

India nuclear + NSC file 21

~~SECRET/DRAFT~~

June 8, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We picked the Indian nuclear problem for the first NSC discussion in your new series of meetings because:

- India is one of the keys to preventing proliferation;
- keeping India off the nuclear track is crucial to its economic progress;
- while we can make no decision now, this problem will be at our elbows on a host of other decisions for some time to come.

You might want to open the meeting by explaining your reason for the new series. The Indian problem is an example of the kind of subject you want to discuss --not necessarily ready for immediate decision but one you will have to grapple with at some point.

The purpose of this meeting is to focus attention on how to keep India off the nuclear track. What we are doing now is insufficient. State's paper (attached) lays out a broader range of options. Each has its obvious limitations and costs. A good airing of these issues with you will give direction to further staff work.

Since everyone will have read the paper, maybe the best way to handle the meeting is for you to state the problem as you see it and then try to surface opinions on the tough questions.

The problem. India cannot afford an effective nuclear deterrent. But it may lose its race with China without one. Our Asian strategy is to buy time until India and Japan (we hope with Pakistan and Indonesia) can help

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BY *bc/m/s*, NARA, Date 2-16-10

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hold Free Asia against China. Can India do its share against a nuclear power without comparable nuclear power of its own?

The tough questions. India has three choices. We have to decide how we could meet Indian needs in each case and whether it would be worth the price.

1. India could rely on nuclear disarmament if the Chinese would join. Do any of our current proposals meet that need? The paper outlines ways we might try to lure India off the nuclear track. Some do not meet the need. Which are the most promising? Would a new push on non-proliferation and test ban treaties buy time?

2. India could rely on someone else's nuclear umbrella. How realistic is it for us to talk about offering security guarantees--nuclear or conventional? What would the US do if the Chinese Communists threatened a nuclear attack on India?

3. India could go nuclear. Some people feel this is inevitable and that the political costs of dissuading them are too great. Should we accept the "inevitable", or is non-proliferation a goal worth paying a big price for?

You may want to end the meeting by stating your own feelings and telling the departments to go back to work.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

June 7, 1966

*India Nuclear
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MEMO FOR MR. WRIGGINS
MR. JOHNSON
MR. KEENY

Here is a possible memo for Walt to send to the President as guidance for the Thursday NSC meeting. This may need a good deal of refining so please feel free to take it apart and put it together again. Howard had thought we might discuss this sometime tomorrow morning in plenty of time to give Walt a crack at the problem before day's end.

Hal Saunders

~~SECRET~~

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By *Chm/ly*, NAARA, Date *2-16-10*

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June 7, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We picked the Indian nuclear problem for the first NSC discussion in your new series of meetings because:

- India is one of the keys to preventing proliferation;
- Keeping India off the nuclear track is crucial to its economic progress;
- while we can make no decision now, this problem will be at our elbows on a host of other decisions for some time to come.

You might want to open the meeting by explaining your reason for the new series. The Indian problem is an example of the kind of subject you want to discuss--not ready for immediate decision but one you will have to grapple with at some point.

The purpose of this meeting is to focus attention on the best targets for further work on how to keep India off the nuclear track. State's paper (attached) lays out a range of options. Each one has its obvious limitations and costs and none solves the problem. A good airing will clarify these limitations and underscore the need for more work.

Since everyone will have read the paper, maybe the best way to handle the meeting is for you to state the problem as you see it and then try to surface opinions on the tough questions.

The problem. India cannot afford an effective nuclear deterrent. But it may lose its race with China without one. Our Asian strategy is to buy time until India and Japan (we hope with Pakistan and Indonesia) can hold Free Asia against China on their own. Can India do its share against a

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- 2 -

nuclear power without comparable nuclear power of its own?

The tough questions. India has three choices. We have to decide how we could meet Indian needs in each case and whether it would be worth the price.

1. India could rely on nuclear disarmament if the Chinese would join. Do any of our current proposals meet that need? The paper outlines ways we might try to lure India off the nuclear track. Some do not meet the need. Which are the most promising? Would a new push on non-proliferation and test ban treaties buy time?

2. India could rely on someone else's nuclear umbrella. How realistic is it for us to talk about offering security guarantees -- nuclear or conventional? What would the US do if the Chinese Communists threatened a nuclear attack on India?

3. India could go nuclear. Some people feel this is inevitable and that the political costs of dissuading them are too great. Should we accept the "inevitable," or is non-proliferation a goal worth paying a big price for?

You may want to end the meeting by stating your own feelings and telling the departments to go back to work.

~~SECRET~~

June 4, 1966.

SECRET/DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We picked the Indian nuclear problem for the first NSG discussion in your new series of meetings because:

- India is one of the keys to preventing proliferation;
- keeping India off the nuclear track is crucial to its economic progress;
- while we can make no decision now, this problem will be at our elbows on a host of other decisions for some time to come.

You might want to open the meeting by explaining your reason for these meetings.

The purpose of the meeting is to focus attention on the best targets

for further work. State's paper (attached) lays out a range of options.

A good airing will sort out the best bets.

Since everyone will have read the paper, maybe the best way to handle the meeting is for you to state the problem as you see it and then try to surface opinions on the tough questions.

The problem. India cannot afford an effective nuclear deterrent. But it may lose its race with China without one. Our Asian strategy is to buy time until India and Japan (we hope with Pakistan and Indonesia) can hold Free Asia against China on their own. Can India do its share against a nuclear power without nuclear power of its own?

The tough questions.

1. The paper outlines ways we might try to lure India off the nuclear track. Some are not very good. Which are the most promising? Which should we concentrate on?

2. What would the US do if the Chinese Communists threatened a nuclear attack on India? How realistic is it for us to talk about offering India security guarantees--nuclear or conventional?

3. What is the best way to buy time in India? We can show the Indians

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they cannot afford nuclear weapons and delivery systems. But most nations put security ahead of common sense. So what else can we do now to hold them off?

--Would a new US push on non-proliferation and test ban treaties help slow them down?

India nuclear~~SECRET~~

June 1, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Henry Owen
Mr. Wreatham E. Gathright

SUBJECT: Preparations for NSC meeting on the Indian
Nuclear Problem

We have examined the proposed papers for the NSC on June 9 and have the following recommendations:

1. The two papers as now presented are too diverse, too extensive, and do not together form an adequate base for the President's perusal.
2. We believe one paper should be put forward, making the following argument:

(a) Growing pressures in India:

Pressures are mounting in India as Chinese tests proceed; these in turn generate internal political pressures which will be increasingly hard to resist.

(b) Why do we care?

-- India's going nuclear will have consequences (March 17 memo for Indira Gandhi's visit, p. 11)

-- India, subject to nuclear blackmail or defeat, would have a range of consequences.

(c) Alternative U. S. approaches:

-- March 16 memo, pp. 5-8, with a somewhat larger discussion of nuclear sharing than in the formulation in paragraph 7, top of page 8.

-- Mr. Bowles' alternative "Limited Defense Program", (p. 2 of May 31 memo, but compressed).

3. Conclusion: It might conclude by commending the three alternative approaches which you consider the USG should most seriously study further.

cc: Smith
Keeny
Johnson
Saunders ✓

Howard Wriggins

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By *cbm/ly*, NARA, Date 2-16-10

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May 25, 1966

TO: W. W. Rostow
FROM: Howard Wriggins
SUBJECT: Al Wohlstetter on the Indian Nuclear Problem

1. In reading Gathright's paper, Wohlstetter thinks an important alternative is left out, to wit: a private guarantee, accompanied by specific contingency planning which would set limits to the types of contingencies we would agree to react to.

2. He stressed: (a) the acceptability of such a private guarantee to the Indians, despite their non-aligned posture, so long as it could be kept out of the public domain in India. (He believed the Russians would learn of it but would not publicly object.) He found the more knowledgeable already aware of being under the U. S. nuclear umbrella, a fact which they believed contributed to Chinese caution during the war with Pakistan.

(b) The fact that if it were coupled with contingency planning specifying different kinds of responses to rather specific Chinese initiatives, our control over possible Indian provocation would be substantially greater than it is as we are presently positioned, with only a vague assurance against nuclear blackmail.

(c) Such planning should be sufficiently secret to ensure against public leaks, but the Chinese should become aware of it, and the terms of our understanding:

i. e. an unprovoked attack by a nuclear power on India would be met by appropriate U. S. action.

3. In his view, we must face the fact that if no such guarantee is offered, we have admitted we do not take this problem seriously and are prepared to let events take their course.

cc: Mr. Gathright
Mr. Saunders
Mr. Johanson
Mr. Keeny

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By Cbm/ky NARA, Date 2-16-10

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India
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May 25, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Al Wohlstetter's Reaction to Gathright's Paper

1. Offer of firm unilateral guarantees:

(a) We should distinguish private from public guarantees. A public guarantee would not be acceptable because it would require India to give up its so-called "non-alignment" posture. However a private guarantee combined with specific contingency planning would: (i) maximize India's reassurance; (ii) set limits to the causus belli.

(b) India will continue to be interested, even if she is on the brink, because the Indians will know that the decision will be very costly and they will be ambivalent to the very end.

(c) Acceptance can be squared with "non-alignment" if the guarantee is private and the specific contingency planning is strictly limited within the two Governments.

(d) As to the riskiness for the U. S. , Wohlstetter wonders why it is riskier than what we have already extended to Japan or Western Europe.

(e) Wohlstetter believes we should make very clear that the guarantee would not hold if the Indians went nuclear.

2. Wohlstetter believes Gathright's point three would push India to be ready for the time when our guarantee would lapse. Moreover, as to Gathright's second point in paragraph 3, the Indians will fight any U. S. effort to influence them on Kashmir. Linking the guarantee to progress on Kashmir will confirm them in their view that only with their own nuclear capability will they be truly free (the Gallois thesis).

3. Gathright's fourth point, Wohlstetter believes to be the wrong thing to do. It makes it cheaper and easier for the Indians to go nuclear. It is bad enough that we have financed Tarapur for 40 years at 3/4 of one percent interest.

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By UCW NARA, Date 03-18-2014

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4. Gathright's point 6 would be idiotic. It would clearly establish for the Japanese and Israelis that Plowshare tests are all right. Thus it would sponsor weapons development under the cover of peaceful uses.

5. Wohlstetter believes that in any case, the Japanese will await Chinese IRBM tests and will continue to hesitate so long as the U. S. shows firm continuing interest in Asia and Japan particularly.

Howard Wriggins

cc: Mr. ^{Keeny}~~Rosen~~
Mr. Saunders

Johnson

~~SECRET~~

Saunder

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*India
nuclear*

~~SECRET~~

May 20, 1966

TO: W. W. Rostow

FROM: Howard Wriggins

SUBJECT: Firebell in the night, Chet's cable on Indian nuclear problem (Delhi's 3142, attached)

1. Chet's estimate of a GOI decision to go nuclear in two or three years if there is no international agreement is consistent with what the experts around town expect. His estimate, therefore, is not new.
2. INR has just completed an extensive talking paper, requested by Chet, on the costs of a nuclear weapons program. This is using data up to SECRET but will be distributable to senior members of GOI. It will strengthen Indira's case, which she already has made public, contradicting Babba's earlier very optimistic estimates. I have not seen it, but it is reported to make a very persuasive case. Do you want a copy?
3. Gathright is developing a piece for the Planning Group on the few things which might be done to buy time. He will bootleg a copy tomorrow.
4. The Secretary appears to still believe we should avoid any form of commitments ahead of time. Some form of guarantees or advance agreement by the Indians to talk with us about this problem are not acceptable to State.
5. Will continue to follow.

