

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
03	memo	Keeny to Rostow	S	2	4/19/67	A
12	memo	Wriggins to Rostow	S	1	3/13/67	A
13	memo	Wriggins to Rostow	S	2	3/13/67	A
14	memo	Wriggins to Rostow [near duplicate of #30]	S	2	1/6/67	A
15	memo	Wriggins to Rostow [Sanitized per RAC, 8/01]	S	2	11/4/66	A
16a	memo	Rostow to the President	S	2	8/1/66	A
18	memo	Wriggins to Rostow [Sanitized per RAC, 8/01] same sanitization 2/19/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-345 open 2/11	C	1	7/12/66	A
19	memo	Wriggins to Rostow	S	2	7/11/66	A
20	memo	Wriggins to Rostow	S	1	6/10/66	A
26	memo	Wriggins for the Record open 3/25/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-344	S	2	5/25/66	A
28	memo	Saunders to Rostow	S	1	4/15/66	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders

Folder Title "India Nuclear, 4/1/66-4/30/67"

Box Number 14

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5/11/2010


Initials

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
30	memo	Wriggins to Rostow	S	2	1/6/67	A
32a	draft	"Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem..." open 5/5/15 per NLJ/RAC 12-340	S	61	12/66	A
36	report	"Highlights of NSC Meeting"	S	3	6/9/66	A
37	report	"Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem..." open 5/5/15 per NLJ/RAC 12-340	S	13	[1966]	A
38	memo	C. Johnson to Rostow open 3/25/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-344	S	2	5/2/66	A
39	note	Keeny to Saunders	PCI	1	[4/66]	A
39a	memo	Keeny to Rostow	S	1	4/29/66	A
40	memo	Tait to Saunders	S	1	4/13/66	A
40a	cable	Intelligence Report [Exempt per RAC, 9/00]	S	1	1/24/66	A
40b	cable	Intelligence Report [Exempt per RAC, 9/00]	S	2	1/21/66	A
40c	cable	Intelligence Report [Exempt per RAC, 9/00]	PCI	1	[2/66]	A

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
40d	cable	Intelligence Report [Exempt per RAC, 9/00]	S	1	2/17/66	A
40e	cable	Intelligence Report [Exempt per RAC, 9/00]	S	1	2/2/66	A
40f	cable	Intelligence Report [Exempt per RAC, 8/01]	S	2	2/26/66	A
40g	cable	Intelligence Report [Exempt per RAC, 9/00]	S	1	4/7/66	A
40h	cable	Intelligence Report [Exempt per RAC, 9/00; near dup. of #42a]	S	3	4/7/66	A
40i	cable	New Delhi 1994	C	1	2/3/66	A
40k	airgrm	New Delhi 805	C	3	3/4/66	A
40l	airgrm	Paris A-1982	C	4	4/9/66	A
41	memo	Keeny to Rostow <i>sanitized 3/25/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-344</i>	S	1	4/8/66	A
42	memo	Keeny to Rostow [near duplicate of #41]	S	1	4/8/66	A

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Initials

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Page 4

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
42a	cable	Intelligence Report	S	3	4/7/66	A

[Exempt per RAC, 9/00; near dup. of #40h, this file; and #1f, NSF, SF, "Nuclear Weapons, India, V1", Box 34; and #87, NSF, CF, India, V7, Box 130]

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Initials

*India
nuclear*

April 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Foy D. Kohler
Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Department of State

INFORMATION TO: Mr. Walt Rostow
Mr. Luke Battle
Mr. William J. Handley
Mr. Douglas L. Heck

SUBJECT: Lunch with B. K. Nehru, April 21, 1967

Today I lunched with B. K. Nehru. We touched lightly on L. K. Jha's visit. I indicated we were seriously interested and urgently studying the question, but I noted we were handicapped by not having the Russian text.

He said he would send off a cable immediately to Moscow. Since they cannot carry Russian through their code, it would have to come by pouch. I suggested it might be possible for us to get it more promptly if the Indian Embassy passed it to our Moscow Embassy for transmittal.

I have also indicated that someone from the Department would be in touch with him shortly regarding whatever message might properly be passed to L. K. Jha as the result of his visit here.

Howard Wriggins

India nuclear

April 20, 1967

WALT -

Subject: Kohler's recommendation to
Secretary Rusk regarding the
response to Jha on the NPT

If Secretary Rusk accepts Kohler's recommendation, the President will be asked to approve the U. S. Government's going ahead and developing the language for a parallel declaration along the lines of the presumed Russian text provided us by Jha.

To L. K. Jha we would say that we will be studying the Russian text and will be preparing one of our own along its general lines.

