

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

148

By WHITE HOUSE
9/2/67.

DATE: August 30, 1967

SUBJECT: Presentation of Credentials by Jordanian Ambassador, Abdul-Hamid Sharaf

PARTICIPANTS: The President
S/CPR - Ambassador Symington
Mr. Saunders, White House Staff
NFA - Rodger P. Davies *RMD*
H.E. Abdul-Hamid Sharaf, Ambassador of Jordan

Jordan

COPIES TO:

S/S CIA AmEmbassy AMMAN
S/P NEA-3
G S/CPR
INR/OD
~~White House~~

The President expressed sympathy for the difficulties through which Jordan was passing.

Ambassador Sharaf noted that Jordan had lost half its population, its most fertile territory, and Jerusalem. The Jordanian Government had been consistently friendly to the United States, a friendship that created difficulties for its relations with some other Arab states. Now it needed the friendship and support of the United States.

The President said we are disappointed with both Israel and Jordan. We had sought to restrain Israel but had failed, and there had been no reason for Jordan to enter the war. When we had agreed to supply military equipment to Jordan, it had been on the understanding that it would not be used against Israel. This agreement had not been kept. The tragedy of the situation is that Jordan did not have to enter the fray.

Ambassador Sharaf agreed that it was tragic that Jordan had been involved and present difficulties stemmed from this act. It was difficult, however, for non-Arab friends to understand the deep emotional factor which was involved. When other Arabs were in a war with Israel, Jordan could not stand aside. In any event, Jordan hoped a formula could be devised to bring peace and a return of its territory.

The President said he and government officials were ready to discuss problems with the Ambassador whenever he wished.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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1967 JUL 26 PM 332

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Action

OO RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 519A/1 2071545
ZNY SSSSS

Info

O 261525Z JUL 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 519/1

NODIS - SANDSTORM

REF: AMMAN 502

1. UPON RECEIPT OF DEPTTEL 12561 ON THE MORNING OF JULY 25 I REQUESTED AN APPOINTMENT WITH HUSSEIN. LATER IN THE MORNING, BUT BEFORE THE PALACE HAD TEWEPHONED ME BACK TO SET A TIME FOR THE APPOINTMENT, I RECEIVED DEPTTEL 125-3 REPEATING AMBASSADOR BRUCE'S TELEGRAM TO THE SECRETARY. I PROCEEDED WITH THE APPOINTMENT FOR FOUR REASONS: (A) MY INSTRUCTIONS TO SEE HUSSEIN ON JULY 25 A PARENT STILL STOOD; (B) FURTHER POSTPONEMENT OF THIS APPOINTMENT WOULD PROVE VERY (#) AND WITH THIS THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR AGREED; (1;) OUR EMBASSY AND THE BRITISH EMBASSY HAD GAINED THE (#) THAT THE KING WAS MOVING MUCH MORE CAUTIOUSLY THAN HE WAS TWO WEEKS AGO; AND MY INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT LIKELY TO CAUSE

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 519/1 ~~SECRET~~

HIM TO MOVE FASTER THAN HE HAD ALREADY DETERMINED TO DO; (D) I HAD A HUNCH HUSSEIN MIGHT ALREADY HAVE BEEN IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE ISRAEL

2. HUSSEIN WAS IN MUCH BETTER PHYSICAL AND MENTAL SHAPE THAN WHEN I (#) SAW HIM. HE LOOKED RESTED, AND AT THE OUTSET OF THE (#) AT LEAST HE SEEMED RELATIVELY RELAXED.

3. AFTER READING HIM MY INSTRUCTIONS, I ADDED THE FOLLOWING (#) IF THE KING FELT THAT A GO-BETWEEN WAS A NECESSITY FROM (#) IT WOULD BE (#) MORE DIFFICULT TO BARGAIN WITH. IF HUSSEIN WISHED TO RETAIN A NON-OFFICIAL AMERICAN--I.E. A SKILLED AMERICAN LAWYER-- WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO TRY TO LOCATE THE RIGHT ONE FOR HIM. WE WOULD, IF HUSSEIN REQUESTED, BE WILLING TO LET HIM USE OUR CIHFTHZUATIONS FACILITIES. IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCE, THE USG DID ENVISAGE A BEHIND-THE-SCEMGS ROLE IN WHICH WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO USE INFLUENCE TO BREAK LOG JAMS. (B) THE

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 02-276 (#19a)

By cbm/ico, NARA, Date 8-26-05

~~SECRET~~

-2- AMMAN 519, JULY 26, 1967 (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 519/1 ~~SECRET~~

QUESTION OF TIMING, METHOD OF APPROACH, ETC. WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO BE LEFT UP TO KING HUSSEIN HIMSELF.

4. I THEN ASKED THE KING WHETHER SINCE HOSTILITIES HE HAD BEEN IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE ISRAELIS. I ADMITTED I WAS ASKING THE QUESTION ON HUNCH. THE KING REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. HE WAS PURPOSELY (#) AS TO THE NATURE OF (#)

5. I ASKED HIM WHETHER, IN HIS CONTACT WITH THE ISRAELIS, HE HAD DISCUSSED THE TERMS OF A SETTLEMENT. HE REPLIED QTE NO. I SIMPLY INDICATED THAT I WAS PREPARED TO FOLLOW THE SETTLEMENT COURSE. I ALSO TOLD THE ISRAELIS THEY MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO GO TOO FAR IN ISRAELI-OCCUPIED JORDAN OR ELSE THIS WOULD MAKE A SETTLEMENT MORE DIFFICULT. THE ISRAELIS URGED ME TO MOVE FAST, SAYING THAT TIME WAS WORKING AGAINST THE MODERATE ELEMENTS IN ISRAEL WHO WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT. UNQTE.

6. THE KING THEN SAID TO ME QTE I REALLY ONLY HAVE ONE QUESTION TO ASK YOU AND TO THIS I MUST HAVE AN HONEST ANSWER. DOES THE US GUARANTEE OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY APPLY IN THE

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 519/1 ~~SECRET~~

PRESENT SITUATION OR NOT? UNQTE. HUSSEIN MEANT BY HIS QUESTION: IF HE WERE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE WITH (#) TO END BELLIGERENCY AND TO LIVE IN PEACE WITH THE ISRAELIS, WAS THE US WILLING TO GUARANTEE THAT HE (#) JERUSALEM, SUBJECT TO MINOR BORDER RECTIFICATION, EFFECTIVE DEMILITARIZATION OF THE WEST BANK, SETTLEMENT OF REFUGEE PROBLEM AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS NOTED IN AMMAN'S 431.

7. I HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO ANSWER HIM IN THE NEGATIVE AND TO INDICATE THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ARAB-ISRAELI WAR SUCH AS HAD OCCURRED LAST MONTH WE COULD NOT UNDERTAKE UNILATERALLY TO GUARANTEE A RETURN ONBJRYAL-JUNE 5 LINES.

8. HUSSEIN THEN SAID THAT WHAT WE WERE PREPARED TO DO TO BACK HIM UP WAS DEEP DISAPPOINTMENT TO HIM. HE OBSERVED THAT WHAT I HAD SAID TO HIM WAS, IN EFFECT, QTE JORDAN IS ON ITS OWN WITH THE ISRAELIS; JERUSALEM IS GOING TO BE VERY DIFFICULT. THE US WILL LEND JORDAN SUPPORT IN TRYING TO ARRIVE AT A SETTLEMENT BUT THE US CAN GIVE JORDAN NO ASSURANCE IN ADVANCE THAT US SUPPORT LE SUFFICIENTLY EFFECTIVE TO PRODUCE A SOLUTION TO JERUSALEM WITH WHICH THE MOSLEM

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-3- AMMAN 519, JULY 26, 1967 (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 519/1 ~~SECRET~~
WORLD AND JORDAN CAN LIVE. UNQTE

9. HE THEN ADDED QTE I AM AFRAID THE WAR LAST MONTH HAS FINALLY FORCED YOU TO MAKE A CHOICE YOU HAVE TRIED SO LONG TO AVOID. YOU HAVE CHOSEN ISRAEL UNQTE. I TOOK ISSUE WITH THIS STATEMENT WITH NUMEROUS ARGUMENTS. I SUMMED THEM UP BY SAYING I NOW REALIZED HE HOPED THAT THE USG COULD OFFER HIM A GOLDEN KEY THAT WOULD OPEN THE DOOR TO A SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO HIM. THE TRUTH IS THERE WERE MANY DOORS TO BE PASSED THROUGH. THE KEY TO THE NEXT DOOR COULD NOT BE FOUND UNTIL ONE HAD PASSED THROUGH THE DOOR BEHIND. WE WERE PREPARED TO HELP HIM TRY TO FIND THE KEY TO EACH DOOR BUT ONE COULD NOT KNOW WHETHER THESE DOORS COULD BE OPENED UNTIL ONE TRIED.

10. HUSSEIN SAID THAT FOR THE TIME BEING HE WAS GOING TO TAKE NO ACTION WHATSOEVER. HE WAS GOING TO THINK EVERYTHING THROUGH AGAIN FROM START TO FINISH.

