

4/06/10

Handwritten signatures and initials

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Action

Info

RR RUEHCR
DE RUQMKG 860A 141855
ZNY SSSSS
R 141845Z AUG 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 860

02957

1967 AUG 15 AM 2 23

1. Copy for Bundy
2. Jordan file

NODIS - SANDSTORM

1. WHEN I SAW HUSSEIN THIS AFTERNOON HE AVOIDED TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE DIRECT DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT OF A SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL. HOWEVER, I CONCLUDED FROM THE GENERAL TENOR OF THE CONVERSATION THAT HUSSEIN WILL, BOTH BEFORE AN ARAB SUMMIT AND AT THE SUMMIT, TRY TO LINE UP AS MANY ARAB STATES AS POSSIBLE TO COME UP WITH A JOINT PROPOSITION FOR SETTLEMENT. THIS PROPOSITION, FOLLOWING NECESSARY UNDER-THE-TABLE NEGOTIATIONS WITH SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS PLUS ISRAEL, COULD BE TRANSLATED INTO A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION TO WHICH INTERESTED STATES, INCLUDING ARAB STATES, COULD SUBSCRIBE.
2. THE ONLY SPECIFIC THING HE TOLD ME WAS THAT IN THE TRAVELS

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 860 ~~SECRET~~

HE WAS TO EMBARK ON TOMORROW, AND AT THE FORTHCOMING ARAB SUMMIT, HE INTENDED TO MAKE IT VERY CLEAR THAT THE ONLY SENSIBLE COURSE FOR THE ARABS TO FOLLOW WAS ONE OF SETTLEMENT AND THAT THIS WOULD REQUIRE CONCESSIONS ON THE PART OF THE ARABS AS WELL AS THE ISRAELIS. I ASKED HIM WHAT IF AT A SUMMIT THE ALGERIANS AND SYRIANS WOULD NOT GO ALONG. HUSSEIN REPLIED QTE I THINK BY THEN I WILL HAVE ENOUGH ADHERENTS SO WE CAN IGNORE ALGERIA AND SYRIA AND BE STRONG ENOUGH TO WITHSTAND ANY TROUBLE THEY MAY TRY TO CAUSE UNQTE.

3. AT ANOTHER POINT IN THE CONVERSATION, HUSSEIN DID SAY TO ME VERY SOLEMNLY QTE YOU DO REALIZE, DON'T YOU, THAT THERE ABSOLUTELY MUST BE AN ACCOMMODATION ON JERUSALEM AS PART OF ANY SETTLEMENT WHICH ARABS CAN ACCEPT AND LIVE WITH? UNQTE
4. I NOTED TO HUSSEIN THAT IF THE ARABS COULD NOT GET MOVING IN THE DIRECTION OF A SETTLEMENT BY SEPTEMBER, TIME MIGHT RUN OUT.

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLS 017R 012 001/2
B. pc NARA. Date 10-9-15

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-2- AMMAN 860, 141845Z AUG 67.

5. HUSSEIN SAID HE REALIZED THIS, HE WAS FOLLOWING TITO'S EFFORTS WITH INTEREST, AND IF AN ARAB SUMMIT WERE DELAYED HE (HUSSEIN) WOULD TRY TO MOVE FORWARD TOWARDS SETTLEMENT WITH AS MANY ARAB STATES AS HE COULD GET TO GO ALONG WITH HIM.

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 860 ~~SECRET~~

6. I THINK HUSSEIN IS STILL HOPING THE UAR WILL MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF SETTLEMENT. COORDINATION OF UAR AND JORDANIAN MOVES, EXPLICIT OR IMPLICIT, WHICH MAY WELL HAVE TO BE FOSTERED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WOULD ENORMOUSLY INCREASE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR AN EFFECTIVE SETTLEMENT.

GP-1. BURNS

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Action

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 738A 2201330
ZNY SSSSS

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Info

R 081325Z AUG 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC

1967 AUG 8 PM 12 51

BT

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 738

Jordan

NODIS SANDSTORM

REF: DEPTTEL 14237

1. THE BRITISH AMB SAW HUSSEIN YESTERDAY AFTERNOON TO CARRY OUT THE INSTRUCTIONS REPORTED REFTEL.
2. HUSSEIN CONFIRMED TO THE BRITISH AMB THAT HE DID NOT PLAN TO PROCEED FURTHER AT THIS PARTICULAR MOMENT WITH TRYING TO MAKE A BILATERAL SETTLEMENT WITH THE ISRAELIS.
3. OTHER MATTERS COVERED BY THE BRITISH AMB WITH HUSSEIN ARE REPORTED IN AMMAN'S 736 AND 737. GP-1. BURNS

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Authority NND969000 (#45)

By *ebm/hq* NARA, Date *8-25-05*

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

Laundries
(copy to Bundy)
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~~SECRET~~

Action PP RUEHC
DE RUEMVL 388 2191015
ZNY SSSSS
P 071000Z AUG 67
Info FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2144
STATE GRNC
BT

CN 1210
RECD: AUG 7, 1967
9:49 a.m.

~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 388

Jordan

NODIS SANDSTORM

REF: TEL AVIV 385; STATE 16698

1. AT LUNCHEON CONVERSATION ON AUGUST 4 EBAN RAISED QUESTION DIRECTLY AS TO WHETHER HUSSEIN IS REALLY OUR QUOTE GREAT AND ONLY HOPE UNQUOTE. FOR INSTANCE, HE ASKED, MIGHT NOT THERE EXIST GREATER OPPORTUNITY WITH NASSER IN HIS WEAKNESS. SETTLEMENT WITH HIM WOULD CARRY MORE INFLUENCE DUE HIS PRESTIGE TOO. I EXPLAINED THAT THERE WAS ALSO QUESTION OF MODERATES VERSUE EXTREMISTS AMONG ARABS AND THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP LINES OPEN TO FORMER. EBAN REVIEWED NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL TO HUSSEIN INVOLVING SENDING TWO EMMISSARIES BUT STATED THAT GOI STRONGLY OPPOSED TO ANY QUOTE PRE-NEGOTIATION UNQUOTE PHASE. HE REMARKED THAT HE THOUGHT WE HAD BEEN TRYING TO PERSUADE GOI TO EXPRESS ITS MINIMUM NEGOTIATING TERMS. EBAN COMMENTED QUOTE IT WAS UNWISE TO ASK AND IT WOULD HAVE BEEN UNWISE FOR ME TO ANSWER UNQUOTE. HE CLAIMED THAT UNDER ARRANGEMENT JORDANIANS WERE SUGGESTING ISRAELIS WOULD FIRST HAVE HAD TO NEGOTIATE WITH U.S. AND THEN WITH JORDANIANS. IF FIRST PHASE HAD NOT WORKED IT WOULD HAVE BEEN CRUCIAL SETBACK. ON OTHER HAND, IF FIRST PHASE HAD BEEN SUCCESS, ITS RESULTS WOULD MERELY HAVE BEEN STARTING POINT FOR JORDANIAN SECOND PHASE. SINCE ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND EXISTENCE ARE AT STAKE EBAN SAID HE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO BE NEGATIVE.

2. I POINTED OUT THAT THIS APPROACH WAS ELIMINATED NOW. FIRST WE HAD REASON TO BELIEVE HUSSEIN MIGHT FALL ALMOST IMMEDIATELY IF THERE WERE NOT SOME SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS TOWARD SETTLEMENT BUT THAT SEEMED LESS LIKELY NOW. IN FACT WHEN HUSSEIN PRESSED US FOR MORE DETAILS ON ISRAELI TERMS RE JERUSALEM WE DID NOT COMPLY. I TOLD EBAN THAT IN MY RECENT DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINTONDC HAD POINTED OUR JERUSALEM WAS A MATTER ABOUT WHICH WE MUST DISCUSS WITH ISRAELIS SOME TIME BUT IT WOULD COME LATTER TOWARDS END OF NEGOTIATION SO WE SHOULD DROP IT NOW AND GET PROCESS STARTED. EBAN INJECTED THAT PERSPECTIVE WAS LOST BY TRYING TO GET ISRAELIS TO DEFINE THEIR POSITION AWAY FROM BARGAINING TABLE RATHER THAN AT IT. I REPLIED AT THIS POINT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET OUR SITES

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 969000 (#31)

By *cbu/rq* NARA, Date 8-25-05

STRAIGHT. WE SHOULD RECALL THAT THIS WHOLE CONFLICT RESULTED FROM NON-ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL AND CHIME GOAL AS EBAN HAD SAID WAS PEACE AND SECURITY. WE MUST BE CAREFUL I REPEATED NOT TO LET TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS BECOME ENDS IN THEMSELVES. EBAN RESPONDED THAT OUR APPROACHES WERE NOT DIFFERENT IN PRINCIPLE BUT QUOTE PEACE AND SECURITY HAVE TERRITORIAL IMPLICATIONS UNQUOTE. HE MENTIONED THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S FIVE PRINCIPLES DID NOT SAY THAT EVERYTHING WOULD GO BACK JUST WHERE IT WAS. THERE WAS LINK BETWEEN PEACE AND SECURITY ON ONE HAND AND TERRITORIAL SPATTERS ON THE OTHER. (IN THIS CONNECTION HE STATED AT ANOTHER POINT THAT IF THEY COULD TALK DIRECTLY HUSSEIN WOULD LEARN THAT QUOTE WHAT WE COULD OFFER WOULD BE IMPRESSIVE GAIN COMPARED TO WHAT HE NOW HAS THOUGH NOT WHAT HE ONCE HAD UNQUOTE.) EBAN MAINTAINED THAT GOI COULD NOT HAVE PEACE AND SECURITY WROTE ON THE MAP OF JUNE 4TH US CANDIDATE. I REMARKED THAT PEACE TREATY IS NOT ACTUALLY REQUIRED AND WENT OVER GROUND CONCERNING US-GERMAN AND-SOVIET-JAPANESE SITUATIONS. EBAN SAID HE WOULD GLADLY SETTLE FOR US-GERMAN ARRANGEMENT WHEN IT CAME TO ARABS

3. HARMAN MAINTAINED THAT PEACE HOWEVER IS MORE THAN STATEMENT RECOGNIZING ITS EXISTENCE OR ENDING STATE OF BELLIGERENCY. IT IS QUESTION OF FACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS. EBAN AGREED BY REMARKING THAT QUOTE WE CAN'T HAVE NON-BELLIGERENCY WITHOUT NEGOTIATION UNQUOTE.

4. TURNING TO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS EBAN SAID GOI WILL TALK TO ANYONE WHO COMES ALONG. I REFERRED TO MR. ROSTOW'S REMARK TO EVRON CONCERNING HUSSEIN'S ADMISSION THAT ISRAELIS HAD BEEN TALKING WITH JORDANIANS DIRECTLY (STATE 15897) AND TOLD HIM AMBASSADOR BURNS HAD JUST HAD HUNCH THIS MIGHT BE HAPPENING WHICH HE ~~FI~~ FI ~~CRIED~~ CRIED OUT WITH KING ON THAT BASIS. EVRON HAD REMARKEDH THATE HE HAD BROKEN CONFIDENCE AGAIN BUT IT REALLY WASN'T AS BAD AS THAT. EBAN REPLIED FACT HUSSEIN BROKE CONFIDENCE DID NOT ENTITLE HIM TO BREAK CONFIDENCE TOO. I PRESSED HIM ON WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN DIRECT TALKS BUT EBAN SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO LOOK INTO SITUATION AND SEE WHAT HE COULD DO FOR US. PERHAPS WE COULD TALK LATER. HE SAID THAT HUSSEIN WOULD CERTAINLY NOT LEARN ISRAEL'S TERMS FROM OUTSIDE AND CONCLUDED BY REMARKING THAT GEORGE BROWN WANTED QUOTE MAP OF WHAT ISRAEL WOULD SETTLE FOR UNQUOTE. EBAN SAID HE HANDED THAT BY REFERRING BROWN TO NASSER SO THAT BROWN COULD ONLY SAY HE HAD RELATIONS THAT AREA.

GP.3.

BARBOUR

BT

* AS RECEIVED

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

84

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Action

RR RUEHCR
DE RUQMKG 686A 2171635
ZNY SSSSS
R 051625Z AUG 67.
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3-120
STATE GRNC
BT
SECRET AMMAN 686

CN 1086
August 5, 1967
2:03 p.m.

Jordan

NODIS SANDSTORM

REF: AMMAN 667

1. THE BRITISH AMB WAS AUTHORIZED BY LONDON THIS MORNING TO OFFER HUSSEIN THREE HAWKER HUNTERS FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY FROM RAF INVENTORY (AMMAN'S 685 TODAY'S DATE CONTAINS A SUMMARY OF THE HAWKER HUNTER SITUATION).

2. THE BRITISH AMB WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SEE HUSSEIN UNTIL MONDAY, BECAUSE HUSSEIN IS IN AQABA. I HAVE LONG SUSPECTED THAT AQABA IS THE PLACE WHERE HUSSEIN HAS CONTACT WITH THE ISRAELIS, IF INDEED THE CONTACT IS A FACE TO FACE ONE. I THINK HUSSEIN WOULD BE WELL ADVISED ON THIS VISIT TO STICK TO WATER SKIING. UNFORTUNATELY, RUMORS HAVE BEGUN TO CIRCULATE IN AMMAN THAT THE KING MAY BE HAVING SECRET DEALINGS WITH THE ISRAELIS AND THAT AQABA IS THE SITE. THE KING'S ADVISORS ARE UNANIMOUSLY OF THE OPINION THAT

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 686A ~~SECRET~~

IF THE KING SHOULD UNDERTAKE SECRET DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS, AND THIS SHOULD EVER BECOME KNOWN, HE WOULD BE ASSASSINATED LIKE HIS GRANDFATHER. ALTHOUGH I DOUBT IF ANY OF THE KING'S ADVISORS HAVE ANY ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE THAT THE KING MAY BE IN CONTACT WITH THE ISRAELIS, THEY ALL SUSPECT HE MIGHT BE INCLINED AT SOME POINT TO TRY IT, AND THEY HAVE ALL WARNED HIM OF THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES. GOJ OFFICIALS HAVE GONE OUT OF THEIR WAY RECENTLY PUBLICLY TO DENY THAT JORDAN CONTEMPLATES MAKING A BILATERAL SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL. THEY ADD THAT WHATEVER JORDAN DOES, WHE WILL DO IN AN ALL-ARAB CONTEXT.

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority ALJ. 017R. 01a. 001/3

by jc NARA, Date 10-9-75

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-2 - AMMAN 686 NODIS SANDSTORM

3. ACCORDING TO CHIEF OF ROYAL PROTOCOL RIFAI'I, WHOM I SAW THIS MORNING, NO DATE HAS AS YET BEEN SET FOR THE KING'S TRIP TO MOSCOW. GOJ NOW THINKS THERE WILL BE AN ARAB SUMMIT, AND HUSSEIN'S TRAVEL PLANS ARE THEREFORE VERY MUCHNHP IN THE AIR PENDING THE SETTING OF A DATE FOR THE SUMMIT, WHICH COULD BE AS EARLY AS AUGUST 10.

4. IN VIEW OF WHAT THE BRITISH HAVE DONE ON HAWKER HUNTERS, WHAT CHANCE IS THERE FOR US, BEFORE THE CONVENING OF AN ARAB SUMMIT, TO BE ABLE TO TELL HUSSEIN WE WILL NOW GO

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 686A ~~SECRET~~

FORWARD ON THE \$1.8 MILLION MAP AND THE \$6.1 MILLION GROUND PACKAGE SALES, BOTH OF WHICH WERE IN THE PIPELINE BEFORE JUNE 5? IF WE ARE GOING TO GO FORWARD WITH THEM, IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE A MORE POTENT EFFECT TO DO SO PRIOR TO AN ARAB SUMMIT THAN AFTERWARDS. I IMAGINE THAT PARA 1 OF JIDDA'S 469 IS A FAIRLY ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE KING'S PRESENT FRAME OF MIND.

GP-1. BURNS

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Classification

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4 Aug 67 00 012

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV

Info

INFO: Amembassy AMMAN

Amembassy LONDON

STATE 15897

Jordan

NODIS

SANDSTORM

1. During Evron call August 2, Under Secretary Rostow reported that Ambassador Burns, on basis his recent talks with King Hussein, thought Hussein still wanted settlement and was attempting strengthen his position as preparatory step.
2. Rostow said our own soundings indicated there was strong feeling about Jerusalem in Moslem world. If formula on Jerusalem could be found which would permit Jordanian-Israeli deal, this could be of crucial importance. It should not be beyond the wit of man to find such formula. Rostow recalled Eban's statement to Secretary that Israeli stand on Jerusalem represented QUOTE negotiating position UNQUOTE and that key consideration for Israel was preservation

Drafted by

NEA:IAI:ALatherton, Jr:fah:

Tel. Ext. 2942

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by

M - Eugene V. Rostow

Clearances:

8/3/67

NEA - Ambassador Battle

S/S - Mr. Walsh

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Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

VJM

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 969000 (#36)
By 60m/rg, NARA, Date 8-25-05

PRESERVATION COPY

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Classification

QUOTE unified administration UNQUOTE. This was not excluded by Hussein. (Evron interjected to say/you mean ~~UNQUOTE~~ unified Israeli administration UNQUOTE.) Rostow said we would continue to explore Jerusalem question and Israel must not exclude consideration of alternative arrangements.

3. Evron said GOI less sure than USG that Hussein wanted settlement. Doubts had been raised, for example, by Jordanian position on refugee questionnaire. If Hussein wanted settlement, it was inconsistent to refuse recognize existence of State of Israel by rejecting questionnaire with that heading. Doubts also raised in Israeli minds by recent Radio Amman broadcasts calling for non-cooperation and resistance to Israeli occupation on West Bank. further changes on

4. Evron continued that Jerusalem not now on agenda. Eban had made clear that Israel prepared find role for Hussein as custodian of Moslem Holy Places. In Evron's view, dual sovereignty idea and other such proposals were not negotiable. However, these were matters for Ambassador Barbour to discuss with GOI.

5. Rostow said Eban's position, as he understood it, was that Jerusalem should be last item on the agenda of the negotiation and could be dealt with if other items settled. Rostow said Hussein had reported that he had been in direct touch with Israelis. Having

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noted earlier in conversation that Israel had lost some confidence in Hussein, Evron commented only QTE that is another agreement Hussein has broken UNQTE. He added QTE but we have no secrets from you. I now understand what McGeorge Bundy meant when he said to Eban you can't keep us out of the room UNQTE. Rostow commented that this was what he meant when he urged a new relationship of candor between USG and GOI.

6. Re Iraqi troops in Jordan, Rostow said our latest information was that Hussein had requested their removal but was now awaiting Aref visit to discuss question. Evron commented that Hussein was not a free agent so long as foreign troops remained in Jordan. Furthermore, Hussein-Nasser military pact still in force. If Hussein serious about wanting settlement, he should renounce pact with UAR.

GP-1

END

RUSKI

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Classification

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Action

RR RUEHCR
DE RUQMKG 667A 2161600
ZNY 55555

1967 AUG 4 PM 1 06

Info

R 041555Z AUG 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT

Jordan

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 0667

NODIS SANDSTORM

1. THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, PHILIP ADAMS, RETURNED TO AMMAN LAST NIGHT FOLLOWING CONSULATATION IN LONDON.
2. HE TELLS ME THAT FOREIGN SECRETARY GEORGE BROWN MADE IT PLAIN THAT THE PRIME INTEREST OF THE BRITISH IN THE MIDDLE EAST AT THE PRESENT TIME WAS TO GET THE SUEZ CANAL REOPENED. THIS TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER TRYING TO OBTAIN AN OVERALL DURABLE SETTLEMENT, OR OF A BILATERAL JORDANIAN-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT AS THE OPENING WEDGE TO AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT
3. IN POINT OF FACT, THE FOREIGN OFFICE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE A PARTICULARLY BURNING INTEREST IN A

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 667A ~~SECRET~~

BILATERAL SETTLEMENT WITH HUSSEIN. FOR ONE THING, THE BRITISH CALCULATE THE ISRAELIS REALIZE AN ACCOMMODATION ON JERUSALEM WOULD BE REQUIRED BY HUSSEIN, AND THE ISRAELIS ARE NOT INTERESTED IN PAYING THIS PRICE. SECONDLY, THE BRITISH THINK THE ISRAELIS ARE NOT AT ALL SURE HUSSEIN IS GOING TO LAST ANYWAY AND BEFORE THE ISRAELIS WOULD AGREE TO RETURN THE WEST BANK MINUS JERUSALEM, THEY WOULD WANT TO MAKE A CAREFUL ASSESSMENT OF HUSSEIN'S CHANCES OF SURVIVAL. IF THE ISRAELIS CALCULATE HUSSEIN MIGHT NOT LAST, THEY MUST ALSO WORK INTO THEIR CALCULATION THE PROSPECT OF A RADICAL ARAB GOVERNMENT CONTROLLING THE WEST BANK, IN WHICH CASE, FIGURE THE BRITISH, ISRAEL WOULD DECIDE TO RETAIN THE WEST BANK IN ORDER TO KEEP THE RIVER JORDAN AS ITS BORDER.

4. THE FOREIGN OFFICE, INDICATED ADAMS, WOULD, OF COURSE, LIKE TO SEE HUSSEIN CONTINUE TO RULE IN JORDAN BUT ARE NOT PREPARED TO INVEST MUCH TO TRY TO SUPPORT HIM. THE BRITISH ARE PREPARED, FOR EXAMPLE, TO DIVERT TO JORDAN HAWKER HUNTER AIRCRAFT EARMARKED FOR KUWAIT. ALTHOUGH I AM NOT CLEAR AS TO WHY THIS

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 969000 (#48)
By *clm/rig*, NARA, Date 8-25-05

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-2- ATMAN 667, AUGUST 4

IS THE CASE, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE SAUDIS, IN ADDITION TO THE KUWAITIS, WOULD HAVE TO APPROVE THE DIVERSION OF THESE

PAGE 2 RUQMKQ 667A ~~SECRET~~
KUWAITI HAWKER HUNTERS TO JORDAN. (POSSIBLY THE SAUDIS HAD ORIGINALLY WAIVED A PRIOR CLAIM ON THESE HAWKERS IN FAVOR OF KUWAIT; IF SO, THIS COULD EXPLAIN THE UK'S NEED TO OBTAIN SAG CONCURRENCE FOR A FURTHER DIVERSION.) GEORGE BROWN TOLD PHILIP ADAMS THAT HE WAS GOING TO WATCH HUSSEIN CAREFULLY TO SEE IF HUSSEIN CAN PERSUADE FEISAL TO AGREE TO DIVERT THE HAWKER HUNTERS TO JORDAN. IF HUSSEIN CAN DO SO, THEN GEORGE BROWN IS PREPARED TO CONCLUDE THAT HUSSEIN DOES POSSESS INFLUENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD AND PERHAPS DESERVES A HIGHER SURVIVABILITY RATING THAN GEORGE BROWN WOULD NOW ACCORD HIM. IN WHICH CASE GEORGE BROWN WOULD BE PREPARED TO DO MORE FOR HUSSEIN THAN HE IS AT PRESENT.

5. ADAMS REPORTED THAT GEORGE BROWN CALLED A SPECIAL MEETING TO DISCUSS JERUSALEM. THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN TEL AVIV REPORTED THE ISRAELIS WERE PASSIONATELY INTRANSIGENT ABOUT JERUSALEM AND NOTHING COULD BE EXPECTED TO BUDGE THEM. SAID GEORGE BROWN QUOTE IF BRITISH INTERESTS REQUIRE THE ISRAELIS TO YIELD ON JERUSALEM, I WILL BLOODY WELL MAKE THEM DO IT UNQUOTE.

6. PHILIP ADAMS EXPECTS TO SEE HUSSEIN TOMORROW AND WILL BRIEF ME AFTERWARDS.

BURNS

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Action

Info

Jordan

RR RUEHC
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC
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CONTROL: 867

RECD; 1967 AUG 4 PM 4 39

NODIS SANDSTORM

REF: STATE 15897

1. WHILE COMMENT MAY BE UNNECESSARY ON EVRON'S OBSERVATIONS, IT DOES STRIKE US THAT EVRON'S REASONS FOR DEDUCING HUSSEIN IS DISINTERESTED IN A SETTLEMENT ARE WIDE OF THE MARK.

2. THE REASON THE GOJ REJECTED THE REFUGEE QUESTIONNAIRE, AS HAS BEEN MADE CLEAR IN OUR PREVIOUS REPGRS, WAS BECAUSE THE FORM AS PROPOSED BY THE GOI APPEARED TO THE GOJ TO CONSTITUTE AN AFFIRMATION OF ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE WEST BANK. SUCH IMPLICATION COULD IMMENSELY COMPLICATE GOJ-WEST BANK RELATIONS AND BRING PROJECTED REFUGEE RETURN TO A HALT. THE GOJ FEARED STRONG ADVERSE POPULAR REACTION, EVEN RIOTS, FROM THE REFUGEES

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Authority NS 017R 012 001/4

By jc NARA Date 10-4-15

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PAGE 2 RUOMKS 0668A ~~SECRET~~
THEMSELVES BECAUSE OF THE WEST BANK SOVEREIGNTY ASPECT WERE
THE QUESTIONNAIRE DISTRIBUTED WITH THE GOJ HEADING. THE
QUESTION OF RECOGNIZING OR NOT RECOGNIZING THE EXISTENCE OF
THE STATE OF ISRAEL WAS NOT THE ISSUE. IN FACT, THE NEW TRIPLE
HEADING ACCEPTED BY GOJ INCLUDES QUOTE THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL
UNQUOTE.

3. RE RADIO AMMAN BROADCASTS CALLING FOR NON-COOPERATION AND
RESISTANCE TO ISRAELI OCCUPATION ON WEST BANK, THIS IS A MUCH
MORE COMPLICATED PROBLEM. THE GOJ IS CLEARLY AMBIVALENT ABOUT
HOW IT SHOULD HANDLE WEST-BANK RESISTANCE. ON THE ONE HAND IT
WELCOMES THIS RESISTANCE AS AN EXPRESSION OF LOYALTY TO AMMAN
AND ALSO SEES IN RESISTANCE ONE WAY TO DISCOURAGE THE GOJ FROM
ANY AMBITIONS IT MIGHT HAVE TO ANNEX THE WEST BANK. ON THE
OTHER HAND, IT DOES NOT WANT WEST BANKERS TO SUFFER TOO GREATLY
FROM ISRAELI REPRISALS OR THE "RESISTANCE SITUATION" ON THE
WEST BANK TO DIMISH THE PROSPECTS OF REFUGEE RETURN. I HAVE
ON SEVERAL OCCASION, BOTH WITH THE KING AND PRINIM JUMA, POINTED
OUT THAT GOJ STIMULATION OF ARAB RESISTANCE ON THE WEST BANK
COULD INHIBIT THE REFUGEES' DESIRE TO RETURN, OR ISRAELI WILLING-
NESS TO HAVE THEM RETURN. I WILL CONTINUE TO STRESS THIS POINT
BECAUSE I BELIEVE GETTING THE REFUGEES BACK MAY MEAN MORE TO THE
GOJ LEADERSHIP THAN SEEKING WHATEVER POLITICAL BENEFIT THERE MAY
BE FOR AMMAN FROM THE WEST BANKERS' SPIRIT OF RESISTANCE. IN
THIS CONNECTION I WOULD NOT THAT THIS RESISTANCE WOULD IN ALL
LIKELIHOOD NOT CEASE JUST BECAUSE RADIO AMMAN STOPPED PUBLICIZING
IT. THERE IS, I BELIEVE, ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT CERTAIN
ELEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK ARE SUFFICIENTLY INCLINED ON THEIR
OWN TO RESIST ISRAELI OCCUPATION THAT ONE NEED NOT HYPOTHESIZE
OUTSIDE ENCOURAGEMENT TO EXPLAIN CONTINUANCE OF RESISTANCE.