Howard Wriggins

~~SECRET~~

April 67

3a

Rough translation of the revised Russian Draft

Taking into consideration the wishes of the non-nuclear States that in conjunction with the renunciation by these States of the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons according to the Treaty on Non Proliferation of such weapons appropriate measures might be taken to safeguard the security of non-nuclear countries and also bear in mind that any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons will endanger the peace and security of all States the Soviet Union declares the following:

In case of an attack by a nuclear State accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons against States not possessing nuclear weapons or a threat of such an attack an essentially new situation will arise in which the Security Council and above all its Permanent members possessing nuclear weapons will have to act immediately under the U.N. Charter which provides taking "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threat to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace". Any aggressor who embarks on the road of the threat of using nuclear weapons or dares unleash a war accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons and thus breaches the peace and security of nations will not go unpunished.

It goes without saying that, as it is provided in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the States who fall victim to an attack, a nuclear one included, have an inherent right of individual or collective self-defence until the Security Council has taken measures ultimately to maintain international peace and security.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: State 10-10-78 (4/ola)
By cbw/jip, NARA, Date 7-28-05

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36

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX B

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY ASSURANCES TO NON-NUCLEAR STATES

Substantive provision from language suitable for UN Resolution which was approved by Committee of Principals on April 22, 1965:

"Welcomes the intention signified by Member States approving this resolution that they will provide or support immediate assistance to any State not possessing nuclear weapons that is the victim of an act of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used, and calls upon all other States to associate themselves with the objectives of this resolution."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *MSJ/dm* NARA, Date 2-16-10

PRESERVATION COPY

Saunders
India nuclear 4

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

April 19, 1967

SUBJECT: Indian Translation into English of Russian Text of
Proposed Soviet Security Declaration Regarding NPT

As further background for your discussion with L. K. Jha at 11 today, attached is a text handed to Gene Rostow late yesterday by the Indians. They say it is an English translation, agreed to by the Russians, of a Russian language paper passed to the Indians in Moscow.

Its statement of what the nuclear powers would be prepared to do does not look too onerous, at first glance. It does, however, clearly preclude us from first use of nuclear weapons in either North Korea or Vietnam (sidelined portion). It obviously requires most careful staffing before we give any reply beyond that suggested in the talking points we sent up last night.

If he asks your views on the text, you may wish to say it looks interesting, but your staffs will have to examine it with great care before you can give a firm response.

W. W. Rostow

Saunders
India nuclear 5

~~SECRET~~

April 18, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Talking Points for your meeting with L. K. Jha, Wednesday, 11 a. m.

L. K. Jha is seeking parallel US and Soviet assurances so India can justify signing the NPT to domestic opponents. Jha believes the Russians would make a declaration to deter nuclear states from nuclear blackmail or nuclear attack against non-nuclear states like India provided the U. S. makes a parallel declaration.

You may wish to:

- (a) thank Mrs. Gandhi for her kind letter and for sending L. K. Jha to report on his Moscow visit;
- (b) hear him describe Moscow's new position on assurances;
- (c) indicate you agree in principle to making a parallel declaration, though the critical question is the specific language. (Secretary McNamara and everyone in State except Secretary Rusk recommend this position; but Secretary Rusk has been so tied up with SEATO he hasn't yet addressed the issue.) Your staff will study whatever texts the Soviets and Indians put forward, and resume early discussions with the Indians if the texts prove promising;
- (d) thank Mrs. Gandhi for her invitation to come to New Delhi. Without committing yourself, you may (or may not) wish to indicate that sometime next year might be feasible.

If Jha shares his worries on the resumption of the sale of military spafes to Pakistan, you may want to say:

- (a) we carefully examined all possible alternatives;
- (b) we felt India did not recognize that Pakistan lacked a defense industry like India's and a source of arms aid like the USSR.
- (c) you--and the Congress--take seriously the need to restrain defense expenditures;
- (d) what steps can the GOI, the much larger party, take to make it politically easier for President Ayub to enter into across-the-board negotiations to normalize Indo-Pak relations.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 99-69 (#113)
By *dbm/ks*, NARA, Date 7-18-05

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Santer 6

April 15, 1967

India
nuclear

Walt -

L. K. Jha's documents.

Attached are Jha's three papers:
Mrs. G's letter to the President; Jha's
personal proposal and India's general
principles it wants included in the NPT.

As I read it, the hooker in Jha's
draft is the side-lined language from
Moscow, particularly in the last paragraph.

We'll tackle this text in detail on
Monday.

Howard Wriggins

~~SECRET~~

*India
nuclear* 7

WALT:

April 15, 1967

Subject: Your Meeting with L. K. Jha Saturday, April 15, at noon.

1. Personal - Jha will soon be leaving his present post as Secretary to the P. M. to become Governor of the Reserve Bank of India. Health blocked him from replacing Biju. We're sorry he's leaving such a key post.