11. HUSSEIN SAID THAT IF A BILATERAL SETTLEMENT HAD IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS TO BE LEFT TO JORDAN AND ISRAEL, EVEN WITH THE US IN A BEHIND-THE-SCENES ROLE, HE DOUBTED THAT ISRAEL WOULD REALLY WANT A SETTLEMENT. BURNS
BT

(#) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

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OO RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 519A/2 2071625
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1967 JUL 26 PM 9:47

Info

O 261605Z JUL 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3014
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 AMMAN 519/2

NODIS - SANDSTORM

A SETTLEMENT WITH JORDAN WOULD REQUIRE ISRAEL TO MAKE ACCOMMODATIONS ON JERUSALEM WHICH ISRAEL HAD GIVEN EVERY PUBLIC INDICATION SHE WAS NOT PREPARED TO DO. FURTHERMORE, SAID HUSSEIN, HE SUSPECTS THE ISRAELIS REALLY WANT TO RETAIN THE WEST BANK IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER. AND LASTLY, HE SAID, HE WAS NOT AT ALL SURE ISRAEL WANTS HIS REGIME TO SURVIVE IN AMMAN. HE OBSERVED THAT, PARADOXICALLY ENOUGH, A RADICAL ARAB REGIME IN AMMAN MIGHT SERVE ISRAELI PURPOSES BETTER. THE LONG AND NOT EASILY DEFENDED BORDER WITH ISRAEL WOULD IMPOSE ON EVEN A RADICAL REGIME IN AMMAN A NON-BELLAGIOUS POLICY VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL. AND SUCH A REGIME WOULD PUSH THE US CLOSER TOWARDS ISRAEL, PERHAPS EVEN TO THE POINT OF GRANTING ISRAEL A MUTUAL SECURITY PACT. AND ALL THIS, SAID HUSSEIN, WAS IN HIS OPINION WORTH MORE TO THE ISRAELIS THAN A MODERATE REGIME IN AMMAN.

12. THE INTERVIEW ENDED WITH HUSSEIN SAYING, QTE I AM GOING TO DO A BIT OF THINKING. I MIGHT CONCLUDE THAT THE SITUATION IS COMPLETELY HOPELESS AND I SHOULD ASK MY PEOPLE IF THEY STILL WANT ME TO CONTINUE TO TRY TO LEAD THEM. UNQTE. I SAID THAT HOPEFULLY WE COULD TALK AGAIN IN A FEW DAYS, AND

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 519/2 ~~SECRET~~

I ASKED THAT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCE IF HE MADE A DECISION HE PERMIT ME TO DISCUSS IT WITH HIM FIRST BEFORE HE TOOK ACTION. HE REPLIED: "WE WILL BE IN TOUCH."

13. MY PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE WITH HUSSEIN IS THAT WHEN HIS EXPECTATIONS PROVE TO BE HIGHER THAN CAN BE REALIZED, HIS IMMEDIATE REACTION IS TO TAKE THE GLOOMIEST POSSIBLE VIEW. WHEN HE HAS THOUGHT THINGS THROUGH, HE OFTEN RECOGNIZES THAT THE SITUATION IS NOT QUITE SO DARK AS HE HAD AT FIRST THOUGHT. WHETHER NOW HE WILL FOLLOW THIS PATTERN REMAINS TO BE SEEN, THOUGH IN THIS CASE I AM LESS CONFIDENT THAT HE WILL.

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-2- 519 2 OF 2 FROM AMMAN JULY 26 (NODIS)

14. I DO NOT KNOW HOW FAR HUSSEIN MIGHT BE PREPARED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS ON JERUSALEM. I DOUBT THAT THEY COULD BE SUBSTANTIAL, SINCE A BILATERAL JORDANIAN-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT CAN BE EXPECTED TO INCUR INTENSE HOSTILITY IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE ARAB WORLD AND HUSSEIN'S ONLY JUSTIFICATION AND PROTECTION FOR A BILATERAL SETTLEMENT WOULD BE TO REGAIN JORDANIAN JERUSALEM FOR THE MOSLEM WORLD. CONCEIVABLY HUSSEIN COULD LIVE WITH INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE OLD CITY IF PRESENTED AS BEING IN RESPONSE TO WORLD-WIDE DEMAND, BUT I AM NOT AT ALL SURE OF THAT. WHAT I AM SURE OF IS THAT

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 519/2 ~~SECRET~~

HUSSEIN WOULD NOT ACCEPT AN ARRANGEMENT ON JERUSALEM WHEREBY THE ISRAELIS EXERCISE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE JORDANIAN SECTOR, EVEN WITH THE GUARANTEE OF ARAB ACCESS. HE SHOWED NO INTEREST IN THE POSSIBILITY OF DIPLOMATIC STATUS FOR THE MOSLEM HOLY PLACES, WITH JORDAN AS TRUSTEE, AND HE SAID AT ONE POINT IN MY CONVERSATION WITH HIM THAT HE WOULD NOT BE INTERESTED IN THE RETURN OF THE WEST BANK WITHOUT JERUSALEM. HE CERTAINLY DOUBTS THAT IN DIRECT BARGAINING WITH THE ISRAELIS HE WOULD BE ABLE TO GET AN ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENT ON JERUSALEM. I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER HUSSEIN STILL ENTERTAINS THE NOTION, COMMON TO MOST ARABS, THAT THE US EXERCISES ABSOLUTE CONTROL OVER ISRAEL. AT ANY RATE, HE MAY HAVE CONCLUDED EITHER THAT IF WE DO EXERCISE ABSOLUTE CONTROL OVER ISRAEL WE ARE NOT YET PREPARED TO FORCE ISRAEL TO DISGORGE THE JORDANIAN SECTOR OF JERUSALEM; OR IF OUR INFLUENCE WITH ISRAEL HAS DISTINCT LIMITS, AS WE SAY, THEN WE MAY NOT BE ABLE OR WILLING TO MUSTER SUFFICIENT PRESSURE TO GET HIM BACK THE JORDANIAN SECTOR OF JERUSALEM. SINCE THE RISKS FOR THE REGIME ARE ENORMOUS THROUGH THE VERY ACT OF UNDERTAKING THE STEPS NECESSARY TO TRY TO OBTAIN A SETTLEMENT, THE QUESTION

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 519/2 ~~SECRET~~

ARISES IN HUSSEIN'S MIND AS TO WHETHER THE REGIME SHOULD INCUR THESE RISKS IF A SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO JORDAN APPEARS UNLIKELY OF ATTAINMENT. HUSSEIN HAS THREE CONCEIVABLE ALTERNATIVES TO BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL, WHICH I LIST IN ORDER OF LIKELIHOOD: (A) TO STAND FAST AND DO NOTHING, WHICH MIGHT BE ABLE TO SUSTAIN FOR LONGER THAN MOST OBSERVERS WOULD THINK POSSIBLE, IN THE HOPES OF SECURITY COUNCIL OR OTHER FORM OF SOLUTION; (B) TO THROW

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-3- 519 2 OF 2 FROM AMMAN JULY 26 (NODIS)

IN HIS LOT WITH HIS RADICAL ARAB NEIGHBORS, WHICH WOULD PRESUMABLY NECESSITATE HIM TO RE-ARM ON A BIGGER SCALE THAN HE HAS THUS FAR CONTEMPLATED. THE IRAQIS MIGHT BE PLEASED TO HAVE JORDAN IN THIS CIRCLE AS A COUNTER-WEIGHT AGAINST SYRIA; (C) TO ABDICATE.

15. PLEASE REPEAT THIS TELEGRAM TO LONDON AND TEL AVIV
GP-1
BURNS
BT

NOT PASSED LONDON OR TELAVIV BY OC/T

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~/NODIS
SANDSTORM

Thursday, July 20, 1967
6:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk's proposal --
agreed by Mac Bundy -- for a response
to Hussein -- which is urgently requested
from Amman.

It is designed to protect the U. S.,
while still permitting us to follow the
negotiation closely; insert ideas; and
throw our diplomatic weight at the right
moment.

You may wish to discuss it with
Sec. Rusk before approval.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

7/21
The President approved.
He asked that Mc Namara
be briefed. (I relayed to
John Walsh.) He was a little
jumpy about the American
lawyer but said OK.

HHS

Arab-Israel
Jordan susp ¹⁵³

2793
153a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 20, 1967

SECRET/NODIS
SAND STORM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Hussein has asked us to intervene to achieve a possible settlement with Israel and to discover their terms of settlement and their willingness to negotiate. He says he has Nasser's blessing (which we would have little confidence in) as long as he does not engage in direct negotiations or conclude a peace treaty. He clearly would like us to lean on the Israelis to secure an agreement with which he can survive.

The Israeli Government is prepared to discuss a settlement with the Jordanians and has suggested we convey to Hussein their willingness to engage in private talks with Hussein or with his representative. Our estimate of their position, which is not yet formal, is that there could be agreement on various elements of a viable settlement except with respect to Jerusalem where the two sides are very far apart indeed on an issue which both regard as crucial. The Israelis do not wish to deal through an intermediary, and clearly do not wish the intermediary to be the U.S.

While the prospects for settlement are not particularly good, everyone -- the U.S., Jordan and Israel -- has such enormous stake in success, that it may be possible to achieve. While time might moderate positions, Hussein's present political status is such that we cannot risk delay in starting the process.

We do not believe we can achieve a satisfactory foreign mediator or that the U.S. should presently play this role. Despite danger to Hussein from his Arab colleagues, we believe direct negotiation is the most feasible and productive course and one which would permit the U.S. to use our influence at appropriate stages to promote agreement without direct U.S. involvement in the total process.