4. I FIND IT HARD TO BELIEVE THAT EVRON CAN BE SERIOUS IN
SUGGESTING THAT HUSSEIN SHOULD RENOUNCE THE GOJ-UAR DEFENSE
PACT IN ORDER TO SHOW HIS GOOD FAITH ABOUT WANTING A SETTLEMENT
WITH ISRAEL. THIS IS IN ARAB TERMS SO POLITICALLY UNREALISTIC
A SUGGESTION THAT I ASSUME EVRON WAS MERELY MAKING A DEBATING
POINT.

5. I HOPE THAT IN NEXT MEETING WITH EVRON DEPARTMENT WILL FIND
IT POSSIBLE, IF IT HAS NOT ALREADY DONE SO, TO GIVE HIM A FULL
BACKGROUND ON HOW HUSSEIN CAME TO COMMENT TO ME ABOUT HIS
BEING IN TOUCH WITH THE ISRAELIS. I CONFRONTED HUSSEIN ABOUT
THIS MATTER, OPERATING PURELY ON THE BASIS OF A HUNCH. I DID

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PAGE 4 RUQMKG 0668A ~~SECRET~~

SO IN SUCH A WAY THAT HE HAD EITHER TO CONFIRM OR DENY HE HAD ALREADY HAD SUCH CONTACTS. IT IS BASICALLY NOT IN HUSSEIN'S CHARACTER TO LIE IN SUCH A SITUATION AND WHILE HE WAS CLEARLY UNHAPPY THAT I HAD ASKED, HE CONFIRMED THERE HAD BEEN CONTACT. HOWEVER, HE WAS CAREFUL TO AVOID BOTH IDENTIFYING THE ISRAELIS AND JORDANIANS INVOLVED AND GIVING ME ANY REAL DETAILS OF THE EXCHANGES. IT WOULD APPEAR FROM REFTEL THE ISRAELIS WERE IRRITATED WITH HUSSEIN FOR HAVING ADMITTED TO US THE CONTACT EXISTED. I FEAR THAT IF THE ISRAELIS SCORE HUSSEIN FOR THIS THROUGH THEIR PRIVATE CHANNEL THIS COULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF COMPLICATING OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH HUSSEIN.

6. RE PARA 2 REFTEL ON THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM, I HOPE THAT IN DISCUSSION OF HUSSEIN'S POSITION WHICH DID NOT EXCLUDE A UNIFIED ADMINISTRATION, ALL OF THE CAVEATS WERE SPELLED OUT TO EVRON AS CONTAINED IN AMMAN TEL 554. IF THE ISRAELIS CAME TO ASSUME ON THE BASIS OF EVRON'S REPORT THAT HUSSEIN MIGHT ACCEPT UNIFIED ADMINISTRATION WITHOUT THESE CAVEATS AND RAISE THIS ISSUE WITH THE KING THROUGH THEIR PRIVATE CHANNEL, HE COULD CONSIDER WE ARE MISREPRESENTING HIM. I WOULD GUESS, IN FACT, HE WOULD NOT HAVE WISHED US TO REPRESENT HIM AT ALL IN THAT

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 0668A ~~SECRET~~
CONNECTION AT THIS TIME.

GP-1. BURNS
BT

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Laundress 40
88

Action

PP RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 65 IA 2151500 ~~SECRET~~
ZNY SSSSS
P 031450Z AUG 67

Info

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
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BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 651

Jordan

NODIS SANDSTORM

REF: AMMAN 603 AND 633; DEPTTEL 15361

1. AMMAN 633 CROSSED DEPTTEL 15361. WHEN I CALLED ON PRIMIN JUMA THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS OTHER MATTERS AND WAS ON THE POINT OF LEAVING, JUMA INTRODUCED SUBJECT OF KING'S MOSCOW TRIP AND SAID THAT ON PRECEDING EVENING HUSSEIN, KHAMMASH AND HE HAD DINNER TOGETHER DURING WHICH KHAMMASH HAD REVIEWED MY COMMENTS (AMMAN 633). ONE UPSHOT OF THEIR SUBSIQUENT DISCUSSION APPARENTLY WAU DECISION KING WOULD NOT RPT NOT TAKE MILITARY DELEGATION WITH HIM TO MOSCOW. HE WILL, HOWEVER, BE ACCOMPANIED, AS IS CUSTOMARY ON ANY SUCH TRIP, BY ONE OR TWO MILITARY AIDES WHO DOUBLE AS SECURITY PERSONNEL.
2. I EMPHASIZED TO JUMA THAT THE POINTS I HAD MADE TO KHAMMASH YESTERDAY HAD BEEN MY STRICTLY PERSONAL VIEWS, THAT I HAD SPOKEN ONLY AFTER KHAMMASH HAD URGED ME AS AN OLD FRIEND TO GIVE MY PERSONAL REACTION, AND SAID THAT US OFFICIAL VIEW WAS THAT SUCH MATTERS ARE ONES FOR THE GOJ TO DECIDE. I THEN TOOK OCCASION TO CONVEY THE VIEWS CONTAINED IN DEPTTEL 15361, THOUGH I LEFT IT PURPOSELY VAGUE AS TO WHETHER I WAS SPEAKING IN A PERSONAL OR OFFICIAL CAPACITY.
3. JUMA CONVEYED TO ME THE SAME IMPRESSION, AS HAD KHAMMASH YESTERDAY, THAT HUSSEIN HAD DECIDED ON THE TRIP TO MOSCOW WITHOUT CONSULTING HIS ADVISORS. BOTH EXPRESSED SOMEWHAT GUARDED APPROVAL OF THE KING'S IDEA THERE WAS BENEFIT IN HIS TAKING SOUNDINGS WITH THE SOVIETS IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN HIS HAND AT A SUMMIT MEETING, BUT JUMA INDICATED THAT HE, LIKE KHAMMASH, WAS OPPOSED TO THE TAKING ALONG OF A JORDANIAN MILITARY MISSION.
4. JUMA THEN STATED THAT HUSSEIN HAS AS YET RECEIVED NO WORD FROM MOSCOW ON TIMING OF THE VISIT. (I ASSUME HUSSEIN INDICATED TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HE WANTED TO VISIT MOSCOW BEFORE AN ARAB SUMMIT.) KING REMAINS HOPEFUL THAT THIS TRIP CAN BE FITTED IN PRIOR TO ARAB SUMMIT; TIME PERMITTING, HE ALSO INTENDS, SAYS JUMA, TO VISIT TEHRAN AND BAGHDAD PRIOR TO SUMMIT, EITHER ENROUTE TO OR AFTER LEAVING MOSCOW.

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By *cbm/rq*, NARA, Date *1-25-05*

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PAGE -2- AMMAN 651

NODIS-SANDSTORM

5. IN VIEW OF FOREGOING, AND SINCE AS THINGS STAND I WOULD HAVE NO OTHER REASON TO SEE THE KING IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, MY INSTINCT, UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO THE CONTRARY, IS TO LET THE MATTER REST WHERE IT IS.

6. DURING OUR CONVERSATION JUMA ALSO DISCUSSED WITH ME WEST BANK DEVELOPMENTS AND DESCRIBED A REPORT SENT HIM BY THE FORMER JORDANIAN GOVERNOR OF JERUSALEM, ANWAR KHATIB, JUST PRIOR TO KHATIB'S ARREST ON JULY 31. THIS IS BEING REPORTED BY SEPARATE TELEGRAM NOT IN THE SANDSTORM CHANNEL. I FOUND PARTICULARLY INTERESTING THAT KHATIB REPORTED HE HAD HAD CONVERSATIONS WITH ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS WHO HAD TOLD HIM IF HUSSEIN WOULD NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAEL HE WOULD NOT ONLY BE GIVEN BACK THE WEST BANK BUT THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE WILLING TO "DISCUSS" JERUSALEM, IMPLYING A GIVE IN THE STATED ISRAELI POSITION ON JERUSALEM. EXACTLY WHEN BETWEEN MID-JUNE AND THE END OF JULY THESE ISRAELI STATEMENTS WERE MADE UNFORTUNATELY IS NOT CLEAR.

GP-1. BURNS

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

015361

INDICATE: COLLECT
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Origin ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN

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Info:

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SANDSTORM

N O D I S

AMMAN 603

Jordan

We fully concur with your handling of King's visit to Moscow. We believe we should not show undue concern at prospect visit and that it would be a tactical mistake to try ~~to~~ ^{to} talk him out of it. When you see him, you should say that we are sure he has carefully weighed the pros and cons of such a venture and that we would not wish to seek to influence his decision. At the same time, while we do not expect him to leap at the first Soviet offer we think it incumbent on USG to state what he already knows, i.e., that his acceptance of Soviet arms would only have an adverse effect on our ability to continue aid to Jordan. It would also complicate and probably jeopardise his chances of working out a settlement with Israel.

GP-3

End

RUSK

Drafted by: NEA/ARN:RBHoughton:dmg 8/2/67 5617

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: M - Eugene V. Rostow

Clearances:

NEA - Ambassador Strong
NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton

NEA - Mr. Battle
S/S - Mr. Read
The Under Secretary

~~SECRET~~

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Authority NND 969000 (#76)
By cbm/ig, NARA, Date 8-25-05

FORM 8-52 09-72

PRESERVATION COPY

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Action 00 RUEHC
 DE RUQMKL 633A 2141800
 ZNY SSSSS
 Info 0 021745Z AUG 67
 FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3085
 STATE GRNC
 BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 633

3 7 9
 AUGUST 2, 1967
 11:11 P.M.

Jordan

NODIS SANDSTORM

REF: AMMAN 603

1. I SAW CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL AMER KHAMMASH TODAY. HE ASKED ME WHAT VIEWS I HAD ON THE KING'S FORTHCOMING TRIP TO MOSCOW. I REPLIED BY ASKING HIM WHAT HE, GENERAL KHAMMASH, THOUGHT OF IT. KHAMMASH SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HE SAW NO OBJECTION TO THE KING'S GOING TO MOSCOW IN ORDER TO TRY TO GAIN DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT, PARTICULARLY IN RELATION TO THE RADICAL ARABS, HE QUESTIONED THE ADVISABILITY OF THE KING'S TAKING ALONG A JORDANIAN MILITARY MISSION.

2. KHAMMASH SAID THAT IT WAS ONLY AFTER HIS RETURN TO AMMAN ON THE EVENING OF JULY 28 THAT HE LEARNED THE KING PLANNED TO TAKE JORDANIAN MILITARY EXPERTS WITH HIM TO MOSCOW. KHAMMASH INDICATED HE DID NOT EVEN NOW KNOW WHO MIGHT HAVE ADVISED THE KING TO DO SO, OR WHETHER THE KING HAD MADE HIS OWN DECISION IN THIS MATTER WITHOUT ADVICE FROM ANYONE. KHAMMASH SAID HE ALSO DID NOT KNOW WHOM THE KING PLANNED TO TAKE WITH HIM TO MOSCOW. KHAMMASH SAID HE TOLD THE KING HE THOUGHT WASHINGTON WOULD IN TIME FURNISH JORJAN WITH MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND THAT HE (KHAMMASH) WAS OPPOSED TO THE IDEA OF HAVING A JORDANIAN MILITARY MISSION VISIT MOSCOW AT THIS TIME. KHAMMASH SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE JORDANIAN MILITARY MISSION WAS JUST TO WINDOW SHOP; NO COMMITMENTS WOULD BE ENTERED INTO AT THIS TIME.

3. KHAMMASH BORE DOWN HARD TO GET MY REACTION. SEVERAL TIMES I SHRUGGED MY SHOULDERS AND SAID THE MATTER WAS ONE FOR THE GOJ ITSELF TO DECIDE. KHAMMASH SAID HE WAS AWARE THE KING HAD INFORMED ME OF HIS INTENTION TO TAKE A MILITARY MISSION TO MOSCOW--HAD WASHINGTON GIVEN ME ANY REACTION? I REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE. FINALLY KHAMMASH URGED ME AT LEAST TO GIVE HIM THE BENEFIT OF MY OWN PERSONAL OPINION.

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Authority NND 969000 (#51)
 By *cbm/rgj* NARA, Date *8-25-05*

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-2- AMMAN 633, AUGUST 2. N O D I S - SANDSTORM

4. I CAPITULATED AND REPLIED "ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES: THE US HAS GROWN QUITE ACCUSTOMED TO HAVING FRIENDLY STATES INDICATE THEY MIGHT HAVE TO GO TO MOSCOW FOR ARMS. WE ARE HARDLY FAZED BY IT ANYMORE. AS GENERAL KHAMMASH KNOWS FROM COL. JORDAN AND ME, AND FROM READING THE NEW YORK TIME, OUR PROBLEM ON SUPPLYING MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO JORDAN IS AT PRESENT ESSENTIALLY CONGRESSIONAL. THE PRESENCE OF A JORDANIAN MILITARY MISSION TO MOSCOW WOULD, IN MY OPINION, HAVE NO EFFECT ON WHAT MILITARY ITEMS WE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO SUPPLY TO JORDAN, OR ON THE TIMING OF THEIR DELIVERY. IN OTHER WORDS, THE EFFECT ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WOULD BE ZERO. AS FOR THE CONGRESS, IT WAS MY GUESS THAT A VISIT OF A JORDANIAN MILITARY MISSION TO MOSCOW AT THIS TIME WOULD, IF ANYTHING, MORE LIKELY HAVE A NEGATIVE THAN A POSITIVE EFFECT, FROM JORDAN'S POINT OF VIEW, AS REGARDS THE MATTER OF ARMS DELIVERY TO JORDAN. IT SEEMED TO ME, TOO, THAT THE SENDING OF A JORDANIAN MILITARY MISSION TO MOSCOW AT THIS TIME WOULD TEND TO WHET THE APPETITE OF THE ARMY AND THE POPULACE GENERALLY FOR ARMS, AND THAT THIS WOULD ONLY RESULT IN INCREASED PRESSURE ON THE GOJ. SINCE PRESUMABLY THE SOVIETS STOOD READY FOR THE INDEFINITE FUTURE TO FURNISH JORDAN WITH ARMS, WHAT WAS THE HURRY TO SEND A JORDANIAN MILITARY MISSION TO MOSCOW UNTIL JORDAN HAD MADE A FINAL DECISION TO ACQUIRE SOVIET ARMS? THE DECISION TO ACQUIRE SOVIET ARMS WAS ONE, OF COURSE; JORDAN WAS FREE TO MAKE AT ANY TIME BUT WAS NOT A DECISION TO BE ENTERED UPON LIGHTLY, SINCE IT WOULD AFFECT A GREAT MANY THINGS, INCLUDING THE US-JORDANIAN RELATIONSHIP, AND ALL THESE THINGS SHOULD BE THOUGHT THROUGH CAREFULLY AND THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES FULLY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

5. KHAMMASH SAID THAT HE AGREED ENTIRELY WITH MY PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS AND LEFT ME WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WOULD PROBABLY TALK TO THE KING AGAIN ABOUT THIS MATTER.

6. I ASKED KHAMMASH ABOUT CURRENT STATE OF GOJ THINKING ON THE F-104 AIRCRAFT AND MENTIONED THE KING HAD INFORMED ME THAT HIS PILOTS WHO HAD RECENTLY TESTED OUT F-5 AIRCRAFT IN IRAN FELT THAT AIRCRAFT WAS UNSUITABLE. KHAMMASH SAID IN HIS OPINION IT WAS "FAR TOO PREMATURE" TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE TYPE OF SUPERSONIC AIRCRAFT JORDAN WOULD EVENTUALLY

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-3- AMMAN 633, AUGUST 2. N O D I S - SANDSTORM

HAVE IN ITS INVENTORY. THE JORDAN AIR FORCE HAD ONLY ONE URGENT NEED: A MINIMUM OF ONE SQUADRON OF HAWKER HUNTERS. "THIS WOULD DO THE AIR FORCE FOR ALONG TIME. KHAMMASH MENTIONED THERE WERE TWO-SEATER MODELS IN BOTH KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA AS WELL AS 5 SINGLE-SEATERS IN THE SAG INVENTORY, HOWEVER, HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT JORDAN'S GETTING THESE FROM EITHER KUWAIT OR SAUDI ARABIA AND URGED THAT USG DO ALL POSSIBLE TO ENCOURAGE HMG TO RELEASE ONE SQUADRON OF HAWKER HUNTERS FROM RAF INVENTORY.

7. KHAMMASH SAID HE WAS STILL CONCERNED ABOUT THE THREAT POSED BY A POSSIBLE MILITARY INTERVENTION FROM SYRIAN. HE SAID HE WOULD NOT ENTERTAIN THIS AS A POSSIBILITY WERE IT NOT FOR THE FACT THE SYRIAN REGIME WAS SO "CRAZY, IRRESPONSIBLE, UNCONTROLLABLE." KHAMMASH GAVE IT AS HIS OPINION THAT THE JORDAN ARAB ARMY WITH PRESENT EQUIPMENT AND WITHOUT AIR SUPPORT WOULD HAVE A FIFTY-FIFTY CHANCE OF BEING ABLE TO TAKE CARE OF THE SITUATION. KHAMMASH SAID HE WOULD FEEL MUCH MORE COMFORTABLE WITH SOME GROUND EQUIPMENT REPLACEMENTS AND AT LEAST A SQUADRON OF HUNTERS.

8. KHAMMASH CONCLUDED THE CONVERSATION BY SAYING HE LOOKED FORWARD TO MEETING WITH COL. JORDAN AGAIN IN LONDON.

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Action

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Info

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ZNY SSSSS
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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
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Jordan

~~SECRET~~ SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTION AMMAN 603

NODIS SANDSTORM

REF: AMMAN'S 519, 554, 594

1. I WOULD ESTIMATE THAT HUSSEIN'S PRESENT THOUGHTS REGARDING CONCLUSION OF A DURABLE PEACE SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL RUN ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

A. HUSSEIN STILL WANTS A DURABLE SETTLEMENT.

B. HE CALCULATES THE ISRAELIS HAVE LESS INCENTIVE THAN THE USG MIGHT THINK TO MAKE A SETTLEMENT WITH JORDAN WITH WHICH HUSSEIN AND HIS REGIME COULD, IN HUSSEIN'S OPINION, SURVIVE.

C. IF ISRAEL IS TO GRANT JORDAN A SETTLEMENT WITH WHICH HUSSEIN CAN LIVE, A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF PRESSURE WILL HAVE TO BE APPLIED ON ISRAEL. THE COUNTRY WHICH POSSESSES THE MOST EFFECTIVE PRESSURE CAPABILITY IN THIS CASE IS THE US. AND THE US HAS NOT INDICATED TO HUSSEIN'S SATISFACTION THAT

PAGE 2 RUQMKG. 603/1A ~~SECRET~~
IT IS WILLING TO APPLY THE PRESSURE WHICH HUSSEIN THINKS WOULD BE REQUIRED.

D. SINCE THE RISKS TO HUSSEIN AND HIS REGIME ARE GREAT IN UNDERTAKING TO MAKE A BILATERAL SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL, HE PREFERS NOT TO INCUR THESE RISKS UNTIL PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS IMPROVE.

E. HE CALCULATES HE CAN WAIT THREE TO FOUR MONTHS. DURING THIS PERIOD, THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY SOME BONANZA WILL COME HIS WAY, SUCH AS NASSER MAKING A SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL, OR SOMETHING BEING WORKED OUT FOR HIM AND OTHER ARABS

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Authority DS-01FR-012-0015

By jc NARA Date 10-9-15

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-2- AMMAN 603, AUGUST 1, SECTION ONE OF TWO-

THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL. AT ANY RATE, DURING THIS THREE-TO-FOUR MONTH PERIOD HUSSEIN PLANS TO TAKE ACTIONS INTENDED TO STRENGTHEN HIS POSITION INTERNALLY IN JORDAN AND TO PUT HIM IN A STRONGER POSITION TO DEAL WITH ISRAEL IN REACHING A SETTLEMENT. IN THIS LATTER CONNECTION HE WILL TRY TO APPLY PRESSURE ON THE US TO BE WILLING TO TAKE A FIRMER STAND WITH ISRAEL IN HIS BEHALF. (I SUSPECT THAT HE IS AS INTERESTED IN OUR SUPPLYING HIM WITH MILITARY EQUIPMENT AS AN INDICATOR OF US SUPPORT TO JORDAN AS HE IS IN HAVING THE MILITARY EQUIP-

MENT ITSELF FOR WHAT HE DEEMS TO BE NECESSARY MORALE AND

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 603/1A ~~SECRET~~
SECURITY REASONS.)

2. EVEN BEFORE MY INTERVIEW WITH THE KING ON JULY 25 (AMMAN'S 519 HUSSEIN ENTERTAINED THE IDEA OF GOING TO MOSCOW IN ORDER TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES OF SOVIET DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT AND AS A GAMBIT TO STRENGTHEN HIS POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE ARAB RADICALS (AMMAN'S 431). WHAT HAS NOW BEEN ADDED IS THAT HE PLANS TO TAKE JORDANIAN MILITARY EXPERTS WITH HIM TO ASCERTAIN WHAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT BE WILLING TO OFFER HIM IN THE WAY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT, AND ON WHAT TERMS.

3. AS INDICATED IN PARA 3 OF AMMAN'S 594, IT WAS WHO INITIATED THE DISCUSSION ABOUT THE KING'S TRIP TO MOSCOW. WHILE I DID NOT FEEL HE WAS IN ANY WAY TRYING TO CONCEAL HIS THINKING ABOUT THIS TRIP, IT SHOULD BE NOTED HE HAD PROBABLY ARRIVED AT HIS DECISION TO MAKE THE TRIP AT LEAST TWO DAYS BEFORE AND WITHOUT FURTHER CONSULTATION WITH US, AS AT ONE TIME (AMMAN'S 431) HE SAID HE WOULD DO

4. AS OPPOSED TO THE CONDITION HE WAS IN WHEN I SAW HIM ON JULY 12 WHEN HE HAD JUST RETURNED FROM CAIRO, HUSSEIN APPEARS NOW TO HAVE RECOVERED HIS CUSTOMARY QUITE EXTRAORDINARY SELF-ASSURANCE. HE IS CLEARLY CONFIDENT THAT HE CAN HANDLE HIM-

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 603/1A ~~SECRET~~
SELF IN MOSCOW AND CERTAINLY IS NOT UNDERTAKING THIS TRIP IN IGNORANCE OF ITS POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES. HE HAS BEEN CAREFULLY

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-3- AMMAN 603, AUGUST 1, SECTION ONE OF TWO-

BRIEFED BY USG REPRESENTATIVES OVER THE YEARS ON SOVIET AIMS AND INTENTIONS TOWARDS THE NEAR EAST AND IS WELL AWARE OF SOVIET AMBIVALENCE TOWARDS HIMSELF.

5. YESTERDAY HUSSEIN CONCLUDED HIS COMMENTS ABOUT HIS MOSCOW TRIP WITH THE STATEMENT: QTE OF COURSE, YOU KNOW I WOULD RATHER GET ARMS FROM YOU THAN FROM THE SOVIETS UNQTE. WHILE I DOUBT THAT HUSSEIN WILL SIGN UP FOR SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT WHEN HE IS IN MOSCOW, I CANNOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF HIS DOING SO. IN ANY EVENT, I SUSPECT IT WILL NOT BE TOO LONG AFTER HE RETURNS FROM MOSCOW THAT HE WILL FEEL HE HAS TO MAKE A FINAL DECISION IN THIS REGARD.

6. I ASSUME HUSSEIN FIGURES THAT BY GOING TO MOSCOW HE WILL BE ADDING TWO STRINGS TO HIS BOW: (A) SOVIET DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT; AND (B) A PRESSURE ON THE US TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING IN TERMS OF DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT. IF THE LATTER PLOY FAILS, HUSSEIN WILL PRESUMABLY CALCULATE THAT SOVIET ARMS MIGHT ALSO REPRESENT A PRESSURE POINT ON ISRAEL, ALBEIT NOT SO EFFECTIVE AS US SUPPORT.

PAGE 5 RUMKMS 603/1A ~~SECRET~~

7. I MIGHT NOTE HERE THAT THE JORDANIAN LEADERSHIP HAS HAD LONG EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH THE US ON THE MATTER ARMS ACQUISITION. WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY FURNISHED THEM WITH A GOOD DEAL LESS THAN THEY HAVE WANTED. THEY ARE CAREFUL READERS OF THE NEW YORK TIMES AND COULD BE INTERPRETING OUR PRESENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS TO MEAN THAT EVEN IF WE DO RESUME OUR ARMS SHIPMENT TO JORDAN, THESE SHIPMENTS WILL PROBABLY BE STRICTLY LIMITED IN QUANTITY AND TYPES OF EQUIPMENT. IT HAS BEEN OVER A MONTH NOW SINCE I FIRST INDICATED TO GENERAL KHAMMASH THAT HE MIGHT WISH TO MAKE A LIST OF HIS PRIORITY MILITARY MATERIEL REQUIREMENT WITHIN THE PLANNING SCOPE OF THE \$1.8 MILLION AND \$6 MILLION AVAILABLE UNDER OUR MAP PROGRAM AND THE GROUND EQUIPMENT SALES PROGRAM. KHAMMASH HAS YET TO GIVE US ANY SUCH LIST FORMALLY, THOUGH A LIST WAS GIVEN TO US JULY 31 BY A JUNIOR OFFICER WITH THE COMMENT THAT THE JAA WILL WISH TO DISCUSS THE LIST WITH US IN ABOUT TEN DAYS.

8. DURING THE PAST TWO WEEKS THE EMBASSY HAS MADE A STUDY OF THE DEGREE OF PRESSURE AMONGST THE POPULACE, AND THE DEGREE

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-4- AMMAN 603, AUGUST 1, SECTION ONE OF TWO.