2. He will bring a letter from Mrs. Gandhi to the President. In light of it, we will reassess whether we should press for an appointment with the President. State hopes this will be possible, but they don't dare fight hard for it. In view of the fact he saw Kosygin, the Indians are worried about arms to Pakistan, and brokerage between us and Moscow on the NPT is potentially important to the President, I hope we'll push it. But you can't evaluate this till you talk with him.

3. L. K. Jha's fishing expedition appears to have landed a promising catch in Moscow. Our problem is to assess promptly how far Secretary Rusk (or the President) should go in expressing interest in seeking to parallel Soviet action, in the event Jha's report of Moscow's proposed language proves correct. Jha goes back on Wednesday.

4. The best way to get the flavor of Jha's view is to read the attached cable report of his talk with Foy. I have sidelined and underlined key passages. If Jha reports accurately (he has some interest in stretching the facts a bit, but not very far), Moscow is now ready to make a declaration when NPT is signed, that would include these two concepts: (a) nuclear powers have a responsibility to act quickly through the Security Council if a non-nuclear signatory of the NPT is subject to unprovoked nuclear threat or attack (Gromyko first included only "attack", then added "threat" at Jha's insistence) and (b) a reference to Article 51 of the Charter which would permit a declaring member to act without waiting for Security Council action, to free it from a possible Security Council veto hang up. They are ready to do it simultaneously with a parallel though not identical declaration by us.

5. What Jha wants before he goes back is a simple statement from us that we are interested in principle in exploring privately with the Russians some such parallel assurance, in the context of the NPT.

DECLASSIFIED (4/04)

Authority: RAC-NLJ-001-131-3-16
By: cbm/ps, NARA, Date: 7-28-05

~~SECRET~~

6. If accurate, this marks a major change in the Soviet position. It clearly sets Russia apart from China and closer to us in the midst of the Vietnam war. It is what the Indians have been talking about for years. It is of very substantial potential importance, and we shouldn't let it slip through inattention.

7. Foy agrees it is an important possibility. But he remains skeptical that the Soviets will really come through with a text which will be as forthcoming and flexible as Jha has been led to believe. He thinks that despite Secretary Rusk's well-known caution, we will be ready to go as far as the Russians ever will. Foy believes we should therefore be forthcoming ourselves in principle, linking any further explorations to our seeing the Russian text.

8. In his meeting with you, Jha will probably want to recapitulate for you his Moscow talks, where he was very well received even at the very top. But to save time, you may want to indicate you understand the main point, and explore other angles;

9. The main purpose for your seeing him, apart from receiving his letter on behalf of the President, assessing whether he should see LBJ and how far we should help this enterprise along, is to assure him that the highest levels of the USG are much interested in his Moscow explorations. Foy, Luke Battle and ACDA recommend you put your conclusion in roughly the following terms:

"We are much interested in his report. We are both aware that the Soviets may not be as forthcoming in the specific language they finally put forward. And it may contain concepts unacceptable to us. In principle, we are prepared to give sympathetic consideration to a US response as parallel as may be possible to the Soviet proposal. To that end, we will wish to continue consultations with the GOI which Jha has initiated on this visit."

10. Jha may have a series of specific concerns, understandably seeking to get as much out of us as possible in return for our Indian signature on the NPT.

- (a) On the importance of IAEA safeguards: Only if there are safeguards can neighbors of nuclear-capable countries be assured there are not secret preparations. And India is well-represented on IAEA, so it needn't fear its own interests will be jeopardized.

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

- (b) On "balance of sacrifice": Indians wouldn't want the US and Russia to unilaterally disarm very far, in view of their fear of China. What do they really have in mind? Is this mainly for public consumption?
- (c) NPT fixed term of only five years (too short for us).
- (d) Indian desire for contingency discussions (Joint Chiefs oppose, but State/ACDA NSAM 355 study proposes just this).
- (e) A more precise commitment by the nuclear powers to promote arms limitation (though if pressed on this, he'll not have much specific to recommend).

11. It would also be helpful if you could probe Jha's analysis of the domestic political opposition to the NPT treaty--what pressure groups oppose it? what parties? what about professional military men? Finance Ministry? different Cabinet members? Is it real, or can't they easily manipulate opinion on its behalf if they want to?

12. He may have other problems besides NPT.

- (a) arms supply policy--we take seriously our intention to curb arms supplies, and make decisions on a case by case basis in the light of the likely impact on arms limitation; India's acquisition will have a far more important effect on Pakistan's level of arms than our possible supply of spares for obsolescent planes.
- (b) Economic aid--he wants it on a multi-year basis, since year by year decisions make planning almost impossible.

Howard Wriggins

~~SECRET~~

*India
nuclear*

April 10, 1967

WALT -

Finally, State's request for a Presidential interview with L. K. Jha has reached me.

You probably can't get an answer back from him before he takes off, but you may want to discuss it with him on the plane.

