

ACTION

return to HHSaunders
Room 372-a EOB when signed.

Jordan

70

Tuesday, November 12, 1968

3:00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Birthday Greetings for King Hussein

State recommends the following greeting for Hussein's Birthday
November 14:

"On this your thirty-third birthday, I send Your Majesty
our best wishes. Though young in years, you are old in
the wisdom of leadership. While I am mindful of the
difficulties that beset your country, I am confident that
Jordan under your courageous guidance will find during
the coming year the peace and justice that we mutually
seek."

This is a nice gesture in any case, but Hussein needs all the
encouragement this sort of personal attention can give him. I recommend
you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

Call me _____



14716

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 7, 1968

Jordan
3461
1. Searched
2. Ret.
71
See WWR memo for President
11/12/68

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Congratulatory Message to King Hussein on
His Thirty-third Birthday

It is recommended that the President send a congratulatory message to King Hussein on November 14th, the King's thirty-third birthday. A suggested text is attached.

United States-Jordanian relations, in which the King is the key element, have been extremely close for the past decade. The King has steadfastly maintained his ties with the United States in the face of increasing domestic criticism, and is particularly appreciative of continuing indications of United States support for Jordan. Our message would be helpful to the King as a reassurance of our interest in Jordan and in his regime at this particularly critical time.

The President has sent several substantive messages to the King over the past months, the most recent of which was on October 11. In addition, we believe it is desirable and appropriate to congratulate the King on this ceremonial occasion.

Robert C. French
for Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Text of Suggested Message

5707
71a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Suggested Message

Suggested message to King Hussein on the occasion of his
thirty-third birthday on November 14: On this your thirty-third
birthday, ^Q ~~it gives me great pleasure to send to Your Majesty my~~ *our*
~~best wishes, and those of the people of the United States.~~ Though
young in years, you are old in the wisdom of leadership. While I
am mindful of the present difficulties that beset your country, I
am confident that Jordan under your courageous guidance will find
the peace and justice that we mutually seek during the coming year.

Signed: Lyndon B. Johnson.

7/6

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NEA/ARN

Aembassy AMMAN

STATE _____

1. Please deliver the following message from the President to King Hussein on November 14: Quote On this your thirty-third birthday, it gives me great pleasure to send to Your Majesty my best wishes and those of the people of the United States. Though young in years, you are old in the wisdom of leadership. While I am mindful of the present difficulties that beset your country, I am confident that Jordan under your courageous guidance will find the peace and justice that we mutually seek during the coming year. Signed: Lyndon B. Johnson. Unquote.
2. Dept does not intend to make public release of message, but has no repeat no objection if Embassy and/or ~~MINI~~ GOJ wish to do so.

END

NEA/ARN:RPPaganelli:gvl 11/7/68 3236

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

NEA/ARN - Mr. Seelye

S/S -

P - Mr. ~~STEPHENSON~~ Coates

S/S-S - Mrs. Denham

S/CPR - Mrs. Johnston

White House _

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other flimsy work copies before delivery to Telecommunications Operations Division

Jordan
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 11, 1968

WWR:

Harry Symmes is in town from Jordan. There is no special reason for you to see him, but he wanted you to know that he is available if you wished him to come over. I see no special reason for this, given pressures on your time, but just wanted you to have the opportunity.

Hal

HHS

Yes

No

— But find out:
will his clients
sign a peace treaty.
W.

P. S. Lois, the best times would be
October 17 or 18 before 11 a. m.

Jordan

Cy to JMR 10/10

~~SECRET INDEX~~

Ambassay LONDON I M M E D I A T E

INFO Ambassay AMMAN I M M E D I A T E
USUN NEW YORK I M M E D I A T E

State _____

INDEX

REF Amman 6999 (Notal)

*1 - P...
2 - Ret.
Returned to
Cromley Smith 10/14/68
Cleared
by WWR*

1. Appropriate Senior Embassy Officer should deliver following oral message from the President to King Hussein soonest: quote (Your Majesty, As you are aware, I have instructed the Secretary of State to open negotiations for the sale of Phantom jet aircraft to Israel. I trust that you will understand the circumstances that led me to take this action, which in no way diminishes our full and unequivocal support for Ambassador Jarring's efforts to bring about a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli crisis. Please be assured that it continues to be our policy to facilitate in every possible way Ambassador Jarring's important mission. I have been gratified by your cooperation with Ambassador Jarring and ~~xxxx~~ remain ~~xxxx~~ hopeful that our joint search for peace in the Middle East will come to a successful conclusion.

2. I would also like to assure you that our commitment to and support for your wise leadership, as affirmed in my messages to you of

NEA/ARN:WSeelye/RPPaganelli:gv1 5617

S/S -
NEA - Mr. Davies
NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton

~~White House~~
U - Nicholas deB Katzenbach
White House -
IO - Mr. Popper
Ambassador Symes
NEA - Parker T. Hart

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: FRUS, Vol. XX, # 277
By *ly*, NARA, Date 6-28-70

*239
King Hussein
10/10/68*

2

Ambassy LONDON

~~SECRET/ENDIS~~

February 11 and June 4, remain unfinished. I highly value our close relations as being in the joint interests of our two countries. You can rest assured that my government desires to maintain - and strengthen - this relationship and that we fully are prepared to give full support to Your Majesty's efforts to find an honorable and equitable solution to the problems that beset you. Please accept my most cordial regards. End quote

3. In delivering this message you may wish to elaborate, drawing upon substance contained in State 252286.

~~XXXX~~

4. FOR AMMAN: Charge should inform Prime Minister of gist of message after London XXXXXXXX confirms delivery to King Hussein.

END

GP-3

~~SECRET/ENDIS~~

Jordan
74

ACTION

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, October 10, 1968
7:35 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Nick suggests a hand-
holding message to King Hussein, now
in London.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Call me _____

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln
(dictated over phone)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cbm/ky NARA, Date 6-28-10

74a

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

TO: Amembassy LONDON IMMEDIATE

INFO Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE
USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

1. Appropriate Senior Embassy Officer should deliver following oral message from the President to King Hussein soonest: "Your Majesty, as you are aware, I have instructed the Secretary of State to open negotiations for the sale of Phantom jet aircraft to Israel. I trust that you will understand the circumstances that led me to take this action, which in no way diminishes our full and unequivocal support for Ambassador Jarring's efforts to bring about a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israel crisis. Please be assured that it continues to be our policy to facilitate in every possible way Ambassador Jarring's important mission. I have been gratified by your cooperation with Ambassador Jarring and remain hopeful that our joint search for peace in the Middle East will come to a successful conclusion.
2. I would also like to assure you that our commitment to and support for your wise leadership, as affirmed in my messages to you of February 11 and June 4, remain undiminished. I highly value our close relations as being in the joint interests of our two countries. You can rest assured that my government desires to maintain -- and strengthen -- this relationship and that we are prepared to give full support to Your Majesty's efforts to find an honorable and equitable solution to the problems that beset you. Please accept my most cordial regards." End Quote.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: FRUS, Vol. 44, # 277
By: NARA, Date: 6-28-10

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

-2-

3. In delivering this message you may wish to elaborate, drawing upon guidance contained in State 252286.
4. FOR AMMAN: Charge should inform Prime Minister of gist of message after London confirms delivery to King Hussein.

END

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

75

Jordan

IRG/NEA 68-36
September 17, 1968

TO: Under Secretary Katzenbach, Chairman
Senior Interdepartmental Group

FROM: IRG/NEA - Lucius D. Battle *LDB*

SUBJECT: Jordan: Contingencies - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

Because of our concern over developments in the past few months that could affect the future of King Hussein, we thought it desirable to have a paper on the subject prepared for consideration by IRG/NEA. The paper, "Jordan: Contingencies," was drafted by John Campbell of S/P. It sets up five contingency situations, each of which would involve a sharp change in Hussein's position and would require us to make some hard policy decisions.

IRG/NEA agreed that the paper, a copy of which is attached, provides a useful checklist of contingencies and steps to be considered in dealing with them, in the context of our broad interests in the Near East and particularly in Jordan. Although the paper delves into our current policy toward Jordan, it was not intended--and should not be read--as an agreed statement of that policy; we expect to reexamine our policy in the course of our forthcoming country-by-country policy review.

The attached paper will be useful to us in preparing our contingency study on Jordan following the illustrative format suggested by the SIG, including various organizational annexes.

Attachment:

"Jordan: Contingencies"

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

IRG/NEA:SS:gs
SS

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 34R-22-3-5-3
By JOL NARA Date 3-13-18

~~SECRET~~

JORDAN: CONTINGENCIES

I. Assumptions

Jordan's independent existence continues to be important to the United States, after as before the Arab-Israel war of 1967, for the following reasons:

1. Jordan has been an example of the proposition that an Arab state, even one which is weak and vulnerable, can maintain independence and achieve benefits for its people by following moderate internal policies and a pro-Western orientation in its foreign relations.

2. It is a key to the balance among Arab states, preventing by its continuance the establishment of a solid front of radical, pro-Soviet states stretching from Iraq to the UAR hostile to the remaining moderate Arab states (especially Saudi Arabia) and threatening to U.S. interests.

3. It is at the center of the problem of Arab-Israel settlement because of the Jerusalem question and the importance of the disposition of the West Bank with its Arab population; and is a possible key, also, to Arab-Israel accommodation, since it is more

SECRET

realistic and less intransigent than other Arab states and has a stronger interest in coexistence with Israel.

4. Should Jordan undergo a radical change of regime or of policy, or be taken over by a neighboring state, the resultant scramble for advantage among Arab states and between Arab states and Israel would raise the danger of renewed war in the area which could also involve outside powers.

5. U.S. prestige is involved through more than a decade of declared interest in Jordan's independence, accompanied by over one-half billion dollars in aid; not that future policy should be imprisoned in the mold of the past, but there is little question that Jordan's loss of independence would be a serious blow to America's influence and prestige in the Middle East.

II. Existing and Developing Situation

1. Jordan's great difficulty, which becomes a difficulty for the U.S. as the power which over the years has assumed a responsibility for its support, has been its weakness - poverty of resources, challenges to the political order, and vulnerability to pressure and subversion. Jordan has needed regular infusions of

outside aid to maintain its armed forces and to bolster its economy.

2. Politically, Jordan has had stability in the sense that the royal regime has maintained itself since the country achieved independence in 1946, surviving a number of attempts, internal and external, to overthrow it. From the taking over of West Bank in 1948-49 to the war of 1967, however, the large Palestinian element (West Bank residents and refugees) represented a continual though not easily measurable force for disruption. The regime has never been sure of the loyalty of its many Palestinian subjects, whose main concern tends to be Palestine rather than Jordan and who, in addition to their own revolutionary potential, have provided a channel for intervention in Jordan's affairs by other Arab states. Since the June war, with a new influx of refugees, the pressures have increased.

3. Occupying the central front facing Israel, Jordan has in times of crisis played host, voluntarily or involuntarily, to units of the armed forces of neighboring Arab states sent in to help hold the line

against Israel, to counterbalance each other, or to exert pressure on the Jordan government. Their presence has constituted a cloud on Jordan's ability to exercise full sovereignty. Iraq has maintained some 20,000 troops on Jordanian soil since the June war. Saudi Arabia has approximately 3500 in the southern part of the country. Jordan's own armed forces of some 60,000 (including national police), now being supplied with aircraft, tanks and other equipment by the United States, are and will be unable to defend the country against Israel.

4. A group of largely leftist politicians headed by Suleiman Nabulsi, the so-called National Charter group, seeks to get into power, but it has no effective leadership and the King has neutralized it without the need for repressive action. The small Communist party urges a government of national unity but has little influence. The major threat comes from groups of armed fedayeen conducting operations against Israel from Jordanian territory. Numbering about 2,000, they are not under the full control of the Jordan government, taking their guidance from organizations of Palestinians such as

El Fatah, PFLOP, and the P.L.O., which in turn are affiliated with Arab parties, movements and governments whose aims and interests (other than the general aim of ending Israeli occupation of the West Bank) are not those of the Government of Jordan and are in fact hostile to it in some respects. Some have connections with Communist powers (including the Soviet Union, Communist China, and Cuba). These groups are not concentrating on the overthrow of the King, at least in present circumstances, but the fact remains that he and his government have not been in a position to assert effective control over them by using the army because they have the sympathy and support of a large part of the population, of elements in the army itself, of the Iraqi forces in Jordan, of other Arab governments, and of opinion throughout the Arab world.

5. The Jordan government places considerable reliance on the connection it has had since June 1967 with the UAR both for maintaining a common front in the question of a settlement with Israel and for limiting the threat of the fedayeen to governmental control within Jordan. This is a significant difference from the prewar situation.

6. The King's position presently depends heavily on his role as a leader and defender of the Arab cause against Israel; thus, while he must see that fedayeen activities are a greater threat to his regime than to Israel, he feels he does not have a free hand to suppress those who alone are doing something to carry the fight to Israel. To a large extent he has tolerated the presence of the fedayeen and their threat to public order even as he seeks to prevent actions on their part which will bring down on his country new blows from Israel. His fate depends on whether he will be left any room at all between the fedayeen and Israel, both pursuing their own aims without regard to what happens to him and his regime, and without much concern whether the state of Jordan survives or not.

