORDANIANS HERE, IN GOOD RUG DEALING FASHIONS, HAVE BEEN PRESSING BEYOND THE PRINCIPLES EXPRESSED TO US BY KING HUSSEIN THIS EVENING.

GOLDBERG OPENED CONVERSATION BY EXPLAINING OUR POSITION WITHIN BROAD POLICY FRAMEWORK PREVIOUSLY COMMUNICATED TO RIFAI (USUN 1507 OF OCT 17). GOLDBERG READ PORTIONS OF THIS TELEGRAM TO KING IN WHICH HE STRESSED UN REP'S FUNCTION WOULD BE TO ACHIEVE PEACE WHICH WOULD INCLUDE AGREEMENT ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AS WELL AS PEACE ARRANGEMENTS. OTHER POINTS INCLUDED: US PRE-

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By *g*, NARA, Date 9-1-09

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PARED USE ITS INFLUENCE TO HELP ACHIEVE REASONABLE SETTLEMENT; FACT THAT WE DID NOT VISUALIZE A JORDAN LIMITED ONLY TO EAST BANK; OUR DESIRE TO HAVE A JORDAN PROTECTED IN PERMANENT BOUNDARIES; THE NEED FOR SOME TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENT; AND OUR DESIRE TO HELP EVEN ON JERUSALEM WHERE WE DO NOT HAVE THE SAME VIEWS. GOLDBERG ALSO STRESSED THAT "OUR PURPOSE IS TO CREATE CONTEXT OF PEACE IN WHICH ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WILL TAKE PLACE

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AND JORDANIAN TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE WILL BE PROTECTED". WHILE WE COULD NOT GUARANTEE THAT EVERYTHING WOULD BE RETURNED TO JORDAN, AND THAT SOME TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENT WILL BE REQUIRED, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO USE OUR INFLUENCE TO HELP JORDAN GET BEST DEAL POSSIBLE.

THIS SET THE STAGE FOR GOLDBERG'S SUBSEQUENT COMMENTS RE WHERE WE GO FROM HERE AT UN. RECALLED THAT WE, RIAD AND RIFAI HAD AGREED TO GIVE NON-PERMS OPPORTUNITY AND THESE EFFORTS HAVE NOW BEEN EXHAUSTED. GOLDBERG AFFIRMED WE ARE READY RESUME DIALOGUE AND WISH TAKE ADVANTAGE OF KING'S PRESENCE TO CARRY ON DIALOGUE. INFORMED KING THAT NASSER HAD INDICATED TO ANDERSON A WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT SC RES BASED ON FIVE POINTS AND THAT HE ENVISAGED UN REP WHO WOULD PRODUCE A DECLARATION, BASED ON CONSULTATIONS WITH BOTH SIDES, FOR SUBSEQUENT RATIFICATION BY SC. GOLDBERG INDICATED THAT THIS WAS ONLY A BRIEF PROVISIONAL REPORT ON THIS DISCUSSION AND IF THIS IS APPROACH UAR HAD IN MIND THIS OFFERED SOME HOPE. I SHOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT TO FIND RIGHT FORM OF WORDS FOR RES IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, GOLDBERG SAID.

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GOLDBERG CONTINUED TIME IS RUNNING OUT, TIME HAS COME FOR PEACE. WE ARE READY TO HELP, WE DO NOT WISH TO GO BACK TO FRAGILE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS. WE ARE COMMITTED TO PRINCIPLE OF POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND WE ARE READY TO REAFFIRM I BILATERALLY AND PUBLICLY IN SC RES. US BELIEVES IN TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, WITHDRAWAL, AND RECOGNITION OF SECURE BOUNDARIES. PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY HAS REMAINED IMPORTANT

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SUB-PRINCIPLES: THERE MUST BE WITHDRAWAL TO RECOGNIZED AND SECURE FRONTIERS FOR ALL COUNTRIES, NOT THE OLD ARMISTICE LINES, AND THERE MUST BE MUTUALITY IN ADJUSTMENTS. IF JORDAN MAKES AN ADJUSTMENT ALONG THE LATRUN SALIENT THERE OUGHT TO BE SOME COMPENSATORY ADJUSTMENT FOR IT. WE WISH TO WORK TO THIS END SO THAT EQUITABLE AGREEMENT CAN BE ACHIEVED. WE BELIEVE GOLDBERG SAID, THAT "HE WHO SEEKS EQUITY MUST DO EQUITY". AS TO JERUSALEM THIS IS A TOUGH ONE IN LIGHT OF OUR HISTORICAL POSITION WITH WHICH HIS MAJESTY IS FAMILIAR. BUT EVEN HERE WE ARE PREPARED TO BE HELPFUL. WE ARE WILLING TO USE OUR INFLUENCE TO SEE WHAT ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE WORKED OUT FOR AN APPROPRIATE JORDANIAN ROLE IN JERUSALEM, AND DO NOT ACCEPT ISRAEL'S CONTENTION THAT JERUSALEM

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IS NOT NEGOTIABLE. WE ARE ANXIOUS TO USE OUR INFLUENCE, IF GIVEN A CHANCE, BUT WE ARE NOT ABLE TO DO SO AS LONG AS PROTRACTED HAGGLING CONTINUES ON RES. WE RECOGNIZE THERE ARE GENUINE SECURITY PROBLEMS AND WEST BANK PART OF JORDAN, FOR EXAMPLE, SHOULD BE SETTLED AS SECURITY MATTER WITH COMPENSATING ADJUSTMENTS. WE ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF WATERWAYS. IN OUR JUDGMENT THIS WAS THE PRIME CAUSE OF 6-DAY WAR. WE WANT TO SEE REFUGEE PROBLEM SOLVED AND WE HAVE BEEN SURPRISED THAT ITS SOLUTION HAS BEEN LINKED TO OPENING OF CANAL. WE STAND FIRM IN SUPPORT OF 1951 SC RES WHICH LINKED OPENING OF CANAL WITH ENDING OF BELLIGERENCY NOT WITH SOLUTION OF REFUGEE PROBLEM. MUST BE REAL EFFORTS TO SETTLE REFUGEE PROBLEM. WE ALSO WANT TO SEE SOMETHING DONE ON ARMS LIMITATION SINCE THIS IS A PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF TENSION IN AREA.

GOLDBERG SAID WITH SOME DISDAIN THAT WHAT HAS BEEN GOING ON AT UN IS EXERCISE IN RHETORIC NOT IN SOLVING BASIC PROBLEMS. US WANTS TO ENGAGE UN IN PEACE MAKING PROCESS AT A PRAGMATIC LEVEL AND WE WISH TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS IN IMPORTANT WAY. WHILE NON-PERM MEMBERS HAVE DISAGREED ON SPECIFIC LANGUAGE

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THEY DID AGREE ON THREE IMPORTANT POINTS: APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION

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REP: AND SC RES SHOULD BE WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF CHAP 6 AND NOT CHAP 7; AND THAT UN REP SHOULD HAVE SPECIFIC MANDATE. WE HAVE SOME THOUGHTS REGARDING SPECIFIC LANGUAGE IN SC RES. WE BELIEVE UN SHOULD SEND OUT A REP TO SEEK "POLITICAL SOLUTIONS", TO "WORK WITH THE PARTIES" AND SEEK TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF "WITHDRAWAL, BOUNDARIES, WATERWAYS AND REFUGEES" AND REPORT BACK TO SC. THE NOTION OF INSTANT PEACE WHICH IS EMBRACED IN INDIAN RES IS NONSENSE. TIME IS RUNNING OUT, AND THERE IS NEED TO GET UN REP OUT PROMPTLY. THE OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE FOR HIM TO GET AT FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS AND NOBODY'S POSITION SHOULD BE PREJUDICED BY ANY SC RES ADOPTED IN THE MEANIME. WE ARE READY TO CARRY ON DIALOGUE WITH KING. HE IS THE CHIEF OF STATE AND HAS THE AUTHORITY TO DO BUSINESS. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT TO RIAD, HE IS NOT IN SAME POSITION. WE WOULD HAVE NO HESITANCY TO PUT SOME OF THESE IDEAS DOWN ON PAPER IF HIS MAJESTY WISHED.

GP=2.

GOLDBERG



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ACTION SS 25

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /025 W

0 P 040513Z NOV 67 ZFF-4
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE IMMEDIATE 8280
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 693

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 3 USUN 1973

EXDIS

KING, VERY SOLEMNLY AND SYSTEMATICALLY AND WITH A GOOD DEAL OF FEELING, RECOUNTED DIFFICULTIES FACING HIS COUNTRY. HE OPENED BY SAYING THIS IS MATTER WHICH CONCERNS JORDAN AND US, PROBABLY GREATEST POWER IN WORLD. THE PROBLEMS IN AREA ARE OF INTEREST TO WORLD COMMUNITY AND OF INTEREST TO US SINCE FINDING SOLUTIONS WOULD HELP LESSEN TENSIONS. HE WISHED TO SPEAK AS FRANKLY AS DID AMB GOLDBERG. HE HAS BEEN IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH CAIRO THROUGHOUT. JORDANIAN POLICY HAS NEVER BEEN ONE OF EXTREMISM

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AND DESPITE 6-DAY WAR IT CONTINUES ITS POLICY OF MODERATION. HE INTENDS TO CONTINUE THIS POLICY SO LONG AS THERE IS DISTINCTION BETWEEN MODERATION AND GIVING AWAY THE RIGHTS OF HIS PEOPLE. WE APPRECIATE FRIENDSHIP OF US. THERE ARE TODAY MANY STRESSES AND STRAINS IN ARAB FAMILY DUE IN PART BY OUTSIDE PRESSURES. PRINCIPAL DIFFICULTIES ARISE IN THE FAILURE TO SOLVE PALESTINE PROBLEM. THIS HAS BEEN AT THE ROOT OF THE TROUBLE. JORDAN HAS TRIED TO HELP REFUGEES, TO GIVE THEM DIGNITY, AND ITS MAIN RESOURCE HAS BEEN ITS PEOPLE AND THEIR DETERMINATION. NOW JORDAN IS IN RUINS AGAIN, AND 15 YEARS OF HIS OWN EFFORTS HAVE BEEN INVOLVED. HIS SOLE INTEREST IS JORDAN.

