

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
003b	rpt	Intelligence Information Report [Exempt per RAC, 8/01]	S	4	10/27/67	A
004	memo	Saunders to Rostow [Exempt per RAC, 3/02]	PCI	1	10/21/67	A
012	memo	Saunders to Rostow [Dup. of #227, NSF, Country File, Jordan, Vol 4, Box 147]	S	1	9/14/67	A
013	memo	Rostow to President [Exempt per RAC, 8/01]	S	1	8/3/67	A
049	cable	Wriggins & Saunders to President [Exempt per RAC, 9/00]	S	2	11/17/66	A
050	memo	Wriggins & Saunders to Rostow [Duplicate in NSF, Name File, Wriggins Memos, x, Box 8]	S	2	11/16/66	A
055	memo	Saunders to Rostow [Sanitized per RAC, 8/01]	S	1	6/21/66	A
061	cable	Amman 4119	S	3	3/30/68	A
064	cable	Tel Aviv 5335	S	1	9/13/68	A
066	cable	Rio de Janeiro 2316 [Dup. of #13, NSF, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind, Box 113]	S	3	9/30/67	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders

Folder Title "Jordan, 4/1/66 - 10/31/67"

Box Number 22

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
068	cable	Rio de Janeiro 2230 [Dup. of #14, NSF, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind, Box 113]	S	2	9/27/67	A
069	cable	Deptel 41218 to USUN [Dup. of #96, NSF, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind, Box 113]	S	1	9/21/67	A
070	cable	USUN 949 [Dup. of #94, NSF, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind, Box 113]	S	1	9/23/67	A
077	cable	Deptel 28273 to Amman & Tel Aviv [Dup. of #75, NSF, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind, Box 113]	S	1	8/28/67	A
079	cable	Amman 732	S	2	8/8/67	A
081	cable	Amman 860 open 11/17/15 [Dup. of #44, NSF, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind, Box 113]	S	2	8/15/67	A
084	cable	Amman 686 open 11/17/15 [Dup. of #46, NSF, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind, Box 113]	S	2	8/5/67	A
087	cable	Amman 668 open 11/17/15 [Dup. of #47, NSF, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind, Box 113]	S	3	8/4/67	A
091	cable	Amman 603 open 11/17/15 [Dup. of #52, NSF, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind, Box 113]	S	5	8/2/67	A

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
094	cable	Telegram 933 to Foreign Office [Dup. of #115, NSF, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind, Box 113]	S	3	7/30/67	A
095	cable	Deptel 14231 to Tel Aviv [Dup. of #79, NSF, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind, Box 113]	S	1	7/30/67	A
096	cable	Amman 562 [Dup. of #57, NSF, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind, Box 113; and #29, NSF, Spec Cmte NSC, Sandstorm, Box 12]	S	1	7/29/67	A
097	cable	Deptel 14184 to Amman [Dup. of #81, NSF, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind, Box 113]	S	1	7/29/67	A
099	cable	Deptel 14221 to Tel Aviv [Dup. of #80, NSF, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind, Box 113]	S	2	7/29/67	A
100	cable	Deptel 14237 to Amman <i>open 11/17/15</i> [Dup. of #78, NSF, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind, Box 113]	S	3	7/29/67	A
103	cable	Amman 556 [Dup. of #58, NSF, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind, Box 113]	S	5	7/28/67	A
104	cable	Amman 554 [Dup. of #60, NSF, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind, Box 113]	S	7	7/28/67	A
109	cable	Deptel 12562 to Amman <i>open 11/17/15</i> [Dup. of #82, NSF, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind, Box 113]	S	2	7/25/67	A

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
111	cable	Deptel 12559 to London open 11/17/15 [Dup. of #26, NSF, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind, Box 113]	S	3	7/25/67	A
113	cable	Deptel 11927 to Amman open 11/17/15 [Dup. of #88, NSF, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind, Box 113]	S	1	7/24/67	A
115	cable	Deptel 11930 to Amman open 11/17/15 [Dup. of #85, NSF, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind, Box 113]	S	1	7/24/67	A
118	cable	Duplicate of #115 open 11/17/15	S	1	7/24/67	A
119	cable	Duplicate of #113 open 11/17/15	S	1	7/24/67	A
122	cable	Deptel 11347 to Amman [Dup. of #90, NSF, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind, Box 113]	S	3	7/21/67	A
124	cable	Amman 378 open 11/17/15 [Dup. of #69, NSF, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind, Box 113]	S	2	7/19/67	A
127	cable	Duplicate of #124 open 11/17/15	S	2	7/19/67	A
128	cable	Amman 363	S	2	7/18/67	A
129	cable	Amman 361 open 11/17/15 [Dup. of #70, NSF, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind, Box 113]	S	1	7/18/67	A

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
132	cable	Tel Aviv 154	S	1	7/14/67	A
133	cable	USUN 218	S	2	7/14/67	A
		[Dup. of #95, NSF, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind, Box 113]				
134	cable	Deptel 6814 to Amman	S	1	7/14/67	A
		[Dup. of #92, NSF, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind, Box 113; and, dup. of #78, NSF, Special Committee Files, "Sandstorm", Box 13]				
135	cable	Deptel 6581 to Tel Aviv	S	3	7/13/67	A
136a	rpt	"US Policy Towards Jordan"	S	8	10/30/67	A
136b	rpt	"Annex 1"	S	2	[10/67]	A
144	cable	Amman 1778	S	2	10/8/67	A
		[Dup. of #9, NSF, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind, Box 113]				
147	cable	Intelligence Information Cable	S	9	9/13/67	A
		[Exempt per RAC, 8/01]				
149	memo	To Walsh, Executive Secretariat, State	S	3	8/3/67	A
		[Dup. of #151 and near dup. 150a this file and #83a, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 37, Box 20]				

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
150	memo	Rostow to President, 7:35pm [Dup. #84, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 37, Box 20]	S	1	8/3/67	A
150a	memo	Near duplicate of #149, 150a & 151	S	3	8/3/67	A
151	memo	Duplicate of #149 & near dup. #150a	S	3	8/3/67	A
152	memo	Rostow to President, 10am [Dup. of #65, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 36, Box 20; and, #119, NSF, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Sandstorm/Whirlwind, Box 113]	S	1	7/27/67	A
156	rpt	re: Jordan	S	3	7/6/67	A
169	memo	re: Jordan	PCI	5	undated	A
175a	memo	Atherton to Hare	C	4	10/3/66	A
175b	rpt	Attachment to #175a	C	1	[10/66]	A
001	draft	memo to WWR [Rostow] open 9/6/11 NLJ 11-61	S	4	10/31/67	A
002	draft	draft report open 9/6/11 NLJ 11-61	S	2	10/31/67	A
137	report	re King Hussein open 3/6/13 per NLJ 11-62	S	2	[10/67]	A
138	report	re King Hussein open 3/6/13 per NLJ 11-62	S	2	10/22/67	A

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Initials

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
By isl NLJ 11-61
NARA, Date 8-29-11

October 31, 1967

Jordan
1

Not used

MEMORANDUM FOR WWR

SUBJECT: Policy for Jordan

Hussein's coming forces us to face up to some tough questions. The hardest is military aid policy, but economic aid isn't far behind. With these tools in question and the UN uncertain of producing a resolution soon, we seem to have very little comforting to tell Hussein.

State's natural inclination would be to continue business as usual, but circumstances make this difficult. Israel's bitterness toward Hussein--reflected in Congress--and general Congressional opposition to arms aid make it hard to resume military shipments to Jordan right now without triggering a sharp reaction. AID feels it will be impossible to justify continued budget support in view of the large Arab donations to Jordan and Congressional cuts.

It helps somewhat to break the problem into two time periods:

(1) What short-run policy will be most likely to encourage political settlement?

(2) What should we do to provide a base for later policy if there is no settlement over a long period.

In the short term, the question is whether we withhold aid to press him to negotiate. The Israelis would like us to discontinue all aid until Hussein negotiates, but State feels we have to preserve as much of our former relationship as we can in order maintain our influence with him. Luke Battle's present formulation is to explain the Congressional

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- 2 -

limitations on our moving before a settlement but to promise resumption-- of at least economic aid--after a settlement.

Whether this will hold him is debatable. Unless the UN comes through with a resolution, he'll have nothing but promises to take home. State's professionals would be more comfortable if we could give him a little non-lethal hardware as a token of our continuing relationship. Defense doesn't want us to resume until we're sure where that takes us.

The even harder question is what rationale we have for a continuing relationship with Jordan if there is no peace settlement. In the past we've justified both military and economic aid in terms of providing stability on Israel's longest and most vulnerable frontier. Hussein's actions in May and June make it hard to re-use that justification persuasively. Now Findley Burns suggests that failure to take a step toward political settlement soon could lead to an increase in terrorism from Jordan with at least the government's tacit acceptance.

Before arguing these questions, there are some basic considerations we need to test:

1. Hussein is still the Jordanian most likely to make peace with Israel. As long as we have hopes of a negotiated peace, keeping him afloat is important. Here are some of the factors that affect our ability to support him and move him.

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a. If Hussein turns to Moscow, that will--by Israel's own threat--kill chances of a settlement. It will also make our further support almost impossible.

b. Our main leverage with him is what we can get for him from Israel. Economic aid is unimportant at the moment. Military aid is more so, but other Western sources may be available. Aid is mainly important as a sign of whether we plan to ditch him or not.

c. We shouldn't justify our policy on expectation that he can produce a settlement by himself. His personal views are moderate, but he isn't a courageous enough leader to make his moderation stick in the face of all the limitations on him.

d. The rationale for policy, then, is not so much to preserve Hussein as an element of stability but to help him as a stepping stone to a peace settlement.

2. The above seems to add up to preserving at least enough of a relationship to make him feel that we'll help in any negotiation with Israel. This means we tell him that going to Moscow will make it impossible to help. The next question is whether we commit ourselves to him beyond promising to help, if he comes back and asks what hope we can give him for the future. One answer would be: Let's wait and see. The other would be to promise to help him become viable on the East Bank for as long as it takes to get a settlement. Reasons for going this far include:

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- 4 -

- a. Hussein is a useful moderate voice.
- b. If the Jordanian regime seemed about to dissolve, that could provoke a land-grab from Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia or Israel.
- c. If Hussein fell, there's a good chance that the successor regime would follow a policy more Syrian-Algerian than peaceful.
- d. Whether Hussein is moderate or not, we have at least a symbolic stake in him. We have commitments to the territorial integrity of the pre-war states which others (notably Faisal) are watching. We have a leg up on helping Jordan achieve economic viability.

It's hard not to conclude with State that there's no realistic alternative to Hussein and that our failure to support him would damage our position with all Arab moderates. The Israelis disagree, but their bitterness blinds them. They can't see beyond their view that Hussein had as much to do with bringing on the war as Nasser or the Syrians. As they see it, his gibes almost forced Nasser to mobilize and then to close the straits; his defense pact with Nasser closed the circle; and when the chips were down his front--far from remaining quiet--became the toughest to crack. The Israelis will not concede that Hussein is better than any other Arab leader on the West Bank.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

By sl NLJ 11-61
NARA, Date 5-29-11

Jordan
Not used
October 31, 1967 ²

1. Getting a peace settlement is our main objective, too. We understand the King's need for a UN resolution to negotiate from and share his sense of urgency.

2. We will do everything we can to help Jordan get the West Bank back, but we can only do so as part of an overall settlement.

a. Quite frankly, this does not mean precise return to June 4 lines. But--while we can't speak for Israel and doubt the Israeli government will make up its mind until it's confronted with a hard proposal--we judge from our talks with them that Jordan could reach a reasonable territorial agreement on the West Bank.

b. We are much less certain of what can be worked out on Jerusalem. However we believe these principles must govern:

--Jerusalem should never again be divided by minefields and barbed wire.

--Jordan must have a role there (a) to act as custodian for the Moslem Holy Places and (b) to share the economic benefits from tourism.

--Jerusalem's final status must be negotiated.

3. On economic aid, Jordan's present financial situation leaves us hard-pressed to justify continuing budget support for the moment. Therefore, we propose to shift the form of our assistance for the time being. We will participate with Jordan in a basic planning exercise that will provide Jordan with the blueprints it needs for further development - in water resources, refugee settlement, etc. If there's a peace settlement

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we are prepared to go to Congress for a special appropriation to support a refugee solution and our share of the development projects that would undergird it.

4. On military aid, we just can't resume now because Congress won't stand for it. We hope Hussein can meet his immediate requirements from France or Britain since going to Moscow would kill chances for a settlement with Israel. In the context of peace, we'd be ready to talk about the kind of reduced military establishment Jordan might need then.

MEMORANDUM FOR WWR

Jordan 3
October 28, 1967.

Subject: Comment on Hussein's Conversation with DeGaulle

1. King Hussein's points are close to ours, but that's not the problem. He and Nasser accepted the US-USSR resolution before Hussein went to Moscow, but both see our efforts to define what it means as backsliding. So Hussein's comments still leave unresolved the definition of the end of belligerency and the timing of implementation.
2. From this and other reports, Hussein seems to have pinned Nasser down on allowing the Israeli flag through the Canal as part of an overall settlement. While Hussein does not link the Canal opening with refugee settlement, Nasser may still do so to put off the day when he has to let the Israelis through the Canal.
3. However, Sir Harold Beeley's talks in Cairo (attached) are interesting on the nature of a refugee settlement. Nasser still clearly links refugees and Canal passage, but two points are interesting: (1) He agrees to exchange promises and match implementation for implementation (though it's hard to see how this would work out since implementing a refugee settlement will take so long). (2) He defines the Israeli promise in terms of repatriation or compensation. This is not really new, and its acceptability to Israel depends on the repatriation being minimal (maybe 50,000). But it does seem to indicate some flexibility. (Comment: I gave you last night a note on Evron's rejection of any linkage.)
4. DeGaulle just isn't concentrating on substance and seems more interested in saying what the Arabs want to hear. His one contribution was to counsel Hussein not to go off the deep end but to bide his time. His openness on arms for Jordan would help us. I just hope political pressure on him will be so great that he'll allow the Israelis to find a similar loophole.

All in all, I think when Hussein gets to New York and talks with Goldberg, we ought to be able to reach a meeting of minds with him on the UN resolution. But we still may be a bit apart on the final terms.

Hal Saunders

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 02-151 (224)
By cbw/jco NARA, Date 8-24-05

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

3a
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 494

PAGE 01 251224Z .

51
ACTION SS 70

INFO FILE 01,7071 W

UAR

R 250835Z OCT 67
FM CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3923

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ CAIRO 834

LIMDIS

1. TESH, HEAD BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION, GAVE ME FOLLOWING RUNDOWN ON BEELEY MISSION:
 - A. BOTH SIDES AGREED TO FULL RESTORATION RELATIONS DURING FIRST HALF DECEMBER.
 - B.1 EGYPTIANS WISH CONSULL WITH ALGERIANS AND SYRIANS BEFORE ANNOUNCEMENT BUT FORESEE NO DIFFICULTIES. THEY HAD ALREADY TOUCHED BASE WITH IRAQIS AND SUDANESE.
 - C. RESTORATION OF RELATIONS TO BE AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL.
 - D. RESTORATION WAS UNCONDITIONAL ON BOTH SIDES. IN HIS TALK WITH BEELEY NASSER CAME AS CLOSE AS HE PROBABLY EVER WILL TO APOLOGIZING FOR BIG LIE SPEAKING VERY MUCH ALONG LINES FONMIN RIAD USED IN HIS RECENT CONVERSATION WITH ASST SECRETARY BATTLE. BRITISH DID NOT RAISE QUESTION OF MOB DAMAGE TO PROPERTY UNTIL AFTER REPEAT AFTER

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 834 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
AGREEMENT RE RESUMPTION HAD BEEN REACHED. FEKI SAID THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY IN SETTLING THIS QUESTION.

E. NASSER REPEATED UNDERTAKING REEXAMINE POSSIBILITY OF

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Authority NLS 02-155 (2246)
By ebm/ics, NARA, Date 8-24-05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 251224Z

OPENING SOUTHERN END CANAL RELEASE TRAPPED SHIPS, BUT BEELEY DOUBTS THAT ANYTHING WILL COME OF THIS. NASSER SAID HE WOULD NOT OPEN CANAL UNTIL ISRAELIS LEFT SINAI. HE SAID HE WOULD PROMISE TO ALLOW ISRAEL FLAG SHIPPING USE CANAL IF ISRAELIS WOULD PROMISE REPATRIATE OR COMPENSATE ARAB REFUGEES. HE WOULD IMPLEMENT HIS PROMISE AS ISRAELIS IMPLEMENTED THEIRS. HE SAID QUESTION OF ISRAEL CARGOES ON THIRD COUNTRY SHIPS WAS NEGOTIABLE.

F. BEELEY WAS ALSO INSTRUCTED REPORT TO HMG HIS ASSESSMENT OF STAYING POWER OF NASSER REGIME. HE DID NOT SPELL OUT TO TESH WHAT HIS CONCLUSIONS WOULD BE. FROM MY OWN LENGTHY PRIVATE TALK WITH BEELEY ON OCTOBER 17, I AM FAIRLY CERTAIN HE WILL STATE THAT NASSER IS GOING TO BE AROUND FOR A WHILE.
RBERGUS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM
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92
ACTION SS 70

INFO /070 W

R 241810Z OCT 67
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9519
INFO AMCONSUL ADEN 221
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 261
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 250
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 113
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 409
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 299
USMISSION USUN 800
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS UNN
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN UNN
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM UNN
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT UNN
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN UNN
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI UNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 3272

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LIMDIS=NOFORN EXCEPT UK

SUBJ: UK/UAR

REF: LONDON 3093 (NOTAL); USUN 1670, PARA 4

1. FOL. RE BEELEY MISSION CONFIDED ON BACKGROUND BASIS OCT 24
BY FONOFF'S MALLET (ACTING HEAD, N. AND E. AFRICA DEPT.) AND
WALKER (UAR DESK). WALKER ACCOMPANIED BEELEY TO CAIRO.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLT 02-155 (#2246)
By , NARA, Date 8-24-05

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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A. NASSER AND BEELEY AGREED DIP. RELS. WOULD BE RESTORED SOMETIME DURING FIRST 15 DAYS DECEMBER. THIS TIMING SUPPOSED TO BE HELD IN STRICT CONFIDENCE, FOR NASSER FIRST WANTS TO "CONDITION" ALGERIANS AND SYRIANS. HE SAID HE WOULD GO AHEAD EVEN IF THEY OBJECTED. IRAQIS, SUDANESE AND RELEVANT AFRICANS HAVE AGREED.