Att.

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Authority NLT 04-102 (1140)
By cbm/jcs, NARA, Date 7-28-05

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UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON

March 9, 1967

File
H.S.'s
file 29

India -
nuclear

TO : H. Wiggins, Executive Office Building

FROM: U. M. Staebler, Assistant Director
for Technical Exchanges
Division of International Affairs

FOR YOUR REVIEW.

March 7, '67

Spurge,
Any reaction? I'd like to
call back today. Harold

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UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

Dear Vikram:

We have been exploring the question you raised during our meeting in Bombay January 11, 1967, concerning the possible availability of a ship with the mobile irradiator which we offered for use in India.

One of the three shipboard irradiators which we have fabricated is currently in use aboard the U. S. Department of the Interior (Bureau of Commercial Fisheries) vessel "Delaware" which is an exploratory fishing vessel operated out of Gloucester, Massachusetts. However, we are advised that the condition of the vessel is such that it is impractical to consider its use in a cooperative program. The vessel was built in 1937. It is 147 ft. long and has a 25 ft. beam. It normally uses an operating crew of 13 and usually has one to four scientists on board.

A replacement vessel currently is under construction and scheduled for delivery in November 1967. Inasmuch as operation was not expected to be continued beyond 1967 many items of repair and overhaul relating to the engines, hull, and deckhouse that normally would have been undertaken were not carried out. It is estimated that approximately \$250,000 would be required to insure that the "Delaware" would be in top condition.

J. H. DeLorme

In view of the condition of the ship, the extra costs and complications of shipboard operation, ^{and} the early stage of development of shipboard versus land based use, and questions which have been raised here regarding the general practicality of considering fish as a major food source in India, we are inclined to think that planning should proceed on the basis of use of the irradiator in a land based installation.

If you or your fisheries people would like more information on any aspects of the irradiator offer we would be pleased to provide it or to arrange for discussions here with our own people involved in food irradiation or with representatives of the

AIR MAIL

Dr. Vikram A. Sarabhai

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Bureau of Commercial Fisheries of the Department of the Interior. Such discussions would be particularly appropriate in connection with the visit which we hope to schedule soon for some of your people to obtain a detailed review of our work in accordance with Item 4 of Attachment B of my letter of October 27, 1966.

We regret that our efforts have not yielded more encouraging results with respect to the ship. We await further word regarding your desired scheduling of the tour and detailed review of our program. Perhaps it would be convenient to arrange this to coincide with your own plans for a visit to the United States so that you could join your group during parts of the tour or for a summary meeting here in Washington.

(but both feel the land-based approach may offer the most effective way to proceed with the telegram.)

Cordially,

Chairman

Dr. Vikram A. Sarabhai, Chairman
Indian Atomic Energy Commission
Apollo Pier Road
Bombay 1, India

bcc: Chairman (2)
GM (2)
AGMIA
EAGM
M. B. Kratzer/A.S. Friedman
W.L. Yeomans/A. Dalton, IA
E. E. Fowler, ID
C. L. Dunham, BSM
H. Wriggins, White House
S. Keeny, White House
C. F. Luce, Interior
Bureau of Commercial
Fisheries, Interior
State Dept. (2)

Excerpt from Report of Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, on Trip to Australia, Thailand, India, and Pakistan, Jan. 3-14, 1967

and the Tarapur Atomic Power Project, 60 miles north of Bombay, which will provide 380 MW of electric power from two enriched uranium, boiling water power reactors designed and manufactured by the General Electric Company. This nuclear power plant, the largest now underway in Asia, is being financed by a US AID loan of \$80 million.

In my conversations with Chairman Sarabhai, I reiterated the importance which the US attaches to the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty. I particularly explored with him the disturbing reports that India might undertake the development of nuclear explosives on the ground that they were to be used only for peaceful purposes. Chairman Sarabhai stated categorically that no such program was in progress or contemplated. However, he maintained the view that the decision of each nation on whether to develop peaceful nuclear explosives should not be inhibited by a non-proliferation treaty. I stressed that the US position is that the development of peaceful nuclear explosives is tantamount to the development of nuclear weapons and that the legitimate needs of nations for these highly sophisticated devices should be met by the nuclear powers, such as the US, which have developed them. Sarabhai feels that the IAEA safeguards system may actually be counter-productive, leading to the spread of nuclear weapons information, as a result of the information gained by the international inspectors being taken back to their individual countries; I do not agree with this point of view.

Chairman Sarabhai's position on the development of peaceful nuclear explosives is characteristic of Indian thinking on the general issue of non-proliferation. This is that India has decided in its own self-interest to forego the development of nuclear weapons and to concentrate on peaceful nuclear applications, but that India should not be prevented by treaty from the development of nuclear weapons whenever its national interest requires. This view was reflected in remarks delivered by Chairman Sarabhai and Prime Minister Gandhi at the dedication ceremony.

I also discussed with Chairman Sarabhai the implementation of our arrangements for increased cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy, which we developed with him during his visit to the US last November, as the guest of the US Atomic Energy Commission. These

arrangements have now been approved by the Indian Government and we are making plans for their prompt implementation. One of the areas covered by our new arrangements is cooperation in the application of radiation to the preservation of food and the disinfestation of grain. In this regard, I offered to Chairman Sarabhai the loan of an experimental irradiator, containing 30,000 curies of cobalt-60, which can be used by India in extending its studies of the radiation preservation of various foodstuffs, including fish and the disinfestation of food grains. In return for the loan of this irradiator without cost to India, the US will receive the full results of the experimental work performed. I later discussed this offer with Prime Minister Gandhi during my meeting with her at the dedication ceremony.

Chairman Sarabhai was optimistic concerning the benefits that the radiation preservation of food may bring in alleviating India's critical food situation and I share this optimism. One of the products on which the Indian AEC plans to concentrate its efforts in the radiation preservation field is fish, and the experimental irradiator which I offered can be of considerable help in advancing these studies. The Indian Ocean is a rich source of food, particularly proteins in which the Indian diet is so deficient, yet little of these products penetrate more than a few miles inland, largely because of the high rate of spoilage. While much work remains to be done, radiation pasteurization is one of the techniques which holds promise for extending the shelf life of such perishable food products by the extra time necessary to enable their distribution to far larger numbers of people.

The disinfestation of grain is also an urgent problem. Current estimates indicate that 10% to 20% of India's grain crop is destroyed by insect pests before it reaches the market place. Radiation may make an important contribution to the reduction of this tragic loss, providing the equally important problem of reinfestation of the grain following radiation, because of the poor food distribution system, can be solved.

In view of these many advantages to India of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy obtainable through cooperation with the United States, I discussed with

Sarabhai the possibility of stationing a USAEC Scientific Representative in India. He was enthusiastic about this suggestion and urged that such a representative be stationed at the Consulate in Bombay rather than at the Embassy in New Delhi.

Turning to the facilities we visited, I can report that India has a truly remarkable peaceful nuclear energy program. The research facilities near Bombay are equal in scope and sophistication to those of many of the most advanced countries outside the military nuclear powers. Among other achievements, India has built, through its own efforts, the only plant at present for the extraction and purification of plutonium from irradiated fuel elements in any country other than the military nuclear powers. There is no doubt that with these facilities and with its competent nuclear scientists and engineers, India has the capability to design and develop nuclear devices on a comparatively short time schedule. However, India has no plutonium nor capability to produce plutonium other than that which is committed by international agreement to use for peaceful purposes only. To be specific, the Canadian-Indian Reactor Uranium System (CIRUS Reactor), a research reactor, is confined, by international agreement between Canada and India, to use only for peaceful purposes, although there are no safeguard arrangements in effect to ensure compliance with this guarantee through on-site inspection. The much larger nuclear power projects, on which India is now receiving help from the US and Canada, are subject to both guarantees and effective safeguard arrangements.

I believe that the Tarapur Atomic Power Project will become one of the show-cases of United States assistance in India and, in fact, in Asia. It is now about 70% complete and on schedule. By 1968, it will be supplying its power to the largest electric power grid in India. The US suppliers, the US AID, and the Indian Atomic Energy Commission all merit genuine congratulations for their performance on this project to date.

One of the most useful aspects of my visit to India was the technical lecture which I presented on the transuranium elements and my press conference. The lecture, which was attended by an estimated 800 Indian scientists and engineers, and which was an entirely scientific report, helped, in my view, to underscore the strong US interest in

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

December 21, 1966

~~SECRET~~

To: NSC - Mr. Howard Wriggins

Howard: Attached is the latest draft of the paper on Indian security. I would especially appreciate your comments on the conclusions.

W.E. Gathright

Attachment:

Copy #21 of draft Indian
Nuclear Weapons Problem

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D. Obm/y KARA, Date 2-16-10

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DRAFT

THE INDIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROBLEM:
SECURITY ASPECTS
A REPORT UNDER NSAM NO. 355

December, 1966

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NLI/Rac 12-346

By LCB

NARA, Date 04-24-2015

THE INDIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROBLEM:
SECURITY ASPECTS
A REPORT UNDER NSAM NO. 355
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THE INDIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROBLEM:

SECURITY ASPECTS

A REPORT UNDER NSAM No. 355

BACKGROUND

1. In response to NSAM No. 331, the Secretary of State forwarded to the President on July 25, 1966, a report concerning the Indian nuclear weapons problem.

2. With respect to the sources of the problem, the report stated:

"The problem arises in part from political and prestige concerns to which a nuclear capability may be pertinent. These concerns relate importantly to India's future position vis-a-vis Communist China in Asia, and to whether an effort to 'go it alone' militarily (including nuclearly) will come to be regarded as essential to exerting independent political influence.

"The problem also stems in part from security concerns -- the need to deter or counter future Communist Chinese nuclear blackmail or attack."

3. Recommendation B(4) of the report called for further study of the second of these sources of the
problem

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problem -- India's security concerns. The present report has been prepared in response to NSAM No. 355 which, inter alia, approved this recommendation for further study of security aspects.

4. In considering these aspects, it should be recalled that the initial report noted that: "Because the problem has more than a single root, no single action we might take can be expected to provide a full answer." The initial report also noted that "we cannot now describe a 'permanent solution.'" These basic considerations continue to be pertinent with respect to both the relationship of security to other aspects of the problem, and actions which might be taken in the security field.

5. The present report consists of two parts:

-- Part I presents agreed conclusions of the inter-agency working group which has been charged with implementation of NSAM No. 355.

-- Part II presents a supporting analysis. The analysis generally reflects the views of the working group; however, no effort has been made to reach full agreement on all details covered in the analysis.