We therefore propose that we respond to Hussein's request along the following lines:

1. The Israelis tell us they are prepared to discuss a settlement on a confidential basis. They wish direct discussions and suggest two on each side.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 00-140 (*56a)
By cbm/cr, NARA, Date 8-26-05

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SAND STORM

~~SECRET/NODIS~~
SAND STORM

2

2. We do not know the Israeli terms for a settlement and doubt that they have been formulated as yet.

3. We are inclined to believe that the possibility exists of working out a settlement of most of the issues and problems that would be involved. Jerusalem, however, will be very difficult and we do not know if there is any flexibility in the Israeli position except in respect to the direct administration of the Holy Places by religious authorities.


4. We do not know if an overall settlement will prove feasible, but we believe it would be worth the try. In any event, we are confident that the Israelis would protect the secrecy of their contacts with Hussein and the Jordan Government.

5. Hussein should keep in mind, however, that we do not trust Nasser, Boumediene and Atassi who are aware of Jordan's intentions and we doubt that Hussein should trust them.

6. Finally, Hussein would be asked how he contemplates staffing-out the negotiations. If he expresses uncertainty, as we expect, the suggestion would be made that private legal counsel would help. If he desired, we would assist him in finding a competent and discreet American firm. While this would marginally increase our involvement, it would lessen the imbalance of negotiating talent that would otherwise exist and permit us to make appropriate inputs at the staffing level throughout the negotiating process.

You will note that Paragraph 6 involves the use of a private American. This seems to us constructive since it provides a method for us to be involved in the process which is controllable and which allows us both a private and public role. The American lawyer will not be acting as an American official, but would be a person in whom we had great confidence.

I have discussed this approach with Mac Bundy, who agrees with it.



Dean Rusk

~~SECRET/NCDIS~~
SAND STORM

154

Standard Form 63

November 1961

GSA Gen. Reg. No. 27

MEMORANDUM OF CALL

Date 7/18

Time 4:25

TO-

YOU WERE CALLED BY- YOU WERE VISITED BY-

Laey
Mrs. Mrs. Laey
Wichita Falls, Kansas Texas

TELEPHONE: Number or code (817) 723-2824 Extension

- PLEASE CALL
- WILL CALL AGAIN
- RETURNING YOUR CALL
- IS REFERRED TO YOU BY:
- WAITING TO SEE YOU
- WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

LEFT THIS MESSAGE: *W h*

*Would like to know what
action you have taken on her
letter. I found it in last week's
incoming mail.*

Received By-

Jordan
H.S.
Talked by phone - 7/18/67

Mrs. George S. Lacy
Post Office Box 4303
Wichita Falls, Texas
76398

Reply by HNS
7/19/67

Mr. Harold Sanders
Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Sanders,

At the suggestion of Elizabeth Carpenter, I am writing you about this problem. In January we met a young man in the Jordanian Air Force at Webb A.F.B., Texas and in the following months came to know him quite well. He expressed his desire, before leaving here and returning home June 23, 1967, of returning and becoming an American citizen. He held the rank of Corporal (two stripes) in the Jordanian Air Force. He was to be stationed at King Hussein Air Base in the far eastern part of Jordan. His father, a school teacher, lives near Irbed and his address is Abdel Hameed Saleem, Irbed/Ibdar Jordan. Nasser A.Hameed Saleem is 25 years old and has had training both here and in England. He trained both at Webb A.F.B. and Sheppard A.F.B. here in Texas.

We would be willing to sponsor this young man's return to the United States to become a citizen. Who would I have to contact to help me with this problem, so that we could most effectively help this young man in his wish to return to the United States and become a citizen? Please let me know what to do at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely and hopefully,

Mrs. Geo. S. Lacy

Mrs. George S. Lacy

Mrs. George S. Lacy
P.O. Box 4303
W Wichita Falls, Texas
76308

4/15/67




ALWAYS
USE ZIP
CODE



Mr. Harold Sanders
Executive Office Building
Washington
D.C.

SAUNDERS

EOB



OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

000907

Handwritten: 41
Orig.
Info.

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN
Amembassy BEIRUT
Amconsul General JERUSALEM
Amembassy JIDDA
Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy TEL AVIV
~~AMMAN~~

JUL 4 2 58 PM '67

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Subject file
on Hussein
must file if any

STATE

~~SECRET~~ EMDIS

1. King Hussein, accompanied by Foreign Minister Tuqan and Chief of Staff Amir Khammash, was invited to the White House for a working luncheon with President Johnson on June 28. During the luncheon prospects for solution of the Middle East Crisis were discussed. The major participants in the discussion were King Hussein, the President, Mr. McGeorge Bundy and the Under Secretary.

~~Mr. Nicholas Katzenbach.~~

2. The King adhered to the public line he had previously expressed at the UN and emphasized the necessity of his obtaining the return of the West Bank.

3. Mr. Katzenbach and Mr. Bundy made the following points to the King:

a) The US believes that a peaceful solution is the only solution and all US efforts would be bent towards that end. We realize that if a peaceful solution is to be a lasting solution it must be a just solution.

b) The realities of the situation appear to exclude the possibility

Drafted by:
A/ARN/Amb. Burns: jh 6/30/67

Tel. Ext.
3236

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by: U- Mr. Katzenbach

Clearances:

NEA - Mr. Davies
M- Mr. Rostow

S/S - ~~UNO~~ ~~DO NOT~~ REPRODUCED
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~

FORM 65 DS-322

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NLT 95-244 (*61)
By: *dm/isp* NARA, Date: 8-26-05

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that a peace could be imposed on Israel and the Arabs from some outside higher source.

c) A settlement between the Arabs and Israelis would have to be in essence bilateral, though there were options in terms of modalities to get around some of the current irreconcilabilities of the Arab and Israeli positions. (For example, a mediator in place of direct Arab-Israeli negotiations.)

d) The US has never had the influence with Israel that the Arabs thought we had, and in point of fact we now have less influence with Israel than ever. With this caveat the Arabs could count on us to use all of our influence and efforts to insure that a just settlement were arrived at, if the Arabs have the will for a settlement.

e) Only a settlement would inspire the USG, the Congress and the American people to be willing to render economic aid which the area so desperately needs. We are no longer interested in financing activities which do not lead to, or are not part of, a final solution to the Middle East problem.

4) In reply to questions designed to ascertain what King Hussein would settle for with respect to Jordan in connection with a peaceful settlement, King Hussein replied that he could not answer such questions until he had had an opportunity to consult with all the Arab leaders. It was apparent from the conversation, however, that Jerusalem was likely to present the most serious problem. In reply to Mr. Bundy's question as to whether Hussein would accept demilitarization of the West Bank, Hussein

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replied that if there were a peaceful settlement with Israel the problem would be academic and would largely take care of itself. Mr. Bundy pointed out to King Hussein that until peoples who have been traditional enemies have had the opportunity to live in peace for awhile it probably would be necessary to have a demilitarized area.

5) After luncheon, while King Hussein was meeting alone with the President, General Khamash spoke along the following line with Mr. Bundy. Said Khamash: "We are now reforming our military units. We will need in the near future to re-supply the army with equipment. I am not speaking of offensive equipment; I am speaking of basic, defensive equipment. We must do this for two reasons (a) the morale of the army and (b) the fact that the army is still the key to stability in Jordan. The Soviets have already started to re-supply other Arab states. In such a situation we would have a hard time sitting by and taking no action even in the absence of the two considerations I just mentioned. I recognize that what I have said presents the US with a problem, since I am aware that you do not in fact or in appearance wish to rearm the Arabs for another round. I have a problem, too, which I have just outlined to you. What do we do ?

6) ~~XXXXXX~~ Mr. Bundy replied that he understood General Khamash' problem and that obviously General Khamash understood ours. He said this is a very ~~it~~ delicate and ticklish problem. He asked the General to keep in close touch with us, since decisions in this respect could

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only be arrived at in the light of the situation which comes to pass with each unfolding day.

7) The President and King Hussein met alone for about twenty minutes.

When they returned to the other members of the party, the President said that he and the King had discussed nothing new that had not already been discussed at the lunch.

8) The President then suggested that the King meet alone with Mr. Bundy and Mr. Katzenbach. This meeting lasted for about forty minutes.

9) The tone of the meeting was marked by seriousness, moderation, and sympathetic frankness.

10) If it is decided to communicate any part of the above to a foreign government, it will be done in Washington.

67-3.

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

000146

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

157

47

Origin
NEA
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy LONDON

IMMEDIATE

Houghton

Jul 2 1 14 PM '67

Jordan

SS
GPM
P
USIA

INFO Amembassy AMMAN

STATE 146

received from Ranch July 2

NSC
CPR

1. Please deliver following message/ from President to King Hussein.

2. QUOTE HIS MAJESTY KING HUSSEIN

~~QUOTE~~ Thank you for your thoughtful and kind message and your congratulations

RSC

on our Independence Day. Your Majesty will always find a welcome in our country where your forthrightness and courage are greatly admired. I appreciated the opportunity to exchange views with you ~~on the Middle East~~ and ~~XXXXXX~~ I profoundly hope that a way may be found to bring the benefits of stability and prosperity to all of the people of the Middle East. As you return to your country to carry out your heavy responsibilities, my best wishes go with you and to the people of Jordan.

With warm personal regards,

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

- 3. If King has departed before this message can be delivered, repeat text to Paris and ask Embassy Paris to deliver.
- 4. We do not plan to release text publicly, but have no objection if GOJ wishes to do so.

