

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
007	memo	Saunders to Rostow [Sanitized per RAC, 9/00]	S	1	9/26/68	A
008	memo	Foster to Rostow [Duplicate of #323, NSF, Country File, Jordan, Vol. V, Box 148]	C	1	8/28/68	A
021	memo	Saunders to Atherton <i>open 3/29/19 per RAC</i>	S	2	4/23/68	A
022	memo	Saunders to Rostow [Near dup. of #336, NSF, Country File, Jordan, Vol. V, Box 148]	S	1	4/17/68	A
023	memo	Saunders to Rostow [Exempt per RAC, 7/05]	S	3	4/12/68	A
024d	draft	President Johnson to King Hussein <i>open 01/25/12 per RAC (#42d)</i> [Duplicate of #42d, NSF, Country File, Middle East, Vol. II, Box 104]	S	3	[4/68]	A
028	memo	Saunders to McPherson <i>sanitized 3/29/19</i>	S	2	3/14/68	A
045	memo	Saunders to Rostow [Sanitized per RAC, 8/01]	S	2	11/27/67	A
046	memo	Saunders to Rostow [Sanitized per RAC, 9/00]	C	1	11/21/67	A
047	rpt	re. Jordan <i>open 3/29/19 per RAC</i>	S	1	11/14/67	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders

Folder Title "Jordan, 11/1/67 - 1/20/69"

Box Number 22

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7/23/2010


 Initials

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
048	rpt	re: Jordan	C	3	11/14/67	A
049	memo	Saunders to Rostow [Duplicate of #114]	S	1	11/13/67	A
061	cable	Amman 8058 corrected copy <i>sanitized 8/31/11 NLJ IFUO</i>	S	1	12/26/68	A
075	memo	Battle to Katzenbach <i>Open 3/29/19 per RAC</i>	S	44	9/17/68	A
077	cable	Amman 5865 <i>Open 3/29/19 per RAC</i>	S	3	7/24/68	A
084	cable	Amman 5084	S	2	5/31/68	A
094b	memo	Helms to President [Exempt per NLJ 02-257; dup. of #336b, NSF, Country File, Jordan, Vol 5, Box 148; and, #7, NSF, Country File, Jordan, Filed by LBJ Lib., Box 148]	S	3	4/15/68	A
094c	memo	Helms to President [Dup. of #336c, NSF, Country File, Jordan, Vol 5, Box 148; and, #7, NSF, Country File, Jordan, Filed by LBJ Lib., Box 148]	S	2	1/25/68	A
103	cable	Intelligence Information Cable [Exempt per RAC, 9/00]	S	7	3/13/68	A
114	memo	Duplicate of #49 [Sanitized per RAC, 9/00]	S	1	11/13/67	A

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7/23/2010

Initials

Jordan
1

January 18, 1969

Your Majesty:

As I prepare to leave office, I wish not only to say good-bye but also to thank you for helping to make possible cooperation for peace and progress between our two countries during my years as President. I know that the spirit of friendship and mutual respect on which this cooperation has been based will continue and that both our peoples will be the better for it.

Our personal association has been a source of special gratification to me. Through it, both of us were able to gain a better understanding of our nations' problems and aspirations. I have been acutely aware of the problems that have beset your country and people, and have admired your steadfastness and courage in your constructive approach to a peaceful solution to these problems. I am hopeful that our mutual goal of a peaceful and prosperous Jordan in a peaceful and prosperous Middle East will be achieved in the near future, and am convinced that our cooperation has advanced the possibility of achieving this goal.

As the enclosed photographs of our recent lunar flight suggest, this shrinking globe is rapidly becoming a single neighborhood. Even the most distant nations now live closer to each other than villages in a single nation did only a few centuries ago. Countries are learning that they must work together for common ends if any are to survive and prosper in the new world of interdependence which science and technology are helping to create.

We have made some progress to this end in recent years. New forms of international cooperation are evident in many areas. I believe that this progress will continue, and that one day an international community will come into being which is as solidly grounded in common interest and common institutions as national communities are today.

- 2 -

I know that both our countries will play a part in this great venture. Despite my retirement from the Presidency, my interest in Jordan's role and my friendship for its people will remain strong, as will my dedication to the goals which both our countries share.

Sincerely,

His Majesty
Hussein I
King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
Amman

LBJ:State:HHS:tmt 1/18/69

Jordan

2

December 12, 1968

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

BKS:

As the attached memo suggests our initial feeling was that we didn't have to respond because this was a response to a letter from the President.

Then a few days ago, Ambassador Symmes said it would make life easier for him if we replied. He's on the receiving end of new military aid requests from the Jordanian Chief of Staff. However, State wants to delay drafting until it can do so in the full knowledge of Jordanian requests.

So we don't need a draft response, but we may get one in a few days and that's OK.

HHS

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

Att: Read-Rostow Memo, 12/5/68, Subj: King Hussein's Reply to the President's Message (File #3698)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cbm/ly, NARA, Date 5-28-10

Jordan
x Israel 3

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, December 4, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: (1) Israeli Raids on Jordan
(2) Message from King Hussein

Before he left this morning, Walt asked me to send you our latest reading on the Israel-Jordan fighting today.

The Israelis say their Sunday commando attack in southern Jordan was a direct response to terrorist shelling of Israel's Dead Sea phosphate works, but that may only have been the last straw following the Jerusalem bomb explosion last week.

Today's attack, however, was directed mainly at the Iraqi troops who have been supporting the terrorists logistically and who themselves opened fire for the first time on Israeli settlements in the Jordan Valley last night. The Israeli embassy here says Israel just couldn't sit still any longer without encouraging more such attacks.

Eban has asked Wally Barbour to transmit a message from Eshkol to the Jordanian government, saying that the Iraqis were the target and that Israel had no intention of widening the action. Rabin's deputy here called me to say the same.

This will probably delay Jordan-Israel talks. Even the Israelis who are concerned about that argue that they have no choice if they're just not going to roll over in front of the terrorists. But with Jarring beginning another round in the area--he saw Eban Monday and goes next to Cairo--the Arabs can't help but assume the Israelis don't care. It's clear that they put short-term security above all.

Hussein alludes to this Israeli attitude in his message (attached) written to you before the attack on another subject--your wire explaining your go-ahead on negotiating the Phantom deal with Israel. He expresses sharply his disappointment with our policy, but given his feelings, the message is restrained.

Harold H. Saunders

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol. xx, # 339
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

~~SECRET~~

3a

~~SECRET~~

Dear Mr. President:

I appreciated receiving your message of October 11, 1968. Unfortunately it confirmed by premonition that the United States would decide to supply Israel with (air superiority) Phantom jet aircraft.

In your message, sir, you expressed the hope that I would understand the circumstances which led you to take this action. Frankly, I could not help but be more disillusioned by this action. As you are aware, Mr. President, I have done, and will continue to do, all that is humanly possible in the hope of clearing the way to a just, honourable, and thus lasting peace in our area. I am willingly taking great political and other risks in my endeavours to achieve that objective. If we have been unable to make any substantial progress towards peace, it is because of Israelis intransigence and failure to make any substantial contributions and concessions towards that end, as well as Israel's obvious territorial ambitions which she often shrouds under the guise of "national security."

I strongly believe that the supply of Phantoms to Israel, if it does not increase her belligerent ambitions, then it certainly does not contribute towards curtailing them. The continuous flow of arms into Israel may only encourage her intransigent attitude, and thus, I fail to see how the decision on the Phantoms would not in any way diminish your support for Ambassador Jarring's efforts.

I quite agree that our search for peace in the area will be facilitated if a meticulous balance of power between the states concerned were possible to achieve, but I submit that Jordan continues to be left out when calculations regarding armaments are made. Jordan is the only country involved in the June war which has not yet satisfactorily replenished her military losses in the war, and Jordan has been the only country to bear the fury of the new American aircraft that have been supplied to Israel since the war. Some might argue that the Eastern armaments of the UAR and other Arab states may well have tipped the balance in favour of the Arabs. I wish to assure, sir, and in all frankness, that after studying the 1948 armed conflict, witnessing and narrowly missing entanglement in the 1956 clash and living through the 1967 so called war, where the air forces of the UAR and others were nearly all completely wiped out by Israel, which has always enjoyed the advantage of superior preparation in every respect as well as the advantage of striking the first blow, I am not consoled by all this superiority in armament quantity and quality that the Arab camp is said to enjoy. In fact, I am far worried and far more apprehensive regarding the eventual fate of my people and armed forces who will be even more inadequately equipped and threatened when Israel receives the Phantoms. I believe it is only fair that Jordan should

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 01-270 (*54a)
By ebm/ies, NARA, Date 8-26-05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

also receive its share of its legitimate requirements for defense from its traditional sources of supply. I hope that our requests from the United States Government would be favourably considered. The Jordanian Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Amer Khammash is ready to leave for Washington, D. C., whenever officials in Washington are ready to meet with him for this purpose.

As for your commitment regarding the territorial integrity of Jordan, may I please remind you, Mr. President, that this integrity has been violated for over a year and a half. If no pressure can be exerted by the United States on Israel to accept a peaceful settlement to the problem, then the United States, in keeping with her commitments to us, should at least refrain from helping Israel to continue her violation of our territorial integrity.

Mr. President, I wish to assure you that I value our close relationship, and I am well aware that our association is in the best interest of our two countries. But what worries me is that American actions and positions regarding the problems of our area are making it difficult, if not impossible, for me and for your other Arab friends to defend or justify American policy in the Middle East. I trust and pray that you will do all that is possible to help us change this image. We are doing our best, but we need your help, support and assistance: for the future of the entire Middle East is at stake, and if there is no just peace in the Middle East, then, unfortunately, there can be no peace in the world.

Please accept, Mr. President, my sincere regards and best wishes.

(signed) Hussein I

Extracted from Amman 7684, December 2, 1968

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ / EXDIS

October 11, 1968

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN

Your Majesty:

As you are aware, I have instructed the Secretary of State to open negotiations for the sale of Phantom jet aircraft to Israel. I trust that you will understand the circumstances that led me to take this action, which in no way diminishes our full and unequivocal support for Ambassador Jarring's efforts to bring about a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israel crisis. Please be assured that it continues to be our policy to facilitate in every possible way Ambassador Jarring's important mission. I have been gratified by your cooperation with Ambassador Jarring and remain hopeful that our joint search for peace in the Middle East will come to a successful conclusion.

I would also like to assure you that our commitment to and support for your wise leadership, as affirmed in my messages to you of February 11 and June 4, remain undiminished. I highly value our close relations as being in the joint interests of our two countries. You can rest assured that my government desires to maintain - and strengthen - this relationship and that we are prepared to give full support to Your Majesty's efforts to find an honorable and equitable solution to the problems that beset you. Please accept my most cordial regards.

Sincerely,

/s/

Lyndon B. Johnson

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By dbm/ly, NARA, Date 5-28-10

Jordan
x P.D.

4

Tuesday, November 12, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Birthday Greetings for King Hussein

State recommends the following greeting for Hussein's Birthday November 14:

"On this your thirty-third birthday, I send Your Majesty our best wishes. Though young in years, you are old in the wisdom of leadership. While I am mindful of the difficulties that beset your country, I am confident that Jordan under your courageous guidance will find during the coming year the peace and justice that we mutually seek."

This is a nice gesture in any case, but Hussein needs all the encouragement this sort of personal attention can give him. I recommend you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

Jordan

5

October 11, 1968

WWR:

Harry Symmes is in town from Jordan. There is no special reason for you to see him, but he wanted you to know that he is available if you wished him to come over. I see no special reason for this, given pressures on your time, but just wanted you to have the opportunity.

HHS

Yes _____

No _____

P. S. Lois, the best times would be
October 17 or 18 before 11 a. m.

Jordan 6

~~SECRET~~

October 11, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Will Jordan Sign a Peace Treaty?

You asked me whether Harry Symmes believes that the Jordanians will sign a peace treaty. I asked him the question myself yesterday at lunch. His answer is two-fold:

1. He himself has not discussed this directly with the Jordanians in specific terms, because he has had to be careful to avoid the appearance of becoming a broker between Israel and Jordan.

2. He does not rule out the possibility. As he put it, "Hussein wants peace so badly, he can taste it." He feels that we have underestimated Hussein's willingness to make a settlement with Israel by himself. If he can get terms that he feels he can sell to his people and to other Arabs--or even in good conscience defend--then he will settle separately. Whether or not that concludes a classic peace treaty Harry cannot say, but the process of settlement he envisions would be all but.

Symmes just last week delivered to Foreign Minister Rifai almost exactly the same kind of lecture you would give on this subject. In fact, what Harry says he told Rifai sounds almost word for word what you reported to me from Arthur Krim--that the Jordanians have a very important case in their hands in their ability to offer real peace to Israel and they should not underestimate the importance of such an offer.

Harold H. Saunders

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 02-206 (287)
By cbw/ics, NARA, Date 8-26-05

~~SECRET~~

7
Jordan
x Israel Arms

September 26, 1968

SECRET

WWR:

I don't know whether this is what you saw or not. It's all either side of CIA or INR has been able to turn up.

One reason no one else had seen it until this morning is that it was only distributed this morning. You may have received an advanced copy (the information is 8 days old) that didn't get to the rest of us.

HHS

SECRET

25X1C

Att: 

SANTITIZED
Authority NLJ 034-022-3-1
By J, NARA, Date 5-28-10

Jordan ⁹
x Israel
x UN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 5, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: BROMLEY K. SMITH
SUBJECT: Jordan-Israel Issue at UN

The UN Security Council began meeting this afternoon, at Jordan's request, on Israel's air attacks yesterday against terrorist bases in Jordan. No vote is likely today. As usual, we will work for as balanced a resolution as possible, deploring both terrorism and retaliation. However, this is increasingly difficult, given the mood in the Security Council and the fact that Israel has built no serious public record on the terrorist incidents leading to this attack. State will have no recommendation on our vote until we see what kind of wording is possible, but Sisco warns that we have to expect it to be pretty rough on Israel.

Meanwhile, Ambassador Barbour is urging the Israelis to make the most of Eban's meeting with Jarring this Saturday, August 10. The Israeli attack has already increased Arab doubts that Israel wants a settlement. Unless we can persuade Eban to give Jarring evidence that Israel means to follow up on the more flexible position Eban described to Ball with serious substantive talk, the gains of the Ball mission could prove short-lived.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *dbm/s*, NARA, Date 5-28-10

HHSaunders:8/5/68

Jordan
x UAR

10

July 26, 1968

~~SECRET~~

WWR:

Here is the account of the Jordanian-Egyptian talks that Hal mentioned in staff meeting this morning. The most important points are that Nasser won't give up an inch of Arab territory, and that Rifai thinks we are being over-optimistic in our reading of Nasser.

John Foster

Att.

Amman 5865, 7/24/68

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (d 326)

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By cbm/hg, NARA, Date 8-26-05

Jordan
11

July 17, 1968

MEMO FOR HARRY McPHERSON

Ambassador Sharaf of Jordan has confirmed his invitation to you and me for a small lunch at his residence, 2319 Wyoming Avenue, at 1:00 p. m. on Tuesday, July 23.

I will order a car for us at the West Basement at 12:45 p. m.

Hal Saunders

Jordan
x Israel
Nuclear
13

~~SECRET~~

July 10, 1968

WWR:

To update my memo for your talk tomorrow with Eliav: Jordan signed the NPT this afternoon. Half the Arab League, all the countries bordering Israel, and all the Arab combatants in the Six Day War have now signed.

John Foster

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cbm/mj NARA, Date 5-28-10

Jordan
x m E
13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 6, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Anti-Arab Sentiment in the Wake of Kennedy's
Assassination

You are probably aware that there is concern that we are going to face a rise in anti-Arab feeling in the country because of Senator Kennedy's assassination.

This stems mainly from Sirhan's Jordanian origin, but there have also been a few unfortunate Arab statements tending to approve of the incident. On the whole, however, the Arabs have deplored the event and there is no evidence of a Near Eastern conspiracy. There has even been pro-Kennedy commentary out of Damascus. King Hussein has sent his condolences to the family and the Jordanian Embassy has released a statement, but so far the other Arab governments have done little or nothing.

State is thinking about asking the Jordanians to get the other Arabs to say something helpful, but the press hasn't given much attention to what the Jordanians have already done. The US Government can take the line that this was the act of one man, not all the Arabs but ultimately it will depend on the good sense of the reporters to keep the Arab aspects of the incident in proportion.

John Foster

cc: Louis Schwartz

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *chm/ly*, NARA, Date 5-28-10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Jordan

14

June 4, 1968

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

WWR:

For your broader background on King Hussein's request for restatement of our Mid-East policy, I am attaching the wire I sent to the Ranch Friday night and the cable which prompted it.