OF PRESSURE FROM THE LOWER RANKS OF THE JORDAN MILITARY, FOR A MAJOR RE-EQUIPMENT OF THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES. WITH THE

PAGE 6 RUQMKG 603/1A ~~SECRET~~

EXCEPTION OF THE AIR FORCE, WE DETECT FAR LESS PRESSURE FROM BELOW THAN FROM THE TOP ARMY COMMAND AND THE JORDANIAN LEADERSHIP. HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, ACCOMPANIED BY MILITARY ADVISERS, COULD, HOWEVER, WHET THE APPETITE FOR ARMS OF THE RANK AND FILE OF THE ARMY AND OF THE JORDANIAN PUBLIC GENERALLY.

9. IF I AM CORRECT, OUR INTEREST IN HUSSEIN IS AS A MEANS TO AN END. AT THIS POINT, PRESUMABLY, "THE END" IS TO PRECLUDE AN EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION FROM DEVELOPING IN THE MIDDLE EAST BY MEANS OF A DURABLE SETTLEMENT AND BY RETAINING A US POSITION IN THE ARAB WORLD.

10. HUSSEIN'S PURCHASE OF ARMS FROM THE USSR COULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE AN EFFECT ON THE ATTAINMENT OF OUR GOAL. SINCE SO MANY CONSIDERATIONS ARE INVOLVED WHICH WASHINGTON IS BETTER ABLE TO ASSESS THAN I--VIZ. CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATIONS, THE REACTION IN ISRAEL AND OTHER MIDDLE EASTERN STATES--I CAN ONLY POSE THE QUESTIONS AND SUBMIT ONE OR TWO HIGHLY TENTATIVE PERSONAL VIEWS.

11. JORDAN. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY FOR HOW LONG WE COULD MAINTAIN A POSITION HERE, SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE MODERATE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME, THROUGH ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE ALONE

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NOTE: MESSAGE DELAYED IN TRANSMISSION.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~SECRET~~ FINAL SECTION OF TWO SECTION AMMAN 603

NODIS-SANDSTORM

(ASSUMING IT MIGHT BE FEASIBLE TO CONTINUE TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN IN DOMESTIC US TERMS). I DO NOT KNOW ENOUGH ABOUT THE PATTERN THAT HAS OCCURRED IN OTHER COUNTRIES WHERE WE AND THE SOVIETS BOTH FURNISH ASSISTANCE.

12. OTHER MODERATE ARAB STATES. I WOULD JUDGE THAT THE EFFECT OF A GOJ-USSR ARMS DEAL ON OTHER MODERATE ARAB STATES MIGHT BE TO ENCOURAGE A DEFEATIST ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PROSPECT OF REMAINING MODERATE.

13. ISRAEL. HUSSEIN MAY CALCULATE THAT A USSR-GOJ DEAL MIGHT TURN HIM INTO A MORE INTERESTING PARTNER FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL THAN HE IS AT PRESENT. I DEFER TO AMBASSADOR BARBOUR, BUT PERSONALLY MORE REASONS OCCUR TO ME WHY ISRAEL MIGHT BE MORE RELUCTANT TO CONCLUDE A GENEROUS SETTLEMENT WITH JORDAN IF JORDAN TAKES SOVIET ARMS, THAN OTHERWISE.

14. SINCE I FELT THAT COMMENT, IF ANY, WHICH MIGHT APPRO-

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 603/2A ~~SECRET~~
PRIATELY BE MADE TO HUSSEIN CONCERNING HIS FORTHCOMING TRIP TO MOSCOW SHOULD BE MOST CAREFULLY WEIGHTED, AND, IN FACT, SCRIPTED IN WASHINGTON, I MADE NO COMMENT YESTERDAY TO WHAT THE KING HAD TO SAY ON THIS SUBJECT.

15. IF THE DEPARTMENT WISHES ME TO MAKE ANY STATEMENT TO HUSSEIN IN THIS CONNECTION, I SHALL APPRECIATE RECEIVING THE TEXT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I DO NOT KNOW WHEN HE PLANS TO LEAVE FOR TAIWAN AND MOSCOW, BUT PRESUMABLY IT COULD BE AS SOON AS AUGUST 4.

GP-1. BURNS
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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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JULY 31, 1967 8:30 PM

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
STATE GRNC
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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 594 SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS

NODIS

SANDSTORM

1. I SAW THE KING THIS AFTERNOON IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT THE INSTRUCTION REGARDING JERUSALEM CONTAINED IN DEPTTEL 14206. THIS SUBJECT, TOGETHER IS SUBSTANCE OF MY CONVERSATION WITH THE KING WHICH RELATED TO REFUGEES, ARE BEING REPORTED BY SEPARATE TELEGRAMS (AMMAN'S 590 AND 591). THE REMAINDER OF THE CONVERSATION WAS AS FOLLOWS:

2. TEHRAN. (THE IRANIAN AMB TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT THE SHAH HAD CONSULTED WITH THE PRESIDENT OF TURKEY AND AYUB KHAN ABOUT HAVING HUSSEIN JOIN THEM IN TEHRAN. I GATHER THAT THE TURKISH AND PAKISTANI PRESIDENTS FELT THAT HUSSEIN'S JOINING THEM WOULD BE "INOPPORTUNE." THE IRANIAN AMB TOLD ME, HOWEVER, THAT THE SHAH WOULD BE PLEASED TO HAVE HUSSEIN VISIT TEHRAN NEXT WEEK BEFORE THE SHAH GOES TO WASHINGTON. THE IRANIANS HAVE EVIDENTLY BEEN PUTTING PRESSURE ON HUSSEIN TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE ISRAELIS.) IT IS EVIDENT HUSSEIN WANTS TO SEE THE

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 594/IA ~~SECRET~~
SHAH BEFORE HE GOES TO WASHINGTON TO ASK THE SHAH TO TRY TO GET WASHINGTON TO GIVE HUSSEIN A GREATER MEASURE OF SUPPORT THAN I WAS AUTHORIZED TO CONVEY ON JULY 25 (AMMAN'S 519). ALL HUSSEIN VOLUNTEERED TO ME ON THE SUBJECT OF HIS FORTH-COMING TRIP TO TEHRAN WAS THAT THE SHAH FELT IT BETTER THAT HUSSEIN VISIT TEHRAN NEXT WEEK RATHER THAN NOW.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 969000 (#54)
By *cmj/hg*, NARA, Date 8-25-05

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-2- AMMAN 594/1 JULY 31

SECTION 1 OF 2

3. MOSCOW. I ASKED THE KING WHAT HIS PRESENT THOUGHTS WERE ABOUT GOING TO MOSCOW. HE REPLIED THAT HE HAD INFORMED THE SOVIET AMB THAT HE HAD DECIDED TO ACCEPT THE SOVIET INVITATION TO VISIT MOSCOW AND HOPED THAT THE VISIT COULD BE ARRANGED FOR NEXT WEEK. (THE COURT CIRCULAR CARRIED ANOTE THAT THE USSR AMB HAD SEEN THE KING ON JULY 29--I.E., TWO DAYS FOLLOWING MY JULY 27 MEETING WITH THE KING REPORTED IN AMMAN'S 554. I ASSUME IT WAS AT THIS MEETING THAT THE KING ACCEPTED THE SOVIET INVITATION. LAST NIGHT'S RADIO ISRAEL'S ENGLISH BROADCAST QUOTED EXTRACTS FROM A JULY 30 PRAVDA EDITORIAL WHICH SEEMS TO HAVE APPEARED OUT OF THE BLUE URGING HUSSEIN TO JOIN THOSE ARAB STATES WHO LOOK TO MOSCOW RATHER THAN TO THE WEST FOR SUPPORT. RADIO AMMAN JULY 31 REPEATED ONLY THAT PORTION OF PRAVDA ARTICLE WHICH PRAISED KING AND VALOR OF

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 594/1A ~~SECRET~~

JORDANIAN MILITARY.) THE KING INDICATED HE HAD THREE REASONS FOR DECIDING TO VISIT MOSCOW AT THIS TIME: (A) AS HUSSEIN PUT IT, THE US AND SOVIET POSITIONS ON A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT ARE NOW NEARLY IDENTICAL AND HE WISHED TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES OF SOVIET DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FOR A SETTLEMENT; (B) IF HE WERE THE ARAB LEADER WHO HAD MOST RECENTLY VISITED MOSCOW, HE WOULD BE ABLE TO SPEAK MORE AUTHORITATIVELY AT THE FORTHCOMING ARAB SUMMIT (IF ONE IS HELD) ABOUT MOSCOW'S PRESENT ATTITUDE THAN COULD THE ARAB RADICALS. AT THE SAME TIME HE WOULD HAVE THE ADDED CREDENTIAL OF BEING THE ONLY ARAB LEADER WHO HAD VISITED WESTERN CAITALS. HE FELT THAT IN THIS UNIQUE POSITION HE WOULD BETTER BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE THE DIRECOON OF THE POSSIBLE FORTHCOMING ARAB SUMMIT IN A MODERATE DIRECTION, I.E., A DIRECTION AIMED TOWARD SETTLEMENT; (C) HUSSEIN SAID HE ALSO WISHED TO ASCERTAIN JUST WHAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE PREPARED TO DO FOR HIM IN THE WAY OF ARMS. FOR THIS PURPOSE HUSSEIN PLANS TO TAKE WITH HIM TO MOSCOW A SMALL NUMBER OF JORDANIAN MILITARY EXPERTS. HUSSEIN WISHES TO KNOW EXACTLY WHAT ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT THE SOVIETS MIGHT HAVE TO OFFER, THE COST, THE TERMS, ETC. HE SAID HE

PAGE 4 RUYFKG 594/1A ~~SECRET~~

WOULD BE PARTICULARLY ON THE ALERT TO JUDGE WHAT, IF ANY, POLITICAL PRICE THE RUSSIANS MIGHT WISH TO CHARGE. HE CONVEYED THE IMPRESSION ALL THIS WAS TO BE JUST EXPLORATORY; HE JUST WANTS THE FACTS. HE DID NOT GO OUT OF HIS WAY TO STATE EXPLICITLY, HOWEVER, THAT HE WOULD NOT SIGN UP FOR

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-3- AMMAN 594/1 JULY 31 1967

SECTION 1 OF 2

ANYTHING IN MOSCOW IF THE TERMS LOOK APPEALING. (EARLIER IN MY CONVERSATION WITH THE KING I HAD READ HIM SELECTED EXCERPTS FROM THE SECRETARY'S JULY 30 TELEVISION APPEARANCE AS AN ENCOURAGER. THE SECRETARY'S TV APPEARANCE, INCIDENTALLY, GOT PRESS PLAY HERE. AT ANOTHER EARLIER POINT IN THE CONVERSATION THE JANG MENTIONED THAT JORDANIAN AIR FORCE OFFICERS HAD BEEN TO IRAN TO TRY OUT THE F-5 AND FELT THAT IT MIGHT NOT BE THE ANSWER TO JORDAN'S NEEDS. DURING ANOTHER EARLIER POINT IN THE CONVERSATION I ASKED THE KING IF GENERAL KHAMMASH HAD RETURNED FROM LONDON. THE KING REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE AND SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH THE GENERAL WAS DISAPPOINTED BY THE RESULTS OF HIS TALKS BOTH WITH US AND WITH THE BRITISH, NONETHELESS HE HAD NOT RETURNED TOTALLY WITHOUT HOPE.)

4. VISIT TO MODERATE ARAB STATES. LATER IN MY CONVERSATION

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 594/1AND ~~SECRET~~
WITH THE KING, WHEN HE TOLD ME HE HAD SOME URGENT MATTERS TO SETTLE IN AMMAN, WHICH I DISCUSS LATER IN THIS TELEGRAM, I ASKED HIM HOW HE WAS GOING TO TAKE CARE OF HIS PROBLEMS IN AMMAN, VISIT TEHRAN AND MOSCOW, AND STILL FIT IN VISITS TO THE MODERATE ARAB STATES, ALL BEFORE A POSSIBLE ARAB SUMMIT ON AUGUST 10? HE REPLIED THAT HE WOULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO GIVE UP HIS PLANS TO VISIT THE MODERATE ARAB STATES BEFORE THE CONVENING OF AN ARAB SUMMIT, IF SUGGESTED MEET ON AUGUST 10, AND THAT HE WOULD SIMPLY HAVE TO LOBBY WITH THE MODERATE AT THE ARAB SUMMIT ITSELF.

5. IRAQ. I ASKED THE KING WHERE THE MATTER OF PRESIDENT AREF'S VISIT TO AMMAN STOOD. THE KING REPLIED THAT AREF KEEPS INDICATING HE WILL COME SOON BUT NEVER SHOWS UP. AT THIS POINT THE KING DOUBTED HE WOULD, IN FACT, SEE AREF BEFORE THE POSSIBLE CONVENING OF THE ARAB SUMMIT ON AUGUST 10. I TOLD THE KING IT WAS THE OPINION OF SOME OBSERVERS (ACTUALLY THE IRANIAN AMB WHOM I HAD SEEN EARLIER THIS MORNING) THAT THE REASON WHY AREF DID NOT WANT TO HAVE THE IRAQI TROOPS RETURNED TO IRAQ WAS BECAUSE OF CONCERN ABOUT THEIR LOYALTY TO THE PRESENT IRAQI REGIME. THE KING SAID HE TENDED TO AGREE WITH THIS ANALYSIS AND SAID HE WAS LESS TROUBLED ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF IRAQI FORCES THAN HE HAD BEEN AT ONE TIME.

PAGE 6 RUQMKF 594 ~~SECRET~~
HUSSEIN SAID THAT IF HE SHOULD LATER UNDERTAKE

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-4- AMMAN 594/1 JULY 31, 1967

SECTION 1 OF 2

BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL, IT WOULD OF COURSE BE THE SAFEST THING TO GET THE IRAQI FORCES OUT. HE ADDED ALSO WHAT HE HAD TOLD ME ON JULY 27--NAMELY, THAT THE IRAQI FORCES WERE IN JORDAN OSTENSIBLY TO PROTECT JORDAN BECAUSE THE JORDAN ARMY HAD BEEN WEAKENED BY EQUIPMENT LOSSES, AND HUSSEIN WOULD BE ON A STICKY WICKET, SO TO SPEAK, IN GETTING THEM MOVED OUT UNTIL AND UNLESS THERE WAS MORE CONCRETE EVIDENCE THAT AT LEAST SOME OF HIS EQUIPMENT LOSSES WERE BEING REPLACED. (INCIDENTALLY, THE FACT THAT THE KING ASKED AREF TO REMOVE THE IRAQI FORCES IN SIDELY KNOWN THROUGHOUT AMMAN AND HAS NOT EXICTED ANY OPPOSITION OF WHICH WE ARE AWARE.)

6. SYRIAN. HUSSEIN SAID THAT THE SYRIANS WERE STILL CAUSING HIM TROUBLE. THE SYRIANS WERE, HE SAID, SENDING NUMEROUS INFILTRATORS INTO JORDAN, NOT ONLY TO CAUSE TROUBLE IN JORDAN BUT ALSO TO INFILTRATE INTO THE WEST BANK AND CAUSE TROUBLE THERE AND IN ISRAEL. I TOLD HUSSEIN I HAD HEARD REPORTS THAT THE SYRIANS HAD INCREASED THEIR MILITARY STRENGTH AT DERA'A (NEAR THE JORDANIAN BORDER ON THE AMMAN- DAMASCUS ROAD). HUSSEIN REPLIED THAT THIS COULD BE TRUE. I OBSERVED TO HUSSEIN THAT NONETHELESS IT SEEMED

BURNS.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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TO ME DOUBTFUL THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD ACTUALLY LAUNCH A MILITARY ATTACK AGAINST JORDAN. FOR ONE THING, I SAID, I DOUBTED THEY WOULD HAVE BACKING IN THIS REGARD FROM THE RUSSIANS--IN FACT, PROBABLY JUST THE RESERVE. SECOND, THE MOST RECENT ESTIMATE OF OUR ACTING DEFENSE ATTACHE WAS THE THE JORDAN ARAB ARMY, EVEN TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ITS EQUIPMENT LOSSES, COULD STILL WHIP THE SYRIANS. THIRD, THE IRAQI FORCES MIGHT JUST HELP THE JORDANIANS IN SUCH A CONTINGENCY. THE KING AGREED THAT IT WAS NOT LIKELY THE SYRIANS WOULD IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES TRY TO INTERVENE IN JORDAN MILITARILY. IF SO, THE JORDAN ARAB ARMS COULD PROBABLY TAKE CARE OF THE SITUATION, THOUGH THERE WOULD BE A SERIOUS AIR DEFENSE PROBLEM SINCE THE RJAF NOW CONSISTS OF ONLY ONE HAWKER-HUNTER. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE IRAQIS WOULD DO, THOUGH HE THOUGHT IT CONCEIVABLE THEY MIGHT IN SUCH A CIRCUMSTANCE HELP THE JORDANIANS. THE KING SAID HE HAD HAD A TALK RECENTLY WITH BORIS URONOV (URONOV, THE LOCAL TASS CORRESPONDENT, HAS BEEN IN JORDAN FOR

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 594/2A ~~SECRET~~

A NUMBER OF YEARS AND IS KNOWN TO BE AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER OF THE GRU). URONOV TOLD HUSSEIN THAT THE SOVIETS CONSIDER THE SYRIANS TO BE IMPOSSIBLE AND THAT THE SOVIETS WERE CONCERNED THE SYRIANS MIGHT BE IRRESPONSIBLE ENOUGH TO TRY TO RESUME HOSTILITIES AGAINST ISRAEL. THE KING ADDED THAT HE (HUSSEIN) THOUGHT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS WERE GETTING ACTIVE IN DAMASCUS, AND THAT BETWEEN THEM AND THE PRESENT REGIME IN SYRIA THE RUSSIANS WERE DOUBTLESS HAVING A DIFFICULT TIME TRYING TO DAMPEN DOWN THE SITUATION.

7. CHANGE OF CABINET. THE KING VOLUNTEERED TO ME THAT HE WAS WRESTLING WITH THE PROBLEM OF TRYING TO FORM A NEW CABINET. HE SAID THAT HE WAS FOND OF PRESENT PRIME MINISTER SA'D JUMA BUT THAT JUMA HAD BEEN SUBJECTED TO SO MANY SHOCKS DURING THE PAST TWO MONTHS THAT HE SEEMED NOW NOT TO HAVE A FIRM GRIP ON THE GOVT. THE KING

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-2- 594 SECTION 2 OF 2 FROM AMMAN (NODIS)

SAID HE FACED A CHOICE BETWEEN FORMING A CABINET OF POLITICIANS AND A CABINET OF EXPERTS. IN THE LATTER CASE HE WOULD PROBABLY INCLUDE SOME MILITARY MEN IN THE CABINET. HE REALIZED THE EAST BANK WAS, SO TO SPEAK, SLOWLY GRINDING TO A HALT. IT HAD TO GET STARTED AGAIN. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A SENSE OF VIGOR, DIRECTION AND PURPOSE. IT WAS VITAL FOR THE GOVT TO KEEP CONTROL OF THE

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 594/2A ~~SECRET~~

COUNTRY. HE SAID HE NOW LEANED TOWARDS A GOVT OF EXPERTS. THEY WOULD BE MORE EFFICIENT AND DYNAMIC THAN THE POLITICIANS HE HAD TO CHOOSE FROM. HE THEN SAID: "GOD KNOWS WHERE I AM GOING TO FIND THE RIGHT PEOPLE, EVEN FOR A GOVT OF 'EXPERTS'".

8. WEST BANK. THE BRITISH CHARGE, WHO SAW THE KING ON JULY 29, TOLD ME HE HAD OBSERVED TO THE KING THAT A MONTH AGO THE BRITISH EMBASSY HAD CONCLUDED HUSSIN COULD NOT LAST ANOTHER 30 DAYS UNLESS HUSSEIN REVITALIZED THE GOVT, PURGED THE ARMY, AND WAS BENEFICIARY OF A "DRAMATIC HAPPENING." HUSSEIN TOLD THE BRITISH CHARGE THAT A MONTH AGO HE WOULD HAVE AGREED, BUT NOW THOUGHT HE COULD HOLD HIS POSITION WITHOUT MOVING IN ANY PARTICULAR DIRECTION FOR THREE TO FOUR MONTHS. THE BRITISH CHARGE TOLD ME THAT, IN HIS OPINION, WHAT HAD MADE THE DIFFERENCE WAS ARAB RESISTANCE ON THE WEST BANK, WHICH WAS PROVIDING A SENSE OF "ACCOMPLISHMENT," HOWEVER LIMITED. IN MY CONVERSATION WITH HUSSEIN THIS AFTERNOON, I ASKED HUSSEIN IF ARAB RESISTANCE ON THE WEST BANK HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH HIS FEELING HE COULD HOLD HIS POSITION IN JORDAN LONGER THAN HAD BEEN ORIGINALLY THOUGHT. HE REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. I REMINDED HIM THAT HE SHOULD

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 594/2A ~~SECRET~~

BE CAREFUL NOT TO STIMULATE ARABS ON THE WEST BANK TO RESISTANCE IF HE DID NOT WANT TO PRECIPITATE WHAT THE ARABS WOULD CONSIDER TO BE REPRESSIVE ISRAELI POLICIES AND WHICH HE HIMSELF HAD ACKNOWLEDGED WOULD CAUSE AN UNDESIRABLE FORM OF AGITATION ON THE EAST BANK AND MAKE A SETTLEMENT MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE. I SAID, TOO, THAT IF IT WERE CALCULATED ARAB RESISTANCE ON THE WEST BANK WOULD MAKE THE ISRAELIS MORE ANXIOUS TO GET RID OF THE WEST BANK IT SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED THE OPPOSITE COULD JUST AS EASILY BE THE CASE. THE KING WAS SILENT, NODDED SLOWLY, THEN SAID "DO YOU KNOW THE ISRAELIS HAVE TODAY ARRESTED ANWAR KHATIB (FORMER JORDANIAN GOVERNOR OF JERUSALEM)?"

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-3- 594 SECTION 2 OF 2 FROM AMMAN (NODIS)

9. ARMY. THE KING SAID HE REALIZED HE WOULD HAVE TO SHAKE UP THE ARMY. HE WOULD DO SO, BUT HE DID NOT WISH TO MOVE PRECIPITOUSLY IN THIS DIRECTION. HE SAID THAT IF HE MOVED PRECIPITOUSLY HE WOULD RUN THE RISK OF PUSHING YOUNGER OFFICERS INTO POSITIONS WHERE THEY WOULD BE OUT OF THEIR DEPTH. HE DID NOT WANT THE SHAKE-UP TO RESULT IN DISORGANIZATION AND CHAOS.

10. COMMENT ON THE KING'S FORTHCOMING TRIP TO MOSCOW WILL FOLLOW BY SEPARATE TELEGRAM.

GP-N BURNS

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

All of us ^{who} have ~~XXXX~~ read your telegram 554 ~~XXXX~~ want you to know how well we think you handled a difficult meeting. The points that you picked out to discuss again with the King were exactly the points that we would have wanted you to stress and were considering suggesting to you. Congratulations on a job well done.

END

RUSKI

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#77)
State Dept. Guidelines
By cbu/rq, NARA, Date 8-25-05

JAB

Drafted by: NEA/LDBattle:atm 7/29/67 Tel. Ext. 4263 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: *SR* The Secretary

Clearance: S/S - *FW* Mr. Walsh

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Classification

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NODIS - SANDSTORM

REF: (#) 556

SAW PRIMIN JUMA THIS MORNING. HE TOLD ME THAT HUSSEIN HAD GIVEN HIM SHORT BRIEFINGS ON MY CONVERSATIONS WITH HUSSEIN JULY 25 AND JULY 27 (AMMAN'S 519 AND 547). THE KING, SAID JUMA, WAS VERY DEPRESSED AFTER MY JULY 25 MEETING WITH HIM BUT WAS IN A MORE POSITIVE FRAME OF MIND AFTER OUR SECOND MEETING.

2. JUMA HIMSELF WAS IN A MOST DEPRESSED STATE. HE SAID THAT THE REFUGEE PROBLEM WAS BECOMING MORE THAN JORDAN COULD BEAR. ALTHOUGH THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES IN EARLY JULY NUMBERED 175,000, THE WEST TO EAST FLOW APPEARED VIRTUALLY TO HAVE CEASED. SINCE THEN, HOWEVER, THE WEST TO EAST FLOW HAD RECOMMENCED AND THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES ON THE EAST BANK NOW STOOD AT ABOUT 250,000. THIS REPRESENTS NEARLY THIRTY PERCENT OF THE POPULATION OF THE WEST BANK, AND REPRESENTS ALSO A 25 PERCENT INCREASE IN THE POPULATION OF THE EAST BANK. HE POINTED OUT THAT IF THE SAME THING HAPPENED IN THE US THIS WOULD BE COMPARABLE TO 25 MILLION PEOPLE CROSSING THE MISSISSIPPI TO BE TAKNE CARE OF BY THE EASTERN STATES, ALL WITHIN A PERIOD OF LESS THAN TWO MONTHS.

3. THE WEST TO EAST FLOW, SAID THE PRIMIN, STILL CONTINUES AND YET THE RETURN OF REFUGEES TO THE WEST BANK IS LOGJAMMED. THE ISRAELIS HAD SUBMITTED A FORM BEARING THE IMPRINT "GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN TO THE WEST BANK." JUMA SAID ALTHOUGH HE PERSONALLY AND THE GOVT COULD ACCEPT THE APPLICATION FORM WITH ITS PRESENT WORDING, THEY WERE TERRIFIED TO HAVE SUCH FORMS PASSED OUT AMONG THE REFUGEES FOR FEAR OF THEIR CREATING RIOTS, SINCE THE FORM WOULD BE INTERPRETED BY THE REFUGEES AS INDICATING THAT THE GOVT OF ISRAEL NOW CLAIMED SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE WEST BANK, REFUGEES WOULD REFUSE TO RETURN, ETC.

4. JUMA SAID THE GOVT WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT A FORM, WITH SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME QUESTIONS AS ARE ON THE ISRAELI FORM,

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Authority: NND 969000 (#56)
By: cbm/rq NARA, Date: 8-25-05

BUT WITH A RED CROSS HEADING. THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS HAD UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED TO THE GOJ POSITION. NOW THE ISRAELIS HAVE COME BACK AND SAID THAT THERE COULD BE NO FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE MATTER UNLESS THERE WERE SECRET DIRECT MEETINGS BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOI AND THE GOJ. JUMA SAID HE REALIZED THE ISRAELIS WERE USING THE REFUGEE PROBLEM TO TRY TO PRESSURE JORDAN FOR POLITICAL ENDS. NEVERTHELESS, HE HAD YESTERDAY TOLD THE HEAD OF THE JORDANIAN RED CRESCENT TO GO TO THE JORDAN RIVER AND MEET WITH THE ISRAELIS. HE HAD TAKEN THIS DECISION ON HIS OWN AUTHORITY AND HAD NOT EVEN TOLD THE KING.