B. RESPONSE BEELEY'S SUGGESTIONS, NASSER AGREED: (1) TO ENCOURAGE FLOSY AND NLF TO COMPOSE DIFFERENCES AND FORM SOUTH ARABIAN GOV'T; (2) TO SPEAK TO MINISTER OF GUIDANCE RE INFLAMMATORY

PAGE 3 RUDTCR 3272 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
"VOICE OF ARABS" BROADCASTS.

C. IN CONTEXT BEELEY'S PITCH FOR UNBLOCKING SOUTHERN END SUEZ CANAL TO FREE STRANDED SHIPS, NASSER SAID THAT BEFORE ISRAELI FLAG VESSELS USED CANAL, PALESTINE REFUGEES MUST BE ASSURED CHANCE TO RETURN TO HOMES OR ELSE COMPENSATED. QUESTION OF ISRAELI CARGOS THROUGH CANAL "NEGOTIABLE".

2. MALLET ADDED FOL. INFO IN REPLY EMBOFF'S QUERIES.

A. UAR OFFICIALS DID NOT RAISE QUESTION OF UK MILITARY PRESENCE PERSIAN GULF.

B. BEELEY NOTED HMG'S EXPECTATION OF COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE TO ALEXANDRIA AND PORT SAID CONSULATES, BUT ASSURANCE OF COMPENSATION NOT RPT. NOT MADE PRECONDITION FOR DIP. RELS. IN FACT, NEITHER SIDE SOUGHT PRECONDITIONS.

C. RE "BIG LIE", BRITISH ARE REASONABLY SATISFIED WITH VARIOUS PRIVATE APOLOGIES BY UAR OFFICIALS AND "EXPLANATIONS" IN

PAGE 4 RUDTCR 3272 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CAIRO PAPERS.

D. LONDON PRESS ACCOUNTS TO CONTRARY, UAR OFFICIALS DID NOT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

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PAGE 03 LONDON 03272 241929Z

SEEK NOR DID BEELEY OFFER ANY BRITISH LOAN. BEELEY REMINDED EGYPTIANS THEY OWED BRITISH CONSIDERABLE MONEY.

BEGIN NOFORN:

3. RESPONSE FURTHER QUESTIONS ON ECONOMIC RELATIONS, MALLET SAID UK OFFICIALS BEGINNING TODAY TO EXAMINE PROBLEM OF HOW TO RECOVER UAR DEBTS. WHILE THERE NO ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION FOR EASING UAR'S REPAYMENT SCHEDULES, MIGHT BE POLITICAL JUSTIFICATION LATER. HMG STILL NOT FURNISHING CREDIT COVER FOR UAR PURCHASES HERE. MALLET DOUBTED ANY EASING OF TERMS WOULD OCCUR BEFORE DECEMBER, AND THOUGHT RELIEF IF ANY THEREAFTER WOULD BE VERY SLIGHT.

END NOFORN.

GP-3 BRUCE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Jordan 5
& Israel

~~SECRET~~

October 17, 1967

WWR:

I think we ought to get the attached in the night reading. An Israeli attack on Jordan is possible any time.

Even if it doesn't happen, it's time to help the President begin collecting his thoughts for Eban next week.

HHS

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *clm/ry* NARA, Date 5-24-70

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, October 17, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Nasty Situation on Israel-Jordan Border and Your Talk with Eban Next Tuesday

Terrorist incidents on the Israeli occupied West Bank have increased in the last couple of weeks. Sunday, the Israelis asked us urgently to pass a message to King Hussein requesting a meeting of Jordanian and Israeli commanders to coordinate efforts to stop infiltration across the Jordan River.

Hussein came back and asked that the Israelis clarify what they thought such a meeting would achieve since Jordan was already making a maximum effort to stop infiltrators. His prime minister persuaded him that he shouldn't allow this sort of contact because the Israelis would exploit it. At the same time, he told us that the Israelis could have all the contact they wanted and at higher levels if we could just get a UN resolution passed for Jordan to operate under.

The Israelis consider Hussein's answer evasive and claim they know he's allowing the terrorists to operate openly in Jordan. They've answered that they have nothing more to say to Hussein. Publicly they've indicated they may have no choice but to strike at the roots of terrorism.

This sounds ominously like the noises that preceded Israel's raid on Jordan last November and last May's mobilization. We've asked Arthur Goldberg to tell Eban they'd be making a terrible mistake to strike at anyone now.

I pass this along because (a) it could lead to new fighting and (b) it sets the backdrop for your talk with Eban next Tuesday.

We think Israel is pursuing a policy that's more likely to lead to another explosion than to a peace settlement. While we appreciate their desire to let time make the Arabs more realistic, once the UN gets a mediator in the field they are going to have to show some give in their position or kill all chances for a settlement.

You will have more formal advice from Secretary Rusk before you see Eban. But the tentative judgment is that you'll want to consider being pretty stern with him. Unless we are fairly tough, he'll go home thinking we buy their line. The attached is to give you a picture of what a tough line might look like since you might like to mull over the line you want to take.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: F.R.I.S., Vol. XIX, #475
By: CBM, NARA, Date: 8-24-05

~~SECRET~~

W. W. Rostow

SECRET

October 17, 1967

POSSIBLE LINE WITH EBAN

1. We're afraid Israel is on the road to another collision--not on the road to peace. We're saying this privately now. But if it looks as if Israel is stalling after a UN mediator starts working, we may have to say so publicly.
2. We're not going to write off Jordan and the West Bank. Our commitment to territorial integrity applied just as much to Jordan as to Israel. Keeping our word is important to us.
3. We don't kid ourselves about Hussein. We know he's unpredictable. But he still looks like the Jordanian most likely to negotiate a peace with Israel. Besides, it doesn't serve our interests to let the Soviets get a foothold in Jordan. We're the ones who have to hold Moscow off when Israel gets in a fight.
4. We know how Israel feels about Jerusalem. But we don't see how peace is possible unless Israel is willing to compromise--and compromise more than anything we've heard them mention so far.
5. We expect Israel to make an offer to settle the refugee problem once and for all. When the President said "justice for the refugees" he meant "justice." That means admitting that some of those poor people have a right to go back and live in Israel if they want to. (We doubt many would.) But it also means a fair financial settlement for the ones who don't.
6. Long-term arms supply is serious business. We're still worried about Israel's nuclear plans. Signing the NPT is a must and we want to know what their policy is.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ00-277(473)
By eban/ct, NARA, Date 8-24-05

SECRET

Jordan
6

~~SECRET~~

Monday, October 9, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from King Hussein

Attached is a long letter from King Hussein reporting his view of the Middle East situation following the Khartoum Conference and recent trips to Cairo and Moscow. He hopes to visit the U. S. toward the end of the month.

It's a strong but dignified letter and lays out Arab reasoning clearly. He expresses deep hurt at what he considers our basic pro-Israeli position. Insofar as we are trying to make the Arabs face up to the existence of Israel, he's not just giving way to polemics. In much the same language as his Ambassador used with you at lunch last Wednesday, he laments the double standard we apply to Arabs and Israelis and says, humbly and sadly, he doesn't find it worthy of a great leader or a great nation to discriminate this way. He told Ambassador Burns he had written because he felt "so personally let down by the USG in recent weeks."

He feels the Arabs at Khartoum reached a reasonable and responsible position. He says even Israeli passage through the Canal is negotiable if linked to redressing the wrongs inflicted on the Arab people of Palestine since 1948. Now he says it's up to the great powers to act, since they were responsible for creating Israel in the first place.

He put two questions to Burns: (1) Will we support a resolution moving UN debate from the General Assembly to the Security Council? He fears that Assembly debate would cause some Arabs to take positions that would tie his hands. (2) Will we support a slightly revised version of the July US-Soviet draft resolution? He says the Soviets will but told him our position had hardened. What he refers to is Arthur Goldberg's effort to work out a more precise understanding of what specific steps would follow such a resolution.

Nick Katzenbach already had his staff working on these questions before this letter came in. We will have an answer for you as soon as possible. But I want you to be aware that this potentially opens a new round of negotiations in New York on the resolution which we felt represents progress if properly interpreted but which the Israelis have objected to vigorously.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, Vol. XIX, #462
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

~~SECRET~~

W. W. Rostow

Jordan 1

MEMORANDUM FOR SHERWIN MARKMAN

September 14, 1967

THROUGH: WALT ROSTOW

In answering Bob Miller of TENNECO, Inc., I suggest you use the following line, which I have checked with Bill Gaud:

1. The Administration continues to view the Jordanian potash project, in which TENNECO and Grace are involved, as technically excellent. For both political and economic development reasons we hope it can go ahead.

2. We don't presume to be able to predict the future political atmosphere, but it's hard to believe that the Jordanian government would not push ahead with this exploitation of one of its few natural resources. As you know, this is an East Bank project.

3. AID would like to cooperate in this project providing Congressional authorizations and appropriations permit. As you know, we expect appropriations to be especially tight this year and can therefore make no promises until we see where we stand.

For your own background, this is a sound project which has been some years in the negotiation. It's an interesting combination of a Jordanian government corporation, private US investment, some World Bank financing and a little AID funding for support projects around the edges. Before the war, Jordan's economy--based on potash, tourism and vegetables--showed promise, largely as a result of local effort and some really intelligent AID work over the years. This is the context within which this project began.

Hal Saunders

September 14, 1967

MEMO FOR SHERWIN MARKMAN

I just want you to know that I will have a response for you to give Bob Miller, Tenneco Inc. tomorrow. I want to double check with Bill Gaud, since what we can do to uphold our share of this project will depend largely on Congressional appropriations, and I want to know his latest thinking on the priority it will have on his books. So, you will be hearing from me tomorrow.

Harold H. Saunders

Jordan 9

Sept. 14, 1967

MEMO FOR MAURICE WILLIAMS

Attached is the letter from Tenneco Inc. that I spoke to you on the phone about this morning. I have attached a proposed response which I hope you will be able to clear with Bill Gaud in time for me to use this tomorrow.

Harold H. Saunders

Att: Letter from Robert H. Miller, to Sherwin Markman, 9/13/67, re potash market for Jordan, with proposed reply.

September 13, 1967

PROPOSED RESPONSE TO TENNECO, INC.

1. The Administration continues to view the Jordanian potash project, in which TENNECO and Grace are involved, as technically excellent. For both political and economic development reasons we hope it can go ahead.

2. We don't presume to be able to predict the future political atmosphere, but it's hard to believe that the Jordanian government would not push ahead with this exploitation of one of its few natural resources. As you know, this is an East Bank project.

3. AID continues to plan on cooperating in this project subject to the usual condition that Congressional authorizations and appropriations permit. As you know, we expect appropriations to be especially tight this year.

Jordan
10

September 14, 1967

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I thoroughly enjoyed our talk yesterday and hope we will have many further opportunities for such discussions.

Meanwhile, I thought you might be interested in the enclosed address given by Mr. Rostow last June. It holds up, I believe, a vision which is worth consideration in your part of the world. In any case, since you will undoubtedly meet Mr. Rostow at some point, you might want to glance over this.

Sincerely,

Harold H. Saunders

His Excellency
Abdul-Hamid Sharaf
Ambassador of Jordan
2319 Wyoming Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20008

Jordan 11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ September 14, 1967

WWR:

The new Jordanian ambassador is a refreshing experience--an articulate and intelligent Arab ambassador.

He'd like to call on you. I told I knew you'd like to meet him but that you're pretty busy. However, I recommend him. Fresh from Amman, he helps redress the balance so heavily weighted in favor of the Evrons of Washington.

HHS

Yes _____
No _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/s*, NARA, Date 5-24-10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

110
September 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Jordanian Ambassador Sharaf

The new Jordanian Ambassador came in to see me this morning as one stop in his initial round of courtesy calls. We had met when he presented his credentials a couple of weeks ago.

He began by saying that we are entering a crucial period and that it is important for the US to encourage its friends. I agreed that the last two months had seen all of us in a peculiar state of indecision. The Arabs for their part had been busy consulting and developing a position. We on our side have been hamstrung by the violence of Congressional opposition to the aid program and the debate over it, which we have not wanted to upset by moving too quickly on the delicate Mid-East scene.

The Ambassador went on to say that our friends in the Arab countries expect us to make good on our pledge of support for the territorial integrity of all states. He pointed out that this pledge has been made numerous times at the highest levels of government, both in public and in private to Arab heads of state. He knows we would be standing behind it if Israel had been attacked and therefore believes that the governments like his, which have been consistently friendly with the US, are reasonable in expecting the USG to honor that pledge.

He said that, in his initial talks here, he had come to understand our position of linking troop withdrawal to the end of belligerency and an overall political settlement. But he was frankly worried, after some of these talks, that we were overemphasizing form at the expense of substance. He said there were numerous practical arrangements that could be made with Israel, but we must realize that a formal peace treaty or formal recognition is beyond the capacity of any Arab government.

I said I could appreciate the possibility that we might have spoken too much the language of Western jurisprudence in hammering on the theme of ending belligerency. A clearer way to make our point, I thought, was to go back to the simple language of the President's 19 June speech. What is at stake here is the creation of a situation in which the right of Israel, as well as of the Arab states, to exist is recognized. I knew from my own talk with King Hussein in March

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#228)

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By cbu/sg, NARA, Date 8-24-05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

that he was quite prepared to live and let live with Israel. I could not be so sure, however, that Nasser shared that view. I couldn't claim to know Nasser's intentions, and was interested in his view. But I could have been convinced easily in early June that Nasser was dead serious about cutting off Israel's oil lifeline. What did he think Nasser intended? Was Nasser ready to live and let live like King Hussein?

Appreciating fully Arab feelings that Israeli encroachment over the years had constituted a continuous threat, I told him quite frankly that, from our Israeli contacts, I was certain that the Israelis had felt their existence threatened last May and June. Whatever disclaimers he might make about Arab rhetoric and propaganda, he ought to realize that the combination of Arab threats and military movements had convinced Israeli leaders that the immediate Arab objective was to destroy Israel then and there. Our main objective in moving toward a settlement is to end the situation in which either side feels that its existence is threatened. Call this what you will--the end of belligerency or a series of practical arrangements--the sine qua non in our eyes is this genuine condition of peace. I told him we have very little stake in the forms or tactics of arriving at such a peace, and I was sorry that he had the impression that we were concentrating on form rather than on substance.

In parting, I told him that I appreciated his articulate, precise and unemotional argument of the Arab case. I felt many Americans just dismissed Arab arguments as propaganda since so many Arab spokesmen harranged us rather than trying to present evidence and argument in the rational ways Americans understand. I urged him to expand his circle of contacts as widely as possible, including Members of Congress, since one of the Arab countries' major obstacles was to overcome the image of hostility and irrationality that had been created by the televising of the UN debates in June and July.

Harold H. Saunders

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Jordan
x Israel 14

August 3, 1967

Dear Mr. Shapiro:

Thank you for your recent letter to the President expressing your views on the problems inherent in any agreement between Israel and Jordan. You may be assured that your views have been taken into consideration.

Sincerely yours,

Harold H. Saunders

Mr. Nathan D. Shapiro
Counselor at Law
50 Court Street
Brooklyn 1, New York

Jordan
15

July 19, 1967

Dear Mrs. Lacy:

Although we have now talked on the phone, I do want to answer your letter at least to confirm what I said.

The first step in helping your Jordanian friend return to the US is for him to apply for a visa at the U. S. Embassy in Amman, naming you as his potential sponsor. I understand you are advising him to do this. I do not at this stage know what his prospects are. Once he has applied, you will be asked to supply documentation supporting his application, and you will have a better idea then.

Yours sincerely,

Harold H. Saunders

Mrs. George S. Lacy
Post Office Box 4303
Wichita Falls, Texas, 76308

cc: Mrs. Elizabeth Carpenter
Ambassador Findley Burns

Jordan~~SECRET~~

July 15, 1967

INFORMAL MEMORANDUM

WALT and MAC -

Subject: Some points from Findley Burns' meeting with Nick, Gene, and Foy, Saturday noon, July 15

1. Hussein and his immediate entourage have always known there was no alternative to a settlement.
2. Hussein wanted first to try to get the Arabs behind him, hence his posture at the UN and his brief and unsuccessful visit with Nasser.
3. The King's room for maneuver is narrow -- the new government needs a strong prime minister. He is unsure of how far the army will follow the high command, though he still thinks the senior and junior officers and men are mainly loyal to him.
4. While he personally emerged with honor from the conflict, he believes that his power is progressively waning.
5. The Soviets have offered arms and feared that his visit to the UN would lead to a prompt settlement, which, as seen from Amman, would be contrary to Soviet interests.
6. Nasser gave Hussein the green light to approach Israel through the U.S., on two conditions: (a) there should be no direct negotiations, and (b) no peace treaty should eventuate. Every Arab leader now knows that Hussein has opted for a settlement.
7. Hussein's pluses: he believes the governmental entourage and responsible members of the bureaucracy will stay with him; the army, though uncertain, is still the key to control and is probably loyal; people down deep want peace, though like other Arabs, they live on several levels at the same time and their pride requires bellicose talk.
8. Hussein's terms: border adjustments - minor adjustments acceptable but giving the Heights of Israel is too much; de-militarization of border acceptable and whole of West Bank also probable.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ03-268 (# 210)
By 26/8, NARA, Date 7-13-10

The stickiest problem is Jerusalem. Just as it is a symbol for Israel, it is also a symbol for the whole Muslim world. If Hussein comes out of a negotiation agreeing that Israel should retain sovereignty over Jerusalem, he risks prompt assassination as well as the end of his regime.

9. On Jerusalem, Burns wonders about this kind of an arrangement: the Holy City would juridically be a "free city", with Jordanian officials as Mayor, Councilmen, etc., public utilities could be handled in a unified way; Israeli customs officials could be at the western walls to prevent Jordanians whom the Israelis didn't want from flowing into Israel, but Israelis would have free access to the city. Jordanian customs officials could be on the eastern walls permitting a free flow of Jordanians into the whole city but preventing the Israelis whom the Jordanians didn't want from going into Jordan.

10. If the Israelis could provide Jordan with a free port and assured transit, the two economies would gradually grow together and Hussein would be independent of Syria for transit.

11. A partial scenario: Burns thinks it likely that only if we press the Israelis hard for such an arrangement will an agreement be possible. To avoid getting publicly hooked with responsibility for what might lead to the end of Hussein, another front "intermediary" should be put forward, through the UN or some leading international figure. Burns hopes we can inform Hussein promptly that the next tranche of \$6 million of supporting assistance will be forthcoming. He also will need enough non-lethal spares to persuade his military that they have a future, and some Hawker Hunters from the Brits as a token airforce. Khammash has a list not yet communicated to Findley and hopes to return to Washington shortly.