Howard Wriggins

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 10, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment for Mrs. Gandhi's Key Advisor,
L. K. Jha, April 17 - 19, 1967

Nick Katzenbach asks if you could receive L. K. Jha, one of Mrs. Gandhi's most experienced and able professional advisors, who will be in Washington between April 12 and 19, after visiting Moscow and before going on to London. He will be bringing a personal message to you from Mrs. Gandhi, presumably on nuclear matters and the NPT, the subjects which he wants to discuss with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara. We also expect he may want to discuss Indo-Pak military budgets.

The Indian Government has sent word that they hope you will be able to see him, and Nick seconds this request.

I plan to see him in any event. But I am sure it would impress him and his Government with the seriousness with which we take non-proliferation, if you could receive him as well. I recommend you do so near the end of his visit, on April 18th or the 19th before he goes to London.

W. W. Rostow

Yes, have Marv set up a time _____

See me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED (#105)

Authority: *State* 3-13-78; NSC 11-20-78
By: *ebm/fcp*, NARA, Date: 7-28-05

*India
nuclear 9*

April 5, 1967

WALT -

Subject: L. K. Jha's Visit and the NPT

Despite the fact that L. K. Jha knows the President and Secretary Rusk will be out of town from April 10th to 15th, Jha will be in Washington from the 12th through 19th of April. He will be bringing a letter to the President from Mrs. Gandhi, and at a minimum, you must see him. A Read to Rostow memo will be asking for an appointment with you, and also, hopefully, with the President. When it arrives, we can discuss how to proceed.

He will also have appointments lined up with Battle, McNamara, ACDA, and Henry Owen. The Secretary's appointment will be scheduled for April 18.

Our preliminary posture will be: (a) to hear him out; and (b) to see if the "security assurances" they require need to be real, or can simply be window dressing for their own domestic consumption.

Tomorrow Heck will be calling a meeting of those who worked on the India non-proliferation NSAM papers. I will attend and report.

2130

Howard Wriggins

Saunders

*India
Nuclear*

10

~~SECRET~~

March 28, 1967

Walt:

Banerjee called, having received a personal message from L. K. Jha that he would like to come to the United States and discuss the NPT problem. He would be bringing a personal letter from Mrs. Gandhi to the President on this matter.

Brom Smith feels that we should not put the President in this position but I feel this may be the price we have to pay for ACDA's lethargy in getting someone to New Delhi. I have put the memo in the form of an approval from LBJ to see Jha which I understand is being recommended by State, but an option is to let Jha come for consultation without committing LBJ in advance.

Howard Wriggins

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

clm/y NARA, Date 2-16-10

106

~~SECRET~~

March 28, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: India and the Non-Proliferation Treaty--Prime Minister Gandhi's Special Envoy L. K. Jha

New Delhi--and the Indian Embassy--report that Prime Minister Gandhi would like to send a personal message to you through her Principal Secretary L. K. Jha regarding India's problems with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. India wants to be sure that any NPT treaty takes account of her security needs against China's growing nuclear capability and that sacrifices on behalf of the NPT are not made by emerging countries alone. He will be visiting London and Paris, has already been to Moscow, and would like to come the 11th or 12th of April. While here he would very much hope to see you.

In view of the important role of India in any NPT Agreement, I recommend we say "Yes" to his coming to consult. But you may not want to commit yourself to receiving him until we know the contents of Mrs. Gandhi's letter.

W. W. Rostow

Yes, I will see L. K. Jha on the 11th or 12th _____

I won't see him, but Secretary Rusk and others can _____

Have him come, but I can't commit myself to see him now _____

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cm/ly* NARA, Date 2-16-10

~~SECRET~~

Sounders
India's nuclear

11

~~SECRET~~

March 15, 1967

MEMORANDUM

TO: WWR

FROM: HW

SUBJECT: India and the NPT

1. It is not yet a very serious issue in domestic politics. The present Indian government is probably firm enough to gain acceptance for any position on the NPT it decides to adopt. Public discussion of the NPT has been overshadowed by the election, Cabinet formation, etc. The Jan Sangh has long advocated going for the Bomb, and it did gain strength in this election. So there will be more flack now than before. But Mrs. Gandhi, Morarji and Chavan together could swing it.

2. Morarji at Finance will be a mixed blessing on this question. He will probably opt for not going for the Bomb because of financial pressures, but he is hyper-sensitive about India's status and equality of treatment. We therefore must promptly improve our methods of consultation with the Indians in New Delhi if we want to avoid a last-minute stone-walling by Indians until their status and pride are fully honored.

3. The issues worrying Indian officials remain (a) not even a gesture at equality of sacrifice; (b) 5-year review subject to weapons' holder veto; (c) safeguards imposed on non-nuclear countries do not apply to nuclear countries, (d) and no real assurance when China is their main enemy.

4. They are getting virtually the full text in bits and pieces from Germans, Japanese, etc., but have not yet got the whole from us. State is pushing today to instruct Geneva to consult the Russians about how and when to make it available to the Indians. This will permit some opening of the dialogue with the Indians in New Delhi.