5. JUMA SAID THAT HE WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY WORRIED ABOUT THE SITUATION ON THE WEST BANK. HE MADE SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME POINTS THE KING HAD MADE TO ME IN OUR LAST MEETING. HE ADDED THAT EXTREMIST ARABS FROM OTHER ARAB STATES MIGHT TRY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION, STIR UP THE WEST BANKERS EVEN MORE, AND PERHAPS SOME SORT OF GUERRILLA WARFARE COULD RESULT. THIS WOULD BE IN NO ONE'S INTEREST AND WOULD END ANY HOPES OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

6. JUMA THEN SAID THAT THE ONLY HOPE HE NOW SAW FOR ACHIEVING A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT IN THE FACE OF WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS THE "DETERIORATING SITUATION" IS A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION COUPLING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WITH AN END TO BELLIGERENCY. JORDAN, HE SAID, WOULD SUBSCRIBE IMMEDIATELY, NO MATTER WHAT ANYONE ELSE DOES.

7. I ALSO SAW FONMIN TOUQAN THIS MORNING. HE, TOO, TALKED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION COUPLING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WITH AN END OF BELLIGERENCY. IN HIS OPINION, SAID TOUQAN, THE WAY TO GO ABOUT THIS WAS FOR THOSE ARAB STATES INTERESTED IN SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT--AND THIS WOULD CERTAINLY INCLUDE JORDAN AND QUITE POSSIBLY EGYPT--TO CONFER PRIVATELY AND INDIVIDUALLY WITH EACH OF THE "BIG FOUR" POWERS TO INDICATE WHAT THE ARAB STATE IN QUESTION COULD ACCEPT. PRESEUMABLY, SIMILAR CONSULTATIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE BETWEEN THE "BIG FOUR" AND ISRAEL. OUT OF THIS, HOPEFULLY, SOME ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE ARRIVED AT. HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT THAT THE JORDANIANS WORK CLOSELY WITH THE UAR ON THIS, IN PART BECAUUE TOUQAN THINKS THE UAR WANTS A SETTLEMENT AND IN PART BECAUSE THE UAR COULD DO JORDAN MUCH HARM IN THE EVENT JORDAN ACTED TOO INDEPENDENTLY. TOUQAN

SAID THERE WOULD BE NOT MUCH POINT IN INVOLVING THE SYRIANS. THE SYRIANS INITIALLY WOULD PROBABLY REFUSE TO PLAY, BUT IF SOMETHING COULD BE WORKED OUT BETWEEN JORDAN, EGYPT AND ISRAEL, THEN DOUBTLESS THE SYRIANS WOULD FOLLOW ALONG LATER.

8. COMMENT ON POSSIBLE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION: ARAB TRIBAL MORES WHICH HAVE EXISTED FOR THOUSANDS OF YEARS ARE STILL DEEPLY INGRAINED IN THE CHARACTER OF THE MODERN ARAB. ONE SUCH TRADITION, AND IT IS A MAJOR ONE, IS THAT DISPUTES, ABOVE ALL BLOOD FEUDS, ARE NOT SETTLED DIRECTLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES CONCERNED. AN INTERMEDIARY DEALING PRIVATELY WITH BOTH SIDES, ARRANGES A COMPROMISE WHICH BOTH PARTIES ARE THEN EXPECTED TO ACCEPT. DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES IN A BLOOD FEUD IS A TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE CONCEPT IN ARAB PSYCHOLOGY.

9. COMMENT ON REFUGEE FLOW AND WEST BANK: JERUSALEM'S 243 AND 245, RECEIVED TODAY, ARE DEPRESSING CONFIRMATION THAT THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION ON THE WEST BANK IS DETERIORATING, AND PERHAPS RAPIDLY. AS I NOTED IN OURTEL 556 YESTERDAY, FURTHER DETERIORATION IN THE SITUATION ON THE WEST BANK IS PROBABLY INEVITABLE AND THEREFORE THE FASTER A JORDANIAN-

ISRAELI SETTLEMENT IS REACHED THE BETTER. THE AMMAN PRESS IS NOW FILLED WITH REPORTS OF INCIDENT AFTER INCIDENT OF ARAB RESISTANCE AND ISRAELI REPRESSION. THE DEPT SHOULD ALSO KNOW THAT PROMINENT PRESS COVERAGE HAS BEEN GIVEN IN AMMAN, BEIRUT, AND NO DOUBT THROUGHOUT THE ARAB WORLD, TO THE ARTICLE BY TWO BRITISH MP'S, MIAN GILMOUR AND DENNIS WALTERS, WHICH APPEARED IN THE LONDON TIMES OF JULY 27. NO MATTER WHAT ARABS MAY THINK OF THE BRITISH, THEY ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE IMPRESSED BY WHAT A BRITISH MP SAYS ON ISRAELI INTENTIONS THAN BY WHAT AN ARAB SAYS. THIS ARTICLE REPORTS THE TWO MP'S EYE WITNESS ACCOUNT OF ISRAELI "INSENSITIVITY" AND "CRUELTY" TO ARABS AT THE RIVER JORDAN CROSSING POINTS. THE TWO MP'S STATE AS THEIR CONCLUSION THAT ISRAEL IS FORCING THE REFUGEES OUT OF THE WEST BANK AND IS STALLING RETURN OF THE REFUGEES BECAUSE THE ISRAELIS HAVE TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS AND HAVE THE PROBABLE INTENTION TO ANNEX THE WEST BANK TO ISRAEL; AND TO ANNEX IT EMPTY OF ARABS. THEY ALSO STATE ISRAEL HAS NO INTEREST IN THE SURVIVAL OF JORDAN.

10. PLEASE REPEAT THIS TELEGRAM TO LONDON AND TEL AVIV.

GP-1. BURNS

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Action

Info

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 RUDICR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0081
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WODIS/SAND STORM

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

PAT DEAN HAS MADE AVAILABLE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WHICH WE TRANSMIT TO YOU ON FYI BASIS: BEGIN TEXT

FOLLOWING THE DISCUSSIONS IN LONDON THIS WEEK WITH H.M. AMBASSADORS AT AMMAN AND TEL AVIV, AND ALSO IN THE LIGHT OF THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY KING HUSSEIN TO AMBASSADOR BURNS AND OF OUR LATEST THOUGHTS ON THE BEST NEXT STEPS AT

PAGE 2 RUEHC 14237 ~~SECRET~~
 THE UNITED NATIONS (ABOUT WHICH SIR PATRICK DEAN SPOKE TO MR. EUGENE ROSTOW LAST NIGHT), THE FOREIGN SECRETARY PROPOSES INSTRUCTING H. M. AMBASSADORS AT AMMAN AND TEL AVIV ON THE FOLLOWING LINES.

H. M. AMBASSADOR AMMAN

(1) I HAVE HEARD THAT KING HUSSEIN HAS CONCLUDED THAT IT IS NOT AT PRESENT FEASIBLE TO PURSUE THE IDEA OF A BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL AND THAT HE IS PROPOSING TO STRENGTHEN HIS RELATIONS WITH THE MODERATE ARAB GOVERNMENTS AND OTHER FRIENDLY STATES IN THE AREA BEFORE DECIDING WHETHER TO TAKE FURTHER STEPS IN THIS DIRECTION. I RESPECT HIS JUDGMENT ON THIS. IN THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE AREA, AND FROM OUR KNOWLEDGE OF PRESENT ISRAEL VIEWS ON JERUSALEM WE THINK THERE WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE RISKS AT THE MOMENT IN HIS TAKING THE INITIATIVE TO SEEK A BILATERAL SETTLEMENT AND THAT HE WOULD BE WISER TO KEEP HIS HEAD DOWN;

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Authority NLS 0178.012.001/7

jc NARA Date 10-9-15

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-2- STATE 14237 JULY 29 (NODIS)

PAGE 3 RUENC 14237 ~~S E C R E T~~

(II) WE HOPE THAT THERE WILL BEFORE LONG BE SOME CONSTRUCTIVE MOVES TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT AT THE UNITED NATIONS E.G. THROUGH THE DESPATCH OF A MEDIATOR TO THE AREA. THE ADVANTAGE OF THIS COURSE IS THAT IT DOES NOT INVOLVE JORDAN GETTING OUT IN FRONT OF THE OTHER ARABS;

(III) MEANWHILE WE THINK THAT KING HUSSEIN WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO PROTECT HIS POSITION AT HOME BY STRENGTHENING HIS GOVERNMENT AND GETTING THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT TO WITHDRAW IRAQI TROOPS FROM JORDAN;

(IV) WE RECOGNISE THE PROBLEM OF AIR FORCE MORALE AND ARE CONSIDERING WHAT WE CAN DO TO HELP WITH THE PROVISION OF SOME HUNTERS, THOUGH THE PROSPECTS ARE NOT GOOD.

H. M. AMBASSADOR TEL AVIV

(I) FROM MY CONVERSATIONS WITH MR. EBAN ON 23 JULY,

PAGE 4 RUENC 14237 ~~S E C R E T~~

AND WITH MR. HADOW, IT IS MY JUDGMENT THAT THE TERMS WHICH THE ISRAELIS ARE LIKELY TO OFFER IN THEIR PRESENT MOOD ARE SO UNATTRACTIVE THAT KING HUSSEIN WOULD BE UNWISE TO STICK HIS NECK OUT BY SEEKING TO ENTER INTO BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. WE ARE ACCORDINGLY ADVISING HIM TO KEEP HIS HEAD DOWN;

(II) MR. EBAN GAVE ME TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT WERE UNCERTAIN WHETHER THE SURVIVAL OF THE PRESENT REGIME IN JORDAN WAS TO THEIR ADVANTAGE OR A MATTER OF INDIFFERENCE TO THEM. I SHOULD LIKE HIM TO BE IN NO DOUBT OF MY OWN OPINION THAT THIS IS A SHORT-SIGHTED ATTITUDE. IF AN EXTREMIST REGIME TOOK OVER IN JORDAN THERE WOULD BE INCREASED DANGER THAT THE ARABS WOULD PREPARE AND THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD SUPPORT THEM IN PREPARING FOR ANOTHER ROUND, AND THE FIRST STRIKE MIGHT NOT ON THAT OCCASION BE MADE BY ISRAEL. IN ANY CASE, BRITISH AND OTHER WESTERN INTERESTS IN THE AREA AS A WHOLE WOULD SUFFER FROM THE COLLAPSE OF THE PRESENT REGIME SINCE WE HAVE AN INTEREST IN THE SURVIVAL OF A MODERATE GROUP OF ARAB GOVERNMENTS;

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-3- STATE 14236 JULY 29 (NODIS)

PAGE 5 RUEHC 14237 ~~SECRET~~

(III) AS REGARDS JERUSALEM, THE ISRAELIS SHOULD NOT MISUNDERSTAND OUR POSITION. THIS QUESTION SEEMS TO US TO BE THE GREATEST OBSTACLE TO A POSSIBLE SETTLEMENT. WE ARE READY TO SUPPORT THEM, AND HAVE SUPPORTED THEM ON MANY ISSUES; BUT WE CANNOT SUPPORT THEM ON THIS. IN THE LONG TERM THE EMOTIONAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF JEWISH COMMUNITIES IN THE WORLD WILL BE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR THE SOLID SUPPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR EXISTENCE BY THEIR NEIGHBOURS WHICH WILL BE FORTHCOMING ONLY IF THEY ARE PREPARED TO BE REASONABLE OVER JERUSALEM. WHEN THE QUESTION SHOULD BE RAISED, AND WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT ARE OTHER QUESTIONS BUT IF AT THIS STAGE ISRAEL SEEKS TO EXCLUDE JERUSALEM FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS DISCUSSIONS MAY NOT GET STARTED AT ALL." RUSK

BT

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Burdly

101

~~SECRET~~

Action

Info

OO RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 555A 2091740
ZNY SSSSS
O 281735Z JUL 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 555

CONTROL: 1237
RECD : July 28, 1967
2:43 p.m.

NODIS - SANDSTORM

REF: AMMAN 554

1. I BRIEFED BRITISH CHARGE THIS AFTERNOON ON MY CONVERSATION WITH HUSSEIN OF YESTERDAY. I RESTRICTED THE BRIEFING TO THE SUBSTANCE OF PARAS 9 THROUGH 20 OF AMMAN'S 554.

2. PLEASE REPEAT TO LONDON AND TEL AVIV.

GP-1 BURNS
BT

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#59)
State Dept. Guidelines

By *cm/rq* NARA, Date *8-25-05*

~~SECRET~~

010046

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

FORM 11 COLLECT
MAY 1962

~~SECRET~~

#4 102

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN PRIORITY

Jul 20 4 11 PM '67

Info:

STATE 10046

N O D I S

SANDSTORM

Jordan

FOR DUNCAN FROM BURNS

1. I leave Washington Friday July 21 for London on
PAA 2118 and PAA 100. Col. Jordan of Defense/ISA joins
me in London Saturday July 22 and we plan to meet ~~xxxxx~~ with
General Khammash. I return to Amman Sunday July 22 on
ALIA 403 at 2045 hours.

2. Please advise Said Rifai I wish to see King Monday
morning July 23.

GP-3

End

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#91)

State Dept. Guidelines

By *cbm/rig*, NARA, Date 8-25-05

Drafted by
NEA/ARN - Amb. Burns:dmg

Ref. No.
3236

Telegraphic transmission
classification

John P. Walsh

Cleared by
7/20/67

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

(4)

105

~~SECRET~~

Action 00 RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 547A 2081801
ZNY SSSSS
O 271754Z JUL 67
Info FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
BT

1010
July 27, 1967,
2:35 p.m.

Rostow
Cy to Saunders

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 547

Jordan

NODIS/ SANDSTORM

REF: AMMAN'S 519

1. CONSCIOUS OF MY INSTRUCTIONS (DEPTEL 11929) THAT "WE MUST WALK THE TIGHTROPE AT THIS TIME," AND FEELING THAT MY INTERVIEW WITH THE KING DAY BEFORE YESTERDAY HAD COME TO TOO NEGATIVE AN ENDING, I SAW THE KING AT MY REQUEST LATE THIS AFTERNOON. I FOUND THAT HE WAS TAKING A BRIGHTER VIEW OF THINGS THAN WHEN I LEFT HIM DAY BEFORE YESTERDAY. I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE CERTAIN CLARIFICATIONS WHICH WERE INTENDED, AND APPEARED TO HAVE THE RESULT, OF ENCOURAGING HIM TOWARDS A MORE POSITIVE OUTLOOK.
2. KING PLANS TO GO TO TEHRAN IN A FEW DAYS TO MEET TOGETHER WITH TYE SHAH AND THE PRESIDENT OF TURKEY; THESNCE HE WILL VISIT THE MODERATE ARAB STATES. SOMEWHERE IN BETWEEN THESE TRAVELS

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 547 ~~SECRET~~
 HE EXPECTS TO MEET IN AMMAN WITH PRES AREF OF IRAQ. KING HAS NOW CONCLUDED THAT FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS IT IS NOT FEASIBLE FOR HIM TO MOVE FORWARD WITH ZRYING TO REACH A BILATERAL SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL AT THIS MOMENT. HIS FORTHCOMING VISITS ARE PART OF A PROGRAM DESIGNED TO STRENGTHEN HIS POSITION GENERALLY.

3. A FULL ACCOUNT OF THE CONVERSATION, TOGETHER WITH COMMENT, WILL BE SENT BY SEPARATE TELEGRAM.
 CP-1. BURNS
 BT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000 (#61)
By *ebm/rjg*, NARA, Date 8-25-05

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

(iii) It our impression GOI has not yet reached firm position on all complex policy questions involved.

(iv) On the whole, prospects on the economic side do not look bad.

(v) Major difficulty is to find solution for Jerusalem which would meet needs of both sides.

(vi) We wish to remind both governments that USG never accepted juridically the pre-June 5 situation with respect to Jerusalem.

b. Decision on whether or not to pursue negotiations was for King Hussein to make. USG was neither encouraging nor discouraging him.

c. Ambassador Barbour would be our principal point of contact with GOI in this matter.

3. Harman asked whether comment about our juridical position referred to West Bank as well as Jerusalem. Rostow said it was correct that we had never recognized de jure Jordanian position on West Bank. In context our message to Hussein, however, we had not made this point. We were only providing good offices and wished to stay out of substantive negotiations. Our purpose in making point re Jerusalem was to highlight inherent difficulties of this question.

4. Harman asked whether, in emphasizing international solution for Jerusalem, we were not strengthening Hussein's hand. Rostow said this

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~~SECRET~~

not our intention. Furthermore, Hussein did not favor internationalization. This connection, Rostow said he wanted reemphasize our conviction that worldwide Moslem interest in Jerusalem was strong and likely to continue. It should be taken seriously.

5. Rostow continued that, while no one could estimate chances for success of Jordanian approach, we saw some possibility to make progress towards peace. There was danger in immobility. Some sense of movement, however slight, was needed to reduce danger of renewed hostilities. Such movement might inter alia include symbolic troop withdrawal.

6. Battle asked how Harman assessed recent Algerian and Syrian activities. Harman said he did not think GOI worried. Algerians and Syrians were talking of employing guerrilla warfare doctrine in situation where it was not applicable. This was not an Algerian or Viet Nam type situation. Circumstances had changed as result of war. Now Arab actions against Israel could only be carried out on Arab territory. It was important for Israel to stay put until elements of any step toward peace were clear. This posture in itself constituted movement toward peace. Nasser's July 23 speech had indicated a sense of weakness and uncertainty in UAR position. In response to Ambassador Barbour's comment that Nasser could be dangerous when he

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did not know where he was going, Harman said that objectively there was little Nasser could do so long as Israel stayed where it was. Barbour noted that GOI could not be unresponsive to overtures from other side, to which Harman replied Israel always willing to talk with any Arab government that wanted to talk with it.

7. Rostow observed that present situation differed from 1956-57. Soviet posture and involvement now must be taken into account. While Soviets openly admitted their disagreements with Arab extremists, they had also made clear they could not control latter. Harman disagreed, stating they could exercise control by stopping arms shipments. Furthermore, USG could influence Soviets in this direction by positive action on GOI arms request. Rostow said Soviets were aware we had these requests under consideration. Whole arms question, however, was extremely delicate. We had to keep in mind that interests of rest of world as well as of Israel were at stake.

8. Harman asserted that up to now Soviets had given up nothing. In General Assembly they had succeeded in eroding formulation of a proposed substantive resolution and had delivered nothing in return. Rostow disagreed, pointing out that USSR had made concession in willingness to link withdrawal with non-belligerency. Harman stuck to basic theme that Soviets had still delivered nothing in the end.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Important thing was to maintain steady nerves, which had worked well up to now.

9. Concluding this portion of conversation, Rostow emphasized that we by no means considered situation hopeless. We did, however, see it as still tense and dangerous.

10. On another subject, Rostow confirmed that King Hussein had requested withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Jordan. President Aref had now asked to discuss matter with Hussein, and we understood this was where matter rested. Meanwhile, in view threat to his position from radical Arabs, Hussein felt he needed arms from us. We thought it important to provide him some items in non-lethal category -- e.g., transport and communications equipment. Harman replied that he had already clearly stated his Government's position on this question.

GP-1

End

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

U Shomo
BT 7/25
#2

107

~~SECRET~~

Action

Info

00 RUEHC
DE RUQMG 502A 2061835
ZNY SSSSS
O 251830Z JUL 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 502

4 7 7
1967 JUL 25 PM 4 08

Jordan

NODIS SANDSTORM

1. I SAW HUSSEIN THIS EVENING. I FOLLOWED TO THE LETTER THE INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN DEPTELS 11347, 11928, 11929, 12561, 12562 AND UNDERTOOK TO ANSWER KING'S QUESTIONS IN AS POSITIVE A MANNER AS POSSIBLE.
 2. KING'S REACTION WAS ONE OF DEEP DISAPPOINTMENT. HE SAID HE PLANNED TO TAKE NO ACTION FOR THE PRESENT IN VIEW OF THE CHARACTER MW MY INSTRUCTIONS WHICH HE INTERPRETED AS INADEQUATE SUPPORT FOR THE COURSE OF ACTION HE HAD HOPED TO TAKE. SAID HE MUST NOW RETHINK HIS POSITION THROUGH.
 3. DETAILS OF CONVERSATION WILL FOLLOW BY SEPARATE TELEGRAM.
 4. PLEASE REPEAT TO LONDON AND TEL AVIV.
- GP-1. BURNS
BT

~~SECRET~~

#4

012561
0216Z 108
JB

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Jamieson
Rostow

Jordan

Origin ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE

25 Jul 67 01 39z

Info: RPT INFO: Amembassy LONDON

STATE
NODIS/SANDSTORM
FOR THE AMBASSADOR

REF: State's 11347, 11928, and 11929.

We are repeating to you an exchange of cables with London which we trust will resolve any misunderstandings which may have existed between Washington and London about the nature of your instructions to convey the Israeli reply to Hussein's inquiry about their willingness to negotiate and their terms for a settlement.

You should now proceed to carry out instructions in reftels, substituting following text for Para D(3) repeat D(3) of reftel 11347.

QUOTE We have not yet been able to develop a detailed or firm assessment of the prospects of successfully negotiating a settlement with Israel. From what we now know we are inclined to believe that there are influential elements in

Drafted by: M:EV Rostow:emb	7/24/67	Tel. Ext. 5284	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Secretary
Clearances: U - Mr. Katzenbach G - Mr. Kohler NEA - Mr. Battle		WH - Mr. McGeorge Bundy S/S - Mr. Hank Walsh	

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Israeli Cabinet who attach importance to the presence of a moderate and peaceful neighbor on Israel's Eastern flank. This would argue in favor of Israel's being ^{reasonable} ~~reasonable~~ on many of the problems of interest to Jordan, including basic economic issues. However, as the King is undoubtedly aware, the problem of Jerusalem will be very difficult for all concerned. The King knows of the attitude of the United States about Jerusalem over the past twenty ~~xxx~~ years and our differences both with Israel and Jordan on that subject. There seems to be some readiness in Israel to accept protection of the Holy Places by the respective religious authorities. We would not be candid with the King, however, if we led him to believe that we see any easy solution for Jerusalem as between Israel and Jordan.

UNQUOTE

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

#4
Jaind...
012562
0219Z
GB

Origin ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE

25 JUL 67 02 07z

Info: RPT INFO: Amembassies London, Moscow

STATE

NODIS/SANDSTORM

In your talks with King Hussein you may tell him that in a talk today with Ambassador Dobrynin, the Secretary asked the Ambassador to talk to UAR, Syria, and Algeria about the possibility of giving assurances that they had no hostile intentions against the moderate Arab States. The Ambassador replied that it would be QUOTE very difficult UNQUOTE for the Soviets to talk to the Egyptians and others along this line.

The talk was otherwise generally addressed to the desirability of US-USSR consultations as a continuation of the talks Ambassador Goldberg conducted with Dobrynin and Gromyko in New York on the possibility of compromise solutions based on the linking Israeli withdrawals and recognition of Israel's ~~rights~~ right to exist. The Ambassador proposed that such talks be continued until we find formulae fully acceptable to both sides. He strongly criticized QUOTE ultra-extremists

Drafted by: M:EV Rostow:emb	7/24/67	Tel. Ext. 5284	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Secretary
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Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Walsh

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NW-017R-012-004/13

By: jc NARA, Date 10-9-15

~~SECRET~~

UNQUOTE among the Arabs.

END

GP-1

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

012560

110

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Laundress
JB

0217z

25 JUL 67 01 37z

Origin ACTION: Amembassy LONDON IMMEDIATE
Info: INFO: Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE

STATE

NODIS/SANDSTORM

REF: London's 622

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

We are frankly puzzled by the interpretation in London of our instructions to Ambassador Burns. We regard them as an interim reply to Hussein's request that we help him achieve a possible settlement with Israel and to discover their terms of settlement and their willingness to ~~negotiate~~ negotiate. In light Brown's message and your comments reftel we will amend Burns' instructions to make interim character more explicit. Para D(1) of State's 11347 is a faithful rendition of what Eban requested Arthur Goldberg in New York and the Secretary in Washington to convey to the King. In this sense we are not at this time playing much greater role than mailman. We would assume a considerable responsibility if we failed

Drafted by:

S/S:JPWalsh:fh

Tel. Ext.

7741

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances:

U - Mr. Katzenbach

NEA - Mr. Battle

M - Mr. Rostow

White House - Mr. Bundy

G - Mr. Kohler

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 969000 (E25)
By *cb/rq*, NARA, Date 8-25-05

~~SECRET~~

expeditiously to convey a message from GOI to Hussein.

It comes as no surprise to us that the Israelis do not have a negotiating position at this time and that there are many voices within their Cabinet. Recognizing this reality there may even be advantage in starting the discussion of ~~many~~ negotiations before the GOI has finally determined its position; the GOI should take into account some of the elements that are possible ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ negotiations before ~~if~~ freezing their position. At the same time we wish emphasize strongly that we are not repeat not urging Hussein to negotiate now. We are leaving it entirely up to him to decide in light of all available advice and information whether it is wise for him to establish contact with Israelis. Surely he can assess the risks and ^{perhaps better than we can.} difficulties involved in our action and inaction/ It is entirely possible that Israelis and Jordanians have some quiet contacts ~~in~~ of which we are unaware.

We are also aware Israeli express intent to make approach to Nasser through intermediary to be ~~is~~ selected. We think as Eban said here, and as Gene Rostow informed Pat Dean, this largely matter for historical record.

British Embassy after full review instruction to Burns considers our position identical to HMG's but evidently this view not fully

~~SECRET~~

Page _____ of telegram to LONDON~~SECRET~~

shared in ~~the~~ London. However, Pat Dean after telephone exchange this afternoon with London has informed us Brown fully agrees we should transmit Israeli reply to Hussein's request. In view this concurrence and fact Burns has already ~~be~~ postponed one appointment with King, we are authorizing him carry out instructions contained State's 11347, as amended ~~xxxxxx~~ septel repeated to you, in meeting with King tomorrow.

END.

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

012559

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0213Z
Laundon DJ III
25 JUL 67 01 32z

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Origin ACTION: AmEmbassy LONDON IMMEDIATE
AmEmbassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE
Info:

STATE

NODIS / ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
SANDSTORM

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

Please transmit this message from me to the Secretary of State:

Qte Dear George: I appreciate your thoughtful ^{message} ~~note~~ on the way in which we should handle the questions King Hussein has addressed to both of us. I am going forward on the basis of the telephone message Pat Dean has just transmitted in your behalf.