*R.B.J.
To
King Hussein
7/5/67*

RUSK

Drafted by: NEA/ARN:MWilby/cls:7/1/67	Tel. Ext. 3235	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	S/S - Mr. Bruce
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Clearances:
~~EX~~NEA/ARN - Mr. Houghton
WH - Mr. Brown - Sit Room and LDX from WH.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

FORMAL VERSION

Jordan

158

SUGGESTED REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE TENTH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE OPENING OF THE ISLAMIC CENTER
WASHINGTON, D. C., ON WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, 1967

Your Majesty, Excellencies and friends, ten years ago a distinguished American, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, participated in the dedication ceremonies of this Center. I am privileged to be here today with His Majesty, King Hussein, a descendant of the family of the Prophet Mohammed, on the tenth anniversary of those dedication ceremonies.

We recognize a great debt to the Islamic world. With their traditions of learning and rich culture, the countries of Islam have contributed greatly to the advancement of mankind. Their discoveries have been fundamental in the development of medicine and astronomy and their contributions to the furtherance of art, science and commerce are substantial. We have benefitted from the many lessons which they have taught us in hospitality and courage.

Above all, we prize the strong bond of friendship which we have enjoyed with the Islamic nations and peoples. We earnestly seek the strengthening and deepening of those bonds.

We sincerely hope that the work and dedication which has contributed to the growth of this Center will be repeated in the development of similar centers in other parts of this great land. I note that the

Islamic Center serves as a collecting point for the Arab Emergency Relief Committee, organized to alleviate the suffering of those in the area of recent hostilities. On behalf of the United States Government I announced an official program of relief. I call upon my fellow citizens to demonstrate their traditional generosity in contributing to private organizations such as this. It is time for men of all faiths to work together to see that a just and equitable settlement removes those unfortunate victims of war from the refugee status. ¶ Freedom to worship is one of our most cherished tenets. I can assure Your Majesty that this place of worship is just as welcome as that of any other religion. The fulfillment of man's spiritual needs is indispensable to us all. May the inspiration we receive today from these beautiful surroundings guide us all along the path of wisdom and justice in our constant strivings for a better world.

Jordan

159

SUGGESTED JOINT COMMUNIQUE FOR THE MEETING BETWEEN
THE PRESIDENT AND KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN ON JUNE 28, 1967

The President and His Majesty King Hussein I exchanged views on the problems arising out of the recent hostilities in the Near East.

King Hussein expressed deep concern at the plight of the refugees, thanked the United States for assistance contributed to the refugees and hoped the United States would do its utmost to relieve the suffering. The President noted that the United States had been a major contributor to the support and rehabilitation of the Palestine refugees. He emphasized our acute concern with the welfare of the refugees, both those displaced by the fighting of 1948 and those who have left their homes as a result of the recent hostilities. He noted that the USG was contributing a total of \$5 million for emergency relief for the refugees through UNRWA and other means.

Both King Hussein and the President agreed that any resolution of the present crisis must be based on justice and the interest of all parties concerned. King Hussein insisted that a first step must be the withdrawal of Israeli forces back to the boundaries pertaining before June 4. The President referred to the five points which he made in his speech of June 19. He expressed the hope that measures could now be taken to implement these points and arrive at a just settlement including the withdrawal of the Israeli forces. He described our basic objective as the achievement of a more durable and more stable situation than that existing prior to June 5. Our commitments on territorial integrity would be fulfilled in that context.

Both agreed that Jerusalem as the repository of shrines of three great religions deserved special attention. Both agreed that the future legal status of Jerusalem must be decided on the basis of international consultation and agreement.

The President reaffirmed the deep interest of the United States Government in Jordan and its people. He expressed the hope that the friendly relations between the two countries would be strengthened and informed the King that the United States Government intended to continue its economic assistance to Jordan.

Although there was not an identity of views on all issues, the exchange was most beneficial, clarifying the positions of the two countries.

PRESS GUIDANCE

Hussein
visit

SUGGESTED ~~STATEMENTS~~ FOR THE MEETING BETWEEN
THE PRESIDENT AND KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN ON JUNE 28, 1967

160

Hussein
visit

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that the USG ^{had established a} ~~was~~ contributing a total of \$5 million ^{reserve fund} for emergency relief for the refugees ^{through UNRWA and other means} ~~and other means~~. ^{he emphasized the} ~~need for a permanent solution to the refugee problem.~~

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^{views} ~~commitments~~ on territorial integrity ^{and political} ~~would be fulfilled in that~~ ~~context.~~ ^{independence of all states}

161

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 30, 1967

Lois -

Has anything happened on
this?

Finished

Hal

Hal Saunders

[Circular signature]

161a

~~SECRET~~

March 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proposed Visit for Tony Taylor to Jordan

You will remember that your brother-in-law went to Jordan about a year and a half ago to advise on the development of handicraft industry there. Now his project has reached a point where he should go back. Because the press last time noted his relationship to you and tabbed him as some kind of arms merchant, AID wants to be doubly careful not to embarrass you. Therefore, they are asking whether we have any objections.

My own feeling is that we should let him go about his business. Tourism is Jordan's main resource, and the Jordanians are doing a remarkably good job of developing it. Secretary Udall's recent visit was a conspicuous boost, and now it is time for men like Taylor to move in and help with the followup details. These are projects we can be proud to be associated with, and everyone feels that Taylor can do an excellent job. State agrees that we should go ahead as economics dictate and stand our ground against any possible press reaction.

Therefore, unless you have any personal reason for wanting to see this delayed, I propose to tell AID we have no objections to their going ahead according to their own schedule.

W. W. Rostow

No objection _____

See me ✓ 3/22/67.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 91-374 (#88a)
By ebw/jjd NARA, Date 8-26-05

~~SECRET~~

TMT - Hold this in
suspense -
Remind me
weekly.
3/30
162

Pls. return to
HH Saunders, Rm. 372-a
EOB when signed.

~~SECRET~~

March 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proposed Visit for Tony Taylor to Jordan

You will remember that your brother-in-law went to Jordan about a year and a half ago to advise on the development of handicraft industry there. Now his project has reached a point where he should go back. Because the press last time noted his relationship to you and tabbed him as some kind of arms merchant, AID wants to be doubly careful not to embarrass you. Therefore, they are asking whether we have any objections.

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18
W. W. Rostow

No objection _____

See me ✓ 3/22/67

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NJ 91-374 (#88a)
By ebm/jed, NARA, Date 8-26-05

~~SECRET~~

163

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

1 2 9 4 3 7

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Jordan

86

Origin
NEA

ACTION: AmEmbassy AMMAN

Info:

STATE 129437

FEB 1 6 10 PM '67

SS

GPM

P

USIA

NSC

DOD

SCI

CPR

NASA

Following message was sent to President by King Hussein:

With a feeling of great sorrow and a sense of mutual loss shared by so many in this world I wish to extend to you Mr. President to the families of the late Virgil Grisson Edward White and Roger Chaffee to all those involved in the space programs as well as to all members of their greater American family our sincerest condolences mankind has lost three true pioneers symbolizing courage and determination to fathom the unknown and mans spirit bent on seeking to attain ever higher and brighter horizons the three pioneers who fell along mankind's determined struggle into a better future will forever remain alive in the hearts of all mankind. Signed Hussein King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

*King Hussein
2/1/67*

Deliver following reply from President to King Hussein:

On behalf of the families of Astronauts Grisson, White and Chaffee and of the American people, I express our heartfelt appreciation for your message of condolence for the tragic loss at Cape Kennedy.

These men were truly envoys of mankind. In their memory we rededicate ourselves to the task of achieving, together with all nations, an understanding of our common space environment and its successful exploration

*RBH
King Hussein
2/1/67*

Drafted by: NEA/ARN/MWiley:jb 2/1/67	Tel. Ext. 3235	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA/ARN:RBHoughton XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Clearances: NEA:MMichaud XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX S/S - Mr. Brown		

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

for the mutual benefit of all peoples on earth, Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

to release

White House does not plan/ ~~returning~~ reply but has no objection ~~for~~ if

GOJ wishes to do so,

END

Decontrol upon receipt

RUSK

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 11, 1967

*FYI
memo not sent.
Att. only was
sent M. Watson
amc*

MEMORANDUM FOR MARVIN WATSON

Attached is ^{*a State Department paper on the status of*} ~~more background on~~ negotiations ^{*between*} between ~~Texas oilman~~ John Mecom and the Government of Jordan. ~~I believe Mecom or his representatives~~ have talked with various members of your staff in the past. *is forwarded for your information.*

State has sent this memo (a) so you'll be fore-armed if Mecom approaches you again, and (b) in hopes that you -- if you see him -- might encourage him to make a reasonable settlement. This case is becoming a thorn in our relations with Jordan, and it doesn't seem that Mecom is making all the effort he might to settle reasonably.