5. But we still need something more high powered and knowledgeable on the details than we yet have in the Embassy in New Delhi, although Jerry Green, the DCM, is a very shrewd and systematic man. He and Chet need a back up, of some kind.

6. I'm pressing Nick to pursue the question of greater consultation with the Indians.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *Chm/sg* NARA, Date 2-16-10

~~SECRET~~

November 4, 1966

TO: W. W. Rostow

FROM: Howard Wriggins

SUBJECT: Progress Report on Dealing with the Indian Nuclear Problem

You will recall that State was asked to prepare a progress report by November 1 on action taken to complement NSAM 355. That report (Tab A) and a special CIA annex (Tab B) are attached.

In summary, these papers make the following points:

1. An interdepartmental Working Group under NEA (chaired by Bill Handley or Doug Heck) keeps watch and coordinates assessments of Indian developments and follow-on actions to implement NSAM 355.

2. Data have been prepared demonstrating likely costs to India of a meaningful nuclear program. Embassy Delhi is now better informed for discussions on costs with selected Indian leaders, and [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1C
25X1C

[REDACTED] At their request, India's nuclear administrators receive cost data to support their thesis that India cannot afford a meaningful nuclear deterrent.

25X1C

3. [REDACTED] continues with selected Indian leaders to demonstrate China's limitations and to keep in perspective China's strategic nuclear threat to India.

4. Studies are under way to examine:

- non-nuclear, scientific achievements to promote Indian prestige;
- implications to us of offering a private assurance to India;
- what we should do in the event the Indians decide to go nuclear.

25X1C

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

Presidential Library Review of NSC Equities is Required

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Authority NLJ 034-014-2-1
By [Signature] NARA, Date 5/10/10

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- 2 -

6. Perhaps the most important step has been progress at New York toward a non-proliferation treaty. The Soviets have made clear that they do not object to German participation in NATO nuclear planning, which is a substantial change in their position. But we have not yet been able to agree on mutually acceptable language, which we and the Russians would then present to others for acceptance. The Indians will hope to avoid having to take a position until after the February election. Trivedi, the Indian representative in New York, argued Monday that if the non-nuclear powers agree to forego nukes, the nuclear powers should agree to stop production. But our people in New York do not believe Trivedi's expression of Indian desires will prevent Delhi from signing something both we and the Russians agree to.

7. Comment: Apart from developments on a non-proliferation treaty, the steps called for by the NSAM have been undramatic. The fact that the town was forced to look at this complicated program in a coordinated way has brought diverse interests and agencies together and raised the priority of this problem. The steps thus far taken, though undramatic, have contributed to the atmospherics, and they are likely to affect the way the Indians assess their own interests. And our methods for gaining knowledge of Indian activities have been improved. The further studies now in preparation may be more useful.

I do not think the President should be troubled by this report now.

Do you want to acknowledge receipt of the progress report, and, in view of Chinese Communist nuclear missile progress, urge them forward?

Att: 2 Tab A - "Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem: NSAM 355,"
Report to Rostow, dated Oct 31 '66, #3899
Tab B - Memo to P. Jessup from Henry P. Schardt
dated 28 Oct '66 (forwarded with original memo
to WWR)

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

October 31, 1966

3899
2 - Saunders
1 - Wiggins
3 - Pitt
15a

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: The Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem: NSAM 355

NSAM 355 asked for a report by November 1 on progress made in implementing recommended USG actions contained in the July 25 report for the President.

The requested report is enclosed. Also enclosed is a copy of my memorandum of August 31 on the same subject.

John P. Walsh
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum.
2. Copy of Memorandum of August 31.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS97-247 (#46)
By *cbm/br* NARA, Date *7-28-05*

~~SECRET~~
Group-3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

~~SECRET~~

NSAM 355: The Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem

Progress Report

I. Current Assessment of the Situation

The Working Group has been reviewing the July 25 Report to the President in the light of information that has subsequently become available which relates to the GOI's nuclear policy and the options available to us for influencing that policy. The Working Group has concluded that the July 25 Report remains valid in all major respects, although review of the actions recommended has resulted in some refinement of certain proposed U.S. tactics. This process of review and refinement is expected to continue in the months ahead.

II. Operation of Working Group

As noted in our interim report of August 30, we have established a Working Group " . . . to examine current developments bearing on the Indian nuclear weapons problem, to keep track of and coordinate specific steps under way to implement recommended actions, to prepare progress reports, and to consider possible further steps not presently under consideration."