Of course I want to go ahead in this as in other matters ~~on reviewing other files~~ I am not clear that on the basis of full agreement with you. / ~~I cannot discern any~~ there is any substantive ~~or procedural~~ difference between us. We agree that we cannot take the responsibility of refusing to transmit to the King the answer X Eban authorized us to transmit ten days ago. We agree that the King must ~~EN~~ make his own decision

Drafted by: <i>G.M.</i> M:EV Rostow:mk	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Secretary
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Clearances:

U - Mr. Katzenbach	WH - Mr. McGeorge Bundy	<i>DR per EVR</i>
G - Mr. Kohler	S/S - Mr. Walsh	
NEA - Mr. Battle		

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority U1.017R.012.004/12
By jc NARA. Date 10-9-15

~~SECRET~~

as to when and how ~~we~~^{he} should take contact with the Israelis. We agree that we should not take responsibility for encouraging or discouraging him. We agree that while the economic aspects of the possible bargain should be ~~feasible~~^{feasible}, in the light of what ~~XXXXX~~ Eban told us both, the issue of Jerusalem will certainly be the most difficult feature of the negotiation, perhaps the breaking point. From Hussein's talk with our Ambassadors, I do not conclude that suitable military arrangements on the West Bank are beyond reach of negotiation. The King seems to assume that that area would be effectively demilitarized.

We are of the view, which Ambassador Barbour confirms, that if we ask the Israelis to state their bargaining position firmly now, in the abstract, we are likely to get answers that neither we nor Hussein could live with. Barbour's judgment is that in the end the Israelis will want Hussein and not the Syrians or the Iraqi on their long frontier with Jordan, and that, although it will be difficult, it is not impossible that ~~under the pressure~~^{in the course} of negotiation they will be able to reach an agreement with Hussein which will also be acceptable to the world community.

~~We are an abstract~~ If negotiations between Jordan and ^{Israel}

~~SECRET~~

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do not begin soon, ~~Ambassador Burns has advised~~ there is a real risk that the regime will founder. There are great risks of course even if negotiations do begin, at a pace which the King can control. He may founder either way.

I fully agree that the staging and support of negotiations present an intricate problem. All we are proposing now, as I have reviewed our papers, is that Ambassador Burns go ahead along the lines of the last paragraph of your message, to transmit an interim reply to the King, which we could supplement as we receive more information about the Israeli position.

I do not think we can take the responsibility for delaying any longer ~~the transmission~~ ^{transmitting} to the King the essence of the answers to his questions which Eban authorized me to forward. I am pleased, after the exchanges of the last two days, that you agree.

I appreciate your thanks for our action in delaying the execution of Ambassador Burns' instructions. Of course ironing out possible misunderstandings between us takes first priority.

Yours sincerely,

Dean

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Poston
Laundis #4 112

~~SECRET~~

Action

Info

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1967 JUL 24 PM 4 31

RR RUEHC
DE RUDTCR 626 2051949
ZNY SSSSS
R 241850Z JUL 67
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ LONDON 626

DEPT PASS DOD WASH AND AMMAN IF APPROPRIATE
STATE FOR ASST SEC BATTLE; DEFENSE FOR DASD/ISA HOOPES
NODIS - SANDSTORM

1. FIRST MEETING OF COL JORDAN WITH KHAMMASH INCONCLUSIVE. JORDAN BRINGING FULL MEMCON. HE HAD NO PRIORITY OR REQUIREMENTS LIST BUT STRESSED POLITICAL VALUE OF REBUILDING ARMY MORALE THROUGH EVIDENCE THAT "TRADITIONAL FRIENDS" WOULD SUPPLY. KHAMMASH WAS VERY UNHAPPY OVER LIMITED \$1.8 MILLION POSSIBLE REPROGRAMMING. HE URGED AIR SHIPMENT OF PART OF ANY DELIVERIES, BECAUSE TIME IS CRITICAL. ALSO URGED ANOTHER MEETING IN LONDON

PAGE 2 RUDTCR 626 ~~SECRET~~
IN ABOUT TWO WEEKS TO FIRM UP A LARGER PROGRAM. HE ASKED WE PRESS BRITISH RE HAWKERS AND SAID F-104 DEAL NOT NECESSARILY OFF. SECOND MEETING SCHEDULED TUESDAY AFTERNOON.
BRUCE
BT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4(*20)
State Dept. Guidelines
By *cbm/rq*, NARA, Date *8-25-05*



~~SECRET~~

Jordan

PAGE 01 STATE 11927

81
ORIGIN :SS 25

INFO NSCE 00,SSO 00,CCO 00, /025 R

04

DRAFTED BY: I/S JPWALSH
APPROVED BY: S/S MR. WALSH
U - MR. KATZENBACH
M - MR. ROSTOW

Z R 240128Z JUL 67 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

~~SECRET~~ STATE 11927

EXDIS

SANDSTORM

REF: STATE'S 11925

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

YOU WILL HAVE NOTED FROM REFTEL THAT US AND UK POSITION RE NOW VERY CLOSE. GEORGE BROWN HAS REQUESTED, HOWEVER, THAT WE DELAY APPROACH TO HUSSEIN UNTIL HE CAN HAVE LOOK AT SUBJECT FIRST THING MONDAY MORNING. WE HOPE SEND FLASH CLEARANCE CONVEY

PAGE 2 RUEHC 11927 ~~SECRET~~
MESSAGE STATE'S 11347 TOMORROW MORNING.

INFORM US BY FLASH, REPEATED LONDON, TIME YOUR APPOINTMENT WITH HUSSEIN AND FEASIBILITY REQUESTING SHORT POSTPONEMENT.

GP--1 RUSK

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NIS. 017R. 012. 004/3

jc NARA: Date 10-9-15



Department of State

TELEGRAM

114

~~SECRET~~

4

PAGE 01 AMMAN 00452 240233Z

87-22
ACTION SS 25

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /025 W

Z P 240210Z JUL 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 0452

EXDIS

SANDSTORM

KING HAS AGREED ON MEETING AT HIS HOME THIS MORNING BEFORE HE DEPARTS FOR OFFICE. TIME NOT RPT NOT YET SET. EXPECT TO RECEIVE CALL SETTING TIME FOR APPOINTMENT BY ABOUT 0800 ZULU RPT 0800 ZULU. ALTHOUGH AWKWARD, IT IS FEASIBLE TO REQUEST SHORT POSTPONEMENT.

OP-1. BURNS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#66)
State Dept. Guidelines
By cbm/rq, NARA, Date 9-25-05

~~SECRET~~

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Department of State TELEGRAM

115

~~SECRET~~

4

PAGE 01 STATE 11930

2
ORIGIN SS 25

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /025 R

DRAFTED BY: S/S:JWALSH
APPROVED BY: S/S:Q:AHDOUGLAS, JR
M:EROSTOW (IN SUBSTANCE)

Z O 240456Z JUL 67 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 11930

EXDIS

SANDSTORM

REF: AMMAN 0452

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

VERY DOUBTFUL WE WILL BE ABLE COMPLETE CONSULTATIONS WITH UK
PRIOR TIME YOUR APPOINTMENT. IN VIEW HIGH DESIRABILITY MOVE
IN TANDEM WITH THEM, MUST REGRETFULLY INSTRUCT YOU REQUEST
POSTPONEMENT YOUR MEETING WITH KING FOR ONE DAY WHILE LEAVING

PAGE 2 RUEHC 11930 ~~SECRET~~
MOST APPROPRIATE EXPLANATION TO YOU, YOU MAY WISH SIMPLY STATE
DEPARTMENT DESIRES TIME TO REVIEW AND SUPPLEMENT YOUR INSTRUCTIONS.
RUSK

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSA-OPR-012-DDW/1
By jc NARA. Date 10-9-15

~~SECRET~~

Action

DE RUDTCR 622 2051830
ZNY SSSSS
O 241803Z JUL 67
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~-LONDON 622

2 0 7
1967 JUL 24 PM 3 18

Info

Jordan

NODIS/SANDSTORM

FOR SECRETARY FROM BRUCE

1. I WENT TO SEE GEORGE BROWN THIS AFTERNOON AT HIS REQUEST. HE READ ME AND AFTERWARDS GAVE ME A COPY OF HIS MESSAGE TO YOU WHICH YOU HAVE NO DOUBT ALREADY RECEIVED.
2. HE DID NOT ASK ME SPECIFICALLY TO SUPPORT HIS EXPRESSED HOPE THAT YOU WOULD CONTRIVE TO HAVE AMBASSADOR BURNS DELAY FOR ABOUT A WEEK THE REPRESENTATIONS HE HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE TOMORROW TO KING HUSSEIN. IT WAS EVIDENT, HOWEVER, AS A RESULT OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH EBAN, BROWN IS GRAVELY CONCERNED LEST WE PRECIPITATE, BY ENCOURAGING HUSSEIN TO ATTEMPT TO ENTER SHORTLY INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL, A STATE OF AFFAIRS WHICH MAY FINISH OFF HUSSEIN.
3. BROWN WAS EMPHATIC ABOUT HIS BELIEF THAT ISRAEL IS NOT ANXIOUS, IS INDEED PERHAPS UNWILLING, TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY WITH HUSSEIN.
4. ALSO, HE FEELS WE MAY WELL FIND OURSELVES EMBARRASSED IF WE ENCOURAGE JORDAN TO UNDERTAKE A NEGOTIATION WITH ISRAEL BEFORE THE ISRAELI CABINET HAS SORTED OUT ITS OWN INTERNAL DISSENSIONS ON THE SUBJECT. BUT EVEN MORE IMPORTANT IN HIS MIND WAS THE INDICATION BY EBAN THAT CERTAIN ELEMENTS IN ISRAEL ARE CONSIDERING GIVING PRIORITY TO A SEPARATE NEGOTIATION WITH NASSER. IN ANY EVENT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXPECT TO MAKE ANY DECISION AS TO ITS OWN POLICY IN THIS REGARD UNTIL, FIRST, ITS AMBASSADORS FROM JORDAN AND ISRAEL REPORT TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE ON 27TH-28TH JULY; AND, SECONDLY, UNTIL BROWN HAS HAD A MESSAGE FROM EBAN TOWARD THE END OF THIS WEEK AS TO WHAT, IF ANYTHING, HAS BEEN DECIDED IN THE ISRAEL CABINET.
5. HE IS EVIDENTLY HOPEFUL THAT YOU WILL CANCEL EXISTING INSTRUCTIONS TO AMBASSADOR BURNS IN AMMAN, AND HAVE BURNS GIVE ONLY AN INTERIM ANSWER AT THIS TIME TO HUSSEIN.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLT 98-228 (#2d)
By ebw/lis, NARA, Date 8-25-05

~~SECRET~~

-2- 622 FROM LONDON, JULY 24, 1967 (NODIS)

6. I BELIEVE IF BURNS CARRIES OUT HIS PRESENT INSTRUCTIONS IT WILL MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN A FUTURE COMMUNITY OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND OURSELVES, AND WILL INEVITABLY STIMULATE PUBLIC SPECULATION OVER OUR DIFFERENCES. YOU WILL OF COURSE ASSESS HOW IMPORTANT THIS MAY BE FOR LATER COOPERATION IN THAT AREA BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. I VIEW WITH GRAVE MISGIVINGS OUR GOING IT ALONE UNTIL WE KNOW MORE DEFINITELY WHETHER ISRAEL IS PREPARED TO MAKE A SEPARATE SETTLEMENT WITH HUSSEIN, AND ON WHAT TERMS.

GP-2. BRUCE
BT

~~SECRET~~

FLASH

Bundy

117

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FLASH

1967 JUL 24 02 57

~~SECRET~~

HCE051

PAGE 01 AMMAN 00452 240233Z

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

67-92
ACTION SS 25

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /025 W

P 240210Z JUL 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 0452

EXDIS

HANDSTORM

... HAS AGREED ON MEETING AT HIS HOME THIS MORNING BEFORE HE
DEPARTS FOR OFFICE. TIME NOT RPT NOT YET SET. EXPECT
TO RECEIVE CALL SETTING TIME FOR APPOINTMENT BY ABOUT 0800
ZULU RPT 0800 ZULU. ALTHOUGH AWKWARD, IT IS FEASIBLE
TO REQUEST SHORT POSTPONEMENT.

IP-1. BURNS

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4(h)(6) ~~SECRET~~
State Dept. Guidelines

By cbm/hg, NARA, Date 8-25-05

~~SECRET~~

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EXDIS

Bundy

118

~~SECRET~~

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1967 JUL 24 05 16

PAGE 01 STATE 11930

ORIGIN SS 25

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /025 R

DRAFTED BY: S/S:JWALSH
APPROVED BY: S/S-O:ANDDOUGLAS, JR
S:EROSTOW (IN SUBSTANCE)

Z O 242456Z JUL 67 ZFFG
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 11930

EXDIS

SANDSTORM

REF: AMMAN 0452

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

VERY DOUBTFUL WE WILL BE ABLE COMPLETE CONSULTATIONS WITH UK
PRIOR TIME YOUR APPOINTMENT. IN VIEW HIGH DESIRABILITY MOVE
IN TANDEN WITH THEM, MUST REGRETFULLY INSTRUCT YOU REQUEST
POSTPCONENENT YOUR MEETING WITH KING FOR ONE DAY. WHILE LEAVING

PAGE 2 RUEHC 11930 ~~SECRET~~
MOST APPROPRIATE EXPLANATION TO YOU, YOU MAY WISH SIMPLY STATE
DEPARTMENT DESIRES TIME TO REVIEW AND SUPPLEMENT YOUR INSTRU-
CTIONS. RUSK

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLJ 017R 012 004/1

By jc NARA. Date 10-9-15

~~SECRET~~

HCE050

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

Bundy

119

PAGE 01 STATE 11927

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WHCA

ORIGIN SS 25

67 JUL 24 01 55

INFO NSCE 00,SS0 00,CC0 00,7025 R

DRAFTED BY: I/S JPWALSH
APPROVED BY: S/S MR. WALSH
1 - MR. KATZENBACH
1 - MR. ROSTOW

Z R 240128Z JUL 67 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

~~SECRET~~ STATE 11927

EXDIS

HANDSTORM

REF: STATE'S 11925

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

YOU WILL HAVE NOTED FROM REFTEL THAT US AND UK POSITION ARE NOW VERY CLOSE. GEORGE BROWN HAS REQUESTED, HOWEVER, THAT WE DELAY APPROACH TO HUSSEIN UNTIL HE CAN HAVE LOOK AT SUBJECT FIRST THING MONDAY MORNING. WE HOPE SEND FLASH CLEARANCE CONVEY

PAGE 2 RUEHC 11927 ~~SECRET~~
MESSAGE STATE'S 11347 TOMORROW MORNING.

INFORM US BY FLASH, REPEATED LONDON, TIME YOUR APPOINTMENT WITH HUSSEIN AND FEASIBILITY REQUESTING SHORT POSTPONEMENT.

GP1 RUSK

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 113.0178.012.004/3
By pc NARA. Date 10-9-15

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Saunders
Bundy #4

~~SECRET~~

120

Action

DE RUDTCR 622 2051830

2 0 7

1967 JUL 24 PM 3 18

Info

ZNY SSSSS
O 241803Z JUL 67
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ LONDON 622

Jordan

NODIS/SANDSTORM

FOR SECRETARY FROM BRUCE

1. I WENT TO SEE GEORGE BROWN THIS AFTERNOON AT HIS REQUEST. HE READ ME AND AFTERWARDS GAVE ME A COPY OF HIS MESSAGE TO YOU WHICH YOU HAVE NO DOUBT ALREADY RECEIVED.

2. HE DID NOT ASK ME SPECIFICALLY TO SUPPORT HIS EXPRESSED HOPE THAT YOU WOULD CONTRIVE TO HAVE AMBASSADOR BURNS DELAY FOR ABOUT A WEEK THE REPRESENTATIONS HE HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE TOMORROW TO KING HUSSEIN. IT WAS EVIDENT, HOWEVER, AS A RESULT OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH EBAN, BROWN IS GRAVELY CONCERNED LEST WE PRECIPITATE, BY ENCOURAGING HUSSEIN TO ATTEMPT TO ENTER SHORTLY INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL, A STATE OF AFFAIRS WHICH MAY FINISH OFF HUSSEIN.

3. BROWN WAS EMPHATIC ABOUT HIS BELIEF THAT ISRAEL IS NOT ANXIOUS, IS INDEED PERHAPS UNWILLING, TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY WITH HUSSEIN.

4. ALSO, HE FEELS WE MAY WELL FIND OURSELVES EMBARRASSED IF WE ENCOURAGE JORDAN TO UNDERTAKE A NEGOTIATION WITH ISRAEL BEFORE THE ISRAELI CABINET HAS SORTED OUT ITS OWN INTERNAL DISSENSIONS ON THE SUBJECT. BUT EVEN MORE IMPORTANT IN HIS MIND WAS THE INDICATION BY EBAN THAT CERTAIN ELEMENTS IN ISRAEL ARE CONSIDERING GIVING PRIORITY TO A SEPARATE NEGOTIATION WITH NASSER. IN ANY EVENT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXPECT TO MAKE ANY DECISION AS TO ITS OWN POLICY IN THIS REGARD UNTIL, FIRST, ITS AMBASSADORS FROM JORDAN AND ISRAEL REPORT TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE ON 27TH-28TH JULY; AND, SECONDLY, UNTIL BROWN HAS HAD A MESSAGE FROM EBAN TOWARD THE END OF THIS WEEK AS TO WHAT, IF ANYTHING, HAS BEEN DECIDED IN THE ISRAEL CABINET.

5. HE IS EVIDENTLY HOPEFUL THAT YOU WILL CANCEL EXISTING INSTRUCTIONS TO AMBASSADOR BURNS IN AMMAN, AND HAVE BURNS GIVE ONLY AN INTERIM ANSWER AT THIS TIME TO HUSSEIN.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NIJ 98-228 (#2d)*
By *ebufis*, NARA, Date *8-25-05*

~~SECRET~~

-2- 622 FROM LONDON, JULY 24, 1967 (NODIS)

6. I BELIEVE IF BURNS CARRIES OUT HIS PRESENT INSTRUCTIONS IT WILL MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN A FUTURE COMMUNITY OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND OURSELVES, AND WILL INEVITABLY STIMULATE PUBLIC SPECULATION OVER OUR DIFFERENCES. YOU WILL OF COURSE ASSESS HOW IMPORTANT THIS MAY BE FOR LATER COOPERATION IN THAT AREA BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. I VIEW WITH GRAVE MISGIVINGS OUR GOING IT ALONE UNTIL WE KNOW MORE DEFINITELY WHETHER ISRAEL IS PREPARED TO MAKE A SEPARATE SETTLEMENT WITH HUSSEIN, AND ON WHAT TERMS.

GP-2. BRUCE

BT

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

121

July 23, 1967

Date

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

CLASSIFICATION

*Saints
for Bundy*

FOR: Mr. Walt W. Rostow
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

For your information and files.

Enclosures:

Tel to London 11627 cy 4
" fm " 588 cy 4
" fm " 587 cy 4

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12958,
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY cl ON 6-23-94

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

CLASSIFICATION

011627

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

#4 121a

JUL 22 4 03 PM '67

Jordan

Origin ACTION: Amembassy LONDON FLASH

Info: NODIS

STATE 11627

SANDSTORM

Ambassador Dean called on Undersecretary Rostow at noon on urgent instructions to report that the Foreign Secretary was intensely irritated because HMG had not been given sufficient time to consider the decision we had reached yesterday, and reported to Ambassador Dean within a few hours, before Ambassador Burns delivered the Israeli reply in Amman. HMG had understood we would take no action in this matter without consultation. They wish to move with us, and to have parallel instructions for their Ambassador.

Rostow replied that we regretted any misunderstanding in this connection, and repeated Secretary Battle's assurance that we would not act without prior consultation. In view of the circumstances, he asked Ambassador Dean to convey his official and personal regrets to the Foreign Secretary, and offered to

Drafted by: M: EVRostow:emb	7/22/67	Tel. Ext. 5284	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: S - The Secretary
Clearances:			

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000 (#27)
By *abm/ra*, NARA, Date 8-25-05

S/S - Mr. McCall

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

delay Ambassador Burns return to Amman for a day in order to give HMG time to reach conclusions on the policy ~~considerations~~ we had reached, on which Dean had been briefed tentatively by Battle on July 17 repeat 17 and 19 repeat 19, and by Rostow along the same lines on July 21 repeat 21.

Rostow reviewed the reasons, reported in septel, which led us to conclude that further delay in transmitting Israeli reply to Hussein's questions could be dangerous to Hussein, ~~and~~ to US-UK interests in Jordan, and ^{to} ~~in~~ the possibilities of settlement.

Dean said he knew that Foreign Minister would appreciate offer of delay, and left to telephone London for further instructions.

END

RUSK

GP-

~~SECRET~~

121b
#4

~~SECRET~~

Action

Info

OO RUEHC
DE RUDTCR 587 2032300
ZNY SSSSS
O 222235Z
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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BT
~~SECRET~~ LONDON 587

002

JUL 22 PM 11 39

NODIS-SANDSTORM

REF: STATE 11418

1. PARAS 2-8 BELOW DRAFTED PRIOR TO UNSEC ROSTOW'S CALL TO AMB. BURNS AND RECEIPT STATE 11627, AND ARE REPORTED FOR BACKGROUND.
2. WE HAVE WHAT COULD DEVELOP INTO REAL PROBLEM WITH BRITISH OVER OUR ALLEGED FAILURE TO CONSULT ADEQUATELY WITH THEM ON JORDAN/ISRAEL SITUATION.
3. FONOFF'S MOBERLY (ACTING HEAD, EASTERN DEPT.) VOLUNTEERED TO EMBOFF JULY 20 BRITISH WERE CONCERNED LEST USG TAKE IMPORTANT DECISIONS ABOUT JORDAN WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATIONS HMG. ON INSTRUCTION, AMB DEAN HAD INQUIRED AND WAS ASSURED TIMELY CONSULTATIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE. EMBOFF PLED (HONESTLY) IGNORANCE.
4. TWO HOURS BEFORE RECEIPT REFTTEL FRIDAY NIGHT, FONOFF ASST UNSEC BRENCHLEY PHONED EMBOFF. BRENCHLEY QUITE AGITATED. HE HAD FLASH TEL FROM AMB DEAN WHO HAD BEEN TOLD BY UNSEC ROSTOW ABOUT AMB BURNS' VISIT HERE. AFTER CHECKING WITH AMB BURNS, MEETING WITH BRENCHLEY ARRANGED SAT NOON.
5. TO SAVE TIME BRENCHLEY, WHO WAS UNUSUALLY COLD, SHOWED AMB BURNS AND EMBOFF AMB DEAN'S LONG REPORTING CABLE. IN SUBSEQUENT SUBSTANTIVE EXCHANGE, BRENCHLEY EXPRESSED VIEW HMG LIKELY RESPOND TO KING HUSSEIN'S JULY 1W REQUEST (FOR APPRAISAL OF PROSPECTS BILATERAL NEGOTS) ALONG LINES ALREADY PROVIDED USG IN WASHINGTON. HE DOUBTED BRITISH WOULD ENCOURAGE HUSSEIN TO ENTER NEGOTS. TO DO SO WOULD IMPLY MORAL COMMITMENT HMG UNWILLING TO MAKE. UK WILL NOT REPEAT 1958 INTERVENTION TO SAVE HASHEMITE REGIME. NEGOTS MIGHT HAVE TEN PERCENT CHANCE OF SUCCESS. BRENCHLEY INDICATED INCLINATION TO ADVISE HUSSEIN TO WAIT A WHILE, CONSOLIDATING HIS INTERNAL POSITION, BEFORE DECIDING ON RESPONSE TO ISRAEL'S APPROACH.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 96 9000 (#23)
By abm/ry, NARA, Date 8-25-05

6. TURNING TO EMBOFF, BRENCHLEY STATED HE SURPRISED, PUZZLED AND DISAPPOINTED AT WAY STATE DEPARTMENT HANDLED THIS MATTER VIS-AVIS HMG. HE RECOUNTED SEVERAL RECENT OCCASIONS, LASTLY JULY 19, WHEN RESPONSIBLE DEPT OFFICIALS ASSURED AMB DEAN THAT USG WOULD MAKE NO MOVE WITHOUT CONSULTING HMG, THAT WE WOULD KEEP IN CLOSEST TOUCH, THAT US POSITION NOT YET DETERMINED. ON BASIS THESE ASSURANCE FONOFF, BELIEVING THERE NO GREAT RUSH, PLANNED BRING AMBS. ADAMS AND HADOW FROM AMMAN AND TEL AVIV EARLY NEXT WEEK FOR CONSULTATION. NOW THOSE INTRA-HMG CONSULTATIONS POINTLESS, FOR USG PRESUMABLY AT PRESIDENTIAL LEVEL ALREADY MADE KEY DECISIONS. BRITS PROBABLY WOULD SIMPLY AWAIT OUTCOME OF AMB BURNS' TALK WITH KING. DEPENDING ON WHAT TRANSPIRES, AMBS ADAMS AND HADOW MIGHT BE CALLED TO LONDON FOLLOWING WEEK. BRITISH REPLY TO HUSSEIN MIGHT BE DEFERRED UNTIL THEN.

7. AMB BURNS NOTED UNSEC ROSTOW PROVIDED FULL BRIEFING ON OUR THINKING TO AMB DEAN. TIMETABLE HAD TO BE SPEEDED UP, FOR KHAMMASH VISIT WASHINGTON HAD TO BE HEADED OFF, ISRAELI POSITION HARDENING AS TIME WENT BY, ETC. BESIDES, UK'S AND OUR POSITIONS SEEM VERY SIMILAR. BRENCHLEY NOT MOLLIFIED. HE STRESSED UK'S CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THERE WOULD BE CONSULTATIONS BEFORE DECISIONS. IT SEEMS USG DID NOT CARE WHAT BRITISH SAID. HE NOTED FONSEC BROWN NOT YET APPRAISED OF THIS MATTER. AFTER FURTHER SHORT EXCHANGE AMB BURNS HAD TO LEAVE. (MEETING LASTED ONE HOUR.) BRENCHLEY THANKED HIM FOR SPARING TIME.

8. EMBOFF STAYED BEHIND TO TAKE UP OTHER ME MATTERS. BRENCHLEY SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO BE UNPLEASANT TO AN AMERICAN AMBASSADOR, BUT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES REALLY VERY HURT BY THIS FAILURE TO CONSULT BRITISH ALLIES. HE HAD ALWAYS BELIEVED CLOSEST US/UK COORDINATION VITAL AND ACTED ACCORDINGLY. SINCE ME CRISIS BEGAN IN MAY, HOWEVER, STATE DEPT IN SEVERAL IMPORTANT INSTANCES DISREGARDED THIS PRINCIPLE. EMBOFF SAID HE CERTAIN USG AT HIGHEST LEVELS STILL GREATLY VALUED UK'S COUNSEL AND HELP ON ME AFFAIRS. KNOWLEDGE OF THIS SUBJECT WITHIN USG WAS NECESSARILY HELD BY FEW HARD-PRESSED SENIOR OFFICIALS. POSSIBLY THIS RESULTED IN SOME SLIPPAGE IN STAFF COORDINATION BUT SURELY NO SLIGHT TO HMG INTENDED. BRENCHLEY HOPED HIS FAITH IN VALUE OF WORKING IN COMPLETE CONFIDENCE WITH USG WOULD SOON BE RESTORED.