7. Prior to the June war the economy was growing rapidly as earnings from its basic resource endowments (tourism, remittances, and agricultural exports) increased. United States budgetary support was being reduced and prospects in the priority sectors of economic potential were such that, combined with the high levels of foreign

exchange reserves relative to import needs, Jordan's economic future appeared brighter than any earlier forecast had prophesied. In its present truncated state, however, with nearly 700,000 refugees and displaced persons to support on the East Bank, economic viability is at least questionable in the absence of substantial continuing foreign assistance. A return of the 350,000 or more who came from the West Bank in 1967 would help considerably, while a settlement with Israel which returned the West Bank to Jordan, with some arrangement for sharing in the tourism earnings of Jerusalem, could help Jordan regain its momentum toward self-sustaining growth.

8. Although the budgetary situation is eased by grants received from oil-producing Arab countries (total since June 1967: \$189 million), the economy remains stagnant. A dynamic development program, to which a large portion of the more than \$200 million in foreign exchange reserves could be committed, would be feasible and desirable. But it would require a sense of political security and confidence, not now evident, in both the government and the private sector.

9. Israel, before the war of 1967, had an interest in the maintenance of Jordan's independence. It continued to cling to the hope that Jordan might eventually break the Arab front by coming to some kind of settlement. Realizing that Hussein wanted quiet on the border, Israel preferred to have the Hashemite state as a neighbor in contrast to a stronger and more dangerous enemy ("Greater Syria," Iraq, or a new "United Arab Republic") which would result from the fall of the regime or the partition of the country. Moreover, as Soviet influence grew in the other Arab states, the Israeli were concerned that it not replace U.S. influence in Jordan.

10. On the other hand, Israel's reprisal raids against Jordan (especially the Es-Samu raid of November 1966) had the effect of weakening the King's position and driving him to assert his loyalty to the Arab cause by drawing closer to the UAR and other radical Arab states. The end result of this process was Hussein's decision to side with Nasser when the war crisis came in 1967 and his ties to the UAR thereafter.

11. Since the war, Israel has shown greater indifference to the fate of Hussein's regime and of Jordan. It has not hesitated to take armed action on

the East Bank, as a means of deterring and controlling fedayeen operations mounted against Israel and Israeli-occupied territory. In the Israeli view it has been more important to strike at the fedayeen than to help bolster the King's position. To American reminders that Hussein was trying to control them, Israeli officials have pointed to the fact that he did not effectively do so. Some elements in Israel may even have desired his fall and the advent of a radical regime like that of Syria, so that in its conflict with the Arabs, Israel would be clearly facing a solid pro-Soviet, anti-American bloc and the problems raised by striking at a moderate regime supported by the U.S. would disappear. Foreign Minister Eban has denied that this is his government's view.

12. Although the Israeli leadership at times has thought of Jordan as the first Arab country which might make peace, neither persuasion nor force has succeeded in inducing Hussein to do so. In fact, he does not see how he can move to a settlement until Nasser does. The Israeli leaders now seem to accept that proposition.

And since they do not see any movement toward settlement by Nasser, they are not prepared to coddle Hussein, and so have given priority to the aim of dealing drastically with the fedayeen raids, striking into Jordan as that policy demands.

13. Hussein's position has thus become increasingly shaky. He seems confident that he can keep things under control, especially if he continues to get arms and can show some economic progress. But arms alone will not solve the problems, he may not have time to produce economic progress or political victories, and he has not been willing to face a showdown with the fedayeen. In the absence of any movement toward an Arab-Israel settlement, the pressures on him will continue and may become intolerable.

14. This situation confronts the U.S. with two sets of policy questions:

- a) What to do now in order to prevent a radical shift in Hussein's policy or his overthrow and to stabilize the situation in Jordan, and

- b) What to do in the event that he cannot hold to the present line and makes such a radical shift in policy or is overthrown.

III. U.S. Action to Buttress Hussein and Jordan

No matter how shaky the government and the state of Jordan may be as factors contributing to stability in the area and to the possibilities for an Arab-Israel settlement, the prospect of their disappearance offers only less desirable alternatives. The U.S. therefore has to consider what steps it may wisely take to help improve their position. Those steps listed below are in some but not all instances a repetition and re-emphasis of present policy. They fall into a number of categories, as follows:

1. Strengthening Jordan militarily and economically to increase the regime's confidence and its ability to control the situation at home and stand up to pressures from abroad.

- (a) Rapid completion of delivery of the arms package now agreed upon and willingness to help Jordan get arms from other sources as

the situation demands. No Jordanian military buildup that is at all probable would represent any significant threat to Israel or disturb the general balance of power between Israel and the Arab states. Even with large quantities of new arms, Jordan cannot expect successfully to defend itself against Israel. But to maintain his regime the King cannot afford to appear totally helpless against Israeli incursions and he needs arms to counterbalance Syria's armed forces. In these circumstances U.S. supply of arms to Jordan continues to be useful in order to preclude the Soviets' entering the field and to show the other Arab states and Israel the American interest in Jordan.

(b) Provision of equipment and training for the Jordanian police forces, as long as it appears that the government is prepared to use those forces effectively to control the fedayeen. The police should be the principal

means for exercising such control, especially since Hussein appears unwilling to use his army against the fedayeen. Present U.S. programs of assistance in this field should be under continuing review as to their usefulness in helping Jordan meet the internal security problem.

(c) Willingness to help Jordan economically.

While resumption of budgetary support is hard to justify so long as Jordan is receiving subsidies from Arab countries, the U.S. can bolster Jordan's position by favoring loans for specific projects, notably those which would expand employment and reduce the pressure of the refugee problem. Such loans would have to come mainly through international agencies or private sources because U.S. public funds for this purpose will be scarce.

(d) Advice to King Hussein and his government to initiate a development program. The economic picture will not improve unless the necessary decisions are taken at the top and competent people put in charge of development. U.S. willingness to help should give us some diplomatic leverage.

(e) Political gestures favorable to Hussein and to Jordan. Public statements and assurances of friendship can be valuable adjuncts to more substantial support, if no real substitute for it.

2. Moves in the Arab-Israel dispute which take account of Jordan's basic concerns and enable Hussein to show his people some progress toward recovery of the West Bank.

(a) U.S. public statements which stress the importance of the withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces to agreed secure frontiers. Such statements need not neglect the other points in the President's speech of June 19, 1967, or the UNSC resolution of November 22,

but would be useful in showing our awareness of the one point of most interest to Jordan. It is important that it be known that our endorsement of "secure and recognized boundaries" does not refer to frontiers that leave all or the bulk of the West Bank to Israel.

(b) Similar U.S. willingness to take the position consistently in the UN and elsewhere that we accept no unilateral settlement of the status of Jerusalem or acts which prejudice future agreement on its status. This has been our position on Jerusalem, but we have been hesitant to defend it and unwilling to vote for it at the UN in a context that did not include the wider aspects of the problem. We should be prepared in the near future to come out publicly for a settlement on Jerusalem which would have a clear role for Jordan in a united city, including physical access from Jordanian territory to the Muslim holy places in the Old City.

(c) Continued diplomatic efforts to dissuade Israel from acts which weaken King Hussein's position and to convince Israel that the coming to power of a radical regime in Amman would not be to Israel's advantage in any respect, including Israel's relations with the United States.

(d) Exercise of persuasion on Israel to be more forthcoming both on the return of the West Bank and on Jerusalem. At the present time it is apparently not possible for the Eshkol government to take a clear stand to the effect that the occupied territory (or most of it) will be returned to Jordan and that the status of Jerusalem will be negotiated. But it is important that this and any future Israeli government know that the U.S. believes Israel should show a disposition to compromise on these questions.

(e) If negotiations toward a settlement get started, the U.S. at an appropriate time should be prepared to support some concrete proposals, including return of the West Bank, partial internationalization of Jerusalem, and compensation and settlement of refugees.

3. Establishment, through international effort, of greater security on the existing cease-fire line, thus reducing the pressure on Hussein and Jordan exerted both by the fedayeen and by Israel.

(a) A new and intensive effort, through the United Nations, to get Israel and Jordan to accept the presence of UNTSO observers along the cease-fire line. While the attempt to bring the parties to a political settlement drags on, and even more if it produces no result, the cease-fire line will be the de facto border. With international observers present, it might be possible to cut down the raids, counter-raids and exchanges of fire. Any success in reducing armed clashes would ease the Jordan government's position. If the great powers were in agreement and the Security Council could act unanimously on such a proposal, it might be possible to put enough pressure on the parties to get them to accept it. For Jordan the argument that it cannot take any

step which would appear to give permanent character to the cease-fire line might come to seem less important than the need for a reduction of both fedayeen and Israeli operations across the line.

(b) Establishment of a UN security force on both sides of the cease-fire line. This step would merely carry the prior proposal further, so that the international responsibility would be peacekeeping and not merely observation. Israel has always strongly opposed the idea of stationing UN troops on its territory and probably would feel the same way about the territory which it now occupies. It would not be likely to drop that opposition except under severe pressure.

(c) In the course of negotiations toward a settlement, occupation of the West Bank (not including East Jerusalem initially) by UN forces as a replacement for Israeli forces, pending final agreement on boundaries. Such a proposal might be ruled out because of anticipated total

opposition to it by Israel. Israel's acceptance is barely conceivable, however, if the proposal were linked to, or had been preceded by, action acceptable to Israel on other points of the Arab-Israel dispute (e.g., abandonment of belligerency and recognition of Israel's right to exist).

On the matter of Jordan's undertaking a negotiation with Israel, the decision must be that of the Jordanian government alone. Much as the U.S. would like to see a breakthrough in the peacemaking process, it cannot take the responsibility of urging Hussein to part company with the UAR and deal with Israel bilaterally, even if he has the prospect of a generous settlement. Such a decision, unless it were on the most generous terms, would involve the risks that any agreement would be repudiated by the Jordan public and that the King and his government would be overthrown in short order, thus bringing both the regime and the projected settlement to an untimely end.

The only sure way to bolster Hussein's position, however, is to bring about progress toward a modus vivendi with Israel that takes account of at least his minimum

requirements. Such progress is not possible without (a) a general move toward settlement involving the UAR as well as Jordan, or (b) unilateral conciliatory measures toward Jordan on the part of Israel pending negotiation of a settlement. The U.S. has only limited influence in either case.

Consideration of what the U.S. might do to shore up Hussein and Jordan must take account of an additional factor: the danger that some of the steps listed above will so commit the U.S. to the King and his country that we would be expected to do everything possible, even take military action, to save them from going under. Probably we shall not want to take such action. Certainly we do not wish to be committed to take it. Prudence on this score must enter into any decisions on the measures listed above.

IV. Contingencies

1. Let us assume that the pressures on King Hussein grow too strong for him to maintain his present position. Roughly five different situations might develop: (a) he might call for Western intervention; (b) he might abdicate (or be assassinated), leaving the government

in the hands of Prince Hassan and the politicians now in power; (c) he might turn to a radical course, forming a new government of Nasserists, Baathis and the like, making common cause with the fedayeen organizations, and perhaps inviting Syrian and UAR troops to join the Iraqi forces on Jordanian territory; (d) he might be assassinated or overthrown, to be succeeded by a radical regime following the policies indicated in (c) above; or (e) in a situation of disorder and near chaos, Jordan might be ripe for takeover by the armies of outside states intent on occupying or annexing part or all of its territory, and a renewal of the Arab-Israel war would be likely.

2. These contingencies, with possible U.S. response to them, are discussed separately below.

A. Hussein calls for Western intervention

3. If Hussein's position became untenable because of political pressures within his own country and he called for help, any U.S. military intervention to save him would have to be ruled out. Even if the dispatch of U.S. forces might be physically possible, there is no certainty that it would be effective in restoring the

situation. If our diplomatic, economic and arms support had not given Hussein enough strength to hold his own, we could have little confidence that armed intervention would save him in extremis. Moreover, from a political standpoint, the degree of involvement represented by the U.S. and UK moves into Lebanon and Jordan in 1958 is hardly possible or desirable now.

4. The UK would not act, nor would other NATO nations, so it would be purely an American decision. Aside from whether the Congress and the American people would approve and support such a move - which is highly doubtful - it is questionable whether U.S. interests would actually be served by it. Could we get out with honor once we got in? Would the U.S. force be able to keep the King in power in the unsettled conditions in which anti-Hussein feeling would be reinforced by anti-American feeling? Would the U.S. force be able to avoid clashes and bloody incidents with the local population? Would the U.S. be prepared to stand up to the charges of Arab and world opinion that it was propping up with bayonets a puppet regime not supported by its own people?

Would it be worth the risk of provoking a Soviet counter-move into Syria or the UAR? The answer to all these questions has to be in the negative.

5. What, then could we do? If the threat to his position were not purely domestic but had elements of outside intervention, the U.S. could make a public affirmation of general support for the independence of Jordan and could move some military units to or within the Middle East area, but without commitment to use force. If Hussein's position were desperate, probably any effort to mobilize international support would be too slow-moving to serve him. If he were able to hold on for a while, we could support a Jordanian appeal to the UN Security Council to consider the potential threat to peace. We could sponsor or support a request to the UN Secretary General to use his influence to keep the peace. We could urge and support the dispatch of a UN peacekeeping force at Hussein's request to help preserve order and guard against violations of Jordan's borders and the cease-fire line. We could try to restrain Israel from mixing into the situation or invading the East Bank.