PART I: CONCLUSIONS

1. We cannot accurately predict when India's leaders will conclude that steps must be taken toward resolving the question of India's future nuclear security vis-a-vis Communist China. The issue could be precipitated in a few months -- or within a few years -- depending on the inter-play of such factors as the following:

- U.S.-Soviet agreement on a non-proliferation treaty;
- Further developments in Communist China's nuclear weapons program;
- Changes in the character of U.S.-Soviet, Soviet-ChiCom, and ChiCom-Pak relations;
- India's assessment of political and economic risks of "going nuclear" versus the strength of its security concerns.

2. No progress has yet been made toward a UN resolution or other international understanding which might afford a measure of assurance for countries which refrain from seeking nuclear weapons. In the Indian case, such an international approach might serve two functions:

-- That

-- That of providing an improved basis, which would be public and consistent with

India's policy of non-alignment, for India's leaders to continue to resist domestic pressures to "go nuclear"; and

-- That of serving as an "umbrella" for more substantial private security understandings.

3. We should continue efforts to develop an international approach which would serve such purposes as the foregoing. However, the Soviet Union has thus far rejected the concept of a positive public assurance for non-nuclear countries and has shown no interest in offering a private security assurance to India. Whether or when these attitudes may change is at best problematical.

4. We are, then, confronted with two major uncertainties:

-- One related to when the security issue will press itself on the attention of India's leaders;

-- The other related to the availability of a suitable international approach.

5.

5. In view of these uncertainties, we should proceed to develop an approach to the security issue which might be used in private bilateral discussions with India's leaders if and as the situation requires. The objective of such a private approach would not be to influence Indian public opinion, but rather to convince India's leaders that they can, without undue risk to their country's security, continue to adhere to their policy against seeking a national nuclear weapons capability.

6. We have examined four courses:

Course A. We might limit ourselves to reiterating privately to India's leaders our publicly announced policy of supporting countries threatened by ChiCom "nuclear blackmail."

Course B. Without unilaterally offering a guarantee of India's nuclear security, we might seek specific understandings with India's leaders concerning ways of implementing our policy against "nuclear blackmail" with a view to maximizing its deterrent effect on Communist China.

Course C.

Course C. We might privately offer India's leaders a unilateral guarantee of India's security against ChiCom nuclear aggression.

Course D. We might explore with India's leaders ways in which India might play a nuclear role without seeking a national nuclear weapons capability.

7. Our conclusions with respect to these courses are as follows:

Course A. We do not believe that merely reiterating our promise of support against "nuclear blackmail" would be adequate to influence the decisions which will confront India's leaders.

Course B. An effort to give substance to our policy against nuclear blackmail would not provide the basis for a long-term "solution." However, such an effort would represent a logical step, might help clarify the issue, and would not, in our view, be counterproductive in terms of our relations with India (or Pakistan). Accordingly,
the

the principal elements of such an approach are presented in the attachment at Tab A.* We believe the course of action outlined under Tab A should be approved at this time, and that the Secretary of State should be authorized to implement this approach whenever he determines it to be necessary and useful in the light of overall U.S. relations with India as well as the status of the Indian nuclear weapons problem.

Course C. The central element of a private unilateral guarantee of India's nuclear security would be a commitment that we would regard ChiCom nuclear aggression against India as aggression against ourselves. In view of the varying circumstances which might affect the manner (demonstrative, tactical, strategic) and scale of the use of nuclear weapons by Communist China against India, we could not commit ourselves to a single response under any and all circumstances. The gap between commitment and response might be filled by joint U.S.-Indian contingency planning with respect

to

*See pages 10-15.

to nuclear contingencies, and by ensuring in our own planning that necessary military capabilities would be available. Going down this road would present major issues for both the U.S. and India, and although it is not a foregone conclusion that India's leaders would reject such an offer, the chance that they would accept it is probably considerably less than even. The need for further consideration of Course C should be determined in the light of the outcome of Course B.

Course D. We cannot now foresee the development of a political basis for offering India a "nuclear role." However, we should continue to examine various possibilities ranging from formal arrangements for consultation on nuclear matters to arrangements under which India might procure appropriate nuclear delivery vehicles to be supplied with nuclear weapons by the U.S. under agreed circumstances. We should exclude from examination arrangements contrary to the terms of a non-proliferation treaty if such a treaty is achieved.

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8. A principal quid pro quo on India's part in connection with the courses outlined above would be refraining from seeking a national nuclear weapons capability. However, consideration should be given to whether we might also seek, for example, more active Indian cooperation in support of intelligence collection activities of joint interest.

9. It should be noted that if the U.S. deploys an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system, the question of the availability of ABM defenses for India is likely to arise. An examination of problems and possibilities in this regard should be included within the scope of U.S. studies of the ABM question.

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CONCLUSIONS - TAB A

ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTING
U.S. POLICY AGAINST
CHICOM "NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL"

1. The following offer would be made privately
to India's leaders:
 - a. We would be prepared to enter into: (i)
advance consultation respecting contingencies in
which Communist China might make threats of
"nuclear blackmail" against India, and (ii)
arrangements to ensure further prompt consulta-
tion if specific situations involving such threats
should arise.
 - b. The objective would be to identify
courses of action which would, under various
circumstances, offer the most effective and
appropriate means of deterring the use of
nuclear weapons by Communist China against India.
 - c. Consideration would also be given to
how specific courses of action might best be
carried out, e.g., separately by the U.S. or
India, or jointly with others.

d.

d. Consultation would normally be through political channels. We would be prepared to consider military consultation if required in connection with particular courses of action.

e. The privacy of the arrangement and of consultations pursuant to the arrangement would be maintained by both countries.

2. The following related arrangements would be proposed:

a. Periodic joint assessments of the ChiCom nuclear threat to India, including strategic implications of changes in the character of ChiCom nuclear capabilities and possible nuclear deployments.

b. A reliable communications link ("hot line") between India and the U.S. (we would encourage India to seek comparable arrangements with the Soviet Union and Communist China).

3. The following considerations would be advanced during discussion of the foregoing approach with India's leaders.

a.

a. The U.S. has a basic continuing interest in the future security and stability of the Asian-Pacific region. The nuclear security and stability of the sub-continent are a key part of this over-all problem.

b. Neither our own interests nor those of free non-nuclear countries of the region would be served by the further spread of national nuclear weapons capabilities or by permitting Communist China to believe that its nuclear weapons program can be exploited at the expense of others.

c. Our policy against "nuclear blackmail" offers a flexible framework for deterring the use of nuclear weapons by Communist China. Flexibility is required since nuclear threats might be made under a variety of circumstances. It is not practical to determine or specify in advance a single response that would be appropriate in all possible situations.

d.

d. Depending on the circumstances, various degrees of pressure might be required. If the situation warranted, the forms of pressure considered could include counterthreats and, possibly, related demonstrative military moves designed to make clear to Communist China the seriousness of the situation.

e. If Communist China were to make nuclear threats against India, the interests of many nations would be involved. Thus, although the Soviet Union is not likely to agree to any specific steps in advance, we have no reason to suppose the Soviets would wish to see Communist Chinese "nuclear blackmail" tactics against India succeed.

f. The steps that can be taken within the framework of our policy against ChiCom "nuclear blackmail" would be likely to prove a more convincing deterrent in Communist China's eyes than an Indian national nuclear weapons capability.

(1) One reason is that, as Communist China is aware, U.S. nuclear capabilities are sufficiently

sufficiently flexible and accurate to permit measured retaliation which would destroy Communist China's nuclear delivery, support and production capabilities.

(2) On the other hand, an Indian capability, if it could survive ChiCom attack, could at best threaten only Communist China's cities and might, therefore, invite a ChiCom strike against Indian cities. Under such circumstances, an Indian threat of retaliation might well not prove credible from Communist China's standpoint.

(3) In addition, if India were to seek a national nuclear weapons capability, it would not be able to count on support which had been intended for non-nuclear countries. The objective should be to increase Communist China's dilemmas rather than to relieve it of the need to weigh most carefully the risks entailed in any use of its nuclear weapons.

(g) In summary, our policy against "nuclear blackmail" is designed to influence Communist China's
leaders

leaders by building on risks they already recognize. One of these risks is that of creating a united opposition to any efforts to exploit "nuclear blackmail" tactics. Another is the risk of direct confrontation with U.S. nuclear power. A rational weighing of such risks should lead to the conclusion that any gains expected from the use of nuclear weapons would be far outweighed by possible losses. This is the best route to effective deterrence of Communist China.

PART II: ANALYSIS

A. The ChiCom Nuclear Threat to India

1. Nuclear Weapons and Communist China's Indian Policy

a. Communist China's principal objectives vis-a-vis India appear to be as follows:

(1) To confirm the Chinese version of disputed boundaries;

(2) To ensure that the border states (Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim) will at least provide a not unfavorably disposed buffer zone insulating Tibet; and possibly to dominate these states in order to have a strategic outpost overlooking the Sub-continent;

(3) To keep the Sub-continent itself off-balance with a view to preventing the emergence of India as a potential competitor for Asian leadership;

(4) To undercut U.S. and Soviet influence and support of India;

(5) To promote the establishment of an anti-U.S./pro-Peking, if not Communist, Indian Government.

b.

b. For the most part, these objectives can be pursued relatively effectively (perhaps most effectively) through political pressures and manipulation. In general, they do not require the application of substantial military force. They do not, in particular, require the actual use of nuclear weapons. However, nuclear weapons are likely to prove useful as a "silent partner" of political pressure, and of conventional military force if conflict should occur.

c. Without resorting to explicit threats of "nuclear blackmail" and without taking the drastic step of mounting a nuclear attack, Communist China may find that the "silent partner" role of nuclear weapons can serve perhaps four functions:

(1) Intimidating India in political bargaining or conventional conflict concerning disputed boundaries;

(2) Convincing the border states that power resides in the north and that their security cannot be safeguarded by India;

(3)

(3) Promoting turmoil in the Sub-continent by encouraging Pakistan to believe that it has a powerful guarantor at its side; and

(4) Discouraging India from taking political or military initiatives adverse to Communist China's interests, and perhaps weakening India's confidence that others would come to its assistance in the event of future Sino-Indian conflict. With respect to the latter point, a major ChiCom concern is that the use of its conventional forces might be countered by U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. Communist China probably regards a major function of its own nuclear weapons program as that of providing its own nuclear umbrella under which political pressures and conventional military pressures might be employed with less risk of U.S. nuclear intervention. This "deterrent" function of Communist China's nuclear weapons program may eventually figure in the context of ChiCom-Indian-U.S. relations as well as elsewhere.

d.

d. Explicit nuclear threats could, of course, come into play in specific situations where the "silent partner" role of nuclear weapons proved inadequate to the task at hand. Although the credibility and effectiveness of such threats would depend in part on the possibility that they might be implemented, they represent essentially a political use of nuclear force and would not necessarily constitute a commitment to employ nuclear weapons. This has certainly been the case to date with Soviet "nuclear blackmail" attempts.

e. If nuclear weapons should actually be used by Communist China against India, it is less likely to be the result of following-through on threats of "nuclear blackmail" than the by-product of an on-going conventional conflict. However, although the possibility that nuclear weapons might be used under such circumstances cannot be excluded, Communist China would need to weigh any assumed advantage of their use against two basic considerations:

(1)

(1) The risk that the U.S. would come to India's assistance; and

(2) The risk of creating widespread international opposition, including that of the Soviet Union.