B S
Bromley Smith

to you as of possible interest.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

164a

January 11, 1967

TO: B. K. S.
FROM: Hal Saunders ^{HS.}

S

I think this is the best way to handle the attached. While there is no record of correspondence in the Central Files, I know that Mecom has been in touch with some of Marv Watson's people in the past.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Jordan

165

Mr. Wiggins
you might check
Central Files of W. H.
to see who Mecon
writes to. (sic)

pld, Do BKS
you know any background?
could you pursue Brown's
suggestion? H

See HNS memo to BKS - 1/11/67
with attached memo from
BKS to Marvin Watson 1/11/67



61

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 4, 1967

Wiggins

15
1650

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Dispute Between John Mecom and the
Government of Jordan

The enclosed memorandum sets forth the facts of a dispute between John Mecom, an independent Texas oilman, and the Government of Jordan. Mr. Mecom has previously communicated with White House officials on this subject and may do so again. We are, therefore, forwarding the enclosed memorandum for your information.

Benjamin H. Read
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Memorandum with Attachments

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (494a)
State Dept. Guidelines
By *etm/rq*, NARA, Date 8-26-05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1656

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Dispute Between John Mecom and the Government of Jordan.

A lingering dispute between the Government of Jordan and John Mecom has become a disturbing element in our relations with Jordan.

In 1964 Mecom entered into an agreement with Jordan under which he received exclusive exploration and drilling rights for the entire Kingdom. The contract specified that he would drill at the rate of 20,000 feet per year prior to discovery of oil. Mecom did a certain amount of exploration and some drilling and then ceased effective operations. After a period of eight months of inaction, he indicated his intention to terminate the agreement.

The Jordanians do not dispute Mecom's right to terminate the contract. They have, however, asserted a claim against him of approximately \$425,000 for failure to comply with the drilling requirement under the agreement. Based on this claim, the Jordanians have refused to clear for export Mecom's equipment in Jordan.

Mecom recognizes that the Jordanians have a claim (his representatives have confirmed that the amount of the Jordanian claim is essentially correct), but he considers the failure to allow him to remove his equipment is a violation of the agreement and that the Jordanians should first release his equipment and then he will deal with them concerning their claim.

Mecom's representatives have negotiated with the Jordanians and on one occasion apparently reached agreement only to have it disavowed by Mecom. Recently, discussions have focused on a settlement under which Jordan would take over Mecom's equipment and a financial payment would be made representing the difference between the value of the equipment and the Jordanian claim. The Jordanians believe that a fair valuation of the equipment in question is in the neighborhood of \$1 million. Mecom, on the other hand, claims that the equipment is worth \$1.5 million. The

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (4948)
State Dept. Guidelines
By ebm/rq, NARA, Date 8-26-05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Jordanians believe that Mecom is placing an unreal valuation on the equipment as a means of wiping out the Jordanian claim against him. The Jordanians have indicated that they would accept a third-party valuation of the equipment.

The negotiations to date indicate that the Jordanians believe they cannot deal with Mecom's representatives since Mecom has demonstrated that he is not bound by their actions. On the other hand, Mecom has failed to meet with Jordanian authorities who have attempted personal contacts for the purpose of discussing a settlement.

As is noted in the most recent cable from Amman dated December 22, the Jordanian official concerned has indicated deep pessimism regarding the dispute and fears that the Jordanian Government will be pushed to extreme action, noting that the patience of the King is near an end.

While recognizing that the dispute is a private one involving purely commercial interests, the Department has endeavored to be of assistance to the parties in resolving the dispute. The best information we have been able to obtain suggests that Mecom is being difficult and avoiding negotiations with the Jordanians designed to reach a fair and prompt settlement. The equipment itself is subject to deterioration while the dispute continues. We are concerned, of course, as a result of the adverse impact of the dispute on our relations with Jordan, as well as on Jordanian attitudes toward American business interests.

Attachments:

Telegrams from Amman -
1134, 1351, 1402, 1578

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

110350
Wiley
Lunders

40

Origin
SS
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN

DEC 30 10 29 AM '66

EXDIS
STATE 110350

Jordan

3

Please deliver following letter to the King from the President:

QUOTE: Your Majesty:

Thank you for your kind letter and thoughtful holiday greetings which were conveyed to me by Ambassador Macomber.

We continue to follow with admiration the way you and your government are dealing with the difficult situation confronting you. I am pleased that we have been able to be of assistance. You may be sure that we will continue to watch closely the events now unfolding in your area. In conveying to you my warm best wishes, I also take this opportunity to renew to you my assurance of continued U.S. friendship and support. Sincerely yours, Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

White House does not plan to release text.

207
12/30/66

Drafted by: NEA/ARN:MWiley:es 12/23/66 Tel. Ext. Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: S/S - John P. Walsh

RUSK

Clearances: S/S - Mr. Walsh White House - Mr. Wriggins
NEA/ARN - Mr. Atherton NEA - Mr. Davies (subst)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cbm/lj NARA, Date 5-28-10

168

Please return to
HHSaunders, Rm. 372a EOB
when signed.

Jordan

December 10, 1966

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Response to King Hussein's Military Equipment Request

We can't come close to meeting Hussein's \$200 million request. We don't have the money, and that big a program would ruin Jordan's promising economic development.

So Secretary McNamara has designed a small package to tackle Hussein's main problem--his army's morale. It includes only \$4.7 million (reprogrammed from existing appropriations) on top of \$3.5 million already in Jordan's FY 1967 military aid program. Instead of enlarging his forces, it would help him improve pay, mobility and organization to tide him over the present crisis of confidence with the army.

This offer probably won't satisfy Hussein. We see it as the starting point for a tough series of negotiations over our whole aid program. We may have to give a little, but before we do we'd send former Ambassador Bill Macomber to try to talk Hussein back to reason.

If you approve this approach, Secretary McNamara will go over the package with Hussein's army commander at 11:00 a. m. Tuesday. Secretary Katzenbach also requests your approval of the attached message from him to Hussein explaining the rationale for the package. We feel the Secretaries should handle this initial response, since you've already sent the King one message and may have to step in again later.

No matter what we do, the Israelis and their friends will object. But we're just cleaning up the mess Israel's raid created and we've taken Israel's military concerns into account. Our JCS says this small package will not affect the military balance on Israel's borders. If you approve, State and Defense will brief key Members of Congress on the program, and we'll tell the Israelis what's involved as soon as we've told the Jordanians.

I recommend you approve.

W. W. Rostow
W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol. xviii, #361
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

~~SECRET~~

Pls. return to
HHSaunders, Rm 396 EOB
when signed (?)

~~SECRET~~

December 2, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Israel - Jordan This Week

We've moved this week into the second phase of our effort to put together the pieces after Israel's 13 November raid. Hussein is still on top of his security situation. Although the army has stuck with him in putting down demonstrations, morale is still a serious problem. We must now show enough movement in improving Jordan's defenses to satisfy his military over the longer term.

He sent his army commander, General Khammash, here Monday with a stupendous \$200 million request for equipment, army expansion and budget support. Secretary Rusk and I have both received him in an effort to make Hussein feel he is getting a fair hearing.

We will have to whittle Khammash's request down to keep Hussein from ruining Jordan economically, but we probably can't get off scot free. We'll have to put together some kind of package and will try to gear it to streamlining existing forces and improving border control. We don't agree with Hussein that this is chiefly a military problem because we don't believe--as he does--that the Israeli attack was the first step in grabbing West Jordan. We are holding Secretary McNamara in reserve to sell our final proposition to Khammash when we have a clearer idea what we can do.

The Israelis have recovered their composure enough to take us to task mildly for supporting last week's UN Security Council censure of Israel. They claim the UN action gives a blank check to the Arab governments backing the terrorists. We're pressing them to beef up their own border control effort and to help improve the UN machinery there. They're willing to talk about improving their own system, but we'll have to press hard before they will be willing to see the UN beefed up. Nevertheless, we still feel the least that ought to come out of this mess is a system that will be a serious deterrent to continued terrorism.

We will be back to you with a formal proposal later.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol. xviii, #355
By abm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Wiggins

HS. 171

~~SECRET~~

Action

03

efj

Info

NNNNVV QMA971VV KGA149
PP RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 375A 3281200
ZNY SSSSS
P 241150Z NOV 66
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
STATE GRNC
BT

22471

1966 NOV 24 AM 8 49

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1237

Jordan

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT 90603

1. DELIVERED PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO KING THIS MORNING.
2. HUSSEIN WAS CLEARLY PLEASED WITH MESSAGE. ASKED ME TO CONVEY HIS THANKS IMMEDIATELY TO PRESIDENT AND COMMENTED "IT IS GOOD TO KNOW THAT YOUR FRIENDS ARE WITH YOU DURING SUCH TIMES." SAID HE WOULD BE ANSWERING THE PRESIDENT IN WRITING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

GP-3. BURNS
BT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/aj* NARA, Date 5-28-10

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

8 1 1 2 3

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

Jordan

173

7

Origin ACTION: AmEmbassy, AMMAN

Nov 8 6 05 PM '66

CPR
Info

STATE

81123

SS

G

NEA

P

US IA

NSC

SSC

FYI following message will be sent direct via commercial channels to King on November 13. "On the occasion of this anniversary of Your Majesty's birth it gives me great pleasure, on behalf of the people of the United States and on my own behalf, to send to you and through you to the people of Jordan sincere good wishes and assurances of our warm friendship. LYNDON B. JOHNSON"

Department will release upon post confirmation of receipt by King unless objection perceived.