6. In other words, the main U.S. effort should be directed not to the salvation of a particular individual or regime in Jordan but to the maintenance of peace and the cease-fire lines of 1967. To this end we could seek the cooperation of the Soviet Union and of other key UN members. It might be that the ensuing actions in the name of the world community would make possible the continuance of Hussein's regime or something like it. If not, we would have to adjust to the new situation.

B. Hussein leaves the scene (by abdication or assassination), and government continues with Hassan and/or the present conservative politicians in charge.

7. If the new regime attempted to hew to the same general line as Hussein's - maintaining reliance on the U.S., holding off Soviet offers and pressures, and keeping to the moderate position domestically and in inter-Arab politics - the U.S. should express its intention to continue the same cordial relations and same policies as before.

8. It would not be wise to rush in with large new aid programs or indications of support, however, until it

was evident that the new regime had some staying power. Hussein's departure itself probably would be either the cause or the result of a serious upsurge of unrest threatening the existing order. The U.S. should not get into the position of committing its prestige as endorser and protector of a regime with slight chance of survival. But we should take a clear position that no outside power, whether Israel or another Arab state, should intervene or seize Jordanian territory.

9. In dealing with the new situation, accordingly, the U.S. should stress its concern with the independence of Jordan, leaving largely to inference its view that the new government provided the best hope of maintaining that independence. If the government then showed that it had a good chance for survival, we would then take a less tentative position in support of it.

10. We should understand that the new government would have to show its Arabism by taking a hard line on a settlement with Israel. That would increase its chances of survival. At the same time we should try to restrain Israel from taking any military action against it. If

it be assumed that no real progress toward a settlement had been made, there would be little to gain by pressing a new government to be more conciliatory toward Israel. That could come later, after that government had proved itself and on condition that Israel's attitude was favorable.

C. Hussein turns to a radical course.

11. If Hussein came to the decision that his moderate and pro-Western position had become untenable and turned to the radical, nationalist elements in his country, such as the National Charter group, we could expect a sharp turn both in internal and external policies. Internally, he would bring more Palestinian nationalists into the government, give up any idea of controlling the fedayeen with his army and security forces, and try to reach agreements with the various fedayeen groupings for cooperation between them and the Jordanian army. Externally, he would shift his policy closer to those of Syria and Iraq, although relying primarily on Nasser, as a less radical radical, to protect his country from domination by Syria or Iraq or both.

He could also be expected to turn to a closer relationship with the Soviet Union and to take up their offers of modern arms on easy terms.

12. The U.S. should not automatically react sharply and in anger to such a shift by Hussein, immediately cutting off aid programs to Jordan or to refugees. Our tactics should be to roll with the punches for a while until we could see how drastic the change was going to be. We would have to terminate the military sales program, however, if the King took arms from the Soviets, and continuance of non-military aid would probably require a new determination by the President. If Hussein should himself take the matter out of our hands by repudiating his former attitudes toward the U.S., rejecting further U.S. aid, or breaking relations, we would have to accept that situation. But if he tried to hold to a roughly neutral line as between the U.S. and USSR, we could adjust to that situation and should avoid giving him no choice but to go all the way to exclusive ties with the Soviet side.

13. A key question would be whether he still stood for the independence of Jordan and could avoid the passing of control of his country into the hands of neighboring states or of the USSR. We would do well to act on the assumption that he did propose to maintain Jordan's independence, until it was proved that he was unwilling or unable to do so. In this connection, the U.S. should try to restrain Israel from making the situation worse by heavy military strikes against Jordan or by taking additional Jordanian territory. The Israeli would be tempted to take the gloves off, once they saw that Hussein had made a major policy shift and was openly cooperating with fedayeen organizations and with Syria and Iraq in a common Arab front against Israel.

14. It must be said, however, that it would not be easy to arrest the course of events at some half-way point once King Hussein had made the decision for a shift in policy. The change itself would open the gates to new pressures from the fedayeen, from Arab neighbors, and from Israel. One would have to rate rather low, therefore, the possibility that Hussein

and his throne could survive for very long, whether he tried to hold the line at an independent, neutralist position, or whether he took the gamble of going all the way with the Palestine nationalists and the militant Arab states. In that event we would be faced with the next alternative.

D. Hussein is assassinated or overthrown, and replaced by a radical regime.

15. Such a change might come at any time as a sudden interruption of Jordan's present course, or it might come as a second stage following an attempt by the King himself to change that course. The consequences would be about the same.

16. We could expect the new regime, which nationalist army officers and Palestinian politicians and guerrilla leaders probably would dominate, to start off by denouncing Hussein and all his works, especially his softness toward Israel and his reliance on the United States. It would probably terminate all bilateral U.S. aid programs. It might break diplomatic relations. In any event, effective U.S. influence would be at an end.

17. Would a new radical regime try to maintain the independence of Jordan, and could it do so if it tried? If the answer to either question is negative, the U.S. would have no reason to continue the role of champion of Jordanian independence. But the questions, as long as they remain hypothetical, cannot be given any confident answers. Jordan might be drawn into a subordinate status as a nominal partner in some kind of federation or confederation with Syria or Iraq or the UAR, which we would find it difficult to oppose as long as it had the color of voluntary association. Or Jordan might keep its independence in spite of itself. As in the past, it is a kind of balancing piece in the contention for power among the Arab states. It also is automatically an economic burden to any state taking responsibility for it.

18. The various rival states, be they radical or conservative, have tended to prefer the continued existence of a weak Jordan to the alternatives, its falling into the hands of another Arab state or becoming the scene of an open struggle among them. A third and

more probable alternative is even worse: the takeover of all Jordan or of another piece of it by Israel, following the example of what happened to the West Bank. The U.S. should oppose such a move and act through the U.N. to bring about Israel's withdrawal.

19. In all of the above contingencies the loss of the West Bank by Jordan to Israel would in all probability become permanent.

20. Thus, although the possibility of the extinction of Jordanian independence through partition cannot be ruled out, the greater likelihood is for a nominally independent but economically disintegrating Jordan in which a succession of nationalist politicians and cliques are vying for the shadow of power, surrounding radical states mix freely into national affairs and maintain their own armed forces and fedayeen units on Jordanian soil ostensibly to help carry on the struggle against Israel, and internal security is not provided by any central Jordanian government or army. The oil-rich Arab states probably would not provide financial support for a Syrian-type regime. The Soviet Union

might be providing arms and political support for such a regime in Jordan but would be wary of taking risks and responsibility for what happened there.

21. There can be little doubt that the only effect of such a situation on Arab-Israel relations would be to raise the tension to new high levels and produce an unending series of incidents, encounters, and battles on both sides of the cease-fire line. The U.S. would wish to restrain Israel from massive reprisals or invasion of the East Bank, but this would be an almost hopeless assignment in view of the military activity on the Arab side and the fact that Jordan would be no longer a moderate, U.S.-oriented state but a partner or puppet of other Arab states vowing to liberate Palestine and destroy Israel. The situation would be close to chaos, and the atmosphere ripe for a renewal of the war.

E. Jordan enters a period of continuing disorder, in which the dangers of breakdown of governmental control and security, of loss of independence or partition of the country, and of renewal of the Arab-Israel war are greatly increased.

22. This stage can come about through the disintegration of Hussein's authority and his regime, or can emerge as the ultimate result of his replacement by a radical regime as described under contingency "D" above. The fundamental question it would pose to the U.S. and other members of the international community is whether this obviously explosive situation should be left to be worked out by the Arab states (perhaps through the Arab League), by the Arab states and Israel through a new test of will and strength and possibly another round of fighting, or by some form of international diplomacy or other action.

23. Whether the collapse of Jordan would precipitate an open struggle among Arab states for control in Amman or for pieces of Jordanian territory is impossible to say. It seems unlikely that any concert of Arab states such as the Arab League could make decisions and then effectively enforce them. The rivalries between Saudi Arabia and the radical states, and among the latter, are too strong for optimism on that score. It is quite possible that Saudi Arabia, which already has troops in the southern

part of the country, would attempt to hold that area; that Iraqi troops would remain in the northern and eastern parts; and that Syrian forces would come in, with or without Iraq's consent. The Jordanian Army might disintegrate or be taken over by other Arab forces. There might be an attempt to coordinate the various occupying forces under a Unified Arab Command (presumably with an Egyptian at the top) or an Eastern Arab Command (excluding Egypt), but with no great prospect of success in either case. Fedayeen organizations and activity, under no effective control, would thrive. A new emotional binge might generate great pressure for full-scale war with Israel.

24. It is hard to imagine Israel sitting still while such a situation was building up. It might act forcefully in the beginning to prevent the influx of new Arab armies into the East Bank. The counter-action could take the form of nipping off new chunks of Jordanian territory such as the Irbid area, marching in force to occupy Amman, or undertaking large-scale military action against communications, military

installations, and troop concentrations (Jordanian or other Arab) as well as fedayeen units and bases. Alternatively, Israel might play a waiting game for a while and then strike later in response to specific military actions from the Arab side.

25. However one may picture the unfolding of events, the danger of violence and war would be there at all times. No foreseeable action by the Arab states or Israel, by themselves or together, would be adequate to check it. Consequently, the powers involved in Middle East affairs would have to decide whether their interests called for action of one kind or another, and if so whether they should act unilaterally or jointly or both, and whether they should use the institutions of the United Nations.

26. Any unilateral U.S. move introducing American armed forces into Jordan would carry many risks and few foreseeable advantages. They could hardly stabilize an internal order that no longer had the elements of stability. Their presence would inflame the Arab world against us, and could bring on a dangerous counter-move by the Soviets.

The U.S. would have to defend itself in the UN against charges of aggression and breach of the peace, with perhaps a heavy majority supporting the charge.

27. Consequently, we would have to act with other powers and preferably through UN channels. At an early stage in the disintegration of governmental authority in Jordan, the U.S. should consider on its own and with a few similarly concerned states certain steps that might be proposed as the situation grew worse. One such step could be a declaration by UN members of the need to assure the continued independence of Jordan. A subsequent step could be a UN observation mission which could go to Jordan at the request of the Jordanian government and report on a continuing basis to the Secretary-General on the dangers to public order, to Jordan's independence, and to the peace - for which there is a precedent, the UN "presence" established in Jordan by the UNGA Resolution of August 21, 1958. A later and more drastic step could be the assumption by the United Nations, again with the consent of Jordan if a functioning Jordanian government existed, of provisional authority necessary to prevent action dangerous

to the peace of the area. Such a UN authority would have to be backed up by a UN security force with contingents from various member nations not including permanent members of the Security Council.

28. In a situation where such measures had not been taken or had proved ineffective and the outbreak of large-scale fighting in and over Jordan appeared imminent, the U.S. should seek a basic understanding with the Soviet Union. The first essential would be an agreement by the two powers not to permit the situation to draw them into military action against each other. The second would be agreement, explicit or tacit, to hold back the Middle Eastern states from getting into a real war. If those basic agreements could be made, it would then be logical for the major powers to take any necessary action through the United Nations, probably the Security Council. The organization has been seized of the Arab-Israel conflict since 1947 and has provided both mediation efforts and machinery for observation of armistice and cease-fire agreements and for peacekeeping. It probably provides the only

means whereby the great powers can make effective whatever accord they reach, world opinion can be tested and perhaps utilized, and appropriate institutional arrangements can be worked out.

29. These several proposals for action through the UN may seem fanciful, unworkable, or dangerous. The main point is whether, given the alternatives, there is a case for international action, based on a general great-power agreement and operating through the UN, to take control of a situation approaching chaos in Jordan. The argument for it is that, while Jordan may be relatively unimportant itself, it nevertheless is essential to the structure of peace in the Middle East; that it keeps a balance among Arab states, and between Arab states and Israel; that the crumbling or removal of the stone that is Jordan can bring down the whole building (it is a rickety building but we do not seem to be able to get a better one); that the initiative and the decisive action must come from outside and is the only way in which Israel and neighboring Arab states can be kept from marching in; and that Israel and

the Arab states, unable to act constructively on their own, will in the end accept it. Israel would gain in security; the Arabs would avoid an Israeli takeover of parts or all of Jordan.

30. Two broad subjects suggested by the above discussion but not covered in this paper are worthy of separate contingency studies. The first is the nature of the decisions which the major powers and the international community acting through the UN might make concerning Jordan if they were successful in checking the drift to chaos and war; the possibilities could range from guarantees of the status quo to a new effort to work out a settlement between the Arab states and Israel. The second subject is the contingency of war arising from military action by Israel, the Arab states, or both.

V. Jordan and the Question of Settlement with Israel

1. The unpleasant nature of the situation resulting from any of the above contingencies and the consequent need to head them off leads to two not very startling but none the less important conclusions:

(a) The U.S. should do everything it properly can to enhance Hussein's prospects for survival in the general line of policy he is now following;

(b) The U.S. should put its full weight behind the search for an Arab-Israel settlement, or a Jordan-Israel settlement if that becomes possible.

2. Pertinent to both points is the desirability of an agreement whereby Jordan would get back the West Bank or an assurance to that effect. It would provide a tremendous boost to the King and his policies, besides being a key to reconciliation of the two countries. While such an agreement is not easily conceivable in the absence of a general settlement covering Jerusalem and other matters in dispute, we should see that every possibility is explored for partial or limited arrangements, political or economic, which point toward recognition of Jordanian rights in that territory. Such a measure as the return of parts of it to Jordanian administration would be of great benefit, unless accompanied by a total Israeli refusal

even to talk about Jerusalem. Even a declaration by Israel that it expected to return the West Bank to Jordan as part of a general negotiated settlement would be helpful in strengthening the King's position and his moderate line.