12. I think Mac should see him and get the flavor of an American view from Amman.

Howard Wriggins

Jordan

July 11, 1967 17

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WALT ROSTOW

King Hussein has sent you the following telegram: "As I depart from the United States allow me to express my gratitude for your hospitality and my appreciation of the useful discussions we had in Washington. I also wish to avail myself of this opportunity to extend to you and to the people of America our heartfelt felicitations and best wishes on the Independence Day of the United States of America. This great occasion comes at the time when the principles and ideals of America, preservation of liberty and pursuit of happiness coupled with independence and territorial integrity are undergoing a serious test in our part of the world. We hope, indeed we are confident that all the nations of the world will follow the right path which leads to justice, peace, freedom and stability. This is the path which the torch of the statue of liberty is meant to illuminate. Please accept my highest esteem and consideration.

I recommend you authorize the following reply be delivered to him immediately in London: "Thank you for your thoughtful and kind message and your congratulations on our independence day. Your Majesty will always find a welcome in our country where your forthrightness and courage are greatly admired. I appreciated the opportunity to exchange views with you on the Middle East crisis and I profoundly hope that a way may be found to bring the benefits of stability and prosperity to all of the people of the Middle East. As you return to your country to carry out your heavy responsibilities my best wishes go with you and to the people of Jordan. With warm personal regards, Lyndon B. Johnson."

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Jordan
x Hussein Visit

18

June 27, 1967

WWR:

You may want to settle this
with the President yourself at
lunch.

HHS

MEMORANDUM FOR MARVIN WATSON

June 27, 1967

SUBJECT: Luncheon for King Hussein

The President has agreed to a small working luncheon for King Hussein on Wednesday, 28 June.

My recommendation for the guest list would be as follows, but I would appreciate your checking with the President:

Under Secretary Katzenbach (Secretary Rusk will be hosting a lunch for the Thai King and Queen.)

Secretary McNamara

McGeorge Bundy

Walt Rostow

Findley Burns, the President's Ambassador to Hussein

Mac Bundy's notion and mine is to keep it as small as possible since, at present count, there will only be four Jordanians--King Hussein, Foreign Minister Ahmad Tugan, Major General Amir Khammash (chief of staff) and Jordanian Ambassador in Washington, Farhan Shubellat.

However, other possibilities would include George Christian, Gene Rostow and Bill Macomber (former US Ambassador in Jordan who knows the King intimately and has performed two special missions to him since November).

Since this is strictly a working session, I anticipate no formal arrival statement and no formal toast at lunch. However, we will provide a paper on press guidance for the President and Hussein to approve for George Christian.

The King has asked--and we strongly recommend--that he have an opportunity for a private talk alone with the President. There are things he will want to say that he can't say in front of any other Jordanian.

W. W. Rostow

Jordan
x P.D.

19

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Announcing King Hussein's Visit

With King Hussein coming here Wednesday for lunch, we have to decide when to announce his visit. The main issue is how you want your announcement to relate to his UN speech, probably at 3:30 p. m. today. He may have to say some things that we won't necessarily like. Mac Bundy thinks that, for that reason, it might be better for us to announce tomorrow so both speech and announcement won't end up in the same papers. But you may want to squelch press speculation by announcing sooner. I see three choices:

1. Get it out by special White House announcement early this afternoon, so the invitation will be on the record before Hussein speaks.
2. Announce at George's 4:00 p. m. press briefing this afternoon.
3. Wait until George's 11:00 a. m. session tomorrow.
4. You could do it yourself if you have a press conference.

I would suggest a very simple announcement here with advance notice to Hussein on timing: "King Hussein of Jordan will visit Washington for an exchange of views with the President on Wednesday, June 28. Details are being arranged."

W. W. Rostow

Announce immediately _____
 At 4:00 p. m. today _____
 I'll do it _____
 At 11:00 a. m. tomorrow _____

Text OK _____
 See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
 By *Chm/ky* NARA, Date 5-24-10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Jordan

20

June 26, 1967

~~SECRET~~

Tom:

Would you please have Maury Williams look over the attached and give us his judgment by c. o. b. Tuesday.

He needn't do a whole new paper of his own. We're primarily interested in his reaction to this paper's main conclusion--that East Jordan could survive economically without West Jordan.

Harold H. Saunders

~~SECRET~~

Att: CIA Memorandum, No. 0660/67, 6/20/67, Subj: Special Assessments on the Middle East Situation, Economic Impact on Jordan of the Loss of Jerusalem or West Jordan, Cy #10

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS034-0221-5
By sp, NARA, Date 5-21-10

Jordan
x Hussein visit

21

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 24, 1967

TO: Jim Jones
FOR: The President
FROM: Walt Rostow

The President agreed last week to see Jordan's King Hussein after Hussein speaks at the UN General Assembly 26 June.

Secretary Katzenbach recommends that the President see him either Wednesday or Thursday, 28 or 29 June, and that the President consider having a very small--say just the Tuesday lunch members--working luncheon for him.

If we could set a time today, we would settle the details with Hussein in New York tomorrow. He arrives there tonight and will spend Sunday with his staff.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *dm/rj* NARA, Date 5-24-10

Jordan
x meqB memos

22

June 23, 1967

Mc GB:

Later today, we will be getting a Katzenbach memo recommending that the President see Hussein next Wednesday or Thursday.

If you approve, I'll just run this through normal channels when it comes.

H. H. S.

Yes _____

No _____

Jordan
x P.D. 23

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 12, 1967

McGB:

Attached need not go in this form if you prefer another. This seemed the easiest way to get your reading.

HHS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Refer to Read - Rostow memo - 6/11/67
att. tel. to Amman (W 74-2251)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By Dom/ls, NARA, Date 5-24-10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 12, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to King Hussein

One of the simple gestures we could make toward Hussein without any policy cost would be a private thank-you for his help in evacuating our people. This was the toughest of the evacuation jobs because of the heavy damage to Jordanian airports. We recommend the following:

"I am deeply appreciative of the magnificent support you and your security forces have given to ensure the safe evacuation of Americans and other members of the international community from Jordan. No government could have done more. I am profoundly grateful.

"With warm personal regards. "

Mac Bundy concurs.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By *dm/ly* NARA, Date 5-24-10

Jordan

24

April 26, 1967

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

This is to say how much I enjoyed my visit with you earlier this week. I hope I shall have the opportunity of chatting with you again soon. Meanwhile, I thought you might be interested, if you have not already seen it, in having the enclosed copy of Mr. Rostow's lecture at the University of Leeds earlier this year. There is much food for thought here for all of us.

Sincerely,

Harold H. Saunders

His Excellency
Farhan Shubeilat
Ambassador of Jordan
2319 Wyoming Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20008

Jordan
05

~~SECRET~~

April 10, 1967

WWR:

On re-checking with AID about Tony Taylor going to Jordan, I find that the Jordanians have not met their own schedule and will not need Taylor for another three months or maybe even more. Therefore, let's let the attached rest for the moment.

For the record, AID reaffirms that Taylor is not promoting himself. He is very definitely the man for the job. Unfortunately, when he goes it will be very difficult to keep some mention out of the papers, though we could try.

HHS

~~SECRET~~

Att: Orig. WWR Memo for the President, 3/21/67,
Subj: Proposed Visit for Tony Taylor to Jordan

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#98)
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By cbu/rg, NARA, Date 8-24-05

Jordan 26

March 30, 1967

Lois -

Has anything happened on
this?

Hal Saunders

Att: Cy, WWRostow Memo for the Rresident, 3/21/67
Subj: Proposed Visit for Tony Taylor to Jordan

Jordan
27

~~SECRET~~

March 21, 1967

WWR:

About a year and a half ago, Antonio Taylor, the President's brother-in-law, went to Jordan to advise on development of their handicraft industry. Now his project has reached a point where he should go back.

Last time, the press noted his relationship to the President and tabbed him as being some kind of arms merchant. As a result of that episode, Bill Macomber before leaving his old job was uneasy about seeing Taylor go out into the current tense Middle East atmosphere.

My own feeling is that this is something quite constructive that we want to be fully associated with. Tourism is Jordan's main resource and the Jordanians are doing a remarkably good job of developing it. Secretary Udall's recent visit was a far more conspicuous boost, and the National Park Service team he's sponsoring there will be a tremendous help in developing the sites of what are undoubtedly some of the greatest tourist attractions in the world. Therefore, I think we ought to let Taylor go as economics dictate and stand our ground against any possible press reaction.

AID says Taylor is highly qualified to do the job, and the job is well worth doing. Rodger Davies in State agrees that we should go ahead.

However, because of Taylor's relationship with the President, I have agreed to take soundings here. Since this is a sound operation which stands on its own merits, you might think it unnecessary to bother the President. Nevertheless, I've drafted the attached in case you'd like to just keep him informed.

HHS

Go ahead _____

I'm sending your notes to the President; let's wait to see whether he reacts _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#89)
NSC Memo, 1/30/85, State Guidelines
By cm/rq, NARA, Date 8-24-05

~~SECRET~~

Check who's promoting him or them. Keep out of papers.

~~SECRET~~

March 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proposed Visit for Tony Taylor to Jordan

You will remember that your brother-in-law went to Jordan about a year and a half ago to advise on the development of handicraft industry there. Now his project has reached a point where he should go back. Because the press last time noted his relationship to you and tabbed him as some kind of arms merchant, AID wants to be doubly careful not to embarrass you. Therefore, they are asking whether we have any objections.

My own feeling is that we should let him go about his business. Tourism is Jordan's main resource, and the Jordanians are doing a remarkably good job of developing it. Secretary Udall's recent visit was a conspicuous boost, and now it is time for men like Taylor to move in and help with the followup details. These are projects we can be proud to be associated with, and everyone feels that Taylor can do an excellent job. State agrees that we should go ahead as economics dictate and stand our ground against any possible press reaction.

Therefore, unless you have any personal reason for wanting to see this delayed, I propose to tell AID we have no objections to their going ahead according to their own schedule.

W. W. Rostow

No objection _____

See me ✓ 3/22/67.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLI 91-374 (#58a)
By cbm/jie NARA, Date 8-24-05

~~SECRET~~

Jordan
trip

28

March 18, 1967

Dear Joe:

I enjoyed immensely our time together during my recent visit and greatly appreciate your exposing me so thoroughly to Jordanian development, past and prospective. I now see your reasons for cautious optimism.

I'm sorry for Jordan's sake that you'll be leaving Amman. However, we'll look forward to having you back with us again. I only hope your colleagues can find someone half so imaginative and energetic to take your place.

Sincerely,

Harold H. Saunders

Mr. Joseph Wheeler
American Embassy
Amman

Jordan
Y. Trip
29

March 18, 1967

Dear Tom:

Just a word of thanks for your help in making my last day in Jordan such an interesting one. The West Bank problem is one that must be seen to be fully understood.

I'd appreciate it very much if you would pass on a special thank-you for Mr. Fisher the next time you see him. Our day with him and his associates was extremely helpful.

Sincerely,

Harold H. Saunders

Mr. J. T. McAndrew
American Embassy
Amman

Jordan
H/Mip 20

March 18, 1967

Dear Findley:

Before settling back to work in Washington, I want to thank you and your staff for making my stay with you such a productive one. I appreciate your time and confidence.

I hope as occasions offer you will tell my Jordanian friends how much I enjoyed meeting them and how much I appreciated their frankness. We may not always do everything they'd like, but it's not for lack of understanding on both sides.

Again thanks and bestwishes.

Sincerely,

Harold H. Saunders

The Honorable Findley Burns
U.S. Ambassador to Jordan
American Embassy
Amman

Jordan
& Trip

31

March 10, 1967

Dear Dick:

Thank you so much for arranging such an interesting Jordanian visit for me. No amount of reading could have given me the understanding I gained from the talks and trips you arranged. But now that I've been through your intensive course, the written word will be alive.

My thanks, too, to your wife for her hospitality and to the other members of the embassy staff who were so good about answering my questions. I look forward to seeing you when you next come our way.

Sincerely,

Harold H. Saunders

Mr. Richard Murphy
American Embassy
Amman

Jordan 32

~~SECRET~~

February 9, 1967

WWR:

King Hussein has an informal invitation from the National Association of Manufacturers to address its convention in New York next December on the subject of what the U. S. has done for developing countries. The NAM is informally sounding out State to make sure there are no policy objections to this invitation. State is asking whether we have any. Of course, no one has any idea what the situation will be next December. We would not at this stage even consider whether to invite him down here for a lunch if he came. However, for the purpose of informal planning, I can see no reason to try to stop the NAM. There is always the potential reaction of the New York Jewish Community to consider, but I should think Hussein would come off as well as any Arab.

So I would favor telling State we pose no objection but make no commitment at this stage. Do you agree?

Hal Saunders

Yes ✓
No

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cmh*, NARA, Date 5-24-10

Jordan
x 7445 M E Travel
33

February 4, 1967

Dear Ambassador Burns:

This summer Hal Saunders will take over as my senior man on the Middle East. As you know, he has followed this account here for some time.

I am sending Hal on a tour of the area later this month and believe it will help us both if you can expose him as fully as possible to your thoughts and problems. He will write you about his schedule.

We are relieved that you have come out of your November - December troubles as well as you have.

Sincerely yours,

W. W. Rostow

The Honorable Findley Burns
U. S. Ambassador to Jordan
American Embassy
Amman

Jordan
v HNS M E Travel
34

February 3, 1967

Dear Findley:

This summer I will be assuming prime responsibility for the Middle East on Walt Rostow's staff. In preparation, he has kindly sprung me for a three-week swing through the area, and I have tentatively scheduled a stay in Jordan from Monday, March 6 (arrive 4 p. m. on Royal Jordan Air Flight #701 from Jidda) to the middle of Thursday, March 9, when I would plan to cross into Israel at Jerusalem.

I hesitate to impose on your busy days but hope perhaps you might turn me over to various members of your staff. Apart from whatever you may think worthwhile to arrange in Amman, I would like to take some sort of trip to the north to get a feel for the Israeli (and Syrian?) borders and take a look at Jordan's management of the water problem there. I have also tentatively thought it might be interesting to go down to the Dead Sea area but leave that to your judgment. I would like to allow time, too, for a look around old Jerusalem before I cross the border.

These thoughts may seem overly ambitious for the time I have. I rely completely on your judgment and outline them simply to give you some notion of what I have in mind.

I look forward to seeing you now that you have weathered the winter's storms and to seeing my good friend Joe Wheeler again. Please let me know whether this is convenient for you. I will be leaving my office 17 February.

Sincerely,

Harold H. Saunders

The Honorable Findley Burns
U. S. Ambassador to Jordan
American Embassy
Amman

cc: Mr. Robert Houghton
Mr. James C. Flint

Jordan
35

January 11, 1967

TO: B. K. S.

FROM: Hal Saunders

I think this is the best way to handle the attached. While there is no record of correspondence in the Central Files, I know that Mecom has been in touch with some of Marv Watson's people in the past.

35a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 11, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MARVIN WATSON

Attached is more background on negotiations between Texas oilman John Mecom and the Government of Jordan. I believe Mecom or his representatives have talked with various members of your staff in the past.

State has sent this memo (a) so you'll be fore-armed if Mecom approaches you again, and (b) in hopes that you -- if you see him -- might encourage him to make a reasonable settlement. This case is becoming a thorn in our relations with Jordan, and it doesn't seem that Mecom is making all the effort he might to settle reasonably.

Bromley Smith

Att: File #15

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By clm/ly NARA, Date 5-28-10

Jordan 36

~~SECRET~~

December 22, 1966

Walt -

Here's a brief rundown on the Jordan situation including (a) the package and (b) Hussein's problem in Cairo this weekend, and how we dealt with the public relations angle. The President might want this before he gets hit with newspaper stories in the morning.

Howard Wriggins

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *abm/ug* NARA, Date 5-24-10

36a

~~SECRET~~

December 22, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Macomber's Deal With Hussein

This appears to have come off well, but Hussein is not out of the woods yet.

Hussein accepted the package we proposed: (a) accelerating procurement and airlifting material already programmed for Jordan with some additional items; (b) lending them 6F 104's until their's are ready and the Jordanians are capable of coping without us (these will be on a "training mission" involving 45 to 50 US personnel and will not be armed); (c) sharing the cost of a 3,000-man increase in the army (he asked for a 10,000 man increase). A raise in army pay is still under discussion. Jordan will do all it can to resist efforts of other Arab states to station their troops in Jordan (but his army staff urge him to accept some Arab forces to augment his own). Jordan will retain its moderate policies toward Israel and agrees to continue to pay for the planes and tanks provided under previous agreements with funds they will press for in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

The King's letter to you suggests he is sufficiently pleased with our hard-bargained package to be able to face his next crisis--a United Arab Command meeting in Cairo this weekend--with some confidence.

He will be under pressure in Cairo from the other Arab leaders who want to embarrass him by insisting they contribute Iraqi and Saudi troops and by demonstrating how little real assistance he is getting from us. Hussein's representative, General Khammash, will not tell exactly what we have given him. But he may have to exaggerate what he has received in order to fend off his Arab critics. So we shall have some overstatement from Cairo over the weekend to contend with.

We have taken great care to watch the public relations angle here. Doug McArthur has been busy on the Hill today, with a carefully worked out brief. Nick Katzenbach has been in touch with members of the Jewish community. A press backgrounder was held at 4:30 with leading New York papers, the wire services and TV network representatives, with a ten

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cbm/xy NARA, Date 5-24-70

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

o'clock hold. We'll brace ourselves for the results in tomorrow morning's papers.

The text of the announcement agreed between us and Hussein is as follows:

"At the request of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan the United States Government has agreed to provide under its existing military assistance program certain items of military equipment to strengthen the defensive capability of the Jordanian armed forces. This additional equipment is being provided as a means of enabling Jordan to assure its security, and thus to contribute further to the stability of the area. A substantial portion of this equipment will be airlifted to Jordan over the next 30 to 60 days. In addition to these deliveries, the shipment of F-104 interceptor, aircraft, previously purchased by Jordan, will be expedited."

If there is anything else to report when Macomber returns, we will get that to you tomorrow morning.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

December 13, 1966

37

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS
BRIEFING ISRAEL'S FRIENDS ON THE JORDAN PACKAGE

Purpose--To reassure our friends by putting the new Jordan package in proper perspective on a confidential basis. We want to convince them that we support Israel fully and anything we do for the Arab countries is done with Israel's interests in mind.

1. The President wanted you to have this talk about our Israel affairs because he feels that many friends of Israel are insufficiently aware of our real policies--and as a result tend to bring undue (and often counter-productive) pressure on the Administration when it seeks to defend US interests elsewhere in the Near East.

2. No one who has an insider's view of the many aspects of our Israeli relations could contest the proposition that the US is 100% behind the security and wellbeing of Israel. We are Israel's chief supporters, bankers, direct and indirect arms purveyors, and ultimate guarantors. This has been US policy since 1947, but has reached a new level since 1961. Might add that the President is satisfied (as was JFK before him) that GOI actually regards us as their best friends.