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ITS PEOPLE AND THE ARAB WORLD; ANY ATTEMPT TO DIFFERENTIATE AMONG THESE IS NOT IN JORDAN'S OR ANYBODY ELSE'S INTEREST. THE KING SAID HE FELT DEEPLY THAT ARABS MUST COMMUNICATE WITH REST OF WORLD AND PRESENT THEIR CASE AS REASONABLE, THE MORE REASONABLE THE STRONGER ITS CASE WOULD BE. HE FEELS THAT THERE IS NOW A CHANCE TO DO SOMETHING, THE OPPORTUNITY IS RIGHT, AND IT IS ESSENTIAL THERE BE A JUST AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINE PROBLEM. HE SOUGHT TO COUNSEL HIS ARAB COLLEAGUES TO MEET AND TACKLE THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES. HE

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CHARACTERIZED KHARTOUM AS A "TURNING POINT" AND BELIEVES ARAB POSITION HAS BECOME REASONABLE. HE SAID WE HAVEN'T MUCH TIME, PRESSURES ARE BUILDING UP INSIDE AND OUT, AND THERE ARE STILL A NUMBER IN THE ARAB WORLD WHO BELIEVE THAT ATTEMPT AT POLITICAL SOLUTION WILL NOT SUCCEED. HE SAW THE SELF-CRITICISM AT KHARTOUM AS A POSITIVE FACTOR. HE BELIEVES ARAB PEOPLE DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE WESTERN WORLD SINCE THEY FEEL THEY HAVE BEEN WRONGED. REGARDLESS OF FACT THAT SOME BELIEVE POLITICAL SOLUTION IS NOT POSSIBLE, THE KING SAID WE MUST TRY VERY HARD TO FIND A JUST SOLUTION. HE WENT ON TO DESCRIBE IN SOME DETAIL THE HUMAN MISERY OF 200 THOUSAND REFUGEES TO DOCUMENT HIS BELIEF THAT THERE IS NOT MUCH TIME LEFT TO FIND A POLITICAL SOLUTION. HE MAINTAINED THAT HIS ARMED FORCES ARE UNDER CONTROL, THAT HE HAS GIVEN STRICT ORDERS, THOUGH HE ADMITTED THAT WHEN ARMED FORCES ARE CLOSE TOGETHER THERE ARE BOUND TO BE INCIDENTS.

HE DESCRIBED WITHDRAWAL AS SERIOUS PROBLEM AND KEY TO ANY SOLUTION. QUESTION WAS WHERE TO. TO ISRAEL AS IT WAS NOW OR WHERE. JORDAN COULD NOT ACCEPT RESULTS OF WAR BUT WAS NOT AVERSE TO

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FAIR TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS ON BOTH SIDES. AS TO JERUSALEM, JORDAN HAS BEEN CUSTODIAN OF HOLY PLACES FOR LAST 20 YEARS, IT IS NOT JORDANIAN OR ARAB BU A MOSLEM AND A WORLD PROBLEM. JORDAN IS NOT AGAINST RIGHTS OF ANY RELIGIOUS GROUP TO VISIT HOLY PLACES. AS TO ARMS, KING SAID HE WOULD BE DISCUSSING THIS MATTER IN WASHINGTON. THE QUESTION OF OLD ARMS BALANCE HAS BECOME UN-

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REALISTIC. HAD THE 6-DAY WAR NOT OCCURRED BALANCE MIGHT HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED ABOUT "A YEAR AND 2 MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE 6-DAY". HOWEVER WAR HAS ALTERED THIS SITUATION AND NO BALANCE EXISTS OR WILL EXIST FOR A LONG TIME. ISRAEL HAS ACQUIRED A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF ARMS FROM UAR, FROM JORDAN, AND IS SECURE. SOVIETS HAVE SUPPLIED JORDAN WITH SOME DEFINITE "REQUIREMENTS". UNLESS HE MEETS MILITARY NEEDS OF HIS OWN TROOPS BETTER, JORDAN WILL HAVE TO CONTINUE KEEP ARAB TROOPS ON ITS TERRITORY. HIS MAJESTY SAID HE CANNOT GET THE ARABS OUT FROM HIS TERRITORY UNLESS HE CAN STAND ON HIS OWN TWO FEET. HE REALIZED HE RECEIVED US ARMS ON CONDITIONS THEY WOULD NOT BE USED AGAINST ISRAEL. AS MEMBER OF ARAB LEAGUE HE COULD NOT BACK AWAY FROM THIS FACT WHEN THE WAR CAME. HE HAD NO OTHER WAY THAN TO FACE UP TO SITUATION. WHILE HE IS NOT ASKING FOR ARMS, AS LONG AS THERE IS NOT A POLITICAL SOLUTION HE WILL HAVE

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TO FIND ARMS AND EQUIPMENT WHEREVER HE CAN, PARTICULARLY IF PRESSURES CONTINUE. HE WANTED THE US TO UNDERSTAND THIS.

AS TO SC, BASIC DIFFICULTY HAS BEEN WHAT MANDATE SHOULD BE GIVEN TO UN REP, QUESTION WAS WHAT PRINCIPLES WAS UN REP TO DISCUSS. ARABS DO NOT WISH TO RETURN TO GA SINCE THIS WOULD CAUSE DIFFICULTIES

AMONG THEM. GA WAS ONLY A PLATFORM. IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH US AND SOVS IN MOSCOW HE HAD FOUND MISINTERPRETATIONS ON BOTH SIDES.

THEN KING DESCRIBED SUCCINCTLY AGREEMENT WHICH HE AND NASSER REACHED ON OCTOBER 17 IN CAIRO. (IN VIEW OF FACT THAT JORDANIANS HAVE BEEN PRESSING VERY HARD IN CONNECTION WITH SC RES IN FAVOR OF INDIAN DRAFT, THIS DESCRIPTION SEEMED TO MAKE BOTH RIFAI AND SHARAF NERVOUS.

KING SAID THAT HE HAD PROPOSED TO NASSER THAT:

1. ARABS WOULD ALL DECLARE END OF STATE OF BELLIGERENCY;
2. RECOGNIZE RIGHT OF EVERY STATE IN AREA TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY;

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3. WATERWAYS WOULD BE OPEN TO VESSELS OF ALL NATIONS, INCLUDING ISRAEL.

IN TURN ISRAEL WOULD BE EXPECTED TO:

1. DECLARE AN END TO STATE OF BELLIGERENCY;
2. RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT OF EVERY STATE IN AREA TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY;
3. WITHDRAW ITS FORCES "FROM TERRITORIES IT HAD OCCUPIED;"
4. "COOPERATE TOWARD FINDING A PERMANENT SOLUTION OF REFUGEE PROBLEM" (WHICH KING DESCRIBED AS A PART RESULT OF STATE OF WAR AND AN ELEMENT OF STATE OF BELLIGERENCY).

GP-2.

GOLDBERG

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~~SECRET~~ 579

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ACTION 06 05

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /025 W

O P 040513Z NOV 67 ZFF4
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8283
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 694

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 3 OF 3 USUN 1973

EXDIS

KING SAID IT WAS "DECIDED" BY HIMSELF AND NASSER THAT JORDAN AND EGYPT WERE READY (1) TO "DECLARE" AN END OF STATE OF BELLIGERENCE, (2) "RECOGNIZE" RIGHT OF EVERY STATE IN AREA TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY AND (3) OPEN SUEZ CANAL AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS ON CONDITION AND UNDERSTANDING ISRAEL WOULD DECLARE ITS ACCEPTANCE OF END OF STATE OF BELLIGERENCE, AS DESCRIBED ABOVE.

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KING SAID ONCE THIS WAS UNDERSTOOD THERE SHOULD NOT BE ANY TROUBLE WITH SC RES. HE THEN STRESSED FIRMLY THAT THIS WAS LIMITED AS FAR AS JORDAN WAS CONCERNED. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF BARRELLING, THAT THEY HAD GONE A VERY LONG WAY. TIME WAS RUNNING OUT, AND THEY WANTED A POLITICAL SOLUTION. HE STRESSED NEED FOR A UN UMBRELLA AND BY THIS HE MEANT A MANDATE FOR A REP THAT COULD GET ON WITH JOB OF IMPLEMENTING SOLUTION.

AMB. COL BERG SAID HE FOUND HIMSELF IN AGREEMENT WITH MUCH OF WHAT HIS MAJESTY HAD SAID. THERE HAVE BEEN PROBLEMS HERE AT UN HOPE THEY HAVE NOT BEEN OF MAKING OF JORDANIAN REPS. THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN THAT ACTIVITIES HERE AT UN ARE NOT IN KEEPING WITH

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PRINCIPLES THE KING HAD JUST ENUNCIATED. THE EFFORT HERE HAD GONE FAR BEYOND THESE PRINCIPLES. GOLDBERG CITED QUESTION OF CANAL FOR EXAMPLE. WE WERE NOT HEARING HERE THAT CANAL SHOULD BE OPENED TO ALL VESSELS, INCLUDING ISRAELI. HE POINTED OUT THAT HIS MAJESTY PROPERLY HAD LINKED OPENING OF CANAL WITH ENDING OF STATE OF BELLIGERENCY AS IN CASE OF 1951 SC RES. BUT HERE THE OPENING OF CANAL WAS LINKED WITH SOLUTION OF REFUGEE

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QUESTION. MOREOVER, IN THE INDIAN RES THERE IS PHRASEOLOGY WHICH REFERRED TO THE WATERWAYS BEING OPENED "IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE". WORD "PRACTICE" HAD BEEN DROPPED BECAUSE THAT WOULD HAVE MEAN GOING BACK TO PRE-JUNE 5 SITUATION BY WHICH THE STRAITS AND CANAL WERE CLOSED ON THE BASIS OF BELLIGERENCY. PHRASE "INTERNATIONAL LAW" IS STILL IN INDIAN DRAFT SINCE THIS WOULD GIVE UAR CONTINUING OPPORTUNITY TO CLOSE THE STRAITS ON THE BASIS OF "SOVEREIGN RIGHTS" US SHARES KING'S IMPATIENCE AND WE ARE PREPARED TO PUT SOMETHING DOWN ON PAPER-A FRESH APPROACH. SPECIFICALLY, WE BELIEVE OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE: (1) PERMANENT PEACE; (2) THERE SHOULD BE A POLITICAL SOLUTION, NOT A MILITARY ONE; (3) THIS POLITICAL SOLUTION SHOULD ENCOMPASS (A) WITHDRAWAL OF OCCUPYING TROOPS, (B) END OF BELLIGERENCY, (C) POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, (D) RECOGNITION OF EVERY STATE TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY IN AREA, (E) SOLUTION OF REFUGEE PROBLEM, AND (F) FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS. UN REP COULD WORK OUT THESE PROBLEMS WITH PARTIES CONCERNED.

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HIS MAJESTY STRESSED THAT WORLD ORGANIZATION MUST DEAL WITH PROBLEM SINCE IT PLAYED SUCH MAJOR ROLE IN CREATION OF ISRAEL. HE DID NOT FEEL SOLUTION HAD TO BE DEALT WITH ON PIECE-MEAL BASIS. SINCE GOLDBERG HAD READ TO HIM THE PRESS TICKER TODAY COMING OUT OF CAIRO DSEVERELY CRITICIZING AMERICAN POLICY, KING SAID HE APPRECIATED MISUNDERSTANDINGS THAT SUCH THINGS CAUSED, BUT THAT WE MUST DEAL WITH THEM PATIENTLY, PARTICULARLY SINCE ONE TAKES

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A LOOK AT THE PRESS ALL OVER THE WORLD. HIS IMPRESSION IS THAT NASSER WANTS GOOD RELATIONS WITH US THOUGH NASSER FEELS WASHINGTON IS TRYING TO HUMILIATE HIM. HE SAID MANY ARABS FEEL THAT US WANTS TO RUB THEIR NOSES IN THE DUST.