9. AT 2300 LOCAL TONIGHT EMBOFF QUERIED BRENCHLEY ABOUT REACTION TO MR ROSTOW'S OFFER TO DELAY AMB BURN'S RETURN TO AMMAN FOR A DAY. BRENCHLEY SAID OFFER, WITH HIS RECOMMENDATION IT BE DECLINED, SENT TO FONSEC AT COUNTRY HOUSE FOR OVERNIGHT CONSIDERATION. BRENCHLEY COULD NOT OF COURSE PREDICT BROWN'S REACTION, BUT PERSONALLY SUGGESTED AMB BURNS NOT RPT NOT CHANGE PLAN TO LEAVE LONDON SUNDAY MORNING.

GP-1.
BRUCE
BT

~~SECRET~~Action CONTROL: 006
RECD: JULY 23, 1967, 1:44AMInfo DE RUDICR 588 2032355
ZNY SSSSS
R 222235Z JUL 67
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ LONDON 588

NODIS - SANDSTORM

FROM FINDLEY BURNS

DEPT PASS INFO AMMAN

1. SAW GENERAL KHAMMASH THIS AFTERNOON. EXPLAINED TO HIM THE CONGRESSIONAL PROBLEM AND GAVE HIM THURSDAY'S AND FRIDAY'S WASHINGTON POST AND NEW YORK TIMES WHICH HAVE A NUMBER OF ARTICLES BEARING ON THE PROBLEM. SAID THAT MR. HOOPES WOULD HAVE COME TO LONDON TO SEE HIM TODAY HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE TRAGIC DEATH OF JOHN MACNAUGHTON, THAT A MAP SHIPMENT COULD BE AUTHORIZED NOW, AND THAT THE POSSIBILITY EXISTED THAT IN A FEW WEEKS WE COULD CONSIDER THE BALANCE OF THE GROUND PACKAGE SALE (\$6 MILLION) THOUGH WE COULD MAKE NO COMMITMENT. ARRANGED FOR KHAMMASH AND COL. JORDAN TO MEET FIRST THING MONDAY MORNING.

PAGE 2 RUDICR 588 ~~SECRET~~

2. KHAMMASH UNDERSTOOD THE CONGRESSIONAL PROBLEM BUT WAS NONETHELESS MOST DISAPPOINTED AT NOT BEING ABLE TO COME TO WASHINGTON AND BY THE SIZE OF THE MILITARY PACKAGE WE COULD AUTHORIZE NOW.

3. HE SAID HE WOULD HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME EXPLAINING TO JORDAN ARMY WHY HE HAD NOT BEEN TO WASHINGTON -- THERE WOULD BE TENDENCY IN JORDAN ARMY TO READ INTO THIS THAT US NOT WILLING TO SUPPORT JORDAN. HE WOULD GIVE THOUGHT OVER WEEKEND TO ADVISABILITY OF HIS REMAINING IN LONDON UNTIL IS WAS POSSIBLE FOR MR. HOOPES TO COME HERE. HE WOULD DISCUSS THIS WITH COL. JORDAN ON MONDAY. KHAMMASH SAID HE MIGHT BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO EXPLAIN WHY HE HAD NOT BEEN TO WASHINGTON IF HE COULD SAY HE HAD SEEN MR. HOOPES (KHAMMASH WOULD ALSO HOPE, I SUSPECT, TO GET A LATER AND MORE PRECISE READING FROM HOOPES AS TO JUST WHAT US IS WILLING TO DO FOR JORDAN IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE WITH RESPECT TO MILITARY EQUIPEMENT.)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 969000 (#22)
By *cbm/hg*, NARA, Date 8-25-05

~~SECRET~~

-2- 588 FROM LONDON JULY 22 (NODIS)

4. KHAMMASH INDICATED THAT HIS "URGENT" LIST WAS LARGER THAN WHAT COULD BE PROVIDED UNDER MAP AND THE BALANCE OF THE GROUND PACKAGE.

PAGE 3 RUDICR 588 ~~SECRET~~
COMBINED. HE ALSO INDICATED HE WOULD NEED AT LEAST SOME CREDIT.

5. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE CRITICAL PROBLEM WAS TO SHORE UP JORDAN SO THAT SHE WOULD BE STRONG ENOUGH TO UNDERTAKE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS. IN HER PRESENT STATE SHE WAS TOO WEAK AND THE REGIME COULD TOO EASILY BE KNOCKED OFF. HE WOULD RECOMMEND TO THE KING THAT NO NEGOTIATIONS BE UNDERTAKEN UNTIL HE, KHAMMASH, COULD BE SURE OF THE ARMY'S LOYALTY AND ITS ABILITY TO DEFEND THE REGIME AGAINST INTERFERENCE FROM ANY QUARTER. HE SAID HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE IRAQI TROOPS IN THE EVENT NEGOTIATIONS WERE UNDERTAKEN AND THUS FAR, TO HIS KNOWLEDGE, AREF HAD NOT RESPONDED TO HUSSEIN'S REQUEST THEY BE WITHDRAWN.

6. KHAMMASH SAID THAT ONCE THERE WAS A SETTLEMENT, THE JAA COULD BE RADICALLY REDUCED BUT THE CRITICAL PERIOD WAS FROM UNTIL A SETTLEMENT COULD BE CONCLUDED, AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS COULD TAKE MANY MONTHS. DURING THIS CRITICAL PERIOD A MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT BETTER EQUIPPED THAN IS THE JAA AT PRESENT IS MOST NECESSARY, AND THAT WHAT

PAGE 4 RUDICR 588 ~~SECRET~~
WE WERE OFFERING WAS SIMPLY NOT ENOUGH. HE SUSPECTS, TOO, THE BRITISH WILL NOT BE FORTHCOMING ON HAWKER HUNTERS.

7. KHAMMASH CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT IF THE US DID NOT THINK HUSSEIN COULD BRING OFF A SETTLEMENT -- EITHER BECAUSE A SETTLEMENT WAS NOT POSSIBLE DUE TO TOO GREAT A DISCREPANCY IN ISRAELI-JORDANIAN REQUIREMENTS, OR BECAUSE WE CALCULATED HUSSEIN'S REGIME WAS TOO WEAK TO SUSTAIN A SETTLEMENT EVEN IF ONE WERE POSSIBLE -- HE COULD UNDERSTAND SUCH A DECISION BUT IT WOULD HELP THE KING AND HIM TO KNOW THIS IS OUR DECISION. NEEDLESS BLOODSHED MIGHT THEREBY BE AVOIDED. AS THINGS NOW STAND WE INDICATE A MODICUM OF SUPPORT TO JORDAN BUT NOT ENOUGH TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO STRENGTHEN JORDAN SUFFICIENTLY TO UNDERTAKE THE DANGEROUS COURSE OF SETTLEMENT.

8. THE CONVERSATION WAS CONDUCTED IN A CALM, FACTUAL AND UNEMOTIONAL ATMOSPHERE.

GP-1. BRUCE
BT

NOT PASSED AMMAN BY OC/T

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

Mr. Bindy

4 123

~~SECRET~~

Action

RR RUEHC
DE RUOMKG 0384A 2001525
ZNY SSSSS

Jordan

Info

R 191520Z JUL 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC.
STATE GRNC

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1967 JUL 19 PM 1 02

BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 384

NODIS
SANDSTORM
REF: AMMAN 325

Rostow

1. WE CONTINUE TO TAKE SOUNDINGS ON SENTIMENT WITHIN THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES. PAST TWO DAYS MEMBERS OF USDAO HAVE HAD LONG CONVERSATIONS WITH SEVERAL SOURCES OTHER THAN THOSE REPORTED BY REF MESSAGE, INCLUDING SUCH DIVERGENT INDIVIDUALS AS MAJOR YOUSEF SAMMARA, WHO IS ONE OF GENERAL KHAMMASH'S PROTEGES, DR. (COL.) SAMKARY, COMMANDANT OF THE BASE HOSPITAL, AND MAJOR YOUSEF KURDI, AMONG WHOSE BROTHERS ARE BRIG. MAHMOUD KURDI, JORDANIAN MILITARY ATTACHE IN LONDON, AND COL. SALIH KURDI, CO OF THE RJAF.

PAGE 2 RUOMKG 0384A ~~SECRET~~

2. WITHOUT EXCEPTION ALL OF THESE INDIVIDUALS CONFIRM OUR PREVIOUS REPORTING CONCERNING QUIET BUT WIDESPREAD SUPPORT FOR A SETTLEMENT. IN FACT, THE SUPPORT FOR A SETTLEMENT SEEMS NOW TO BE SO COMPLETE AS TO ALMOST BE A "PARTY LINE." KEY POINTS RECURRING IN THESE CONVERSATIONS ARE: (A) THE OTHER RADICAL ARAB STATES BETRAYED JORDAN, (B) JORDAN MUST SEEK A SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL, (C) THIS MUST BE THROUGH INTERMEDIARY NOT THROUGH DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS, (D) SETTLEMENT MUST BE AN HONORABLE ONE, AND (E) ABOVE ALL, JERUSALEM MUST BE RETURNED TO JORDAN.

GP-3
DUNCAN

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 969000 (#68)
By *clm/rq* NARA, Date 8-25-05

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

124
4

~~SECRET~~

Action PP RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 378A 2001159
ZNY SSSSS
Info P 191140Z JUL 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
STATE GRNC
BT
SECRET AMMAN 378

0 1 6 6 3 2
1967 JUL 19 AM 9 51

Jordan
Wiggins
Saunders

NODIS

SANDSTORM

1. CHIEF OF STAFF KHAMMASH IN DISCUSSION WITH EMBOFF JULY 18 EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN THAT PROPER ATTENTION BE PAID THE ALL-IMPORTANT PROBLEM OF TIMING AS JORDAN SEEKS A SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL. KHAMMASH SAID JORDAN MUST QUICKLY FIND OUT WHAT THE ISRAELI TERMS WILL BE AND BELIEVES IT IS VITAL THAT A SECRET JORDANIAN-ISRAELI DIALOGUE BEGIN IMMEDIATELY WITH MEDIATION OF THE USG.

2. IF JORDAN CAN ACCEPT ISRAELI TERMS, KHAMMASH SAID, IT IS THEN ESSENTIAL TO WORK OUT A PLAN WITH MAXIMUM SOPHISTICATION TO DECIDE HOW ISRAEL AND JORDAN WOULD "PLAY THE GAME IN PUBLIC." KHAMMASH IS APPREHENSIVE THAT HUSSEIN MAY MAKE PUBLIC MOVES TOO QUICKLY. HE CITED THREE EXAMPLES OF HOW

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 378 ~~SECRET~~

THE KING HAD ALREADY OR IS PRESENTLY INCLINED TO TAKE PRECIPITOUS ACTION BY (A) SENDING A LETTER TO AREF WHEN HE DID REQUESTING THE WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI TROOPS FROM JORDAN, (B) PLANNING TO CONVOKE AT THIS TIME A PREDOMINANTLY PALESTINIAN CABINET UNDER A PALESTINIAN PRIME MINISTER AND (C) PLANNING TO ISSUE A "WHITE PAPER" CONTAINING MATERIAL DEROGATORY TO THE ARAB WAR EFFORT WHICH WOULD FOCUS IN PARTICULAR ON SYRIAN SHORTCOMINGS DURING THE JUNE HOSTILITIES.

3. KHAMMASH OBSERVED THAT IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE THE RISK OF ABORTING PROGRESS TOWARD A GENERAL SETTLEMENT JORDANIAN AND ISRAELI MOVES SHOULD BE CAREFULLY WORKED OUT WITHIN THE OVERALL AREA CONTACT. WHEN ISRAEL TAKES AN ACT AFFECTING JORDAN IT MUST HAVE VERY CLEARLY IN MIND THE EFFECT SUCH ACTION WILL HAVE IN CAIRO. NASSER'S ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION MUST BE CONSIDERED IN PLANNING BOTH BY AMMAN OR JERUSALEM.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: MLJ-017R-012-004/4
NARA Date: 10-9-15

~~SECRET~~

-2- AMMAN 378, JULY 19

4. ... AFTER FOREGOING CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF KHAMMASH WENT TO PALACE AND MET WUTH KING PRIOR TO HIS (KHAMMASH'S) DEPARTURE TODAY FOR LONDON. WE HAVE NOT YET GOTTEN A READING OF WHETHER KHAMMASH SPOKE ALONG SAME LINES TO HUSSEIN.

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 378 ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

5. COMMENT: WE SHARE KHAMMASH'S CONCERN ABOUT NECESSITY FOR THE MOST CAREFUL TIMING AS WE MOVE FORWARD TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF HUSSEIN'S READINESS TO SEEK A SETTLEMENT. THE KING FEELS HIMSELF UNDER GREAT COMPULSION TO MOVE. THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE WILL TAKE UNCOORDINATED ACTIONS INCREASES THE LONGER HE IS LEFT WITHOUT AN INDICATION OF OUR THINKING IN RESPONSE TO HIS INITIATIVE. IN THIS CONNECTION WE SHOULD NOTE REPRORTS GIVEN US DURING THE PAST 24 HOURS BY US JOURNALISTS INCLUDING TIME CORRESPONDENT GRIGGS AND TIME MANAGING EDITOR OTTO FUERBRINGER AS WELL AS BY AFME REPRESENTATIVE AMMAN ALL OF WHOM SAW KING EVENING JULY 18. HUSSEIN TOLD THEM IN SEPARATE INTERVIEWS: (A) THERE WAS NO LONGER ANY PROSPECT OF AN ARAB SUMMIT (B) SOME ARABS WERE READY TO FOLLOW PATH OF TOTAL RELIANCE ON COMMUNIST POWERS BUT HE HAD REJECTED THIS (C) JORDAN WOULD HAVE TO FIND A "NEW PATH" TO SOLVE ITS PROBLEMS ON ITS OWN; HOWEVER, JORDAN WAS LOOKING TO USG TO HELP IT REGAIN TERRITORIES UNDER ISRAELI OCCUPATION. BY MAKING FOREGOING COMMENTS, WHICH ELIMINATE SEVERAL ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION, TO NONOFFICIAL AMERICANS KING COMES CLOSE TO TIPPING HIS HAND THAT HE HAS DECIDED ACTIVELY TO SEEK A

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 378 ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~
SEPARATE JORDANIAN-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT.

GP-3

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Assistant Secretary Battle gave Dean July 17 our preliminary assessment.

C. Current thinking US is that while risky it is essential we encourage settlement between Israel and Jordan, even though we recognize chance bringing such settlement to successful conclusion difficult indeed. Dangers to King are many but alternative routes for him are limited. We will explore further with Ambassadors Barbour and Burns likelihood success such effort and US role, if any. US desires UN mediator appointed by GA resolution or Security Council action as convenient cover for other negotiations which could proceed simultaneously.

D. Ambassador Burns will return Amman end of week via London in hope brief you further re thinking at that time. We will make every effort keep in touch British here and may in due course suggest discussions London.

GP-1

END

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Mr. Saunders

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Action

RR RUEHC
DE RUOMKG 0384A 2001525

Info

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R 191520Z JUL 67

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1967 JUL 19 PM 1 02

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC.
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SANDSTORM
REF: AMMAN 325

Roston

1. WE CONTINUE TO TAKE SOUNDINGS ON SENTIMENT WITHIN THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES. PAST TWO DAYS MEMBERS OF USDAO HAVE HAD LONG CONVERSATIONS WITH SEVERAL SOURCES OTHER THAN THOSE REPORTED BY REF MESSAGE, INCLUDING SUCH DIVERGENT INDIVIDUALS AS MAJOR YOUSEF SAMMARA, WHO IS ONE OF GENERAL KHAMMASH'S PROTEGES, DR. (COL.) SAMKARY, COMMANDANT OF THE BASE HOSPITAL, AND MAJOR YOUSEF KURDI, AMONG WHOSE BROTHERS ARE BRIG. MAHMOUD KURDI, JORDANIAN MILITARY ATTACHE IN LONDON, AND COL. SALIH KURDI, CO OF THE RJAF.

PAGE 2 RUOMKG 0384A ~~SECRET~~

2. WITHOUT EXCEPTION ALL OF THESE INDIVIDUALS CONFIRM OUR PREVIOUS REPORTING CONCERNING QUIET BUT WIDESPREAD SUPPORT FOR A SETTLEMENT. IN FACT, THE SUPPORT FOR A SETTLEMENT SEEMS NOW TO BE SO COMPLETE AS TO ALMOST BE A "PARTY LINE." KEY POINTS RECURRING IN THESE CONVERSATIONS ARE: (A) THE OTHER RADICAL ARAB STATES BETRAYED JORDAN, (B) JORDAN MUST SEEK A SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL, (C) THIS MUST BE THROUGH INTERMEDIARY NOT THROUGH DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS, (D) SETTLEMENT MUST BE AN HONORABLE ONE, AND (E) ABOVE ALL, JERUSALEM MUST BE RETURNED TO JORDAN.

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Authority NND969000 (#68)
By dm/rg, NARA, Date 8-25-05

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Action

PP RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 378A 2001159
ZNY SSSSS

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1967 JUL 19 AM 9 51

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P 191140Z JUL 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
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Jordan

NODIS

SANDSTORM

1. CHIEF OF STAFF KHAMMASH IN DISCUSSION WITH EMBOFF JULY 18 EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN THAT PROPER ATTENTION BE PAID THE ALL-IMPORTANT PROBLEM OF TIMING AS JORDAN SEEKS A SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL. KHAMMASH SAID JORDAN MUST QUICKLY FIND OUT WHAT THE ISRAELI TERMS WILL BE AND BELIEVES IT IS VITAL THAT A SECRET JORDANIAN-ISRAELI DIALOGUE BEGIN IMMEDIATELY WITH MEDIATION OF THE USG.

2. IF JORDAN CAN ACCEPT ISRAELI TERMS, KHAMMASH SAID, IT IS THEN ESSENTIAL TO WORK OUT A PLAN WITH MAXIMUM SOPHISTICATION TO DECIDE HOW ISRAEL AND JORDAN WOULD "PLAY THE GAME IN PUBLIC." KHAMMASH IS APPREHENSIVE THAT HUSSEIN MAY MAKE PUBLIC MOVES TOO QUICKLY. HE CITED THREE EXAMPLES OF HOW

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 378 ~~SECRET~~

THE KING HAD ALREADY OR IS PRESENTLY INCLINED TO TAKE PRECIPITOUS ACTION BY (A) SENDING A LETTER TO AREF WHEN HE DID REQUESTING THE WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI TROOPS FROM JORDAN, (B) PLANNING TO CONVOKE AT THIS TIME A PREDOMINANTLY PALESTINIAN CABINET UNDER A PALESTINIAN PRIMIN AND (C) PLANNING TO ISSUE A "WHITE PAPER" CONTAINING MATERIAL DEROGATORY TO THE ARAB WAR EFFORT WHICH WOULD FOCUS IN PARTICULAR ON SYRIAN SHORTCOMINGS DURING THE JUNE HOSTILITIES.

3. KHAMMASH OBSERVED THAT IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE THE RISK OF ABORTING PROGRESS TOWARD A GENERAL SETTLEMENT JORDANIAN AND ISRAELI MOVES SHOULD BE CAREFULLY WORKED OUT WITHIN THE OVERALL AREA CONTACT. WHEN ISRAEL TAKES AN ACT AFFECTING JORDAN IT MUST HAVE VERY CLEARLY IN MIND THE EFFECT SUCH ACTION WILL HAVE IN CAIRO. NASSER'S ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION MUST BE CONSIDERED IN PLANNING BOTH BY AMMAN OR JERUSALEM.

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Authority: NSA-OTFR 012-00414

By: JC NARA Date: 10-9-15

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-2- AMMAN 378, JULY 19

4. AFTER FOREGOING CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF KHAMMASH WENT TO PALACE AND MET WITH KING PRIOR TO HIS (KHAMMASH'S) DEPARTURE TODAY FOR LONDON. WE HAVE NOT YET GOTTEN A READING OF WHETHER KHAMMASH SPOKE ALONG SAME LINES TO HUSSEIN.

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 378 ~~SECRET~~

5. COMMENT: WE SHARE KHAMMASH'S CONCERN ABOUT NECESSITY FOR THE MOST CAREFUL TIMING AS WE MOVE FORWARD TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF HUSSEIN'S READINESS TO SEEK A SETTLEMENT. THE KING FEELS HIMSELF UNDER GREAT COMPULSION TO MOVE. THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE WILL TAKE UNCOORDINATED ACTIONS INCREASES THE LONGER HE IS LEFT WITHOUT AN INDICATION OF OUR THINKING IN RESPONSE TO HIS INITIATIVE. IN THIS CONNECTION WE SHOULD NOTE REPRORTS GIVEN US DURING THE PAST 24 HOURS BY US JOURNALISTS INCLUDING TIME CORRESPONDENT GRIGGS AND TIME MANAGING EDITOR OTTO FUERBRINGER AS WELL AS BY AFME REPRESENTATIVE AMMAN ALL OF WHOM SAW KING EVENING JULY 18. HUSSEIN TOLD THEM IN SEPARATE INTERVIEWS: (A) THERE WAS NO LONGER ANY PROSPECT OF AN ARAB SUMMIT (B) SOME ARABS WERE READY TO FOLLOW PATH OF TOTAL RELIANCE ON COMMUNIST POWERS BUT HE HAD REJECTED THIS (C) JORDAN WOULD HAVE TO FIND A "NEW PATH" TO SOLVE ITS PROBLEMS ON ITS OWN; HOWEVER, JORDAN WAS LOOKING TO USG TO HELP IT REGAIN TERRITORIES UNDER ISRAELI OCCUPATION. BY MAKING FOREGOING COMMENTS, WHICH ELIMINATE SEVERAL ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION, TO NONOFFICIAL AMERICANS KING COMES CLOSE TO TIPPING HIS HAND THAT HE HAS DECIDED ACTIVELY TO SEEK A

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 378 ~~SECRET~~
SEPARATE JORDANIAN-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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SECRET AMMAN 0361

Jordan

NODIS SANDSTORM

KHAMMASH HAS TOLD EMBOFF THAT KING IS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING PROPOSING THAT GAZA BE INCORPORATED INTO JORDAN AS PART OF GENERAL SETTLEMENT. AN ACCESS CORRIDOR THROUGH THE NEGEV WOULD BE REQUIRED IN SUCH EVENTUALITY. KHAMMASH SAID THIS ARRANGEMENT WOULD BOTH PROVIDE JORDAN WITH A MEDITERRANEAN PORT AND FACILITATE SETTLEMENT OF THE OVERALL REFUGEE PROBLEM UNDER JORDANIAN AUSPICES.

GP-3. DUNCAN

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Authority NW 017R 012004/6

by *J* NARA Date 10-9-15

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Wiggins
Solomon
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Action

Info

CONTROL: 14141
RECD : JULY 17, 1967, 7:09 AM

PP RUEHC
DE RUQMGK 325A 1981013
ZNY SSSSS
P 171000Z JUL 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY [redacted]
STATE GRNC
BT
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Jordan

NODIS SANDSTORM

1. JAA LTC MUHAMMAD SA'ID JAMHOUR, DIRECTOR OF TRAINING, SOUGHT OUT MAJOR PERRY, US ARMY STUDENT IN JAA STAFF COLLEGE JULY 15 TO PASS FOL INFO URGENTLY TO ACTING DATT ON DESIRES FOR SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL:

A. PRESENT JORDANIAN GOVT IS TO BE REPLACED TO PREPARE WAY FOR A SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL. NEW GOVERNMENT, WHICH MAY BE LED BY SULEIMAN NABULSI AS PRIMIN, WILL INCLUDE REPS FROM ALL FACTIONS AS WIDE COALITION IN-EFFORT OBTAIN POPULAR SUPPORT FOR SETTLEMENT.

B. NINETY-NINE PERCENT OF ALL JORDANIANS STRONGLY DESIRE A PRIVATE SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL, NO MATTER WHAT THEY MAY SAY PUBLICLY. THIS INCLUDES THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES WHO WILL BACK THE KING COMPLETELY IN THIS REGARD.

PAGE 2 RUQMGK 325 ~~SECRET~~

C. JORDANIANS FEEL THAT SYRIA AND EGYPT BETRAYED THEM THUS LEADING TO JORDAN'S HEAVY LOSSES.

D. THE IRAQI ARMY UNITS IN JORDAN ARE BEING WITHDRAWN IN PREPARATION FOR THE SETTLEMENT.

E. SYRIA, IRAQ, UAR AND ALGERIA MAY FORM SOME TYPE OF POLITICAL UNION AS A RADICAL BLOC.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000 (#71)
By *cbm/rg*, NARA, Date 8-25-05

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-2- AMMAN 325, JULY 17

F. SECRET BUT THUS FAR HIGHLY GENERAL TALKS ARE UNDERWAY WITH LEBANON TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR FUTURE DISCUSSIONS ON AN ECONOMIC UNION BETWEEN ISRAEL, JORDAN, AND LEBANON TO CAPITALIZE ON TOURISM AND ECONOMIC EXCHANGE IN FACE OF RADICAL ARAB BLOC.

2. COMMENT: JAMHOUR WAS PRESENT AT THE SECOND OF TWO BRIEFINGS BY KING (AMMAN 4945), THE FIRST FOR MAJOR GENERALS ONLY AND THE SECOND FOR REMAINING KEY COMMANDERS AND STAFF OFFICERS. JAMHOUR'S STATEMENT REINTENTIONS OF GOJ PARA 1(A) ABOVE VERY PROBABLY REFLECTS INDICATIONS GIVEN BY KING. AS TO NABULSI HEADING GOVERNMENT, WE HAVE HEARD A FEW RUMORS TO THIS EFFECT BUT JAMHOUR'S ASSERTION ON THIS IS PROBABLY SPECULATIVE. WE HAVE AS YET HEARD NOTHING FROM OTHER SOURCES REGARDING ANY SECRET NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN LEBANON AND JORDAN DESIGNED AT LEADING TO AN ECONOMIC UNION WITH ISRAEL - PARA 1 (F) ABOVE.