3. A cardinal principle of our Middle East policy is to create an environment in which Israel can survive and ultimately prosper. We do a number of things to affect this environment. We have spent since 1949 \$87 million for the elaborate UN peacekeeping machinery on Israel's borders and we have helped support over a million Arab refugees who are the recruiting pools for terrorist organizations, at a cost of over \$387 million. Without going into detail our aid to a number of other Arab countries is given with a distinct eye to stability on the Arab-Israeli front. It serves Israeli interests if we keep the Soviets and Chicoms from attaining undue influence. Bear in mind that Moscow and Peiping are violently pro-Arab, and use the Arab/Israeli issue for their own purposes. It doesn't help Israel if we drive Nasser or Aref wholly into Communist arms.

4. A major objective in stabilizing this environment is to foster a sound regime in Jordan. The highest officials in the Israeli government are the first to say that this is also their objective in Jordan. King Hussein has realistically accepted the assistance of Israel and admitted the emptiness of Arab's threats to drive Israel into the sea. He has also worked hard to create a Jordanian national entity which would meld east and west bank thereby extinguishing Palestinian nationalism.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cbm/hg NARA, Date 5-24-10

5. To date we have spent \$550 million to maintain stability in Jordan. That has included a small on-going military assistance program as well as two special sales of military equipment. We have fully informed the Government of Israel on all of these and it has shown its understanding of our purpose.

6. The Israeli raid on Jordan on November 13 has severely undercut King Hussein. It deeply humiliated his army, his main support--and sharpened long standing discontent among the Palestians on Jordan's vulnerable west bank. It also increased pressure from other Arab governments to force Hussein to accept stationing non-Jordanian troops in Jordan--a move aimed at his possible overthrow. He feels he must show adequate movement to improve Jordan's defenses against repetition of the 13 November raid or abdicate his responsibilities as Jordan's leader.

7. We do not agree with Hussein that this is essentially a military problem because we have Israel's firm assurance that the 13 November raid does not constitute a change in Israel's policy toward Jordan. While Hussein has asked for an extravagant \$200 million of new military equipment, we have responded with a package worth less than 4% of that, designed to:

--Prevent diversion of resources from Jordan's promised economic development program.

--Show enough improvement in pay, organization and equipment to preserve the army's morale and loyalty.

--Not upset the military balance to Israel's disadvantage.

8. I want to underscore that this is the beginning of our effort to meet problems which both we and the Israeli government feel must be solved. This package will not affect the military balance because it is not primarily a military program. It is the starting point for what will undoubtedly be a long series of general aid negotiations which will be required to get Hussein over this hump and bring him back to reason.

9. Meanwhile it is possible that many of you do not realize the extent to which we have helped Israel over the years and continue to do so:

(a) AID grants and loans through FY 65 have totalled over \$500 million, plus \$220 million in EXIM loans. On the PL 480 side we've provided \$325 million in foodstuffs. All this has helped Israel achieve probably the highest sustained growth rate in the world (10-11% per annum for the last ~~twelve years~~). The Israelis expect this growth to continue at least at 9% annually. Their foreign exchange reserves are up from around \$280 million at the end of 1961 to over \$600 million now. It is a real success story.

These aid levels stand out against the background of general aid policy designed gradually to phase out concessional aid in countries like Israel which have moved impressively toward self-sustaining growth. Israel's per capita GNP of \$1400 in 1965 was about 75% of the UK's, 90% of Holland's, 110% of Austria's, 125% of Italy's and 200% of Greece's. Our aid policy has grown out of the pressures of low appropriations and our belief that it is healthy for nations to push away aid props just as soon as possible.

(b) Third, we have made quite sure that Israel could meet its minimum military aid requirements, either here or from other Western sources. Our JCS regularly review the situation and still estimate that Israel can defeat any likely Arab combination, now or in the next few years. The Israelis believe the same thing.

--So long as Israel can meet its arms needs from France, the UK (or for a time Germany), we've sought to avoid becoming major direct suppliers in order to: (1) fend off Arab pressures; (2) fofestall excessive Arab requests; (3) avoid driving the Arabs to Moscow and Peiping for even more. This policy makes sense, and in fact has given Israel better arms cheaper than it could get them from us.

--But in those cases where Israel could not meet legitimate defensive needs elsewhere, we've helped quietly and directly. The 1962 sale of 5 HAWK batteries is a case in point. Also, most people don't know that we've provided 106 mm. recoilless rifles, armored half tracks, extensive electronic equipment, C-97s, and other items. We've trained over 300 Israeli military here. Lastly, it's an open secret (though we'd like to keep it that way) that we played a major role in the Bonn/Israel arms deal.

--In 1965 and 1966 we made arms sales of tanks and combat aircraft. These decisions were made after long and careful consideration to prevent development of a destabilizing arms imbalance in the area. These sales were made on liberal credit terms.

(c) We do a great deal to enhance Israel's technological edge over the Arabs--which is in many respects its secret weapon. We gave a nuclear research reactors and we now support scientific research in Israel at the level of \$8 million a year--about 25% of all the funds Israel spends on non-military research and development. This represents the work of 15 USG agencies supporting some 350 science projects. These programs are a substantial contribution to keeping an already outstanding scientific community constructively employed.

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

(d) In the field of providing vital water, we have given quiet assurance that we will help Israel maintain access to its share of the Jordan waters. We have also engaged in discussions with Israeli representatives on cooperative research in the field of desalting and the President has appointed Ambassador-at-Large Ellsworth Bunker to recommend next steps in this program.

(e) On the diplomatic front, President Johnson reaffirmed publicly during the 1964 visit of Prime Minister Eshkol and again during the August 1966 visit of President Shazar the US commitment to support the integrity of states in the Near East and to oppose aggression in any form. In addition, our presence in key Arab countries has enabled us to work usefully for peace and moderation. We have produced no final solutions for any of the Arab-Israel problems but our activities have:

- Safeguarded access to Israel's fair share of the Jordan's waters.
- Helped reduce tensions and incidents along Armistice lines.
- Preserved effective UN peacekeeping machinery.
- Supported Israel, where warranted, in the United Nations.
- Tried to make progress on the refugee problem.
- Encouraged more realistic Arab attitudes toward the Arab-Israel dispute.

~~SECRET~~

*Jordan
not sent*

Your Majesty:

My Government and I continue to watch closely the events now unfolding in the Middle East. We have reviewed carefully the request carried to us by your distinguished Chief of Staff and have concluded that we should act quickly in providing additional military assistance. I have instructed Secretary McNamara to discuss the details of our response with General Khammash. While this response does not meet your request in full, it is, I believe, a substantial and significant one. In addition, and with a view to making this special support as helpful to you as possible, I have asked that every effort be made to ensure that the equipment reaches you with as little delay as possible. To accomplish this a substantial portion will be air lifted.

I understand that you will, of course, continue your wise policy of restraint and will continue the measures you have previously adopted to enhance stability in the area. I trust that these and our assistance will enable you to resist the stationing of non-Jordanian troops in Jordan.

We have not had time to consider adequately the full budgetary and economic implications of a build-up in Jordan's military establishment. While this has not prevented our acting promptly and affirmatively, I am seriously concerned over these implications; and I would like to send an emissary to discuss with you the force levels of Jordan's army and related economic problems of concern to both of us. The emissary would have my highest confidence and would be a person well known to you.

We understand the great concern which the Israeli action of November 13 has caused you and the difficulties you have faced as a result of it. We have sought to be helpful. I have great admiration for the manner in which you are facing these problems and for your policy of moderation. I know this to be the course of wisdom and I wish to assure you of continued United States friendship and support.

Sincerely,

His Majesty Hussein I
King of the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan

LBJ:State:HHS:tmt 12/13/66

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
B. *Chm/* NARA, Date 5-24-10

Jordan 39

~~SECRET~~

December 10, 1966

Walt:

The state of play on the Jordan package as of 5:00 p. m. is that McNamara has approved and Katzenbach has promised to focus on it when he gets back to State from the White House around 6:00 p. m. So his memo (bootleg copy attached) may come in overnight.

I'm leaving the attached covering memo for you to use because it's urgent to get this up to the President as soon as Katzenbach's memo comes in. McNamara will see Khammash at 11:00 a. m. Tuesday to deliver the package before leaving for Paris. Since our response is so small, we need all the prestige of a McNamara to try to make it go down as easily as possible.

I've instructed the sit room to get Katzenbach's memo to you at the first chance.

Howard Wriggins

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *clm/rj* NARA, Date 5-24-10

SECRET

December 10, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Response to King Hussein's Military Equipment Request

We can't come close to meeting Hussein's \$200 million request. We don't have the money, and that big a program would ruin Jordan's promising economic development.

So Secretary McNamara has designed a small package to tackle Hussein's main problem--his army's morale. It includes only \$4.7 million (reprogrammed from existing appropriations) on top of \$3.5 million already in Jordan's FY 1967 military aid program. Instead of enlarging his forces, it would help him improve pay, mobility and organization to tide him over the present crisis of confidence with the army.

This offer probably won't satisfy Hussein. We see it as the starting point for a tough series of negotiations over our whole aid program. We may have to give a little, but before we do we'd send former Ambassador Bill Macomber to try to talk Hussein back to reason.

If you approve this approach, Secretary McNamara will go over the package with Hussein's army commander at 11:00 a. m. Tuesday. Secretary Katzenbach also requests your approval of the attached message from him to Hussein explaining the rationale for the package. We feel the Secretaries should handle this initial response, since you've already sent the King one message and may have to step in again later.

No matter what we do, the Israelis and their friends will object. But we're just cleaning up the mess Israel's raid created and we've taken Israel's military concerns into account. Our JCS says this small package will not affect the military balance on Israel's borders. If you approve, State and Defense will brief key Members of Congress on the program, and we'll tell the Israelis what's involved as soon as we've told the Jordanians.

I recommend you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: FRUS, Vol. xviii, #361
By: cbm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

SECRET

*Jordan
x Israel 40*

~~SECRET~~

December 9, 1966

MEMO FOR LOIS NIVENS

Here are enough copies of the record of Mr. Rostow's conversation with Ambassador Harman yesterday for you to send to S/S if he wants them to go.

Hal Saunders

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *abm/hj*, NARA, Date 5-24-10

40a

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

December 9, 1966

SUBJECT: Ambassador Harman's Call on Mr. Walt Rostow
4:30 p. m. 8 December 1966

Ambassador Harman began his presentation by recalling that on November 22 Ambassador Barbour had mentioned to Foreign Minister Eban that the US would send a quick impact shipment of military equipment to Jordan. Later Ambassador Harman had been informed here of the general content of that package. Israel had not reacted at that point because it understood our objective. This week, however, Ambassador Harman had learned "from his own sources" that the Jordanian chief of staff is in town and that we are contemplating additional military equipment for Jordan. He had tried to get details from State but had not been given them.

When he is left in the dark like this, he said, he necessarily begins to speculate about what he does not know. He recalled, for instance, that during the Komer negotiations in 1965 Komer had mentioned 100 tanks for Jordan in the new sales deal but had not mentioned the 100 already included in the military assistance program. So any talk of a new package about which he is kept in the dark makes him uneasy. He could not help but feel that any package we might put together would seriously affect the military balance between Israel and Jordan and he wanted us to know of his government's grave reservations about it.

Mr. Rostow responded by pointing out in general that we had to face a very serious situation in Jordan created by the Israeli raid of 13 November. He said he had not seen the details of the package we are considering for Jordan and therefore could not obviously convey them to Harman. However, he could explain the elements which will go into our decision:

--The King depends on his military for the stability of his regime. The military has been deeply disillusioned and humiliated as a result of the Israeli raid. Whatever we do must be geared primarily to helping the King maintain the loyalty of his army.

--Anything we do will be designed to do the least possible damage to Jordan's promising economic development program.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 00-228 (P150)
By cbw/clr, NARA, Date 8-24-05

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- 2 -

--Our package will also be designed to help the King improve his capacity to police the borders.

--We are fully aware of Israel's concerns about the military balance--they are ours, too--and will have them very much in mind.

Ambassador Harman responded by saying that he was afraid this military package would have somewhat the same effect as the UN Security Council vote in New York. It would encourage the Arab side to think that it could further hem in Israel by terrorism and the fruits of terrorist raids.

Mr. Rostow said he did not feel the Israeli government fully appreciated the extent to which its raid was a traumatic experience for Jordan. He said as he had watched the cables over the past few weeks he was deeply aware of how close the King had come to losing his position. While it was easy for Harman and the Israeli government to say that Jordan had no choice but to turn to us for help, Mr. Rostow said he was not at all sure that the King would not turn to the Soviets for help in the last analysis.

The interview ended with Mr. Rostow's assurance that he understood the Israelis' message and that their concerns would be taken into account.

Harold H. Saunders

~~SECRET~~

*Jordan
& Israel*

~~SECRET~~

December 2, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Israel - Jordan This Week

We've moved this week into the second phase of our effort to put together the pieces after Israel's 13 November raid. Hussein is still on top of his security situation. Although the army has stuck with him in putting down demonstrations, morale is still a serious problem. We must now show enough movement in improving Jordan's defenses to satisfy his military over the longer term.

He sent his army commander, General Khammash, here Monday with a stupendous \$200 million request for equipment, army expansion and budget support. Secretary Rusk and I have both received him in an effort to make Hussein feel he is getting a fair hearing.

We will have to whittle Khammash's request down to keep Hussein from ruining Jordan economically, but we probably can't get off scot free. We'll have to put together some kind of package and will try to gear it to streamlining existing forces and improving border control. We don't agree with Hussein that this is chiefly a military problem because we don't believe--as he does--that the Israeli attack was the first step in grabbing West Jordan. We are holding Secretary McNamara in reserve to sell our final proposition to Khammash when we have a clearer idea what we can do.

The Israelis have recovered their composure enough to take us to task mildly for supporting last week's UN Security Council censure of Israel. They claim the UN action gives a blank check to the Arab governments backing the terrorists. We're pressing them to beef up their own border control effort and to help improve the UN machinery there. They're willing to talk about improving their own system, but we'll have to press hard before they will be willing to see the UN beefed up. Nevertheless, we still feel the least that ought to come out of this mess is a system that will be a serious deterrent to continued terrorism.

We will be back to you with a formal proposal later.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol. xviii, #555
By *cbm*, NARA, Date 8-24-05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Jordan *Saunders*
November 28, 1966 *43*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ROSTOW

King Hussein's answer to your letter can be summarized as follows:

He thanks you warmly for "all you have done in the support of justice and right." He stresses the dangers his regime is facing from enemies both from outside and within his country, many of them being "our common enemies, the Marxists." Jordan, a model of evolutionary change, is facing its most difficult hour. He points out that your orders for "an urgent review of measures the United States might take to support the peace and security of Jordan... and its economic progress... are most timely and welcome." He indicates the situation is so critical that he has instructed his Chief of the General Staff Kahmmash to come to Washington immediately. He hopes Kahmmash can bring him back reassuring news which will considerably help him in his struggle against those who would bring him down.

The text follows:

(Amman 1269 attached)

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *clm/ly* NARA, Date *7-13-10*

H.S.
Jordan 43

MEMORANDUM

November 24, 1966

WALT, State's Strategy on Israel-Jordan

five

We seem to be making some progress. There are ~~four~~ elements to State's present approach.

1. They have been beating the Israeli's to be sure they don't provoke further worries, and if Jordan should have to attack, there will be no Israeli hot pursuit.
2. The President's letter will have served to reassure Hussein somewhat (Roger Davies thinks a good deal; I'm more skeptical that words alone will do it).
3. Walter Harris' channel will be sending a careful assessment of Israeli actions and intentions, as we read them. (This will be based in part on what Eshkol asked us to communicate to the Jordanians, but we will be putting this material in as our own assessment, since Eshkol's credibility at this stage is slight.
4. The speed-up of the military aid package, which a message is being prepared today. Within seven days, we can airlift 15 jeeps with 106 mm. recoilless rifles which can be used for both internal security and anti-tank purposes.
Within ~~savaxxix~~ 30 days we can ship
6 106-mm. self-propelled howitzers.
The schedule for delivering F-104's
will be speeded up.

I believe this token of our interest will make a substantial difference to Hussein's nerve and may help him stand off his own hawks.

5. They are now working on a scenario on frontier stabilization, which may include a Goldberg statement at the UN and a technical US mission to visit both countries, with Macomber to go to the Jordan side. DOD is pressing ahead on alternatives packages of frontier surveillance and warning devices which will meet Hussein's real security worries better than much of the heavy hardware he's asking for.

Comment: If we weather this weekend, we'll probably be in the clear enough to push ahead strongly on Para. 5.

Howard Wriggins

DECLASSIFIED (126 only)
Authority NJ/RAC 00-303 (only)
By cbmkj NARA, Date 8-24-05

TO ROSTOW FROM WRIGGINS FOR THE PRESIDENT

Saunders 44
Jordan

~~SECRET~~

November 23, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to King Hussein

Attached is a letter from you to King Hussein which Nick Katzenbach wants urgently to send to King Hussein.

Our next step in defusing the Jordan-Israel crisis is to bolster King Hussein. He is under great pressure both from the Palestinian elements in his population and from the Junior Army officers who charge that he has not provided adequately for Jordan's defense. Demonstrations have spread to all the major centers in West Jordan. He has asked us for substantial amounts of military equipment to help him demonstrate that he has moved to prevent a repeat of the mauling Israel gave Jordan's forces on November 13. Some of his advisors tell him that only attacking Israel will win the popular support necessary to save his regime.

From our point of view either of the extreme approaches Jordan officials are talking about amount to suicide. An attack on Israel could result in nothing but a severe Jordanian defeat. Expanding the Army to the extent the King is talking about would be economic suicide because the Jordanian budget -- already heavily subsidized by us -- could not stand the additional \$20 million a year in normal support maintenance costs we estimate would be required.

The King may still choose to commit suicide. He has told Ambassador Burns that a point may come when he would rather go

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E.O. 13526, Vol. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6
By: cbm, NARA, Date: 8-24-05

RBJ
King Hussein
11/23/66

down fighting his enemies rather than his own people. However, our job is to (a) do what we can to help him through this tense period and (b) to restore balance to his thinking. We are convinced -- and we now have Eshkol's own assurances -- that Israel has not changed its policy toward Jordan as the King seems to believe. With the gradual restoration of calm, we hope to turn his thinking to modest efforts to better control his borders.

The attached message from you to the King is designed to help him over the current crisis.

It expresses our sympathy to Hussein, makes clear our sharp disapproval of Israel's action, and reaffirms our interest in the peace, security, and economic progress of Jordan. It seeks to allay his fears that this major raid represents a change in Israel's policy toward the West Bank by indicating you have good reason to believe it highly unlikely that the events he fears will in fact occur. (We have the firmest assurances from Israel to this effect.) It makes clear that the Israelis are fully aware that a repeat performance will have the gravest consequences for U. S. -Israeli relations.