HIS MAJESTY LET RIFAI CARRY THE BALL REGARDING DISCUSSIONS RE SC RES. RIFAI FIRST SAID THAT HE WAS MUCH SURPRISED TO READ IN NEW YORK TIMES THAT ANDERSON WAS ON OFFICIAL MISSION. RIFAI WAS PRESENT WHEN ANDERSON SPOKE TO RIAD AND THAT THE CONTENTS OF NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE HAD ASTONISHED HIM. HE NOTED THAT REPORTS MENTIONED "JOINT DECLARATION", AND HE RECALLED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT THIS WAS IDEA CONTAINED IN BRAZILIAN TEXT WHICH ARABS DID NOT CONSIDER VERY SERIOUSLY. HE CONTENDED THAT INDIAN

PAGE FIVE RUEHDT 1973/3 ~~SECRET~~ EXDIS
TEXT USED THE FIVE PRINCIPLES AS STARTING POINT (WITH EXCEPTION OF ARMS LIMITATION). HE STRESSED THAT FIRST ORDER WAS TO END THE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF THE TERRITORIES; ONCE THIS ACHIEVED ONE COULD MOVE ON TO SOLUTION OF OTHER MATTERS. HE STRESSED THAT JORDAN HAS GONE AS FAR AS IT COULD BY ACCEPTING CHANGES IN 6-POWER DRAFT. THIS DRAFT WAS DRAWN LARGELY FROM TEXTS WHICH US HAD PREVIOUSLY SUPPORTED. IF LA TEXT WERE RE-INTRODUCED IN GA UNCHANGED, THE ARABS WOULD GO WITH IT. RIFAI THEN MADE EFFORT TO TRY TO GET US TO FOCUS AND NEGOTIATE ON BASIS INDIAN TEXT. IN PROCESS HE STRESSED WHAT HE CONSIDERS TO BE ONE BASIC ESSENTIAL-WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES AND NEED TO BE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR ON THIS POINT. HE ARGUED THAT RESPECT FOR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY SHOULD COME BEGIN UNDERLINE AFTER END UNDERLINE WITHDRAWAL. GOLDBERG REBUTTED THIS BY SAYING THAT CHARTER OF UN DOES NOT ENVISAGE WITHDRAWAL IN CIRCUMSTANCES OF STATE OF WAR.

CONVERSATION COCLUDED BY KING RESPONDING AFFIRMATIVELY TO OUR SUGGESTION THAT WE PUT DOWN SOMETHING ON PAPER WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT AGREEMENT ON PRINCIPLES ACHIEVED BY NASSER AND HUSSEIN IN CAIRO ON OCT. 17.

GP-2.

COLEBERG

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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Jordan

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EXDIS

GOLDBERG MET WITH KING HUSSEIN AGAIN THIS AFTERNOON (NOV. 5) AT KING'S REQUEST. ALSO PRESENT WERE ABDUL MONEM RIFAI, SAID RIFAI, SHARAF, AND SISCO. BUFFUM AND PEDERSEN.

KING INITIATED CONVERSATION. SAID HIS POSITION WAS AS FOLLOWS. JORDAN WAS INTERESTED IN SUBSTANCE NOT WORDS. THIS WAS WHY HE HAD ENCOURAGED US TO SEIZE OPPORTUNITY THAT MIGHT BE LAST ONE FOR ALL OF US. JORDAN'S INTEREST WAS IN LAYING FOUNDATION FOR JUST AND LASTING PEACE. WE SHOULD NOT WASTE MORE TIME ON DETAILS AND ON WORDS.

PAGE TWO RUEHDT 1999 ~~SECRET~~

PROBLEM WAS IN US HANDS. HE REALIZED US OBJECTIVES WERE TO EXERCISE ITS RIGHTS IN ATTEMPTING TO SOLVE PROBLEM WHICH AFFECTED ALL OF US. A JUST AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WAS US AND HIS PURPOSE AS WELL. WITHOUT US HELP HE COULD NOT GET VERY FAR.

HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MANY OTHER SC MEMBERS. RIGHT NOW ISSUE WAS IN US HANDS AND THAT OF SC. HE WISHED US SUCCESS FOR BEST RESULTS. WE KNEW IN LIGHT OF HIS FRANK EXPOSITION TO US

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By 4, NARA, Date 9-1-09

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PAGE 02 USUN N 01999 060806Z

OF HIS POLICY AND HIS DISCUSSIONS IN CAIRO HOW FAR HE WOULD BE ABLE TO GO. HE DID NOT WISH TO COMMENT ON TEXT WE HAD GIVEN HIM; (USUN'S 1988) BUT HE WISHED US ALL SUCCESS. HE HOPED THAT BEFORE HE WENT, US EFFORTS WOULD MEET WITH SUCCESS.

KING CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE LOOKED FORWARD TO HIS VISIT IN WASHINGTON.

PAGE THREE RUEHDT 1999 ~~SECRET~~

GOLDBERG REPLIED THAT KING HAD CORRECTLY SUMMARIZED SITUATION. HE HAD ALSO BEEN CORRECT IN UNDERSTANDING US HAD NOT OFFERED RES IN BARGAINING CONTEXT BUT AS BEST AND MOST APPROPRIATE STEP WE COULD MAKE TO FACILITATE SETTLEMENT WITHIN UMBRELLA OF UN. WE HOPED WE COULD GET ON WITH JOB OF RESTORING PEACEFUL SITUATION IN AREA AND BEING OF ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN.

GOLDBERG NOTED HE HAD IN PREVIOUS CONVERSATION MADE RESERVATIONS ABOUT OUR POLICY POSITION ON KEY WORDS (OCCUPIED TERRITORY). HE HAD SINCE DISCUSSED THEM AT APPROPRIATE LEVELS AND COULD SAY THEY HAD US APPROVAL.

KING HAD APPROPRIATELY SAID ISSUE WAS NOW IN OUR HANDS AND THAT OF SC. ON THIS HE HAD SOME IMPORTANT OBSERVATIONS. TIME WAS NOT WORKING IN FAVOR OF PEACE.

BEFORE FIGHTING HAD COMMENCED IN JUNE US HAD PUT PROPOSAL FORWARD IN SC THAT MIGHT HAVE PREVENTED THE WAR. THIS HAD BEEN REJECTED BY USSR AND BY ARABS. REJECTION OF THIS PROPOSAL, WHICH INVOLVED ONLY FREEDOM OF TRANSIT THROUGH GULF, HAD BEEN A GREAT MISTAKE.

PAGE FOUR RUEHDT 1999 ~~SECRET~~

AFTER FIGHTING BROKE OUT IN EARLY DAYS US IN SC HAD OFFERED A RES INCLUDING WITHDRAWAL AND OPENING OF STRAITS OF TIRAN IN DISCUSSION WITH SOVS. THEY HAD SAID WE SHOULD SHOW IT TO ARABS.

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THIS ALSO HAD BEEN TURNED DOWN. THEN IN GA WE HAD SUPPORTED PROPOSAL (LA TEXT) WHICH WE THOUGHT HAD BEEN APPROPRIATE TO THAT TIME. THIS ALSO HAD BEEN TURNED DOWN. THEN WE HAD WORKED OUT NEW TEXTS WITH USSR. THESE TOO WERE TURNED DOWN.

GOLDBERG SAID LET US NOT MAKE SAME MISTAKE AGAIN. WHAT IS AVAILABLE TODAY OFTEN IS NOT AVAILABLE IN FUTURE. EVENTS OFTEN TAKE OVER FOR THEMSELVES. THREE MONTHS FROM NOW MAY NOT OFFER SAME OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROGRESS AS TODAY. WE KNEW HE WAS REFLECTIVE ON THAT HIMSELF.

GOLDBERG THEN REFERRED TO REQUEST BY KUZNETSOV TO SEE HIM AND SAID HE WOULD SHORTLY BE TALKING TO HIM. HE DID NOT WANT TO BREAK CONFIDENCES WITH KING AND HIS INQUIRY WAS ACCENTUATED BY HIS REMARK THAT ISSUE WAS IN HANDS OF SC. HE WONDERED WHAT KING'S ATTITUDE WOULD BE TOWARDS WHAT HE SHOULD SAY TO KUZNETSOV.

PAGE FIVE RUEHDT 1999 ~~SECRET~~

KING REPLIED THAT "PRIOR TO MY REACHING MY VERY CLEAR UNDERSTANDING WITH NASSER AS TO HOW FAR WE COULD GO" HE HAD GONE TO MOSCOW. IN MOSCOW HE HAD ENCOURAGED SOVS TO CARRY ON CONVERSATIONS WITH US. HE BELIEVED THIS SHOULD CONTINUE AND WE SHOULD FEEL NO COMPUNCTION ABOUT WHAT WE DISCUSSED WITH THEM.

GOLDBERG EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND MEETING ADJOURNED.

COMMENT: WHILE IN LIGHT OF RIAD'S STATEMENT YESTERDAY THAT HE INTENDED TO GO TO SC WITH INDIAN TEXT, CONVERSATION COULD HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED AS A DISENGAGEMENT BY KING, OUR ASSESSMENT AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION WAS THAT IT WAS TO BE TAKEN EXACTLY AS KING EXPRESSED IT, I.E., THAT HE WAS ENCOURAGING US TO GO AHEAD WITH THIS TEXT BUT WISHED TO LEAVE HIMSELF IN SITUATION WHERE IT COULD NOT BE SAID HE HAD AGREED TO IT (POSSIBLY BECAUSE OF COMPLICATIONS WITH OTHER ARABS).

PAGE SIX RUEHDT 1999 ~~SECRET~~

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THIS ASSESSMENT LATER CONFIRMED BY INFORMATION CONVEYED TO CARADON BY SAID RIFAI IN WHICH HE REPORTED THAT SUBSEQUENT TO THIS CONVERSATION KING HAD TALKED TO RIAD AND GIVEN HIM VERY FAVORABLE REACTION TO US TEXT.

GP-3.

GOLDBERG

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Present Status of King
Hussein's Visit

You will have seen a detailed memorandum of my conversation with King Hussein at lunch yesterday. I met privately with him for a half hour preceding that luncheon and, among other things, referred to his conversations with Ambassador Goldberg in New York. I intended to incorporate the statements made by Ambassador Goldberg to him and by reference to indicate my approval of Ambassador Goldberg's statements.

Following the luncheon, a member of the King's party inquired as to whether I had specifically meant to include a reference to the statements made by Ambassador Goldberg with respect to territorial integrity. I authorized a U.S. official to confirm to the King that I had by reference incorporated Ambassador Goldberg's assurances in my comments.

The net effect of this incorporation is to state that the United States as a matter of policy does not envisage a Jordan which consists only of the East Bank. The United States is prepared to support the return of a substantial part of the West Bank to Jordan with boundary adjustments. However, the United States would use its influence to obtain compensation to Jordan for any territory it is required to give up.

For example, if Jordan is required to give up the Latrun salient, the United States will use its diplomatic and political influence to obtain in compensation access for Jordan to a Mediterranean port in Israel. Finally, although as a matter of policy we do not agree with either Jordan's

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Authority NLJ 99-268 (F5a)
By cbm/ls, NARA, Date 6-21-05

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or Israel's position on Jerusalem, we are prepared to use our diplomatic and political influence to obtain for Jordan a role in Jerusalem. In short, we are prepared to make a maximum diplomatic and political effort to obtain for Jordan the best possible deal in terms of settlement with Israel.