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 325 ~~SECRET~~

3. LTC JAMHOUR IS A GRADUATE OF THE US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE AT FORT LEAVENWORTH. HE IS A MOSLEM PALESTINIAN FROM NABLUS. NORMALLY AN OPPORTUNIST WHO IS VERY CLOSE-MOUTHED, FACT THAT HE DELIBERATELY SOUGHT CHANNEL TO PASS MESSAGE WE CONSIDER TO BE INDICATION HIS SINCERITY AND DEPTH OF FEELING. WE ARE HEARING THE SAME ESTIMATES FROM A NUMBER OF SOURCES. JAMHOUR IS IN EXCELLENT POSITION TO TAKE SOUNDING OF MIDDLE AND JUNIOR GRADE OFFICER SENTIMENT. MAJOR PERRY, WHO IS IN CLOSE DAILY CONTACT WITH 25 JUNIOR JAA OFFICERS, STATES THAT ABOVE REPORT CONFIRMS THEIR FEELINGS EXACTLY, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE RELUCTANT TO ADMIT THIS PUBLICLY. HE STATES JULY 14 ISSUE OF TIME IS BEING WIDELY CIRCULATED AND LAUDED AS REPRESENTING VERY CLOSE TO TRUTH REGARDING CURRENT SITUATION.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Dept is being done at this?* *Wiggins Saunders*
Department of State

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131

Action 0 161508Z JULY 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2910
STATE GRNC
BT

CONTROL: 13806
RECD : July 16, 1967
12:38 p.m.

Info
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 318

Jordan

NODIS - SANDSTORM

PLEASE BRING TO ATTENTION AMBASSADOR FINLEY BURNS

REF: AMMAN'S 245; JERUSALEM 122; TEL AVIV 155

1. KING ASKED EMBOFF JULY 16 STATUS HIS REQUEST AMB BURNS JULY 12 FOR HELP PERSUADE ISRAELIS LET WEST BANK NOTABLES CROSS OVER FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH HIM. EMBOFF NOTED PRELIMINARY REACTION OF EMB TEL AVIV ONE OF RELUCTANCE INTERVEN IN THIS MATTER AND BELIEF NOTABLES COULD MAKE ARRANGEMENTS ON OWN AS HAD MAYOR NABLUS. KING REPLIED HE HAD SENT WORD TO ANWAR KHATIB ASKING HIM COME TO AMMAN BUT HAD HAD NO REPLY. HE CONSIDERS IT HIGHLY IMPORTANT IN LAYING GROUNDWORK FOR SETTLEMENT THAT HE SEE KHATIB AND OTHERS VERY SOON. HE WANTS SOME OF THEM IN NEW CABINET. ALSO, ADVICE OF CERTAIN WEST BANKERS HAS BEEN THAT KING SHOULD ARRANGE FOR SUCH NOTABLES PUBLICLY TO URGE SETTLEMENT ON KING AT PROPER TIME.

2. WE DO NOT KNOW WHY KHATIB HAS NOT RESPONDED. POSSIBILITY OF COURSE IS LACK OF DECISION IN KHATIB'S OWN MIND OR UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHAT ISRAEL'S REACTION WOULD BE. LACK OF ISRAELI PERMISSION IS HOWEVER A STRONG POSSIBILITY. KING OBVIOUSLY ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE THIS EXERCISE AND TO OUR ASSISTANCE IN CONNECTION WITH IT. WE ARE NOT INCLINED QUESTION HIS VIEW OF UTILITY OF THESE EXCHANGES. WE BELIEVE THEREFORE WE SHOULD FIND WAY TO ACCOMMODATE KING'S REQUEST. AT THIS STAGE CERTAINLY WE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT LINK OUR URGING TO THE ACTIVE SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS KING HAS MADE OR EVEN VERY CLOSELY, IF AT ALL, TO IDEA OF ENCOURAGING SETTLEMENT. THIS WOULD RISK PREMATURE DISCLOSURES AT WRONG LEVELS. WE SUGGEST THEREFORE THAT DEPT CONSIDER EITHER (A) SPEAKING TO EBAN IN THE UNITED STATES OF GENERAL DESIREABILITY ENCOURAGING SUCH EXCHANGES AND ASKING HIM ENDEAVOR FACILITATE THEM OR (B) CONCURRING OUR ORIGINAL RECOMMENDATION (AMMAN 245) AND WHILE RECOGNIZING PROBLEM, ASKING TEL AVIV TO RAISE QUESTION WITH APPROPRIATE LEVELS ISRAEL GOVERNMENT, ADDUCING GENERAL ADVANTAGES SUCH EXCHANGES. IN EITHER CASE, PERMISSION ANWAR KHATIB IN PARTICULAR SHOULD BE SOUGHT SINCE HE IS MOST ON KING'S MIND. GP-1

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000 (472)
By *cmf/ry* NARA, Date 8-25-05

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RC/NEA 67-39
October 30, 1967


Jordan
136

INTERDEPARTMENTAL REGIONAL GROUP
FOR NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Agenda for Meeting - Tuesday, October 31, at 9:00 a.m.

The meeting will resume the consideration of our policy towards Jordan initiated at the IRG meeting of October 16, with particular reference to the forthcoming visit of King Hussein.

A revised draft policy paper on various issues in our relations with Jordan, prepared by the Country Director, is attached.


Sidney Sober
Staff Director

Attachment:

NEA/ARN paper, "U. S. Policy Towards Jordan,"
10/30/67

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cm/s*, NARA, Date 5-28-10

-136c

Recommended Patterns of Support in the Military, Economic and Cultural Fields

N.B. Public and Congressional attitudes have limited the extent of military support which we can now extend to Jordan. The following recommendations are based on U.S. national interests and should be adopted as soon as possible in light of the domestic political situation.

1. Economic Aid

The Government of Jordan is temporarily in possession of sizable cash balances and the country's foreign exchange reserves are relatively high. Jordan's present affluence, however, contrasts sharply with its longer range economic outlook which, without the return of the West Bank or a solution to the refugee problem, is bleak indeed. Tourism, by all odds Jordan's best potential asset for foreign exchange earning, is centered on the West Bank. If the present situation continues, Jordan will have a population of almost 50 percent refugees and little potentiality for economic development. Although it will now be necessary to adjust our pattern of aid, it will also be important to avoid creating the impression that our budget support is being cut off for political motives. We recommend the following specific actions:

a) We find suitable projects which would justify release of remaining \$6.2 million for fourth quarter of CY 1967.

b) Subject to availability of funds, we remain receptive to proposals for sound development loans which would contribute to the economic development of the East Bank.

c) We continue a program of technical assistance at approximately the current level of \$2.5 million per year.

d) We provide Jordan with its wheat and feed grain import requirements under PL 480 sales agreements.

e) In the event of a settlement with Israel, we should seek special appropriations to fund original development projects designed to absorb refugees.

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-2-

2. Military Assistance

a) Permit Jordan to purchase approximately \$6 million worth of non-lethal military equipment to fulfill the balance of the 1965 military sales agreement.

b) Continue a small MAP program to Jordan, including spare parts, training ammunition, and other non-lethal items. We should also continue a program of training Jordanian military personnel in the United States. For the near future the MAP program should remain at approximately the \$2 million level which we had previously programmed.

c) We should enter into a discussion with the GOJ aimed at reducing the size of the Jordanian army from its pre-June 5 level of approximately 52,000 men to the pre-UAC level of approximately 37,500 men. Although we should encourage Jordan to obtain its combat equipment from other Western sources, we should not exclude ourselves from providing Jordan with combat equipment if our national interest so requires.

d) For the time being, we should keep the F-104 sales agreement in a state of suspension and quietly assist the GOJ in its efforts to obtain a squadron, i.e. 16 - 20 planes, of Mark 9 Hawker Hunters. The GOJ has indicated that they may prefer to acquire French Mirage aircraft as the next step. We should encourage them to meet their supersonic aircraft requirements from Western European sources and make the process of canceling the F-104 contract as financially painless as possible.

3. Cultural Relations

Our previous programs of exchange professors for Jordan University and leader grants for prominent Jordanians have been very successful. These programs should be continued and, if possible within budgetary limitations, be expanded.

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.. In a private meeting on 26 October, King Husayn had the following reactions to respective Department cables relayed to him:

A. Arms Sales: The King was completely relaxed and composed as the text of the State message was read to him. Of course, he already knew from press reports of the USG decision on sale of arms to Jordan. Husayn said, matter-of-factly, without any rancor; that as USG must realize neither he, nor the army, nor Jordan can continue hanging in the air on this issue and he would have to have a final USG answer one way or the other before he left Washington. This should be considered an official notification to the USG of his views.

B. USUN Position: Husayn appreciated the reply on UN deliberations, but felt it contained little he did not already know. He seems much more relaxed and quietly confident of the rightness and reasonableness of his policy position than before, perhaps because of De Gaulle's reassurances. Husayn said it now appeared the refugee problem and its relation to other aspects of the solution was the major stumbling block. He said there was no need to be legalistic about it but some agreement on a refugee solution was obviously an essential to any settlement. The refugee problem embodied all the hostility and belligerency of the past 20 years and it could not be left hanging while the other issues were solved. No Arab could accept a settlement which did not include a refugee solution. He said he assumed the USG realized this and, indeed, wanted a refugee solution as much as anyone else. He said he did not believe a reasonable agreement on refugees could not be worked out amicably as part of the package without undue burden or embarrassment to anyone, including Israel. Once this was in motion a settlement was assured. Husayn added in regard to the UN that in exchange with his delegation today, Syrians are under instructions to move debate into General Assembly and begin attacks on Israel again. He said he thinks he has managed to stall this by agreement between UAR, Syria, and Jordan not to appear before either Security Council or General Assembly and to make no public statements regarding Israel or current deliberations. He said he would hope Israel could follow same line.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

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11-62

By cbm NARA, Date 2-21-2013

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C. Johnson - Eban Meeting: Regarding the Department's message on the meeting of President Johnson and Prime Minister Eban, Husayn read and returned with smile, but made no comment.

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Jordan

138

at Madrid
10/22/67

1. King Hussayn is highly agitated at reports received from other Arabs and from UN on what he believes is USG's negative and elusive attitude toward moderate Arab solution which he has been pushing. He wonders whether this represents staffed out USG position or simply UN Ad Hoc maneuvering and has asked me inquire officially and give him an answer soonest.

2. Hussayn is clearly hurt by what he believes to be major let down by USG over past two months. He explained that when he saw President Johnson at end of June, Arabs were in disarray, extremists were in vanguard and hope of any reasonable settlement nil. Since then, mainly through his efforts, despite Washington prediction that he could not pull it off and if he did would be outvoted, Arab Summit was convened and moderate unified position adopted. This was in no small part result of intensive lobbying throughout Arab world before hand. With moderate cover provided by Summit, Hussayn set out to get resolution which USG, USSR, and Nasir would accept. He settled on old USG/USSR draft which Secretary Rusk had told Jordan Formin was basis for resolution which would permit USG to exert influence towards settlement. First step was to get Nasir's concurrence, since other Arabs had in effect agreed to accept anything Nasir and Hussayn worked out. Nasir accepted language of US/USSR draft. Next step was to get USSR to accept resolution on which Nasir and Hussayn agreed. This also accomplished. Next step was USG approval which Hussayn assumed would be easiest in view of long friendship and fact he following course enunciated by USG and only one which had any prospect of peaceful end.

3. In his view USG backsliding and sidestepping began at this point. His reworded draft was viewed by USG as significant watered-down departure from original, however, Hussayn said he made clear he not wedded to particular language and asked USG for suggested changes. He received only evasive answers in reply. At same time USG began placing great stress on interpretation of language as condition precedent. Yet, according to interpretation not a factor when original US/USSR draft or other draft proposals presented or voted on during June-July UN sessions. Nevertheless, Hussayn said he took USG insistence on prior interpretation into account in further pursuit of matter. He agreed to written or oral acknowledgment of Israel right exist and got Nasir to do the same. He also argued Nasir into opening the Suez Canal as a feature of ending belligerency. Despite all this he finds the USG at UN dragging feet, arguing in circles and refusing cooperate. He finds this extremely exasperating in view of dramatic shift in Arab position to point which USG told him was its goal. He wonders now what it is exactly USG will buy or whether it determined to buy nothing.

4. While USG taking what he considers, negative position, all other states (UK, France, neutrals) very positive in reaction to new Arab position. He feels USG placing too much stress on USSR "reserve" toward proposed resolution in talks with USG. Soviets

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By cbm NARA, Date 2-21-2013

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have agreed buy anything Nasir accepts, so USSR a passive factor in present negotiations. Reference to USSR "reserve" thus a red herring. Hussayn views present impasse as ironic. Jordan is major victim, has done most to achieve a settlement, is USG's best friend in area, yet USG is only state blocking resolution. Hussayn convinced resolution could easily be worked out, with all necessary interpretations, between Jordan and USG which would be acceptable to latter and which Hussayn could sell to Nasir. Failure ^{on} refusal USG to see this and act on it is what currently embitters him.

5. Time now makes all above factors acute. General Assembly reconvenes 25 October. Non-permanent SC members working up draft based on new Arab position. But there are only two days in which to get acceptance of this. In view hardened USG position and apparently stalling tactics Hussayn doubts deadline can be met. His first preference would be USG sponsored resolution in SC along above lines since USG would get credit it badly needs with Arabs for finding solution. Second preference would be joint US/USSR resolution. Third preference is present non-permanent member efforts at composing resolution. If all fail he will be inclined blame USG. In such event Arabs will probably sponsor same resolution in General Assembly with, according them, assurance of certain passage. Arabs will probably abstain in GA vote explaining abstention, not as objection to text, but as indication SC not GA should have been venue and that Arab acceptance contingent on Israeli acceptance. Returning to (portion garbled) will also entail review of Arab relations with USG whose actions will be blamed for SC failure and viewed as further evidence of USG commitment to Israel. He views assignment of UNREP without specific charter as Israeli ploy to freeze status quo and is not acceptable.

6. Comment: If results have all been negative and no progress made by time Hussayn arrives in USA, 2 November, he will unquestionably make detailed and probably convincing appeal to President Johnson. If this also fails, the grace period which the other Arabs have given Hussayn to find political solution will have run out, and he will return home deeply embittered. Neither he nor any other Arab leader will have any choice but to follow line pressed by Bounedienne and Syrians and a shift to the East will be inevitable.

7. Since consequences of UN failure so serious and possibility of UN success so close to our grasp, would urge dissemination of views to appropriate officials if only to be sure the record straight. King Hussayn would like a clarification of USG position. A reply by early 24 October Paris time would permit passage of USG views at our next meeting.

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Department of State

139
TELEGRAM

Sander

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PAGE 01 STATE 52869

81
ORIGIN SS 25

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /025 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: RBHOUGHTON: UNP: ARDAY
APPROVED BY: M: EVROSTOW
NEA: DAVIES
IO: POPPER
S/S: MEEHAN

Jordan (subject file) 03
Intemim answer to Hussein

O R 121929Z OCT 67 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0138
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0371

~~SECRET~~ STATE 52869

EXDIS

AMMAN 1797

1. YOU MAY INFORM KING HUSSEIN THAT WE HAVE ALWAYS FELT THAT DISCUSSION OF THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS WOULD BE MORE FRUITFUL IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAN IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. FROM A PROCEDURAL POINT OF VIEW WE DO NOT THINK, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO GO THROUGH THE STEP OF PROPOSING A RESOLUTION TO MOVE THE ISSUE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE ITEM IS ALREADY ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL AGENDA.

PAGE 2 RUEHC 52869 ~~SECRET~~

2. HOWEVER, WE FEEL IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT DISCUSSIONS BE

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (b) (5)
State Dept. Guidelines
By *cbm/hg*, NARA, Date *8-25-05*

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Department of State

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PURSUED IN THE DAYS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD TO SEE WHETHER WE CAN FIND SUFFICIENT COMMON GROUND BOTH IN LANGUAGE AND INTENT TO ENSURE THAT SC PROCEEDINGS WOULD BE CONSTRUCTIVE. WHILE WE APPRECIATE THE FACT THAT THE KING HAS HAD TO MAKE CHANGES IN TEXT ON THE INSISTENCE OF THE UAR, NEVERTHELESS THESE REPRESENT CONSIDERABLE DEPARTURE FROM WHAT WE HAD DISCUSSED WITH THE SVOIETS AT THE END OF THE ESSGA. AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG WILL BE DISCUSSING SPECIFICS WITH JORDANIAN DEL AT EARLY DATE, AND WE WILL KEEP YOU FULLY INFORMED.

3. YOU SHOULD ALSO INFORM THE KING THAT WE VERY MUCH APPRECIATE AND ADMIRE THE EFFORTS HE HAS MADE OVER THE PAST WEEKS TO DEVELOP A MODERATE ARAB POSITION IN AN EFFORT TO WORK OUT A PERMANENT SOLUTION TO THE PRESENT CRISIS. WE HAVE BY NO MEANS GIVEN UP HOPE THAT A JUST SOLUTION CAN BE FOUND AND YOU MAY ASSURE HIM THAT WE ARE DEVLTING OUR ENERGIÉS TOWARD THAT END. OUR POSITION HAS NEITHER SOFTENED NOR HARDENED AND REMAINS BASED ON THE FIVE POINTS DESCRIBED IN THE PRÉSIDENT'S STATEMENT OF JUNE 19. HIS LETTER TO THE PRÉSIDENT IS BEING STUDIED AND WILL BE

PAGE 3 RUEHC 52869 ~~SECRET~~
ANSWERED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

GP-3. RUSK

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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ACTION SS 25

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P R 081525Z OCT 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3739
INFO AMEMBASSY RABAT 119
AMEMBASSY TUNIS 124
AMEMBASSY LONDON 629
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 149
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 495
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 106
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1032
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1123
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 150
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 952
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 92
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 558
AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI 23
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 529
STATE GRNC

*Jordan
(file with
King Hussein's
letter)*

~~SECRET~~ SECTION ONE OF TWO AMMAN 1776

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 1776/1A ~~SECRET~~
EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO

1. ON HUSSEIN'S INSTRUCTION, KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY ZAID RIFA'I CALLED ON AMBASSADOR EVENING OCT 7 TO BRING JUST COMPLETED LENGTHY LETTER FROM KING TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON TOGETHER WITH A SUGGESTED SC RESOLUTION ON THE CRISIS. (TEXT OF LETTER

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Authority *NLS 02-155 (#102)*
By *cbm/ias*, NARA, Date *8-25-05*



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 01776 094152Z

TO DEPT ONLY IN IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING MESSAGE.)

2. RIFA'I ASKED AMBASSADOR TO READ LETTER AND THEN SOUGHT HIS COMMENTS. AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THE LETTER HAD AN INOPTORTUNE TONE AND NOTED IN PARTICULAR THAT IT CONTAINED ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT US POLICY TOWARDS THE ME CRISIS WHICH APPEARED TO BE LARGELY BASED ON WHAT THE SOVIETS AND THE EGYPTIANS HAD LED HUSSEIN TO BELIEVE TO BE OUR POLICY. RIFA'I REPLIED THAT HE HOPED THE LETTER WOULD NOT BE MISINTERPRETED IN WASHINGTON BUT READ RATHER AS STATING HOW REMOTE THE KING FELT WERE THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE UNLESS THE USG WERE PREPARED TO USE ITS INFLUENCE OVER THE ISRAELIS AND, FURTHERMORE, TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT A

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 1776/1A ~~SECRET~~

RESOLUTION SUCH AS THE US AND USSR HAD FORMULATED AT THE ESSGA. THE ALTERNATIVE TO ACTION, ON THE PART OF THE USG WOULD BE ARAB PREPARATION FOR ANOTHER ROUND AND JORDAN, AS THE KING'S LETTER STATED, WOULD BE FORCED TO SECURE ARMS FROM ANY AVAILABLE SOURCE. RIFA'I ALSO SAID THAT THE KING'S UNDERSTNDING OF THE RECENT TREND IN THE USG POLICY WAS BASED ON REPORTS TO HIM FROM SEVERAL SOURCES INCLUDING CONTACTS BETWEEN THE JORDANIAN DELEGATION AND USUN. HE ADDED THAT DURING THE AFTERNOON THE KING HAD SHOWN HIM AN EARLIER DRAFT OF THE LETTER WHICH HAD BEEN "TEN TIMES MORE BITTER" IN EXPRESSING HUSSEIN'S CONVICTION THAT THE USG WAS ABANDONING JORDAN BY UNWILLINGNESS TO PLAY A ROLE IN BRINGING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT. RIFA'ID SAID THAT HE HAD CONVINCED THE KING TO TONE DOWN THE EARLIER DRAFT AND FELT THAT THE FINAL VERSION WAS AN ACCURATE AND FRANK EXPOSITION BY A FRIEND OF THE UNITED STATES OF THE KING'S AND THE JORDANIAN PEOPLE'S SENSE OF FRUSTRATION OVER US "IN ACTION". AMBASSADOR CHALLENGED RIFA'I ON THIS AND REMINDED HIM OF OUR EFFORTS THROUGHOUT THE ESSGA, WHICH THE ARABS HAD REBUFFED, TO ASSIST IN PASSING A RESOLUTION FAIR TO ALL PARTIES.

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 1776/1A ~~SECRET~~

3. ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HUSSEIN, RIFA'I THEN SUBMITTED THE DRAFT SC RESOLUTION WHICH THE KING HAD SHOWN TO THE SOVIETS

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IN MOSCOW. THE SOVIETS HAD TOLD HUSSEIN THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO SUPPORT THIS RESOLUTION BUT DOUBTED THAT THE USG WOULD DO SO. RIFA'I EMPHASIZED THAT NEITHER THE GOJ NOR THE UAR WAS WEDDED TO THE EXACT WORDING OF THIS DRAFT. HE ASSERTED THAT THE SUGGESTED DRAFT WAS BASED ON THE TEXT OF THE JOINT US-USSR DRAFT WHICH THE SOVIETS HAD REVIEWED WITH THE UAR LAST JULY WITH A FEW REWORDINGS INTENDED PRIMARILY TO DRESS UP LAST SUMMER'S DRAFT AS A NEW RESOLUTION SO THAT CERTAIN OTHER ARAB STATES COULD MORE EASILY ADHERE. RIFA'I STRESSED THAT BOTH PRESIDENT NASSER AND THE KING INTENDED THIS SUGGESTED DRAFT TO SERVE AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON AND THAT THEY WOULD ACCEPT ANY CHANGES AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND OURSELVES WHICH DID NOT SIGNIFICANTLY DEVIATE FROM THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PRESENT DRAFT. THE SOVIET POSITION BASICALLY WAS THAT IT WOULD SUPPORT ANY RESOLUTION AGREEABLE TO THE ARABS.

4. IN THIS REGARD THE SOVIETS HAD TOLD THE KING HOW UNHELPFUL

Q

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 177671A ~~SECRET~~

THEY CONSIDERED THE SARG'S ATTITUDE HAD BEEN AT THE ESSGA AND SUBSEQUENTLY. THE SOVIETS ASSURED HUSSEIN THAT MOSCOW WOULD NOT BE DETERRED BY POSSIBLE SYRIAN OPPOSITION IN THE FUTURE FROM SUPPORTING A SC RESOLUTION WHICH WAS AGREEABLE TO CAIRO AND AMMAN.

THE SOVIETS HAD PROMISED TO COUNSEL DAMASCUS TO PRACTICE RESTRAINT AND PERMIT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO BE WORKED OUT BUT SAID THAT THEIR EFFORTS AT PERSUASION HAD TO BE SUPPLEMENTED BY THOSE OF OTHER ARAB STATES AND URGED THE KING TO USE HIS INFLUENCE ON DAMASCUS. ACCORDING TO RIFA'I, HUSSEIN HAS JUST PASSED WORD THROUGH THE SYRIAN AMBASSADOR HERE REQUESTING THAT WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS EITHER PRES. ATASSI OR FONMIN MAKHUS COME TO AMMAN TO DISCUSS HUSSEIN'S SOVIET TRIP. WITH THAT TOPIC AS BAITN THE KING IS OPTIMISTIC HE CAN ATTRACT ONE OR THE OTHER OF THE SARG LEADERSHIP TO AMMAN WHERE HE WILL URGE THAT DAMASCUS SUPPORT A POLITICAL SOLUTION OF THE PRESENT IMPASSE OR AT LEAST NOT OPPOSE SUCH A SOLUTION.

GP-3. BURNS

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ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

P R 081525Z OCT 67
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 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3740
 INFO AMEMBASSY RABAT 140
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 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 150
 USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 456
 AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 107
 AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1033
 AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1123
 AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 151
 AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 953
 AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 93
 AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 559
 AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI 29
 AMEMBASSY JIDDA 530
 STATE GRNC

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1776 SECTION 2 OF 2

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 1776/2A ~~SECRET~~
EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO

5. THE TEXT OF THE SUGGESTED DRAFT STATES: QUOTE THE SECURITY COUNCIL: 1. DECLARES THAT PEACE AND FINAL SOLUTION TO THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM SHOULD BE ACHIEVED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. 2. CALLS FOR: A. THE

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Department of State

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 01776 090158Z

IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAELI FORCES FROM ALL TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY THEM AFTER THE 4TH OF JUNE, IN KEEPING WITH THE INADMISSABILITY OF THE CONQUEST OF TERRITORY BY WAR. B. THE IMMEDIATE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY EACH MEMBER STATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE AREA THAT ALL ENJOY THE RIGHT TO MAINTAIN AN INDEPENDENT NATIONAL STATE AND TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY, AND THE REDRESSING AND RENUNCIATION OF ALL CLAIMS AND ACTS INCONSISTENT THEREWITH. 3. DETERMINES THAT IT WILL ACT DIRECTLY WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED AND UTILIZE A UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT A JUST SOLUTION OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM, IN PARTICULAR THE PROBLEM OF THE REFUGEES AND THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS DENIED THEM FOR SO LONG AND OF ASSURING FREEDOM

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 1776/2A ~~SECRET~~] END QUOTE

6. THE KING, RIFA'I STATED, IS MOST ANXIOUS TO FORESTALL THE SCHEDULED GA DEBATE ON THE NEAR EAST WHICH, THE JORDANIANS UNDERSTAND, MAY BEGIN OCT 16. THE GOJ'S IDEA IS TO CUT OFF GA DEBATE BY HAVING A GA RESOLUTION PASSED ON OR BEFORE OCT 16 SIMPLY REFERRING THE ME PROBLEM TO THE SC FOR ACTION. (RIFA'I DID NOT INDICATE WHICH COUNTRIES THE GOJ THOUGHT MIGHT INTRODUCE SUCH A RESOLUTION AT THE (A.) ONCE THE PROBLEM IS IN THE HANDS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE KING HOPES THAT A RESOLUTION ALONG THE LINES OF THE DRAFT IN PARA 5 COULD BE SPEEDILY PASSED. THE MODALITIES OF WITHDRAWAL AND IMPLEMENTATION OF DROPPING THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY COULD THEN BE WORKED OUT WITH THE AID OF A UN APPOINTED MEDIATOR. THE JORDANIAN DELEGATION, RIFA'I ADDED, HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO TAKE NO INITIATIVE AT THE UN WHICH IS NOT FULLY COORDINATED WITH BOTH THE US AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS.

7. HUSSEIN ALSO INSTRUCTED RIFA'I TO INFORM AMBASSADOR THAT, DEPENDING UPON THE COURSE OF THE SC CONSIDERATION OF THE ME PROBLEM, HE MIGHT TRAVEL TO NEW YORK IN EARLY NOVEMBER.