It is difficult at this juncture to identify specific ChiCom military requirements that could be met only by using nuclear weapons against India which would outweigh this liability and risk.

f. Although nuclear weapons could come to figure in Communist China's Indian policy in the foregoing ways, we do not know what relative priority Communist China has assigned to its objectives vis-a-vis India or to the eventual deployment of nuclear weapons in support of these objectives. Whatever the case may be during the period when Communist China's nuclear weapons stockpile is limited, its capabilities will grow. India cannot escape the need to examine its own situation in the light of this changeable and changing threat.

2.

2. India's Security Concerns

a. Thus far, India has assigned military priority to meeting the threat of conventional conflict with Communist China, the threat of further conflict with Pakistan, and the possibility of a two-front war involving both. Imbalances still affect specific types of capabilities, but certain of the shortcomings revealed in 1962 have been lessened. India's military self-confidence, clearly deficient in 1962, has also been bolstered as a result of the 1965 conflict with Pakistan.

b. Now, however, India must weigh the implications of Communist China's emerging nuclear capability. In the background, there are doubtless nagging recollections that in 1962 concern about Communist Chinese air strikes against its cities inhibited India from making the most effective use of its own "air power." Looking to the future, India is probably going to be subject to increasing self-doubts respecting the confidence with which it might engage in conventional conflict with a nuclear-armed

armed Communist China. As these considerations suggest, India is likely to view itself as a prime target for "nuclear blackmail" in future political and military confrontations with Communist China; it is likely to feel intimidated by Communist China's nuclear weapons even if explicit threats are not made, and even if there is small chance that nuclear weapons would be used.

c. However, India's problem cannot be dismissed as entirely psychological. The fact that Communist China will have nuclear weapons presents a military problem for the U.S. and will have to be factored into our own military plans and operations. There is no reason to expect India to discount a threat we ourselves must take seriously.

d. None of these considerations means that India would necessarily find the best solution to its security concerns in a national nuclear weapons capability. However, if India refrains from seeking such a capability, it will not be the result of writing-off the ChiCom nuclear threat.

Such

Such a decision could only be based on the assumption that India could turn to the U.S., and possibly the Soviet Union as well, in the event of future contingencies.

B. Contingencies and Possible U.S. Responses

1. "Nuclear Blackmail" and the Use of Nuclear Force

a. Three types of contingencies need to be considered:

(1) "Nuclear blackmail" is viewed here as a specific effort to achieve political or military objectives through explicit threats to use nuclear force. Such threats might conceivably be made in the context of political confrontations as well as under conditions of imminent or on-going conventional conflict. Threats could be offensive (to advance Communist China's own objectives), or defensive (to force India to halt some military action which it had initiated).

(2) If information or circumstances suggested that Communist China were about to employ nuclear weapons, the contingency would

be

be dominated by a real threat of imminent nuclear attack.

(3) The actual use of nuclear weapons could be demonstrative (for psychological effect), tactical (against Indian forces actually engaged in conflict or against forward reserves), or strategic (against key military targets, civilian areas, or both). Their use might support a conventional military action initiated by Communist China, or assist in repelling an action initiated by India.

b. Several considerations need to be kept in view in considering these hypothetical contingencies.

(1) If they should arise at all, they will not necessarily arise sequentially; that is, there is no necessary or orderly progression from "nuclear blackmail," through threat of imminent nuclear attack, to the actual use of nuclear weapons.

(2)

(2) The circumstances (both as to the origin and character of the contingency) might be either clear or highly ambiguous. The latter would likely be the case where, say, a border dispute was involved.

(3) Both the opportunity to respond and the character of appropriate responses could vary considerably.

2. U.S. Reaction to ChiCom "Nuclear Blackmail."

a. Our present policy of providing support against ChiCom "nuclear blackmail" does not commit us to any particular course of action. The range of circumstances in which the issue might arise is broad, and no single course of action suggests itself. Depending on the circumstances, the main possibilities appear to be as follows:

(1) If the threat arose in the context of a political confrontation between India and Communist China and did not carry the implication of an immediate attack, we might seek to apply political pressure alone or
jointly

jointly with others. This pressure might take the form of condemnation of Communist China's tactics without necessarily advancing a counterthreat.

(2) In the event of conventional conflict, it is probable that efforts to halt the conflict would already be underway. If a nuclear threat seemed to presage eventual escalation, efforts to bring the conflict to a halt might be intensified, and counterthreats and perhaps demonstrative measures might be employed to discourage escalation.

(3) At some stage, consideration might be given to steps supporting India's conventional capabilities. However, halting the conflict might well be given higher priority.

(4) If nuclear attack appeared imminent, a forceful counterthreat might be called for, and the possibility of a disarming strike might be considered, although the inhibitions against such a course would be substantial.

b.

b. Whether the Soviet Union would associate itself with us in any of the foregoing actions is uncertain. It has not as yet been prepared to accept the concept of positive action in support of non-nuclear countries presumably because such a policy would be transparently directed against another Communist state -- Communist China. If an actual situation should arise which the Soviets could not ignore, they might still prefer to act separately rather than jointly with us. The thrust of Soviet political action might be in the same direction as our own, and it is likely that we might share an interest in bringing conventional conflict to a halt. Under foreseeable circumstances, it is far less likely that the Soviets would either join or support public counterthreats against Communist China.

c. These considerations suggest that support against "nuclear blackmail" might not in the event prove to be of a kind which would take India's special interests into account. This would be especially true if "halting the conflict" became an end in itself.

3.

3. U.S. Reaction to ChiCom Nuclear Attack

a. As noted above, the use of nuclear weapons by Communist China might conceivably take any of several forms: demonstrative, tactical, strategic. The scale might be limited or large. The circumstances leading to the use of nuclear weapons might be clear or ambiguous. These basic uncertainties make hazardous any effort to predict how we would in fact react.

b. Taking these uncertainties into account, the principal factors which now appear to have a bearing on our reactions can be summarized as follows:

(1) If the use of nuclear weapons by Communist China represented the first use that any country had made of them since the Second World War, the event would clearly signal Communist China's intention not to follow what others have come to view as the "rules of the game." It is in fact highly unlikely that Communist China would consider the

the breaking of the "rules of the game" to be in its interest. However, if it should take this step, the question for the U.S. and others would be whether to accept the risk of further ChiCom violations, or to seek to enforce the "rules" through political and/or military action.

(2) The most effective political action available would probably be to threaten to retaliate against any further use of nuclear weapons by Communist China. But would we limit ourselves to threats if Communist China had actually attacked one or several of India's large cities? How would other Asian countries react if this were our only response?

(3) We might, on the other hand, choose to strike Communist China's nuclear delivery, support and production capabilities following the initial incident in which nuclear weapons were employed. But would we do so if, for example, Communist China had employed only

one

one or a few weapons for demonstrative or psychological purposes? Would others feel that we were justified in retaliating on such a scale?

(4) In considering these alternatives, we would, of course, need to consider the attitude of the Soviet Union. Under present and foreseeable circumstances, it would clearly not be in the Soviet Union's interest to precipitate a general nuclear war in response to a measured U.S. nuclear attack against military capabilities in Communist China (which might in fact represent a potential threat to the Soviet Union itself). To reduce the risk, we might notify the Soviet Union of our intentions (or if substantial improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations had occurred, we might seek to enlist their support or cooperation). Soviet attitudes would, however, be a factor that would have to be weighed at the time.

(5)

(5) Finally, we could not disregard the possibility of a ChiCom response -- a thrusting outward of its conventional military forces; or, eventually, the employment of intercontinental capabilities against us if we had not been able to destroy all such capabilities. Either of these reactions would be irrational in the sense that they might call forth additional U.S. nuclear action, and to deter such responses, we might, indeed, make clear in advance what further action we would take. But how much risk would remain? How much risk would we be prepared to accept?

c. If the foregoing represents a reasonable approximation of the main factors that would have to be considered, the uncertainties involved argue strongly against assuming that we would automatically retaliate nuclearly against any Communist Chinese use of nuclear weapons against India. But these uncertainties must be considered in the light of others:

(1)

(1) Whether the risk that Communist China might use nuclear weapons against India would be increased if there were evident uncertainty concerning our own reaction;

(2) Whether India's uncertainty as to our intentions would increase the chance of its going nuclear; and

(3) How these aspects of the future nuclear security of the entire Asian-Pacific region inter-act with other aspects of regional security.

C. An Approach Based on U.S. Policy Against "Nuclear Blackmail."

1. A U.S.-Indian Consultative Arrangement

a. Because of uncertainties inherent in predicting the circumstances under which our policy against ChiCom "nuclear blackmail" might be called into play, we will need to retain a high degree of flexibility. However, two questions arise:

(1)

(1) Whether we can retain full flexibility and still use our policy against "nuclear blackmail" as a means of influencing India's leaders in their consideration of questions bearing on their country's future nuclear security.

(2) Whether, without losing essential flexibility, we might be able to build on our present policy in a way that might be meaningful to India's leaders.

b. The answer to the first of these questions is clearly negative. To retain full flexibility, we would, in effect, have to avoid any elaboration of our present policy. But unless an effort is made to structure that policy in a way that is understood by India's leaders, it is likely to appear lacking in substance and to be viewed as a well intentioned gesture rather than a meaningful tool.

c.

c. On the other hand, it should be possible to build on our present policy in ways that would retain needed flexibility. What might be done in this regard could still prove far from providing a full answer to India's nuclear security problem especially over the longer-term. However, a dialogue with India's leaders concerning ways of implementing our policy against "nuclear blackmail" would offer a logical next step.

d. The basis for such a dialogue might be a twofold U.S. offer which would be presented privately to India's leaders as a means of maximizing the deterrent effect of our present policy:

(1) An offer to enter into advance consultations concerning contingencies which might involve ChiCom "nuclear blackmail" threats against India, and concerning the range of responses that might, depending on the circumstances, offer the most appropriate and effective ways of counter-
ing such threats.

(2)

(2) An offer to enter into an arrangement for prompt joint consultation on specific courses of action in the event such contingencies should arise.

e. The only commitment would be the commitment to consult. In this respect, the arrangement would be similar to our 1963 agreement to consult with India, in the event of Communist Chinese attack on India, regarding possible U.S. assistance in strengthening India's air defenses. However, in the present case, provision would be made for advance consultation. The objective would not be "contingency planning" in a formal sense but rather preliminary clarification of a range of possible contingencies and responses. Decisions regarding courses of action would only be arrived at on the basis of further consultation in the light of specific circumstances.

f. There are some hazards in such an approach.

(1)

(1) Although the only commitment would be to consult, there would be an implied commitment that we would undertake some action in India's behalf if need should arise. However, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that our present policy already carries such an implication.

(2) A dialogue concerning contingencies and responses would inevitably raise a number of "what if" questions. However, India's leaders will be grappling with such questions in any case. If a dialogue could aid in keeping matters in perspective, we should gain rather than lose. The fact that we would not be able to offer simple solutions may be less important under present circumstances than the opportunity to make the case that an Indian national nuclear weapons capability would not itself offer a simple solution and that other approaches offer greater promise.