The foregoing was conveyed to the King with a clear statement that we cannot guarantee that everything will be returned to Jordan since, of course, we cannot speak for Israel.

King Hussein's visit has so far gone quite well. During his visit, King Hussein will have made a number of public appearances in addition to meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House. He appeared on the TV program "Face the Nation" on November 5. He also has delivered an address at Georgetown University and at the National Press Club.

The major theme of the King's public statements is the need for a permanent understanding between Israel and its Arab neighbors. In what he described as the "new and positive approach of the Arabs towards a lasting peace in the Middle East", he has stressed the willingness of the Arab world to consider a political approach to the Arab-Israel question.

Specifically, he has called on Israel to state what it proposes to do with respect to Arab lands it has occupied, Arab refugees it has displaced, and the future of the Old City of Jerusalem. He has stressed the Arab desire for peace and has pointed out that Israel has a choice of either living with the Arabs peacefully or of remaining an isolated outpost in the Arab world.

A separate memorandum is being submitted with respect to the current situation at the United Nations.

Dean Rusk

Hussein Visit

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STA
WASHINGTON

- 1. Hussein visit
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November 11, 1967

*Cy to Lois Niven for
Rostow's files with
HH S memo 11/22/67*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

SUBJECT: Meeting Between President Johnson,
King Hussein and Secretary Rusk on
Wednesday, November 8 at 5:30 p.m.

Following the meeting between the President and the King, Secretary Rusk gave me some of the highlights of the discussion.

The meeting was cordial and a few minutes were spent in pleasantries, including the presentation of a cigarette lighter to His Majesty by President Johnson.

Discussions centered on the U.S. resolution currently before the Security Council. The President pressed the King to support the U.S. resolution. He pointed out that the resolution is to be a compromise resolution. The Government of Israel is not happy with the text; the Arabs are not happy with the text. It is difficult to draft a resolution that makes both sides happy, but it is imperative that both sides accept the resolution if it is to be implemented.

King Hussein tried his best to get precision on the clause with respect to withdrawal of Israeli forces. The President replied that it was difficult to be precise in one part and not on the others. There were imprecise statements in the resolution in several respects. The King then said that if it was impossible to be precise as to when or where withdrawal should take place, he hoped that it would be possible to be precise with regard to the question of who was to withdraw. The phraseology of the resolution calling for withdrawal from occupied territories could be interpreted to mean

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that the Egyptians should withdraw from Gaza and the Jordanians should withdraw from the West Bank. This possibility was evident from the speech by Prime Minister ~~FERDIAW~~ ^{Ebani} in which the Prime Minister had referred to both Gaza and the West Bank as "occupied territory".

The President agreed to talk with Ambassador Goldberg in New York and he and Secretary Rusk told the King that we would be back in touch with him by noon the following day with respect to his suggestion for inclusion of the word "Israeli" before the word withdrawal in the resolution.

The President urged strongly that the Jordanians support the U.S. resolution, and expressed the hope that Jordan would try to get the UAR on board also. The U.S. will use its leverage to bring about a settlement. We have to move one step at a time, however, and the King must understand that we too have problems.

After the King left the President's office, he had a brief exchange with Secretary Rusk concerning the provision of arms to Jordan. I heard him say that he hoped for an answer before he departed from the U.S. The Secretary later told me that he had predicated this hope on there being progress made in New York.



Lucius D. Battle



Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 175876

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ORIGIN SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN; RBHOUGHTON/RPDAVIES
APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY
NEA/IAI: MR ATHERTON
IO: MR POPPER
S/S: MR READ
NEA: WHANDLEY
WH: MR ROSTOW
U: MR KATZENBACH

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Jordan (subject)

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EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 5084; 5170

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Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, #188
By cbm, NARA, Date 6-21-05

1. PLS PASS TO KING HUSSEIN FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT:

YOUR APPREHENSIONS CONCERNING FUTURE SANCTITY OF JORDANIAN TERRITORY HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO MY ATTENTION. I WISH AGAIN TO ASSURE YOU, AS I DID IN MY LETTER OF FEB 11, THAT IT IS OUR POLICY AND OUR INTEREST TO CONTINUE OUR CLOSE RELATIONSHIP AND OUR SUPPORT OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN. AS AMBASSADOR SYMMES HAS INDICATED TO YOU, WE HAVE MADE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL OUR POLICY TOWARD THE CONTINUED INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY OF YOUR COUNTRY. YOU SHOULD ALSO KNOW THAT WE WOULD STRONGLY OPPOSE ANY OCCUPATION OF TERRITORY BEYOND THE PRESENT CEASE-FIRE LINES. I RECOGNIZE THAT YOUR MAJESTY HAS SOUGHT TO PREVENT USE OF JORDANIAN TERRITORY TO MOUNT ACTS OF VIOLENCE ACROSS THE CEASE-FIRE LINE AND URGE THAT CONTINUED EFFORTS BE MADE TO PREVENT THESE ACTIONS WHICH PROMOTE INSTABILITY AND ARE AN IMPEDIMENT TO PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE.

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2. I WANT ALSO TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE CONTINUING OUR EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A JUST SETTLEMENT IN THE NEAR EAST WHICH IS, AFTER ALL, THE ONLY SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM ABOUT WHICH WE ARE BOTH CONCERNED. RUSK

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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Jordan

PAGE 01 STATE 113645

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ORIGIN SS 30

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DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: RBHOUGHTON
APPROVED BY: S/S-9: MR. FINCH
NEA: RPD AVIES (INSUBST)
IO: JSISCO (INSUBST)
NEA/IAI: AATHERTON
WH: MR. WALT W. ROSTOW

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TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0792

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EXDIS

FOR DELIVERY TO THE AMBASSADOR AT OPENING OF BUSINESS

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE
PRESIDENT TO KING HUSSEIN. BEGIN TEXT, QUOTE: HIS MAJESTY,
KING HUSSEIN, AMMAN, JORDAN. YOUR MAJESTY: I SEND YOU THIS
PERSONAL WORD IN ADVANCE OF THE REPORT GENERAL KAMMASH WILL
GIVE YOU. THE GENERAL HAS ARGUED HIS CASE WELL.

OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE ENJOYED A WARM, CLOSE, MUTUALLY
BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP FOR A LONG PERIOD. THERE ARE FEW
OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD WITH WHICH WE HAVE WORKED AS

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PAGE 02 STATE 113645

CLOSELY AS WITH JORDAN. I ASSURE YOUR MAJESTY THAT IT IS OUR POLICY AND OUR INTEREST TO CONTINUE THAT RELATIONSHIP AND OUR SUPPORT OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN. WHILE THE JUNE WAR HAS CREATED STRAINS AND PROBLEMS FOR BOTH OF US, IT HAS NEVER ALTERED OUR FUNDAMENTAL POLICY TOWARDS JORDAN.

DESPITE THE CURRENT HEAVY DEMANDS ON OUR RESOURCES, GENERAL KHAMMASH IS RETURNING WITH AN ARMS PACKAGE WHICH WE CONSIDER TO BE A SUBSTANTIAL RESPONSE TO YOUR REQUEST FOR US TO MEET YOUR LEGITIMATE ARMS REQUIREMENTS. WE INTEND THIS PACKAGE TO BE A STRONG REAFFIRMATION OF OUR SUPPORT.

I ALSO ASSURE YOU THAT WE HAVE NOT ALTERED OUR FIRM RESOLVE TO EXTEND OUR FULL DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL SUPPORT OF AMBASSADOR JARRING TO REACH A JUST AND DURABLE SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. DURING YOUR VISIT HERE IN NOVEMBER, WE EXPLAINED TO YOU OUR POSITION ON THE WEST BANK AND JERUSALEM. WE HAVE NOT CHANGED THAT POSITION. AS AMBASSADOR JARRING MAKES PROGRESS, WE HOPE AND EXPECT THAT THERE WILL BE OPPORTUNITIES FOR US TO SUPPORT HIS EFFORTS IN MORE

PAGE 3 RUEHC 113645 ~~SECRET~~
SPECIFIC WAYS.

YOUR MAJESTY, WE ARE BOTH PASSING THROUGH A CRITICAL PERIOD IN THE HISTORY OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES. WITH PATIENCE, WISDOM AND MUTUAL TRUST, I AM SURE THAT WE CAN SOLVE OUR PROBLEMS AND OBTAIN THE OBJECTIVE WE BOTH SO FERVENTLY DESIRE--A PEACEFUL MIDDLE EAST IN WHICH A UNITED JORDAN CAN PLAY ITS HISTORIC ROLE.

WITH ALL GOOD WISHES, SINCERELY, LYNDON B. JOHNSON. END
QUOTE. RUSK

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Hussein Visit
34

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

11/8/67

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Discussion with King Hussein

The following supplementary talking points for possible use with King Hussein have been prepared in light of developments today at the United Nations.

1. We were pleased that His Majesty had encouraged us in taking an initiative in the Security Council.
2. As His Majesty knows, time is not on the side of peace and we are very anxious for a United Nations representative to be appointed promptly so that the United States can give full support politically and diplomatically to his efforts in working out a reasonable settlement in the area.
3. We wish to assure His Majesty that the United States will help to work out a possible peace settlement.
4. It would be most helpful if His Majesty could take steps to assure full support of Jordan and do what he can with Egypt to assure acceptance of the United States resolution. This resolution goes as far as we can go with reasonable prospects of Israel's willingness to cooperate with the United Nations representative.
5. We must not lose this opportunity by inconsequential word exercises at the United Nations that are causing unfortunate delays in getting the United Nations representative out to the area.
6. The longer the occupation continues the more difficult it will be to achieve the kind of a settlement that will protect the territorial integrity and political independence of a Jordan in secure and agreed boundaries.

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GROUP 3

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4(46)
State Dept. Guidelines
By *etm/pw*, NARA, Date 6-21-05

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I know the Secretary and Ambassador Goldberg have had detailed discussions with His Majesty and have indicated our views more precisely how we see things shaping up. We have no blueprint, we cannot guarantee the result: Israel is not our puppet. His Majesty can be assured, however, that we will do everything possible politically and diplomatically to be helpful. But in order for us to be helpful we must have the United States text adopted promptly. The United States text gives His Majesty what he needs and wants -- a United Nations umbrella under which to pursue discussions.

What is available today may not be available a month or two or three months from now and it is very important therefore that this opportunity not be lost.

We hope, therefore, His Majesty will do everything he can to win prompt acceptance among the Arab delegations and particularly the United Arab Republic to accept or acquiesce in the United States text.

Dean Rusk

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Department of State

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Saunders/Davis

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41
ORIGIN SS 25

INFO /025 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN,RHBHOUGHTON
APPROVED BY: S/S-MR. JOHN P. WALSH
NEA/ARN-AMBASSADOR SYMMES
NEA-MR. BATTLE

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Hussein visit

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FOLLOWING BASED ON UNCLEARED MEMCON FYI AND SUBJECT REVISION;
1. ON NOVEMBER 6 THE SECRETARY HOSTED A WORKING LUNCH FOR KING HUSSEIN, WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE JORDAN AMBASSADOR SHARAF AND CHIEF OF ROYAL CABINET RIFA'I. THE UNDER SECRETARY, ASSISTANT SECRETARIES BATTLE AND SISCO AND HARRISON SYMES, BMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE TO JORDAN, ALSO ATTENDED.