The President said he wished to discuss this at the Tuesday lunch. I am sure you will have in mind possible broader motives behind Hussein's request.

HHS

Att: Amman 5084, 5/30/68

Wire, Rostow for the President, 5/31/68

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By chm/6, NARA, Date 5-28-10

Jordan
x P D 15

SECRET/NODIS

May 31, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

King Hussein is again worried by rumors of an imminent Israeli attempt to seize territory on the East Bank in northern Jordan from which some terrorists operate. He has asked Ambassador Symmes for a statement "from the highest authority in USG" of our present attitude toward the independence and territorial integrity of Jordan.

We do not believe Israel plans such a move, although we can never rule out an attack against terrorist bases. We don't know why Hussein is being fed these rumors, but it may be an effort to keep him uneasy about trying to deal with Israel. Or it may simply be normal operation of the Arab rumor mill.

Although we do not believe these rumors, we do think it would be a good idea to restate assurances we have given him before as a background for possible negotiation with the Israelis. This, rather than current rumors, may be what is really on his mind in making this request, and we want him to know that our position remains as we described it to him last November.

The one element in this message that would be new is our saying we would oppose any acquisition of territory beyond present cease-fire lines. We have not had to face that, but I cannot believe even the Israelis would expect us to sit back quietly if they tried to take new territory across the Jordan River.

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: FRUS, Vol. XX, # 183
By: cbm, NARA, Date: 8-24-05

SECRET/NODIS

- 2 -

State recommends that Ambassador Symmes be authorized to convey urgently the following oral message from you to Hussein:

"Your apprehensions concerning future sanctity of Jordanian territory have been brought to my attention. I wish again to assure you, as I did in my letter of February 11, that it is our policy and our interest to continue our close relationship and our support of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. As Ambassador Symmes has indicated to you, we have made abundantly clear to the Government of Israel our policy toward the continued independence and integrity of your country. From our talks last November, you know of our position on the ultimate disposition of the West Bank and Jerusalem. You should also know that we would strongly oppose any occupation of territory beyond the present cease-fire lines. I recognize that Your Majesty has sought to prevent use of Jordanian territory to mount acts of violence across the cease-fire line and urge that continued efforts be made to prevent these actions which promote instability and are an impediment to progress toward peace. I wish also to assure you that we are continuing our efforts to bring about a just settlement in the Near East which is, after all, the only solution to the problem about which we are both concerned.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Jordan
x P.D.

ACTION

16

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Thursday, May 23, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Independence Day Message to Hussein

This Saturday, May 25, is the anniversary of Jordan's independence. State recommends that you send Hussein the following message:

"On this anniversary of the independence day of Jordan, I congratulate Your Majesty and send to the people of Jordan good wishes from the people of the United States. We sincerely hope that Jordan, under your courageous leadership, will find peace and justice during the coming year."

We are checking this with you because it is a message to a touchy area. Otherwise, however, it is quite routine and uncontroversial. Any word of encouragement to Hussein is good at this time when we hope he will soon begin talks with Israel under Ambassador Jarring's auspices in New York. The Israelis know full well that we believe Hussein's survival is important to Israel's security and our own interests.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Jordan 17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 6, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Jordanian Potash Project

When John McCloy saw the President, he reported King Hussein's concern that an American company join the Jordanian potash development project.

Before the June war, two American companies--W. R. Grace and Tenneco--were just about ready to join a consortium with AID, the Kuwait Development Fund, and the Government of Jordan to proceed with this \$100 million project. The war disrupted those plans.

Since the war, Grace has dropped out, but Tenneco is still interested. To get things moving, the World Bank in February outlined to the Jordanian government a scheme whereby the Jordanians and AID and the Bank together could get started on the work in such a way as to leave the door open for private companies to join them within a year. At the same time, the Bank put this proposition to Tenneco.

We are now awaiting the two following steps:

1. A response from the Jordanian Government to the proposal by the World Bank. If King Hussein wants to move this project, his answer is necessary.
2. Tenneco's response to the Bank's proposition, which should be in shortly. If it is not quite satisfactory, then will be the time for the USG to persuade Tenneco to join, and this is the point at which some sort of special US guarantee might come in.

I will let you know as soon as we have the Tenneco response.

Harold H. Saunders

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#332)
NSC Memo, 1/30/93, State Guidelines
By *cbm/rq*, NARA, Date *8-26-05*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Jordan

18

May 6, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WHEELER

Joe:

I have told Walt Rostow that, on the Jordan potash project, we are awaiting Tenneco's response. When we get it, we will presumably know whether some extra USG persuasion is required. I have promised to let Walt know when that response comes in. Would you mind keeping me posted?

Harold H. Saunders

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By dmly, NARA, Date 5-28-10

Jordan

19

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Wednesday, April 24, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Short Message to King Hussein

King Hussein's wife gave birth late yesterday to twin daughters. State recommends the following message:

"Your Majesty: My heartiest congratulations on the birth of your twin daughters. I know they will lighten your days and I send our best wishes to you and your family at this happy time."

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Jordan 20

Message telephoned to Mr. Saunders by Mr. Wiley :

April 24, 1968

TO AmEmbassy Amman

After confirming news report, Embassy should deliver following message from President to King Hussein:

"Your Majesty: Please accept my heartiest congratulations on the occasion of the birth of your twin daughters. My best wishes to you and your family for a happy and prosperous future."

USG does not intend to make public release of this message but has no objections should GOJ wish to do so.

Jordan
x Israel
x Arab-Israel
21

~~SECRET~~

April 23, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ATHERTON

SUBJECT: One More Thought for the Katzenbach Exercise

One of the ideas you will be considering in response to Mr. Katzenbach's memorandum is a bilateral Israel-Jordan settlement.

The main problem in making such a settlement stick is finding enough Arab and Palestinian support for Hussein. So far, we have assumed--as Hussein has said--that he must have Nasser's support. However, if Nasser is absolutely determined not to participate, is it possible to develop a substitute? Two possibilities suggest themselves:

1. One is the idea we have heard from some Israelis recently--the notion of negotiating with West Bank leaders and then letting them negotiate their own arrangement with East Bank Jordan. I appreciate the problems in this--the difficulty of getting enough Palestinians behind it to drown out the radicals in the PLO and other organizations and the likelihood that the West Bankers involved would be repudiated as quislings. But it might be worth considering whether their working in collusion with Hussein would reduce these difficulties.

2. The bolder--hence more complicated but perhaps more interesting idea--is for Hussein with our help to round up the support of the Saudis, Libyans, Kuwaitis, Tunisians, Lebanese, Moroccans, Turks, Iranians for a bilateral settlement once negotiated. There are a couple of possible angles to this:

--One approach would be to sell this as a straightforward effort to line up the moderates to isolate Nasser-Soviet influence. This smacks of the Islamic pact but on the other hand the Saudis, Jordanians, Moroccans and Iranians have long been after the United States to "choose sides." If they were willing to choose sides this time with Hussein and, in the process to end their subsidy for Nasser, a byproduct of this might be either bringing Nasser down or bringing him to a settlement.

--A variant of this would be to take the same approach without going so far as to make this an overt part of a radical-moderate polarization. In this form, it could grow out of talks in New York where Nasser was ostensibly participating. Backers of Hussein could hail his "victory" as a first step and leave it open to Nasser to take the second.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 034R-22-3-1-7
By JNL VARA Date 3-13-18

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Given Libyan desire to bring its subsidies to an end, there may be something here worth working with. Hussein is obviously the man to organize this, but Faisal and Hassan should be willing partners provided Hussein can satisfy them that he--not Nasser--is serving the Arab cause. This risks the polarization we have always tried to avoid, but maybe the time has come to assume that we'll never have decent relations with Nasser and, without tackling him head-on, to encourage the constructive Mid-Easterners to move on without him.

Harold H. Saunders

cc: Mr. Davies
Mr. Heymann

~~SECRET~~

Jordan
x Israel 24



~~SECRET~~/NODIS

April 5, 1968

WALT:

Here's the package with the Eshkol and Hussein messages, our idea of how to use the President's remaining months and the proposal for an emissary to Israel. You should also be aware of the following:

1. Hussein leaves for Cairo "Saturday morning" in his personal plane. There is a 7-hour time difference between Amman and Washington.
2. Gene believes (attached) a governmental emissary (i. e. Gene) should go to Jerusalem because no one else could become sufficiently steeped in the lore to argue the fine points. I respectfully disagree and feel that this points up the difference between State's concept of this as a conventional diplomatic mission and what I believe you and I see as something very specially Presidential.
3. The shorter Eshkol text (Tab C) simply cuts the State draft off (unchanged) after its introduction and adds two paragraphs about the emissary. I do think, however, that Nick should take another look if the President approves the shorter version.
4. We'll handle Mac Bundy any way you instruct. However, I do think I'll brief him by phone on generally what's in the air.

Hal

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.1
By *cbm/b*, NARA, Date 5-28-10

24a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Under Secretary for Political Affairs

April 4, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/PERSONAL
NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR: U - The Acting Secretary

I concur in the attached papers, except for the recommendation on p. 3 of the Memorandum for the President.

I remain of the view that the man to go to Tel Aviv to turn our relations with the Israelis around should be a senior official who is steeped in the detail of the Middle Eastern crisis, and not a private citizen. The trips to Amman and Cairo are secondary to the basic object of this trip -- to persuade the Israeli Cabinet to join in a campaign for peace. I just don't believe that can be done by outsiders, however close to the Government.

If the President decides to send someone, a paragraph to this effect should be added to the letter.



Eugene V. Rostow

Attachments.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/PERSONAL
NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *clm/ky*, NARA, Date 5-28-10

SECRET/NODIS

Friday, April 5, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Next Step in the Middle East

I have thought deeply about how best to use your next nine months to achieve the kind of Mid-East settlement you envisioned in your speech last June 19. The attached recommendation from Nick Katzenbach, while originated before your announcement Sunday, is a first step. You will want to read his memo (immediately underneath); it grows out of his feeling that we're at a crossroad now with terrorism mounting and Jarring almost at the end of his rope.

My proposal starts with my conviction that we shall not break the cycles of terrorism-retaliation or of semantic haggling over the meaning of the November 22 UN resolution until Israel takes a more forthcoming position toward negotiations. I clearly do not propose that we press Israel a la 1957 to give up anything basic without satisfaction of its need for security. But I do believe that a marginal shift in Israel's tactical position could get negotiations started.

Our main asset in persuading the Israelis to relax is that they believe you will stand behind them. They trust you personally as no one else. My hope is to build on that asset, but it is too soon for you personally to get directly involved.

The first step--and this is where Nick Katzenbach's recommendation comes in--is to send someone to Jerusalem to talk to the Israelis and to sit there until they made a solid enough shift in their tactical position to get negotiations going. The man we send must be someone who clearly speaks for you and whom the Israelis believe shares your sympathy with them. This must not be the usual diplomatic mission. As I see it, you would not be sending a man to argue a change in Israel's position; you would be sending a man to discuss the future of Israel and what President Johnson can do to make Israel more secure before he leaves office. Of course, his position would be that peace is Israel's only long-term hope.

Mac Bundy is everyone's top choice. He has all the personal qualifications and the added convenience of a cover for any trip to the area in his foundation business. In his non-governmental position, he could also go on to Cairo if needed, despite lack of diplomatic relations. We have not talked with him about it but would make the strongest plea straight from you if you approved.

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (4426)
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By obx/ryg, NARA, Date 8-26-05

To help calm the immediate situation on the Jordan-Israel border and to give Hussein something to take to Cairo tomorrow, Nick recommends the attached two messages to Hussein (Tab A) and Eshkol (Tab B). We should not kid ourselves that written messages make much of a dent any more. Nothing will convince the Arabs of our good intentions but a major effort to achieve a settlement which includes Israeli troop withdrawal. Nothing will move Israel but assurance that we're sticking to our basic support for her. That's why the messages will probably not help much without the emissary.

I have no problem with the message to Hussein (Tab A) and recommend you approve immediate transmission so Harry Symmes can put this in Hussein's hands before he leaves for Cairo tomorrow morning.

I do recommend an alternative message to Eshkol (Tab C). State's text (Tab B) gets you into arguing with Eshkol over details of Israel's diplomatic position. I believe this is business for your emissary, not for you. If you send an emissary, therefore, I suggest you send the shorter text (Tab C). If not, then the longer text (Tab B) might be suitable. My shorter text is simply an abbreviation of State's draft, but if you approve I would want to give Nick one more look at it before sending.

W. W. Rostow

Approve emissary to Israel; have Nick
call Mac Bundy _____

See me _____

Approve message to Hussein (Tab A) _____

See me _____

Approve short message to Eshkol (Tab C) _____

Approve long message to Eshkol (Tab B) _____

See me _____



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

24c

~~SECRET-NODIS~~

April 4, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Middle East Problem

Recommendations:

1. That you sign the attached letters to Prime Minister Eshkol and King Hussein.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2. That you agree in principle, subject to a final recommendation regarding timing, to send a personal representative to Tel Aviv for intensive talks with Israeli representatives, and possibly to Amman and Cairo. Some suggested names of prominent private persons from which a representative might be chosen are included in the following memorandum.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Selected Name _____

Background:

We are deeply concerned over recent developments in the Middle East which are affording the Soviets the opportunity to exploit the situation: the pattern of provocative terrorist activities countered by substantial Israeli military retaliation; the increased status which the Fedayeen seem to have achieved as a result of these developments; the inability of Hussein to deal with this matter and the apparent weakening of his regime; the decline in sympathy for Israel and growing doubts about its peaceful intentions; the inability of Jarring to get a dialogue going between Israel and the Arabs resulting from a rigid Israeli posture and the hardening of the UAR attitude.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#42c)

State Dept. Guidelines

By cm/sq, NARA, Date 8-26-05

~~SECRET-NODIS~~

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- 2 -

In light of the foregoing, we have concluded we must make a more direct effort to arrest and reverse these trends. Our efforts with the parties concerned to take measures to bring greater stability to the cease-fire areas and to begin talks under Jarring's auspices have not been successful. I believe it is now urgent that we raise these appeals to a higher level. We have indications that many Israelis are as concerned as we about the present course of events, and such an effort would strengthen those calling for a re-appraisal of Israeli policies, particularly with respect to terrorism. We have therefore recommended to you the early despatch of the attached letters to Eshkol and Hussein.

In addition, it would be highly desirable for you to send to Israel, perhaps some time next week (depending on the results of Jarring's continuing efforts), an individual who could speak frankly to the Israeli Government regarding recent trends and to explore with them possible steps which could be taken to reverse these trends. The principal short-range purpose of such a trip would be to try to indicate to Jarring a willingness to formulate acceptance and implementation of the Security Council resolution in such a way that it at least provides Jarring the opportunity to continue his efforts both in Amman and Cairo. While it is problematical that this would get talks started, it would at least help place the onus for failure on the UAR rather than Israel. More broadly and fundamentally, such an emissary could try to get across to the Israelis the immediate need for some gesture on their part, at least to Jordan, which will be an overt demonstration to the Arab world of a continuing Israeli interest in a political settlement. This would bolster Hussein. As a follow up to your discussions with Eshkol, your emissary could also explore with the Israelis their concrete ideas about a settlement.

The U.S. emissary would not take over the mediation effort of Jarring. He would support Jarring's efforts, and we would ask Ambassador Goldberg to explain this to the Secretary General so that there would be no misunderstanding.


~~SECRET-NODIS~~

~~SECRET NODIS~~

- 3 -

Our hope would be that such an emissary would also find it desirable and opportune to discuss matters in Amman and Cairo, though we would not wish to make any final recommendations to you in this regard until we know the results of discussions in Tel Aviv. Since it would be desirable to include Cairo on the itinerary, we believe the individual selected should be a private person in whom you have confidence rather than a government official. We have three possibilities in mind in the following order of preference: McGeorge Bundy, Robert Murphy, George Ball. Ambassador Goldberg feels, and we agree, that the emissary should have some ostensible reason for the visit other than the actual purpose. In this respect, McGeorge Bundy would be especially suitable since his foundation affairs could quite naturally take him to the Near East.

Ambassador Goldberg concurs.


Acting Secretary

~~SECRET NODIS~~

24d

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Suggested Message

A

Your Majesty:

I have considered your message of March 21 with two thoughts uppermost in mind: deep sympathy for the serious problems which recent events have posed for your country; and deep anxiety about the prospects for peace in the Middle East -- anxiety which has been deepened by the deteriorating situation in the Israel-Jordan ceasefire sector. I am distressed and saddened by the loss of life from recent incidents and by the further suffering which these incidents brought about.