RUSK

*L.B.J.
to
King
11/13/66*

Drafted by: S/CFR:LNichols:pl 11/7/66

2008

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

James W. Symington
Chief of Protocol

Clearances: NEA/ARN - Mr. Wiley

S/S-C - Mrs. Denham

NEA - Mr. ~~Handley~~ Davies

S/S - Mr. Walsh

WHITE HOUSE CONCURRENCE NOT NECESSARY

UNCLASSIFIED

Jordan 174

mtg of Oct. 6, 11:30 a. m.
Room 372

Jordanians:

Hatem Zu'bi (Min. of Nat'l Economy)

Izzedin Mufti (Min. of Finance)

Dr. Khalil Salem (Governor, Central Bank)

Mr. Najm ad-din Dajani (SecGen, Jordan
Development Board)

Kanj Shukrey (Under Secretary, Min. of Finance)

State:

Marshall Wiley

Alfred Atherton

AID (?)

Saunders
File
Jordan
175

October 6, 1966

TALKING POINTS
JORDANIAN ECONOMIC DELEGATION

1. Pleased to see them. Rostow's regrets. He is out of town on two separate trips most of these three days.
2. We do understand the main points of the Jordanian argument but would welcome hearing anything they'd like to say (bearing in mind that we're not economists and not in a position to discuss in detail the ins and outs of their argument.)
3. We would like to make these points, which reflect White House--and we think the President's--view of Jordan:
 - a. Jordan is important to us. Absolutely no change in that policy.
 - b. We think that would be clearer to them if they were more deeply immersed in the Washington atmosphere and could see these two recent actions against the background of this year's mood in Washington:
 - Arms sales: Very difficult these days because of Vietnam, India-Pak experience and general feeling that we should back away from arms races everywhere. Fact that the President made that painful--and believe us, it was painful--decision in favor of Jordan is more than just incidental evidence of the importance Jordanian security has for us.
 - Continuation of budget support: Our reduction distresses the Jordanians, and it distresses us. We may be at fault for not consulting with them as early as we might have. But we can assure them that we did the very best we could by them. From having been personally involved in the Washington hassle, we can testify that we had to go right to the top to do this well. We can also testify that those opposed to the Jordan program were opposed on grounds that had nothing to do with judgments on Jordan's importance or performance. Balance of payments a major problem, as they will hear in Treasury. But not just a Treasury problem--a national problem with which the President deeply personally concerned.
 - c. So what is most important is that Jordanians not read what they have heard in Washington as in any way a change in policy. In fact, the problems we face underscore the need for even closer cooperation in the future. We hope, for instance, that we can arrange full consultation on what happens beyond the current Jordanian fiscal year. We realize the Jordanians are moving toward financial independence--over time--and that we should begin to plan for it early to be sure the process best serves everybody's political and economic interests.

FOR DISCUSSION WITH
THE JORDANIAN DELEGATION

- ✓ 1. I wish to dispel any idea that the USG is less interested now than before in the stability and economic development of Jordan.
- ✓ 2. USG has heavy world-wide commitments, however, and we must make decisions within certain limitations.
- 3. FL 480 is an excellent example of our readiness to do what we can within these limits.
 - ✓ a. Jordan was the first to get approval on FL 480.
 - b. The quantity approved for the first half year was closely in line with the GOJ request, while other countries were cut sharply.
- h. USG determination re budget support was based on our careful assessment of the GOJ economic position.
 - a. We would not have made the cut unless we felt the economy of Jordan could stand it.
 - b. We would not have used the SIC unless we felt it was within reasonable expectations of Jordanian purchases.

Frankly, 50% tying under SIC was a practical compromise within the USG between AID and those who wanted to tie 100%. We held the line, knowing that 50% tying was tight, but also within the realm of possibility.

5. The question of GOJ reserves was the determining one in our assessment that the \$5 million cut could be sustained.

- a. It was impossible to sustain the level of budget support, when reserves were going up.
- b. We realized that not all reserves were free reserves, but still the level was adequate to withstand the proposed cut.

(1) GOJ reserves as of July 1966 were \$197.1 million, an increase of \$17.3 million from December 1965 and an increase from December 1963 of \$91.8 million.

(2) AID projections of reserves show minimum increases for 1966 of \$8.4 million; \$2.7 million in 1967 and \$0.3 million in 1968.

6. We are not attempting to use duress or threat to get the GOJ to take actions re lowering currency backing, income tax, etc. We are trying to work only as partners, we understanding your needs and you understanding our limitations.

- a. We are proud of the progress Jordan has made.
- b. We are not taking credit for it. The credit belongs to Jordan.
- c. We are aware that Jordan is a triumph for the evolutionary approach in the midst of revolutionary regimes around it. We do not want to see the evolutionary approach lose out.

d. The evolutionary approach requires self-help measures.

The record of the GOW is good, and will continue to be good. On the surface, it looks as if you were being penalized for success, whereas the fact is that you are moving towards the day you and we both want: namely, independence from outside support. You and we both realize standing on your own is never easy.

7. Frankly, I cannot encourage you to believe there will be any change in our earlier decisions concerning cuts in budget support and partial tying. I can even fear that if the matter were re-opened, it might lead to further restrictions. Because I have received a letter from the Prime Minister, and because you have come here today, I will ask the Staff to review this decision once again.

I say "once again" because we have not only reviewed it earlier, but also because we sent an exceptionally qualified person -- Dr. Vincent Barnett -- to make an independent review.

We will give full consideration to all the points in the Prime Minister's letter to me. We will listen sympathetically to all that you wish to say today and I want to invite your fullest and frankest comments. We are friends talking together on a subject which is of importance to us all.

COMMENTS TO BE MADE AFTER
THE OPEN DISCUSSION

1. We realize that the GOJ was not fully consulted concerning our decision to cut budget support in your next Fiscal Year, and further realize we were delayed in informing you of this decision.
2. As I believe you all know now, our delay in transmitting the decision was the result of a deep conflict within the USG.
 - a. Those who were concerned with our very serious balance of payments problem held out to the very end for 100% tying and for a deeper cut next year.
 - b. The entire matter (went to the President twice.) *Thoroughly discussed*
 - c. The final determination was in favor of those who wanted to do what we thought was possible within the framework of the Jordanian economy as opposed to those who wanted tighter controls and larger cuts.
3. We wish in the future to avoid unilateral action, such as our last decision seemed to be. We want full consultation on what happens beyond your next fiscal year and the time to start seems to be now.
4. The place to start seems to be to look jointly at the Seven-Year Plan and your thinking regarding its implementation.
5. As said previously, we do not want to blunt the development thrust. Jordanian development is our main concern, just as it is the main concern

of the Seven-Year Plan and the concern of all of you here.

6. In the course of the review of what your development plans are for the remainder of the Plan period, it will be possible to develop priorities and to identify the role we each can play in attaining development, as well as continuing Government operations. In this process, we would hope to develop agreed upon guidelines for the order of priorities.
7. We stand ready to consider favorably loan applications which meet our normal, world-wide criteria for sound development projects.
8. By early identification of the priority activities, there will be time to develop the background material for loan consideration and to avoid the misunderstandings which arose in the past.
9. The Prime Minister has indicated his interest in a loan for equipment for water spreading and erosion prevention projects. Within the magnitudes discussed by the Prime Minister, this kind of loan could move quickly.
10. Repeat: There is no lessening of our interest in the political stability and economic development of Jordan. We do, however, have our limitations. The need is to find the common ground, and I hope that the JDB and other GOJ offices, along with our Embassy and AID Mission, can find that common ground.

Handwritten note on right margin:
...we would like to bring out of our budget support.

Clearances:

NSA/DP, AWhite

STATE:NSA/ASST, W/iley

NSA/NE, JOFlint:bec

X

175d

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NEA - Ambassador Hare

October 5, 1966

ARN - Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.

Additional Briefing Memorandum for your Meeting with the Jordanian Delegation at 4:45 p.m. Today

The Jordanian delegation has an appointment with Ambassador Macomber after the luncheon at 1:00 p.m. today, October 5. Ambassador Macomber will listen to their plea for a reduction in the size of the supporting assistance cut for 1967 and for a reduction in the percentage of supporting assistance tied to U.S. procurement. After hearing them out, Ambassador Macomber will assure them that the decisions with respect to the AID program do not reflect any change in U.S. policies toward Jordan and the cuts are justified by developments in the Jordanian economy. Ambassador Macomber will also tell them that we are giving thorough consideration to the points raised by the Prime Minister in his letter.

To avoid sending them home empty handed, Ambassador Macomber is prepared to offer them the following:

1. The U.S. Government will give favorable consideration to a sector loan for earth moving equipment to be used in water spreading and erosion control projects in Jordan. This loan was specifically requested by the Prime Minister. The exact amount of the loan will probably not be specified but is expected to be in the range of \$500,000 to \$1,000,000.
2. The U.S. Government is prepared to consider additional applications for development loans for sound projects. Since we are already looking at projects of approximately \$40,000,000, this assurance will in effect remove the previous limitation of \$35,000,000 on development loans for Jordan.
3. Ambassador Macomber will offer to review jointly with the Jordanians the seven-year development plan. This joint review will attempt to refine priorities within the plan and would be a first step in delineating the U.S. role in both economic development and budget support over the next five years. Such a review should help convince the Jordanians that we do not wish to act unilaterally in arriving at economic decisions affecting the Jordanian economy and that they will have an opportunity in future years for full consultation with us before aid levels are established.

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *ckm/ly*, NARA, Date 5-28-10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

On Thursday the delegation has an appointment with Mr. Winthrop Knowlton, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, at 3:00 p.m. We have recommended to Treasury that they discuss the U.S. balance of payments problem with the Jordanians and also explain to them the effect this problem has had on our aid program on a worldwide basis.