I believe we now have the Israelis focussing on better control of the borders -- the most necessary immediate step in launching a period of quiet in Israel-Jordan relations. It will be more difficult to get Hussein concentrating on this problem rather than making unrealistic calls on us to make Jordan and Israel militarily equal.

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

We will also have to help him parry thrusts again from the USSR and UAR, who are standing in the wings waiting to jump in with offers of new equipment as they were when you approved our plane sale. However, this message is the first step in that direction.

I recommend you authorize State to send this letter out this afternoon.

~~SECRET~~

44a

~~SECRET~~

November 23, 1966

PROPOSED MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN

Your Majesty:

Words of sympathy are small comfort when lives have been needlessly destroyed. I do, however, want to convey to Your Majesty a sense of the sorrow and concern the military action by Israel in the Hebron area has raised in me and in this country generally. My disapproval of this action has been made known to the Government of Israel in the strongest terms. Our support of condemnation of this action by the Security Council and Ambassador Goldberg's statement during the Security Council hearings demonstrate the depth of my feelings and those of our country.

This action has placed Your Majesty in a difficult position. I am certain that with your demonstrated courage, wisdom and moderation, your difficulties will be overcome. For our part, I assure you that this government maintains its interest in the peace and security of Jordan and in the economic progress and well-being of its people. I have ordered an urgent review of measures which the United States Government could take to assist you during this difficult period. We will continue to be in touch with your government on this question.

Finally Ambassador Burns has informed me of Your Majesty's concern that Israel's policies have changed and that Israel now intends to occupy territory on the West Bank of the Jordan River. While I can

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority E.O. 13526, # 346
 By CSM, NARA, Date 8-24-05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

understand the reasons for this concern, I have good reasons to believe it highly unlikely that the events you fear will in fact occur. In this connection my government's opposition to the use of force to alter armistice lines or borders in the Near East has been made unmistakably clear to all parties concerned.

The strong private representations we have made in Israel as well as our forthright public statements make clear that should Israel adopt the policies you fear it would have the gravest consequences for United States - Israel relations. There is no doubt in my mind that our position is fully understood and appreciated by the Israelis.

~~SECRET~~

Jordan 45

~~SECRET~~

November 23, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to King Hussein

Revised by
Wriggins
11/23/66

Our next step in defusing the Jordan - Israel crisis is to bolster King Hussein. He is under great pressure both from the Palestinian elements in his population and from the Junior Army officers who charge that he has not provided adequately for Jordan's defense. Demonstrations have spread to all the major centers in West Jordan. He has asked us for substantial amounts of military equipment to help him demonstrate that he has moved to prevent a repeat of the mauling Israel gave Jordan's forces on November 13. Some of his ^{advisors} ~~visitors~~ tell him that only attacking Israel will win the popular support necessary to save his regime.

From ^{our} his point of view either of the extreme approaches Jordan officials are talking about amount to suicide. An attack on Israel could result in nothing but a severe Jordanian defeat. Expanding the Army to the extent the King is talking about would be economic suicide because the Jordanian budget--already ~~mechanically~~ heavily subsidized by us--could not ~~sustain~~ stand the additional \$20 million a year in normal support maintenance costs we estimate would be required.

DECLASSIFIED #346
Authority W.H. Gudelmis & FRUS, Vol. XIV,
By , NARA, Date 5-28-70

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

The King may still choose to commit suicide. He has told Ambassador Burns that a point may come when he would rather go down fighting his enemies rather than his own people. However, our job is to (a) do what we can to help him through this tense period and (b) to restore balance to his thinking. We are convinced--and we now have Eshkol's own assurances--that Israel has not changed its policy toward Jordan as the King seems to believe. With the gradual restoration of calm, ^{better} we hope to turn his thinking to modest efforts to ~~help~~ control his borders.

The attached message from you to the King is designed to help him over the current crisis. It contains

I believe we now have the Israelis focussing on better control of the borders--the most necessary immediate step in launching a period of quiet in Israel-Jordan relations. It will be more difficult to get Hussein concentrating on this problem rather than fantastic screams to make Jordan - Israeli military equal. However, this message is the first step in that direction.

45a

~~SECRET~~

November 23, 1966

PROPOSED MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN

Your Majesty:

Words of sympathy are small comfort when lives have been needlessly destroyed. I do, however, want to convey to Your Majesty a sense of the sorrow and concern the military action by Israel in the Hebron area has raised in me and in this country generally. My disapproval of this action has been made known to the Government of Israel in the strongest terms. Our support of condemnation of this action by the Security Council and Ambassador Goldberg's statement during the Security Council hearings demonstrate the depth of my feelings and those of our country.

This action has placed Your Majesty in a difficult position. I am certain that with your demonstrated courage, wisdom and moderation, your difficulties will be overcome. For our part, I assure you that this government maintains its interest in the peace and security of Jordan and in the economic progress and well-being of its people. I have ordered an urgent review of measures which the United States Government could take to assist you during this difficult period. We will continue to be in touch with your government on this question.

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~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority FRUS, Vol XVIII, # 346
 By , NARA, Date 5-28-10

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

understand the reasons for this concern, I have good reasons to believe it highly unlikely that the events you fear will in fact occur. In this connection my government's opposition to the use of force to alter armistice lines or borders in the Near East has been made unmistakably clear to all parties concerned.

The strong private representations we have made in Israel as well as our forthright public statements make clear that should Israel adopt the policies you fear it would have the gravest consequences for United States - Israel relations. There is no doubt in my mind that our position is fully understood and appreciated by the Israelis.

~~SECRET~~

Jordan
x Israel

46

~~SECRET~~

November 17, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR HARRY McPHERSON

In view of your frequent contacts with American Jewish leaders, you should be aware of the tremendous damage the Israeli government has done our interests (and its own) by its Sunday attack on Jordan.

Attached are several memos spelling this out, but you should also know that we may--though we haven't cleared this with Secretary Rusk or the President yet-- announce that we are suspending all military shipments to Israel. As you will have seen in the papers, we will also be working for a UN Security Council resolution condemning Israel.

Harold H. Saunders

- Att: Cy, WWR Memo for President, 11/14/66
Cy, WWR Memo for President, 11/15/66
 Subj: Israel-Jordan Clash at Today's Lunch
Cy, Wriggins-Saunders Memo for WWR, 11/16/66
 Subj: Next Steps on Jordan-Israel
Cy, HHS Memo for WWR, 11/17/66, Subj: A Constructive Posture Toward Israel

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/sj*, NARA, Date *5-28-10*

Jordan
x Israel
47

~~SECRET~~

November 17, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR BILL BUFFUM

One of my main regional concerns again crosses your UN track--Israel's Sunday attack on Jordan.

Since our perspective over here is a little different from yours, I thought it might be worth sharing with you some private thoughts about the President's interests in all this. The attached hasn't been cleared by anyone here, but the approach seems consistent with the President's earlier charge to think big about breaking the Arab-Israeli stalemate.

I have no illusions about the obstacles and fully understand the difficulty of changing anything on the Arab-Israeli armistice lines. However, if we don't try now, I can't picture a situation--short of the war we're trying to prevent--that would give us a better opportunity.

Harold H. Saunders

cc: Nat Davis

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cbm/s, NARA, Date 5-28-10

Jordan
x Israel

48

~~SECRET~~

November 17, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR BILL HANDLEY

Attached is a personal effort to sort out our thoughts on where the President fits into our efforts to pick up the pieces after the Israel-Jordan blowup. This has no official status, but since our perspective is a little different from yours, Howard and I thought it worth throwing into the pot.

As seen from here, Israel's bad mistake will throw new demands on us, but it has also strengthened our hand vis-a-vis Israel. Since the President has said he wants to make progress if possible toward breaking the Arab-Israeli stalemate, we owe it to him to think that big about this situation.

We have no illusions about the obstacles. On the other hand, it takes a blowup to move anything in this part of the world and now we've got one!

cc: Rodger Davies Harold H. Saunders
 Harry Symmes
 Roy Atherton

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *clm/ly*, NARA, Date 5-28-10

48a

~~SECRET~~

November 17, 1966

The President may never be in a stronger position vis-a-vis Israel. Elections are two years off, and he has an open-and-shut case that the Israelis have severely damaged our interests.

Our job is to turn this advantage into specific gains. No one claims this will be easy--or even possible. However, we ought to try to use this blowup--the biggest since 1956--to seal off Israel's Lebanon-Syria-Jordan border. We ought to set our sights high.

The first step is to spell out what we want. The minimum is to insure that this doesn't happen again. Possibilities include:

- An Israeli guarantee that it will not attack Jordan on such scale again. We might try to rebuild the Jordan-Israel relationship.
- Strengthening the UN group all along the border.
- Improving border-control machinery bilaterally.

The second step is to develop the leverage we need. Our moral position is one asset--they've really done us harm and cost us money. We can suspend military shipments or the Bunker operation. We might encourage American Jewish leaders to add their pressure. We can add all this up in the President's letter to Eshkol.

The third step is to justify this course to American Jewish leaders. We might take this line: We've invested energy and treasure in stabilizing Israel's borders. Now Israel has deliberately destroyed the fruits of that investment and raised the costs to us besides. We can't go on investing unless Israel itself begins moving toward long-term coexistence with the Arabs. Without that movement, we'd be investing without hope.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.1
By cbm/j, NARA, Date 5-25-10

~~SECRET~~

Jordan
x Israel

51

~~SECRET~~

November 15, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Israel - Jordan Clash at Today's Lunch

I'm concerned that we haven't reacted strongly enough against Israel's massive raid into Jordan. I suggest discussing this with Secretary Rusk at lunch.

I'm not suggesting our usual admonition against retaliation. We'll maintain that posture, but I can sympathize with the Israelis' answer that they can't ignore increasing cross-border raids of Arab terrorists which generate strong pressures on the Israeli government to defend its border citizens. The coalition government can't stand up indefinitely to these pressures.

But retaliation is not the point in this case. This 3000-man raid with tanks and planes was out of all proportion to the provocation and was aimed at the wrong target.

In hitting Jordan so hard, the Israelis have done a great deal of damage to our interests and to their own:

--They've wrecked a good system of tacit cooperation between Hussein and the Israelis. We had his tacit agreement to keep his armor off the west bank of the Jordan, and he had made an honest effort to round up terrorists in Jordan. Continuing this kind of cooperation will be all but impossible now.

--They've undercut Hussein. We've spent \$500 million to shore him up as a stabilizing factor on Israel's longest border and vis-a-vis Syria and Iraq. Israel's attack increases the pressure on him to counter attack not only from the more radical Arab governments and from the Palestinians in Jordan but also from the Army, which is his main source of support and may now press for a chance to recoup its Sunday losses.

--They've set back progress toward a long term accommodation with the Arabs. It makes even the moderate Arabs feel fatalistically that there is nothing they can do to get along with the Israelis no matter how hard they try. It puts a premium on extreme Arab chauvinism.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, Vol. xviii, # 533
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

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- 2 -

--They may have persuaded the Syrians, who are the main troublemakers, that Israel didn't dare attack Soviet-protected Syria but could attack US-backed Jordan with impunity.

It's important that we strengthen the hand of those within the Israeli Government who feel this is not the proper way to handle the problem. Even members of the Israeli military now doubt that retaliation will stop the cross-border raids, though they see no better solution.

We've already laid the groundwork for a sharp reaction, but this by itself doesn't go far enough. Ambassador Goldberg issued a statement in New York deploring the attack. We refused to pass an Israeli message to King Hussein justifying the raid. We will probably support Jordan if it goes to the UN (though we'll also have to deplore the Jordan-based road-mining incident that killed three Israelis and provoked this attack). Ray Hare gave Ambassador Harman a pretty hard time this afternoon. (Harman was more embarrassed than defensive.)

To stimulate discussion, you may want to raise the following possibilities with Secretary Rusk:

--You could send a message to Eshkol restating our interests and making clear that Israel has undercut those interests as well as its own.

--We could leak the main points of such a message to the press or in UN corridors to rebalance our image with the moderate Arabs.

--We could slow down military deliveries to Israeli inconspicuously but just enough to make our point. Vietnam priorities could be an overt excuse.

--We might begin putting out the line with our Jewish friends here that the US can't go on supporting Israel's interests in the Middle East unless the Israelis themselves show some intent over the long run to reach an accommodation with the Arabs. This, after all, is what we are trying to do with the Indians and Pakistanis.

--The most constructive thing we could do looking to the future would be to offer help either through the UN or bilaterally to make available the latest techniques in border security. Many new simple devices have been successful in Vietnam and have been available on the open market.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

This is delicate business, but you've put a high priority on finding new ways to get at the Arab-Israeli stalemate. This kind of Israeli move makes progress impossible. We've felt that, with Eban's appointment, the winds in Israel might begin to shift away from the old timers' idea of "fortress Israel" to the younger men's hopes for some kind of break in the impasse. We ought to come down on the side of accommodation where we can. If we don't this time, no one will ever believe we care.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Jordan
& Israel

52

~~SECRET~~

November 14, 1966

WWR:

You may want to give the President some perspective on the Israel-Jordan clash and the flavor of our reaction.

Harold Saunders

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *Clam/sg* NARA, Date 5-28-10

52a

~~SECRET~~

November 14, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We're quite discouraged over Israel's Sunday morning 3000-man raid into Jordan--by far the largest since the 1956 Suez attack. They demolished most of one town, caused at least 30 civilian deaths and gave the local Jordanian army unit a bad mauling.

We've reacted sharply. Ambassador Goldberg issued a statement in New York deploring the attack. We refused to pass an Israeli message to King Hussein justifying the raid. We will probably support Jordan if it goes to the UN (though we'll also have to deplore the Jordan-based road-mining incident that killed three Israelis and provoked this attack). Ray Hare gave Ambassador Harman a pretty hard time this afternoon. Harman was more embarrassed than defensive.

We understand the pressures on Eshkol to protect Israel's border citizens and his fear that the recent sharp increase in sabotage is a new phase in Arab policy. Israelis argue they must strike at Arab civilians in force to induce them not to cooperate with Arab raiders using Jordan despite King Hussein's effort to prevent them.

But we've consistently urged the Israelis not to retaliate--especially against Jordan where King Hussein has made an honest effort to crack down on raiders and runs the most moderate of the Arab regimes. Although it's hard to argue wholeheartedly that the Israelis should not use their superior strength to protect themselves, every time they strike back it sets back chances for long range accommodation with neighboring states. This time, they've destroyed much of the international support they gained in the UN Security Council last month and--judging from Hussein's initial reaction--have just about killed promising tacit cooperation with Hussein. Hussein is trying to be more independent of Cairo, but such pressures from Israel only make this harder for him.

We will continue urging Hussein not to strike back. We are also looking at longer range measures to help the Israelis seal off their borders by using radar fences and other simple techniques successful in Vietnam. This is the only way to get at the root of the problem.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cbm/s NARA, Date 5-28-10

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Please Return
to HHSaunders
Room 396 EOB
when signed.

53

Jordan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 4, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Congratulatory Message to Jordanian King Hussein

August 11 marks the anniversary of Hussein's ascension to the throne. A short message from you, like one you sent last year, is an easy way to show our continuing concern. As a courtesy gesture, it should not cause us any trouble elsewhere in the area.

We are in pretty good shape in Jordan now as a result of our aircraft sale. However, we will have to keep on gradually cutting back our economic aid. So keeping alive his sense of your personal interest is worth a little effort.

If you approve, we would send the following:

"On the anniversary of your ascension to the throne of Jordan, I once again take great pleasure in conveying to you my personal greetings and the best wishes of the American people for the increasing prosperity of your country. The United States values highly its association with Jordan and looks forward to continued close and cordial relations between our two nations. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson"

State recommends you approve and I concur.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/s*, NARA, Date 5-28-10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Jordan
x PR.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ August 4, 1966

WWR:

The attached makes sense. This is the one personal message we send to Hussein. Last year we also sent a message on his thirtieth birthday, but we will not be doing that again soon. Of course, there is the usual Government to Government National Day message but that is not quite the same as this personal note.

HHS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Att: Memo, Read to Rostow, 8/3/66,
Subj: Congratulatory Message to
King Hussein (@H-2686)
with suggested WWR Memo for President, 8/4/66

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cm/s*, NARA, Date *5-28-10*

54a

Jordan
x P.D.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 4, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Congratulatory Message to Jordanian King Hussein

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W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓
Disapprove

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.1
By cbm/ly, NARA, Date 5-28-10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

52

~~SECRET~~

June 21, 1966

WWR:

Prince Hassan of Jordan will be in Washington next week. He is mainly on a private trip to canvass graduate school possibilities (he's just out of Oxford). But he will spend several days here talking in INR and [redacted] and seeing a few people like Alex Johnsen.

25X1A

He would also like to talk to someone here about our overall organization for national security. This is not just an idle curiosity. King Hussein is thinking of putting him in charge of pulling together the top-level Jordanian foreign affairs and security apparatus into some sort of NSC-type system.

You are obviously the prime candidate. This guy is a good investment; [redacted]. So it would not be a waste of your time -- if you have any.

25X1

However, knowing how fragmented your time is, I'd propose setting him up to see Howard who could give him a good nuts-and-bolts picture of our operation. Then maybe we could schedule you to top the session off with a few insights, with the understanding you might have to drop out at the last minute.

Dates would be 30 June or 1 July.

Hal Saunders

OK; I'll try

Just can't do it _____

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ034-022-1-8

By 4 NARA, Date 5-24-10

file
Jordan 56

Tuesday, May 3, 1966
3:30 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

King Hussein has written you an extremely warm thank-you letter for your decision to sell F-104's to Jordan. It requires nothing more than a friendly acknowledgment because all of our tough conditions are clearly spelled out in the secret memo of understanding which concluded the deal. So this letter just wraps up the niceties.

Attached for signature if you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Att: Read to Rostow Memo, 4/24/66,
Subj: Proposed Presidential Message to King Hussein
Read to Rostow Memo, 4/19/66,
Subj: Letter from King Hussein of Jordan to President Johnson

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *clm/g*, NARA, Date 5-28-10

56a

May 4, 1966

Your Majesty:

Thank you for your kind letter in which you expressed your appreciation for the opportunity to purchase F-104 aircraft. Our decision to sell these aircraft was based on our belief that you and the people of Jordan are firm and reliable friends of the United States. I hope that the sale will further strengthen the ties of friendship and mutual trust that exist between our two countries.

I send you best wishes for the future and I hope you will have every success in carrying out your heavy responsibilities.