The Working Group has met frequently during the past three months and has proven useful as a mechanism for securing a consensus on policy within the differing Washington organizations interested in the Indian problem, and as an institutional mechanism for implementing agreed policy. For example:

--The Working Group has thoroughly discussed modalities for impressing Indian opinion leaders

~~SECRET~~

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 97-247 (#46)
By cbm/cbm NARA, Date 7-28-05

with the heavy costs and complexities of a nuclear weapons program, and has concluded that at least at this time, cost and related data on this subject should generally be made available to Indian opinion leaders indirectly, preferably through third-country articles and opinion, without USG attribution;

--We have agreed that in determining how we publicly portray our estimate of the Chinese Communist threat to peripheral countries such as India, our interest in maintaining our credibility requires that we neither exaggerate nor downplay the threat as we see it, but rather play it straight while trying to keep it in perspective;

--The Working Group has drawn on the resources of a variety of offices within the Department and other government agencies to further its policy review and implementation of recommended actions, an example being the study of existing Indo-U.S. cooperation in the fields of nuclear energy, space, and general science which has been prepared by the Department's Science Office. (See Section (III) (D) (6) below).

III. Progress in Implementing Specific Recommended Actions

A. Economic Pressures and Inducements

1. Recommended Action: "We should continue indirect pressures designed: (a) to focus India's attention on improving economic performance; and (b) to limit over-all defense expenditures. We should stress the political as well as economic importance to India of successfully carrying out the present five-year plan."

Action to Date: We have not considered that this recommendation required specific action within the context of the Working Group's responsibilities, since it involves general policy considerations with which the Department generally, and NEA in particular, are concerned on a day-to-day basis. In formulating our policy on such questions as how to get India to improve its economic performance and to limit over-all defense expenditures, NEA gives due weight to the relevance of such policy to the Indian nuclear problem.

2. Recommended Action: "In support of foregoing, we should make available both to Indian governmental leaders and to non-governmental opinion leaders additional materials designed to make clear: (a) the difficulties and costs of achieving and of maintaining the continuing effectiveness of a militarily useful nuclear deterrent force; and (b) the drain such an effort would impose on scientific, technical, and managerial personnel sorely needed for development. We should utilize both official and unofficial channels and should prepare such special materials (including classified and unclassified materials) as may be necessary."

Action to Date: A quantitative study of costs that India might have to face in carrying out a nuclear weapons program has been prepared and sent to Embassy New Delhi (and to other posts for information), for the background use of appropriate members of the U.S. official community in India in oral discussions with Indian opinion leaders. As indicated above, we have concluded that it would probably be counter-productive to circulate such material in writing directly to Indian audiences in a manner which would make its USG origin evident. (This view, by the way, has been strongly supported by our embassy in New Delhi and was specifically reiterated by Ambassador Bowles during his recent consultation here). We are now working on the problem of stimulating or generating useful articles by private U.S. scholars and particularly by scholars and other informed persons in third countries, for discreet replay in India.

Meanwhile, we have been responding to a limited number of requests for unclassified cost data from Indian leaders known to be opposed to a nuclear weapons program. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, and Dr. Bhagavantam, who heads India's research and development establishment in the Ministry of Defense, have independently and privately asked different USG agencies for data which could support their thesis that India cannot afford a nuclear weapons program. We have responded by providing them with such material as carefully selected magazine articles and unclassified transcripts of testimony before Congressional committees which give some idea of the costs and complexities of our own programs.

3. Recommended Action: "We should avoid direct threats that we would cut back (or eliminate) economic aid in the event of a pro-nuclear decision. However, if India's leaders should ask us what our reaction would be, we should consider expressing the view that we doubt that the U.S. Congress would agree to subsidizing, even indirectly, an Indian nuclear weapons program."

Action to Date: We have, of course, avoided threatening India with a reduction of our economic aid in the event of a pro-nuclear decision. The contingency on which the second half of this recommended action is based has not arisen to date.

4. Recommended Action: "If India's leaders should come to us in a year or two seeking increased aid levels, and if we were prepared to respond favorably in the light of India's actual economic performance, we should consider making continuation of India's "no bomb" policy an implicit part of the deal."

Action to Date: The contingency referred to here has not yet arisen.

B. Security Aspects

1. Recommended Action: "We should make available privately to India's leaders such information and analyses as might, without falsely discounting ChiCom progress, make clear difficulties and limitations still confronting the ChiCom nuclear weapons program and aid in keeping the potential ChiCom nuclear threat in strategic perspective as far as India's interests are concerned."

Action to Date: Intelligence data have been passed to the GOI. Details will be set forth in a separate report. The Working Group is currently considering utilization of unclassified analyses for broader dissemination within the Government of India.

2. Recommended Action: "In our own public statements, we should avoid magnifying the ChiCom nuclear threat."

Action to Date: This action, together with the first four actions recommended under section (D) below, relate primarily to our public posture. We have prepared a message providing guidance for our public statements and informational activities generally which is designed to give effect to all five of these recommended actions. A copy is attached as Annex 1. It has been given rather wide geographic distribution, since in many cases our public posture needs to be consistent in all countries if it is to be effective in any one.