My intention in my earlier communication to you was not to ascribe responsibility to Jordan for any particular incident but to state my deep concern at the serious implications of continued terrorism anywhere in the ceasefire sector, which, like Israeli reactions thereto, seriously jeopardizes the prospects for peace. We both recognize that such activity, originating in part from Syria, but using Jordanian territory, has become a critical factor in the continuing cycle of violence. I

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SECRET-NODIS

Authority NETJ01R-104-2-6/#42d)
By ① NARA, Date 1/12/12

know the efforts you have made to control these incidents and despite the difficulties I am sure you will continue them.

The only durable answer to the basic problems of the area is an Arab-Israeli settlement. I have greatly appreciated your forthcoming and constructive attitude toward Ambassador Jarring's Mission which was undertaken pursuant to the Security Council Resolution of November 22. I look upon the Jarring Mission as the primary hope and believe it must succeed. I want you to know that I am sending an urgent appeal to Prime Minister Eshkol addressed specifically to this problem. It seems clear to me that the situation in the area has become so critical, and that the risks in continued delay of meaningful peace talks are so serious, that every effort must be made to dispense with further procedural arguments and proceed to serious talks under Jarring's auspices on the substance of the problem. I hope you may be able to prevail upon President Nasser in this sense.

In the interim, I am sure you will agree that whatever steps are feasible should be taken to ease the situation.

~~SECRET-NODIS~~

-3-

While we understand the reasons for your reluctance to agree to UN observers in the cease-fire sectors, we would appreciate your Majesty's thoughts on possible alternatives which might provide the United Nations with the means of making a more constructive and positive contribution to peacekeeping.

I should like to remain in close touch with you on this problem and shall welcome your further thoughts.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Majesty
Hussein I,
King of the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan.

~~SECRET-NODIS~~

24e

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Suggested Message

B

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have considered your message of March 22 with two thoughts uppermost in my mind: deep sympathy for the serious problems which continuing terrorist acts pose for your country; and deep anxiety about the prospects for peace in the Middle East.

I appreciate, of course, the dilemma which the recent growth of terrorism presents. I believe, however, that military action across cease-fire lines does not deter the type of terrorism you face, but leads to greater insecurity, above all at this critical moment.

We both recognize, I am sure, that true security for Israel lies only in peace. I believe we are now at a crossroads in this respect in the Near East: the sole peace-making process now available is the Jarring Mission. I am deeply concerned by the lack of tangible results from this mission and the cumulative deterioration of the

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#42e)
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By cbm/rq, NARA, Date 8-26-05

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

situation resulting from a growing incidence of terrorism and counter military actions--especially at this delicate moment in the internal life of Jordan. I feel, therefore, that there is an urgent need to reverse the present trend--a trend which carries the risk not only of greater and greater violence and insecurity, but indeed of another round of general hostilities, as well as irreparable damage to the Jarring Mission. We wish to see every possible step taken to minimize these risks.

There is very little time. There is still, however, an opportunity for an active strategy of peace. The purpose of this letter is to explore this possibility with you on an urgent basis.

The United States has extensive and complex interests in the Near East. We have important relationships with Arab states as well as with Israel. The strategic location of this whole area, lying between Africa and Asia and between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean, is of great continuing significance for us, and its resources are of importance for us and our European allies. For

these reasons in particular, we have a strong interest in preventing the further extension of Soviet influence in the Near East.

Our policies in the region, as expressed in my statement of June 19, which were substantially embodied in the November 22 Security Council resolution, are part of our effort to help build a new system of security in the world. Their theme is a profound commitment to peace. Accordingly, we have over the years opposed aggression and sought to eliminate the causes of conflict. Our goal is a just and durable peace in which all the nations of the Near East could live and grow in security.

Failure of the Jarring Mission would, therefore, be a serious blow to United States interests, and I do not see how it could be otherwise for Israel and the Arab states. Both Israel and the Arab states have a responsibility for cooperating with Jarring, and we continue to urge the Arabs as well as your government to exercise this responsibility constructively. The present atmosphere must be changed to one more conducive to settlement.

I am convinced it would facilitate the Jarring Mission task if we could terminate the long, unnecessary and sterile controversy over "accepting" the Security Council Resolution of November 22. We believe it would be a positive and helpful step for Israel to make a simple statement to Ambassador Jarring that Israel accepts the Resolution and is ready to implement it through agreement reached by meetings under Ambassador Jarring's auspices. Such a statement would fully protect Israel's position. In our judgment, there would also be a great advantage if this position were made known publicly.

We agree with you that the resolution is not self-enforcing. We continue to support the goal of an agreed and accepted peace settlement engaging the parties, rather than an imposed solution. We agree, too, that negotiations in the Rhodes pattern would offer a practical way forward; and we welcomed the step forward you took in indicating willingness to carry on discussions in this format, despite your preference for direct negotiations without third party intervention. We have stated our views in this respect repeatedly to the Arab states

and to other interested governments.

I strongly believe, however, that the situation in the Near East has become so critical that the risks of further delay in meaningful peace talks outweigh whatever risks there may be in prudent flexibility on modalities--flexibility which could be exercised without relinquishing the objective of an agreement accepted by the parties. Modalities, I recognize, are important--particularly in light of past history--but they are, after all, a means, not an end.

We have urged, and will continue to urge on the Arab governments concerned the necessity of participation by the parties in arriving at an agreed and accepted settlement. In this connection, we are encouraged by the Secretary-General's recent report envisaging--if the "acceptance and implementation" hurdle can be overcome--meetings between the parties under Ambassador Jarring's auspices.

I feel it could also be helpful in moving towards a durable peace to make it clear to all concerned, as

we have repeatedly urged, that you are not undertaking any changes of a permanent character in the Arab parts of Jerusalem, pending negotiations for a peaceful settlement. Jerusalem is the most sensitive aspect of the problem of settlement.

I hope, Mr. Prime Minister, that these reflections will help you to understand the concern I feel about present prospects in the Near East, and their bearing on the interests of the United States. I believe these concerns apply equally to the long-term interests of your country in a just and peaceful settlement, accepted by your neighbors. In this regard, I am certain, we share common interests.

To safeguard our common interests, it is imperative that we remain in close touch, and consult about actions either of us may take that could affect the other.

In conclusion, I cannot stress too strongly that if no alternative is found to the mounting cycle of terrorism and large-scale military response, and to the lack of progress of the Jarring Mission, I fear that

Israel may be placed in extremely difficult positions in the United Nations, and elsewhere, and that important United States interests throughout the area -- and particularly in Jordan -- could be seriously affected. I urge you, therefore, to take all of these factors into account, to deal with the problem of terrorism for what it is, a part of the larger question of a peaceful settlement, and to pursue that larger question with flexibility in your further dealings with Ambassador Jarring.

I am confident that if we both concentrate on the essentials we can mutually improve the prospects for a just and lasting peace between the parties--which is our common goal.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Levi Eshkol
Prime Minister
State of Israel
Jerusalem

24f

SECRET/NODIS

ABBREVIATED MESSAGE TO ESHKOL

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have considered your message of March 22 with two thoughts uppermost in my mind: deep sympathy for the serious problems which continuing terrorist acts pose for your country; and deep anxiety about the prospects for peace in the Middle East.

I appreciate, of course, the dilemma which the recent growth of terrorism presents. I believe, however, that military action across cease-fire lines does not deter the type of terrorism you face, but leads to greater insecurity, above all at this critical moment.

We both recognize, I am sure, that true security for Israel lies only in peace.

I believe we are now at a crossroads in this respect in the Near East: the sole peace-making process now available is the Jarring Mission. I am deeply concerned by the lack of tangible results from this mission and the cumulative deterioration of the situation resulting from a growing incidence of terrorism and counter military actions-- especially at this delicate moment in the internal life of Jordan.

I feel, therefore, that there is an urgent need to reverse the present trend--a trend which carries the risk not only of greater and greater violence and insecurity, but indeed of another round of general hostilities,

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (b)(4)
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By cmx/rg, NARA, Date 8-26-95



SECRET/NODIS

- 2 -

as well as irreparable damage to the Jarring Mission. We wish to see every possible step taken to minimize these risks.

There is very little time. There is still, however, an opportunity for an active strategy of peace. I do not believe it is possible to explore this satisfactorily in a letter. Therefore, I should like to send to Jerusalem Mr. McGeorge Bundy to discuss this with you in detail.

In proposing this, I wish to make clear at the outset that I contemplate no change in our basic position as I stated it last June 19 and as it evolved in close consultation with your colleagues in the subsequent months. You know from our talk in my home of my personal feelings about the future of Israel. Mr. Bundy's talk with you, if you and Foreign Minister Eban are able to receive him, would be wholly in that spirit.

As you know, I have within the past week made a difficult personal decision. I made it because I believe I can do more in the cause of peace this way. Mr. Bundy's purpose would be to explore with you how best to proceed. I should appreciate knowing as soon as possible whether and when you might be able to receive him.

Sincerely,

His Excellency Levi Eshkol
Prime Minister
State of Israel
Jerusalem

SECRET/NODIS

*Jordan
x Israel*

25

~~SECRET~~

March 29, 1968

Walt:

I have written the attached so you could pass it on to the President if you feel there's some value in letting him mull over this problem.

Hal Saunders

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *ckm/ky* NARA, Date 5-28-10

25a

~~SECRET~~

March 29, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Next Step with Israel-Jordan

The problem in a nutshell is this:

--We agree that terrorism is a threat Israel has to do something about.

--We think Israel's effort to end terrorism by military attacks won't work. If they keep going down this track, we see only a rising spiral of attack and counter-attack ending in all Arabs at the summit rejecting a political solution and committing themselves to a guerrilla war against Israel. There's evidence now that the Israelis are beginning to think this way too, although they feel they must respond to terrorism somehow and don't yet see an alternative.

--The only persons who can stop terrorism from Jordanian territory are the Jordanian government. The problem, therefore, is to convince Hussein to stop it or--if he's already convinced but unable--to create conditions which strengthen his hand enough to crack down. We disagree with the Israelis that their military attacks strengthen his hand.

--The alternative we see is to get Jarring's peace talks on the road. If Hussein can show he's getting somewhere his way, maybe it's not too late for him to call the terrorists off, or stop them by force.

--One of the main obstacles to getting Jarring's negotiations started is Israeli inflexibility. One of the main reasons for Israeli inflexibility is the fact that the Cabinet has not taken a formal position on the terms for a peace settlement; Eshkol fears breaking up his coalition but we have assurance that they'll make up their minds the moment there's a glimmer of Arab willingness to talk.

--The difficulty with this is that the Arabs aren't likely to talk until somebody assures them there's a workable deal possible at the end of the track. This is what all the haggling over whether Israel accepts the UN resolution is about.

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Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, #127
By ctm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

SECRET

- 2 -

What all this adds up to is the conclusion of some of us that we should now urge Eshkol to bite the bullet and make the limited move necessary to give the Arabs the assurance they're looking for. Eshkol would give away nothing of substance; he would risk a Cabinet crisis, possibly for limited gains. But the risk of doing nothing looks a lot worse to us.

The alternative is to let force play itself out. The argument for is that only the Israelis will decide to bite the bullet when the pressure of terrorism builds up. The argument against is that we're in a worse position every time Israel strikes back and there's a real danger of the UN Security Council voting sanctions against Israel--with us having to decide whether to vote for, abstain or veto. More important, Israel is in a worse position if we don't stop the guerrilla spiral before the Arabs commit themselves to it.

The debate was brought to a head today in State when Luke Battle tried to clear a response from the President to Eshkol's last message. Arthur Goldberg felt it was too tough for the President. Luke, while fully understanding the President's concerns, feels that any message we send ought to lay out what we see as the serious consequences of Israel's current course.

My own feeling is that if we decide to do nothing to deter the Israelis from further retaliation it ought to be because we've decided consciously to let force play itself out a while longer. We shouldn't do nothing just because State can't work out line of action it feels the President can approve.

I don't believe there's any point in just sending another Presidential message for Eshkol to disregard. If we approach the Israelis this time, it ought to be with the purpose of working out with them a way to get Jarring on the tracks. I think the only way to do this would be to send someone like Mac Bundy with the most serious words from the President for three or four days of talk in Jerusalem. This need not look like pressure at all. The main focus wouldn't be to restrain them. It's just the only way I can see at this time to decide where we and they are going, and the only place to do that is where Eshkol and his Cabinet are.

State is considering this idea this afternoon.

Harold H. Saunders

SECRET

Jordan
26

~~SECRET~~

March 29, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WWR

SUBJECT: Today in the Jordan Valley

The exchange of fire today bore a strong resemblance to the retaliatory shelling and bombing of 15 February. The Israelis-- if they didn't start it--escalated it quickly, and before the day was over the clash which started with a terrorist incident just South of Lake Tiberias had involved units as far south as Jericho.

When it became evident that the February 15 shelling hadn't stopped the terrorists in the Karamah area, the Israelis raided Karamah. We don't know whether the parallel will hold true when the Israelis decide that today's shelling didn't stop the terrorists in the northern Jordan Valley, but the only difference might be that there will be much less than a month between the shelling and the raid.

The Israelis have asked us to deliver a note to Prime Minister Talhouni which reads like an ultimatum, but doesn't specify what Israel will do if Jordan doesn't stop the terrorists. State doesn't want to get involved in the business of delivering ultimatata. We'll probably tell the Israelis we'll deliver any constructive message, but if they want to send an ultimatum, they should send it through the UN.

In the meantime, the Jordanians have called for a Security Council meeting, probably for tomorrow.

Hal has written you separately on the major policy issues involved in deciding how, if at all, to persuade the Israelis to stay their hand.

John Foster

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#339)
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By abm/rq, NARA, Date 8-26-05

~~SECRET~~

Jordan
27

SECRET/NODIS

March 14, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WWR

SUBJECT: More on Hussein

Just to make sure you don't miss it, the attached from Harry Symmes deals with the other side of the question we wrote you about yesterday--what we might have to do to make it possible for Hussein to negotiate with Israel. Yesterday we considered whether it's possible for him to go it alone and leaned toward concluding that chances of his talking alone are a good bit less than even. Now Harry is writing about how to improve the chances.

Harry feels that, to get Hussein to the negotiating table, we would have to get a specific statement from the Israelis on the minimum they are willing to offer and would have to agree to protect Hussein from the dangers of talking to Israel. He specifically mentions contingency plans for helping to handle civil strife and efforts by other Arab states to interfere.

We'll have to think this through, but it's plain that Harry is not just talking about more barbed wire to use against infiltrators at the proper time. Hussein would probably want clear indication that we will do what is necessary to save him, not that we will make friendly gestures.

Obviously, we're not going to be able to make him feel completely safe. The one thought I (HHS) have for bucking him up is based on an interesting comment to me the other day by an intelligent Lebanese. He says the Arab governments are increasingly reluctant to settle the broad Palestine question without the participation of the Palestinians. When I asked whether anybody really took seriously the thought that the Palestinians could organize a responsible representation in settlement negotiations, he said that the ouster of Shuquairy and the evolution of a collegial PLO leadership was designed to do just this.

The thought that occurs to me is that if Hussein needs support for negotiating alone the Palestinians might provide it. Jordan and Israel--not the UAR--are sitting on most aspects of the Palestine problem. If Hussein could say he was negotiating with or on behalf of representative Palestinians who wanted peace, he might have some added backing.

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Authority NLS 02-206 (#343)
By clm/ies NARA, Date 8-26-05

SECRET/NODIS

We're still better off pursuing our present course--trying to get the UAR back on the Jarring track both directly and via Hussein. But if that fails, we'll be looking for ideas like this. I've checked fairly widely in State and CIA and no one thinks this is a wild idea. In fact, Hussein himself is already trying to bring more Palestinians into his government. The problems are that: (a) Palestinian leadership is fragmented so he couldn't hope to have unanimous support; and (b) if Hussein gets too involved with PLO-type Palestinians, it could mean the end of Jordan via encouragement for a separate Palestine. But Hussein today is a man with no attractive alternatives, and this risk may be less than the risk of no movement at all.

If we do get back into the area of Jordan-Israel negotiations, Jerusalem will be the main sticking point, and we will have to trot out again all the thoughts you had on Jordan-Israel economic cooperation.

John W. Foster

Harold H. Saunders

Att: Amman 3770, 3/12/68

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

March 14, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR HARRY McPHERSON

SUBJECT: Background for Lunch with the Jordanian Ambassador

As background for our lunch with Ambassador Sharaf tomorrow, you might want to read the two attached reports on the Jordanian view of the current state of the Jarring mission.

The Jordanians--and the Egyptians--sincerely believe that the Israelis are responsible for the lack of progress so far. They see the UN Security Council resolution as an already determined settlement which has only to be implemented. The purpose of any talks would be to work out the necessary details. When the Israelis call for direct or even indirect--negotiations, or propose a new agenda for talks, Jordanians see an attempt to evade a solution which Israel implicitly accepted and the United States guaranteed in New York last November. Israel's annexation of Jerusalem and recent decrees, which the Arabs see as the first step toward annexing all the occupied territories, just increase their distrust of Israeli intentions.