Sincerely,

151 LBJ

His Majesty
Hussein I,
King of the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan
Amman

LBJ:State:HHS:tmt 5/3/66

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *Obm/s* NARA, Date 5-28-10



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

Jordan
WS (4) 51
Saunders

RR RUEHCR
DE RUEHDT 7709 3162345
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 112334Z NOV 68
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4535
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ USUN 7709

1968 NOV 11 PM 7 02

02986

NODIS SANDSTORM

IN DISCUSSION WITH BUFFUM NOV 11 JARRING SAID THAT THERE HAS ALREADY BEEN A WEEK'S SLIPPAGE IN ISRAELI INDICATION OF THEIR TIME-TABLE FOR TALKS WITH JORDAN. WHEREAS EBAN ORIGINALLY TOLD HIM NEXT MOVE WOULD TAKE PLACE AROUND NOV 16, IN WEEK-END CONVERSATION, EBAN WAS NOW SPEAKING IN TERMS OF THIRD WEEK IN NOVEMBER. IGNATIEFF (CANADA) TOLD PEDERSEN EBAN NOW TALKING ABOUT NOV 23.

GP-1.

BUFFUM
BT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NSA 97-136 (*116)
By cm/ies, NARA, Date 8-25-05

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~ NODIS
Classification

214812

5

58
FOR OC/T USE ONLY

3 Aug 68 16 49z

Origin ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN

Info

STATE 214812

NODIS SANDSTORM

REF: AMMAN's 5985

Jordan

We have for some time operated on assumption contacts of a disavowable character underway between Jordanians and Israelis. At periods we have been skeptical as to likely effectiveness these contacts and have at no time had complete knowledge their nature. Nevertheless, from our point of view we see no reason at present to probe Israelis further since they are obviously reluctant cut us in on specifics and possibly have good reason.

Moreover, Israelis have told us categorically they intend to give us a clearcut judgment in early August as to what the possibilities are for progress with the Jordanians as a result of any contacts they may have. You should not assume, though we do not have any specific knowledge, that GOI-GOJ contacts are necessarily limited to those which you have reported.

Drafted by: NEA:LDBattle/*LB*
IO:JJSisco:jmp *Jp* Tel. Ext. 5241 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: U - Mr. Katzenbach *ML*

Clearances: S/S - Mr. Walsh *EW* M - Mr. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ NODIS
Classification

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *dm/h*, NARA, Date 5-28-10

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

Classification

We well aware dangers to King of any such contacts which may exist. We assume that both King (and perhaps his entourage) and certainly the Israelis equally aware dangers. Given Jarring efforts and current slight evidence movement under his mission, we see no reason for us at this juncture to probe, since it seems advantageous to our interest to let any such contacts proceed in their natural course. If they exist, they can only help Jarring Mission. You should indicate no repeat no knowledge or suspicion of such talks to other Ambassadors or to Jordanian officials including King Hussein. This message is for your guidance and information only. It is of the highest importance that our assumption on this subject not be known. If asked a question as you were by the Italian Ambassador you should continue to follow the line taken there, i.e., that we know nothing of such contacts and that we continue to ~~rep~~ rely on Jarring Mission and our own diplomacy.

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

Classification



Department of State

Jordan #6
TELEGRAM 59

~~SECRET~~

6 9 7 3 Q
APRIL 27, 1968
7:29 A.M.

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 4555A 1181200
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 271130Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5364
STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4555

NODIS

SUBJ: SANDSTORM

REF: USUN 4785

1. REFTEL AND OTHER RECENT MESSAGES ON ISRAELI THINKING ABOUT JARRING MISSION GIVE MORE THAN HINT THAT GOI MAY NOW CONCENTRATE ON MAKING SEPARATE ARRANGEMENTS WITH JORDAN. I WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED TO FIND THEY WILL SEEK CONTACTS WITH HUSSEIN DURING HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO EUROPE. WE HAVE ALREADY REPORTED SIGNS THAT SOME MEMBERS OF THE JORDANIAN "ESTABLISHMENT" MAY BE CONSIDERING SEPARATE TALKS WITH ISRAEL.

2. FOR ALL OF REASONS SET FORTH IN AMMAN 3770 AND 4119, I THINK WE MUST BE EXTREMELY CAREFUL IN HOW WE USE (OR ACQUIESCE IN ISRAELIS USING) THIS LAST ASSET FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT BECAUSE IF A SEPARATE PEACE EFFORT SHOULD BLOW UP, HUSSEIN AND JORDAN WILL STAND TO LOSE EVERYTHING. ISRAEL WILL ONLY HAVE LOST ANOTHER MOVE IN ITS CHESS GAME WITH THE ARABS.

3. I THEREFORE THINK OUR OWN INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST REQUIRE:

(A) THAT WE OBTAIN A CLEAR AND ENFORCEABLE BILATERAL UNDERSTANDING WITH ISRAEL ON WHAT WE CONSIDER A MINIMUM FLOOR FOR ISRAEL TO OFFER JORDAN FOR NEGOTIATIONS, WITH UNDERSTANDING ISRAEL MIGHT HAVE TO GIVE MORE IN ACTUAL BARGAINING WITH JORDAN. THIS WILL BE ESSENTIAL IN CASE OF JERUSALEM ASPECT OF PROBLEM.

(BB) THAT WE GIVE CAREFUL AND DETAILED CONSIDERATION TO POLITICO-MILITARY CONTINGENCIES THAT MIGHT ARISE AND BE PREPARED TO MOVE

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol. XL A 153
By , NARA, Date 5-28-10

~~SECRET~~

-2- AMMAN 4555, APRIL 27

FIRMLY AND DEFINITELY (1) TO UNDERWRITE ANY MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENT ISRAEL AND JORDAN MIGHT REACH, OR (2) TO ASSIST GOJ IN MAINTAINING PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY PARTICULARLY IF EFFORTS REACH SEPARATE AGREEMENT SHOULD FAIL, AND (3) TO PREVENT ANY OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE THAT MIGHT BE THREATENED OF UNDERTAKEN BY OTHER STATES IN THE AREA.

4. JORDAN AND ISRAEL MAY MOVE TO SEPARATE TALKS WITHOUT OUR KNOWLEDGE. SUCH TALKS COULD FAIL, AND IT WOULD THEN BE TOO LATE FOR US EITHER TO HELP INFLUENCE THE PARTIES TO FINAL AGREEMENT OR TO PROTECT JORDAN AND OUR MIDDLE EASTERN INTEREST FROM THE BLOWUP THAT MAY ENSUE.

5. FOREGOING IDEAS WERE DEVELOPED IN GREATER DETAIL IN AMMAN 3770 AND 4119 WHICH I HOPE WILL BE REREAD IN CONJUNCTION WITH THIS MESSAGE.

SYMMES

BT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

4
6
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

RR RUEMC
DE RUQKMG 4267A 0991930
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 081925Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4267

2076Q

1968 APR 8 PM 2 58

NODIS

SANDSTORM

REF: AMMAN 4119, 4266

Jordan

AS WE SEE IT, WEST BANKERS LIKE HIKMAT AL-MASRI AND ANWAR AL-NUSEIBEH WILL BE IMPORTANT DIRECT CHANNELS BETWEEN HUSSEIN AND ISRAELIS IF THERE IS TO BE ANY QUICK PROGRESS IN LATEST EFFORTS UNDER JARRING UMBRELLA. AT SAME TIME WE BELIEVE RECOMMENDATIONS WE HAVE MADE FOR PROBING OF ISRAELI INTENTIONS BY USG REMAIN RELEVANT AND PERHAPS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT IF AND WHEN WE ARE GOING TO GET MOVING. WE HOPE DEPARTMENT IS GIVING SOME CONSIDERATION TO IDEAS PROPOSED IN AMMAN 4119 AND 3770.
GP-1 SYMMES
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *dm/sj* NARA, Date 5-28-70

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM 62

~~SECRET~~

Handwritten notes: Jordan, W D, 2

RR RUQMG
DE RUQMG 3770/1A 072170Z
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 121615Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4876
STATE GRNC
BT

CONTROL : 3131Q
RECEIVED : March 13, 1968
2:33A.M.

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 3770

NODIS

SANDSTORM

1. IT IS NOW GETTING ON TO FOUR MONTHS SINCE THE ADOPTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF NOV 22. MOST RECENT REPORTS FROM CAIRO, TEL AVIV, AND USUN INDICATE THAT WE ARE FURTHER THAN EVER AWAY FROM IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT RESOLUTION AND MAY SOON BE BACK IN SC.

2. IN LATE SUMMER WE DECIDED AT LEAST TEMPORARILY TO CLOSE DOWN "SANDSTORM" AND BEGAN TO PURSUE PRESENT POLICY OF SEEKING A MULTILATERAL ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT. IN MAKING THIS SHIFT

PAGE TWO RUQMG 3770/1A ~~SECRET~~

WE OF COURSE RECOGNIZED THE DIFFICULTY OF GETTING INDIVIDUAL ARAB STATES WHICH, AFTER ALL, HAVE QUITE DIFFERENT INTERESTS IN A FINAL SETTLEMENT, TO AGREE ON A CONCERTED APPROACH TO DEALING WITH ISRAEL. INDEED, THE DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING SUCH AN ARAB CONSENSUS HAS BEEN ONE OF THE PRICIPAL LESSIONS OF THE PAST TWENTY YEARS.

3. OVER THE YEARS WE HAVE ALSO BEEN VERY MUCH AWARE OF ANOTHER LESSON--THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR A LEADER OF ONE OF THE SMALLER ARAB STATES, SUCH AS LEBANON OR JORDAN. TO MAKE A SEPARATE PEACE WITH ISRAEL AND SURVIVE. PARTICULARLY IN JORDAN, THE FATE OF KING ABDULLAH ALWAYS COMES TO MIND. WE DOUBT THAT THE SITUATION HAS CHANGED TODAY. A SEPARATE PEACE WOULD STILL ENTAIL EXTREMELY GRAVE RISKS FOR THE ARAB LEADER WHO APPEARED TO CONTEMPLATE IT. THE MOST MODERATE AND REASONABLE JORDANIANS WE TALK TO SEE SEPARATE TALKS ONLY AS A LAST, DESPERATE RESORT.

4. WE KNOW QUITE WELL THAT KING HUSSEIN AND MANY JORDANIAN LEADERS WANT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. FROM THE VERY BEGINNING

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Authority *FCIM, Vol. 11, 1-2.4*
By *ebm*, NARA, Date *8-25-05*

~~SECRET~~

-2-Page, AMMAN 3770, Section I of 2, March 13, 1968 NODIS/SANDSTORM

PAGE THREE RUMKMG 3770/1A ~~SECRET~~

OF THE JARRING MISSION (EVEN THOUGH THEY MAY HAVE PLAYED WITH WORDS DURING THE FIRST MEETING WITH JARRING IN ORDER TO SAVE THEIR HONOR AND THEIR REPUTATIONS WITH FELLOW ARABS) WE HAVE KNOWN THAT THE JORDANIANS ACCEPTED THE RESOLUTION AND WANTED TO MOVE TO PRACTICAL NEXT STEPS.

MEANWHILE, THE SITUATION IN PRESENTLY TRUNCATED JORDAN CAN ONLY WORSEN, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE ISRAEL CONTINUES TO FOLLOW POLICIES TENDING TO CONSOLIDATE, AT LEAST IN ARAB EYES, ITS OCCUPATION OF THE WEST BANK. UNFORTUNATELY, THE MANIPULATIVE STRATEGY FOLLOWED BY ISRAEL (THAT IS RETALIATORY RAIDS TO TEACH JORDAN A LESSON," OFFICIAL AND SEMI-OFFICIAL THREATS LINKED WITH RETALIATION, AND PUBLIC SURFACING OF CONTACTS WITH ARABS OR EASING OF ARAB STANDS) TENDS TO COMPOUND CURRENT DIFFICULTIES FACED BY JORDAN'S LEADERS. IN OUR VIEW, ALTHOUGH ERRORISM IN FUTURE MAY NOT BECOME ANY MORE EFFECTIVE IN ISRAEL OR IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY, IT SEEMS BOUND TO INCREASE BECAUSE OF POLICIES ISRAEL ITSELF IS FOLLOWING. AND THE POST-FEB 15 DEVELOPMENTS HAVE SHOWN THAT IT IS GOING TO BECOME MORE AND MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE JORDAN REGIME TO SUPPRESS IT.

PAGE FOUR RUMKMG 3770/1A ~~SECRET~~

RECOVER, THE TERRORISTS POSE A MAJOR THREAT TO THE JORDANIAN REGIME ITSELF. WE CAN ONLY CONCLUDE FROM HERE THAT IF PRESENT TALEMATE IN THE JARRING MISSION CONTINUES, WE WILL NOT ONLY HAVE FAILED TO ACHIEVE A MULTILATERAL SETTLEMENT UNDER JARRING'S EGIS, BUT MORE IMPORTANT, WE WILL ALSO HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY DIMINISHED THE CHANCES FOR MOVING SUCCESSFULLY TOWARDS A BILATERAL JORDAN-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT. THE OUTLOOK FOR A STABLE AND INDEPENDENT JORDAN WILL BECOME EVEN MORE BLEAK.

FOREGOING SUGGESTS THE TIME MAY HAVE COME TO CONSIDER AGAIN WHETHER TO ENCOURAGE ISRAEL AND JORDAN TO SEEK A BILATERAL SETTLEMENT. I RECOGNIZE OF COURSE THAT THIS IS NOT AN EITHER-OR MATTER. IT MIGHT WELL BE POSSIBLE AND DESIRABLE, FOR EXAMPLE, TO ENCOURAGE JORDAN-ISRAEL CONTACTS UNDER A MORIBUND JARRING EFFORT. IN OTHER WORDS, WE COULD PAY LIP SERVICE TO WHAT MIGHT BE AN OBVIOUSLY DEAD JARRING MISSION BUT STILL USE LATTER AS A GO-TO FOR CONTACTS. THERE WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE OTHER POSSIBLE VARIATIONS. I AM CERTAIN WE WILL FIND CONSIDERABLE RESISTANCE TO ANY KIND OF SEPARATE BILATERAL SETTLEMENT FROM MANY PROMINENT JORDANIANS. AS TIME GOES ON I WOULD EXPECT SUCH OPPOSITION

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-3-Page, AMMAN 3770, Section 1 of 2, March 13, 1968 NODIS/SANDSTORM

PAGE FIVE RUONKG 3770/1A ~~SECRET~~

TO INCREASE RATHER THAN TO DIMINISH, PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE ISRAEL'S POSITION WOULD HAVE HARDENED. RECOGNIZING THERE ARE POSSIBILITIES FOR TALKS SHORT OF OUTRIGHT, SECRET CONTACTS, I BELIEVE IF AS A LAST RESORT WE WERE PREPARED TO TELL THE KING WE SAW NO CHANCE OF FORWARD MOTION BY OTHER MEANS AND THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO PROTECT HIM IF HE MOVED TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL, HE MIGHT DECIDE TO TAKE THIS STEP. I WOULD BE OPPOSED TO OUR MAKING SUCH AN APPROACH, HOWEVER, UNLESS WE HAD FIRST OBTAINED FROM THE ISRAELIS A CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT IN DETAILED TERMS OF WHAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED INITIALLY TO OFFER HUSSEIN. BY THIS I MEAN, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO GET FROM ISRAEL A CLEAR MINIMUM COMMITMENT AS TO WHAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO GIVE JORDAN WITH REGARD TO JERUSALEM. THIS MINIMUM COMMITMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE SPECIFIC IN TERMS OF AREA, LINES ON THE GROUND, ACCESS, ECONOMIC MODALITIES, AND ASPECTS OF SOVEREIGNTY. IT WOULD HAVE TO BE SUBJECT TO SOME DISCUSSION. IN OTHER WORDS, WE WOULD NEED TO BE ABLE TO SAY TO THE KING THAT ISRAEL WAS AT LEAST COMMITTED TO DO WHAT IT HAD SAID BUT THAT WE WOULD ALSO HOPE IN DISCUSSIONS ISRAEL MIGHT HAVE SOME ADD-ONS TO ITS MINIMUM POSITION. WE WOULD ALSO

Why start with the hardest one first?

PAGE SIX RUONKG 3770/1A ~~SECRET~~

NEED SPECIFICS WITH REGARD TOWHERE THE ISRAELIS EXPECT TO REDRAW WEST BANK BORDERS, WHAT THEY ACTUALLY MEAN BY DEMILITARIZATION, AND WHETHER THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER SOMETHING LIKE THE JOSEPH JOHNSON PLAN FOR REFUGEES. UNLESS WE COULD OBTAIN SUCH SPECIFIC STATEMENTS FROM ISRAEL, I WOULD BE OPPOSED TO OUR APPROACHING THE KING ON BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. IN FACT, I WONDER IF WE SHOULD NOT NOW SEEK TO ELICIT WHAT ISRAEL IS PREPARED TO OFFER AGAINST CONTINGENCIES SHORT OF OUTRIGHT, SECRET CONTACTS.

BT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELETYPE UNIT

RR 0000
DE 00000 0770/2A 0721300
ZNA 0000 ZIM
R 121515Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4877
STATE GRNC

CONTROL : 31220
RECEIVED : March 13, 1968
1:56A.M.

BT
~~SECRET~~ FINAL SECTION OF TWO AMMAN 3770

MODIG

SANDSTORM

7. I WISH TO MAKE CLEAR I AM NOT BY ANY MEANS SUGGESTING WE SHOULD ALIGN OURSELVES WITH JORDAN TO ACT AS JORDAN'S AGENT IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS ITSELF. I DO BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE KING AND THE OFFICIALS WHO MIGHT GO ALONG WITH HIM HAVE EVERYTHING TO LOSE BY MOVING TO ANYTHING STACKING OF SEPARATE PEACE AND THAT THEY THEREFORE DESERVE TO HAVE FROM US AND FROM THE ISRAELIS THROUGH US A GUARANTEED FLOOR FOR COMMENCING THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE SUBSTANCE OF SUCH DIRECT CONTACTS THAT PREVIOUSLY HAVE TAKEN PLACE BETWEEN JORDAN AND ISRAEL (AT LEAST THOSE OF WHICH WE ARE AWARE) LARGELY HAVE BEEN DEVOID OF DETAIL. WE GATHER THAT THE KING HAS FOUND ISRAELI GENERALIZATIONS BROUGHT OVER BY EMISSARIES SUCH AS MUSEIBEH QUITE UNATTRACTIVE FOR THIS REASON.

8. IF WE WERE TO MOVE TOWARDS BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS, I THINK WE SHOULD BE PREPARED WITH CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR HELPING TO HANDLE CIVIL STRIFE AND EFFORTS BY OTHER ARAB STATES TO INTERFERE. I WOULD SUGGEST WE GIVE THOUGHT IMMEDIATELY TO THIS KIND OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN ANY CASE BECAUSE KING HUSSEIN MIGHT WELL MOVE TOWARDS BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT OUR

PAGE TWO RUCMG 3770/15 ~~SECRET~~
ENCOURAGEMENT.