3. Recommended Action: "We should make a further determined effort to interest the Soviet Union in a UN resolution of assurances for non-nuclear countries along the lines of our 1965 draft."

Action to Date: In bilateral discussions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in New York, we have urged the Soviets to agree that assurances should be embodied in a UN resolution along the lines of our 1965 draft, rather than inserted in a non-proliferation treaty as a clause limiting

the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear parties (Kosygin proposal). The discussion with the Soviets has not progressed to the point where we can determine what would be the best next steps.

4. Recommended Action: "When it becomes clear whether or not such a resolution can be achieved, we should address the question of whether to offer India a private security assurance. In order to facilitate prompt future consideration of this possibility, detailed studies should now be mounted of: (a) the circumstances in which we might be called upon to prevent the Chinese from using "nuclear blackmail" in that part of the world, a policy enunciated in connection with the explosion of the first Chinese nuclear device; (b) how we would be likely to react in the event that Communist China were to mount (or threaten imminently to mount) a nuclear attack against India; (c) what tangible steps might eventually need to be taken to bolster the credibility of a private security assurance; and (d) what further steps in the security field might need to be considered if it should become apparent that India, nevertheless, was determined to have a nuclear role."

Action to Date: These studies are in progress and we expect to complete them by the end of the year.

C. Arms Control Measures

Recommended Action: "While we should not expect arms control agreements alone to prevent an Indian nuclear decision, we should continue our efforts to seek agreements in this area. In assessing costs and benefits to the U.S., due regard should be given to the fact that a comprehensive or threshold nuclear test ban would be likely to help restrain an Indian decision to go nuclear."

Action to Date: In presenting possible test ban proposals within the U.S. government, ACDA has called attention to the fact that an extension of the limited test ban would be likely to help restrain an Indian decision to go nuclear. ACDA will request that due regard be given to this fact in deciding on possible new test ban proposals.

D. Political Prestige of Non-Nuclear Countries

1. Recommended Action: "Although it will be difficult to deflect the widespread trend toward speaking in terms of "five nuclear powers," we should ourselves avoid this term and try to blunt this tendency. We should adopt a negative attitude toward proposals based on the assumption that the five nuclear countries which have tested nuclear weapons have in common some special interest not shared by others."

Action to Date: See paragraph (3) (A) of Annex 1, and section (B) (2) above.

2. Recommended Action: "Henceforth, in documents and public statements on this subject, we should refer to "civil nuclear powers" (including India and all others not having nuclear weapons) in contradistinction to "military nuclear powers" (i.e., the five powers which now have nuclear weapons) as a means of alleviating the unpleasant effects derived from differentiating between "nuclear and non-nuclear powers.""

Action to Date: See paragraph (3) (B) of Annex 1, and section (B) (2) above.

3. Recommended Action: "We should encourage the view that the several countries (including India) which have achieved advanced peaceful nuclear capabilities but have refrained from seeking nuclear weapons are entitled not only to respect for their restraint, but to a special voice in nuclear matters."

Action to Date: See paragraph (3) (C) of Annex 1, and section (B) (2) above.

4. Recommended Action: "We should emphasize the relevance of economic strength to political influence."

Action to Date: See paragraph (3) (C) (2) of Annex 1, and section (B) (2) above.

5. Recommended Action: "We should bear in mind that, if the U.K., as a former colonial power, were to phase out of national nuclear deterrence, the impact on India's thinking about nuclear weapons would be highly significant."

Action to Date: The Department of State has recently examined whether the U.K. might phase out its national nuclear deterrent, and reached the conclusion that at this time the U.K. does not intend to take such action. USG officials concerned with this question are aware of its relevance to the subject of Indian non-proliferation.

6. Recommended Action: "A special study should be made of more specific steps, including scientific and technical projects, that might be taken to enhance India's political prestige."

Action to Date: The Working Group is currently reviewing, with the Department's Science Office, the current state of Indo-U.S. cooperation in the fields of nuclear energy, space, and general science, as a first step toward identifying areas in which either the further intensification of existing cooperation or the initiation of new departures appears both feasible, and relevant to our non-proliferation objective. In addition, USIA is continuing a project, started some time ago, to publicize, through its worldwide facilities, India's achievements in all fields of science.

E. Intelligence Requirements

Recommended Action: "In order to have as much warning as possible of any impending shift in India's present no-bomb

policy, increased priority should be assigned to the collection and analysis of relevant intelligence data."

Action to Date: CIA is submitting a separate report on this.

F. Contingency Planning

Recommended Action: "A long-term planning study should be initiated of alternative approaches it might be in the U.S. interest to adopt in the event India should decide to proceed with a national nuclear weapons program."

Action to Date: We expect to complete this study by January 1.