ON-FILE NSC
RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY

The Israelis are just as sincere in their completely different view of the resolution. They think Jarring is supposed to arrange negotiations and that from these negotiations a settlement will emerge. The principles set forth in the resolution--which the Arabs think are a settlement--are nothing more than guidelines for Jarring. Our view is closer to Israel's than to the Arabs', and Jordan's view is closer to ours than Nasser's.

We don't agree with the Jordanians that the Egyptians have not backtracked in the past few weeks. But if you accept the Arab view of the resolution, a case can be made that the Arabs are still trying to get a settlement. They are willing to implement the resolution, and any Egyptian backtracking was along the lines of withdrawing inducements to get the Israelis to agree to implement the resolution. The Arabs still see themselves as having gone more than halfway--Hussein deserves a lot of credit for bringing Nasser even this far--and they don't understand why Israel keeps insisting on negotiations, or why we can't get the Israelis to change their demands.

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

State Dept. review completed

SANITIZED

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~


- 2 -

My main idea in suggesting this lunch is to give you a chance to make your own judgments of the Arab position by asking Sharaf any questions you want. The one message it would be useful for you to get across authoritatively is that the President is still staunchly behind the UN resolution and the Jarring mission--we're not just backing stubborn Israelis. I'll plug into the conversation anywhere it seems useful, but we'll set the ground rules as unofficial and free-wheeling.

I'll stop by your office shortly before 1:00 p.m. We've reserved a table at the Sans Souci. (I'll take care of the bill since I've invited Sharaf, and you can settle with me later.)

Hal Saunders

Att.



3/2/68 . 25X1

Arman 1794, 3/14/68.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

Jordan

29

~~SECRET~~

March 13, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WWR

SUBJECT: Hussein's Next Step?

One question that Jarring's impasse poses is whether Hussein might be willing to deal with the Israelis even if Nasser refuses to participate in negotiations--and whether, if he did, the result would be worth anything. We can't completely discount this possibility, but strong pressures make it difficult for him to act independently.

If he acts without Nasser's approval, Hussein forfeits Egyptian protection from the radical Arabs. The Algerians can do little more than issue anti-Jordanian statements, but the Syrians could easily switch their terrorist effort from Israel to Jordan, and the Iraqis have troops in Jordan.

Within Jordan, Hussein would face trouble not only from Iraqis and Syrians, but from local Nasserists and from other Jordanians who oppose independent negotiations who would exploit such feelings to move against the monarchy. Working together these people might topple Hussein--or at least prevent him from carrying out any agreement he might reach with Israel.

The tentative view in the intelligence community is that it is too dangerous for Hussein to enter any public talks with Israel--even under UN supervision. Some doubt that he could even risk secret negotiations, but something may be possible. State isn't closing this door yet.

If he did try for a settlement, he would have little with which to bargain--he can't open the canal or end the war by himself--and without Arab backing he couldn't accept a settlement the other Arabs felt was unfavorable. He would almost certainly have to get more on Jerusalem than the Israelis would be willing to give.

The Israelis would probably agree to negotiations with Hussein as possibly leading to negotiations with Nasser himself, or at least as creating disunity in the Arab camp. But they firmly believe that Nasser must be involved in any meaningful settlement. They feel Hussein is too weak to deliver real peace.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 02-206 (#344)
By ebm/ies, NARA, Date 8-26-05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Our first effort will be to bring Nasser around, both directly and via Hussein, but a Jordan-Israel settlement now becomes more than a theoretical alternative.

John W. Foster

~~SECRET~~

Jordan

30

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

March 7, 1968

At the request of Marvin Watson via Bromley Smith, I called a Mr. Lyle yesterday. As I understand it, he had called Mr. Watson to complain that nothing was happening regarding the efforts of the Mecom Company to get its oil drilling equipment out of Jordan.

This case must be at least two years old. Mecom contracted with the Jordanian Government to drill for oil. When it decided that none was to be found, it decided to pull out without having drilled the exploratory holes contracted for. It therefore owes some damages to the Jordanian Government for the uncompleted contract and for some private claims incurred in the course of its work. Mecom has negotiated with the Jordanian Government through several different agents and a couple of agreements have been reached during this period only to be repudiated by Mr. Mecom, as I understand the story from State.

When I talked with Mr. Lyle, I told him that I understood from our Embassy in Amman that the Jordanians were ready to meet their requirements on their side for a settlement. When he asked what the next step would be, I told him that someone with full power of attorney for Mr. Mecom would have to go to Jordan to negotiate a final settlement. He asked if he could tell Mr. Mecom that and I said he could. He said he might call me again from Houston.

Since this same information documented by full details from our Embassy in Amman has been sent in late February to another agent of Mr. Mecom, I did not have the impression that Mr. Lyle was at all informed about the recent developments in this case. He acted as if this were quite a new development when in fact this information has been available in general to Mr. Mecom for some months. I had the impression that he was in town and was just calling to lodge a pro-forma complaint about the State Department. When I called him, he complained only about the Jordanians.

Harold H. Saunders

orig: (1) Bromley Smith
(2) Marvin Watson, if Mr. Smith wishes.

cc: Marshall Wiley

Jordan 3/

March 5, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR HARRY
McPHERSON

Harry, You will remember my suggestion for a lunch with the new Jordanian Ambassador. He is now back from a week in Amman.

If you will ask your secretary to give me a selection of a couple of days and times in the next week or two, I would arrange for the two of us to meet Ambassador Sharaf at the Sans Souci for lunch unless you have some other idea.

Hal Saunders

*Jordan
x Israel*

32

February 21, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWR:

Just in case Jerusalem ends up in the UN Security Council, I thought you ought to have the attached for background. We may still be able to hold the Jordanians back but this indicates the seriousness of the problem.

Hal Saunders

Att: Amman 3498, 2/19/68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4(*199)
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By cbm/rq, NARA, Date 8-26-05

Jordan
& Israel
33

~~SECRET~~

February 16, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Hindsight on Israel-Jordan Incidents

This is a decidedly uncleared view of what went on up and down the Jordan Valley yesterday, but it does reflect the sentiments of those in State most directly involved.

Yesterday's shooting in retrospect looks like an Israeli-staged affair. The evidence is mostly circumstantial:

First, Eshkol and Dayan made statements earlier in the week warning Jordan on terrorism--a pattern familiar from the mid-May speeches which kicked off the whole May-June crisis.

Second, the Israelis in the embassy here called Country Director Roy Atherton at 2:30 a. m. to tell him about a relatively minor mortar shelling near an Israeli settlement. To be sure, this came against a background of more serious previous incidents, but was nothing like the mining which took four Israeli lives the week before. It looks as if they were ready to strike at the first excuse and wanted to make the record.

Third, after we arranged the cease-fire and the Jordanians actually stopped shooting, the Israelis kept on for another hour and a half. This looks like the familiar pattern of setting an objective and then observing a cease-fire only after achieving it.

There are other possible interpretations, of course. The Israelis might have settled for less but kept going when the Jordanians continued replying in kind to make sure their message got through. Terrorists may have provoked the incident just to drive the wedge deeper between Israel and Jordan.

Allowing for these variations, my main point is that yesterday's fighting was probably more than just a fire-fight that got out of hand. The Israelis were probably delivering a well-drafted message.

We're working on three fronts to use the incident to gain better control--pressing for UN observers, encouraging a direct meeting of Israeli and Jordanian commanders and helping Jarring.

Harold H. Saunders

cc: Harry McPherson

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NLS 01-20 (498)
By: bms/j. NARA, Date: 8-26-05

Jordan
34

February 13, 1968

Dear Professor Smith:

I appreciate the concern for Jordan which you expressed in your recent letter. We, too, have a deep interest in the progress and prosperity of a united Jordan. We believe we are working in that direction.

We understand how difficult it is for our Arab friends to understand the position we have taken since June 5. Our position as outlined by the President on June 19, 1967, arises from our deep conviction that a lasting peace in the Middle East can not grow from simple slogans or easy half-solutions. We believe it can come about only if the parties to the June war can reach some kind of agreement on the issues dividing them.

This was also the sense of the United Nations Security Council when it passed its resolution of November 22. We sincerely hope that Ambassador Jarring, who is now at work, will be able to bring about this sort of agreement.

Sincerely yours,

W. W. Rostow

Professor Robert H. Smith
Professor of Religion
The College of Wooster
Wooster, Ohio

Att: Remarks of the President at the National Foreign
Policy Conference for Educators, State Department, 6/19/67

Jordan

35

MEMORANDUM FOR HARRY McPHERSON

February 12, 1968

Since you are on the receiving end of so many Israeli approaches, I'm wondering whether you ever feel the need for an intelligent exposition of the Arab perspective.

I realize that the Arab-Israeli argument is not one of your main responsibilities and that you know we're ready to help any time. But I can also imagine that you must occasionally be on the spot yourself for a quick judgment on one Israeli-related issue or another.

Please don't read this as any subtle hint on your objectivity or anything sinister like that. My only reason for writing is just to let you know that for the first time we have a young, intelligent and articulate Arab ambassador in town in the person of Abdul Hamid Sharaf, the new Jordanian. I'd be the first to admit that most of the Arabs here are not worth talking to because they're more willing to lecture than discuss, but this fellow is quite different. So if you haven't already met him, I simply want you to know he's around in case you feel the need of a foil to Eppie or his successor.

If by any chance you would find this contact useful, I am sure we could arrange a lunch or a short call. If not, just throw this in the outbox.

Harold H. Saunders

Yes, I think it would be interesting _____

No, it's just one too many _____

cc: Walt Rostow

Jordan
36

~~SECRET~~

February 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BATTLE

In preparation for General Khammash's talk with Walt, I talked with both Bob Houghton and Rodger Davies and then gave Walt the attached. Walt took this line, although he expressed it with greater eloquence and greater length. He started by saying that the problem of military assistance for Jordan had been one of the hardest ones our Government had had to come to grips with in recent months, and then he went on to explain with some feeling why it had been.

In addition to the line described in the attached, I also spoke of our pride in Jordan's past economic progress and our deep desire to see it continue. He spoke as one who had "shared the adventure" of trying to bring better lives to people, and he wanted to see Jordan get on with that job.

He said he personally believed from talking to Israelis endlessly that a settlement between Israel and Jordan was possible. We had promised to lend our weight to the settlement process. Our problem to date has been the impossibility of leaning on Israel when there is no specific proposal for us to advocate. As Ambassador Jarring digs deeper into substance, we will be better able to press for specific arrangements. Right now we are supporting Ambassador Jarring within the limits of our desire not to interfere with his responsibility.

On the military assistance package, Walt simply said it was before the President and it would not be appropriate for him to comment. He could say, however, that we were acutely aware of the General's problems.

Khammash thanked Mr. Rostow and said he understood our position. There was some further talk about the increasing difficulty over controlling terrorism, and Khammash made a general plea for our coming through as soon as possible with as large a military package as possible.

Khammash indicated that a message from the President would be helpful to him in selling our position in Amman.

Harold H. Saunders

Att: Cy, HHS Memo to Walt Rostow, 2/9/68, Subj: Your Talk with Khammash and Sharaf--2:00 p.m. ~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *dam/s*, NARA, Date 5-28-10

Jordan
x P.L.

37

~~SECRET~~

Friday, February 9, 1968

Mr. President:

Since you are not seeing General Khammash, State is suggesting a short message direct to Hussein. You have already exchanged messages saying we're willing to resume if he won't turn to the Soviets and he won't if we meet his legitimate needs. The attached is designed to wrap up this exchange.

W. W. R.

*Revised by WWR
2/10/68*

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By chm/ly NARA, Date 5-28-10

~~SECRET~~

January 29, 1968

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: General Amer Khammash
Ambassador Abdul-Hamid Sharaf
Harold H. Saunders

To help General Khammash while away time while he waits for our answer to his military equipment requests, I invited him and Ambassador Sharaf to lunch today. We covered the following ground:

1. Soviet-Jordanian relations. Khammash said the Soviets are waiting to move into Jordan "in a big way." The military delegation they had planned to send would have included several two-star Generals. He went on to describe in familiar terms the shakiness of the Jordanian political structure and the importance of our military assistance in stabilizing it. He pointed out that if the King falls, some opportunist group will take over; he implied that leftists would be in the best position to do so.

When I asked how he and others of like mind felt about the possibility of accepting Soviet arms, he described his reaction as being similar to that of a man whose scruples are unquestionable but who has become so hungry that he has no choice but to steal a loaf of bread. He knows it is his downfall but feels he has no choice. King Hussein is fully aware that the Soviet presence in Jordan would seriously jeopardize his regime, but the alternative is being undercut by his own military.


2. Impression of Jarring mission. Apart from taking several cracks at Israeli intransigence, Khammash came quickly around to the familiar line that the US really ought to be doing Jarring's job. He could hardly be expected to overcome the obstacles in his way. The US would have to step in eventually.

3. US Role in the Arab World. He felt that some gesture is required on Israeli withdrawal or on Jerusalem even to begin to help the US recoup its losses. Both General Khammash and the Ambassador said they felt restoration with relations with Cairo would help our position a great deal. When they cited the British example, I suggested that perhaps the British had mainly improved their position by giving up their power base in the Middle East, but the Jordanians held to the idea that we too could improve our position by getting back into business with Nasser.

4. Nasser. I asked General Khammash how he read Nasser's intentions. I said that our reports seem to reveal two or three Nassers, and General Khammash replied, "At least two." He went on to describe Nasser as "schizophrenic" (I assume he was using the term generally rather than clinically). He described how, over the past fifteen years, he has seen Nasser many times speaking to many Jordanian leaders and has watched his position shift back and forth. Nevertheless, he felt that Nasser does not intend to rely on a military solution to the present impasse. He reported that, while he (Khammash) was pushing to revive the UAC to get more money for Jordan, the Egyptians now showed very little interest in it. He did say, however, that Egyptian military training is being carried on day and night. More Soviet specialists have been brought in, largely because the leadership of Egyptian military were lost to the Israelis in the war, and Soviet specialists are needed simply as manpower to help the training. The General assured me that the Soviets are not in operational control of any Egyptian units.

5. Terrorism. When I asked who could stop the Syrians, he said he felt they could be isolated once the Israelis withdrew from occupied territory. Until then, it will be very difficult for Arab governments in general to oppose terrorists who justify their acts as efforts to liberate conquered territory. He felt general support for guerrilla-type activities is building very rapidly in the Arab world.

6. US Policy and Aspirations. I described the difference between US and Soviet methods in terms of the Soviet desire to make quick political gains as contrasted to our desire to build something solid over a longer period of time even at the expense of short-term gain. These differences of approach apply whether we are talking about economic aid projects or a formula for peace in the Mid-East. I admitted that the situation sometimes looks bleak for us and bright for the Soviets. However, we had to operate on faith that Governments like Jordan's who have genuinely tried to build solid economic foundations would come out ahead in the end, while the Socialist regimes which were being built on slogans would stagnate. We know we have to do our share, but we don't expect to perform miracles overnight. Khammash applauded this approach and felt that it was an argument for helping Jordan to become a showplace for our approach to the problems of the area!


Harold H. Saunders

cc: Mr. W. W. Rostow
Mr. Walsh
Mr. Houghton

Jordan
39

~~SECRET~~

January 29, 1968

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Ambassador Abdul-Hamid Sharaf
Harold H. Saunders

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 02-154 (#234)
By byu/jcs, NARA, Date 8-26-05

~~SECRET~~

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Harold H. Saunders

cc: Mr. W. W. Rostow
Mr. Walsh
Mr. Houghton

~~SECRET~~

January 15, 1968

WWR:

Jordan's General Khammash will be here at the opening of business Thursday. He will spend the morning in State with Luke Battle and others and then move to the Pentagon that afternoon. We expect him to be around for a number of days and will probably have to go to the President at some point while he is here to OK whatever final package may emerge from the talks

My main point in writing this memo is to say that Nick Katzenbach is hosting a small lunch for Khammash at 1 p.m. Thursday. State would like to invite you and asked me to find out whether you would be available.

Hal Saunders

Yes _____

No _____

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *clm/ly*, NARA, Date 5-28-10

Jordan
41

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

January 10, 1968

Jordanian Ambassador Sharaf came in this afternoon at his request for a general discussion since we had not talked for a couple of months. Our conversation mostly ranged over the familiar problems of Arab-Israeli settlement although he obviously had a special interest in whatever I might say about the Eshkol visit.