3. The main difficulty with all these proposals is that they depend on a conciliatory policy on the part of Israel of which there has been no sign. That point raises the entire question of the relationship between internal developments in Jordan and the international effort for an Arab-Israel settlement based on the UNSC resolution of November 22, 1967. Up to now, no significant progress has been made by Ambassador Jarring toward a Jordan-Israel settlement because (1) Israel has insisted on direct negotiations, meanwhile not indicating except in very general terms what it would accept as a solution for the West Bank or for Jerusalem; and (2) Jordan is unwilling to open any negotiations without the participation or consent of President Nasser, unless perhaps it should get a clearer and more accommodating indication of

Israel's position. The U.S. has not been willing to give advice on substantive matters to either party, because the matter is in the hands of Jarring and because we are still hoping for a package settlement of all the major issues between Israel and the two Arab states, the UAR and Jordan.

4. Should the U.S., if the Jarring effort fails or is indefinitely stalled, seek something less than a package settlement? Specifically, should it try to bring about some forward movement on the disputed issues between Israel and Jordan? If that is not possible now, owing to Hussein's inability to move alone, will it become more possible in the event that changes of government or of policy take place in the UAR? The answer to those questions, in relation to what is likely to be a deteriorating situation in Jordan, involve judgments on whether American or other action from outside would make that situation worse or better. If the Jordan government were pushed into a position of negotiating or dealing with Israel, it would increase its risks of being overthrown unless it could

quickly show some results in the form of regained territory. We should be wary of promoting negotiations, therefore, without knowing first whether Israel would in fact be ready to make such concessions.

5. Any progress toward the twin goals of strengthening Jordan's independence and the position of its regime on the one hand, and some measure of Jordan-Israel agreement on the other, would thus depend on the acceptance by all parties (Israel, Jordan, and those attempting to bring them together) of the proposition that a series of inter-related steps taken toward those two goals holds promise of a better and safer situation than exists now or would exist under any of the contingencies discussed under section IV above. Such conditions would be hard to meet, but the question of how we might move in that direction is a proper subject for advance planning.



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, Israel*

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*See JW Foster memo
to WWR - 8/28/68*

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ACTION NEA 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SAH 02, ACDA 16, SR 01,
ORM 03, AF 09, SAL 01, SA 01, RSR 01, /147 W

P R 280900Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6246
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USUN 1122

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SUBJ: JORDANIAN FEARS OF ISRAELI ATTACK

1. FONMIN RIFA I SUMMONED REPRESENTATIVES US, UK, FRANCE AND SOVIET UNION EVENING AUG 27 TO MEETING OVER WHICH VICEROY PRINCE MOHAMMED PRESIDED WITH ACTING PRIMIN TOUDAN AND ACTING MIN INTERIOR AKIF AL FAIZ ATTENDING. MOHAMMED MENTIONED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO US AMBASSADOR IN GENERAL TERMS EARLIER IN THE DAY (SEPTEL). HE WISHED ON THIS OCCASION TO PASS ON TO THE FOUR POWERS RESULTS OF FURTHER STUDY OF THE SITUATION.

2. MOHAMMED STATED CONCENTRATION OF TANKS VARIOUSLY ESTIMATED AT 100 TO 135 OBSERVED IN GOLAN HEIGHTS REGION OPPOSITE JORDAN REPORTEDLY MOVED LAST FEW DAYS FROM BEISAF VALLEY AREA. VISITORS FROM WEST BANK REPORTED EXTENSIVE MILITARY MOVEMENTS. HE HAD CONSULTED WITH JORDAN ARAB ARMY STAFF AND THEY FEARED ATTACK ON JORDAN HEIGHTS WAS IMMINENT. MOHAMMED SAID GOJ COULD NOT CONSIDER ANOTHER ATTACK INTO ITS TERRITORY AS SIMPLY A RAID AND HAD ORDERED MILITARY TO ASK FOR ASSITANCE FROM OTHER ARAB FORCES. THIS MIGHT INCLUDE IRAQI TROOPS AND AIR SUPPORT FROM OTHER ARAB STATES. HE RECALLED THE KARAMEH RAID AND SAID JORDAN HAD CONSIDERED THIS A LOCAL OPERATION AND

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *clm/ly* NARA, Date *6-28-10*



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REFUSED OFFERS OF ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER ARABS. AN ATTACK ON THE HEIGHTS, HOWEVER, COULD NOT BE DESCRIBED AS LOCAL. THE ARMY CONSIDERED IT COULD HOLD AGAINST ATTACK ON THE HEIGHTS FOR ONLY A FEW HOURS. THE REPORTS OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND ISRAELI THREATS WERE SUCH THEY FELT THEY COULD EXPECT AN ATTACK ANY TIME FROM FIRST LIGHT ON WEDNESDAY.

3. RIFAI RECALLED THAT JORDAN HAD REPORTED SIMILAR SIGNS OF IMPENDING ACTION ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, NOTABLY KARAMEH AND SALT, IN WHICH CASES THEIR REPORTS HAD UNFORTUNATELY BEEN CONFIRMED. RIFAI READ THE GOJ MONITORINGS OF ISRAELI PRESS AND RADIO. HE QUOTED FROM HAARETZ AUG 26 STATING THAT JORDAN SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF ISRAEL MADE A RESPONSE FITTING TO THE ACTIONS WITH WHICH ISRAEL CHARGED JORDAN. HE ALSO QUOTED FROM LEBANESE PAPER AN NAHAR CITING "BRITISH RELIABLE SOURCES" THAT ATTACK WAS EXPECTED AGAINST JORDAN SHORTLY.

4. RIFAI SAID HE HAD INSTRUCTED JORDAN'S PERMREP AUG 26 AND THE LATTER HAD SENT A STRONG NOTE TO MEMBERS OF THE SC DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE COUNCIL'S RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE FACE OF THESE THREATS IN THE LIGHT OF THE LATEST SC DECISION ON SALT. HE SAID JORDAN WAS DISCOURAGED BY THE OUTCOME OF THE PREVIOUS SC DECISIONS WHICH SEEMED INEFFECTIVE AND HOPED THAT THROUGH THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE FOUR POWERS AND THEIR CONTACTS WITH THE ISRAELIS THAT ISRAEL COULD BE DISSUADED FROM A FURTHER MASSIVE ATTACK. HE ADDED THAT JORDAN WOULD NOT HESITATE TO BRING THE CASE TO THE SC AND ASK FOR COERCIVE MEASURES IF AN ATTACK OCCURRED.

5. PRINCE MOHAMMED REFERRED TO ISRAELI CHARGES THAT COMMANDOS HAD ATTACKED SETTLEMENTS IN THE BEISAN AREA IN PARTICULAR AS JUSTIFICATION FOR CURRENT SPATE OF THREATS. HE SAID HE BELIEVED THAT COMMANDO OPERATIONS IN THE BEISAN AREA HAD BEEN FEW OR NON-EXISTENT FOR ABOUT TEN DAYS. HE SAID SOME COMMANDOS HAD BEEN FORCED TO LEAVE THE AREA OPPOSITE BEISAN BY THE JORDAN FORCES IN THAT AREA. ALSO A NUMBER OF COMMANDOS HAD BEEN JAILED THAT VERY DAY. RIFAI REINFORCED MOHAMMED'S STATEMENTS SAYING THAT THE ARMED FORCES WERE TAKING ACTION TO RESTRAIN THE COMMANDOS. TOUQAN SAID THAT THE ARMY HAD TAKEN CARE NOT TO SHELL ANY CIVILIAN ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE EXCHANGE OF FIRE ON SUNDAY AUG 25 AND HAD ANNOUNCED THIS FACT WHILE THE EXCHANGE WAS IN PROGRESS.

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6. THE US, UK, FRENCH AND RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVES PROMISED TO REPORT THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS.

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Att to John Foster

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Memo to Pastow
7/26/68

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ACTION SS 70

SUMMARY

INFO CIAE 00,1070 W

R 241230Z JUL 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6008
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USUN 1060

- POWELL
- BUDGET
- DAVIS
- FRIED
- GHEORGH
- HARTON
- JESUP
- JOHNSON
- MORSE
- KERRY
- LEONARD
- SAUNDERS
- TAYLOR

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LIMDIS

SUBJ: RIFAI REPORT ON DISCUSSIONS WITH NASSER AND RIAD

1. ON 24TH FONMIN GAVE ME BRIEF SUMMARY OF HIS MEETINGS WITH PRES NASSER AND FONMIN RIAD IN CAIRO AND PROMISED A MORE EXTENSIVE REVIEW IN NEXT FEW DAYS. RIFAI HAD HAD FIVE MEETINGS WITH RIAD AND A DETAILED TALK WITH NASSER. THE BASIC POINT THAT EMERGED FROM THESE DISCUSSIONS IS THE UAR'S INSISTENCE THAT NOT A SINGLE INCH OF ARAB TERRITORY CAN BE LOST TO THE ISRAELIS IN ANY SETTLEMENT. THIS APPLIES TO EVERY PIECE OF OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORY, INCLUDING JERUSALEM AND GAZA. HE SAID BOTH NASSER AND RIAD FEEL THE UAR HAS ALREADY GONE TOO FAR IN PUBLIC POSITIONS IT HAS TAKEN WITH REGARD TO ACCEPTING THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION AND AGREEING TO IMPLEMENT IT. IN SPITE OF UAR ACCEPTANCE AND OTHER INDICATIONS OF UAR "MODERATION," ISRAEL HAS NOT MOVED ONE STEP FORWARD. ISRAEL IS STILL BARGAINING ON MODALITIES AND FORUMS OF AGREEMENT AND THE UAR FEELS IT CANNOT GO ANY FURTHER THAN IT HAS GONE. RIFAI SAID HIS TALKS IN CAIRO LED HIM TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE IS CONSIDERABLE OVER-OPTIMISM ON THE PART OF BOTH JARRING AND THE US WITH RESPECT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF THE UAR ENGAGING IN JOINT MEETINGS AT SOME POINT. (AT THIS POINT I READ TO RIFAI FROM THE JULY 12 MEMCON OF PARKER'S CONVERSATION WITH GHORBAL ON THE POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. RIFAI SAID RIAD HAD TAKEN EXACTLY THE SAME LINE WITH HIM AND THAT, IN FACT, HE HAD LITTLE HOPE OF

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By JOW VARA Date 3-13-05



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THE UAR AGREEING TO ANY FORM OF JOINT MEETINGS.)

2. I ASKED RIFAI IF THE UAR POSITION ON NOT GIVING UP "A SINGLE INCH OF ARAB TERRITORY" WAS NOT A RETROGRADE STEP IN HIS VIEW. I SAID I HAD EARLIER UNDERSTOOD THE UAR HAD INDICATED JORDAN WOULD BE FREE TO WORK OUT ITS OWN SUBSTANTIVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH ISRAEL AND IN ARRIVING AT SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THERE MIGHT BE BORDER RECIFICATIONS INVOLVING SOME LOSS OR GAIN OF TERRITORY. RIFAI REPLIED THE DIFFERENCE WAS THAT AGREEMENT ON BOUNDARIES WOULD BE MUTUAL WHEREAS WHAT RIAD WAS REFERRING TO WAS JERUSALEM AND THE GAZA STRIP, OVER BOTH OF WHICH ISRAELI WAS ASSERTING SOVEREIGNTY UNILATERALLY. RIAD WAS EMPHASIZING THE PRINCIPLE OF THE "UNITY OF SOLUTIONS." THE RESOLUTION WAS A PACKAGE, NONE OF WHICH COULD BE IMPLEMENTED BY ANY ARAB STATE IF THE ISRAELIS WERE LEFT IN OCCUPATION OF ARAB TERRITORIES. (IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION RIFAI SAID THIS INCLUDED THE GOLAN HEIGHTS.)

3. RIFAI SAID ISRAEL'S PROCLAMATION OF THE UNIFICATION OF JERUSALEM AND WHAT HAD BEEN COMMUNICATED TO JORDAN BY BALLI WITH REGARD TO THE ISRAELI POSITION ON JERUSALEM ARE COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE TO ALL ARABS. I COMMENTED THAT RIFAI HAS BEEN QUOTED AS SAYING THAT IF ISRAEL INSISTS ON ITS PRESENT JERUSALEM LINE, JORDAN AND THE OTHER ARABS WOULD INSIST UPON INTERNATIONALIZATION AS THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE. WAS THIS POSITION ON INTERNATIONALIZATION CONSISTENT WITH RIAD'S POSITION ON NOT GIVING UP ANY ARAB TERRITORY? RIAD REPLIED THAT OF COURSE IT WAS CONSISTENT BECAUSE THE OTHER ARAB STATES HAD ALWAYS SUPPORTED THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF JERUSALEM AND, THEREFORE, THIS WOULD NOT MEAN GIVING UP OF ARAB TERRITORY.

4. WITH REGARD TO THE TWO QUESTIONS THAT EBAN HAD ASKED JARRING TO PUT TO THE UAR, RIFAI SAID THAT EVEN IF JARRING PUTS THEM TO THE UAR, HE DOUBTS THAT ANY PROCESS OF DISCUSSION WILL MATERIALIZE.