Annex - State Circular 73836

India
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August 1, 1966

Walt,

New NSAM on Indian Nuclear Problem

Here is a Memorandum to the President and a follow-on NSAM on the Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem. Wreath did a long NSAM, attempting to compress the substance of the recommendations. Brom, Hal and I thought it better to have a short NSAM which referred to the recommendations as formulated in the language agreed to by everyone.

I think this is ready to go forward to the President, after yellow pencil treatment.

Howard Wiggins

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 97-252 (#8)

By ob/ies, NARA, Date 7-28-05

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Saunders

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August 1, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Follow-up on NSC Discussion of the Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem

Secretary Rusk has sent the paper you requested at the NSC meeting of June 9 on the Indian nuclear problem. He sees no dramatic steps to discourage the Indians from starting down the nuclear route that would not cost us more than any likely gain would be worth. However, his paper, agreed around town, does recommend a number of steps which together provide some hope of discouraging or delaying an Indian decision.

In the economic field, it recommends a number of steps to impress on the Indians the costs -- in development, manpower and Indo-Pakistan relations -- of going nuclear. It also suggests we keep an eye on ways to link possible larger economic assistance in the future to a firm Indian commitment not to go nuclear.



It also recommends seeking Soviet cooperation in a UN assurance to non-nuclear countries and suggests we continue efforts to achieve arms control agreements which might delay an Indian decision to go nuclear.

It asks for a number of studies, including how best to deal with Chicom "blackmail" of India or an overt Chicom nuclear threat to India, how to bolster the credibility of private security assurances to India and how to react if India does go nuclear.

The report also recommends a number of steps to bolster the technological and political prestige of those states which could go nuclear but refrain from doing so.

It requests that a high priority be assigned to gathering and analyzing relevant intelligence, and recommends a long-term

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 12-345

NARA, Date 01-30-2013

by 468

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- 2 -

contingency study of what we should do in the event that India decides to undertake a national nuclear program.

You will find these recommendations spelled out in the attached (pp. 1-4). They do not solve the Indian nuclear problem, but they do represent a good blueprint for making the most of the assets we have. If you approve continuing along these lines, I will sign the attached NSAM to keep the departments moving down this path.

W. W. R.

Approve _____

See me _____

HW:HS:lw

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~~SECRET~~

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August 1, 1966

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 355

TO: The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: The Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem, further
to NSAM 351

The President has approved the recommendations contained in the Secretary of State's memorandum to the President of July 25, 1966, concerning the Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem, as requested in NSAM 351. These recommendations are attached.

He asks that the Secretary of State assume responsibility for implementing these recommendations. Where appropriate, the Secretary may, in consultation with other agencies, delegate to these agencies responsibility for implementing specific recommendations.

Within one month, I would appreciate it if the Department of State could report to this office the assignment of operational responsibility for the specific tasks called for by these recommendations. By November 1 we would hope for the first progress report on implementation.

HW:HS:lw

W. W. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 93-65 (*1)
By clm/icp, NARA, Date 7-28-05

*India
nuclear*

July 18, 1966

Note for Mr. Rostow:

Subject: India nuclear paper

Harry Schwartz called to say that your memo with suggested changes in the text of the India Nuclear Paper reached him after some delay and only after he had cleared a revised text with DoD. Could we deal with your points in some other way?

I agreed that we could.

(a) We could use the NSAM to fix the operational responsibility.

(b) By direct and informal communication with the drafters of the future studies we could deal with the problem of examining the pros and cons of an assurance. We could similarly ensure an adequate discussion of the nuclear blackmail issue if the revised paper does not provide for it.

Howard Wriggins

Saunders

*India
nuclear*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 12, 1966

TO: W. W. R.

FROM: Howard Wriggins

SUBJECT: Notes on Meetings in India, June 3-6, 1966

Here are Ben Brown's notes on the Kaysen/Wiesner, etc., discussions with the Indians. These are strictly confidential, since the group does not want it known that such a detailed report was made to us.

For your purposes, the most interesting pages are:

(1) On one possible nuclear blackmail scenario, see pp. 10-12: Gopal hypothesis that China might threaten to take out two or three Indian cities if it doesn't give up Kashmir to the Pakistanis!

(2) Gopal on Vietnam, page 19: He believes there are splits in Hanoi which are plastered over every time we bomb the north. In his view, we should have a six months' pause in the bombing to permit these splits to sharpen and for the pro-Moscow Ho to find ways of saving face while coming to the conference table.

(3) On nuclear weapons costs, pp. 20-22, mostly Wiesner and other Americans discussing the problems. Little Indian reaction.

(4) Views on test ban negotiations, pp. 23-24: Trivedi says that if there is to be a treaty, it can't freeze present status quo and must represent costs to the nuclear powers. He found it hard to name the price the nuclear powers would have to be induced to pay if a treaty were to be satisfactory to India, except to say that "the only essential clause would be a cut-off in the production of fissile materials."

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 04-102
By g/lis, NARA, Date 2/28/11

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