When he asked me whether there was any special interpretation I could provide on the Eshkol communique, I stuck to the general guidance in State's outgoing telegram on the subject. I agreed with him that its tone was restrained. I said I felt that it was consistent with the President's June 19 insistence on arms limitation and that it focussed primarily on the problems of achieving peace. He simply mentioned the importance of the US not supplying Phantoms to Israel, and we dropped the subject.

On the general problem of settlement, his main theme was that he feels Arab world sentiment is crystalizing in favor of Arab guerrilla warfare against Israel. When I asked him whether he felt this problem would be solved if the Israelis withdrew, he said he felt a sufficiently new atmosphere would be created in Jordan and Egypt to make the problem manageable and that Syria would then be isolated. The key to any steps toward peace settlement is Israeli withdrawal.

I said I thought the main problem at the moment is to figure out how to engage negotiating gears. There are hardliners and flexible thinkers on both sides; the problem is to give the flexible factions a chance to get together and to work out some firm propositions to use in bringing their hardliners around. I did not see Israel's insistence on direct negotiations as pure obstinacy since I felt Eshkol needed to give his divided Cabinet something precise to chew on before he brought it to the point of decision. I told him again that I thought his government would find Israel more flexible than its public position seemed once a dialogue could begin.

When he mentioned the importance of the US using its influence, I said we had been careful for the moment not to get in Ambassador Jarring's way but that we certainly didn't exclude involving ourselves at some point if we could help.

He returned to arms limitation and said we should get together with the USSR. I said there are two ways to go at limitation--restraint by suppliers and restraint by receivers. Both are difficult, but we are doing what we can. If the Arabs feel strongly, why don't they go to the USSR and urge Soviet leaders to cooperate with the US in restraining the arms race.

cc: Mr. Rostow
Mr. Davies

~~SECRET~~

74.4.
Harold H. Saunders

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (b)(2)(D)
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By abw/ry, NARA, Date 8-26-05

Jordan
42

~~SECRET~~

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cc: Mr. Rostow
Mr. Davies

Harold H. Saunders

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#212)
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By cbw/hg, NARA, Date 8-26-05

Jordan
x Israel
x mag B memos
43

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

December 1, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

You may recall among the documents I sent you in my last package that Foreign Minister Eban had brought a message to the President from Prime Minister Eshkol. We considered the President's talk with Eban and Goldberg's subsequent exchanges in New York to constitute an interim reply to Eshkol's points, because we did not consider it wise for the President to invest any more heavily in the fast-moving tactical situation in New York. Now that we have a UN resolution and are entering a new phase, it seems a good time to reply.

Recalling the President's desire once before to have you look over another such letter, I am sending you the attached draft as a base from which we can work quickly if need be. This draft is still in the State Department mill and is a combination of a basic revision I did plus a few State additions. This version is now going to Arthur Goldberg who is obviously the other person the President would want to have it checked with outside Washington.

Perhaps the best way to handle this is for you to call me if you have any changes to suggest in the attached. Then I would check back with you if Arthur's changes seem significant. It will be a lot easier to go to the President with a draft that you and Arthur have both checked. I can't guarantee that there won't be changes on the seventh floor, but a previous draft slid over here so easily and with so little seventh floor attention, that I can only assume that hotter problems have engaged most of the attention there.

One other fact that you should be aware of is that we have suggested to the Israelis February 7 or 8 for Eshkol's meeting with the President. We assume this will be acceptable to them, but we have not yet heard. Our present plan would be, once the President has approved, to let them announce that Eshkol is coming to the US for a series of private engagements and that he hopes to see the President. We would confirm.

I am also enclosing a couple of other items of interest.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/sj*, NARA, Date 5-28-10

Harold H. Saunders

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

Attachments:

1. Draft letter to Prime Minister Eshkol with suggested inserts #1 and #2.
2. Cy, Eshkol Letter to the President, 10/23/67
3. Cy, HHS memo for WWR, 11/24/67, "Addendum to Your Talk with Herzog"
4. Cy, HHS Memo of Conversation, 11/21/67, between Herzog and Rostow, 11/21/67
5. Cy, HHS memo to WWR, 11/22/67, re interpretation of Arab and Soviet motives in the Middle East.
6. Cy, HHS memo to WWR, 11/27/67, Subj: Findley Burns' View of Hussein and the Israelis

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

Insert #1

I can not stress too strongly the need for all parties to be active and forthcoming in seeking ways to use fully this unique opportunity for peace.

The Arabs in acquiescing in the United Kingdom resolution, have come a long way from positions of the past. However, I do not believe that time is any longer on the side of peace. If Ambassador Jarring is unable to make progress and the problem is returned to the United Nations, I fear the chances would be slight indeed that a new and constructive start could again be made, either within or outside that body.

Insert #2

The second is your Government's policy with respect to Jordan. I can understand the basis for your doubts and, since my recent meeting with King Hussein, have given this question much serious thought. I have concluded that from the viewpoint of our interests--and I should think of yours as well--the present Jordanian regime remains preferable to any conceivable alternative. For our part, we must continue to give King Hussein the support we judge necessary. I count on you not to make this task more difficult for us.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cbm/ly NARA, Date 5-28-10

Jordan

44

November 28, 1967

MEMO FOR CAROLE FARRAR

Following is the proposed inscription
for the photo I understand the President
wants to send to King Hussein:

"To His Majesty King Hussein,
with warm memories of our
talks together."

This is an excellent idea. The King
can use all the morale support we can give
him right now.

Harold H. Saunders

45

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR WWR

November 27, 1967

SUBJECT: Findley Burns' View of Hussein and the Israelis

Talking with Findley Burns Wednesday, I got a different view of Hussein from the one I received from our [redacted]. This is probably natural since our [redacted] is very close to Hussein and wants to think the best of him. Findley's view in some ways comes close to the Israeli view, although it doesn't impute the same malevolence.

To begin with, he honestly doubts that Hussein will negotiate with Israel. He does not doubt Hussein's sincere desire for a settlement, but he believes that when Hussein has to face up to the terms he's likely to get, he will not be able to go through with an agreement. Burns feels the one thing he learned from his early [redacted] experience with Hussein was that Hussein is afraid to negotiate unless he's sure he can bring back a satisfactory settlement.

25X1A

That same [redacted] exchange has left Hussein inwardly quite bitter with us. He thought in July we owed it to him to try to bring the Israelis to reasonable terms for him. Our refusal left him feeling that we had "chosen Israel" and betrayed our relationship with him. He's still smart enough to know he needs us but the relationship isn't the same. Burns describes Hussein's dilemma in terms of the choice Israel gives him. As Burns sees it, it's a choice between (a) the satellite relationship that any real peace settlement and fuller economic intercourse would lead to and (b) maintaining his self-respect in his present status.

Burns believes Israel's objective is to stabilize the Middle East by bringing Jordan, Syria and Lebanon into some sort of satellite relationship with Israel. Foreign Minister Abba Eban even hinted at this in his Strasbourg speech where he mentioned a possible economic union among those nations.

Burns sees Israel's current policy toward Jordan is as follows: Israel is aware from its contact with notables on the West Bank that it may be possible to detach the West Bank from the rest of Jordan and set up a client state. The Israelis may believe that the same would be possible on the East Bank, if they could just knock off Hussein and establish contact with comparable notables there. With Hussein gone and with an arrangement being made between them and docile notables on both banks, Israel could then restore something like the pre-war Jordan and develop a state that would be in a client relationship with Israel.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
Authority NLJ 034-022-3-6
By [Signature] NARA, Date 1/12/11

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Burns believes that it is in the United States' interest, if there is no settlement, that Israel do this. The only reason he sees for continuing to support Hussein under present circumstances is that Hussein still is the Arab most likely to work out a peace settlement with Israel. If Hussein can not do that, Burns does not see much interest in our continuing to commit our prestige to him.

He explains Israel's current campaign to tarnish Hussein's image this way: The Israelis are really much more comfortable with the idea of a polarized Middle East with two American feet in the Israeli camp instead of just one. Their objective since Samua has been to drive us into this sort of polarization. They cannot do this as long as we have close ties to Hussein. Therefore, they are out to tarnish Hussein's image as badly as they can.

Comment: Burns' view of Hussein's fear of negotiating may be pretty realistic, especially when you couple his reluctance with the fact that the Israelis won't do anything to encourage him. There may be elements of his other analysis in some Israeli thinking, but I doubt it's as clear in their minds as he puts it. However, Hussein probably figures Israeli strategy this way.

Harold H. Saunders

cc: McGBundy

~~SECRET~~

Jordan
46

CONFIDENTIAL

November 21, 1967

WWR:

Findley Burns, back from Amman, will be here Wednesday and Friday. He would like to see one or both of us. I promised to see him myself and to ask whether you would be free.

Given all your other problems, I don't really feel this is essential unless you especially want to talk to someone from Amman. You missed the [redacted] fellow 25X1A and this would be a reasonable substitute, but it is not at all crucial.

HHS

Yes - Wednesday - 2 pm.

No

TMT
I assume from my calendar that you've told Burns.

H. yes
T

CONFIDENTIAL

SANITIZED
Authority NLJ034-022-3-3
By [signature], NARA, Date 5-28-10

Jordan

47

~~SECRET~~

November 14, 1967

1. Does Hussein really want a peace settlement--not just a 1957-type arrangement for Israeli withdrawal but a once-and-for-all settlement?

2. If he wants a settlement under honorable terms, can he bring Jordan--or even those around him--along with him?

--His Foreign Minister seems to be undercutting him in New York.

--His security forces won't carry out his instructions to stop terrorists.

--He hasn't succeeded in getting Iraqi troops out.

--Pro-Egyptians like Talhouni seem able to talk him out of any constructive move toward Israel.

3. To what extent is Hussein just a stalking-horse for the real Khartoum line (verbal concessions but no peace)?

--Is he himself deceived by Nasser, or is he a witting and cunning deceiver?

4. In sum, is it fair to characterize Hussein as a reasonable man wanting a settlement but lacking the power to follow through?

DECLASSIFIED

Authority AAC 034R-22-3-3-5
By JAV *ARA Date 3/3/8

~~SECRET~~

Jordan
50

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR WWR

November 6, 1967

SUBJECT: Hussein-Rusk Talk

Harry Symmes has dictated a long memcon which probably won't be over till late in the evening. He did, however, give me a brief rundown of the subjects covered:

--Refugees. The King agreed that, if given a private choice, most of the refugees would choose resettlement. He wouldn't commit himself on whether we could begin doing things now to move toward that end, but he left the impression that he'd be willing to consider.

--Arms. The King accepted the idea of arms control in the context of a settlement, regretted the timing of our resumption of military shipments to Israel. The Secretary explained the Congressional problem, partly in terms of the Arabs' having upset the delicate pre-June balance of arms in the area by their own acts. Mentioned our opposition to nuclear weapons in the area. Discussed Soviet intent in rearming the Arabs.

--UN. The Secretary said we're prepared to use our muscle in support of a settlement when there is something definite to support. But our position alone could not settle the problem; the parties had to come to terms somehow.

--Hussein said it was important to define withdrawal now so there is no misunderstanding later. The Secretary gave him about the same answer Goldberg had.

--Hussein and Sisco discussed the difference between Hussein's claim that he and Nasser got a go-ahead at Khartoum to work out a political settlement and the way the Arabs have been acting as a group in New York. We thought it important for Hussein to lead and bring other Arabs with him rather than letting them limit him as they had in July.

--Soviet intent uncertain.

--UAR. Nothing new. We want good relations. If they can't say anything nice about us, they could at least keep quiet.

--Economic. Hussein described the dislocation resulting from loss of the West Bank.

The above is rough and does not include the Secretary's private half hour alone with the King. However, it does sketch the range of luncheon conversation. Harry said the atmosphere was excellent.

Hal Saunders

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLI 02-154 (222)
By cty/jcs, NARA, Date 8-26-05

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

*Jordan
with letter
(LB)*

51

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 851

PAGE 01 AMMAN 00369 221135Z

14
ACTION NEA 15

INFO CPR 02, GPM 04, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SS 20, USIA 12, RSR 01, /069 W
----- 120869

P R 221044Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 7194

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE AMMAN 369

REF: STATE 9472

1. IN DELIVERING PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S MESSAGE TO CHIEF OF ROYAL PROTOCOL, WE OFFERED TO CABLE IT TO EMB LONDON FOR TRANSMITTAL TO KING HUSSEIN. PROTOCOL CHIEF HAS NOW TOLD US HE HAD INFORMED KING OF MESSAGE BUT WOULD PLEASED IF EMBASSY LONDON COULD TRANSMIT TEXT TO KING AT DORCHESTER HOTEL. EMBASSY MIGHT EXPLAIN THAT THE PHOTOGRAPHS REFERRED TO IN THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE WILL BE DELIVERED SHORTLY TO AMMAN, ALONG WITH THE SIGNED ORIGINAL. QUOTE: YOUR MAJESTY, AS I PREPARE TO LEAVE OFFICE, I WISH NOT ONLY TO SAY GOOD-BYE BUT ALSO TO THANK YOU FOR HELPING TO MAKE POSSIBLE COOPERATION FOR PEACE AND PROGRESS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES DURING MY YEARS AS PRESIDENT. I KNOW THAT THE SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP AND MUTUAL RESPECT ON WHICH THIS COOPERATION HAS BEEN BASED WILL CONTINUE AND THAT BOTH OUR PEOPLES WILL BE THE BETTER FOR IT.

OUR PERSONAL ASSOCIATION HAS BEEN A SOURCE OF SPECIAL GRATIFICATION TO ME. THROUGH IT, BOTH OF US WERE ABLE TO GAIN A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR NATIONS' PROBLEMS AND ASPIRATIONS. I HAVE BEEN ACUTELY AWARE OF THE PROBLEMS THAT HAVE BESET YOUR COUNTRY AND PEOPLE, AND HAVE ADMIRERD YOUR STEADFASTNESS AND COURAGE IN YOUR CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THESE PROBLEMS. I AM HOPEFUL THAT OUR MUTUAL GOAL OF A PEACEFUL AND PROSPEROUS JORDAN IN A PEACEFUL AND PROSPEROUS MIDDLE EAST WILL BE ACHIEVED IN THE NEAR FUTURE, AND AM CONVINCED THAT OUR COOPERATION HAS ADVANCED THE POSSIBILITY OF ACHIEVING THIS GOAL.

*FD To
King Hussein
1/22/69*

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

5



Department of State

TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 AMMAN 00369 221135Z

AS THE ENCLOSED PHOTOGRAPHS OF OUR RECENT LUNAR FLIGHT SUGGEST, THIS SHRINKING GLOBE IS RAPIDLY BECOMING A SINGLE NEIGHBORHOOD. EVEN THE MOST DISTANT NATIONS NOW LIVE CLOSER TO EACH OTHER THAN VILLAGES IN A SINGLE NATION DID NOT A FEW CENTURIES AGO. COUNTRIES ARE LEARNING THAT THEY MUST WORK TOGETHER FOR COMMON ENDS IF ANY ARE TO SURVIVE AND PROSPER IN THE NEW WORLD OF INTERDEPENDENCE WHICH SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ARE HELPING TO CREATE.

WE HAVE MADE SOME PROGRESS TO THIS END IN RECENT YEARS. NEW FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ARE EVIDENT IN MANY AREAS. I BELIEVE THAT THIS PROGRESS WILL CONTINUE,

AND THAT ONE DAY AN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL COME INTO BEING WHICH IS AS SOLIDLY GROUNDED IN COMMON INTEREST AND COMMON INSTITUTIONS AS NATIONAL COMMUNITIES ARE TODAY.

I KNOW THAT BOTH OUR COUNTRIES WILL PLAY A PART IN THIS GREAT VENTURE. DESPITE MY RETIREMENT FROM THE PRESIDENCY, MY INTEREST IN JORDAN'S ROLE AND MY FRIENDSHIP FOR ITS PEOPLE

WILL REMAIN STRONG, AS WILL MY DEDICATION TO THE GOALS WHICH BOTH OUR COUNTRIES SHARE. LYNDON B. JOHNSON END QUOTE
DECONTROL ON RECEIPT. SYMMES.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



Department of State

TELEGRAM

Jordan

52

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 040

PAGE 01 STATE 009272

82
ORIGIN NEA 15

INFO CPR 02, GPM 04, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SS 20, USIA 12, /068 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: RPPAGANELLI
APPROVED BY: NEA/RODGER P. DAVIES
NEA/ARN: MR. SEELY S/S: MRS. DAVIS WHITE HOUSE: MR. SMITH
66635
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION: ORIGIN: NEA/ARN

----- 108033

R 200119Z JAN 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 009272

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO KING HUSSEIN: QUOTE YOUR MAJESTY, AS I PREPARE TO LEAVE OFFICE, I WISH NOT ONLY TO SAY GOOD-BYE BUT ALSO TO THANK YOU FOR HELPING TO MAKE POSSIBLE COOPERATION FOR PEACE AND PROGRESS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES DURING MY YEARS AS PRESIDENT. I KNOW THAT THE SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP AND MUTUAL RESPECT ON WHICH THIS COOPERATION HAS BEEN BASED WILL CONTINUE AND THAT BOTH OUR PEOPLES WILL BE THE BETTER FOR IT.