9. ADDITIONALLY, WE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE IRONCLAD ASSURANCES FROM THE ISRAELIS WITH REGARD TO (1) PUBLICITY (BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER TALKS-- PARTICULARLY IF THE TALKS SHOULD BE INCONCLUSIVE THE ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE TO AVOID SURFACING THE CONTACTS) AND THE CESSATION OF MANIPULATIVE ACTIVITIES (SUCH AS RETALIATION AND THREATS) AT LEAST DURING THE COURSE OF THE TALKS.

SYMMES

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~ *Rm*

Classification

249988

63

4 OCT 68 15:52z

FOR CC/T USE ONLY

Origin
Info

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV
INFO: Amembassy AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
USUN

Jordan

STATE
NODIS
~~EXXIS~~ SANDSTORM

1. In conversation October 3 with Davies and Atherton, Israeli Minister Argov asked about the Secretary's talks with Arab Foreign Ministers in New York. Daviës said talks revealed no significant new ground on Arab side and ~~they~~ were for most part comprehensive presentation of Arab position with which we were all familiar. We viewed them as first round of continuing dialogue which US reps would hope to continue with all parties in New York.

2. Argov asked whether Jordanian Fon Min had referred to (a) Israeli position on West Bank territorial settlement which Eban told Secretary had been communicated to GOJ, and (b) authority which Hussein had told British he had given Rifai to meet with Israelis under Jarring auspices in New York under certain circumstances. Depoffs replied that Rifai had not brought up either of these points and that we had not mentioned them to Rifai. Argov said he was not

Drafted by: *SAC*
NEA/IAI:ALAtherton, Jr:mob
Clearance: IO - Mr. Popper (Info)

Tel. Ext. 2942

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Rodger P. Davies
S/S - Mr. Brown *RWD*
U - Mr. Katzenbach *WJK*

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By *cbm/ty* NARA, Date 5-28-10

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Classification

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Classification

[surprised that Rifai had not referred to these matters; he could assure us, however, that Israel was in touch with GOJ and that contacts were continuing.]

GP-3

END

KATZENBACH

~~SECRET~~
Classification



Department of State

TELEGRAM

65

Davis Saunders

~~SECRET~~

3

PAGE 01 USUN N 01119 301738Z

44
ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

S

Jordan
File with SANDSTORM cables

P 301652Z SEP 67
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7315
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 581

~~SECRET~~ USUN 1119

EXDIS

IN A LONG AND FRANK DISCUSSION WITH JORDANIAN FONMIN MUHAMMAD ADIB AL-AMERI, GOLDBERG REVIEWED DIFFICULTIES CAUSED BY JORDANIAN UN REPS (EL FARRA) LEADERSHIP IN ATTACKING US IN SC AND GA OVER PAST 18 MONTHS, BAD IMPRESSION THIS HAS MADE ON AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION, ITS POTENTIAL ADVERSE EFFECT ON BILATERAL RELATION WITH US, AND NEED FOR ARABS TO FACE REALISTICALLY DISADVANTAGES TO THE ARABS OF A POLICY OF ATTACKING US PUBLICLY WHILE EXPECTING US PRIVATELY TO EXERT INFLUENCE ON THEIR BEHALF. GOLDBERG STRESSED THAT EACH TIME WE ARE ATTACKED PUBLICLY IT REDUCES THE ABILITY OF THE USG TO PURSUE POLICY OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES IN AREA.

PAGE TWO RUEHDT 1119 ~~SECRET~~ EXDIS
GOLDBERG REAFFIRMED OUR STRONG FEELING OF FRIENDSHIP FOR JORDAN AND OUR DESIRE TO BE HELPFUL. HE READ TO F. IN NUMBER OF STATEMENTS MADE BY EL FARRA OVER PERIOD 18 MONTHS, INCLUDING PERSONAL ATTACKS ON US REPS AND UNACCEPTABLE STATEMENTS DESCRIBING OUR POLICY AS BEING MOTIVATED BY "DOMESTIC POLITICS". GOLDBERG SAID SUCH JORDANIAN STATEMENTS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH EXPRESSIONS OF DESIRE ON PART OF JORDANIANS FOR FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH US. DREW ANALOGY TO DETERIORATION RELATION BE-

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~~SECRET~~ OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 97-74 (*81)
By *duffy*, NARA, Date 8-25-05



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 USUN N 01119 301738Z

TWEEN US AND UAR; EACH TIME NASSER MADE SPEECH, ATTACKING US THIS DEEPLY RESENTED BY AMERICAN PEOPLE, WHO ALONG WITH OUR CONGRESS, COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY WE WOULD BE EXPECTED TO PROVIDE AID IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES. STRESSED WE WISHED TO AVOID THIS KIND DETERIORATION IN JORDANIAN RELATIONS, SO WE ASKING FONMIN TO LOOK CAREFULLY AT STATEMENTS OF JORDANIAN REP AT UN. POINTED OUT UN DEBATES COVERED ON AMERICAN RADIO AND TV, AND THEREFORE SUCH STATEMENTS GO RIGHT INTO LIVING ROOM OF MILLIONS OF AMERICANS. FINALLY, GOLDBERG POINTED OUT THAT JUST TWO DAYS AGO JORDAN ONLY RPT ONLY MEMBER STATE WHO ATTACKED US (OTHER THAN COMMUNISTS) IN GENERAL COMITE DURING CONSIDERATION OF SOV AGGRESSION ITEM. THIS IS INEXPLICABLE TO US. (GOLDBERG, WHO ACCOMPANIED BY SISCO AND FOR PART OF CONVERSATION BY BUFFUM, INSISTED EL FARRA BE PRESENT WHEN HE READ NUMBER OF STATEMENTS MADE BY HIM OVER PAST MONTHS GOLDBERG CONSIDERED INAPPROPRIATE.)

FONMIN SEEMED UNFAMILIAR WITH DETAILS OF EL FARRA ACTIONS AT THE UN. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD OUR CONCERN AND WOULD REVIEW MATTER CAREFULLY WITH EL FARRA. (HE LATER INFORMED GOLDBERG THAT HE HAD DONE SO AND THAT HE AGREED WITH US "100 PERCENT" THAT STATEMENTS SHOULD NOT RPT NOT HAVE BEEN MADE AND EXPECTED THIS WOULD BE AVOIDED IN THE FUTURE.)

PAGE THREE RUEHDT 1119 ~~SECRET~~ EXDIS
CONVERSATION TURNED TO FUTURE, PARTICULARLY AFTER GOLDBERG HAD OUTLINED IN SOME DETAIL WHAT HE CONSIDERED TO BE OPPORTUNITIES LOST BY THE ARABS OVER THE PAST MONTHS IN BEING UNABLE TO TAKE NECESSARY ACTIONS IN TIME. FOR EXAMPLE, GOLDBERG CITED HIS FREQUENT ATTEMPTS TO GET COUNCIL TO ACHIEVE CEASE-FIRE WHICH WOULD HAVE HELPED JORDAN VERY CONSIDERABLY AND YET EACH TIME ANSWER GIVEN TO HIM BY SOVS WAS THAT ARABS HAD REJECTED PROPOSAL. HE POINTED OUT THAT LA RES IN THE GA WAS A CONSTRUCTIVE STEP FOR ARABS, WHICH MANY NOW HAD COME TO REALIZE, BUT REGRETTED ARABS UNABLE TO SEE THIS AT THE TIME. HE RECALLED ALSO COMMON GROUND ACHIEVED BY THE US AND USSR ON A RES LATE IN THE ESSGA AND ONCE AGAIN THE ARABS REJECTED IT. FONMIN AGREED THAT THIS WAS UNFORTUNATE AND SAID THAT AS SUBSEQUENTLY AT KHARTOUM, A DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN THAT ALL OF THE

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WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 USUN N 01119 301738Z

ARABS MUST STAND TOGETHER. IT WAS POINTED OUT TO FONMIN HOW SUCH DECISIONS TO ACT IN UNITY ARE INJURIOUS TO JORDAN. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW PEACE COULD COME TO ME IF THE VOICE OF ARABS WAS VOICE OF MILITANCY AND OF ALGERIANS WHO WERE OVER 800 MILES AWAY FROM SUFFERING OF RECENT WAR. IF THIS WAS TO BE POSITION OF ARABS, IT WAS VERY HARD TO SEE HOW REAL PROGRESS COULD BE MADE AND IT WAS HARD TO SEE HOW JORDANIAN INTERESTS COULD BE SERVED. GOLDBERG THEN STRESSED THAT MOST CONSTRUCTIVE ACTION THAT COULD BE TAKEN AT UN WOULD BE FOR A UN REP TO BE APPOINTED SO THAT A DIALOGUE COULD BEGIN, A DIALOGUE IN WHICH JORDAN COULD LOOK TO JORDANIAN INTERESTS, RATHER THAN BEING HEMMED IN BY DECISIONS WHEREBY ARABS WERE EXPECTED TO ACT TOGETHER. POINTED OUT WE REALIZE IMPORTANCE OF WEST BANK TO JORDAN. GOLDBERG WISHED TO ASSURE FONMIN, THAT WHILE NOBODY COULD GUARANTEE WHAT THE RESULTS OF DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL

PAGE FOUR RUEHDT 1119 ~~SECRET~~ EXDIS
WOULD BE, SINCE ISRAEL IS NO MORE A SATELLITE OF US THAN IS JORDAN, HE WAS SURE THAT JORDAN COULD GET A BETTER DEAL TODAY THAT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE THREE MONTHS FROM NOW, OR SIX MONTHS OR A YEAR FROM NOW WHEN POSITIONS WOULD PROBABLY BECOME EVEN HARDER. LONGER TERRITORIES REMAIN OCCUPIED STRONGER WOULD BECOME THOSE IN ISRAEL WHO BELIEVE THAT SECURITY SHOULD BE ACHIEVED PRIMARILY IN TERRITORIAL TERMS. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT THE PREPONDERANT VIEW IN ISRAEL TODAY IS THAT A REASONABLE UNDERSTANDING AND AGREEMENT CAN AND SHOULD BE ACHIEVED WITH JORDAN, BUT GOLDBERG STRESSED THIS MUST BE DONE SOONER RATHER THAN LATER.

FONMIN SEEMED VERY IMPRESSED WITH THIS LINE OF REASONING AND SAID THAT HE WOULD STUDY THIS MATTER CAREFULLY AND WISHED TO HAVE ANOTHER MEETING WITH GOLDBERG SINCE HE FOUND THIS MTG EXTREMELY USEFUL. GOLDBERG STRESSED THAT FONMIN COULD TELL KING HUSSEIN THAT US HAS EVERY INTENTION TO USE ITS INFLUENCE AND INTERESTS TO HELP BRING ABOUT WHAT WE CONSIDER TO BE A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT AND A DURABLE AND STABLE PEACE. FONMIN EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION FOR THIS STATEMENT.

GP-1.
GOLDBERG

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WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION

~~SECRET~~ OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Classification~~

3. Aware of the considerable political and personal risks involved, we cannot in full conscience tell King what we think he should do with regard establishing contacts with Israelis. We do, however, wish to share our feeling there is real danger that Israel's position on the ground may become even more entrenched and public pressures/move GOI from position of maximum flexibility if some hope for movement toward settlement not maintained. Therefore, time not necessarily on Jordan's side.

4. In imparting above, you should avoid any implication that USG is advising him to proceed and make clear that decision is King's alone and that we will continue to try to be helpful no matter which way it goes.

5. We are repeating to you President's message to King Faisal. You should draw on this without identifying source to provide King with our views on results of Khartoum meeting.

END

GP-1

KATZENBACH

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Classification~~

COMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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~~SECRET~~

Action

RR RUEHC
DE RUDTCR 1980 2531100

Info

ZNY SSSSS
R 151030Z SEP 67
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8675
STATE GRNC
BT

GN 3558
September 15, 1967
7:54 a.m.

~~SECRET~~ LONDON 1980

1. Jordan
2. (Sandy Biker)

NODIS

SANDSTORM

RSW: LONDON 1981

1. IN UNSEC ROSTOW MEETING WITH GORE-BOOTH SUBSEQUENT TO DISCUSSION WITH OFFICIAL'S GROUP SEPTEMBER 15, QUESTION OF JORDAN-ISRAEL NEGOTIATIONS AGAIN DISCUSSED. GORE-BOOTH EXPRESSED BRITISH VIEW THAT TIME IS NOT ON HUSSEIN'S SIDE. HOWEVER, BRITISH HAVE IMPRESSION HUSSEIN HAS NO GREEN LIGHT FROM KHARTOUM SUMMIT FOR SEPARATE NEGOTIATION BUT MUST GET MASSER AGREEMENT BEFORE HE MOVES. IN ANY EVENT, THEY THINK HUSSEIN MORE LIKELY THAN NASSER TO BE FIRST TO TRY NEGOTIATIONS

PAGE 2 RUDTCR 1980 ~~SECRET~~
WITH ISRAEL.

2. GORE-BOOTH STUCK TO BRITISH LINE THEY DON'T WANT TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ADVISING HUSSEIN TO NEGOTIATE BUT OBSERVED THAT HUSSEIN'S PROBLEM IS MATTER OF TIMING AND OPTIMUM MOMENT WILL COME FOR HIM TO TRY. BRUCE
BT

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000 (#17)
By cmj/sg, NARA, Date 8-25-05

TELEGRAM Department of State

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Saunders

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Action PP RUEHC RUEHCR
DE RUDTCR 1981 2581040
ZNY SSSSS
Info P R 151080Z SEP 67
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8676
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 242
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 270
RUEHCR/US MISSION NEW YORK 728
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ LONDON 1981

CV-3554
September 15, 1967
7 a.m.

1. Jordan
2. (copy in Bundy folder)

NODIS

SUBJECT: SANDSTORM

REF: LONDON 1985

1. IN SEPTEMBER 14 EXCHANGE RE MIDDLE EAST OTHERWISE REPORTED REFTEL, UNDERSEC ROSTOW RAISED QUESTION OF THE POSTURE WE SHOULD TAKE NOW IN RELATION TO JORDAN'S RESPONSE TO LATEST MESSAGE FROM TEL AVIV IN THIS SERIES. HE RECALLED THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD ASKED FOR OUR ADVICE

PAGE 2 RUDTCR 1981 ~~SECRET~~

AND HELP IN ARRANGING FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND HAD DECIDED NOT TO MOVE ACTIVELY UNTIL AFTER ARAB SUMMIT. THAT SUMMIT HAD NOW TAKEN PLACE. CONDITIONS WERE CHANGING. ROSTOW HAD RAISED THE ISSUE WITH AMBASSADOR DEAN IN WASHINGTON RECENTLY. WE WANTED VIEWS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT BEFORE REACHING A DECISION. BOTH HE AND UK SIDE (DEPUTY UNDERSEC ALLEN, ASST. UNDERSEC BRENCHLEY, AND HEAD OF EASTERN DEPT. MOORE) NOTED THEY NOT SPEAKING FROM CLEARED POSITIONS BUT IN SPIRIT FRANK CONSULTATION PRIOR TO RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTAL DECISIONS.

2. ALLEN COMMENTED KING'S FIRST STEP TOWARDS SEPARATE DEAL WITH ISRAEL WOULD ENTAIL CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL AND PERSONAL RISK. FONOFF WOULD HESITATE TO ADVISE HUSSEIN TO GO AHEAD. IF NEGOTS DID PUT KING IN MORE DIFFICULT POSITION, US AND UK WOULD BE HELD RESPONSIBLE. UK AMBASSADOR AMMAN FEELS MOST HMG COULD DO WOULD BE TO DISCUSS PROS AND CONS WITH HUSSEIN. BRITS DOUBT THERE IS ENOUGH CERTAINTY OF ADEQUATE GIVE IN ISRAELI POSITION.

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Authority NND 969000 (#16)
By ctm/rg NARA, Date 8-25-05

PAGE 3 RUDTCR 1981 ~~S E C R E T~~

3. ROSTOW AGREED THERE WERE RISKS. HE WAS SURE USG WOULD AGREE THAT WE WOULD NOT TAKE HUMAN OR POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY OF TRYING TO PUSH HUSSEIN INTO NEGOTS. ON THE OTHER HAND A SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION BETWEEN JORDAN AND ISRAEL WOULD BE GREATLY IN OUR JOINT AND COMMON INTERESTS, BOTH AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS PEACE IN THE AREA, AND FOR THE CONTRIBUTION IT WOULD MAKE AS A START ON THE REFUGEE PROBLEM, A SOLUTION OF THE JERUSALEM QUESTION AND ABOVE ALL AS A WAY TO INTER THE PALESTINE ISSUE IN THE ARAB WORLD. IF NO SUCH NEGOTIATIONS OCCURRED, AND THE STATUS QUO BECAME PERMANENT ON THE WEST BANK, WE SHOULD FOR YEARS FACE THE CHARGE THAT WE HAD FAILED TO UPHOLD THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IN BEHALF OF JORDAN, AND BE TARRED IRREVOCABLE WITH PARTIALITY IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE. FOR THESE REASONS WE WERE BENDING EVERY EFFORT, AS THE BRITISH KNEW, TO PREPARE THE WAY FOR SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS BY OUR DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL ON REFUGEES AND ON THE JERUSALEM PROBLEM. THIS QUESTION OF SEPARATE ISRAEL/JORDAN NEGOTS BORE CAREFUL RE-EXAMINATION. ISRAELIS MAINTAIN THE SOONER HUSSEIN NEGOTIATES THE BETTER DEAL HE'LL GET. SITUATION EXPLOSIVE. TIME CERTAINLY NOT ON OUR SIDE. (ALLEN NOTED TIME NOT ON UK SIDE EITHER,

PAGE 4 RUDTCR 1981 ~~S E C R E T~~

ESPECIALLY RE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS.) ROSTOW SUGGESTED MOST WE COULD DO WOULD BE TO TELL HUSSEIN TIME NOT ON HIS SIDE. WAS IT OUR JUDGMENT THAT THIS WAS THE CASE? SHOULD WE PASS THAT JUDGMENT ON TO USSEIN, CAREFULLY AVOIDING IMPLICATION OF ADVISING HIM TO PROCEED?

4. ALLEN SAID QUESTION OF TIME WORTH CLOSE CONSIDERATION, BUT HE JUST DID NOT SEE HUSSEIN GOING AHEAD WITH NEGOTS NOW. MOORE, WHO SAW KING LAST WEEK, THOUGHT HUSSEIN WAS EAGER FOR A DEAL INVOLVING RETURN OF DEMILITARIZED WEST BANK, BUT ADAMANT AGAINST "SUBSTANTIAL ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY" OVER OLD CITY JERUSALEM. HUSSEIN WOULD DEEM BETTER TO WAIT THAN TO EMBARK ON NEGOTS WHICH WOULD FAIL IN RESPECT HIS JERUSALEM REQUIREMENT.