5. I TOLD RIFAI THAT I FOUND HIS SUMMARY FOR THE CAIRO TALKS MOST DISCOURAGING. HIS RESPONSE WAS THAT WHEN HE HAD A CHANCE TO BRIEF ME ON THE DETAILS I MIGHT BE EVEN MORE DISCOURAGED.

6. COMMENT: ON THE OTHER HAND, BRITISH AMB ADAMS, WHO SAW RIFAI EVEN MORE BRIEFLY THAN I IN CONNECTION WITH ANOTHER MATTER, SAID RIFAI HAD TOLD HIM THE TALKS IN CAIRO HAD GONE

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"PRETTY WELL" AND THAT HE WOULD BRIEF HIM IN A FEW DAYS. ADAMS:
AND I WILL COMPARE NOTES AS SOON AS WE GET DETAILS.

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Jordan

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ORIGIN NEA 15

INFO CPR 02, GPM 04, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SS 20, USIA 12, /068 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:R P PAGANELLI
APPROVED BY: NEA/ARN:ROBERT B. HOUGHTON
S/S-S MR. HOUDEK
NEA:MR. MCCONNELL
S/CPR:MRS. JOHNSTON

- BOWLER
- BUDGE
- DAVIS
- FRIED
- GUNBURGH
- HAMILTON
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- JORDAN
- KEENE
- LEONARD
- ROSE
- SANDERS
- TAYLOR

R 162325Z JUL 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

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1. FOLLOWING MESSAGE SENT FROM KING OF JORDAN TO PRESIDENT ON JULY 6: QUOTE. I HAVE THE PLEASURE OF EXPRESSING TO YOUR EXCELLENCY AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE OUR WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS ON THE OCCASION OF THE INDEPENDENCE ANNIVERSARY OF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA STOP I SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW OUR BEST WISHES FOR YOUR EXCELLENCY'S WELL-BEING AND HAPPINESS AS WELL AS FOR THE WELFARE AND PROSPERITY OF YOUR NATION. UNQUOTE.

King Hussein to LBJ 7/6/68

2. EMBASSY REQUESTED DELIVER FOLLOWING REPLY:

HIS HIGHNESS
HUSSEIN I
KING OF JORDAN

QUOTE. MY SINCERE THANKS FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF OUR NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE. THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES SHARE MY HOPE THAT THE CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES WILL CONTINUE TO PROSPER IN THE YEARS TO COME. FOR MY OWN PART I RECIPROCATE YOUR HIGHNESS' CORDIAL MESSAGE OF PERSONAL GOOD WISHES.

SINCERELY,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON. UNQUOTE.

LBJ to King Hussein 7/6/68

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PAGE 02 STATE 203506

3. WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT RPT NOT PLAN TO RELEASE REPLY BUT HAS NO RPT NO OBJECTION IF GOJ WISHES TO DO SO. DECONTROLLED UPON DELIVERY OF MESSAGE.
RUSK

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



Department of State

TELEGRAM

1. Ball
2. Jordan

~~SECRET~~ 156

79

PAGE 01 STATE 202036

50
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: IO: ARDAY
APPROVED BY: IO: DAVID H. POPPER
NEA-MR. DAVIES (CLEARED IN SUBSTANCE)
S/S - MR. WALSH
WH - MR. SAUNDERS

P 131847Z JUL 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ STATE 202036

EXDIS

PARIS FOR BALL AND SISCO

1. PLEASE PREPARE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT FOR DELIVERY TO KING AND HOLD FOR AMB. BALL, WHO WILL DELIVER IT PERSONALLY IN HIS CALL ON KING.

BEGIN TEXT.

YOUR MAJESTY:

I HAVE ASKED AMBASSADOR GEORGE BALL, WHO HAS JUST ASSUMED HIS NEW RESPONSIBILITIES AT THE UN, TO DISCUSS WITH YOU AND CERTAIN OTHER ARAB STATESMEN, AND WITH ISRAELI OFFICIALS, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREA. THE TRIP TO THE AREA WILL GIVE HIM THE OPPORTUNITY TO BECOME FULLY FAMILIAR WITH THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. AMBASSADOR BALL BRINGS WITH HIM ASSURANCES OF OUR CONTINUED FIRM SUPPORT FOR JORDAN AND MY SINCERE PERSONAL WISHES FOR YOUR MAJESTY.

IT HAS BEEN MORE THAN A YEAR SINCE THE END OF HOSTILITIES. IN THIS TIME THERE HAS NOT BEEN ANY PROGRESS TOWARD THE AGREEMENT CALLED FOR IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF NOVEMBER

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, VOL. XX, #211
By cbm, NARA, Date 8.24.05

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS
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EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

ZBJ
King's Personal
7/13/68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 202036

22, 1967. I FULLY APPRECIATE THE DIFFICULTIES YOU FACE IN THE CONTINUING ABSENCE OF A SETTLEMENT, AND THE COURAGE AND MODERATION YOU HAVE SHOWN IN MEETING THEM.

I ASSURE YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN ITS FULL SUPPORT TO THE EFFORTS OF AMBASSADOR JARRING AND THAT IT WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. AMBASSADOR BALL'S VISIT TO JORDAN, AND TO OTHER STATES IN THE AREA, IS EVIDENCE OF OUR CONCERN AND OF OUR CLOSE INTEREST IN THE EFFORTS WHICH ARE BEING MADE TO FIND A WAY TOWARD PEACE.

I SHALL LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM AMBASSADOR BALL YOUR THOUGHTS ON THESE MATTERS. I HOPE THAT HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH YOU WILL HELP LEAD TO THE JUST AND DURABLE SETTLEMENT WHICH WE ALL SO FERVENTLY DESIRE.

SINCERELY, LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

END TEXT

GP-3. RUSK

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
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EXDIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE LEGAL ADVISER

Jordan
WH - Mr. Rostow 1990
9102
WH 80

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 21, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

THROUGH: S/S *CUR*
FROM: L - Carl F. Salans *CFS*
SUBJECT: Case of Sirhan Bishara Sirhan - INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM

1. Rostow
2. Saunders
3. Rit.
Ret'd to BKS - 6/25/68

This memorandum records the Department's activities this week in the case of Sirhan Bishara Sirhan, a Jordanian national charged with the murder of Senator Robert F. Kennedy. Sirhan is currently in the custody of Sheriff Peter Pitchess of Los Angeles County. Until yesterday, Sirhan was represented by attorney Wilbur Littlefield of the California bar, a member of the Public Defender's Office. On June 20, Mr. Russell Parsons, a private California attorney, was retained by Sirhan and became attorney of record in the case.

In the course of the week, the Department has consulted with Deputy Attorney General Warren Christopher, Sheriff Pitchess and Assistant District Attorney Ritzie of Los Angeles County, Deputy Police Chief Robert Houghton of Los Angeles, and Public Defender Wilbur Littlefield.

Arab lawyers

On June 18, the press reported that influential lawyers' groups in Jordan had selected four prominent Jordanian attorneys to come to the United States to assist in Sirhan's defense. Under California law, a decision on an application by an alien attorney to practice for the purpose of this case in the Superior Court of California would lie in the discretion of the trial judge. While we doubt that any trial judge would allow an alien attorney to assume complete charge of the case, a judge would probably allow such an attorney to appear as associate counsel along with a California attorney of record.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *bm/8*, NARA, Date *6-28-00*

On June 18, NEA officers spoke with Jordanian Ambassador Sharaf, who expressed the view that the active entry of Jordanian lawyers into the case could create political problems in US-Jordanian relations. Ambassador Sharaf informed the Department that he had strongly advised his government to dissuade the lawyers from coming to the U.S. On June 19, according to press reports (later confirmed by Embassy Amman), Jordanian Prime Minister Talhouni met with the selected attorneys. The result of this meeting was apparently the cancelling of the group's trip and entrusting possible further action to the Arab Lawyers' Federation whose Secretary General may come to the United States "...to take part in discussion of the question" of Sirhan's defense. In response to the Department request for views, Embassy Amman has expressed its opinion that we should make no representations to the GOJ regarding the Jordanian lawyers.

We have reports that other Arab lawyers in Lebanon and Libya have announced their intention to assist Sirhan.

Consular access

On June 19, Ambassador Sharaf told Department officers that on the evening of June 18 the Honorary Consul of Jordan in Los Angeles, Mr. George Zraikat, had visited Sirhan at the prison. According to the Ambassador, Mr. Zraikat and Sirhan were required to sit on opposite sides of a glass partition and to speak through a telephone in English. Public Defender Littlefield was present throughout the conversation. The Ambassador expressed dissatisfaction with these conditions, especially the requirement for communication in English and the lack of privacy in the meeting. The Ambassador requested the Department to look into these matters.

According to Sheriff Pitchess and Public Defender Littlefield, the conditions imposed on the meeting between Mr. Zraikat and Sirhan were the normal security precautions taken at the jail and applicable to all prisoners. The requirement that visitors speak in English is also standard; the Sheriff said this was for Sirhan's protection, indicating that there have been a number of threats made against Sirhan's life. He also pointed out that both Sirhan and Mr. Zraikat speak English perfectly. The point was made to the Sheriff

that United States consular officers abroad seek to communicate with imprisoned American nationals in English. Sheriff Pitchess informed us, however, that defense counsel Parsons and the trial judge agreed that all visitors should speak in English when communicating with Sirhan. If the Jordanians wanted to press the point, they should speak to Mr. Parsons. Ambassador Sharaf was advised of these developments.

There exists no general international law right of privacy during communication between a consular officer and a national of the sending state, although, of course, a right of access is recognized. Privacy of communication between a prisoner and his attorney is required; and Sirhan has been permitted to meet privately with his defense counsel.

Consultations with Justice Department

We have consulted with Deputy Attorney General Christopher on these various aspects of the Sirhan case. Mr. Christopher said that he had recently visited Los Angeles, has spoken with Sheriff Pitchess, and had inspected the jail where Sirhan is being held in order to have a look at the conditions of detention, which seemed satisfactory to him.

cc:

U
M
G
NEA

L/NEA:RHNeuman:gb



Department of State

TELEGRAM

81

29

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 843

Jordan

PAGE 01 STATE 181203

44

ORIGIN NEA 15

INFO CPR 02, GPM 04, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SS 20, USIA 12, H 02, /070 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN - BHBAAS
APPROVED BY: NEA/ARN - DAVID L. GAMON
S/S - MR. PARKER
S/S - MR. SCOTES

R 121414Z JUN 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 181203

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO KING HUSSEIN

- 1. QTE THE TRAGIC AND UNTIMELY DEATH OF SENATOR ROBERT F. KENNEDY HAS COME AS A GREAT SHOCK TO ALL AMERICANS. ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, I EXPRESS MY DEEPEST APPRECIATION FOR YOUR WORDS OF SYMPATHY. UNQTE
- 2. QTE THE KNOWLEDGE THAT YOUR COUNTRYMEN SHARE OUR GRIEF IS A SOURCE OF GREAT COMFORT AND CONSOLATION. I SHALL TRANSMIT YOUR MESSAGE TO MRS. KENNEDY AND MEMBERS OF THE SENATOR'S FAMILY. LYNDON B. JOHNSON UNQTE
- 3. WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT PLAN TO RELEASE MESSAGE, BUT HAS NO OBJECTION TO RELEASE BY KING HUSSEIN.
- 4. FOLLOWING, FYI, IS ENGLISH TEXT OF KING HUSSEIN'S MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT:

QTE THE NEWS OF THE DEATH OF LATE SENATOR ROBERT KENNEDY WAS PARTICULARLY SHOCKING TO ME. HIS DEATH, INDEED, IS AN IRREPLACEABLE LOSS TO THE NOBLE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND TO HIS FRIENDS AND ADMIRERS ALL OVER THE WORLD. IT IS WITH DEEP SORROW AND PROFOUND REGRET THAT I EXPRESS TO YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, AND TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS GOVERNMENT MY MOST SINCERE CONDOLENCES AND THOSE OF THE PEOPLE

*288
to
Hussein
6/12/68*

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



Department of State

TELEGRAM

29

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 181203

AND GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN. MAY GOD, THE ALMIGHTY, GIVE US ALL THE POWER TO SUPPRESS VIOLENCE AND CRIME. WITH RENEWED ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION. HUSSEIN I. UNQTE RUSK

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



Department of State

TELEGRAM

82

~~SECRET~~ 127

Saunders

3

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05199 060715Z

!!
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 060635Z JUMF68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5698

Jordan

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 5199

EXDIS

SUBJ: PRESIDENT'S ORAL MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN

REF: STATE 175976 & 176578

1. ON FIFTH I PASSED PRESIDENT'S ORAL MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN, WHO EXPRESSED WARM APPRECIATION FOR IT. HE MADE NO OTHER COMMENT ON THE MESSAGE ITSELF BUT IMPLIED IT CONTAINED WHAT HE HAD WANTED TO HEAR WHEN HE MADE HIS REQUEST ON THIRTIETH.

2. STATE 176578 WAS RECEIVED AFTER MY MEETING WITH HUSSEIN. I WILL TAKE EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO BRING PRESIDENT'S REMARKS TO KING'S ATTENTION.