OUR PERSONAL ASSOCIATION HAS BEEN A SOURCE OF SPECIAL GRATIFICATION TO ME. THROUGH IT, BOTH OF US WERE ABLE TO GAIN A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR NATIONS' PROBLEMS AND ASPIRATION. I HAVE BEEN ACUTELY AWARE OF THE PROBLEMS THAT HAVE BESET YOUR COUNTRY AND PEOPLE, AND HAVE ADMIRERD YOUR STEADFASTNESS AND COURAGE IN YOUR CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THESE PROBLEMS. I AM HOPEFUL THAT OUR MUTUAL GOAL OF A PEACEFUL AND PROSPEROUS JORDAN IN A PEACEFUL AND PROSPEROUS MIDDLE EAST WILL BE ACHIEVED IN THE NEAR FUTURE, AND AM CONVINCED THAT OUR COOPERATION HAS ADVANCED THE POSSIBILITY OF ACHIEVING THIS GOAL.

LBH
to
Hussein
1/20/69

AS THE ENCLOSED PHOTOGRAPHS OF OUR RECENT LUANR FLIGHT SUGGEST, THIS SHRINKING GLOBE IS RAPIDLY BECOMING A SINGLE NEIGHBORHOOD. EVEN THE MOST DISTANT NATIONS NOW LIVE CLOSER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

44



Department of State

TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 009272

TO EACH OTHER THAN VILLAGES IN A SINGLE NATION DID NOT A FEW CENTURIES AGO. COUNTRIES ARE LEARNING THAT THEY MUST WORK TOGETHER FOR COMMON ENDS IF ANY ARE TO SURVIVE AND PROSPER IN THE NEW WORLD OF INTERDEPENDENCE WHICH SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ARE HELPING TO CREATE.

WE HAVE MADE SOME PROGRESS TO THIS END IN RECENT YEARS. NEW FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ARE EVIDENT IN MANY AREAS. I BELIEVE THAT THIS PROGRESS WILL CONTINUE, AND THAT ONE DAY AN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL COME INTO BEING WHICH IS AS SOLIDLY GROUNDED IN COMMON INTEREST AND COMMON INSTITUTIONS AS NATIONAL COMMUNITIES ARE TODAY.

I KNOW THAT BOTH OUR COUNTRIES WILL PLAY A PART IN THIS GREAT VENTURE. DESPITE MY RETIREMENT FROM THE PRESIDENCY, MY INTEREST IN JORDAN'S ROLE AND MY FRIENDSHIP FOR ITS PEOPLE WILL REMAIN STRONG, AS WILL MY DEDICATION TO THE GOALS WHICH BOTH OUR COUNTRIES SHARE. LYNDON B. JOHNSON END QUOTE

2. ORIGINAL OF LETTER AND PHOTOGRAPHS BEING POUCHED.

3. WHITE HOUSE PLANS NO RELEASE THIS MESSAGE, BUT HAS NO OBJECTION TO RECIPIENT DOING SO.

DECONTROL ON RECEIPT. RUSK

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Jordan
Pls return to HHSaunders
Room 372-a EOB when signed.

53

January 18, 1969

Your Majesty:

As I prepare to leave office, I wish not only to say good-bye but also to thank you for helping to make possible cooperation for peace and progress between our two countries during my years as President. I know that the spirit of friendship and mutual respect on which this cooperation has been based will continue and that both our peoples will be the better for it.

Our personal association has been a source of special gratification to me. Through it, both of us were able to gain a better understanding of our nations' problems and aspirations. I have been acutely aware of the problems that have beset your country and people, and have admired your steadfastness and courage in your constructive approach to a peaceful solution to these problems. I am hopeful that our mutual goal of a peaceful and prosperous Jordan in a peaceful and prosperous Middle East will be achieved in the near future, and am convinced that our cooperation has advanced the possibility of achieving this goal.

As the enclosed photographs of our recent lunar flight suggest, this shrinking globe is rapidly becoming a single neighborhood. Even the most distant nations now live closer to each other than villages in a single nation did only a few centuries ago. Countries are learning that they must work together for common ends if any are to survive and prosper in the new world of interdependence which science and technology are helping to create.

We have made some progress to this end in recent years. New forms of international cooperation are evident in many areas. I believe that this progress will continue, and that one day an international community will come into being which is as solidly grounded in common interest and common institutions as national communities are today.

237
to
King's House
8/18/69

- 2 -

I know that both our countries will play a part in this great venture. Despite my retirement from the Presidency, my interest in Jordan's role and my friendship for its people will remain strong, as will my dedication to the goals which both our countries share.

Sincerely,

His Majesty
Hussein I
King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
Amman

LBJ:State:HHS:tmt 1/18/69



Department of State

Jordan

TELEGRAM

54

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 867

PAGE 01 STATE 009180

85
ORIGIN AF 16

INFO CPR 02, GPM 04, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SS 20, USIA 12, /069 R

DRAFTED BY: AF/N: W LLOYD
APPROVED BY: S/S: JW DAVIS
AF: MR. QUIMBY
WHITE HOUSE: MR. SAUNDERS
66637

105532

R 182050Z JAN 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY RABAT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 009180

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO KING HASSAN:

QTE: YOUR MAJESTY:

AS I PUT ASIDE THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF MY OFFICE I WISH TO TAKE THIS OCCASION TO SEND YOU A PERSONAL MESSAGE OF FAREWELL AND TO EXPRESS TO YOU MY WARM APPRECIATION FOR THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION WE HAVE SHARED DURING MY YEARS AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

AT THE TIME OF YOUR VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES IN 1967 WE ENJOYED A PERSONAL ASSOCIATION WHICH, I BELIEVE, ENABLED US BETTER TO UNDERSTAND THE HOPES AND CONCERNS OF OUR TWO PEOPLES. THIS PERSONAL ASSOCIATION, YOUR MAJESTY, HAS BEEN A SOURCE OF SPECIAL GRATIFICATION TO ME. I AM CERTAIN THAT THE SAME SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP AND MUTUAL RESPECT WILL CONTINUE TO EXIST BETWEEN MOROCCO AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE YEARS TO COME.

MODERN CIVILIZATION IS STEADILY NARROWING THE BARRIERS OF LANGUAGE AND GEOGRAPHY THAT HAVE SEPARATED THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD. TODAY NATIONS LIVE MORE CLOSELY TOGETHER THAN DID VILLAGES YEARS AGO. THIS REVOLUTIONARY NEW PERSPECTIVE OF THE WORLD IS WELL SYMBOLIZED BY THE ENCLOSED PHOTOGRAPHS OF OUR RECENT LUNAR FLIGHT.

2138
to
Hassan
11/18/69

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

77



Department of State

TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 009180

I KNOW YOU SHARE WITH ME THE CONVICTION THAT NATIONS MUST WORK TOGETHER IF THEY ARE TO SURVIVE AND PROSPER IN THE INTERDEPENDENT WORLD OF TODAY.

GREAT STEPS FORWARD HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN RECENT YEARS. I APPLAUD YOUR EFFORTS, YOUR MAJESTY, TO FOSTER REGIONAL COOPERATION IN THE MAGHREB. SUCH CONSTRUCTIVE LEADERSHIP IS REQUIRED BY ALL STATES IF WE ARE TO BUILD AN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OF RESPONSIBLE NATIONS.

I KNOW THAT OUR COUNTRIES, LINKED BY HISTORY SINCE THE EARLY YEARS OF OUR REPUBLIC, WILL CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER FOR THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND FREEDOM FOR ALL MANKIND. ALTHOUGH I AM RETIRING FROM PUBLIC LIFE MY FRIENDSHIP FOR YOU AND THE MOROCCAN PEOPLE REMAINS. I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO WISH YOU AND YOUR PEOPLE CONTINUED PEACE AND PROGRESS.

SINCERELY, LYNDON B. JOHNSON UNQUOTE

- 2. SIGNED ORIGINAL AND APOLLO PHOTOGRAPHS WILL FOLLOW.
- 3. WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT INTEND RELEASE TEXT BUT HAS NO OBJECTION TO RELEASE BY RECIPIENT.
- 4. DECONTROL UPON DELIVERY OF MESSAGE. RUSK

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



Department of State

Jordan

TELEGRAM

55

UNCLASSIFIED 816

PAGE 01 AMMAN 00066 061649Z

50

ACTION NEA 15

INFO CPR 02, GPM 04, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SS 20, USIA 12, RSR 01, /069 W
----- 035085

R 061520Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2071

UNCLAS AMMAN 0066

SUBJ: NEW YEAR GREETINGS FROM PRIME MINISTER TALHOUNI
TO: PRESIDENT JOHNSON

1. EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRIMIN
TALHOUNI FOR TRANSMITTAL TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON:

QUOTE: YOUR EXCELLENCY, I HAVE RECEIVED WITH SINCERE THANKS
YOUR KIND MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS ON THE OCCASION OF THE NEW YEAR
TO ME AND THE PEOPLE OF JORDAN. PARA I AVAIL MYSELF OF THIS
OPPORTUNITY TO EXTEND TO YOUR EXCELLENCY
AND THE PEOPLE OF
THE U.S.A. MY WARM GREETINGS AND BEST WISHES FOR CONTINUED
PROSPERITY AND PROGRESS. SINCERELY, BAHJAT TALHOUNI, PRIME
MINISTER. END QUOTE.

2. SINCE MESSAGE IS REPLY TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S NEW YEAR'S
MESSAGE TO PRIMIN, WHICH WAS PUBLISHED IN AMMAN LOCAL PRESS
JAN 2, EMBASSY BELIEVES NO REPLY IS REQUIRED.

SYMMES

Pm Talhouni
207
1/4/69

UNCLASSIFIED

24



Department of State

TELEGRAM

Jordan 56

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 076

PAGE 01 STATE 293745

84

ORIGIN NEA 15

INFO CPR 02, GPM 04, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SS 20, USIA 12, /068 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: PJGRIFFIN TEXT RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE
APPROVED BY: NEA- MR DAVIES
NEA/ARN MR SEELY
WHITE HOUSE MR SAUNDERS
S/S MR BROWN
66642

- BUDGET
- DAVIS
- FRIED
- GINSBURGH
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- JORDEN
- KEENEY P
- LEONHART
- LEWIS
- MORRIS
- SAUNDERS
- TAYLOR
- V. P.

007222

R 310105Z DEC 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 293745

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING NEW YEAR'S MESSAGES FROM THE
PRESIDENT TO THE KING AND PRIME MINISTER AL-TALHOUNI
RESPECTIVELY

BEGIN QUOTE:

YOUR MAJESTY: ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE I EXTEND TO
YOU AND TO THE PEOPLE OF JORDAN GREETINGS AND WARM GOOD WISHES FOR A
HAPPY AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR. AS I APPROACH THE END OF
MY TERM IN OFFICE, I TRUST THAT THE COMING YEAR WILL BRING
SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN THE SEARCH FOR A JUST AND LASTING
MIDDLE EAST PEACE, WHICH BOTH OUR COUNTRIES SO EARNESTLY
DESIRE. SINCERELY, LYNDON B JOHNSON END QUOTE BEGIN QUOTE:

YOUR EXCELLENCY: AS ONE OF MY LAST OFFICIAL ACTS, I EXTEND
TO YOU AND TO THE PEOPLE OF JORDAN SINCERE GREETINGS
AND BEST WISHES ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE COMING YEAR. SINCERELY, LYNDON B JOHNSON END QUOTE

2. WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT PLAN PUBLISH BUT HAS NO OBJECTION
SHOULD RECIPIENTS WISH TO DO SO. IF RECIPIENTS DO PLAN TO
PUBLISH WOULD APPRECIATE TWENTY-FOUR HOURS NOTICE SO
WHITE HOUSE MAY ARRANGE FOR JOINT RELEASE IF DESIRED.

3. DECONTROL UPON RECEIPT. EXEMPT RUSK

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

239
to King
12/31/68



Department of State

Jordan
(with New Years)
TELEGRAM

57

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 550

PAGE 01 AMMAN 08132 311310Z

50
ACTION NEA 15

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CPR 02, GPM 04, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SS 20,
RSR 01, /057 W

----- 009416

O 311158Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE AMMAN 8132

REF: STATE 293745

- 1. PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE PLANS RELEASE PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S NEW YEAR MESSAGE TO PRIME MIN ON WEDNESDAY, JAN FIRST FOR PUBLICATION IN LOCAL PRESS JAN SECOND.
- 2. PALACE SOURCE INFORMED EMBASSY THAT PALACE NOT PLANNING RELEASE TEXTS OF CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES TO KING HUSSEIN BUT WILL PROBABLY ANNOUNCE FROM WHOM MESSAGES RECEIVED.

SYMMES

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

28



Department of State

*Jordan
(with President's
letter)*

TELEGRAM

58

~~SECRET~~ 180

PAGE 01 AMMAN 08100 301334Z

Sawalus

3

49
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

003736

R 301305Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7031

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 8100

EXDIS:

REF: STATE 292142

I GAVE HUSSEIN THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE (REFTEL) AT MEETING ON 28TH (OTHER SUBJECTS REPORTED SEPTELS). HUSSEIN APPEARED TOUCHED BY CONTENTS OF PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE. HE READ IT CAREFULLY AND THEN SAID IT WAS A "VERY NICE MESSAGE" AND THAT HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR IT.
GP-3.

SYMMES

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (418)
State Dept. Guidelines
By *cbm/rq*, NARA, Date *8-26-05*

~~SECRET~~ *2*



Department of State

Jordan

TELEGRAM

- ~~BUDGET~~
- ~~DAVIS~~
- ~~FRIED~~
- ~~GINSBURGH~~
- ~~JESSUP~~
- ~~JOHNSON~~
- ~~JORDAN~~
- ~~KEENE~~
- ~~LEONHART~~
- ~~LEWIS~~
- ~~MORSE~~
- ~~SAUNDERS~~
- V.P.

59

UNCLASSIFIED 965

PAGE 01 AMMAN 08093 300852Z

11
ACTION NEA 15

INFO CPR 02, GPM 04, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SS 20, USIA 12, SCI 05, NASA 04,
RSR 01, /078 W

002589

R 300820Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7026

UNCLAS AMMAN 8093

SUBJECT: MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS FROM KING HUSSEIN TO
PRESIDENT JOHNSON ON APOLLO EIGHT

ON DEC 28, EMBASSY RECEIVED FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM KING
HUSSEIN FOR TRANSMITTAL TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON:

"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
 "PLEASE ACCEPT MY SINCERE AND HEARTFELT FELICITATIONS FOR THE
 SAFE RETURN OF THE THREE ASTRONAUTS AFTER THEIR HISTORIC
 JOURNEY TO THE MOON. THE REMARKABLE SCIENTIFIC ACHIEVEMENT OF
 THESE THREE HEROES DESERVES THE CONGRATULATIONS OF THE WORLD
 AND HUMANITY AS A WHOLE. MAY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE CONTINUE
 TO OPEN EVER WIDER HORIZONS FOR THEIR FELLOW MEN.
 "WITH MY BEST WISHES TO YOUR EXCELLENCY,
 "HUSSEIN I."

SYMMES

King Hussein
to RBJ
12/28/68

UNCLASSIFIED

2



Department of State

Jordan
(with Ed greeting)
TELEGRAM

60

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 277

PAGE 01 AMMAN 08066 271006Z

16
ACTION NEA 15

INFO CPR 02, GPM 04, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SS 20, USIA 12, RSR 01, /069 W
----- 123643

R 270951Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7017

- BUDGET
- DAVIS
- FRIED
- GINSBURGH
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- JORDAN
- LEONHARDT
- LEWIS
- MARRIS
- SAUNDERS
- TAYLOR
- V. P.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE AMMAN 8066

SUBJ: KING HUSSEIN'S REPLY TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S
EID AL-FITR MESSAGE

REF: STATE 289872

1. EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED FOLLOWING MESSAGE FOR TRANSMITTAL
TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON:

"HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

"I WISH TO THANK YOUR EXCELLENCY MOST SINCERELY FOR
YOUR KIND MESSAGE OF FELICITATIONS ON THE OCCASION OF EID AL-FITR.
I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXTEND TO YOUR EXCELLENCY MY BEST
WISHES FOR YOUR PERSONAL HAPPINESS AND THE CONTINUED PROSPERITY
OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. HUSSEIN I"

2. EMBASSY DOES NOT BELIEVE REPLY IS NECESSARY.

DECON 1/1/69. SYMMES

King Hussein
to LBJ -
12/27/68

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

(Jordan
(with President's letter)

61

~~SECRET~~ 180

PAGE 01 AMMAN 08058 270759Z

16
ACTION SS 70

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CIAE 00, /070 W

123184

P 261434Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7014

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 8058

LIMDIS:

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

SUBJ: AUDIENCE WITH KING HUSSEIN

REF: STATE 292075, 293142

1. APPRECIATE VERY HELPFUL GUIDANCE FOR AUDIENCE WITH KING NOW SCHEDULED FOR SOME TIME TWENTY-EIGHT. I EXPECT TO DELIVER PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE AT THAT TIME.