5. ALLEN WONDERED IF KHARTOUM SUMMIT MADE IT EASIER OR MORE DIFFICULT FOR HUSSEIN TO ENTER ON SEPARATE NEGOTS; FONOFF TENTATIVELY THOUGHT IT MORE DIFFICULT, AND THAT HUSSEIN AND NASSER HAD NOT REPEAT NOT GOTTEN A GREEN LIGHT TO PROCEED. ROSTOW SAID THAT THE FACTS WERE UNCLEAR BUT IT HAD BEEN HIS IMPRESSION JORDAN AND UAR GOT OK TO NEGOTIATE INDIRECTLY WITH ISRAEL. ALLEN SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR HUSSEIN TO MOVE WITHOUT ARAB BACKING. BRENCHLEY QUESTIONED WHETHER

PAGE 5 RUDTCR 1981 ~~SECRET~~,
TIME WORKING AGAINST HUSSEIN. IMPOSSIBLE TO PROVE OR DISPROVE.
HE CITED REPORT OF UK AMBASSADOR'S SEPTEMBER 13 TALK WITH
JORDANIAN FONMIN. LATTER CONFIDED HE GOING TO UNGA VIA CAIRO
WHERE HE HOPED TO COORDINATE GA POSITION WITH UAR. FONMIN
SAID NECESSARY DEVISE SOME FORMULA, VIS-A-VIS GA TACTICAL
SITUATION, TO AVOID APPEARANCE OF ARAB INTRANSIGENCE. BRENCHLEY
THOUGHT IN VIEW THIS MOVE HUSSEIN UNLIKELY TO BE THINKING IN
TERMS OF EARLY SEPARATE NEGOTIS.

6. IT WAS AGREED IN VIEW OF THE COMMON US-UK VIEW OF THE
IMPORTANT GOALS AT STAKE IN JORDANIAN-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS
THAT BOTH GOVERNMENTS WOULD TRY TO REACH CONCLUSIONS PROMPTLY
ON NEXT STEPS, IF ANY, IN THIS PROCESS. BRUCE
BT

NNNN

Sandus

73

~~TOP SECRET~~

4

Action

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 1256A 2471745
ZNY TTTT
R 041728Z SEP 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT

5 3 1 Q

1967 SEP 4 PM 4 10

Info

~~TOP SECRET~~ AMMAN 1256

Jordan

NODIS - SANDSTORM

REF: STATE 28273

1. WHEN I SAW KING HUSSEIN AUG 26, BEFORE HE WENT TO THE ARAB SUMMIT, I ASKED IF HE WERE STILL CONSIDERING DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS. HE REPLIED, QTE NOT FOR THE PRESENT UNQTE.

2. I SAID THAT, SPEAKING IN A PERSONAL CAPACITY, I THOUGHT THE MATTER MERITED HIS RECONSIDERATION. NOTWITHSTANDING CERTAIN STATEMENTS BY PROMINENT ISRAELIS, IT WAS OUR JUDGMENT THAT ISRAEL HAD REACHED NO CONCLUSIONS AS REGARDS TERMS FOR JORDAN. THESE TERMS COULD ONLY BE DETERMINED BY THE ISRAELI CABINET, AND THE ISRAELI CABINET WOULD NOT COPE WITH THE PROBLEM UNTIL FACED WITH THE CONCRETE REALITY OF NEGOTIATIONS. I RECOGNIZED THAT THERE WERE DANGERS INVOLVED FOR THE JORDANIAN REGIME IN HAVING DIRECT SECRET TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS, BUT COULD NOT MATTERS BE SO AR-

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 1256 ~~TOP SECRET~~
RANGED THAT THE KING COULD CONVINCINGLY DENY SECRET NEGOTIATIONS IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT OF LEAK. IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR ALL CONCERNED TO KNOW HOW FAR ALONG JORDAN AND ISRAEL COULD GET TOWARDS A POLITICAL SOLUTION. IF JORDAN AND ISRAEL COULD COME TO AN AGREEMENT, THAT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE A NET GAIN. IF ISRAEL AND JORDAN COULD NOT AGREE, AT LEAST EVERYONE WOULD HAVE A BETTER IDEA THAN IS NOW THE CASE OF THE REAL AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT.

3. THE KING REPLIED HE WOULD THINK OVER WHAT I HAD SAID BUT THAT HIS IMMEDIATE REACTION WAS THAT HE CONTINUED TO BELIEVE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD NOT BE A USEFUL EXERCISE AT THIS TIME. HE REMINDED ME THAT WHENEVER HE HAD FELT DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE USEFUL, HE HAD NOT IN THE PAST HESITATED TO HAVE THE CONTACT, NOR WOULD HE HESITATE IN THE FUTURE.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED (241)

Authority NND 969000 + State Guidelines
By *cbm/rg*, NARA, Date 8-25-05

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 1256 FROM AMMAN SEPTEMBER 4, 1967 (NODIS-SANDSTORM)

4. WHEN I SAW THE KING ON SEPT 3, ON HIS RETURN FROM THE ARAB SUMMIT MTG I RELAYED TO HIM EBAN'S PROPOSAL. THE KING RESPONDED THAT HE DID NOT THINK THE TIME WAS RIPE FOR A MEETING SUCH AS EBAN PROPOSED. HE SAID THAT THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE ON REFUGEE RETURN, PLUS INCREASING INDICATIONS HE WAS RECEIVING THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT GIVE HIM A SETTLEMENT WITH WHICH HE COULD LIVE, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS JERUSALEM, MADE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 1256 ~~TOP SECRET~~

AT THIS TIME APPEAR TO HIM TO BE AN UNPROFITABLE UNDERTAKING GIVEN THE RISKS INVOLVED.

5. COMMENT: I WOULD JUDGE THE KING FEELS THAT AS A RESULT OF THE ARAB SUMMIT (AMMAN 1255) HE WOULD BE IN A STRONGER POSITION VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL TO SEEK A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT UNDER UN AUSPICES IN CONJUNCTION WITH NASSER AND WITH THE BACKING OF ALL BUT TWO OF THE ARAB STATES THAN HE WOULD BE DEALING BILATERALLY WITH ISRAEL, UNLESS, OF COURSE, THE US COULD BE THE INTERMEDIARY AND REFEREE. BURNS
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

Journalist
Jordan
4 74

Origin ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN
" " TEL AVIV

IMMEDIATE

2 SEP 67 17 37z

Info:

STATE 31817

NODIS - SANDSTORM

Amman's 1207

FBIS check indicates no broadcasts such as alleged reftel in Arabic,
Hebrew or English services Kol Israel last ten days.

GP-1

END

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#74)
State Dept. Guidelines
By cbm/sg, NARA, Date 8-25-05

Drafted by: NEA:RPD Davies:bw	9/2/67	Tel. Ext.: 2107	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Rodger P. Davies
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Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Walsh

INR - Mr. Thornton (subs)

~~TOP SECRET~~

COMING TELEGRAM Department of State

See des
4 of 10

15

~~TOP SECRET~~

Sandstorm

Action

Info

RR RUEHCR
 DE RUQMKG 11561 2420535
 ZNY TTTT
 R 300530Z AUG 67 6598
 FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN AUG 30, 1967, 3:38 AM
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3384
 STATE GRNC
 BT
~~TOP SECRET~~ AMMAN 1156
 NODIS
 REF: DEPTTEL 25273

Jordan

Sandstorm

REFTEL WAS RECEIVED IN AMMAN AFTER KING'S DEPARTURE FOR KHARTOUM. I INTEND SEEK EARLY MEETING WITH KING AFTER HIS RETURN FROM ARAB SUMMIT AND WILL RELAY EBAN VIEW AT THAT TIME.

GP-1. BUR.
 BT

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Authority NND 969000 (#43)
 By *cbm/rq*, NARA, Date 8-25-05

~~TOP SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

4 of 10

76

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

06277

Info

AUG 29, 1967, 5:35 AM

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMVL 614 2410850
ZNY TTTT
R 290845Z AUG 67
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2284
STATE GRNC
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 614

Jordan

NODIS SANDSTORM

STATE 23273

FONMIN EBAN, IN CONVERSATION WITH ME AUGUST 28TH ALSO ADVERTED TO POSSIBLE SECRET MEETING BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES FROM ISRAEL AND JORDAN. HOWEVER, HIS COMMENT WAS IN NATURE OF LOW KEY INQUIRY WHETHER I AWARE ANY RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS DIRECTION AND REITERATION OF ISRAEL'S WILLINGNESS TO MEET WITH JORDAN ANY TIME ANY PLACE. HE DID NOT RPT NOT EXPRESS VIEW REPORTED BY ISRAELI EMBASSY THAT TIME APPROACHING WHEN SUCH MEETING WOULD BE USEFUL ALTHOUGH

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 614 ~~TOP SECRET~~

HIS INDICATION OF INTEREST COULD BE INTERPRETED AS REFLECTING HIS THINKING THAT EFFECT. PERHAPS HE FELT INHIBITED FROM SAYING SO IN SO MANY WORDS AFTER JUST HAVING MADE AN EXTENDED PRESENTATION REPORTED TEL AVIV'S 613, THE FUNDAMENTAL GIST OF WHICH IS THAT THERE INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO DATE TO SUGGEST ARABS PREPARED TO TALK AND THAT ONUS INITIATION OF TALKS SHOULD REMAIN WITH ARABS.

GP-1 BARBOUR
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND969000 (#30)
By *cbu/rq*, NARA, Date 8-25-05

Numbers
025406

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET/NODIS~~
Classification

78

23 Aug 87 02 25z

Origin ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
Info INFO: Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE
USUN
STATE 25406..

Jordan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SANDSTORM

Under Secretary Rostow lunched today with Minister Evron at the latter's invitation. Evron explained that he wished to discuss certain aspects of recent talks with more leisure than was possible in regular meetings.

1. Evron began with a question from Foreign Minister Eban. The question related to the reference in the draft Resolution on which the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed at New York to the idea of QUOTE the inadmissibility of the conquest of territory by war UNQUOTE. The Foreign Minister wanted to know whether we had the position on June 4th in mind, because it was impossible for Israel to accept that starting point. Rostow replied that so far as he could recall we had never accepted the position on June 4th.

Drafted by: *EVR* M:EVROstow:jd 5284
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: *EVR* - Eugene V. Rostow

Clearances: 8/22/67
S/S - Mr. Gribble *WJG*

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Authority NND 969000 (*34)
By *cm/jg*, NARA, Dec 8-25-05

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FORM 6-63 DS-322

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Classification

as the predicate of USG statements on withdrawal, recalling that we had refused to allow such a reference to be slipped into the agreed draft by the Soviets at the last moment in New York. He also recalled an early remark by the President in a press conference in which the President had linked troop withdrawals to adjustments in frontiers on which the parties might agree.

In any event, as had been made clear in our meeting on August 17, the President's statement of June 19 was and remained the USG position, and we had reiterated to the Soviets that we construed the draft Resolution on which we had agreed in the light of the President's statement of June 19, and as consistent with it. We had underlined the point, as he knew, in our message to Tito.

2. Evron wished to know whether we were bound by every word in the draft Resolution, and whether we planned to proceed on that basis in the Security Council despite Israeli objections. Rostow replied that it was too soon to reach any conclusions on that question. He thought, and Evron agreed, that there were advantages in approaching Tito and the Arabs on the basis of an agreement between the US and the USSR, which we could interpret

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Classification

as we did. We did not know whether the Soviets would stick to the agreed text, or to its main ideas. If they did, that fact would have to be examined very carefully, for it would be a fact of importance. Manifestly, Soviet-American agreement on a major issue would be of significance to every country of the world, including Israel. Evron concurred. If suggestions for change came up, in the normal course of negotiation, the situation would be different, and would be faced then with full consideration on our part of Israeli suggestions.

3. Evron had two other points to raise about the draft; and Rostow asked that all questions about the text be discussed in New York with Ambassador Goldberg. It might be convenient to receive the suggestions in writing, both here and in New York. In response to a question, Rostow said it might of course become possible at a later point to return to the original US resolution on which the Security Council had never voted.

4. Rostow asked about the stress in recent talks on the word QUOTE recognition UNQUOTE. Had the Israeli position changed? We had always understood the Israeli position to be withdrawal QUOTE to a condition of peace UNQUOTE. Evron confirmed that the

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~~Classification~~

latter formulation was indeed the Israeli position, although they welcomed the word QUOTE recognition UNQUOTE in the Soviet draft.

5. With regard to the possibility of negotiation with Hussein, Evron made the following points: (a) he fully agreed with Rostow on the importance of a successful negotiation with Hussein, for a number of reasons, including above all the possibility of ending the Palestine question as an inflammatory issue in the Arab world; (b) he stated that there was QUOTE room for negotiation UNQUOTE in the Israeli position on Hussein's presence in the Old City of Jerusalem, so long as the principle of a unified city open to all and under ^{unitary} military municipal administration was accepted. He said Mayor Kollek was hoping for Arab councillors to be chosen at the next elections. -QUOTE He might regret it later but that's what he wants UNQUOTE.

(c) he agreed that the problem should be faced as the last item on the agenda of a negotiation, after successful and favorable agreements were reached on economic arrangements, security arrangements for the West Bank, and political boundaries. Then the issue of Jerusalem would emerge as the key to an end of the

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Classification

Palestine problem. Evron thought Hussein had made a mistake by delay. He could have had more favorable terms two months ago, and could get better terms now than in six months time.

6. Rostow said we should soon be ready to suggest some ideas about cooperation with Israel and Jordan in the first instance with respect to development and resettlement plans for Arab refugees, following the line Horowitz had expressed when he was here. Evron replied that Harman would be ready for such talks when he returned to Washington later in the week.

7. Evron referred with evident distaste to the recent Barbour-Bitan conversation, and said that he and Rafael had been shocked by the report. Rostow confirmed that the reference to a collision course and the implied threat to pull out all stops had created concern. That was simply ^{repeat not} the way to deal with the USG. Evron nodded vigorously. We understood GOI concern about ultimate security issues. He attributed the unfortunate episode to Eban's sensitivity to domestic political charges that he was a dove of moderation. He had told us earlier that Eban would find compromise more difficult than others. In part, he thought, Eban's sensitivity derived from his experience with Secretary of State Dulles in 1956-1957. ^{Eban} ~~He~~ was convinced.

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that Dulles had failed to carry out certain commitments with regard to the Gaza Strip and other questions.

8. Evron raised with urgency the question of arms sales. Rostow explained again the difficult situation on the Hill. Evron said that GOI was glad to help us on this, but there was some feeling on the part of certain Senators that the Israelis were being used. ^{Israelis} ~~They~~ would of course help where they could; and had no objection to arms sales to Morocco, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia, but were still opposed under present circumstances to arms deliveries for Jordan.

END

RUSK

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~
Classification



Department of State

*Saudi
Jordan*
TELEGRAM
SD

~~SECRET~~

3

PAGE 01 LONDON 01139 161909Z

43
ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

P R 161711Z AUG 67
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8114
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 233
DOD WASHDC

S

Bundy

~~SECRET~~ LONDON 1139

EXDIS

DOD FOR DASD HOOPES, ISA/OSD

SUBJ: JORDAN

REF: LONDON 1094.

1. EMBOFF SECURED RUN DOWN TODAY OF KHAMMASH'S MEETING LATE YESTERDAY WITH THOMSON (REFTEL) FROM BEAMISH, EASTERN

PAGE 2 RUDTCR 1139 ~~SECRET~~

DEPT. BURDEN OF KHAMMASH-THOMSON TALK CENTERED, AS EXPECTED, ON ADDITIONAL HAWKER-HUNTERS. ALSO AS ANTICIPATED BRITS DID NOT UP THE ANTE BEYOND THREE ALREADY OFFERED FROM RAF ON GROUNDS SET FORTH BY BEAUMONT IN REFTEL.

2. ACCORDING TO BEKZOSH, KHAMMASH WAS NOT SURPRISED WITH THOMSON'S PITCH, ALTHOUGH THE GENERAL WAS OBVIOUSLY DISAPPOINTED BRITS COULD NOT DO MORE. AS BEAMISH PUT IT, KHAMMASH WENT AWAY FROM FONOFF "NOT DESPERATE ALTHOUGH HE WAS FAR FROM RELAXED". BEAMISH'S JUDGMENT (WHICH APPARENTLY REFLECTS FONOFF LINE) IS THAT KHAMMASH DID NOT GIVE IMPRESSION THAT HIS FAILURE GET FULL BEVY OF

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Authority NLT 93-296 (#48)
By etn/ijp, NARA, Date 8-25-05



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 LONDON 01139 161909Z

HAWKERS WOULD IMPEL HUSSAIN TO TURN TO SOVS FOR MIG'S TO MAKE UP JORDANIANS' IMMEDIATE AIRCRAFT RESUPPLY REQUIREMENT.

3. KHAMMASH SAW CHRISTIE, UNDER SEC, MINTECH, TODAY, ACCORDING BEAMISH, TO DISCUSS TECHNICAL PROBLEMS RELATED DELIVERY OF HAWKERS FROM UK, INCLUDING THREE FROM RAF

PAGE 3 RUDTCR 1139 ~~S E C R E T~~

WHICH ARE NOW SCHEDULED BE FLOWN OUT TO JORDAN BY MID-SEPTEMBER. KHAMMASH ALSO TALKING TO MOD TODAY ON MATTER OF CENTURION SPARES.

4. BEAMISH THEN ALLUDED TO RICHARD BEESTON ART UNDER AMMAN DATELINE APPEARING IN TODAY'S DAILY TELEGRAPH. ARTICLE, INTER ALIA, STATES THAT BRITAIN "HAS OFFERED TO SUPPLY FOUR HUNTERS, THE ONLY ONES AVAILABLE, SINCE THEY ARE STILL OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT IN RAF, BUT ARE NO LONGER IN PRODUCTION". ARTICLE GOES ON TO STATE THAT IF UK CANNOT PROVIDE FULL SQUADRON OF HUNTERS, HUSSAIN MAY WELL PURCHASE MIG'S FROM RUSSIA. IN VIEW THIS STORY, WHICH MERELY STATES THAT UK HAS SOLD THREE HAWKERS TO JORDAN. RAF SOURCE NOT IDENTIFIED NOR, OF COURSE, FACT THAT TWO OF THREE HAWKERS HAVE US FINANCIAL EQUITY. BEAMISH ASSURED EMBOFF FONOFF WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE KEEP FACT UNDER WRAPS THAT TWO AIRCRAFT HAVE US STRINGS.

5. MOBERLEY, EASTERN DEPT., PROVIDED ANOTHER EMBOFF

PAGE 4 RUDTCR 1139 ~~S E C R E T~~

PLAYBACK ON KHAMMASH MEETING WITH THOMSON WHICH CORRESPONDS IN FULL TO BEAMISH'S ACCOUNT. GP-3. KAISER

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