GP-3

SYMMES

*LIB
To
King Hussein
6/6/68*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/yc* NARA, Date 6-28-10

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

Sanchez 83

42

~~SECRET~~ 237

PAGE 01 STATE 175876

3

81
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: RBHOUGHTON/RPDAVIES
APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY
NEA/IAI: MR ATHERTON
IO/ MR POPPER
S/S: MR READ
NEA: WHANDLEY
WH: MR ROSTOW
U: MR KATZENBACH

O R 042027Z JUN 68 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USUN NY

Jordan (subject)

~~SECRET~~ STATE 175876

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
Authority ERUS, Vol. XX, #188
By *cbm*, NARA, Date 8-24-05

REF: AMMAN 50840 5170

1. PLS PASS TO KING HUSSEIN FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT:

YOUR APPREHENSIONS CONCERNING FUTURE SANCTITY OF JORDANIAN TERRITORY HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO MY ATTENTION. I WISH AGAIN TO ASSURE YOU, AS I DID IN MY LETTER OF FEB 11, THAT IT IS OUR POLICY AND OUR INTEREST TO CONTINUE OUR CLOSE RELATIONSHIP AND OUR SUPPORT OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN. AS AMBASSADOR SYMMES HAS INDICATED TO YOU, WE HAVE MADE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL OUR POLICY TOWARD THE CONTINUED INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY OF YOUR COUNTRY. YOU SHOULD ALSO KNOW THAT WE WOULD STRONGLY OPPOSE ANY OCCUPATION OF TERRITORY BEYOND THE PRESENT CEASE-FIRE LINES. I RECOGNIZE THAT YOUR MAJESTY HAS SOUGHT TO PREVENT USE OF JORDANIAN TERRITORY TO MOUNT ACTS OF VIOLENCE ACROSS THE CEASE-FIRE LINE AND URGE THAT CONTINUED EFFORTS BE MADE TO PREVENT THESE ACTIONS WHICH PROMOTE INSTABILITY AND ARE AN IMPEDIMENT TO PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE.

KBJ to King Hussein 6/14/68

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

42

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 175876

2. I WANT ALSO TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE CONTINUING OUR EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A JUST SETTLEMENT IN THE NEAR EAST WHICH IS, AFTER ALL, THE ONLY SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM ABOUT WHICH WE ARE BOTH CONCERNED. RUSK

EXD1S EXD1S EXD1S EXD1S

~~SECRET~~

ORIGIN/ACTION

18

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

85
OUL 6 JORDAN
XR POL 15-1 US/JOHNSON
FOR RM USE ONLY

RM/R	REP	AF
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ARA	EUR	FE
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L	6/PM	AID
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INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA
NSC	6	

A-365

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NO.

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JUN 6 10 55 AM 1968

RS/AN
ANALYSIS BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy AMMAN

DATE: May 30, 1968

SUBJECT : King Hussein's Reply to President Johnson's Congratulatory Message on the Anniversary of Jordan Independence Day

REF : State 170164

The Royal Palace delivered to the Embassy May 27 the following text of a letter from King Hussein to President Johnson, replying to the message transmitted in refel:

"The people of Jordan join me in expressing to Your Excellency our sincere thanks and gratitude for your kind message of congratulations on the occasion of Jordan's Independence Day anniversary with our best wishes for Your Excellency's well-being and happiness and for the continued welfare and prosperity of your nation."

SYMES

- ~~BOWDLER~~
- ~~BUDGET~~
- ~~DAVIS~~
- ~~FRIED~~
- ~~GINSBURG~~
- ~~HAMILTON~~
- ~~JESSUP~~
- ~~JOHNSON~~
- ~~JORDAN~~
- ~~KEENE~~
- ~~LEDWITH~~
- ~~ROSE~~
- ~~TAYLOR~~

Hussein to RBG
5/27/68

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

In Out

Drafted by: POL:EEKeller:clc

5/29/68

Contents and Classification Approved by:

DCM:ESDuncan

Clearances: POL:RWMurphy



Department of State

TELEGRAM

Jordan 86
22

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 826

PAGE 01 STATE 170164

40
ORIGIN NEA 15

INFO CPR 02, GPM 04, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SS 20, USIA 12, RSR 01, /069 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA:AR: RPPAGANELLI; MWWILEY
APPROVED BY: NEA: LUCIUS D BATTLE
S: CPR: MRS JOHNSON (PHONE)
NEA:ARN: MR HOUGHTON
NEA: MR DAVIES
S/S: MR MEEHAN
WHITE HOUSE: MR SAUNDERS
P: RLSTEVENSON

RODGER
BUDGET
DAVIS
FRIED
GINSBERG
HAWLEY
JESSE
JOHNSON
KAPLAN
KELLY
LITTON
MAY
MURPHY
NICHOLS
RUSK
SHEPHERD
TAMM
TROTTER
WALSH
WINTERROWD
WYDEN
YERGEN
ZIEGLER

P 241542Z MAY 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 170164

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO KING HUSSEIN OR IN HIS ABSENCE TO REGENT CROWN PRINCE HASSAN ON MAY 25: QUOTE ON THIS ANNIVERSARY OF THE INDEPENDENCE DAY OF JORDAN, I CONGRATULATE YOUR MAJESTY AND SEND TO THE PEOPLE OF JORDAN GOOD WISHES FROM THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES. WE SINCERELY HOPE THAT JORDAN, UNDER YOUR COURAGEOUS LEADERSHIP, WILL FIND PEACE AND JUSTICE DURING THE COMING YEAR. SIGNED: LYNDON B. JOHNSON. UNQUOTE.

2. EMBASSY OR USIS AMMAN MAY RELEASE MESSAGE IF DEEMED APPROPRIATE. RUSK

200
to
King Hussein
5/25/68

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

new
5/23/68
7:45

MEMORANDUM

Jordan

87

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Thursday, May 23, 1968 -- 7:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Independence Day Message to Hussein

This Saturday, May 25, is the anniversary of Jordan's independence. State recommends that you send Hussein the following message:

"On this anniversary of the independence day of Jordan, I congratulate Your Majesty and send to the people of Jordan good wishes from the people of the United States. We sincerely hope that Jordan, under your courageous leadership, will find peace and justice during the coming year."

We are checking this with you because it is a message to a touchy area. Otherwise, however, it is quite routine and uncontroversial. Any word of encouragement to Hussein is good at this time when we hope he will soon begin talks with Israel under Ambassador Jarring's auspices in New York. The Israelis know full well that we believe Hussein's survival is important to Israel's security and our own interests.

W. Rostow
W. Rostow

Approve

Disapprove

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add. s/s. 5/24
11:05
notified Mr. [unclear] and [unclear]

Jordan

Pls. return to HHSaunders
Rm. 372-a EOB when signed. *98*

ACTION

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Thursday, May 23, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Independence Day Message to Hussein

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W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



7712

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 22, 1968

*Jordan
x P.D. 1-Pruders
O-Rt. 89
See WWB memo for
President - 5/23/68*

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Congratulatory Message to King Hussein
on Jordan's Independence Day

It is recommended that the President send a
congratulatory message to King Hussein on May 25 on
the occasion of the anniversary of Jordan's independ-
ence. A suggested text is attached.

We hope that Ambassador Jarring will soon be able to
arrange talks in New York among Jordan, the UAR and Israel.
Our message would be helpful to the King as a reassurance
of our interest in Jordan and in his regime at this
particularly critical time.

We have not sent a similar message since 1964, nor
did we greet the King on his birthday in November.

John P. Walsh
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Text of Suggested Message.

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89a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Suggested Message

Suggested message to King Hussein or in his absence to Regent Crown Prince Hassan on May 25: On this anniversary of the independence day of Jordan, it gives me great pleasure to send Your Majesty and the people of Jordan congratulations and good wishes from the people of the United States. We sincerely hope that Jordan, under your courageous leadership, will find peace and justice during the coming year. Signed: Lyndon B. Johnson.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Amembassy AMMAN

STATE

1. Please deliver the following message from the President to King Hussein or in his absence to Regent Crown Prince Hassan on May 25: QUOTE On this anniversary of the independence day of Jordan, it gives me great pleasure to send Your Majesty and the people of Jordan congratulations and good wishes from the people of the United States. We sincerely hope that Jordan, under your courageous leadership, will find peace and justice during the coming year. Signed: Lyndon B. Johnson. UNQUOTE.
2. Embassy or USIS Amman may release message if deemed appropriate.

END

NEA/ARN:RPPaganelli/
 MWiley:dmg 5/21/68 3236

Lucius D. Battle
 NEA - ~~Rodger Davies~~

S/CPR - Mrs. Johnson (phone)
 NEA/ARN - Mr. Houghton
 NEA - Mr. Davies

s/s -
 White House -
 P - RLStevenson

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



Department of State

TELEGRAM

90

Saunders

32

- ~~BOWLEN~~
- ~~BUDGET~~
- ~~DAVIS~~
- ~~FRIED~~
- ~~GINSBURGH~~
- ~~HAMILTON~~
- ~~JESSUP~~
- ~~JOHNSON~~
- ~~JORDEN~~
- ~~KEENE~~
- ~~LEONHART~~
- ~~ROCHE~~
- ~~SAUNDERS~~
- ~~TAYLOR~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 551

PAGE 01 STATE 152913

50
ORIGIN NEA 15

INFO CPR 02,GPM 03,NSC 10,P 04,RSC 01,SS 20,USIA 12,1067 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:MWWILEY
 APPROVED BY: NEA:RODGER P. DAVIES
 PROTOCOL:MR. KING
 WHITE HOUSE: MR. SAUNDERS
 NEA/ARN:MR. HOUGHTON
 S/S:MR. WALSH

 P 251645Z APR 68
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 152913

1. AFTER CONFIRMING NEWS REPORT EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO KING HUSSEIN: QUOTE. DEAR KING HUSSEIN, MY HEARTIEST CONGRATULATIONS ON THE BIRTH OF YOUR TWIN DAUGHTERS. I KNOW THEY WILL LIGHTEN YOUR DAYS, AND I SEND OUR BEST WISHES TO YOU AND YOUR FAMILY AT THIS HAPPY TIME. UNQUOTE.
2. USG DOES NOT INTEND MAKE PUBLIC RELEASE THIS MESSAGE BUT HAS NO OBJECTION SHOULD GOJ WISH TO DO SO. RUSK

King Hussein
4/25/68

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Pls. return to
HHSaunders, Room 372-a EOB
when signed.

Jordan

91

SECRET

Thursday, April 25, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Late Note Before You See John McCloy at 11:45 a. m.

When John McCloy saw King Hussein during his recent trip, Hussein was discouraged about our arms program. At that time, he had asked for certain items to be airlifted, and McCloy may raise this with you.

Paul Nitze has just agreed to a total of 13 flights to Jordan. The first 3 of these will simply be regular US military supply flights into Jordan which, among other material for our people, will also carry some communications and other such logistical equipment included in the Jordanian package. Then there will be 10 special flights, at Jordan's expense, beginning in 2-3 weeks and carrying such things as jeeps and recoilless rifles.

This action partly takes care of Hussein's complaint to McCloy. However, his main concern was discouragement over delays by Israel and Nasser in getting peace talks started. I'm sure he wishes we could lean harder on Israel.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#535)
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *dmf/rq*, NARA, Date 8-26-05

5:20 pm
4/24/68

50

Jordan

MEMORANDUM

ACTION

92

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Wednesday, April 24, 1968
5:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Short Message to King Hussein

King Hussein's wife gave birth late yesterday to twin daughters. State recommends the following message:

"Your Majesty: My heartiest congratulations on the birth of your twin daughters. I know they will lighten your days and I send our best wishes to you and your family at this happy time."

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____
Disapprove _____

cl. 5/3, Helen Brown
4/25/68 11:00 am
notified Saunders' Jr.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Pls. return to HHSaunders
Room 372-a EOB when signed.

93

Jordan

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Wednesday, April 24, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Short Message to King Hussein

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"Your Majesty: My heartiest congratulations on the birth of your twin daughters. I know they will lighten your days and I send our best wishes to you and your family at this happy time."

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Jordan

94

See HHS memo to
Poston 4/17/68.

→ BKS

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

To Hal Saunders
Should this go to
WWIR for the President
or can it await their
return?

Brown
4/16/68

Brown:
I would hold it for return.
My memo to Walt (attached) is
my reason.

Hal



Department of State

TELEGRAM

94a

44

~~SECRET~~ 795

PAGE 01 STATE 147492

82
ORIGIN NEA 15

INFO EUR 15, GPM 03, NSC 10, CIAE 00, INR 07, NSAE 00, RSC 01, DODE 00,

IGA 02, AID 28, /081 R

DRAFTED BY: DOD/ISA:RMURRAY
APPROVED BY: NEA/ARN-ROBERT B. HOUGHTON

R 161734Z APR 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AIEIBASSY AMMAN
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
CINCSTRIKE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 147492

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: JORDAN ARMS - AIRLIFT

REF: AMMAN 4311

1. TENTATIVE SCHEDULE OF AIR SHIPMENT OF MAP GRANT AID ITEMS AS FOLLOWS:
2. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HAS BEEN ASKED TO INCLUDE FOLLOWING FY 67 MAP GRANT AID ITEMS ON MAC FLIGHT ARRIVING AMMAN ON

PAGE 2 RUEHC 147492 ~~SECRET~~
24 APRIL.

- A. DRONE TARGET SYSTEM (EXCEPT FOR 3 ITEMS OF TOOL SETS WHICH ARE SCHEDULED FOR 30 APRIL FLIGHT) INCLUDING 20 DRONES.
- B. 38 EACH AIMING CIRCLES.
- C. 10 EACH MORTAR SIGHTS (THIS ALL THAT NOW AVAILABLE).