(3)

(3) Finally, "crisis consultation" might not in the event produce an agreed course of action. This limitation is to some extent inherent in any consultative arrangement, including those with allies. Despite this limitation, a firm commitment to consult might make our policy against "nuclear blackmail" more directly relevant to India's concerns than is now the case.

g. Consultative arrangements of the type contemplated here could, of course, involve countries other than the U.S. and India. Any offer along these lines would represent an assurance of our willingness to consult bilaterally rather than a barrier to broader consultative arrangements if such should materialize.

2. Supporting Measures

a. The basic arrangement described above could be supported by either or both of two measures.

(1)

(1) The first would be related to the process of advance consultation. Assessment of Communist China's nuclear capabilities and their strategic implications would to an extent be involved in any examination of contingencies. However, special provision might be made for periodic joint assessments to ensure that the contingency review process kept pace with significant changes. Such assessments would not be limited to appropriate exchanges of intelligence data but would seek to place such data in strategic perspective.

(2) The second supporting measure would be concerned with ensuring the practicability of "crisis consultation." A reliable communications link ("hot line", possibly via satellite) between New Delhi and Washington might serve this purpose. In addition, such a link, if publicly revealed, might have some deterrent value. It should be possible to develop an acceptable

acceptable public justification for the link which would not highlight its basic purpose. Moreover, India might be encouraged to seek similar links with Moscow and with Peking itself.

b. These two measures would be well within the framework of the basic consultative arrangement and might help underwrite its utility, and possibly its credibility from the standpoint of India's leaders. However, these supporting measures are not indispensable and should be put forward as possible but not essential ingredients of the package.

D. The Question of a U.S. Nuclear Guarantee for India

1. Characteristics and Limitations

a. Exploration of the consultative arrangement described above would represent a logical step and might help clarify the nuclear security issue as it is viewed by India's leaders. We could

take

take this step without incurring any obligation to go further. Conversely, we should probably not try to arrive at a decision concerning the need or desirability of going further until a "reconnaissance" of this type has been carried out. However, it may become important for us to weigh the question of offering India a unilateral U.S. guarantee of its nuclear security.

b. The principal characteristics and limitations of such a guarantee would be as follows:

(1) We would, in effect, affirm that we would regard ChiCom nuclear aggression against India as aggression against ourselves. This would commit us to act only: (a) in the event of unprovoked ChiCom nuclear attack against India; or (b) in a case where some ChiCom reaction might have been provoked but where the employment of nuclear weapons by Communist China was unwarranted.

(2) In view of uncertainties concerning the manner and scale of the possible use of
nuclear

nuclear weapons by Communist China against India, we should not commit ourselves to a nuclear response or to a single response of any type under any and all circumstances. However, we could make clear that depending on the circumstances, we might undertake a variety of responses including -- but not limited to -- the demonstrative use of nuclear weapons, and measured nuclear retaliation against Communist China's nuclear delivery, support, and production capabilities.

(3) We could not undertake any commitment concerning a pre-emptive disarming strike against Communist China's nuclear capabilities (although such a strike might conceivably be considered in an extreme and escalating conflict situation).

(4) We would not commit ourselves to engage our non-nuclear forces in support of a conventional conflict between India and Communist

Communist China. However, in addition to our present agreement to consult on air defense, it might be useful to provide for joint U.S.-Indian consultation, in the event of ChiCom conventional aggression against India, in order to determine whether the provision of conventional arms or equipment by the U.S. to India would aid in holding the conflict to conventional levels and in terminating it rapidly.

c. Some level of joint U.S.-Indian military contingency planning would probably be required in support of an arrangement along the foregoing lines.

2. Deterrent Effect and Steps to Bolster Credibility

a. The question of whether the U.S. should consider offering a guarantee of this character to a non-ally is raised in the following section. If such a guarantee were offered under foreseeable circumstances, the offer would have to be made privately and the purpose of the offer would be to influence India's leaders, not to affect Indian public opinion. In this regard, the function of
the

the guarantee would not be to solve India's domestic political problems but to enable India's leaders to conclude that a decision to continue opposing pressures to "go nuclear" would not entail undue risks to their country's security.

b. The deterrent effect on Communist China would not derive directly from this private guarantee but from our past record of willingness to come to India's assistance, our continuing interest in India, and our evident intent to prevent Communist China itself from capitalizing on the use of its nuclear weapons. In addition, although any joint U.S.-Indian military contingency planning would be conducted privately, the fact that such planning was taking place might intentionally be made known to Communist China in order to bolster deterrence.

c. Further steps to bolster the credibility of a U.S. guarantee might well become necessary. These would need to be calculated in terms of their effect on either or both of the two leadership groups

groups involved -- India's leaders and those of Communist China. Without attempting here to specify particular steps, the range of possibilities would include the following.

(1) Apart from the character of U.S. relations with India, on the one hand, and Communist China, on the other, the state of U.S.-Soviet and Soviet-ChiCom relations would affect the credibility of a U.S. guarantee. Steps which would facilitate favorable evolution in U.S.-Soviet relations and/or ensure against a Soviet-ChiCom rapprochement would, as a general matter, help sustain credibility.

(2) A second factor influencing credibility would be the relative nuclear strength of the U.S. and Communist China. Development and demonstration of an inter-continental nuclear delivery system (presumably an ICBM) by Communist China will inevitably raise questions from India's standpoint

standpoint even though Communist China might not achieve a significant operational force until some years following an initial test. We have not ourselves arrived at firm conclusions concerning how best to meet this eventual threat. Without pre-judging such conclusions here, it seems clear that in order to sustain the credibility of a U.S. guarantee in the eyes of India's leaders, we would need to explain why deterrence does not necessarily work in both directions between major and minor nuclear powers, and why our superior and more flexible nuclear force would continue to provide an effective basis for a guarantee of India's nuclear security. Strategic argumentation supporting these propositions could be advanced whether or not the U.S. had decided to deploy anti-ballistic missiles (ABM's); however, the character of such argumentation would, of course, be affected by such a decision.

(3)

(3) If circumstances within the Sub-Continent should permit U.S. assistance in remedying imbalances in arms and equipment available to India for conventional defense against Communist China, steps in this direction might favorably affect both India's and Communist China's view of the degree of our interest in India's security.

(4) If substantial progress could be made in improving Indian-Pak relations, the possibility of a potential U.S. "conflict of interest" (in India's eyes) would be lessened, and the credibility of a U.S. nuclear guarantee would be increased.

3. The Problem of Acceptability

a. It is not a foregone conclusion that India's leaders would reject a U.S. nuclear guarantee. A decision to "go nuclear" is not itself a clear-cut alternative, and India's leaders might wish to buy time rather than trouble. Nonetheless, the chance that they would accept is probably less than even.

b.

b. Even if a reasonably credible arrangement might be developed, other issues would be involved from India's standpoint. Indeed, the basic issues might not be either credibility or the bending of India's policy of non-alignment. Rather, the basic issues could be nationalism and the desire to escape dependence on others if and as it becomes possible to do so. India has already made clear its desire to achieve independence in production of conventional arms and munitions since it has not found wholly satisfactory external sources of supply and since dependence in such matters tends to limit political independence. To remain dependent on the U.S. or others for nuclear support could present a pressing dilemma in India's eyes.

c. Security is not, in any event, the only issue in the Indian debate over the "bomb." We cannot predict that political and psychological attractions of a nuclear role will diminish in general or from India's standpoint in particular. We can be sure that India's present decision not to "go nuclear," will in any case remain subject to continuing re-assessment.

d.

d. A nuclear guarantee for India would also raise serious issues from our own standpoint. India is not our ally and does not wish to enter into an alliance with us. Moreover, we are already heavily committed in support of other defensive arrangements. An arrangement with India would clearly involve many uncertainties.

e. However, an Indian pro-nuclear decision would also generate problems and uncertainties. And it may become important for us to weigh the question of whether our net interest in the future security and stability of the Sub-continent and the Asian-Pacific region would be served by offering India a nuclear guarantee as an alternative to an Indian national nuclear weapons capability. For the same reasons, it may also become necessary to consider whether the kind of alternative we might offer could eventually come to include a nuclear role for India.

E.

E. Approaches to a Nuclear Role for India

1. Political Alternatives and Their Limitations

a. In theory, a number of functional alternatives (discussed in the following section) might offer routes to a larger nuclear role for India while stopping short of the independent ability to control nuclear weapons that is the distinguishing mark of a national nuclear weapons capability. Since the basic motivation for such a capability stems from political or security advantages which are believed to go along with control, no alternative may suffice. Under any of the alternatives discussed below, India would, in effect, be an associate member rather than a full member of the "nuclear club"; its dependence on U.S. nuclear forces and on U.S. decisions concerning the application of such forces would not be lessened in any fundamental way.

b. One functional alternative -- joint ownership of nuclear warheads -- has been excluded from consideration in the following review on political grounds. The first reason is that a non-proliferation agreement,

agreement, if achieved, would almost certainly prohibit this alternative. A second reason is that even if joint warhead ownership were not otherwise ruled out, the inter-play of U.S. interests in Europe and Asia would appear to preclude such ownership arrangements with Asian nations unless or until the similar question bearing on our relations with European Allies had been definitively resolved. Finally, while posing difficult questions of control, joint warhead ownership would not in and of itself relieve the political difficulties entailed in any close U.S.-India nuclear relationship. If these difficulties could be overcome at all, other functional alternatives might suffice.

c. Each of the several functional alternatives considered below could, again in theory, be packaged in different political forms:

(1) Bilateral U.S.-Indian arrangements
(with parallel arrangements offered to Pakistan);

(2) Trilateral arrangements associating
the U.S. with India and Pakistan in the defense
of the Sub-Continent;

(3)

(3) Multilateral arrangements involving other Asian countries subject to the ChiCom nuclear threat.

d. No adequate political basis exists today for any of these approaches to the packaging of nuclear arrangements. Each would involve difficult adjustments in the relations of the U.S., India, and others (including most importantly U.S. allies), and there is small likelihood that such adjustments could be effected during India's period of nuclear decision. However, if serious consideration is to be given to coupling one of these approaches to any of the functional alternatives below, the Indian question should not be considered in isolation.

There are two reasons:

(1) The problem involves both our non-proliferation objectives and our objectives for security of the Asian-Pacific region.

"Solutions" for the Indian case must be consistent with both sets of objectives.

(2)

(2) It is not necessarily the case that the narrower the approach, the fewer the difficulties.

(a) A bilateral arrangement would focus most sharply on the necessarily changing character of U.S.-Indian relations, impose the need for offering comparable arrangements to Pakistan, require explanations and possible off-setting actions in the case of other U.S. allies, and be subject to instability if other Asian nations (for example, Japan) should subsequently "go nuclear."

(b) Any trilateral U.S.-Indian-Pak arrangement for defense of the Sub-Continent would require a merging of Indian-Pak interests and a submerging of differences to a degree not now foreseeable. If this should prove possible in time, the resulting arrangement would probably fit more readily into any emerging pattern of regional defense arrangements, but we cannot now assume that such arrangements will in fact emerge.