2. AS DEPT WILL RECALL, HUSSEIN HAS CONSISTENTLY EXPRESSED TO US HIS INTEREST IN HAVING " MAXIMUM ADVANCE NOTICE " OF PUBLICITY WITH REGARD TO PHANTOMS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. LATEST GUIDANCE WE HAVE INDICATES THAT IF QUERIED ABOUT STATUS OF PHANTOMS DEAL, WE ARE TO SAY DISCUSSIONS ARE CONTINUING. I AM CERTAIN THIS MATTER WILL BE VERY MUCH ON KING'S MIND AND THAT RECEIPT OF MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT WILL AGAIN STIMULATE HIS CONCERN ABOUT THIS MATTER.

3. I APPRECIATE HIGHLY SENSITIVE NATURE OF PHANTOM TALKS BUT I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY ADVANCE WORD ON THE PHANTOM DEAL THE DEPT COULD AUTHORIZE ME TO SHARE WITH THE KING. THIS PROBABLY WILL BE LAST TIME I SEE HIM BEFORE HE RETURNS FROM LONDON LATE JANUARY. SYMMES

- ___ BUDGET
- ___ DAVIS
- ___ FRIED
- ___ GINGBROUGH
- ___ JESUP
- ___ JOHNSON
- ___ JORDEN
- ___ KEENE P
- ___ LEONHART
- ___ LEWIS
- ___ MORRIS
- ___ SAUNDERS
- ___ TAYLOR
- ___ V. P.

3.3
(b)(1)

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 11-60

By isl NARA, Date 8-24-11

~~SECRET~~
6

EXDIS
EXDIS
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Department of State

Jordan

TELEGRAM

62

~~SECRET~~ 074

PAGE 01 STATE 292142

52
ORIGIN SS 30

3

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN - RPPAGANELLI/NEA - RPD AVIES
APPROVED BY: THE UNDER SECRETARY
NEA - PTHART
NEA/ARN - TWSEELYE
NEA/IAI - ALATHERTON
IO - JJSISCO
WHITE HOUSE - WWROSTOW
SS - MR. WALSH
66605

117248

R 251827Z DEC 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

~~SECRET~~ STATE 292142

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, VOL. XX, #363
By ebm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 7684

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN FROM THE PRESIDENT: QUOTE YOUR MAJESTY: I APPRECIATE THE FRANK EXPOSITION OF YOUR CONCERNS AND PROBLEMS REGARDING THE GENERAL AREA SITUATION AND THAT OF JORDAN IN PARTICULAR AS CONTAINED IN YOUR LETTER OF NOVEMBER 30. I BELIEVE IT IS INDICATIVE OF CLOSE AND FRIENDLY US-JORDANIAN TIES AND OF YOUR PERSONAL CONFIDENCE IN ME THAT YOU FEEL FREE TO EXPRESS YOUR VIEWS IN SUCH A DIRECT MANNER.

2. IN THE PAST DIFFICULT EIGHTEEN MONTHS WE HAVE PLAYED AN ACTIVE ROLE IN SUPPORT OF AMBASSADOR JARRING'S EFFORTS TO BRING A JUST PEACE IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF NOVEMBER 22, 1967. I FEEL CERTAIN THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WILL GIVE PRIORITY ATTENTION TO ATTAINMENT OF PEACE IN THE NEAR EAST.

3. SINCE THIS WILL MOST PROBABLY BE OUR LAST EXCHANGE OF

LCB
King Hussein
12/25/68

~~SECRET~~
23

EXDIS
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 292142

CORRESPONDENCE BEFORE I RELINQUISH OFFICE AS PRESIDENT, I REAFFIRM MY GREAT ADMIRATION FOR YOUR WISE LEADERSHIP, GALLANTRY AND COURAGE WHICH HAVE BEEN SO SEVERELY TRIED OVER THE PAST MONTHS. I WISH YOU SUCCESS IN YOUR DETERMINATION TO BRING PEACE, JUSTICE AND PROSPERITY TO YOUR PEOPLE. YOUR CONSTRUCTIVE GOALS HAVE MY SUPPORT AND THAT OF MY COUNTRY, AND I FEEL CONFIDENT THAT MY SUCCESSOR WILL VIEW YOUR PRAISEWORTHY ASPIRATIONS IN A SIMILAR LIGHT. WITH WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS, LYNDON B. JOHNSON. END QUOTE.

GP-3.
RUSK

~~SECRET~~

23



16430

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~

December 25, 1968

*Orig to WK
cy to President - Cleared by
President*

3860

63

Jordan

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: The President's Reply to King Hussein's Letter

Enclosed is a suggested reply from the President to King Hussein's letter of November 30. Although we initially recommended that there was no need for a response, our Ambassador in Amman subsequently reported that Hussein was expecting a reply. We believe now that failure to respond might be misinterpreted and concur in the Ambassador's strong recommendation that a reply be sent.

BHR by ap.

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:
Suggested reply to
King Hussein

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *chm/s*, NARA, Date 5-28-10

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

63a

Suggested Reply

Your Majesty:

I appreciate the frank exposition of your concerns and problems regarding the general area situation and that of Jordan in particular as contained in your letter of November 30. I believe it is indicative of close and friendly US-Jordanian ties and of your personal confidence in me that you feel free to express your views in such a direct manner.

In the past difficult eighteen months we have played an active role in support of Ambassador Jarring's efforts to bring a just peace in the framework of the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967. I feel certain that the new administration will give priority attention to attainment of peace in the Near East.

Since this will most probably be our last exchange of correspondence before I relinquish office as President, I reaffirm my great admiration for your wise leadership, gallantry and courage which have been so severely tried

His Majesty
Hussein I,
King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,
Amman.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ERUS, Vol. XX, #363
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

over the past months. I wish you success in your determination to bring peace, justice and prosperity to your people. Your constructive goals have my support and that of my country, and I feel confident that my successor will view your praiseworthy aspirations in a similar light.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson



Department of State

Devlan (with President's letter)

TELEGRAM

64

~~SECRET~~ 792

PAGE 01 STATE 292075

92

ORIGIN SS 70

INFO CIAE 00,1070 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN; RPPAGENELLI/TWSEELYE
APPROVED BY: PARKER T HART
NEA/RPDAVIES
NEA/IAI: ALATHERTON
UNP: ARDAY
S/S MRPARKER
IO MR SISCO (SUBST)

----- 115298

P 242237Z DEC 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ STATE 292075

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR AMBASSADOR'S AUDIENCE WITH KING HUSSEIN

REF: AMMAN 7990

1. FOLLOWING ARE SUGGESTED TOPICS WHICH AMBASSADOR MAY WISH TO DISCUSS WITH KING DURING EXPECTED AUDIENCE.

A. PRESIDENT'S RESPONSE TO HUSSEIN'S NOVEMBER 30 LETTER; AMBASSADOR MAY WISH TO DELIVER PERSONALLY PRESIDENT'S LATEST MESSAGE TO KING IF TRANSMISSION IS APPROVED AND IS RECEIVED IN TIME.

B. JARRING MISSION; YOU MAY REAFFIRM WE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT JARRING'S EFFORTS AS THE BEST VEHICLE FOR REACHING AN EQUITABLE AND LASTING MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT. WE APPRECIATE THE GOJ'S COOPERATION WITH JARRING TO DATE AND ARE CONFIDENT THIS COOPERATION WILL CONTINUE.

C. FUTURE OF WEST BANK:

(1) IN LIGHT OF GAVIN YOUNG INTERVIEW, WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN ANY COMMENTS KING MIGHT HAVE ON CONCEPT OF SEMI-AUTONOMOUS

SECRET
19

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13202, Sec. 3.4
By cbm/y, NARA, Date 5-28-10



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 292075

OR AUTONOMOUS

(2) WE WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE YOUR ENDEAVORING AGAIN TO OBTAIN KING'S PERSONAL VIEWS--ON AN INFORMAL BASIS--RE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS HE HAS IN MIND FOR WEST BANK AS PART OF A JORDAN-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT. FURTHER GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN SEPTEL.

D. IRAQI TROOPS: WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE INCREASINGLY TROUBLE-SOME ASPECTS OF IRAQI TROOP PRESENCE IN JORDAN; E.G., APPARENT ANTI-REGIME PLOTTING BY THE IRAQIS AND THEIR RECENT INDEPENDENT ACTION OF SHELLING ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS. THE KING'S THOUGHTS ON THE PROBLEM ARE OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO US IN THE WAKE OF HIS RECENT MEETING WITH GOI DEFENSE MINISTER TIKRITI IN JORDAN, AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS TO EFFECT IRAQIS REINFORCING TROOPS.

E. ARMS SUPPLY: IF YOU DEEM APPROPRIATE, YOU MAY OUTLINE TO KING SUBSTANCE OF STATE 291067.

F. REFUGEES AND DPS: YOU MAY FIND IT USEFUL TO REMIND THE KING OF OUR EFFORTS, INCLUDING MAJOR STRESS AT UN, TO INDUCE ISRAEL TO PERMIT PROMPT RETURN OF DPS TO WEST BANK. YOU MAY ASSURE HIM THAT WE WILL CONTINUE THESE EFFORTS. AT SAME TIME WE URGE GOJ TO RESPOND PROMPTLY AND POSITIVELY TO US PROPOSALS FOR FEEDING, ETC., OF DPS NOW ON EAST BANK.

G. FEDAYEEN CONTROL: WHILE COMPLIMENTING KING FOR HIS EFFORTS TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN, YOU MAY WISH TO GET HIS LATEST ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFICACY OF THE GOJ-FEDAYEEN 14-PINT "AGREEMENT". IN THIS CONNECTION YOU MIGHT NOTE THAT ISRAELIS VIEW "AGREEMENT" WHICH PLACES FEDAYEEN UNDER JORDAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL, AS VINDICATION OF THEIR BELIEF THAT CONTINUED FEDAYEEN ACTIONS HAVE FULL SANCTION OF JORDAN GOVERNMENT. WE ASSUME HUSSEIN DID NOT INTEND TO CONVEY THIS IMPRESSION AND WONDER WHAT HE HAD IN MIND WHEN HE EXTENDED JORDANIAN "CONTROL" OVER CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS WHICH, IN FACT, APPEAR TO BE BEYOND HIS CONTROL.

H. RECENT SOVIET INITIATIVES: WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HUSSEIN'S VIEWS ON RECENT SOVIET OVERTURES TO ISRAELIS IN NEW YORK AND GROMYKO VISIT TO CAIRO. ANY INFORMATION HE MIGHT HAVE ON GROMYKO VISIT TO CAIRO WOULD BE WELCOME. ACCORDING TO PRESS, IN ADDITION TO SEEING UAR OFFICIALS, GROMYKO RECEIVED JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR TO CAIRO. GPL-3. RUSK

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

Jordan
TELEGRAM

65

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 935

PAGE 01 STATE 289872

85

ORIGIN NEA 15

INFO CPR 02, GPM 04, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SS 20, USIA 12, /068 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: RPPAGANELLI

APPROVED BY: NEA: RPD AVIES

NEA/P: MR SMITH

P: MR MCCLOSKEY INFO

S/CPR: MRS JOHNSTON

S/S: MR BROWN

WH: MR SAUNDERS

NEA/ARN: MR SEELYE

66633

091189

R 192214Z DEC 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 289872

SUBJ: 'ID-AL-FITR MESSAGES

1. PLS DELIVER FOLLOWING TO KING HUSSEIN AT APPROPRIATE TIME:
QTE: YOUR MAJESTY: ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, IT
IS MY GREAT PLEASURE TO EXTEND SINCERE GREETINGS AND WARMEST
GOOD WISHES TO YOU AND TO THE PEOPLE OF JORDAN ON THE OCCASION
OF "'ID AL-FITR".

LYNDON B. JOHNSON UNQTE

2. WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT PLAN RELEASE BUT HAS NO OBJECTION IF
GOJ WISHES TO DO SO. RUSK

LAB to
King Hussein
12/19/68

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

47



15949

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

3745
Mr. Saunders
FVI *66*

SECRET/EXDIS

December 11, 1968

Jordan

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter from King Hussein to
President Johnson Replying
to the President's Message
of October 11, 1968

Enclosed is King Hussein's signed letter of
November 30, 1968 to the President. Embassy Amman
telegraphed the text to the Department on December 2.
My memorandum to you of December 5, 1968 transmitted
the text and recommended no reply.

Benjamin H. Read
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. King Hussein's Letter
2. Copy of My Memorandum, December 5
3. Copy of Embassy Amman's Covering
Airgram

SECRET/EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *chm/ly* NARA, Date 6-28-10

660



Transmitted to King 11/30/68

THE ROYAL PALACE,
Amman, Jordan,
November 30th, 1968.

Dear Mr. President,

I appreciated receiving your message of October 11th, 1968. Unfortunately it confirmed my premonition that the United States would decide to supply Israel with (Air Superiority) Phantom Jet Aircraft.

In your message, Sir, you expressed the hope that I would understand the circumstances which led you to take this action. Frankly, I could not help but be more disillusioned by this action. As you are aware, Mr. President, I have done, and will continue to do, all that is humanly possible in the hope of clearing the way to a just, honourable, and thus lasting peace in our area. I am willingly taking great political and other risks in my endeavours to achieve that objective. If we have been unable to make any substantial progress towards peace, it is because of Israel's intransigence and failure to make any substantial contributions and concessions towards that end, as well as Israel's obvious territorial ambitions which she often shrouds under the guise of "National Security".

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 01-270 (22C)
By obm/ies NARA, Date 8/26/05

Transmitted to King 11/30/68

I strongly believe that the supply of Phantoms to Israel, if it does not increase her belligerent ambitions, then it certainly does not contribute towards curtailing them. The continuous flow of arms into Israel may only encourage her intransigent attitude, and thus, I fail to see how the decision on the Phantoms would not in any way diminish your support for Ambassador Jarring's efforts.

I quite agree that our search for peace in the area will be facilitated if a meticulous balance of power between the States concerned were possible to achieve, but I submit that Jordan continues to be left out when calculations regarding armaments are made. Jordan is the only country involved in the June war which has not yet satisfactorily replenished her military losses in the war, and Jordan has been the only country to bear the fury of the new American aircraft that have been supplied to Israel since the war. Some might argue that the Eastern armaments of the U.A.R. and other Arab States may well have tipped the balance in favour of the Arabs. I wish to assure, Sir, and in all frankness, that after studying the 1948 armed conflict, witnessing and narrowly missing entanglement in the 1956 clash and living through the 1967 so-called war, where the Air Forces of the U.A.R. and others were nearly all completely wiped out by Israel, which




(2)

has always enjoyed the advantage of superior preparation in every respect as well as the advantage of striking the first blow, I am not consoled by all this superiority in armament quantity and quality that the Arab camp is said to enjoy. In fact, I am far more worried and far more apprehensive regarding the eventual fate of my people and armed forces who will be even more inadequately equipped and threatened when Israel receives the Phantoms. I believe it is only fair that Jordan should also receive its share of its legitimate requirements for defense from its traditional sources of supply. I hope that our requests from the United States Government would be favourably considered. The Jordanian Chief of Staff, Lt. General Amer Khammash is ready to leave for Washington D.C., whenever officials in Washington are ready to meet with him for this purpose.

As for your commitment regarding the territorial integrity of Jordan, may I please remind you, Mr. President, that this integrity has been violated for over a year and a half. If no pressure can be exerted by the United States on Israel to accept a peaceful settlement to the problem, then the United States, in keeping with her commitments to us, should at least refrain from helping Israel to continue her violation of our territorial integrity.

Mr. President, I wish to assure you that I value our close relationship, and I am well aware that our association is in the best interest of our two countries. But what worries me is that American actions and positions regarding the problems of our area are making it difficult, if not impossible, for me and for your other Arab friends to defend or justify American policy in the Middle East. I trust and pray that you will do all that is possible to help us change this image. We are doing our best, but we need your help, support and assistance; for the future of the entire Middle East is at stake, and if there is no just peace in the Middle East, then, unfortunately, there can be no peace in the world.