2. THE MEETING COVERED THREE MAIN SUBJECTS-- REFUGEES, US MIDDLE EAST ARMS POLICY, AND A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION THE ARAB-ISRAELI CRISIS. DISCUSSION ON REFUGEES UNCOVERED NO NEW GROUND. HUSSEIN EMPHASIZED THAT JORDAN CONTINUED TO NEED RELIEF ASSISTANCE FOR THE REFUGEES, BUT THAT REAL NEED WAS RETURN OF REFUGEES TO THEIR HOMES ON WEST BANK. HUSSEIN EXPLAINED ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE THE TIE-IN BETWEEN THE REGUGEE PROBLEM AND ISRAELI TRANSIT OF THE SUEZ

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CANAL. HE SAID ISRAELI TRANSIT COULD BEGIN BEFORE A COMPLETE SOLUTION OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM WAS REACHED. WHAT WAS REQUIRED WAS A START TOWARDS A SOLUTION.

3. IN DISCUSSING ARMS PROBLEM, SECRETARY EXPRESSED KEEN DISAPPOINTMENT AT SOVIET REFUSAL TO COOPERATE WITH US IN EFFORT RESTRAIN ARMS RACE IN MIDDLE EAST. OUR DECISION SELL AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL DIRECTLY RELATED TO INFLUX SOVIET ARMS AS WE ARE CONCERNED WITH ARMS BALANCE IN AREA. HUSSEIN REPLIED PROBLEM WAS MEANING OF WORD "BALANCE". THERE WAS NO BALANCE BEFORE JUNE 5.

HAD THERE NOT BEEN A WAR, THE ARABS MIGHT HAVE REACHED A BALANCE WITH ISRAEL WITHIN 14 MONTHS FROM LAST JUNE. JORDAN, HOWEVER, WAS NOT ONLY WORRIED ABOUT CONVENTIONAL ARMS, BUT ALSO ABOUT REPORTS ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE ATOMIC WEAPONS IN ONE YEAR. JORDAN FACED CURRENTLY WITH ARMS REQUIREMENTS WHICH IT HAD NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO SATISFY. IN INTERIM JORDAN COMPELLED RETAIN IRAQI FORCES ITS TERRITORY FOR OWN DEFENSE. JORDAN HAD TO HAVE ARMS FROM SOME SOURCE WHICH DEFINITE AND CONTINUOUS.

4. SECRETARY HOPED HUSSEIN COULD UNDERSTAND OUR PROBLEM RE ARMS SUPPLY. PROBLEM WAS TO AVOID ALL-INCLUSIVE LEGISLATIVE PROHIBITION AGAINST SUPPLY OF ARMS. HE COULD NOT EXAGGERATE EFFECT INDIA-PAKISTAN SITUATION HAD IN THIS RESPECT. MANY LEGISLATORS UPSET THAT AMERICAN ARMS BEING USED BY BOTH SIDES CONFLICT. CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES PERSISTED AND THEREFORE WE HAD TO MOVE SLOWLY. SECRETARY EMPHASIZED IT WOULD BE DISASTROUS IF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTRODUCED IN MIDDLE EAST. OUR POLICY ABSOLUTELY FIRM KING COULD LEAVE IT TO US BECAUSE WE WERE VERY SERIOUS ON THIS ISSUE, WHICH WE REGARDED AS FUNDAMENTAL.

5. RIFA'I INDICATED JORDAN'S UNDERSTANDING OF PROBLEM EXPLAINED BY SECRETARY. HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, WHY US GAVE ISRAEL ARMS AND NOT ITS ALLY JORDAN. AMBASSADOR SHARAF ADDED THAT WHAT HAD SHOCKED ARAB WORLD WAS THAT DECISION SELL AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL MADE AT SAME TIME ISRAEL PUBLIC POSITION TOWARDS SETTLEMENT CURRENT CRISIS HARDENING. SECRETARY UNDERSTOOD ARAB FEELINGS, BUT OTHER ELEMENTS HAD TO BE CONSIDERED. WE DID NOT BELIEVE IT IN INTEREST US

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OR ARABS FOR MAJOR POWERS BECOME INVOLVED MILITARILY IN MIDDLE EAST.

6. ON BORADER PROBLEM UN RESOLUTION, SECRETARY INDICATED HE WAS NOT PESSIMISTIC AND THAT HE HOPED WE COULD GET STARTED ALONG PRESENT LINES. MR. SISCO TOLD HUSSEIN THAT AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG AND US DELEGATION VERY IMPRESSED BY THEIR TALKS WITH HIS MAJESTY OVER THE WEEKEND. HE EMPHASIZED THAT TIME WAS OF ESSENCE AND IT IMPORTANT TO GET A UN REPRESENTATIVE INTO THE AREA. ONCE THIS DONE, AS AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG HAD NOTED, US COULD PLAY STRONG SUPPORTING ROLE. SECRETARY REMARKED THAT WE ARE NOW MAKING SOME HEADWAY. WE SEE SHAPE OF POSSIBLE SOLUTION AND ARE PREPARED USE OUR MUSCLE IN SUPPORTING A PERMANENT SOLUTION THAT CORRESPONDED TO SOBER, REFLECTIVE JUDGMENT OF RESPONSIBLE LEADERS IN AREA.

7. IN DISCUSSING RESULTS OF KHARTOUM CONFERENCE, MR. SISCO COMMENTED THAT THERE APPEARED INHERENT LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOM OF ACTION GIVEN HUSSEIN. IN RECENT DAYS WE HAD WONDERED IF ARAB GROUP EN MASSE HAD NOT BEEN MAKING DECISIONS IN NEW YORK RATHER THAN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES. THE JORDANIANS CONFIRMED AGAIN THAT KHARTOUM CONFERENCE HAD DECIDED THAT OTHER ARABS WOULD GO ALONG WITH WHAT KING HUSSEIN AND PRESIDENT NASSER COULD WORK OUT. MR. SISCO EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS A CRUCIAL POINT. AN EARLY RESOLUTION IN JULY WHICH SEEMED ACCEPTABLE TO JORDAN AND THE UAR HAD BEEN KILLED BY OTHER ARABS. IT WAS THEREFORE IMPORTANT THAT COUNTRIES PRIMARILY CONCERNED SHOULD MAKE UP THEIR MINDS AND NOT WORRY ABOUT GROUP PSYCHOLOGY. WE HOPE THEREFORE JORDAN COULD HAVE DOMINANT VOICE.

8. MR. SISCO THEN STRESSED THAT RESOLUTION DISCUSSED WITH KING OVER WEEKEND WAS CRUCIAL. IF KING AND NASSER AGREED, EVERYTHING WOULD BE ALL RIGHT. KING RESPONDED THAT ONLY DIFFICULTY HAD BEEN MATTER OF WITHDRAWAL AND HOW IT SHOULD BE DEFINED. JORDAN COULD ACCEPT STATEMENTS WITH REGARD TO WITHDRAWAL, BUT WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS MEANING OF THOSE STATEMENTS AND JORDAN NEEDED A COMMITMENT AS TO THEIR MEANING. AMBASSADOR SHARAF COMMENTED THAT JORDAN WOULD NEED TO KNOW IN ITS BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES HOW LATTER STOOD WITH REGARD TO MATTERS SUCH AS WITHDRAWAL. THE SECRETARY COMMENTED

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THAT KEY QUESTION OF RECIPROCITY DID NOT INVOLVE THE US. THE UNITED STATES HAD NOT CLOSED THE TIRAN STRAITS AND IF TIRAN HAD NOT BEEN CLOSED, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO JUNE WAR. THE UNITED STATES WOULD CERTAINLY WORK TO SUPPORT A SETTLEMENT THAT HAD PROSPECTS OF SUCCESS, BUT THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT IN COMPLETE CONTROL OF ALL PARTIES. OUR ANSWERS ALONE COULD NOT SETTLE PROBLEM. NEITHER ARABS NOR ISRAELIS WOULD TAKE OUR ANSWER AS FINAL.

9. IN SUMMARIZING UN SITUATION, MR. SISCO SAID CONSULTATIONS WERE CONTINUING. AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG WAS DISCUSSING DRAFT THAT WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE KING, WITH OTHER KEY DELEGATIONS AND IN NEXT DAY OR TWO WE SHOULD KNOW WHETHER THERE REASONABLE CHANCE OF SUCCESS. WHILE ISRAEL NOT YET SIGNED ON, DRAFT PROVIDES GOOD STARTING POINT. THE POSITIVE VIEWS OF JORDAN AND THE UAR WOULD OF COURSE BE CRUCIAL.

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31

TALKING POINTS

What Hussein Wants

Hussein comes here worried, and with a sense of grievance.

He is willing to negotiate with the Israeli, but not without the cover of a UN resolution. He believes he has helped prepare the way for such a resolution -- first by obtaining a moderate Arab position at the Khartoum summit, then by promoting a text drawn from the US five points and the US-Soviet agreement. Now, he feels, we are upping the ante in New York and backing off, as the Israeli position has become harder. This -- combined with our failure to reinstate the military aid program -- leads him to question whether the US is still interested in Jordan and in a political settlement. He has been to Moscow to get Soviet backing for a settlement, and received there offers of economic and military aid. Hussein is coming to Washington not only seeking reassurance, but to make a new calculation of how far he can depend on the United States. In specific, Hussein will want to know:

-- What kind of a resolution do we want in New York and what are we willing to do to get it?

-- What is our position on Jerusalem and the West Bank, and what are we willing to do to back it up?

-- How do we see the future of US/Jordan relations?

Do we still have an interest in a moderate Jordan, and if so, what are our intentions on military and economic aid?

What We Want

We have made a new calculation of what the Jordanian connection is worth. In essence Hussein is valuable to us because of the -- possibly indispensable -- role he can play in

starting and sustaining negotiations for a general political settlement between Israel and its neighbors. Beyond that, Hussein has been known for ten years as a US protege. If he fails to survive, or turns away from us towards Moscow, our prestige in the area -- and the confidence of other moderate regimes in us -- will suffer. The balance of power in the Arab world would shift sharply away from moderation. Given the existing limits to our access in the area, the loss would be serious.

Our objective in these talks is to keep Hussein on course towards a UN resolution and direct or indirect negotiations with Israel. Because of attitudes in Congress on arms and the AID budget problem, we have nothing tangible to offer him now as evidence of support. (Indeed, we will have to tell him we are altering the nature of our economic support.) But we must convince him that we want a settlement equitable to both sides, and are willing to use our influence to get it. In order to do so, we must first make certain that he has no misconceptions of what we are up to in New York. We must also explain more definitely than so far what our position is regarding his territorial problems. And we must reaffirm that despite our difficulties we wish to continue our close and friendly relationship with Jordan.