The delegation will then meet with Mr. Wiggins at the White House at 11:30 on Thursday. We hope this meeting will help assure the Jordanians that they are receiving a hearing in all relevant areas of the U.S. Government.

The final appointment is with Mr. Gaud at 4:00 p.m. on Thursday. At this meeting we expect to give them the final word on the \$5,000,000 cut and on tying 75% of the supporting assistance in Jordan fiscal year 1967. Mr. Gaud will most certainly tell them that these decisions cannot be changed, but we hope that the Jordanians will then feel that their views have had a full hearing in Washington.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

176

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

22269

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

81

Origin
NEA

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN

Info:

SS

STATE 22269

G

r

USIA

NSC

CPR

1. Embassy should deliver following message:

"His Majesty

Hussein I

King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

QUOTE On the anniversary of your ascension to the throne of Jordan, I once again take great pleasure in conveying to you my personal greetings and the best wishes of the American people for the increasing prosperity of your country. The United States values highly its association with Jordan and looks forward to continued close and cordial relations between our two nations. / Lyndon B. Johnson. UNQUOTE

2. Department will release following Post confirmation of receipt by addressee unless objection received.

END

RUSK

289
to King
Hussein
8/5/66

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

NEA/ARN:PEBeard:es:7/29/66 2236

classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

NEA/ARN - Mr. Atherton

S/S - Mr. Walsh

P - Mr. Freeman (subs)

White House - Mr. Wriggins

S/CPR - Miss Nichols

UNCLASSIFIED

2686

177



11946

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 3, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Congratulatory Message to
King Hussein

Jordan
1 - Wiggins
1 - Ker
See 7/25 note to WWR 8/4
9 suggested WWR memo
To President 8/4/66

August 11 marks the date in 1953 when King Hussein ascended the throne in Jordan. In 1957, the United States established a special relationship with Jordan which has continued without interruption.

In the past few years, however, and especially prior to our decision to sell supersonic fighter aircraft to Jordan, the King has expressed some concern about the strength of our support for him. Particularly in view of current attacks on him by militant Arab nationalists and Palestinians, we believe the King feels the need for reassurances of our strong support.

Such reassurances would be consistent with our decision to sell him supersonics and to continue heavy economic aid to Jordan. Such a message might also offset any doubts we may have raised in the King's mind by informing him that we plan to reduce our budget subsidy to Jordan next year by about 17 percent.

A proposed message is enclosed, similar to one which was sent last year.

John P. Walsh
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Proposed Message to
King Hussein

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/s*, NARA, Date 5-28-10

177a

UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN

STATE

1. Embassy should deliver following message:

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Hussein I

King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

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2. Department will release following Post confirmation of receipt by addressee unless objection received.

END

UNCLASSIFIED

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

178
03090

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

Jordan

JUL 7 7 22 PM '66

85

Origin ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN

NEA
Info.
SS
G
P
USIA
NSC
CPR

STATE 3090

1. Following message received by White House July 3, 1966:

QUOTE The people of Jordan join me in expressing to you Mr. President and the people of the United States of America our warmest felicitations on the occasion of the 190th anniversary of independence. I avail myself of this opportunity to renew our best wishes for your personal health and continued success in serving the people of America and the world. Al Hussein UNQUOTE.

King Hussein to LBJ 7/3/66

2. Please deliver following reply to King Hussein: QUOTE

On behalf of our people and Government, I thank you for your good wishes on the 190th anniversary of the independence of the United States of America. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE.

3. White House does not plan to release above reply but has no objection if GOJ wishes to do so.

LBJ to King Hussein 7/7/66

END

BALL ACTING

BALL

Drafted by: NEA/ARN:PEBeard:es:7/7	Tel. Ext. 3236	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA/ARN-Alfred L. Atherton
--	--------------------------	---

S/S-S - Mr. Alsdorf NEA - Mr. Constable

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Intelligence Note - 385

June 16, 1966

179

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *TH*
Subject: Husayn Expounds on Arab Solidarity and Communism

Jordan

Husayn's Challenge to Nasser. Jordanian King Husayn's address to the graduates of Ajlun Teachers' College on June 14 is a significant statement of his policies on matters such as Arab solidarity and Communism. In this clear public expression of his views, King Husayn appears to be taking up UAR President Nasser's challenge to conservative regimes and aligning himself with Saudi Arabia's King Faysal. In so doing, he endangers his already faltering rapprochement with Nasser and exposes Jordan to a return to the isolation he escaped in 1964. Husayn's remarks on the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) challenge PLO Chairman Shuqayri as well as Nasser.

Endorsement of Summit Meetings and Islamic Unity. Husayn's endorsement of the Arab Summits and his linking Islamic unity with Arab nationalism are certain to anger Nasser, who has already privately expressed annoyance at Husayn's support for Faysal's proposals for Islamic unity. Husayn states that Islam and Arab nationalism are inseparable. He credits the Arab Summit meetings with making preparations to "avert the danger" and "restore the usurped right" in Palestine and he comes out in favor of a continuation of the Summit meetings. In fact, he foresees "huge battles in which the Arabs and Arabism would be the losers" should the Arab Summits and cooperation collapse.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *blm/s*, NARA, Date 5-28-10

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
automatically declassified

Attack on the Palestine Liberation Organization. While going along with the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1964, King Husayn has been wary of the PLO and from the PLO's start has been engaged in a contest with PLO Chairman Ahmad al-Shuqayri for the support of Jordan's Palestinian majority. At Ajlun, Husayn laments that the PLO has come under "the domination of subversive partisans" and labels it a vehicle for the destruction of Arab solidarity and unified action. Shuqayri has already announced that he will broadcast a reply to Husayn's criticism and it may be that the shaky truce that has been in effect between the Jordan Government and the PLO since March 1, 1966 is also on the verge of collapse.

Communism "An Even Greater Danger" than Zionism. Husayn dealt very clearly with what he called the danger of Marxist infiltration in the Arab world and obliquely accused the Syrian leaders of throwing themselves into the laps of communism in order to secure their continuance in power. Further, he termed Communism, both Soviet and Chinese, an even greater danger to the Arab world than Zionism. Though Husayn's remarks on Communism are especially applicable to Syria and follow a series of attacks by Amman radio on the current Syrian regime, both Nasser and Shuqayri are likely to feel challenged because of their dealings with the USSR and Communist China.

Jordan
Pls. return to
W. W. Saunders
Rm 387 Eo B
when signed.

180

Tuesday, May 3, 1966
3:30 p. m.

May 3, 1966

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

King Hussein has written you an extremely warm thank-you letter for your decision to sell F-104's to Jordan. It requires nothing more than a friendly acknowledgment because all of our tough conditions are clearly spelled out in the secret memo of understanding which concluded the deal. So this letter just wraps up the niceties.

Attached for signature if you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Att: Read to Rostow Memo, 4/24/66,
Subj: Proposed Presidential Message to King Hussein
Read to Rostow Memo, 4/19/66,
Subj: Letter from King Hussein of Jordan to President Johnson

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cm/ly* NARA, Date 5-28-10

*Pls. return to
H. W. Saunders
Rm 387 EOB if
signed.*

180a

May 4, 1966

Your Majesty:

Thank you for your kind letter in which you expressed your appreciation for the opportunity to purchase F-104 aircraft. Our decision to sell these aircraft was based on our belief that you and the people of Jordan are firm and reliable friends of the United States. I hope that the sale will further strengthen the ties of friendship and mutual trust that exist between our two countries.

I send you best wishes for the future and I hope you will have every success in carrying out your heavy responsibilities.

Sincerely,

15/ LBJ

**His Majesty
Hussein I,
King of the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan
Amman**

LBJ:State:HHS:tmt 5/3/66

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *dbm/s*, NARA, Date 5-28-10

*LBJ
to
King Hussein
5/4/66*



6727

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON


~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

April 24, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Proposed Presidential Message to
King Hussein

Enclosed is a recommended reply to King Hussein's
letter of April 9 to President Johnson. The letter was
transmitted to the White House on April 19.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Suggested message to King Hussein
2. Letter to President Johnson from King Hussein

~~SECRET~~

Group 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *Chm/ljs*, NARA, Date 5-28-10

1. Searched
2. Ref.

*See WWR memo
to President 5/3/66.
+ ltr on green 181
Jordan*

APR 25 1966

181a

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

Proposed Message from President Johnson
to King Hussein

Your Majesty:

Thank you for your kind letter in which you expressed your appreciation for the opportunity to purchase F-104 aircraft. Our decision to sell these aircraft was based on our belief that you and the people of Jordan are firm and reliable friends of the United States. I hope that the sale will further strengthen the ties of friendship and mutual trust that exist between our two countries.

I send you best wishes for the future and I hope you will have every success in carrying out your heavy responsibilities.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Majesty
Hussein I,
King of the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *Abm/ly*, NARA, Date 5-28-10

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

1816

Amembassy AMMAN

EXDIS

(dated)

Please deliver following letter/From President to King Hussein:

QUOTE ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Your Majesty:

Thank you for your kind letter in which you expressed your appreciation for the opportunity to purchase F-104 aircraft. Our decision to sell these aircraft was based on our belief that you and the people of Jordan are firm and reliable friends of the United States. I hope that the sale will further strengthen the ties of friendship and mutual trust that exist between our two countries.