(c)

(c) A broader multilateral arrangement (in effect, an Asian league for nuclear deterrence with the U.S. standing as guarantor) could not emerge unless and until present differences in experience and outlook came to be outweighed by common concern respecting the ChiCom nuclear threat, coupled with common concern about the destabilizing effects in the region of additional national nuclear weapons capabilities. Such an approach would, however, shift the focus away from a direct U.S.-Indian relationship, and would provide a larger framework for submerging Indian-Pak differences (provided Pakistan had altered its view of the advantages of being manipulated by Communist China).

(3) The reaction of Japan would be of special significance. The Japanese have already made clear that their own view of the nuclear weapons question will be influenced

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by developments in India. This is likely to be the case whether, on the one hand, India should seek a national nuclear weapons capability or whether on the other hand, we should seek to develop a nuclear role for India which stopped short of such a capability. e. No clear political course can now be charted. This should be kept in view in considering the several functional alternatives outlined below.

2. Functional Approaches

a. Four principal alternatives might be considered as opening the way to a progressively larger nuclear role for India.

(1) Consultative arrangements similar to those being established with our principal European allies would afford direct participation in nuclear planning, that is, in planning related to the disposition and targeting of U.S. nuclear forces and the circumstances under which they might be employed. Such consultation would presumably be limited

to

to considerations bearing on India's nuclear security, and would not extend to considerations bearing on over-all U.S. nuclear capabilities.

(2) Preparatory Steps for Joint Action in Contingencies. Without requiring Indian procurement of hardware, a binding arrangement might be made: (a) to train Indians in nuclear delivery techniques (or in the operation of strategic defenses -- ABM's), and (b) to agree to supply hardware and warheads for India's use under mutually understood circumstances.

(3) A Deterrent "Nuclear Sharing" Arrangement. A binding arrangement might be made involving: (a) Indian procurement, installation, and manning of a nuclear delivery system (probably a missile delivery system); and (b) U.S. provision of compatible nuclear warheads, which would remain under U.S. custody (probably not on Indian soil) except under agreed circumstances when they would be released to India.

(4)

(4) A Defensive "Nuclear Sharing" Arrangement. Should the U.S. produce and deploy ABM's and should an effective defense prove feasible for India, a binding defensive arrangement might be made. The character of this arrangement would vary as between land-based and sea-based ABM systems. An arrangement involving land-based ABM's might involve: (a) Indian procurement, installation, and manning of radars and defensive missiles; and (b) U.S. provision of warheads which would remain under U.S. custody and which might be brought to India by U.S. personnel in time of crisis or conflict. An arrangement involving sea-based ABM's would probably involve procurement, installation, and manning of land-based radars by India, but defensive missiles, together with their warheads, would be located on U.S. ships off-shore (presumably with Indian liaison personnel aboard).

b. Major considerations bearing on these alternatives are as follows:

(1)

(1) Each of these alternatives, as outlined here, would be primarily concerned with strategic nuclear issues. None would automatically offer an approach to the question of deterring or responding to the possible demonstrative or tactical use of nuclear weapons by Communist China.

(2) Each alternative would require a high degree of mutual confidence. From the U.S. standpoint, not the least of the issues would be that of maintaining the security of information passed to India.

(3) Hardware solutions of either type would be expensive. Whether India could bear the cost or whether we would wish to do so would present a major problem. It should be noted that, with the exception of radar procurement associated with a sea-based ABM system, the cost of hardware solutions would be almost as large as that of an Indian national nuclear capability.

(4)

(4) An approach involving ABM's would clearly be a long-term approach. The question of India's security in the interim would need to be answered through other arrangements. Moreover, unless a very high-confidence ABM deployment could be designed, a defensive hardware solution would not necessarily relieve Indian pressures for a deterrent role of some sort, or for a national nuclear weapons capability.

(5) Approaches involving training and hardware would provide a "leg-up" toward an Indian national nuclear weapons capability should India decide to abrogate an arrangement with the U.S.

(6) Inherent in each of the alternatives is the question of whether, or under what circumstances, the U.S. might be prepared to undertake a disarming strike against Communist China's nuclear delivery capabilities if it appeared that deterrence was about to fail.

c.

c. If there are compelling political reasons why the Indian case cannot be considered in isolation, there are compelling strategic reasons as well. The nuclear security of the Asian-Pacific region may not be indivisible as in the case with that of Western Europe. However, the character of some of the foregoing issues strongly suggests that efforts to resolve part of the problem must increasingly be evaluated in terms of the whole.

Saunders 33/

India Nuclear
x NSAM

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November 7, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BENJAMIN READ
S/S Department of State

SUBJECT: Progress Report on NSAM 355

Thank you for your November 1 report on progress in connection with NSAM 355.

I take it that the steps thus far taken, though undramatic, are likely to be affecting the way the Indians assess their options.

The further studies in progress appear promising. In view of China's latest test, we hope that the timetable for the studies noted in paragraph B-4 could be foreshortened by two weeks, i. e. submission by December 15.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cbm/s NARA, Date 2-16-10

~~SECRET~~

9/9/66 to Wiggins
1 - ~~Frontier~~ HS
2 - Ret. 34



13291

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

August 31, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

India Nuclear

Subject: The Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem: NSAM 355

NSAM 355 requested that by September 1, the Department ". . . report to this office the assignment of operational responsibility for the specific tasks called for by these recommendations." (The recommendations are those contained in the July 25 Report for the President.)

The requested report is attached.

BHR

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:
Report

~~SECRET~~
Group-3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 97-247 (#6a)
By ctm/cbm NARA, Date 7-28-05

~~SECRET~~

NSAM 355: The Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem

Designation of Operational Responsibility for Recommended Actions

I. Establishment of Working Group

The Department has established a small Working Group to examine current developments bearing on the Indian nuclear weapons problem, to keep track of and coordinate specific steps under way to implement recommended actions, to prepare progress reports, and to consider possible further steps not presently under consideration.

The Working Group is chaired by the Country Director for India, Nepal and Ceylon (NEA). S/P, INR, G/PM, ACDA, and DOD/ISA will regularly be represented, and representatives of other interested organizations will be invited on an ad hoc basis.

II. Assignment of Responsibility for Specific Recommended Actions

A. Economic Pressures and Inducements

1. Recommended Action: "We should continue indirect pressures designed: (a) to focus India's attention on improving economic performance; and (b) to limit over-all defense expenditures. We should stress the political as well as economic importance to India of successfully carrying out the present five-year plan."

Responsibility Assigned To: NEA

2. Recommended Action: "In support of foregoing, we should make available both to Indian governmental leaders and to non-governmental opinion leaders additional materials designed to make clear: (a) the difficulties and costs of achieving and of maintaining the continuing effectiveness of a militarily useful nuclear deterrent force; and (b) the drain such an effort would impose on scientific, technical, and managerial personnel sorely needed for development. We should utilize both official and unofficial channels and should prepare such special materials (including classified and unclassified materials) as may be necessary."

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Responsibility Assigned To: To be carried out on a continuing basis by the working group under NEA direction, drawing primarily on the resources of CIA, but with inputs as appropriate from other members of the intelligence community, ACDA, and perhaps others. For purposes of implementing this recommendation, USIA shall be included in the Working Group.

3. Recommended Action: "We should avoid direct threats that we would cut back (or eliminate) economic aid in the event of a pro-nuclear decision. However, if India's leaders should ask us what our reaction would be, we should consider expressing the view that we doubt that the U.S. Congress would agree to subsidizing, even indirectly, an Indian nuclear weapons program."

Responsibility Assigned To: NEA

4. Recommended Action: "If India's leaders should come to us in a year or two seeking increased aid levels, and if we were prepared to respond favorably in the light of India's actual economic performance, we should consider making continuation of India's 'no bomb' policy an implicit part of the deal."

Responsibility Assigned To: NEA and AID

B. Security Aspects

1. Recommended Action: "We should make available privately to India's leaders such information and analyses as might, without falsely discounting ChiCom progress, make clear difficulties and limitations still confronting the ChiCom nuclear weapons program and aid in keeping the potential ChiCom nuclear threat in strategic perspective as far as India's interests are concerned."

Responsibility Assigned To: Data to be prepared by appropriate members of the intelligence community, such as CIA and DIA, coordinating with the Working Group through INR; decisions on how and when to convey such data to be recommended by the working group and determined on each occasion by the Assistant Secretary, NEA, or at higher levels, as appropriate.

2. Recommended Action: "In our own public statements, we should avoid magnifying the ChiCom nuclear threat."

Responsibility Assigned To: The Working Group, under NEA's direction, and in collaboration with USIA, should prepare a policy paper for wide circulation within the U.S. Government covering not only this point but also actions recommended under section D below (points D 1-4).

3. Recommended Action: "We should make a further determined effort to interest the Soviet Union in a UN resolution of assurances for non-nuclear countries along the lines of our 1965 draft."

Responsibility Assigned To: ACDA in collaboration with IO.

4. Recommended Action: "When it becomes clear whether or not such a resolution can be achieved, we should address the question of whether to offer India a private security assurance. In order to facilitate prompt future consideration of this possibility, detailed studies should now be mounted of: (a) the circumstances in which we might be called upon to prevent the Chinese from using "nuclear blackmail" in that part of the world, a policy enunciated in connection with the explosion of the first Chinese nuclear device; (b) how we would be likely to react in the event that Communist China were to mount (or threaten imminently to mount) a nuclear attack against India; (c) what tangible steps might eventually need to be taken to bolster the credibility of a private security assurance; and (d) what further steps in the security field might need to be considered if it should become apparent that India, nevertheless, was determined to have a nuclear role."

Responsibility Assigned To: Working group should implement this under general supervision of NEA, with S/P, G/PM, and ISA as primary agents. INR and CIA should be involved in 4 (a); JCS should be consulted and requested to do studies as appropriate.

C. Arms Control Measures

Recommended Action: "While we should not expect arms control agreements alone to prevent an Indian nuclear decision, we should continue our efforts to seek agreements in this area. In assessing costs and benefits to the U.S., due regard should be given to the fact that a comprehensive or threshold nuclear test ban would be likely to help restrain an Indian decision to go nuclear."

Responsibility Assigned To: ACDA

D. Political Prestige of Non-Nuclear Countries

1. Recommended Action: "Although it will be difficult to deflect the widespread trend toward speaking in terms of "five nuclear powers," we should ourselves avoid this term and try to blunt this tendency. We should adopt a negative attitude toward proposals based on the assumption that the five nuclear countries which have tested nuclear weapons have in common some special interest not shared by others."

Responsibility Assigned To: See B (2) above

2. Recommended Action: "Henceforth, in documents and public statements on this subject, we should refer to "civil nuclear powers" (including India and all others not having nuclear weapons) in contradistinction to 'military nuclear powers' (i.e., the five powers which now have nuclear weapons) as a means of alleviating the unpleasant effects derived from differentiating between 'nuclear and non-nuclear powers.'"

Responsibility Assigned To: See B (2) above

3. Recommended Action: "We should encourage the view that the several countries (including India) which have achieved advanced peaceful nuclear capabilities but have refrained from seeking nuclear weapons are entitled not only to respect for their restraint, but to a special voice in nuclear matters."