Hussein will be skeptical. Since we have only assertions and not action to offer him, our success will depend on how convinced he is that we will act on those assertions to obtain a balanced settlement. If he is not convinced, the immediate danger is that Hussein will conclude that there is no future in negotiation. If Jordan gives up, no Arab country is likely to pursue negotiations. The delay -- given the Israelization of Jerusalem -- would be very damaging.

Consequences of Failure to Reach a Settlement

You should know that the Israeli evaluation of Hussein does not jibe with ours. Israeli representatives have gone out of their way to give us the impression Israel is writing

Hussein down, and maybe off. Their motive may be to make sure Hussein comes to the bargaining table alone; or their view may reflect a much diminished interest in negotiations. Manifestly they do not want continued close US/Jordan relations. We shall have to have this out with the Israelis.

Whatever the chances of settlement -- and as of now it is hard to be sanguine -- failure would be costly to us. Arab/Israeli tension would heighten, terrorism increase, the arms race accelerate, as both sides prepared for a new round. The United States could not stand aside, and probably could not avoid closer identification with Israel. The long-term risk of a confrontation with the Soviet Union would grow.

Talking Points

1. We both want to create conditions in which negotiations can start. Your efforts at Khartoum and afterwards have made an important contribution. For our part we have taken the lead in New York in working for a UN resolution. We have also tried to protect an environment favorable to negotiation by intervention on both sides in such questions as the movement of refugees, the terrorist problem, the opening of banks. We interceded strongly with Foreign Minister Eban of Israel on these problems two weeks ago.

2. Hope your talks with Arthur Goldberg have cleared up any misunderstanding on what our intentions are in New York.

3. We hope for quick action on a resolution. We agree with you that time is not on the side of a peaceful settlement. We understand your need for a Security Council resolution before undertaking negotiations.

When you are ready to negotiate either directly or indirectly, we are prepared to put our weight behind an equitable solution. We have no precise blueprint for a settlement.

But we do believe that it should involve the return of the West Bank to Jordan. In order to obtain this the West Bank would probably have to be demilitarized. Territorial adjustments would have to be made around boundary lines as they stood before the war. The boundaries must be permanent.

Jerusalem is tougher for a variety of reasons including our historical position with which you are familiar. As we have stated publicly, we do not accept Israel's unilateral action. We are prepared to use our influence to see what arrangements can be worked out. We believe Jerusalem should be a city with free access to all and that the interests of the three great religions and the interest of the inhabitants must be protected. It may be that these objectives could best be achieved through some form of international or other status involving participation of Jordan. But we do not exclude the possibility of an agreement between Israel and Jordan that would meet Jordan's political, economic and religious interests. In the context of peace, we can envision Jerusalem becoming the focus of a new and profitable relationship between the economies of Jordan and Israel. These might include bilateral trade, increased tourism across newly opened borders, duty-free access by Jordan to the Mediterranean, improved use of the Jordan waters.

4. You will appreciate that we cannot speak for the Israelis nor do we have unlimited influence over them. What we have said reflects our thinking alone.

5. We are seriously disturbed by the arms race in the Middle East. Congress is concerned about our general arms policy as well as that for the Middle East area. We have tried to find a formula for curbing the arms race and accordingly refrained from June until October from supplying arms to the area. Unfortunately our hands were forced by a heavy Soviet arms influx. As we are concerned with an arms balance in the area, we accordingly had to sell arms to Israel. We recognize Jordan's legitimate requirements for some arms and sincerely regret that strong feelings in Congress make it difficult for

us to carry out a military assistance program for Jordan in the absence of negotiations for a settlement. With a settlement we should be able to provide reasonable quantities of arms. However, given Congressional sentiment on this question and the serious trouble we are having in getting a foreign aid bill out of the Congress, we cannot resume any arms supply to Jordan at this particular time. We would hope that favorable developments looking towards a settlement might permit us to resume some shipments of military equipment other than major combat items in the fairly near future. In the interim we are prepared to support certain of Jordan's arms requests from Western European suppliers.

6. We do appreciate your situation and ask your patience a while longer. I think you know the temper of this country. There is much unhappiness about the events of June 5. I believe we can overcome these difficulties. I am sure I am telling you nothing you do not already know when I say that a decision of Jordan to obtain arms in the Soviet Union would make close US/Jordani cooperation of the sort we have enjoyed much more difficult.

7. Although we understand you do not wish to discuss economic matters, we do want to assure you of our continued active interest in Jordan's economic development and viability. We want to continue to participate in your development effort. I want you also to know that we are discussing ways of helping you get the Potash project under way as soon as possible. The nature of our assistance must, however, reflect your mounting reserves of foreign exchange, the sizeable contributions from other Arab states and our own stringent budgetary situation. We would like to discuss these matters with your Government.

8. I know you share our continuing concern at the possibility of an outbreak of fighting as a result of terroristic activity. We commend your wisdom in trying to convince other Arab states of the folly in using this tactic. We know you

will continue to do everything you can to control infiltration from Jordan. We on our side have been pressing restraint on the Israelis and emphasized the dangers of retaliation. We are nonetheless worried by the consequences, should the Syrians persist in using this weapon.

9. We agree that a solution to the refugee problem is essential to a permanent settlement. We have been actively studying the problem and are prepared to devote substantial resources to a settlement of the problem. A final solution would probably involve some repatriation, resettlement and compensation. We would be interested in hearing any ideas which the King might suggest for best dealing with the refugee problem, including interim measures which might be taken to provide dignity and a sense of self-sufficiency to the refugees even in advance of a settlement of the overall problem.

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11/5/67

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Approved in S
11/7/67

Memorandum of Conversation

8-
Hussein visit
Parsons
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DATE: November 6, 1967

SUBJECT: American-Jordan Talks on Middle East Situation

19153

See HHS memo to WWR - 11/8/67.

PARTICIPANTS: His Majesty King Hussein of Jordan
His Excellency Abdul Hamid Sharaf, Ambassador of Jordan
His Excellency Zayd Rifa'i, Chief of Royal Cabinet

The Secretary
The Under Secretary
NEA - Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary
IO - Mr. Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary
NEA/ARN - Harrison M. Symmes, Ambassador to Jordan

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1. Refugees. The Secretary asked the King about the "new refugees" -- who they are and what is needed for them. The Secretary wondered if the matter needed more attention than it had been given. The King replied in a general way, stating that there were about 200,000 refugees altogether on the East Bank, some living in the cities with members of their families and others in camps. Only a few had been able to return to Israel. UNRWA, of course, was the main institution dealing with them, but others are helping. Mr. Rifa'i provided more detailed figures, stating that 120,000 of these refugees had filled out forms in the hope of returning to the West Bank. Only about 14,000 had been allowed to return. Others who had wanted to go and whose return had been approved did not in fact return because it would have meant splitting up their families. Rifa'i explained that the Government of Israel had approved return on the basis of individual rather than family applications. Thus 9,000 others whose return had been approved were unwilling to go back because it would have meant leaving their families. Rifa'i asserted also that the Israelis had approved the return of villagers but had not approved the return of refugees who formerly had been in camps, apparently because they wished to keep the camps for refugees from Gaza. Ambassador Sharaf commented that the Israelis also have not approved the return of anyone from Jerusalem.

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(Drafting Office and Officer)

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By cbm/ia NARA, Date 6-21-05

The Secretary asked the King if additional assistance needed for these refugees would be looked upon as implying approval of their status as new refugees and thus misinterpreted. The King and Rifa'i both stated that help would be needed. Rifa'i went on to say that any relief assistance would be welcomed, but what is really needed is to get them home. Meanwhile they must be kept alive. In response to the Secretary's question, Mr. Battle and others stated that UNICEF is not active in assisting the refugees at this time but that CARE and NEED, Inc., and certain other groups have been very active recently.

The Secretary asked if the GOJ has a central office to deal with refugee problems. The King indicated there is such an office, and Mr. Rifa'i commented that there is in addition to Government ministries dealing with refugee problems a Ministerial Committee for Refugees.

In further discussion, Mr. Battle commented that the US Government has been reluctant to take steps that might be misinterpreted as attempts to liquidate the refugee problem. NEED, Inc. has shared our concern about this. Mr. Battle wondered if the USG had been too sensitive in this regard or whether it would be feasible to try to proceed to long-term development activities instead of merely dealing with relief. The Secretary also asked whether outside attempts to deal with this problem on a long-term humanitarian basis might be misinterpreted. Again the King did not respond specifically but mentioned that the problem has its immediate aspects which must be dealt with and that the longer-term aspects could be dealt with as part of an overall solution. In any case, the King said, the problem must be dealt with. Mr. Rifa'i noted that much would depend upon the nature of assistance given.

The Secretary turned to Mr. Battle and said that he thought the problem of the new refugees should be looked at on an urgent basis and that he wanted the results of this new look at the problem to be available within the next couple of days. The Secretary then raised the question of "old refugees" and asked whether the King thought it would be possible for the UNRWA Commissioner General to seek authority from the UN to ask the refugees privately about their choice as to compensation or repatriation. The King said that he thought this might be all right in terms of a general solution. Mr. Rifa'i said that in both cases it is important to recognize that the Government of Israel would be involved; that is, both as to compensation or repatriation. The Secretary emphasized that he was speaking about private choice on the part of the refugees and not about a general political determination. He explained that he thought we could begin by asking ten refugees and then 100 and then 1,000 about their own private choices. As he saw it, the important thing was to keep Shuqayri

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and others out of the matter so that a mass emotional political decision could be avoided. Ambassador Sharaf noted that if the occupied territory of the West Bank was returned to Jordan the new refugees would not be a big problem, since they could then return to their previous abodes. Then after withdrawal of the Israelis and, hopefully, a settlement on Near East problems, the matter of a longer-term solution of the old refugee problem could be faced.

The Secretary commented that we do not know the Israeli Government's attitude toward repatriation. One reason was because the refugees had never been asked to indicate whether they would wish repatriation. The Secretary said he believed that if given a chance to express themselves privately most refugees would not wish to be repatriated to Israel. The King endorsed the Secretary's view and said he thought most refugees would wish resettlement, but that the matter was becoming more and more complicated as the refugees produced sons and grandsons. The King also volunteered that transit of the Suez Canal is not tied to a complete solution of the refugee problem, but that a beginning of a solution to the refugee problem would be required.

2. Hussein's Talks With de Gaulle. The Secretary remarked to the King that we receive very little information from President de Gaulle or from his ministers.

He wondered how the King had found his visit to President de Gaulle. King Hussein responded that he had found President de Gaulle sympathetic and understanding, that President de Gaulle had commented that he hoped the United States would come around to more reasonable views about some of the world problems.

3. U. S. Arms Policy in the Area. The Secretary said that a major problem on which we had made little progress with the Soviet Union was the problem of arms restraint in the area. It is a three-cornered problem. The Soviets had supplied arms to certain Arab countries. This supply of Soviet arms had caused problems for certain other Arab countries which had then turned to the West, and this had caused a chain reaction that induced Israel to seek additional arms. The Secretary said we had tried to make clear to the Soviets we were not trying to freeze the June 10 situation, but rather to find ways to prevent a resumption of the arms rivalry. We had found no Soviet interest in finding ways to restrain this rivalry, which was very disappointing to us. Restraint in arms build-ups was one of the President's five points, and we were sorry there has been no progress in this field.