I send you best wishes for the future and I hope you will have every success in carrying out your heavy responsibilities.

Sincerely, ~~XXXXXXXX~~

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

CP-3.

END

NEA:NB:MMWiley:es:4/22/66

NEA + Rodger P. Davies

NE - Mr. Atherton
S/S -

White House -

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By chm/s, NARA, Date 5-28-10

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

181c



THE ROYAL PALACE,
Amman, JORDAN,
April 9th, 1966.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLI 03-34 (#74)
By cmf/jcs, NARA, Date 8-26-05

Dear Mr. President:

It is with a deep sense of gratitude and appreciation that I write to you, following the conclusion of the agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for the supply to the Royal Jordanian Air Force with the United States built F.104 Starfighter type aircraft, and also following the return to Jordan of its negotiator General Amer Khammash Chief of Staff of our Armed Forces.

There is no way, Mr. President, by which I could express my deep gratitude and that of my Government and people, especially in the Armed Forces and particularly in the Air Force, for your personal understanding and support, and for the friendly spirit which emanated from it and with which, the Jordanian negotiator was met, throughout his stay up to the completion of his mission in the United States.

It is indeed only a new demonstration of the solidarity of the relations that happily exist between our two nations, the confidence, trust and the sense of unity in belonging to the family of free nations, safeguarding joint-principles and upholding the same ideals.

Mr. President, you came to our assistance as the great friend we know you to be, and we are proud to have, your personal assistance at an extremely delicate moment in Jordan's history shall never be forgotten

King Hussein
to R.B.G.
4/9/66

Dear Mr. President:

It is with a deep sense of gratitude and appreciation that I write to you, following the conclusion of the agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for the supply to the Royal Jordanian Air Force with the United States built F.104 Starfighter type aircraft, and also following the return to Jordan of its negotiator General Amer Khammash Chief of Staff of our Armed Forces.

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It is indeed only a new demonstration of the solidarity of the relations that happily exist between our two nations, the confidence, trust and the sense of unity in belonging to the family of free nations, safeguarding joint-principles and upholding the same ideals.

Mr. President, you came to our assistance as the great friend we know you to be, and we are proud to have, your personal assistance at an extremely delicate moment in Jordan's history shall never be forgotten and by providing us with the 104s, we know that the United States Government has provided us with the best. I am fairly confident that our Jordanian pilots will prove those aircraft to be the best, and once again that the strength of Jordan will be as it has always been that of freedom, stability and progress, that the strength of Jordan

EXDIS



-2-

shall never be used in any other way save in legitimate self-defence, for freedom, justice and in persuance of a better future for the people of this part of the world.

I seize this opportunity to wish you, Mr. President, continued good health and every success in fulfilling your great and demanding responsibilities.

Your Sincere Brother

Stewart L.

President Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States of America,

shall never be used in any other way save in legitimate self-defence, for freedom, justice and in persuance of a better future for the people of this part of the world.

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Your Sincere Brother

Stewart L.

President Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States of America,
The White House,
Washington D. C.

C-137

- 1. Saunders
- 2. Riv.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 19, 1966

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

IN REPLY REFER TO: 6482

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

182
See WWB memo
to President 5/3/66
+ ltr. on green.
Jordan

Subject: Letter from King Hussein of Jordan
to President Johnson

Enclosed is a letter from King Hussein to
President Johnson regarding the provision of jet
aircraft by the U.S. to Jordan.

The Department will forward to you its recom-
mendation regarding reply.

Benjamin H. Read
for Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Letter from King Hussein. > *Serial 4/20*

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *Chm/ly*, NARA, Date *05-28-10*



182a

THE ROYAL PALACE,
Amman, JORDAN,
April 9th, 1966.

Dear Mr. President:

It is with a deep sense of gratitude and appreciation that I write to you, following the conclusion of the agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for the supply to the Royal Jordanian Air Force with the United States built F.104 Starfighter type aircraft and also following the return to Jordan of its negotiator General Amel Khammash Chief of Staff of our Armed Forces.

There is no way, Mr. President, by which I could express my deep gratitude and that of my Government and people, especially in the Armed Forces and particularly in the Air Force, for your personal understanding and support, and for the friendly spirit which emanated from it and with which, the Jordanian negotiator was met, throughout his stay up to the completion of his mission in the United States.

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King Hussein
to ROR
4/9/66

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority N3 03-34 (47k)
By SP/ice, NARA, Date 8-26-05

shall never be used in any other way save in legitimate self-defence, for freedom, justice and in persuance of a better future for the people of this part of the world.

I seize this opportunity to wish you, Mr. President, continued good health and every success in fulfilling your great and demanding responsibilities.

Your Sincere Grolier

A handwritten signature, likely "Grolier", written in dark ink. The signature is stylized and somewhat cursive, with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right and a vertical stroke extending downwards from the end of it.

President Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States of America,
The White House,
Washington D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

183

Jordan

FEB 14 1966

Mr. Robert Komer
The White House

BOB:

Here is the material on
the record as regards Development
Lending for Jordan, which Hal
Saunders asked for by telephone
this afternoon.

Wm

William B. Macomber, Jr.

/

2/14/66

THE RECORD OF DEVELOPMENT LENDING TO JORDAN

I. GENERAL COMMENTS

Formal notification of AID's planning figure of a total of \$35 million over a period of five years was given to the GOJ on June 11, 1965. This was included in a letter from the Ambassador to the Prime Minister outlining the premises of development lending.

These premises were stated as: GOJ adherence to rigid self-help measures, determination of development priorities, full economic and feasibility studies in support of all development activities, and GOJ guarantee of loans undertaken in the private sector to be given only when the project was clearly self-liquidating and when government revenues from taxes or otherwise would clearly increase and when the project will be a net producer of foreign exchange.

The GOJ written response to the Ambassador's letter accepted these conditions.

The GOJ record on self-help has been generally good. The record on feasibility studies and the GOJ guarantee of private sector borrowing has been less satisfactory.

The most serious exception was the purchase of French jets (Caravelles) for Jordan's small and financially fragile airline. This was done without a feasibility study which we specifically asked to be made, thus violating the basic, written agreement outlining the premises for development lending.

Despite this, we did not suspend our willingness to consider lending nor interrupt the process of moving toward ultimate approval of loan applications which were on hand. In this process, we have, however, insisted that the rudimentary AID procedural steps be observed.

Loan procedures are new for Jordan, our previous program having been entirely grants.* GOJ officials are having some difficulty in adjusting to them. They also are not fully conversant with the US meaning of the term "feasibility study," having had experience only with the less-demanding European meaning of the phrase. This together with the Prime Minister's urge "to get things done yesterday" has resulted in GOJ requests which, on occasion, run counter to AID requirements. When requests could be approved within requirements and without straining prodence, they were approved.

* with one or two very minor exceptions which took place several years ago

II. SPECIFIC RECORD ON LOANS

A. North Shuneh-El Arda Road (\$1.6 million)

Application Received: April 2, 1965

AID approved issuance of invitations to bid even prior to loan authorization: August 8, 1965.

Loan authorized: Sept. 17, 1965.

GOJ slow in letting contracts and securing right of way.

Contracts let: January 1966.

Construction: Starting

B. Jerusalem-Bethlehem Road (approximately \$1.5 million)

First application received: July 6, 1965

Immediate evaluation by AID revealed inadequate data.

Additional data requested: Periodically

Revised application received: Nov. 22, 1965

To date, adequate data is available for only one section.

GOJ has asked approval to issue invitations to bid this section.

AID has not given approval due to uncertainties on remainder.

AID did, however, approve use of local currency for a 2 km

stretch near Bethlehem which could safely be separated from the total package. (This was a special effort to accommodate the GOJ. It is not considered good practice to authorize^a start on one section of a relatively short road until all the road is fully ready to be designed.)

C. Telecommunications (approximately \$6.8 million)

April 22, 1965: AID provided services of an advisor to assist on loan application.

September 6, 1965: AID suggested desirability of having a

GOJ team proceed to Washington to negotiate a contract for a consulting engineer, and indicated readiness to include costs of such a contract retroactively under the loan.

September 16, 1965: Team arrived in Washington, selected a contractor and drew up draft contract within two weeks, but was not empowered to sign.

December 6, 1965: After considerable delay, consultant's contract signed by GOJ, but without reference of final draft to AID. It called for elements outside the loan application, though we had repeatedly cautioned that this could delay loan action. Issue not yet resolved as to whether the GOJ will amend the contract to conform with the present application or continue the contract and submit a new application; in which case, a new loan review process will be required.

D. Potash

The GOJ has offered no criticism of AID efforts, along with those of the IBRD, to make this a feasible project and a candidate for later loan approval.

E. Industrial Development Bank

The GOJ first proposed and then unilaterally withdrew this as a possible loan activity.

III. TECHNICAL COOPERATION ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF LOANS

In the letter from the Ambassador to the Prime Minister, AID indicated its readiness to carry on a number of technical cooperation activities which would facilitate the loan making process. All of these

have been carried out. They include:

- A. Provision of the services of a telecommunications consultant.
- B. Grant financing of the contract for a consulting engineering firm to examine the feasibility of improvements at the Jerusalem airport.
- C. Provision of the services of a consultant for the Industrial Development Bank.
- D. Provision of the services of our Regional Engineer to assist in preparation of data for the road loan applications.

JCflint: NESA/NE
2/14/66