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ/RAC 02-246 (#336a)
By edw/ics, NARA, Date 8-26-05

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 147492

BALANCE WILL BE SCHEDULED FOR SUBSEQUENT MAC FLIGHTS AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE FROM NEW PROCUREMENT).

- D. 21 EACH AN/VRC 10 RADIO SETS.
- E. 20 EACH AN/PRC 10 RADIO SETS.
- F. 32 EACH INSTALLATION UNITS FOR RADIO SETS AN/GRCS.
- G. VARIOUS QUANTITIES SPARE PARTS CURRENTLY AVAILABLE.

PAGE 3 RUEHC 147492 ~~SECRET~~

3. AMMUNITION FOR SOME TIME HAS BEEN PACKED FOR SEA SHIPMENT. ARMY HAS ALREADY ORDERED SUPPLY ACTION ON PRIORITY BASIS FOR SHIPMENT FIRST AVAILABLE VESSEL. TO TRANSFER NOW TO AIR WOULD BE COSTLY AND TIME CONSUMING.

4. WE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU SHORTLY AS TO SHIPMENT OF OTHER MAP AND NON-MAP ITEMS. GP-3. RUSK.

~~SECRET~~

Jordan
x Israel
Message to Hussein and Eshkol

95

April 4, 1968

WALT:

This is the package I wrote you about earlier today (Lois said she would at least put my memo in your brief case).

There has been no time to staff it here at all. State took a week to get it out and just barely made tonight's pouch.

The ^{main} ~~main~~ element of urgency is that Hussein is going to Cairo Saturday. But there are also continuing reports of Israeli buildup. Since the message to Hussein says the President is sending one to Eshkol, it's hard to separate the two.

The one alternative on the Eshkol message would be to send a short one saying the President would like to send someone to talk. There are all kinds of nuances in the proposed draft about direct negotiations, Rhodes-type talks, etc. that it might be better not to be locked into if we're going to send an emissary. If the President wants to approve the Hussein message, you could simply wire me back to provide a short message to Eshkol suggesting an emissary. We could include a short word of caution and leave the rest of the message to be used as instructions for the emissary.

One final word about the nature of the emissary, if you get into that. Everyone except Gene believes this should be a non-governmental fellow. The main reason is that he would be delivering a delicate message from the President that no Department official should be forced to carry. I am still afraid that thinking in the Department about this fellow's mission is far from the mission we have in mind. If you will remember your drafting the formula that the President finally used on the F-4s at the Ranch during the Eshkol visit, you will be close to the kind of job I see this emissary doing. State, I fear, sees the emissary going on a conventional diplomatic mission. It's going to be much trickier than that, and it's going to involve telling Eshkol delicately that he's going to have to face a divided Cabinet and get some decisions out of it if he wants our continued support. That's no job for an Under Secretary of State, no matter how competent and articulate.

If you have time to deal with this at all, I hope you can catch the President in a quiet moment to spell out the vision I know you share of this mission. I hope you can avoid it's being dealt with off-handedly or without full thought of what's at stake here. We can do this one right and give the President's June 19 policy a chance to succeed. Or we can shoot from the hip and kill it.

Sorry to leave this with you. And sorry to say some things that might be offensive to my good friends in State. But I feel strongly about this, and I honestly believe they don't see this from the President's viewpoint.

Bon Voyage!
DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
Bckm/s, NARA, Date 6-28-10

Hal
Hal Saunders

ZFF-6
96
Jordan
133887
Police
Panderus
21 Mar 68 05 40
FOR OC/T USE ONLY

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~ ~~STATE~~
Classification

Origin
Info:

ACTION: AmEmbassy AMMAN FLASH

Info: AmEmbassy TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

USUN New York IMMEDIATE

NODIS

STATE 133887

Deliver following message urgently from President to King Hussein. Quote: Dear King Hussein;

While I appreciate your problem in controlling terrorism incidents such as that which occurred on March 18th cannot but arouse passions most destructive for common hopes for peace in the Middle East.

I found your public statement of February 15th courageous; but despite this statement and subsequent efforts incidents have continued.

I appeal to you for a maximum effort to bring such incidents under firm control and to indicate by words and actions your determination to maintain an environment in which such violence cannot occur.

Drafted by:

As received from White House

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

S/S-O: Eledbetter

Clearances:

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, vol. XX, #120
By etm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

SECRET

289
To
Hussein
3/21/68

Page 2 of telegram to AmEmbassy AMMAN FLASH

~~SECRET~~

Classification

I am making a strong appeal at this time to Prime Minister
Eshkol to exercise restraint.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Unquote.

End



Department of State

Jordan 97

~~SECRET~~

TELEGRAM
ACTION COPY

CONTROL : 5309Q
RECEIVED : March 21, 1968
3:49A.M.

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 3922A 0810830
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 210329Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4980
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3922

NODIS

SUBJ: PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO KING HUSSEIN

REF: STATE 133887

REFTEL RECEIVED AT 8:45 LOCAL. WE DELIVERED PRESIDENT'S
LETTER TO KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY ZAID RIFAI AT 9:40 LOCAL.

SYMMES
BT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *ckm/s*, NARA, Date 6-28-10



Department of State

TELEGRAM

#10

98

1. J.F.
2. Jordan - subject file

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 5368Q
RECD: A MARCH 21, 1968
7:56 A.M.

OO RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 3928A 0811035
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 211030Z MAR 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4985
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3928

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, F/22
By ctm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

NODIS

REF: STATE 133587-

1. WE HAVE JUST BEEN ASKED BY KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY TO SEND FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM KING HUSSEIN TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON:

2. QTE DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: IN RESPONSE TO YOUR LETTER WHICH I JUST RECEIVED, I WISH TO POINT OUT THE FOLLOWING: WE ARE NOW FIGHTING ONCE AGAIN, DEFENDING--IN THE FACE OF A BLATANT AND PREMEDITATED ISRAELI AGGRESSION--OUR LAND, OUR HOMES, THE SHABBY TENTS OF THE VICTIMS OF CIVILIZATION, AND OUR HONOR. WE ARE DOING SO WITH WHAT HAS REMAINED IN OUR HANDS IN THE WAY OF WEAPONS SINCE JUNE 1967, FACING OVERWHELMING ODDS, UNEQUIPPED AS WE ARE, NOT EVEN BY A FINALIZED AGREEMENT BETWEEN US FOR RESUPPLYING US WITH DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT BY THE FRIENDLY UNITED STATES.

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3928A ~~SECRET~~

3. "IF THE BATTLE SHOULD GO THE WAY IT WELL MIGHT DO, THEN JORDAN, ITS HEAD OF STATE: ITS LEADERS, ITS ARMED FORCES AND ITS PEOPLE WOULD ALL BECOME THE VICTIMS OF AMERICAN WEAPONS, AND THEIR OWN FAITH IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS PRESIDENT, AS WELL AS THE FRIENDSHIP WHICH THEY VALUED TO THE POINT OF REFUSING TO ACCEPT ANY OTHER OPTION TO BOLSTER THEIR DEFENCE IN THE FACE OF A HISTORY OF CONTINUED AGGRESSION.

4. "I AM NOT, AND SHALL NEVER HOLD MYSELF OR MY GOVERNMENT AND ARMED FORCE, RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF THE ISRAELI FORCES OF OCCUPATION IN THE WEST BANK OF JORDAN AND THE REST OF THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES. NOR DO I EXPECT TO BE HELD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS."

~~SECRET~~

King Hussein
172 RB8
3/21/68

~~SECRET~~

-2- AMMAN 3928, MARCH 21

5. "AS FOR THE INCIDENT OF MARCH 18 TO WHICH YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, REFERRED, I WISH TO STATE, FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THAT AFTER A MOST THOROUGH INVESTIGATION, THIS INCIDENT COULD NOT BE TRACED INNSANIN OR CONSEQUENCE, TO JORDAN.

6. "WE HAVE TRIED OUR BEST, HONESTLY, FAITHFULLY AND SINCERELY TO LAY THE FOUNDATION FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THIS AREA. THE BLAME FOR FAILURE, IF IT OCCURS, MUST LIE SQUARELY ON THE ISRAELI SIDE AND ON THOSE WHO, KNOWINGLY OR UNDELIBERATELY,

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3928A ~~SECRET~~
ENCOURAGE ISRAEL IN HER PLAN FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF THE FIRST AND LAST CHANCE TO ACHIEVE PEACE.

7. "WITH MY REGARD. SINCERELY, AL-HUSSEIN. UNQTE.

8. COMMENT: AS WE HAVE REPORTED, PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE ARRIVED AFTER ISRAELI ATTACKS HAD BEGUN (AND HAD BEEN IN PROGRESS FOR THREE HOURS). IN DELIVERING LETTER IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT IT HAD ORIGINATED PRIOR TO THIS MORNING'S ATTACKS AND THAT A PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE HAD ALSO BEEN SENT TO ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER.

9. WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO HUSSEIN EVOKED A VERY NEGATIVE REACTION. KING WAS APPARENTLY PARTICULARLY UPSET BY WHAT HE CONSIDERED IMPUTATION WE WERE HOLDING JORDAN RESPONSIBLE FOR BUS INCIDENT AND THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN SINCERE IN HIS EFFORTS TO TRY TO CONTROL TERRORISTS.

GP-1. SYMMES

BT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

Jordan
(subj)
TELEGRAM *91*

~~SECRET~~

5

Poundis

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 3922A 0810830
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 210829Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4980
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3922

CONTROL : 5309Q
RECEIVED : March 21, 1968
3:49A.M.

NODIS

SUBJ: PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO KING HUSSEIN

REF: STATE 133887

REFTEL RECEIVED AT 8:45 LOCAL. WE DELIVERED PRESIDENT'S
LETTER TO KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY ZAID RIFAI AT 9:40 LOCAL.
SYMMES
BT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/j*, NARA, Date *6-28-10*

Sent 12:15 AM

~~FLASH~~
AMMAN FLASH
TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USUN NEWYORK IMMEDIATE
Dear King Hussein;

STATE
MADRID
DELIVER FOLLOWING
MESSAGE URGENTLY
FROM PRESIDENT TO
KING HUSSEIN

Jordan

QUOTE

While I appreciate your problem in controlling terrorism,
incidents such as that which occurred on March 18th cannot but
arouse passions most destructive for common hopes for peace
in the Middle East.

100

I found your public statement of February 15th courageous;
but despite this statement and subsequent efforts incidents have
continued.

I appeal to you for a maximum effort to bring such incidents
under firm control and to indicate by words and actions your de-
termination to maintain an environment in which such violence
cannot occur.

I am making a strong appeal at this time to Prime Minister
Eshkol to exercise restraint.

SINCERELY

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

UNQUOTE

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol xx, #120
By cbm/g NARA, Date 6-28-10

289
To
King Hussein
6/3/20/68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

Jordan
Jarrington
101
3

~~SECRET~~ 979

PAGE 01 AMMAN 3794 140941Z

ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 140825Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0000
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1357
AMEMBASSY LONDON 2778
USUN NEW YORK 0756

SS
Launders

Att to HNS memo to
Harry McPherson
3/14/68.

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3794

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION-TALK WITH HUSSEIN

REF: AMMAN 3782, STATE 129216

1. WHEN I SAW KING HUSSEIN LAST EVENING, I ALSO CARRIED OUT INSTRUCTIONS IN PARA TT OF STATE 129216 BE REVIEWING MY DE-

PAGE 2 R00MKG 3794A ~~SECRET~~
TAILED DISCUSSION WITH ABD AL-MONEIM RIFAI EARLIER IN DAY (AMMAN 3782). I NOTED RIFAI CONSIDERED SITUATION MIGHT NOT BE SO BLEAK IN SOME WAYS AS IT APPEARED. NEVERTHELESS, WE WANTED KING TO KNOW HOW WE SEE SITUATION IN HOPE GOJ WOULD ALSO WISH TO SAVE JARRING MISSION AND HOPEFULLY BRING ALL PARTIES ALONG TO "NEXT STEPS". GIVEN HIS ROLE IN TALKS LEADING TO ADOPTION OF NOV 22 RESOLUTION, WE HOPED KING WOULD AGREE WE SHOULD NOT LET JARRING MISSION FOUNDER BECAUSE OF DEBATES ON MEANINGS OF WORDS.

2. HUSSEIN, WITH ZIAD AL-RIFAI OCCASIONALLY INTERJECTING COMMENTS, (ASID) FOLLOWING:
a. HE WOULD WAIT TO HEAR WHAT JARRING HAD TO SAY ABOUT ISRAELI POSITION ON ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION. IT SEEMED TO

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NLT 02-267 (4/57)*
By *eb/iss*, NARA, Date *8-26-05*

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 AMMAN 03794 140941Z

HIM, HOWEVER, THAT ISRAEL MUST BEAR MOST OF THE BLAME IF JARRING FAILS. DESPITE THE UNDERSTANDINGS LEADING UP TO THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION, ISRAEL HAD BEEN INSISTING ON "DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS" AND "PEACE TREATIES". ISRAEL HAD REFUSED TO "ACCEPT" THE RESOLUTION. ISRAEL MEANWHILE CONTINUED TO TAKE EXTREME AND REPEATED MEASURES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES INCON-

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3794A ~~SECRET~~

SISTENT WITH PRINCIPLES OF THE RESOLUTION. JORDAN HAD ACCEPTED THE RESOLUTION FROM THE BEGINNING. JORDAN WANTS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT UNDER THE RESOLUTION. JORDAN SO FAR HAS NO REASON TO BELIEVE ISRAEL ALSO WANTS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. HE HOPED JARRING WOULD PROVE HIM WRONG.