In responding, King Hussein said that the difficulty as far as the Arabs were concerned was the understanding of the word "balance". What is balance? There had not been a balance before June 5 and when the June war came there was no balance. In 14 months (from last June) there might have been a balance. (It was not clear what the King meant to imply by his statements at this point.) The King went on to say that Jordan is not worried only about the conventional arms situation, but also about reports that in one year Israel will have atomic weapons. There are a lot of problems in regard to arms. Some of the equipment Jordan had been receiving had been supplied with conditions as to how it would be employed. Jordan also had had binding arrangements with the Arab League. It was easy to ask why Jordan had fought in June, but the situation leading up to June had placed great pressure on Jordan and the Samu' raid had forced Jordan to reconsider its whole policy. (The Secretary interjected that Jordan surely knew the United States attitude with regard to the Samu' raid.) King Hussein said it was clear Jordan needed to participate in a collective response to Israeli threats. He went on to say that small countries also had the problem of having to rely on definite and continuous sources of supply. Jordan was now faced with a problem of arms requirements that it had not been able to satisfy. Meanwhile, it was forced to keep the Iraqi Army in Jordan to help defend itself. Jordan must have arms from somewhere and must have a source of supply that would have the quality of continuity. The Secretary responded that he hoped the King could understand our position in regard to arms supply. Our aim has been to avoid an all-inclusive legislative prohibition to supply arms. The Secretary said he could not exaggerate the effect of the India-Pakistan war in this respect. Many of our legislators had been upset that American arms were being used by both sides. These Congressional attitudes persisted, and therefore we had to move carefully. The Secretary emphasized, however, that he could be categorical with regard to the subject of nuclear weapons. "On this subject we are as old as Methuselah. We do not play games. It would be disastrous for nuclear weapons to be introduced into the Middle East." The King could leave it to us because we are very serious on this matter which we regard as fundamental.

Mr. Rifa'i said Jordan could understand the difficulties about arms supply as explained by the Secretary. What Jordan could not understand is why the United States felt it now had to give Israel arms and refuse them to Jordan, which is an old ally. The people in the Near East are particularly sensitive with regard to the supply of aircraft to Israel. Under Secretary Katzenbach noted that our failure to have done something for the Government

of Israel and other Arab countries would have made the situation even more difficult. In this part of the discussion King Hussein said he is not against arms control in the context of an overall solution to Middle Eastern problems. Ambassador Sharaf commented that Jordan also has its public opinion. The decision to supply arms to Israel had been made in the context of the public hardening of Israel's position toward the results of the June war. This had been a shock to the Arab world, and it was this as much as anything that led the Arabs to insist at the UN upon unconditional withdrawal by the Israelis. In the context of the whole situation at the UN and the Israeli public position, the supply of arms to Israel by the US could only be regarded as shocking. The Secretary said he understood Arab feeling about this, but there are many other elements to be considered. The possibilities for settlement in the Middle East are much greater if the big powers are not involved militarily. Yet we cannot take non-involvement of the big powers for granted. We do not know what is in the mind of Moscow, yet we believe it is not in the interests of the United States or the Arabs for the big powers to become involved militarily. Meanwhile, the Soviets have made a massive resupply of arms to certain Arab countries. We cannot be sure that they have changed their position that Israeli withdrawal to pre-June 5 conditions must take place before all else is discussed. We are not certain about the Soviet attitude on military intervention.

4. US/UAR Relations. The Secretary remarked that the United States has never had any problems with the UAR so long as the UAR was looking after its own national interests. What had complicated our relations was UAR foreign adventures at the expense of its neighbors. We had never asked for or expected praise or thanks for our assistance, but had only wanted it used for the national interests of the country to which it was given. The Secretary commented that leaders who neglect their own people seem to get into trouble. He called the names of Ben Bella, Nkrumah, Sukarno and said maybe there are others. As far as the United States is concerned, the Secretary said that we have two requirements for good relations with the UAR. The first is that the UAR have good relations with its neighbors, and the second is that the UAR be silent about us if it could not be friendly toward us. The Secretary commented that President Johnson had never responded to attacks by foreign leaders and had not initiated any attacks on other leaders. There was further discussion of how private statements of Arab leaders could be reconciled with their public actions. Ambassador Sharaf stressed that there is also a difference between Arab words and Israeli actions, which is unfair to the Arabs. Mr. Battle

commented that fair or not, Arab words give the Israelis a superb propaganda justification. The Secretary commented on the change in Arab attitudes since the Khartoum Conference. Before the Khartoum Conference it had seemed that the Arabs felt obliged always to agree with the most extreme Arab voice such as voices from Syria or Algeria or Mr. Shuqayri. Since Khartoum it seemed there was a new air of moderation. King Hussein agreed with this assessment, but emphasized that there are still Arabs who do not agree with this approach. Thus time is of the essence. Palestine is still at the root of our troubles and we must solve that problem.

5. Jordan's Economic Situation. The Secretary referred to the encouraging way Jordan had dealt with its economic development in the past few years and asked how the King now sees the economic situation. The King said that the economy had been paralyzed as a result of the war and that there were serious economic dislocations because of the occupation of the West Bank. The King and Mr. Rifa'i noted that most Jordanian exports are from the West Bank, about 45 per cent of the agriculture and 80 per cent of the industry of the country are on the West Bank. Jordan has not only lost the positive benefits of its income from these sources, but the Government at the same time must continue paying Government salaries to Jordanians remaining on the West Bank. Ambassador Sharaf noted that under Jordan's development plan tourism was an important element and would become increasingly important. In the development of tourism the Government relied heavily on Jerusalem. Thus Jerusalem has a political, cultural, emotional and very important economic importance for Jordan.

6. Situation in Syria. The Secretary said that the situation in Syria seemed to be very fragile and the King agreed, saying that when he was in Moscow he had found the Soviets quite disenchanted with Syria.

7. Arab Attitude Towards Jews. In a discussion of Arab attitudes towards Jews, Mr. Rifa'i explained that it is important to remember there are Arab Jews and that the word "Arab" applied to an ethnic distinction while "Jew" was a religious distinction. There had been Arab Jews and all Arabs had lived together peacefully until Zionism had intruded in the area. Ambassador Sharaf stressed that it was the migration of Eastern European Jews to Palestine that had accentuated the problem. One had to bear in mind the piecemeal invasion of the Zionists over the past forty years to understand the desperation of the Jordanians in the circumstances leading up to the June war.

8. UN Resolution on Arab-Israel Crisis. The Secretary, in commenting on the

broader problem of a UN resolution, said he is not pessimistic. He hoped that we could get started along present lines. Mr. Sisco told the King that Ambassador Goldberg and the US Delegation had been very impressed by their talks with His Majesty over the weekend. The longer we waited to adopt a Security Council resolution, the more difficult the problem would be. It is important to get a UN representative into the area promptly. Once this was done, as Ambassador Goldberg had noted, the US could play a strong supporting role in trying to achieve a reasonable, peaceful settlement. The Secretary remarked that President Kennedy had once said, "If you have a fight, do not fight about nothing, fight about something." We are now making some headway. We see the shape of a possible solution and we are prepared to use our muscle in supporting a permanent solution that corresponded to the sober, reflective judgment of responsible leaders in the area.

Mr. Sisco commented on the freedom of action the Khartoum Conference appeared to have given King Hussein and President Nasser. He said, speaking candidly we see limitations on this freedom of action as it manifests itself at the UN in New York. In recent days we have wondered if the Arab group en masse has not been making decisions in New York rather than the individual countries. We believe it important that Jordan play a decisive role, that Jordan and the UAR make individual decisions rather than a mass Arab decision which gives extreme elements a veto. King Hussein responded that at Khartoum he and President Nasser had been given a chance to try for a political solution. Mr. Rifa'i explained that at Khartoum no definition of a political solution had been decided. It had been left to King Hussein and President Nasser to decide. The other Arabs were to go along with what King Hussein and President Nasser could work out. Mr. Sisco said that this is a crucial point. An earlier draft resolution in July which seemed to be acceptable to Jordan and the UAR had been killed by certain other Arabs. It was therefore important that the countries primarily concerned should make up their minds, make the decisions, and not worry about a group psychology. We therefore hoped Jordan could have a dominant voice. Mr. Rifa'i said the King had always appreciated this fact. He had called for a summit conference as early as June 9. Hopefully, agreement could now be reached on an acceptable resolution. Mr. Sisco said he wanted to stress again that he thought the resolution discussed with the King over the weekend was crucial. If King Hussein and President Nasser are on board with this resolution, everything would be all right. The King responded that the only

difficulty had been the matter of withdrawal and how it should be defined. The question of withdrawal requires clarification. Jordan could accept statements with regard to withdrawal, but what was important was the meaning of those statements. Jordan needed a commitment as to their meaning. It was important to understand beforehand what was meant by withdrawal. Ambassador Sharaf commented further that Jordan would need to know in its bilateral negotiations with the United States how the United States stood with regard to matters such as withdrawal. Moreover, there is Arab public opinion to be kept in mind. "We Arabs are verbally minded people." The Secretary remarked that the key question of reciprocity does not involve the United States. The United States had not closed Tiran and if Tiran had not been closed there would have been no June war. The United States would certainly work to support any settlement that had prospects of success, but the United States is not in complete control and our answers alone cannot settle the problem. Neither the Arabs nor the Israelis will take our answer as final. His Majesty knows where we stand and what we would like to bring about.

Mr. Sisco summarized the situation at the UN by saying that the US delegation had been much impressed with what had been discussed with His Majesty over the weekend, consultations are continuing, Ambassador Goldberg is discussing the draft that had been discussed with the King with other key delegations and in the next day or two we should know whether there is a reasonable chance of success. While Israel was not yet signed on, the draft, if adopted, could be a good starting point for discussion among the parties with UN help. The positive views of Jordan and the UAR would of course be crucial.

Hussein Visit 4235
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

Primer

November 5, 1967

*Att. to St. LS memo
to WWR. 11/6/67.*

TO: THE SECRETARY

EDB

FROM: NEA - Assistant Secretary Battle

Subject: Talking Points for Hussein Visit

Attached herewith is a Talking Points paper for the visit of King Hussein of Jordan. In view of the fluidity of the situation in New York, it will be necessary to supplement it with last-minute information from Ambassador Goldberg.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (HSA)
State Dept. Guidelines
By *cbm/jw*, NARA, Date 6-21-05

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TALKING POINTS

What Hussein Wants

Hussein comes here worried, and with a sense of grievance.

He is willing to negotiate with the Israeli, but not without the cover of a UN resolution. He believes he has helped prepare the way for such a resolution -- first by obtaining a moderate Arab position at the Khartoum summit, then by promoting a text drawn from the US five points and the US-Soviet agreement. Now, he feels, we are upping the ante in New York and backing off, as the Israeli position has become harder. This -- combined with our failure to reinstate the military aid program -- leads him to question whether the US is still interested in Jordan and in a political settlement. He has been to Moscow to get Soviet backing for a settlement, and received there offers of economic and military aid. Hussein is coming to Washington not only seeking reassurance, but to make a new calculation of how far he can depend on the United States. In specific, Hussein will want to know:

-- What kind of a resolution do we want in New York and what are we willing to do to get it?