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Responsibility Assigned To: No immediate action. Working group to watch for opportunities to implement this action.

6. Recommended Action: "A special study should be made of more specific steps, including scientific and technical projects, that might be taken to enhance India's political prestige."

Responsibility Assigned To: Working group should examine possibilities and farm out assignments as appropriate, e.g. to SCI, AEC, NASA.

E. Intelligence Requirements

Recommended Action: "In order to have as much warning as possible of any impending shift in India's present no-bomb policy, increased priority should be assigned to the collection and analysis of relevant intelligence data."

Responsibility Assigned To: CIA (coordinating with INR)

F. Contingency Planning

Recommended Action: "A long-term planning study should be initiated of alternative approaches it might be in the U.S. interest to adopt in the event India should decide to proceed with a national nuclear weapons program."

Responsibility Assigned To: S/P. Interested agencies such as DOD and JCS should be consulted as appropriate.



13291

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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Saunders 3/53
Wriggins
1- *Saunders* HS
2- *Ret.* 35/

August 31, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: The Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem: NSAM 355

NSAM 355 requested that by September 1, the Department ". . . report to this office the assignment of operational responsibility for the specific tasks called for by these recommendations." (The recommendations are those contained in the July 25 Report for the President.)

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Group-3

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority *NLS 97-247 (6a)*
By *Chapman* NARA, Date *7-28-05*

1966

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Responsibility Assigned To: S/P. Interested agencies such as DOD and JCS should be consulted as appropriate.

Ms. Saunders 32

File India nuclear 31

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THE INDIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROBLEM:
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i

Introduction: Key Issues

1. What would be the effects of an Indian national nuclear program on US interests? (See para 2 of attached paper.)
2. Is there anything more that we can and should do to acquaint India with the costs and difficulties of a nuclear program? Should we be prepared to go further than we have so far in using economic leverage to deter such a program? (See para 3a of attached paper.)
3. How effective would a non-proliferation treaty, a comprehensive test ban, and/or a threshold test ban be in deterring an Indian nuclear program? What price should we be prepared to pay for such agreements? (See para 3b of attached paper.)
4. How far is it in the US interest to go in seeking to meet Indian security concerns, what form should such action take, and what might be the timing? (See para 3c of attached paper.)
5. Is there any dramatic new approach which would have greater effect on Indian nuclear intentions than the courses of action discussed in the attached paper? (See para 4 of the paper.)
6. Should the NSC direct State, the DOD, and ACDA to undertake a study, in greater depth, of the issues raised above? (See para 5 of the paper.)

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THE INDIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROBLEM

1. The Situation. In the wake of the third Chinese Communist nuclear test, domestic pressures for India to embark on a nuclear weapons effort have mounted sharply. Government leaders are continuing to hold the line against such a course. But a decision point is likely to be reached within a few years and, unless there is some new development, India almost certainly will go nuclear.

Such a decision could start a nuclear proliferation chain reaction. This would be contrary to basic US national interest. It is therefore imperative that we take all possible promising actions to prevent it.

This paper surveys steps to this end which have been generally considered in this government. It does not address the question of whether even more far-reaching actions may be necessary and feasible in dealing with this problem. It recommends further study of this and other aspects of the problem.

2. Effects of an Indian Weapons Program. An Indian effort to achieve a credible national nuclear deterrent against Communist China would do great damage to Indian development prospects. The damage would increase as India sought an adequate stockpile and a suitable delivery system.

Should India go down this line, the Paks would be critically concerned about their own security and would probably turn to the US, Communist China, or the Soviet Union either for assistance in acquiring nuclear weapons or for support in deterring India.

The likelihood of further proliferation (e.g., Japan and Israel) would be increased, and nuclear pressures might be set in train in Germany.

A different kind of consideration is that if India should "go nuclear", and achieve an independent deterrent to Chinese nuclear power, India might look less to the US (and the USSR) for defense against Chinese Communist nuclear blackmail.

3. Courses of Action

a. Economic Pressures. Among the basic factors having a bearing on India's decision are the cost of a nuclear weapons program and the effect which such a program might have on foreign aid to India.

Data on costs and on the difficulties of acquiring a credible and reliable deterrent force have been forwarded to Ambassador Bowles, for use with India's leaders. Additional data will be supplied, which India's leaders may use publicly to support their stand against nuclear weapons.

The related question of the level of India's defense expenditures has been raised with Indian Planning Minister Mehta and will be pursued. Points being emphasized include: (i) the need for a reasonable limit on defense expenditures as a prerequisite to economic development; and (ii) our intention to take defense expenditures into account in determining future aid policy. This dual emphasis on the cost of "going nuclear" and the need to hold down defense expenditures can be expected, within limits, to influence India's decision.

We could go further and threaten to cut off economic assistance and to withdraw all assurances of political and military aid, if India decided to develop its own nuclear weapons. US fulfillment of this threat would probably impel the Indians to look at once to their own means to meet their security needs, and probably also to turn to the Soviet Union. Even making the threat could have an adverse effect on Indian-American relations and on Indian confidence in the US. Perhaps the threat, and certainly the cutoff of aid, would greatly reduce American influence and enhance Soviet influence in India, and would subject India to heavy economic and political strains, which would threaten its viability as a democratic state and an Asian counterweight to China.

On the other hand, less drastic use of aid, as one of a number of levers, might effectively influence an Indian decision.

b. Arms Control Agreements. In addition to the more specific effects of particular arms control agreements, any progress in disarmament which indicated growing US-Soviet detente could have a dampening effect on pressures for a national Indian nuclear program.

(i) Non-Proliferation Treaty. The US is at present continuing its efforts to reach agreement on a non-proliferation treaty, as its first priority arms control measure.

While such a treaty would inhibit proliferation, it is not clear whether agreement can be achieved. There have been suggestions that the Soviets would sign a non-proliferation treaty which would permit consultation and allow the USSR to take the public position that new collective hardware arrangements are excluded. This must be weighed against the effects that this approach would have on our policy toward Europe and Germany.

Should India adhere to a non-proliferation treaty, it is possible that she would later withdraw if she felt her national interests required such an action. Such a treaty would not mitigate the Indian security problem, unless it were coupled with other measures of the sort discussed in this paper.

(ii) Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The US continues to support an adequate, verified comprehensive test ban treaty.

Such a treaty would have a major political and technical impact on proliferation. However, the principal effect would be political. A nation which had agreed not to conduct any nuclear tests would not lightly withdraw from this obligation. While only testing would be prohibited, and a nation could develop and stockpile weapons without withdrawing from the treaty, this course seems unlikely. A comprehensive test ban would thus have an impact on an Indian decision to acquire nuclear weapons.

The Soviets continue to reject inspection. Recently, however, they have indicated that they would be willing to consider making available information from internal Soviet sites. If this would significantly reduce the number of unknown events, a compromise solution to the inspection problem might become possible.

Because of their estimate of the over-all adverse impact on US national security, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are opposed to a comprehensive test ban.

(iii) Threshold Test Ban. The likely effect and security implications of a "threshold" test ban, which would extend the present limited test ban to underground tests above a seismic magnitude of 4.75, are now being considered via the Committee of Principals route. Such a treaty would materially inhibit an Indian decision to acquire nuclear weapons. It would have less effect, of course, than a comprehensive test ban; but it would be more responsive than a non-proliferation treaty to Indian desires for restraints on nuclear, as well as non-nuclear, countries.

c. Security Arrangements. Security against nuclear attack is becoming an increasingly important factor in the Indians' calculations regarding their nuclear policy. In determining whether to try to secure this security through outside assurances or their own nuclear deterrent, the Indians can be expected to seek a policy which is consistent with non-alignment. The Indians will do this for two reasons: (i) Because they consider that their security interests require good relations with the Soviet Union, from whom they receive economic and military aid and support against Communist China; (ii) because they want to maintain their position among the Afro-Asians.

In responding to Indian security concerns, the key question we have to ask ourselves is: What would the US, in fact, do if the Chinese Communists were to mount (or threaten imminently to mount) a nuclear attack on India?

If we believe that our interest in Indian independence, in preventing Communist expansion, and in maintaining some reasonable semblance of world order would move us to stand by India in this circumstance, then the problem is how to make this clear to the Indians ahead of time, so as to affect their nuclear intentions, without involving either commitments which go beyond our likely response to nuclear attack on India or insuperable Congressional difficulties. Possible steps to this end are considered below.

(i) Nuclear Power Guarantee. The Indians would welcome a joint US-USSR guarantee to all non-nuclear states. (The UK would certainly join, but this is of secondary importance to the Indians. France might not join and, of course, Communist China would not.) The Soviet Union, however, has made clear that it does not wish (at least at present) to join the US in any such assurances, much less in a joint guarantee obviously directed against China. If the situation should so change that the USSR were ready to take part in joint assurances, this would probably defer an Indian decision to acquire its own nuclear weapons. We should consider, at an appropriate time, attempting to determine privately the conditions, if any, under which the USSR might be interested in joint or parallel assurances, either in or out of the UN framework.

(ii) Public US Call for Nuclear Guarantees. Congressman Holifield has proposed privately that, if the USSR is unwilling to join us in giving assurances, we should nonetheless publicly declare US readiness to join with the other nuclear powers in guaranteeing all non-nuclear states against nuclear attack, and let the onus fall on the USSR for failing to agree.

This ploy, would, however, be attacked by the Soviet Union and Communist China, and would probably be ignored or rejected by France. The Indians would regard such a move as undesirable and, from their point of view, unhelpful. Moreover, by demonstrating the inability of the nuclear powers to provide joint assurances, it might well persuade many in India (and perhaps elsewhere) that they would, indeed, have to rely on themselves.

The Soviets would probably use such a US proposal as the occasion to reaffirm their counterproposal for the nuclear powers to pledge never to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state not having nuclear weapons on its territory.

(iii) US Assurances Under Umbrella of UN Resolution.

In 1965 the Committee of Principals approved the draft of a possible UN Resolution, the operative language of which expressed the intention of UN Members "to provide or support immediate assistance to any State not possessing nuclear weapons that is the victim of an act of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used."

In the fall of 1965, we sounded out the Soviets and were told that the Soviet Union considered the question of assurances "premature", and that the matter might be considered after the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty. Subsequently, the Soviets advanced their counterproposal (noted above) calling for nuclear powers not to employ nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries on whose territory no nuclear weapons were stationed.

If the Soviet Union should reconsider its position, a UN Resolution of the type we have offered could serve as an "umbrella" which would be consistent with Indian non-alignment and under which more specific US-Indian arrangements might be pursued.

Under this "umbrella", the US could offer firm private assurances of support to India, which could be buttressed by such steps as describing to the Indians our nuclear capabilities directed at the Communist Chinese threat. The Soviets would, of course, be free to do likewise, if they wished, -- secretly, and without having to assume the public stance of cooperating with the US.

This UN umbrella cum private US assurances might offer at least an interim solution to the problem.

There is a question, however, as to whether such secret assurances would have the needed impact on Indian non-governmental opinion, which is the source of most of the present pressure for India's "going nuclear." It is doubtful, in any event, that these assurances could, in fact, be kept secret.