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 1776/2A ~~SECRET~~
THE REAL PURPOSE OF THE TRIP WOULD BE TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT

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JOHNSON IN WASHINGTON.

GP-3. BURNS

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3754
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Authority NLI 02-155 (#99)
By *cbm/les* NARA, Date 8-25-05

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1797

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 1776

1. I MET WITH KING AFTERNOON OCT 9 AT HIS REQUEST. HUSSEIN SAID HE HOPED I COULD GET HIM AN URGENT REPLY FROM WASHINGTON AS TO WHETHER USG WOULD (A) SUPPORT A RESOLUTION MOVING DISCUSSION OF MIDDLE EAST CRISIS FROM GA TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL PRIOR TO THE GA PLENARY DEBATE SCHEDULED TO BEGIN OCT 16 AND (B) WHETHER WE WOULD SUPPORT A RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ALONG THE LINES OF THE DRAFT GIVEN ME OCT 7 (REFTEL PARA 5). HUSSEIN MAY

PAGE 2 RUGXMO
1797 ~~SECRET~~

LEAVE FOR ALGIERS AS EARLY AS THE MORNING OF OCT 12, AND HOPED I COULD GIVE HIM AN ANSWER BEFORE THEN.

2. HUSSEIN EXPLAINED HE HAD WRITTEN HIS LETTER TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON (AMMAN 1777) BECAUSE HE FELT SO PERSONALLY "LET DOWN" BY THE USG IN RECENT WEEKS. HE ASSERTED THERE WAS A FEELING THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST THAT OUR EVERY ACTION WAS DESIGNED SOLELY TO ASSIST THE ISRAELIS. FURTHERMORE,

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 01797 091741Z

WHEN IN MOSCOW THE SOVIETS HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE USG POSITION HAD HARDENED TO THE POINT OF INSISTING THAT ALL MODALITIES OF IMPLIMENTATION BE WORKED OUT PRIOR TO THE US AGREEING TO SUPPORT ANY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, EVEN ONE SIMILAR TO THE US-USSR DRAFT OF LAST SUMMER.

3. THE BASIC REASON, HUSSEIN SAID, THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM MUST BE REMOVED FROM THE GA IS THAT IT IS TOO LIKELY THE PRESENT DEGREE OF ARAB UNITY FAVORING A POLITICAL SOLUTION WOULD SPLI
PER UNDER EXPOSURE TO THE PRESSURES OF GA DEBATE.
IF THE MATTER COMES TO THE SC ONLY AFTER EXTENDED GA DEBATE,

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 1797A ~~SECRET~~

VARIOUS ARAB STATES MIGHT HAVE TAKEN POSITIONS IN THE GA WHICH WOULD MAKE THEIR SUBSEQUENT ADHERENCE TO A SC RESOLUTION MORE DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE. THE JORDANIAN UN DELEGATION HAD JUST REPORTED THEY HAD SECURED THE AGREEMENT OF THE SYRIAN AND ALGERIAN DELEGATIONS NOT TO OFFER ANY OPPOSITION AT THE UN TO A POSSIBLE SC RESOLUTION. FOR THESE REASONS EARLY TRANSFER TO THE SC WAS ESSENTIAL.

4. REGARDING A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, HUSSEIN SAID HE SIMPLY HAD TO HAVE THE UMBRELLA OF A SC RESOLUTION IN ORDER TO WORK OUT THE MODALITIES OF IMPLEMENTATION. IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO MOVE WITHOUT THIS COVER.

5. WHEN I INQUIRED ABOUT HOW HE ENVISAGED THE TIMING OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL ONCE A RESOLUTION WERE PASSED, HUSSEIN SAID HE RECOGNIZED THAT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WOULD TAKE SOME TIME. DURING THIS PERIOD HE RECOGNIZED HE WOULD HAVE TO WORK OUT A SOLUTION TO JORDANIAN-ISRAELI PROBLEMS. HE WOULD IF IT SEEMED ADVANTAGEOUS COME TO NEW YORK AND

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 1797A ~~SECRET~~

DO SO HIMSELF. ASKED IF HE WOULD CONSIDER DIRECT NEGO-

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 01797 291741Z

TIATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS AT SOME POINT UNDER THE UMSRELLA OF A SC RESOLUTION, HUSSEIN SAID IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO ANSWER IN ADVANCE; IT WOULD DEPEND ON CIRCUMSTANCES THEN EXISTING BUT HE EXCLUDED NO POSSIBILITIES.

6. ASKED WHAT THE UAR POSITION IS, THE KING SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE UAR TODAY IS AS READY AS JORDAN, ONCE A SC RESOLUTION IS PASSEDON IMMEDIATELY TO TRY TO WORK OUT A SOLUTON WITH ISRAEL. HOWEVER, SAID HUSSEIN, EVEN SHOULD CAIRO CHANGE ITS POSITION, AMMAN IS PREPARED, ONCE A RESOLUTION IS SECURED, TO TRY TO REACH A SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL EVEN IF JORDAN IS THE ONLY ARAB STATE TO DO SO.

7. FAILING EARLY PASSAGE OF A SC RESOLUTION, SAID HUSSEIN, THE POSSIBILITY OF A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE ME CRISIS, AND HE HIMSELF AS PRINCIPAL PROPONENT OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION, WOULD BE DISCREDITED. IN SUCH EVENT HE SEES ONLY A BLEAK FUTURE AHEAD IN THE AREA FOR THE

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PAGE 5 RUQMKG 1797A ~~SECRET~~
ARABS, THE ISRAELIS, AND THE
AMERICANS. ONLY THE SOVIETS
WOULD STAND TO GAIN.

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 01777 090632Z

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3741

~~SECRET~~ SECTION ONE OF TWO AMMAN 1777

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 1776

SUBJ: KING MUSSEIN'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON OF OCT 7
QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I THOUGHT IT IMPERATIVE, SIR,
TO COMMUNICATE TO YOU IN THIS MANNER, THE GIST OF MY FEELINGS
REGARDING THE CURRENT SITUATION IN OUR AREA.

I WOULD HAVE VERY MUCH LIKED TO HAVE HAD THE PRIVILEGE AND
PLEASURE OF CONTACTING YOU PERSONALLY, MR. PRESIDENT, BUT ALAS,
DUE TO THE GREAT STRAIN THAT I HAVE BEEN UNDER FOR THE LAST FEW
MONTHS, MY HEALTH CONDITION PREVENTS ME FROM HAVING THIS

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 1777/1A ~~SECRET~~
PLEASURE - AT LEAST, UNTIL ABOUT THE END OF THIS MONTH WHEN I
HOPE TO BE ABLE TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ONCE
AGAIN, AND POSSIBLY THE UNITED NATIONS.

DUE TO THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION, I FELT IT IMPORTANT
TO IMMEDIATELY COMMUNICATE WITH YOU, SIR, REGARDING THE PRE-
VAILING CONDITIONS IN OUR AREA FOLLOWING THE RECENT AGGRESSION
BY ISRAEL AND HER OCCUPATION OF THE WEST BANK OF JORDAN AND
OF OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES. EVER SINCE 1948, ISRAEL HAS

*King Hussein
Sts 209
10/7/67*

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Authority UJ 00-251 (22a)
By cbu/cb, NARA, Date 8-25-05

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 01777 090632Z

COMMITTED AGGRESSION AFTER AGGRESSION AND DENIED THE ARAB PEOPLE OF PALESTINE THEIR RIGHT OF SELF DETERMINATION AND EXPELLED IN 1948 OVER ONE MILLION PEOPLE FROM THEIR HOMELAND, ONLY TO BE FOLLOWED BY HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS MORE PEOPLE WHO WERE RECENTLY EXPELLED FROM THE WEST BANK OF JORDAN AND FROM OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES, NOW UNDER ISRAELI OCCUPATION. THE FACT THAT NOW IT SEEMS TO BE EXPECTED OF THE ARAB LEADERS AND PEOPLE - MEMBERS OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY - TO ACT IN A MANNER WHICH WOULD SET A VERY DANGEROUS PRECEDENT, SPECIFICALLY THAT OF PERMITTING AN AGGRESSOR TO DICTATE HIS TERMS FROM THE POSITION THAT HE HAS ACQUIRED AS A RESULT OF HIS AGGRESSION, IS AN INTOLERABLE FARCE.

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 1777/1A ~~SECRET~~

THE CONTINUED SUFFERING OF OUR PEOPLE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; THE REFUSAL OF ISRAEL TO ABIDE BY THE UNITED NATIONS AND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON JERUSALEM AND ON THE HUMANITARIAN PROBLEM OF REFUGEES, AND HER CONTINUED DENIAL TO THEM TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES AND LAND, AS WELL AS ISRAEL'S USE OF THIS ISSUE AND HUMAN TRAGEDY AS A POLITICAL WEAPON, IS A SHAME THAT WILL BE BORNE BY ALL WHO PERMIT THIS SITUATION TO PERSIST ANY LONGER.

SIR, I HAVE ALWAYS FELT PROUD OF THE FRIENDSHIP THAT HAS EXISTED BETWEEN US AND BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS. I AM SAD TO FEEL THAT PERHAPS I WAS TOO MUCH OF AN IDEALIST WHEN I BELIEVED THAT PRINCIPLES AND IDEALS IN WHICH WE BELIEVE, WILL ALWAYS BE UPHELD. I REFER TO THE RIGHT OF AN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE OF A COUNTRY

TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY AND THEIR UNALIENABLE RIGHT TO "LIBERTY, FREEDOM AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS." DOUBLE STANDARDS SEEM TO EXIST IN THE TREATMENT OF PEOPLE IN OUR AREA AND WE, ARABS, SEEM TO CONTINUE TO HAVE THE MISFORTUNE OF BEING VICTIMIZED BY THOSE, WHO THEMSELVES WERE ONCE VICTIMIZED, NOT BY US ARABS, BUT BY OTHERS.

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 1777/1A ~~SECRET~~

SIR, ISRAEL SEEMS TO HAVE BENEFITED BEYOND REASON FROM

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PAGE 03 ANMAN 01777 290632Z

THE ASSISTANCE, HELP AND PAMPERING OF MANY COUNTRIES, AND OF THE UNITED STATES IN PARTICULAR. THE UNITED STATES WOULD APPEAR AT PRESENT TO HAVE CHOSEN TO FORSAKE HER FRIENDSHIPS AND FRIENDS

AMONGST US ARABS AND TO MAINLY CONCERN HERSELF WITH ATTEMPTING TO ENFORCE ON THEM WHAT ISRAEL MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT WISH. ISRAEL HAS BENEFITED FROM THE FACT THAT THE GREAT POWERS, IN THEIR CONCERN OVER WORLD PEACE AND THEIR OWN SECURITY, HAVE REPEATEDLY AVOIDED A CONFRONTATION ON SO MANY ISSUES. THIS HAS PERMITTED ISRAEL TO CARRY OUT HER AGGRESSION AND TO INFRINGE ON THE RIGHTS OF ARABS TO LIVE IN PEACE - A PEACE WITH JUSTICE; AND HAS FORCED THEM TO DIVERT THEIR ENERGIES AND RESOURCES FROM THEIR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF BUILDING FOR THEMSELVES THE BETTER FUTURE WHICH IS THEIR RIGHT. ISRAEL HAS ALSO MANAGED TO NEARLY ACHIEVE COMPLETE SUCCESS IN DISCREDITING THE POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THIS AREA AND IN DAMAGING HER IMAGE, AS WELL AS CAUSING UNTOLD HARM TO UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD AND THE INTERESTS OF MANY WHO LIVE IN IT.

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 1777/1A ~~SECRET~~

SIR, IT APPEARS TO ME THAT, DUE TO THE EXTREME NECESSITY FOR SWIFT ACTION WHICH WOULD BRING ABOUT AN EARLY ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO THE POSITIONS HELD PRIOR TO JUNE 5TH, SO THAT A PEOPLE CAN BE SAVED AND THEIR DIGNITY BE RESTORED AND WRONG BE RIGHTED BEFORE IT BECOMES TOO LATE, THAT EVERY ATTEMPT SHOULD

BE MADE TO ENCOURAGE THE BIG POWERS, MAINLY THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM WHICH INVOLVES WORLD PEACE AS WELL AS THEIR MUTUAL INTERESTS. SINCE THESE WORLD POWERS WERE MAINLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CREATION OF THE PROBLEM IN THE FIRST PLACE, THEY HAVE A MORAL OBLIGATION TO ENFORCE WHAT IS RIGHT AND TO REDRESS THE WRONGS THAT HAVE BEEN COMMITTED AGAINST MY NATION. THEY SHOULD ENSURE, THROUGH THEIR MUTUAL CONTACTS, THAT RESULTS ARE ACHIEVED AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD BE THE APPROPRIATE ORGAN TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM AND TO ARRIVE AT A JUST SOLUTION WHICH CAN BRING ABOUT PEACE AND SECURITY TO OUR REGION. THE BASIS FOR SUCH A SOLUTION MIGHT VERY WELL BE ALONG THE SAME LINES

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PAGE 04 AMMAN 01777 090632Z

EMBODIED IN THE LAST DRAFT RESOLUTION AGREED UPON BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR TOWARDS THE END OF THE LAST EMERGENCY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

PAGE 6 RUQKKG 1777/1A ~~SECRET~~

SIR, I HAVE BEEN DOING A GREAT DEAL OF WORK IN THIS AREA WITH MY COLLEAGUES IN POSITIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY. THE KHARTOUM SUMMIT CONFERENCE REPRESENTED A MAJOR IMPROVEMENT AND CHANGE IN ARAB POLICY AND APPROACH. I FEEL THAT ARAB LEADERS HAVE RISEN TO THE LEVEL OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AND THAT ARABS ARE DEMONSTRATING THAT THEY ARE REASONABLE AND RESPONSIBLE. THE ANSWER NOW LIES WITH THE GREAT POWERS TO TAKE ACTION, AND THEN IT LIES WITH ISRAEL. THIS IS HER CHANCE TO REALLY PROVE TO THE WORLD, BEFORE PROVING TO US, THAT SHE WANTS PEACE IN THIS AREA AND THAT ALL HER EARLIER ATTEMPTS TO APPEAR IN THAT LIGHT WERE NOT MERELY TO CONCEAL HER REAL AMBITIONS OF CONSTANT EXPANSION AT OUR EXPENSE.

GP-1. BURNS

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REF: AMMAN 1776

SIR, MUCH IS SAID ABOUT THE SUFFERING OF ISRAEL, YET, IN FACT, THOSE WHO HAVE SUFFERED MORALLY AND PHYSICALLY HAVE, ALL ALONG, BEEN THE ARABS. ISRAEL'S LOSSES IN LIFE, PROPERTY AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT CAN NEVER BE COMPARED WITH THE ARAB LOSSES INCURRED AS A RESULT OF HER CONTINUED AGGRESSIONS. SHE HAS MANAGED TO CAUSE GREAT SUFFERING TO SO MANY PEOPLE. SHE HAS MANAGED TO ACQUIRE A VAST AMOUNT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT, OF EASTERN AND WESTERN MANUFACTURE, WHICH INCREASE HER POTENTIAL AS A CONSTANT THREAT TO ARAB SECURITY AND PEACE IN THE REGION

PAGE 2 RUQMKQ 1777/2A ~~SECRET~~
AND COMPEL US NOW TO DO ALL THAT IS IN OUR POWER TO RE-EQUIP FROM ALL AVAILABLE SOURCES, TO FACE HER THREAT.

SIR, WHEN A MISTAKE WAS COMMITTED BY US AS A RESULT OF THE WRONG IMPRESSIONS WE HAD DURING AND IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE SHORT ARAB-ISRAELI WAR, AND WHEN WE THROUGHT AND WRONGLY ACCUSED THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN OF ACTIVELY HELPING ISRAEL IN THE WAR, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND OTHERS TOOK THAT AS A GREAT AFFRONT. WE ON THE OTHER HAD REGRETTED OUR MISTAKE BITTERLY. YET, WATCHING PRESENT DEVELOPMENTS I CANNOT HELP BUT WONDER THAT HAD

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THE WAR GONE THE OTHER WAY, AND IN VIEW OF THE APPARENT PREVAILING SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT WHICH ISRAEL SEEMS TO ENJOY EXCLUSIVELY FROM THE UNITED STATES, WHETHER THE UNITED STATES MIGHT NOT HAVE ACTED PHYSICALLY TO SUPPORT HER. THIS APPARENT DISCRIMINATION IS NOT WORTHY, IN MY HUMBLE OPINION, OF ONE OF THE WORLD'S GREATEST LEADERS AND ONE OF THE WORLD'S GREATEST GOVERNMENTS AND GREATEST NATIONS.

ANOTHER SAD AND UTTERLY INCOMPREHENSIBLE SITUATION EXISTS OVER THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON JERUSALEM. IN

PAGE 3 RUOMKG 1777/2A ~~SECRET~~

ALL FRANKNESS, THE UNITED STATES INSISTENCE ON INTERNATIONALIZING THE CITY OF JERUSALEM AND DEPRIVING US OF THE PRIVILEGE OF BEING THE CUSTODIANS OF THE HOLY PLACES FOR ALL THE GREAT MONOLITHIC RELIGIONS, A PRIVILEGE WHICH WE HAVE PROUDLY ENJOYED FOR OVER TWELVE CENTURIES, IS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO US AND IS AN AFFRONT THAT IS DIRECTED TO ALL YOUR FRIENDS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD. WE HAVE REPEATEDLY SAID THAT HAD THERE BEEN A JUST PEACE IN THIS AREA, NO ONE WOULD HAVE EVER BEEN DENIED HIS RIGHT TO VISIT THESE HOLY PLACES AND IT WAS ONLY THE FACT THAT NO SUCH JUST PEACE EXISTED, EVER SINCE THE TRAGEDY OF PALESTINE FIRST TOOK SHAPE, THAT CAUSED THE ISRAELIS TO BE PREVENTED FROM VISITING THEIR HOLY PLACES. WE HAVE ALSO ALWAYS SAID THAT UNTIL SUCH A JUST PEACE IS ESTABLISHED WE DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN PEOPLE OF THE JEWISH FAITH AND ZIONISTS.

AS FOR THE DRAFT RESOLUTION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE USSR, I HAVE MADE MANY CONCERTED EFFORTS IN THIS AREA TO MAKE IT ACCEPTABLE. I TALKED AT LENGTH OVER THIS ISSUE WITH THE UAR PRESIDENT AND HE AGREED THAT THE GIST AND CONTEXT OF THE RESOLUTION, IF EMBODIED IN A SIMILAR RE-WORDED DRAFT, EMANATING

PAGE 4 RUOMKG 1777/2A ~~SECRET~~

FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WOULD BE MOST ACCEPTABLE. AS FOR SUEZ AND THE RIGHT OF PASSAGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS. THE UAR'S POSITION IS ONE THAT LINKS THE SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 01777 090606Z

TO ACTIONS THAT MUST BE TAKEN TO REDRESS THE WRONGS CAUSED TO THE ARAB PEOPLE OF PALESTINE. I BELIEVE THAT THIS WAS EMBODIED IN THE SAID DRAFT RESOLUTION. I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM A VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION WHERE I FELT SATISFIED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USSR WAS WILLING TO COOPERATE WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT IN BRINGING ABOUT SUCH A RESOLUTION AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WHAT DISTRESSED ME MOST THROUGH MY CONTACTS, IS SOMETHING THAT I HOPE MOST SINCERELY IS TOTALLY WITHOUT FOUNDATION, SPECIFICALLY THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S POSITION HAS ALTERED SINCE THE EARLIER DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS AGREED UPON AND THAT SHE IS NOW ATTEMPTING TO ADD TO ISRAEL'S GAINS. SIR, OUR PROBLEMS HERE ARE ENORMOUS. WINTER IS ABOUT TO SET IN AND THOUSANDS UPON THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE ARE ENDURING EXTREME HARDSHIP AND WILL HAVE TO ENDURE MORE HARDSHIP, DUE TO OUR INABILITY TO COPE WITH THE PROBLEM WITH OUR PRESENT LIMITED RESOURCES. IN THE FACE OF ISRAEL'S CONTINUED DENIAL TO THE PEOPLE OF JORDAN AND OTHER ARABS OF THEIR RIGHT TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES AND LAND, AND IN THE FACE OF ISRAEL'S GROWING

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 1777/2A ~~SECRET~~

ARROGANCE, MILITARY MIGHT AND SPIRIT OF ADVENTURE, AND IN FACING THE FACT THAT ONLY ISRAEL'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY SEEMS TO BE THE CONCERN OF MANY IN THIS WORLD, WE ARE HAVING TO RE-BUILD AND RE-EQUIP OUR ARMED FORCES. WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF DOING SO ON THE FOLLOWING BASIS: DETERMINING OUR NEEDS AND REQUIREMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH EARLIER EXPERIENCES AND ATTEMPTING TO SECURE THE URGENTLY NEEDED RIGHT EQUIPMENT BEST SUITED TO OUR NEEDS, FROM ANY AVAILABLE SOURCES. THIS IS ANOTHER ADDITIONAL STRAIN WHICH WE ARE COMPELLED TO BEAR.

SIR, I REALLY HOPE THAT I MIGHT BE RIGHT IN FEELING THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS NOT MADE HER CHOICE TO BACK ISRAEL AND TO FORSAKE HER OTHER FRIENDS AND INTERESTS IN THIS AREA.

SIR, IF AT THE END OF THIS PRESENT SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS NO SATISFACTORY SOLUTION TO THIS PRESENT CRISIS IS REACHED. THE ARABS HAVE ONE OF TWO CHOICES; EITHER TO STOOP AND ACCEPT ISRAEL'S DICTATED CONDITIONS OR BE COMPELLED TO DO ALL IN THEIR POWER, REGARDLESS OF THE CONSEQUENCES, TO SECURE THEIR RIGHTS AND

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PAGE 04 ANMAN 01777 090606Z

PAGE 6 RUQMKG 1777/2A ~~SECRET~~

RECOVER THEIR DIGNITY. I CAN ASSURE YOU, SIR, IN ADVANCE, THAT WE SHALL HAVE ONLY THE LATTER CHOICE AND COURSE OF ACTION TO TAKE. WE SHALL HAVE BEEN DRIVEN TO THAT END AND I AM SURE THAT, FAIR AND JUST AS YOU ARE, YOU WILL BE ABLE TO UNDERSTAND AND APPRECIATE OUR PREDICAMENT.

WISHING YOU, SIR, ALL THE BEST FOR YOUR CONTINUED GOOD HEALTH AND HAPPINESS, AND ENTRUSTING YOU WITH THE FATE AND FUTURE OF THIS AREA WHERE SO MUCH IS AT STAKE, I REMAIN, YOUR SINCERE FRIEND, HUSSEIN END QUOTE

GP-1. BURNS

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The President says:

"Ask Mac Bundy to read and comment.
Could we see him soon?"

Told
Bundy
10/11/67.

3 TR
17 TR

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Monday, October 9, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from King Hussein

Attached is a long letter from King Hussein reporting his view of the Middle East situation following the Khartoum Conference and recent trips to Cairo and Moscow. He hopes to visit the U. S. toward the end of the month.

It's a strong but dignified letter and lays out Arab reasoning clearly. He expresses deep hurt at what he considers our basic pro-Israeli position. Insofar as we are trying to make the Arabs face up to the existence of Israel, he's not just giving way to polemics. In much the same language as his Ambassador used with you at lunch last Wednesday, he laments the double standard we apply to Arabs and Israelis and says, humbly and sadly, he doesn't find it worthy of a great leader or a great nation to discriminate this way. He told Ambassador Burns he had written because he felt "so personally let down by the USG in recent weeks."

He feels the Arabs at Khartoum reached a reasonable and responsible position. He says even Israeli passage through the Canal is negotiable if linked to redressing the wrongs inflicted on the Arab people of Palestine since 1948. Now he says it's up to the great powers to act, since they were responsible for creating Israel in the first place.

He put two questions to Burns: (1) Will we support a resolution moving UN debate from the General Assembly to the Security Council? He fears that Assembly debate would cause some Arabs to take positions that would tie his hands. (2) Will we support a slightly revised version of the July US-Soviet draft resolution? He says the Soviets will but told him our position had hardened. What he refers to is Arthur Goldberg's effort to work out a more precise understanding of what specific steps would follow such a resolution.

Nick Katzenbach already had his staff working on these questions before this letter came in. We will have an answer for you as soon as possible. But I want you to be aware that this potentially opens a new round of negotiations in New York on the resolution which we felt represents progress if properly interpreted but which the Israelis have objected to vigorously.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, vol. XIX, #462
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

W. W. Rostow

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Jordan

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EMBASSY OF JORDAN
WASHINGTON, D. C.

September 22, 1967


Dear Mr. Saunders:

I received your very kind letter of September 14th with the enclosed copy of the address given by Mr. Rostow last June. I wish to express to you my appreciation for this very kind gesture. I also wish to tell you how much I enjoyed and benefited from our conversation when we met last.

Certainly, Mr. Rostow's speech is a profound and interesting one. I enjoyed reading it.

I hope we will meet again soon.

Sincerely yours,



Abdul Hamid Sharaf

Mr. Harold H. Saunders
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Jordan
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR ^u
 HAL SANDERS
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FROM : SHERWIN MARKMAN

A-1

I would appreciate it if you could give me some background and guidance on this.

Attachment

*Cy to Maurice Williams
for clearance of reply
with HNS memo 9/14/67*

*See HNS memo to Markman
(thru WWB) - 9/14/67*

146a

ROBERT H. MILLER
Executive Assistant

September 13, 1967

Mr. Sherwin Markman,
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sherwin:

Per our telephone conversation, the following is the problem I through at you:

Before the Mid-East crisis Tenneco Oil Company together with W. R. Grace Company and an existing Jordanian Corporation were in active negotiations with Jordanian government officials involving a proposed 100 million dollar plus potash project in the Dead Sea. The commitments for financing the project were and are still in good shape. In addition to the potash plant that was to be built, Tenneco and Grace were proposing to form a separate world-wide marketing corporation to market the potash to be produced in Jordan.

When the Mid-East crisis occurred the negotiations stopped and the negotiators went home. Next week three high officials of the Jordanian government have asked my company officials to meet with them in New York City to continue further discussions involving this project. It is our understanding when the King of Jordan met with President Johnson this project was one of the items discussed by them. We have reason to believe that the President was very enthusiastic about this project and Administration support was there.

In order for officials from my company to carry on meaningful negotiations and discussions at the September 18th meeting with the Jordanian officials in New York City it is most important that we have some idea as to the Administration's present position regarding the project. Any information you can give me in this regard will be used discreetly and will be most sincerely appreciated.

Since we only have five days before the meeting, I will appreciate hearing from you at the earliest possible time.

Sincerely yours,

Bob