Please accept, Mr. President, my sincere regards and best wishes.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'King', with a large, sweeping flourish extending to the right.

His Excellency
President Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States of America,
The White House,
Washington D.C.,
U. S. A.



15778

DEPARTMENT OF STATE ^{HLB}

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~/EXDISDecember 5, 1968 ⁶⁶⁶MEMORANDUM FOR WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: King Hussein's Reply to the President's
Message

Transmitted as an enclosure is King Hussein's reply to the President's message of October 11. As you will recall, the occasion for the President's message was our announcement to open negotiations for the sale of Phantom jet aircraft to Israel. The message was designed to reassure the King that these negotiations in no way prejudiced USG support for the Jarring Mission or for Jordan.

The King is obviously very upset with the proposed sale of Phantoms to Israel. His sharply worded reply to the President reflects the great strains placed upon him during the past months. A principal thrust of the King's reply is that alleged Israeli intransigence and alleged United States' passivity in the face of this intransigence impedes a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. Other points made by the King include: (1) the proposed Phantom sale directly contradicts our profession of support for the Jarring Mission; (2) Jordan has suffered from Israeli military actions since the June 1967 war, particularly from aircraft supplied to Israel by the United States; (3) Jordan's marked military inferiority to Israel requires a military quid pro quo for Jordan to offset the Phantoms; (4) the United States' commitment to the territorial integrity of Jordan continues to be violated by Israeli occupation; (5) U. S. actions and positions on the Middle East problem are making it difficult for Hussein and other moderate Arabs to justify their close ties with the United States.

Our Ambassador in Jordan has a continuing dialogue with the King and there is no need for a further response on the part of the President. A signed copy of the letter has been sent by pouch.

Benjamin H. Reed
Benjamin H. Reed
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Text of King Hussein's Message

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS - GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *pe/chen* NARA, Date *6-28-10*

GROUP/ACTION

S/S-26

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 15-1 JORDAN

15949

FOR RM USE ONLY

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A-513

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

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TO : Department of State

COPY NO. 1 / SERIES A

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AGR	COM	FRB
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FROM : Amembassy AMMAN

DATE: December 5, 1968

INT	LAB	TAR
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SUBJECT : Message from King Hussein to President Johnson in Reply to the President's Message of October 11, 1968

TR	XMB	AIR
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REF : Amman 7684, State 253744
NC NC

ARMY	CIA	NAVY
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EXDIS

The enclosed sealed envelope contains a letter from King Hussein to President Johnson replying to the President's message of October 11, 1968 (State 253744). The text was cabled in Amman 7684. The King's letter was transmitted to the Embassy under cover of a letter from Secretary General of the Royal Court, Zaid Rifa'i, requesting that it be forwarded to the President.

SYMES

Enclosure: ^(Sealed) att m.m.

1. As stated.

Enclosure to WH via Read/Rostow memo S/S #15949 12/11/68.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By: [signature] NARA, Date 6/28/10

FORM 4-62 DS-323

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

In Out

Drafted by: POL:RHPelletreau/clc 12/3

Contents and Classification Approved by:

DCM:ESDuncan

Clearances: POL:MDraper

SECRET



15778

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

December 5, 1968

Jordan 3698
1 - ~~Pres~~
2 - Ret. 61
See HNS memo to
BKS - 12/12/68

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: King Hussein's Reply to the President's
Message

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Benjamin H. Read
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:
Text of King Hussein's Message

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS - GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13202, Sec. 3.4
By *14/cbm* NARA, Date *6-28-10*

67a

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

King Hussein's Message as Contained
in Amman 7684 of December 2, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I appreciated receiving your message of October 11, 1968. Unfortunately it confirmed my premonition that the United States would decide to supply Israel with (air superiority) Phantom jet aircraft.

In your message, sir, you expressed the hope that I would understand the circumstances which led you to take this action. Frankly, I could not help but be more disillusioned by this action. As you are aware, Mr. President, I have done, and will continue to do, all that is humanly possible in the hope of clearing the way to a just, honorable, and thus lasting peace in our area. I am willingly taking great political and other risks in my endeavors to achieve that objective. If we have been unable to make any substantial progress towards peace, it is because of Israel's intransigence and failure to make any substantial contributions and concessions towards that end, as well as Israel's obvious territorial ambitions which she often shrouds under the guise of "national security."

I strongly believe that the supply of Phantoms to Israel, if it does not increase her belligerent ambitions, then it certainly does not contribute towards curtailing them. The continuous flow of arms into Israel may only encourage her intransigent attitude, and thus, I fail to see how the decision on the Phantoms would not in any way diminish your support for Ambassador Jarring's efforts.

I quite agree that our search for peace in the area will be facilitated if a meticulous balance of power between the states concerned were possible to achieve, but I submit that Jordan continues to be left out when calculations regarding armaments are made. Jordan is the only country involved in the June war which has not yet satisfactorily replenished her military losses in the war, and Jordan has been the only country to bear the fury of the new American aircraft that have been supplied to Israel since the war. Some might argue that the Eastern armaments of the UAR and other Arab states may well have tipped the balance in favor of the Arabs. I wish to assure, sir, and in all frankness, that after studying the 1948 armed conflict, witnessing and narrowly missing entanglement in the 1956 clash and living through the 1967 so called war, where the air forces of the UAR and others were nearly all completely wiped out by Israel, which has always enjoyed the advantage of superior preparation in every respect as well as the advantage of striking the first blow, I am not consoled by all this superiority in armament quantity and quality that the Arab camp is said to enjoy. In fact, I am far more worried and far more apprehensive regarding the eventual fate of my people and armed forces who will be even

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~
GROUP 3

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ01-270 (22c)
By cbm/isp NARA, Date 8-26-05

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified

King
Hussein's
Message
12/2/68

more inadequately equipped and threatened when Israel receives the Phantoms. I believe it is only fair that Jordan should also receive its share of its legitimate requirements for defense from its traditional sources of supply. I hope that our requests from the United States Government would be favorably considered. The Jordanian Chief of Staff, Lt. General Amer Khammash is ready to leave for Washington, D. C. whenever officials in Washington are ready to meet with him for this purpose.

As for your commitment regarding the territorial integrity of Jordan, may I please remind you, Mr. President, that this integrity has been violated for over a year and a half. If no pressure can be exerted by the United States on Israel to accept a peaceful settlement to the problem, then the United States, in keeping with her commitments to us, should at least refrain from helping Israel to continue her violation of our territorial integrity.

Mr. President, I wish to assure you that I value our close relationship, and I am well aware that our association is in the best interest of our two countries. But what worries me is that American actions and positions regarding the problems of our area are making it difficult, if not impossible, for me and for your other Arab friends to defend or justify American policy in the Middle East. I trust and pray that you will do all that is possible to help us change this image. We are doing our best, but we need your help, support and assistance: for the future of the entire Middle East is at stake, and if there is no just peace in the Middle East, then, unfortunately, there can be no peace in the world.

Please accept, Mr. President, my sincere regards and best wishes.

Hussein I



Department of State

Jordan 68
TELEGRAM
with letter

~~SECRET~~ 205

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PAGE 01 STATE 281961

81
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY:NEA/RP DAVIES
APPROVED BY:NEA:PT HART
NEA/ARN:MR. SEELYE
S/S:MR. WALSH
S/NL:AMB LEONHART
WHITE HOUSE:MR. SAUNDERS

005492

R 042247Z DEC 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

~~SECRET~~ STATE 281961

EXDIS

SUBJ: KING'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT

REF: AMMAN'S 7684

1. GOVERNOR SCRANTON WAS BRIEFED ON GENERAL SECURITY SITUATION, STATUS OF THE JARRING MISSION, AND ON US ASSURANCES TO JORDAN.
2. INASMUCH AS NECESSARY BACKGROUND NOT AVAILABLE TO CHIEFS OF MISSIONS VISITED BY THE GOVERNOR PRIOR TO ARRIVAL AT AMMAN, YOU SHOULD BRIEF HIM ON KING HUSSEIN'S VIEWS AS EXPRESSED IN LETTER. YOU SHOULD GIVE HIM ALSO RATIONALE ADVANCED FOR DELAYING GENERAL KHAMMASH'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON.
3. WE ARE NOT RECOMMENDING A REPLY TO KING HUSSEIN'S LETTER. IF QUESTION IS RAISED, YOU SHOULD NOTE THAT LETTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED TO PRESIDENT AND THE KING'S VIEWS MADE KNOWN TO OTHER APPROPRIATE USG OFFICIALS. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT GENERAL KHAMMASH'S VISIT AT THIS JUNCTURE IS NOT NECESSARY.

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E.O. 13202, Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/ly*, NARA, Date 6-28-10

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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R 021429Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6859

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 7684

EXDIS

CORRECTED COPY

EXDIS

SUBJ: KING'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT

REF: STATE 253744

1. WE HAVE BEEN ASKED BY PALACE TO FORWARD FOLLOWING LETTER FROM KING HUSSEIN TO THE PRESIDENT:

QTE DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I APPRECIATED RECEIVING YOUR MESSAGE OF OCT 11, 1968. UNFORTUNATELY IT CONFIRMED BY PREMONITION THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD DECIDE TO SUPPLY ISRAEL WITH (AIR SUPERIORITY) PHANTOM JET AIRCRAFT.

IN YOUR MESSAGE, SIR, YOU EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT I WOULD UNDERSTAND THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED YOU TO TAKE THIS ACTION. FRANKLY, I COULD NOT HELP BUT BE MORE DISILLUSIONED BY THIS ACTION. AS YOU ARE AWARE, MR. PRESIDENT, I HAVE DONE, AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO, ALL THAT IS HUMANLY POSSIBLE IN THE HOPE OF CLEARING THE WAY TO A JUST, HONOURABLE, AND THUS LASTING PEACE IN OUR AREA. I AM WILLINGLY TAKING GREAT POLITICAL AND OTHER RISKS IN MY ENDEAVOURS TO ACHIEVE THAT OBJECTIVE. IF WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO MAKE ANY SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE, IT IS BECAUSE OF ISRAELIS INTRANSIGENCE AND FAILURE TO MAKE ANY SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND CONCESSIONS TOWARDS THAT END, AS WELL AS ISRAEL'S OBVIOUS TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS WHICH SHE OFTEN SHROUDS UNDER THE GUISE OF " NATIONAL SECURITY."

I STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THE SUPPLY OF PHANTOMS TO ISRAEL,

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Authority NLT 01-270 (22c)
By clm/ps, NARA, Date 8-26-05

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NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 07684 030714Z

IF IT DOES NOT INCREASE HER BELLIGERENT AMBITIONS, THEN IT CERTAINLY DOES NOT CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS CURTAILING THEM. THE CONTINUOUS FLOW OF ARMS INTO ISRAEL MAY ONLY ENCOURAGE HER INTRANSIGENT ATTITUDE, AND THUS, I FAIL TO SEE HOW THE DECISION ON THE PHANTOMS WOULD NOT IN ANY WAY DIMINISH YOUR SUPPORT FOR AMBASSADOR JARRING'S EFFORTS.

I QUITE AGREE THAT OUR SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE AREA WILL BE FACILITATED IF A METICULOUS BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN THE STATES CONCERNED WERE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE, BUT I SUBMIT THAT JORDAN CONTINUES TO BE LEFT OUT WHEN CALCULATION REGARDING ARMAMENTS ARE MADE. JORDAN IS THE ONLY COUNTRY INVOLVED IN THE JUNE WAR WHICH HAS NOT YET SATISFACTORILY REPLENISHED HER MILITARY LOSSES IN THE WAR, AND JORDAN HAS BEEN THE ONLY COUNTRY TO BEAR THE FURY OF THE NEW AMERICAN AIRCRAFT THAT HAVE BEEN SUPPLIED TO ISRAEL SINCE THE WAR. SOME MIGHT ARGUE THAT THE EASTERN ARMAMENTS OF THE UAR AND OTHER ARAB STATES MAY WELL HAVE TIPPED THE BALANCE IN FAVOUR OF THE ARABS. I WISH TO ASSURE, SIR, AND IN ALL FRANKNESS, THAT AFTER STUDYING THE 1948 ARMED CONFLICT, WITNESSING AND NARROWLY MISSING ENTANGLEMENT IN THE 1956 CLASH AND LIVING THROUGH THE 1967 SO CALLED WAR, WHERE THE AIR FORCES OF THE UAR AND OTHERS WERE NEARLY ALL COMPLETELY WIPED OUT BY ISRAEL, WHICH HAS ALWAYS ENJOYED THE ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR PREPARATION IN EVERY RESPECT AS WELL AS THE ADVANTAGE OF STRIKING THE FIRST BLOW, I AM NOT CONSOLED BY ALL THIS SUPERIORITY IN ARMAMENT QUANTITY AND QUALITY THAT THE ARAB CAMP IS SAID TO ENJOY. IN FACT, I AM FAR WORRIED AND FAR MORE APPREHENSIVE REGARDING THE EVENTUAL FATE OF MY PEOPLE AND ARMED FORCES WHO WILL BE EVEN MORE INADEQUATELY EQUIPPED AND THREATENED WHEN ISRAEL RECEIVES THE PHANTOMS. I BELIEVE IT IS ONLY FAIR THAT JORDAN SHOULD ALSO RECEIVE ITS SHARE OF ITS LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS FOR DEFENSE FROM ITS TRADITIONAL SOURCES OF SUPPLY. I HOPE THAT OUR REQUESTS FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WOULD BE FAVOURABLY CONSIDERED. THE JORDANIAN CHIEF OF STAFF, LT. GEN. AMER KHAMMASH IS READY TO LEAVE FOR WASHINGTON D.C., WHENEVER OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON ARE READY TO MEET WITH HIM FOR THIS PURPOSE.

AS FOR YOUR COMMITMENT REGARDING THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF JORDAN, MAY I PLEASE REMIND YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT THIS INTEGRITY HAS BEEN VIOLATED FOR OVER A YEAR AND A HALF. IF NO PRESSURE CAN BE EXERTED BY THE UNITED STATES ON ISRAEL TO ACCEPT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT TO THE PROBLEM, THEN THE UNITED STATES, IN KEEPING WITH HER COMMITMENTS TO US, SHOULD AT

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 07684 030714Z

LEAST REFRAIN FROM HELPING ISRAEL TO CONTINUE HER VIOLATION OF OUR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

MR. PRESIDENT, I WISH TO ASSURE YOU THAT I VALUE OUR CLOSE RELATIONSHIP, AND I AM WELL AWARE THAT OUR ASSOCIATION IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES. BUT WHAT WORRIES ME IS THAT AMERICAN ACTIONS AND POSITIONS REGARDING THE PROBLEMS OF OUR AREA ARE MAKING IT DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, FOR ME AND FOR YOUR OTHER ARAB FRIENDS TO DEFEND OR JUSTIFY AMERICAN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I TRUST AND PRAY THAT YOU WILL DO ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE TO HELP US CHANGE THIS IMAGE. WE ARE DOING OUR BEST, BUT WE NEED YOUR HELP, SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE; FOR THE FUTURE OF THE ENTIRE MIDDLE EAST IS AT STAKE, AND IF THERE IS NO JUST PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THEN, UNFORTUNATELY, THERE CAN BE NO PEACE IN THE WORLD.

PLEASE ACCEPT, MR. PRESIDENT, MY SINCERE REGARDS AND BEST WISHES. SGD. HUSSEIN I. UNQTE

2. DEPT MAY WISH TO SEND THIS MESSAGE TO INTERMEDIATE POSTS ON GOV SCRANTON'S ITINERARY SO THAT HE MAY HAVE TIME TO READ IT PRIOR TO HIS ARRIVAL IN AMMAN.

3. SIGNED LETTER FOLLOWS BY POUCH. SYMMES

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Department of State

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R 021429Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6859

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 7684

EXDIS

SUBJ: KING'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT

REF: STATE 253744

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I STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THE SUPPLY OF PHANTOMS TO ISRAEL, IF IT DOES INCREASE HER BELLIGERENT AMBITIONS, THEN IT CERTAINLY DOES NOT CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS CURTAILING THEM. THE

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Authority NLT 01-270 (#22c)
By cmfics NARA, Date 8-26-05

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 07684 021710Z

CONTINUOUS FLOW OF ARMS INTO ISRAEL MAY ONLY ENCOURAGE HER INTRANSIGENT ATTITUDE, AND THUS, I FAIL TO SEE HOW THE DECISION ON THE PHANTOMS WOULD NOT IN ANY WAY DIMINISH YOUR SUPPORT FOR AMBASSADOR JARRING'S EFFORTS.

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 07684 021710Z

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3. SIGNED LETTER FOLLOWS BY POUCH. SYMMES

NOTE: * TEXT AS RECEIVED,
CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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