Moreover, to have any hope of satisfying the Indians, these US assurances would have to be quite specific. Yet such specificity would bind the US to involve itself in a nuclear conflict under at least partially unforeseen circumstances and without the ability to control India's actions.

(iv) US Assistance to a Limited Defensive Indian Deterrent. Ambassador Bowles has suggested that consideration be given to US assistance to India in such measures as: installation of an effective early warning system and other measures for defense against manned bombers, expansion of joint US-Indian efforts to detect Communist Chinese nuclear and missile capabilities, secret scientific consultation on ballistic missile defenses, and secret studies of integrated air defense against Communist Chinese nuclear attack - which might include consideration of an Indian manned bomber force for use against Communist Chinese launching sites.

We have assisted Indian air defenses since 1962, and could conceivably extend this effort. However, it is doubtful that this would allay Indian concern over the Communist Chinese nuclear threat, which will include missiles.

Consultation on ballistic missile defenses (which we could not now provide) might well convince the Indians that their only real defense would be a nuclear deterrent, and thus stimulate Indian desires for nuclear weapons of their own.

In the same way, studies of an Indian conventional manned bomber force could well convince the Indians that what they really need are missiles with nuclear warheads.

(v) US-Indian Alliance. A formal military alliance would offer the most convincing means of engaging the American deterrent in India's defense. There are strong reasons against our undertaking a formal alliance commitment. In any event, the issue is hypothetical, at least for the present, since the Indians wish to retain their non-aligned status. If such a US-Indian alliance were concluded, it might result in a complete US break with Pakistan and in a Pakistan-Chinese Communist alliance.

(vi) Nuclear Sharing. The US might offer to assist India in acquiring the capability to deter or retaliate against Communist Chinese nuclear attack with its own delivery means, using American nuclear warheads which would be made available to India at the time of a Chinese attack. The advantages, in comparison with a strictly unilateral US guarantee, would include a less direct military commitment for the US (in the sense that the Indians, not the US, would strike Communist Chinese targets) and yet, from the Indian standpoint, a more tangible US commitment to give essential assistance.

This course of action faces a number of difficulties: (a) India's desire to remain at least formally non-aligned, and to avoid alienating the Soviet Union; (b) the dilemma of fashioning a nuclear sharing arrangement that would provide enough -- but from the US standpoint not too much -- of a nuclear role; (c) the impact of such an arrangement on others (Pakistan, Japan, and other US Asian allies) and on the UK role East of Suez; (d) the over-all effect on US military commitments and on US aid for India, since we might have to bear much of the cost; and (e) the question of Congressional attitudes.

The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not believe a nuclear sharing arrangement would do more than delay an Indian pro-nuclear decision. While this may be true, there may come a time when such delay would be well worth seeking. The Director of ACDA does not consider a nuclear sharing arrangement desirable.

d. The Plowshare Loophole. There is some pressure on the Indian Government for a peaceful (PLOWSHARE) explosion to demonstrate India's technical capabilities. Such a "peaceful" Indian explosion would, however, be widely viewed (in Pakistan and elsewhere) as the beginning of an Indian nuclear weapons program and, from the technical standpoint, would be virtually indistinguishable from weapon development. The Committee of Principals is, therefore, considering steps to dissuade India from "peaceful" nuclear explosive development.

4. Conclusion

4. Conclusion. A number of the courses of action discussed above are now underway:

-- We are already seeking to impress the Indians with the cost and difficulty of acquiring a nuclear deterrent.

-- We are trying to make clear to India the inter-relation between external aid and levels of Indian military expenditure.

-- We are seeking to negotiate arms control proposals, including a non-proliferation agreement, and we are examining new proposals, notably a threshold test ban.

-- We are exploring the problem of general security assurances, particularly action that can be taken in the UN.

Each of these approaches has potentialities, limitations, and costs.

Achieving even delay in an Indian decision to go nuclear would be extremely useful. At their present pace, however, these courses of action are likely to secure such delay for only a relatively limited period. To achieve more substantial effect, approaches not now underway (whether discussed in this paper or otherwise) would be needed.

5. Recommendation. State, DOD, and ACDA should be directed to study in greater depth the following inter-related issues, emerging from recent review of the Indian nuclear question:

a. The extent to which it might be in the US interest to use our economic leverage more explicitly to discourage an Indian national nuclear program.

b. The effect which various arms control agreements might have on Indian nuclear intentions, and what price the US should be prepared to pay for such agreements.

c. How far it is in the US interest to go in meeting Indian security concerns, what form such action might take, and what the optimum timing might be.

d. Whether there are other approaches to the problem which need to be pursued.

Such study should balance the price of each of these suggested courses of action against the damage resulting from India's choosing the independent nuclear path.

Such study should thus provide a basis for deciding whether there are specific recommendations that can be made to the NSC as to measures which the US, its own interests in mind, should take to delay or prevent India's choosing that path.

India nuclear 38

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May 2, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. W. W. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: French Assistance to an Indian Nuclear Weapons Program

Walt --

This is a footnote to Spurgeon's memorandum to you of April 29, with which I agree.

There is another straw in the wind as to Indian plans in the form of a report of Indian conversations with the Canadians last February concerning Canadian assistance to the Indians on the fourth Indian power reactor. The Indians have strongly requested that the reactor be built without any safeguards and have indicated that they might reject Canadian assistance if the Canadians insist on safeguards. As you know, the Indians have only one large reactor in operation at the present time -- the Canadian-Indian reactor (CIR), a research reactor, at Trombay. Three other reactors are under construction -- two with U. S. assistance at Tarapur and one other Canadian reactor at Rajasthan. Indications are that Canada will continue to insist on adequate safeguards for the fourth reactor.

The Trombay reactor now in operation is theoretically under Canadian safeguards but the status is somewhat doubtful in view of the fact that Canada placed safeguards on the first uranium fuel load for the reactor. Subsequently the Indians supplied the fuel and the present loading and the reactor itself are not subject to safeguards, although the agreement under which the reactor was built specifies that the reactor would be used only for peaceful purposes. This reactor can produce enough plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons a year if the Indians decide to make weapons.

The French flirtation could be very tempting to the Indians because of the well-known French opposition to safeguards. The French could offer the Indians both technical assistance for the construction of un-safeguarded natural uranium reactors that would produce plutonium and ultimately ^{provide} nuclear weapons technology. It is doubtful if the French would extend financial assistance to the Indians. At the moment it is also

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By LICKS NARA, Date 03-18-2014

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doubtful if the French would undertake to provide the Indians with U-235 for either power production or for production of sophisticated nuclear weapons because the French U-235 supply from their Pierrelatte gaseous diffusion plant will not even^{be} enough to satisfy French demands.

I agree with Spurgeon that it will be extremely important to keep a close watch on any Indian negotiations with the French who are a non-existent link in the anti-proliferation chain.

Charles E. Johnson

~~SECRET~~

ORIGIN/ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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ARA	EUR	PE
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TO : Department of State 1966 MAR 27 PM 2 32

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INFO: London, New Delhi

RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : American Embassy, Paris

DATE: March 25, 1966

SUBJECT: Franco-Indian Relations

REF :

The March 24 issue of Le Monde features an article by Jean Wetz datelined New Delhi and entitled "The Visit of Madame Gandhi to Paris, Example of Franco-Indian Rapprochement." Wetz is Le Monde's correspondent in India. Appearing on the eve of Madame Gandhi's informal visit to France, the article, which is outlined below, is considered worthy of attention in that it quite likely reflects official French views on the general subject of Franco-Indian relations. (Views identical to those stated in the article were expressed on the Government-controlled radio the following day.)

After briefly referring to the obstacles which, until 1962, had prevented closer cooperation between the two countries -- the question of the fate of the French possessions in India and France's involvement in the Algerian war -- Mr. Wetz notes that the Indians are now under the impression that General de Gaulle is showing increased interest in India's foreign policy and India's economic development. He adds that the fighting between India and Pakistan did not affect adversely the good relations with France because the Indians themselves understood the position of the French Government on problems as, for example, the embargo on arms. Wetz comments that, as a matter of fact, France implemented this embargo with "greater flexibility" than the Anglo-Saxons.

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

In Out

Drafted by:

POL:JGDean:rrt:3-24-66

Contents and Classification Approved by:

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from Paris

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The current phase in Franco-Indian relations started with Prime Minister Pompidou's visit to India at the beginning of last year. At that time, it was agreed that periodic consultations would be held between representatives of the two governments, and this agreement has not remained a dead letter. Another meeting between officials of the two countries will take place in Paris at the beginning of June, which Wetz interprets as an example of India's interest in maintaining this contact with Paris. Until now, these exchanges of views were primarily designed to prevent possible misunderstandings between the two countries; in the future, however, Wetz does not exclude the possibility that these contacts will lead to common action on such problems as, for example, Viet Nam, provided this problem has sufficiently evolved to be ready for a settlement.

On the economic side, Wetz comments that France cannot compete with American assistance. Nevertheless, he notes that French aid to India is increasing and in this connection cites the increased assistance of the French Petroleum Institute and the likelihood of the construction by France of a refinery in India.

In reviewing the field of nuclear energy, Wetz states that present conditions appear to be favorable for France to construct an atomic energy plant in India. While this project, which has been under study for a number of months, still raises some delicate technical and financial problems, it would appear that from the political point of view both countries favor increased cooperation in this field of endeavor.

Wetz admits that friction does exist, especially in the commercial field, where the Indians complain that certain rules of the Common Market hinder their exports. While the Indians are aware of France's ties to the Common Market, they also realize that France, more than others, is trying to obtain favorable conditions for underdeveloped countries.

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
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from Paris

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The cultural agreement between France and India which was supposed to have been signed already a year ago has been delayed by a number of administrative problems. For example, the Indian Minister of Finance is particularly sticky about granting certain financial advantages to French experts which they consider essential before accepting assignments in India. However, people generally believe, in India, that the cultural agreement will soon be signed, which would multiply the intellectual and artistic exchanges between the two countries, increase the number of academic chairs for the study of the respective civilizations and languages, as well as permit the sending of a larger number of French teachers and scientists to India. Wetz concludes that it is not a question of wishing to replace the English language and English culture in India but rather to satisfy a desire expressed by some Indian intellectuals to provide a "new window on Europe and its intellectual life."

For the Ambassador:



Ernest L. Stanger
First Secretary of Embassy

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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India Nuclear
HS
File with
April 8, 1966
what did NEA think?
Also ask Galtight in S/P.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Subject: Reported French Offer to Assist India in the Atomic Energy Field

Ret'd to WWR with HS memo 4/15/66.
India Nuclear

Walt --

[Redacted]

[Redacted] reports that De Gaulle has offered to collaborate with India in atomic energy including weapons development.

I have asked CIA to provide us with any additional information it has on this subject and to see whether anything further [Redacted]

If further investigation supports this report, I believe that serious consideration should be given to a direct approach to the Indians to make clear to them we would look with grave displeasure on any such action on their part.

Spurgeon
Spurgeon Keeny

Att.

cc: FMBator - w/att.
Hsaunders - w/att.
HSRowen

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

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NARA, Date 03-23-2014

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By ULD