-- What is our position on Jerusalem and the West Bank, and what are we willing to do to back it up?

-- How do we see the future of US/Jordan relations?

Do we still have an interest in a moderate Jordan, and if so, what are our intentions on military and economic aid?

What We Want

We have made a new calculation of what the Jordanian connection is worth. In essence Hussein is valuable to us because of the -- possibly indispensable -- role he can play in

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Authority NLS 99-268 (#84)
By cm/is, NARA, Date 6-21-05

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

starting and sustaining negotiations for a general political settlement between Israel and its neighbors. Beyond that, Hussein has been known for ten years as a US protege. If he fails to survive, or turns away from us towards Moscow, our prestige in the area -- and the confidence of other moderate regimes in us -- will suffer. The balance of power in the Arab world would shift sharply away from moderation. Given the existing limits to our access in the area, the loss would be serious.

Our objective in these talks is to keep Hussein on course towards a UN resolution and direct or indirect negotiations with Israel. Because of attitudes in Congress on arms and the AID budget problem, we have nothing tangible to offer him now as evidence of support. (Indeed, we will have to tell him we are altering the nature of our economic support.) But we must convince him that we want a settlement equitable to both sides, and are willing to use our influence to get it. In order to do so, we must first make certain that he has no misconceptions of what we are up to in New York. We must also explain more definitely than so far what our position is regarding his territorial problems. And we must reaffirm that despite our difficulties we wish to continue our close and friendly relationship with Jordan.

Hussein will be skeptical. Since we have only assertions and not action to offer him, our success will depend on how convinced he is that we will act on those assertions to obtain a balanced settlement. If he is not convinced, the immediate danger is that Hussein will conclude that there is no future in negotiation. If Jordan gives up, no Arab country is likely to pursue negotiations. The delay -- given the Israelization of Jerusalem -- would be very damaging.

Consequences of Failure to Reach a Settlement

You should know that the Israeli evaluation of Hussein does not jibe with ours. Israeli representatives have gone out of their way to give us the impression Israel is writing

Hussein down, and maybe off. Their motive may be to make sure Hussein comes to the bargaining table alone; or their view may reflect a much diminished interest in negotiations. Manifestly they do not want continued close US/Jordan relations. We shall have to have this out with the Israelis.

Whatever the chances of settlement -- and as of now it is hard to be sanguine -- failure would be costly to us. Arab/Israeli tension would heighten, terrorism increase, the arms race accelerate, as both sides prepared for a new round. The United States could not stand aside, and probably could not avoid closer identification with Israel. The long-term risk of a confrontation with the Soviet Union would grow.

Talking Points

1. We both want to create conditions in which negotiations can start. Your efforts at Khartoum and afterwards have made an important contribution. For our part we have taken the lead in New York in working for a UN resolution. We have also tried to protect an environment favorable to negotiation by intervention on both sides in such questions as the movement of refugees, the terrorist problem, the opening of banks. We interceded strongly with Foreign Minister Eban of Israel on these problems two weeks ago.

2. Hope your talks with Arthur Goldberg have cleared up any misunderstanding on what our intentions are in New York.

3. We hope for quick action on a resolution. We agree with you that time is not on the side of a peaceful settlement. We understand your need for a Security Council resolution before undertaking negotiations.

When you are ready to negotiate either directly or indirectly, we are prepared to put our weight behind an equitable solution. We have no precise blueprint for a settlement.

But we do believe that it should involve the return of the West Bank to Jordan. In order to obtain this the West Bank would probably have to be demilitarized. Territorial adjustments would have to be made around boundary lines as they stood before the war. The boundaries must be permanent.

Jerusalem is tougher for a variety of reasons including our historical position with which you are familiar. As we have stated publicly, we do not accept Israel's unilateral action. We are prepared to use our influence to see what arrangements can be worked out. We believe Jerusalem should be a city with free access to all and that the interests of the three great religions and the interest of the inhabitants must be protected. It may be that these objectives could best be achieved through some form of international or other status involving participation of Jordan. But we do not exclude the possibility of an agreement between Israel and Jordan that would meet Jordan's political, economic and religious interests. In the context of peace, we can envision Jerusalem becoming the focus of a new and profitable relationship between the economies of Jordan and Israel. These might include bilateral trade, increased tourism across newly opened borders, duty-free access by Jordan to the Mediterranean, improved use of the Jordan waters.

4. You will appreciate that we cannot speak for the Israëlis nor do we have unlimited influence over them. What we have said reflects our thinking alone.

5. We are seriously disturbed by the arms race in the Middle East. Congress is concerned about our general arms policy as well as that for the Middle East area. We have tried to find a formula for curbing the arms race and accordingly refrained from June until October from supplying arms to the area. Unfortunately our hands were forced by a heavy Soviet arms influx. As we are concerned with an arms balance in the area, we accordingly had to sell arms to Israel. We recognize Jordan's legitimate requirements for some arms and sincerely regret that strong feelings in Congress make it difficult for

us to carry out a military assistance program for Jordan in the absence of negotiations for a settlement. With a settlement we should be able to provide reasonable quantities of arms. However, given Congressional sentiment on this question and the serious trouble we are having in getting a foreign aid bill out of the Congress, we cannot resume any arms supply to Jordan at this particular time. We would hope that favorable developments looking towards a settlement might permit us to resume some shipments of military equipment other than major combat items in the fairly near future. In the interim we are prepared to support certain of Jordan's arms requests from Western European suppliers.

6. We do appreciate your situation and ask your patience a while longer. I think you know the temper of this country. There is much unhappiness about the events of June 5. I believe we can overcome these difficulties. I am sure I am telling you nothing you do not already know when I say that a decision of Jordan to obtain arms in the Soviet Union would make close US/Jordani cooperation of the sort we have enjoyed much more difficult.

7. Although we understand you do not wish to discuss economic matters, we do want to assure you of our continued active interest in Jordan's economic development and viability. We want to continue to participate in your development effort. I want you also to know that we are discussing ways of helping you get the Potash project under way as soon as possible. The nature of our assistance must, however, reflect your mounting reserves of foreign exchange, the sizeable contributions from other Arab states and our own stringent budgetary situation. We would like to discuss these matters with your Government.

8. I know you share our continuing concern at the possibility of an outbreak of fighting as a result of terroristic activity. We commend your wisdom in trying to convince other Arab states of the folly in using this tactic. We know you

will continue to do everything you can to control infiltration from Jordan. We on our side have been pressing restraint on the Israelis and emphasized the dangers of retaliation. We are nonetheless worried by the consequences, should the Syrians persist in using this weapon.

9. We agree that a solution to the refugee problem is essential to a permanent settlement. We have been actively studying the problem and are prepared to devote substantial resources to a settlement of the problem. A final solution would probably involve some repatriation, resettlement and compensation. We would be interested in hearing any ideas which the King might suggest for best dealing with the refugee problem, including interim measures which might be taken to provide dignity and a sense of self-sufficiency to the refugees even in advance of a settlement of the overall problem.

M:TOEnders/NEA:ARN:RHoughton
11/5/67

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

BB
Mr Saunders
Mrs Saunders
& \$ (Kathy)
notified
11/1/67
41

Hussein
visit

Tuesday, October 31, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. President:

Secretary Rusk has asked me to let you know his personal feelings about your seeing King Hussein. He had hoped to mention this at lunch today, but there wasn't time.

He appreciates your desire to keep these visitors to a minimum and concurs in your not trying to have Hussein to lunch if you feel that makes too heavy a load. However, he does feel it's important for you to see Hussein while he is here. Therefore, he would like your permission to extend an invitation for an office meeting.

Hussein will land in New York November 2 and will come to Washington November 6. He will see Arthur Goldberg in New York, and Secretary Rusk would talk to him here before he saw you. Hussein is set to speak to the Press Club and to meet with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

I would like to add my own endorsement. Hussein is uncertain about our position, and a talk with you would significantly reassure him. We'll have precious little to maintain our ties with him, since Congress will make military and economic aid difficult. Yet he is the Jordanian most likely to negotiate peace with Israel. A peace settlement would be such a great achievement that I think he warrants this investment of your time.

I gather Jim Jones is tentatively holding 5:30 p. m. on November 8 open pending your decision.

W. W. Rostow

I'll see him at 5:30 p. m. on the 8th _____

See me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Hussein
F return to HHSaunders *Visit*
Rm. 372-a EOB when signed.

47

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Isl Walk
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#10)
NSC Memo, 1/30/85, State Guidelines
By *cm/jw*, NARA, Date *6-21-05*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, October 26, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr Saunders

SUBJECT: Appointment for King Hussein

King Hussein arrives in New York on November 2nd and will stay at least until the 10th. Since his trip to Moscow, he has been to see Nasser again and is stopping in Algiers, Madrid, Paris, Bonn, and London on the way here. He is coming largely in hopes of seeing you. Attached is Nick Katzenbach's recommendation that you invite him for a small working lunch on November 7 or 8 as you did in June.

I hate to involve you so deeply. However, I believe your role is crucial for these reasons:

- Your relationship with him will be our main, if not our only important tie with him in the weeks ahead. We have just announced releasing military shipments to all the friendly Arabs except Jordan, and we'll have trouble completing our budget support commitment for this year because the sizable Arab donations have put Jordan in pretty good financial shape.
- Despite the Israelis' bitter feelings about him, he's still the best bet to work out a settlement with Israel. He may not settle alone, but for the moment he seems to be carrying Nasser's proxy.
- He feels we've let him down, and the Soviets have made him attractive aid offers. He has worked hard to get the Arabs behind a position he thinks meets our objectives. Secretary Rusk and Arthur Goldberg may be able to persuade him we haven't changed our tune, but there's really no substitute to his hearing it from you.

Therefore I recommend you have him for a working meal, but offer these options:

3 Nov. Fri.

Senate For. Rel.

8 Nov. 4:00p.m.

7 Nov. Press Club Lunch.

Working lunch if we can find a date. (You are booked for lunch on November 7 and 8.) _____

Working dinner on 7 or 8 November _____

Office meeting only _____

Prefer not to see him _____

3,6,7,8

Walt Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Hussein Visit

Pls. return to HHSaunders
Rm. 372-a EOB when signed.

44

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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- Working lunch if we can find a date. (You are booked for lunch on November 7 and 8.) _____
- Working dinner on 7 or 8 November _____
- Office meeting only _____
- Prefer not to see him _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (tt13)
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *cbm/jw*, NARA, Date *6-21-05*

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Hussein Visit
& P.D. 45*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 25, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*See WWR memo for
President 10/26/67*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment with King Hussein
of Jordan.

King Hussein is scheduled to arrive in New York on November 2, where he will have consultations at the UN. He will be in Washington from November 6 to November 9 (while here, he will speak at Georgetown University and see IBRD officials).

Hussein's real purpose for coming is his hope that he can meet with you to discuss a political settlement of the Arab-Israel crisis.

Recommendation:

That you see King Hussein at a time convenient to you on November 7 or 8.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That you give a small working lunch for him.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Acting Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#15)
State Dept. Guidelines
By *cbm/jm* NARA, Date *6-21-05*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~