B. BASED ON JORDAN'S INFORMATION, THE UAR POSITION DID NOT LOOK LIKE BACKTRACKING. (ZAID HAD WITH HIM AND READ FROM THE MINUTES OF RIYAD'S MARCH 7 MEETING WITH JARRING.) HE WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT JORDAN ALSO DOES NOT ENVISAGE "ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION" TO MEAN THAT ISRAEL IS THEN FREE TO INTRODUCE A DETAILED AGENDA FOR SOME FORM OF VEILED DIRECT TALKS LEADING TO A PEACE TREATY. JORDAN HAS ALWAYS BEEN WILLING TO TALK UNDER JARRING'S AEGIS ABOUT HOW THE PRINCIPLES OF THE RESOLUTION ARE TO BE IMPLEMENTED. IT IS THOSE PRINCIPLES, HOWEVER, AND NOT EBAN'S LIST AS PRESENTED IN THE EARLY MEETINGS WITH JARRING THAT ARE UP FOR DISCUSSION. FOR EXAMPLE, KING SAID THERE WOULD BE NO NEED TO DISCUSS THE BOYCOTT. IF RELIGIOUS BOYCOTT WERE RENOUNCED AS THE RESOLUTION SPECIFIED, THEN THE ARAB SECONDARY BOYCOTT WOULD VANISH IMMEDIATELY. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF SOVEREIGN ARAB STATES (SOME OF WHOM DID

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 3794A ~~SECRET~~

NOT TRADE WITH EACH OTHER) DID NOT WISH TO TRADE WITH ISRAEL, THAT WAS ANOTHER MATTER. THE RESOLUTION DID NOT REQUIRE SUCH TRADE TO BE DISCUSSED, LET ALONE FORCED ON ARABS. ISRAEL'S INSISTENCE ON SUCH AGENDA ITEMS WOULD ONLY STIMULATE ADVERSE ARAB REACTION.

C. HE FEARED THE ISRAELIS ARE NOW MORE INTERESTED IN BRINGING DOWN NASSER THAN IN PROCEEDING TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. (ZAID AL-RIFAI DREW PARALLEL BETWEEN CURRENT ISRAELI

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 AMMAN 03794 140941Z

TACTIS ON THE JARRING MISSION AND KING FAISAL'S ACTIONS IN DEALING WITH NASSER ABOUT THE YEMEN PROBLEM. THE ISRAELIS SEE NASSER IN A WEAKENED CONDITION AND IN THEIR EAGERNESS TO

EMBARRASS NASSER HAVE BEEN DISTRACTED FROM THE BUSINESS AT HAND.

3. THE U.S. COULD COUNT ON JORDAN TO DO ALL IT COULD IN ITS HONOR TO HELP PRESERVE THE JARRING MISSION. JORDAN WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE OF RECENT U.S. EFFORTS IN THIS RESPECT. UNFORTUNATELY, JORDAN'S INFORMATION SO FAR DID NOT ENCOURAGE IT TO BELIEVE ISRAEL HAS EITHER ACCEPTED THE RESOLUTION OR IS WILLING TO DISCUSS IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS PRINCIPLES.

PAGE 5 RUMKMG 3794A ~~SECRET~~

3. COMMENT: WE ARE CONVINCED JORDAN WILL DO EVERYTHING IT CAN TO SAVE THE JARRING MISSION, NEVERTHELESS, FROM THIS VANTAGE POINT WE ARE FORCED TO CONCLUDE THAT, WHATEVER UAR BACKTRACKING THERE MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE BEEN, IT IS MOST IMPORTANT FOR US TO GET A CLEAR CUT ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION, AS WELL AS RECOGNITION OF THE NEED TO PROCEED AS ENVISAGED IN THE TALKS LEADING UP TO ADOPTION OF THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION. THOSE PRE-RESOLUTION TALKS DID NOT REQUIRE "DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS" NOR PROVIDE FOR A DETAILED AGENDA TO BE SUBMITTED IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THE JARRING MISSION. ISRAELI GAMBITS TO DATE HAVE KEPT ALIVE ARAB SUSPICIONS GENERALLY AND HAVE RAISED SERIOUS QUESTIONS IN JORDANIAN MIND ABOUT ISRAELI INTENTIONS.

4. SUGGEST DEPT ALSO PASS AMMAN 3782, 3783 AND 3784 TO CAIRO IF IT HAS NOT ALREADY DONE SO. SYMMES

GP-3

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY DC/T.

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

102

~~SECRET~~

Jordan

W H

2

R7 RUEHC
DE RUQWKG 3770/1A 0721700
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 121615Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4876
STATE GRNC
BT

CONTROL : 31310
RECEIVED : March 13, 1968
2:38A.M.

Jordan

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 3770

*Att. to JF & HHS memo to
WWP - 3/14/68 - Subj -
"More on Hussein"*

MODIS

SANDSTORM

1. IT IS NOW GETTING ON TO FOUR MONTHS SINCE THE ADOPTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF NOV 22. MOST RECENT REPORTS FROM CAIRO, TEL AVIV, AND USUN INDICATE THAT WE ARE FURTHER THAN EVER AWAY FROM IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT RESOLUTION AND MAY SOON BE BACK IN SC.

2. IN LATE SUMMER WE DECIDED AT LEAST TEMPORARILY TO CLOSE DOWN "SANDSTORM" AND BEGAN TO PURSUE PRESENT POLICY OF SEEKING A MULTILATERAL ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT. IN MAKING THIS SHIFT

PAGE TWO RUQWKG 3770/1A ~~SECRET~~

WE OF COURSE RECOGNIZED THE DIFFICULTY OF GETTING INDIVIDUAL ARAB STATES WHICH, AFTER ALL, HAVE QUITE DIFFERENT INTERESTS IN A FINAL SETTLEMENT, TO AGREE ON A CONCERTED APPROACH TO DEALING WITH ISRAEL. INDEED, THE DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING SUCH AN ARAB CONSENSUS HAS BEEN ONE OF THE PRICIPAL LESSIONS OF THE PAST TWENTY YEARS.

3. OVER THE YEARS WE HAVE ALSO BEEN VERY MUCH AWARE OF ANOTHER LESSON--THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR A LEADER OF ONE OF THE SMALLER ARAB STATES, SUCH AS LEBANON OR JORDAN. TO MAKE A SEPARATE PEACE WITH ISRAEL AND SURVIVE. PARTICULARLY IN JORDAN, THE FATE OF KING ABDULLAH ALWAYS COMES TO MIND. WE DOUBT THAT THE SITUATION HAS CHANGED TODAY. A SEPARATE PEACE WOULD STILL ENTAIL EXTREMELY GRAVE RISKS FOR THE ARAB LEADER WHO APPEARED TO CONTEMPLATE IT. THE MOST MODERATE AND REASONABLE JORDANIANS WE TALK TO SEE SEPARATE TALKS ONLY AS A LAST, DESPERATE RESORT.

4. WE KNOW QUITE WELL THAT KING HUSSEIN AND MANY JORDANIAN LEADERS WANT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. FROM THE VERY BEGINNING

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Authority FRUS Vol. XX #109
By *cbm*, NARA, Date *8-24-05*

~~SECRET~~

-2-Page, AMMAN 3770, Section 1 of 2, March 13, 1968 -NODIS/SANDSTORM

PAGE THREE RUQMKG 3770/1A ~~SECRET~~
OF THE JARRING MISSION (EVEN THOUGH THEY MAY HAVE PLAYED WITH WORDS DURING THE FIRST MEETING WITH JARRING IN ORDER TO SAVE THEIR HONOR AND THEIR REPUTATIONS WITH FELLOW ARABS) WE HAVE KNOWN THAT THE JORDANIANS ACCEPTED THE RESOLUTION AND WANTED TO MOVE TO PRACTICAL NEXT STEPS.

5. MEANWHILE, THE SITUATION IN PRESENTLY TRUNCATED JORDAN CAN ONLY WORSEN, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE ISRAEL CONTINUES TO FOLLOW POLICIES TENDING TO CONSOLIDATE, AT LEAST IN ARAB EYES, ITS OCCUPATION OF THE WEST BANK. UNFORTUNATELY, THE MANIPULATIVE STRATEGY FOLLOWED BY ISRAEL (THAT IS RETALIATORY RAIDS TO "TEACH JORDAN A LESSON," OFFICIAL AND SEMI-OFFICIAL THREATS LINKED WITH RETALIATION, AND PUBLIC SURFACING OF CONTACTS WITH ARABS OR EASING OF ARAB STANDS) TENDS TO COMPOUND CURRENT DIFFICULTIES FACED BY JORDAN'S LEADERS. IN OUR VIEW, ALTHOUGH, TERRORISM IN FUTURE MAY NOT BECOME ANY MORE EFFECTIVE IN ISRAEL OR IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY, IT SEEMS BOUND TO INCREASE BECAUSE OF POLICIES ISRAEL ITSELF IS FOLLOWING. AND THE POST-FEB 15 DEVELOPMENTS HAVE SHOWN THAT IT IS GOING TO BECOME MORE AND MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE JORDAN REGIME TO SUPPRESS IT.

PAGE FOUR RUQMKG 3770/1A ~~SECRET~~
MOREOVER, THE TERRORISTS POSE A MAJOR THREAT TO THE JORDANIAN REGIME ITSELF. WE CAN ONLY CONCLUDE FROM HERE THAT IF PRESENT TALENTE IN THE JARRING MISSION CONTINUES, WE WILL NOT ONLY HAVE FAILED TO ACHIEVE A MULTILATERAL SETTLEMENT UNDER JARRING'S EGIS, BUT MORE IMPORTANT, WE WILL ALSO HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY DIMINISHED THE CHANCES FOR MOVING SUCCESSFULLY TOWARDS BILATERAL JORDAN-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT. THE OUTLOOK FOR A STABLE AND INDEPENDENT JORDAN WILL BECOME EVEN MORE BLEAK.

6. FOREGOING SUGGESTS THE TIME MAY HAVE COME TO CONSIDER AGAIN WHETHER TO ENCOURAGE ISRAEL AND JORDAN TO SEEK A BILATERAL SETTLEMENT. I RECOGNIZE OF COURSE THAT THIS IS NOT AN EITHER-OR MATTER. IT MIGHT WELL BE POSSIBLE AND DESIRABLE, FOR EXAMPLE, TO ENCOURAGE JORDAN-ISRAEL CONTACTS UNDER A MORIBUND JARRING EFFORT. IN OTHER WORDS, WE COULD PAY LIP SERVICE TO WHAT MIGHT BE AN OBVIOUSLY DEAD JARRING MISSION BUT STILL USE LATTER AS A HOOK FOR CONTACTS. THERE WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE OTHER POSSIBLE VARIATIONS. I AM CERTAIN WE WILL FIND CONSIDERABLE RESISTANCE TO ANY KIND OF SEPARATE BILATERAL SETTLEMENT FROM MANY PROMINENT JORDANIANS. AS TIME GOES ON I WOULD EXPECT SUCH OPPOSITION

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-Page, AMMAN 3770, Section 1 of 2, March 13, 1968 NODIS/SANDSTORM

PAGE FIVE RUQMKG 3770/1A ~~SECRET~~

TO INCREASE RATHER THAN TO DIMINISH, PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE ISRAEL'S POSITION WOULD HAVE HARDENED. RECOGNIZING THERE ARE POSSIBILITIES FOR TALKS SHORT OF OUTRIGHT, SECRET CONTACTS, I BELIEVE IF AS A LAST RESORT WE WERE PREPARED TO TELL THE KING WE SAW NO CHANCE OF FORWARD MOTION BY OTHER MEANS AND THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO PROTECT HIM IF HE MOVED TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL, HE MIGHT DECIDE TO TAKE THIS STEP, I WOULD BE OPPOSED TO OUR MAKING SUCH AN APPROACH, HOWEVER, UNLESS WE HAD FIRST OBTAINED FROM THE ISRAELIS A CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT IN DETAILED TERMS OF WHAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED INITIALLY TO OFFER HUSSEIN. BY THIS I MEAN, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO GET FROM ISRAEL A CLEAR MINIMUM COMMITMENT AS TO WHAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO GIVE JORDAN WITH REGARD TO JERUSALEM. THIS MINIMUM COMMITMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE SPECIFIC IN TERMS OF AREA, LINES ON THE GROUND, ACCESS, ECONOMIC MODALITIES, AND ASPECTS OF SOVEREIGNTY. IT WOULD HAVE TO BE SUBJECT TO SOME DISCUSSION. IN OTHER WORDS, WE WOULD NEED TO BE ABLE TO SAY TO THE KING THAT ISRAEL WAS AT LEAST COMMITTED TO DO WHAT IT HAD SAID BUT THAT WE WOULD ALSO HOPE IN DISCUSSIONS ISRAEL MIGHT HAVE SOME ADD-ONS TO ITS MINIMUM POSITION. WE WOULD ALSO

Why start with the hardest one first?

PAGE SIX RUQMKG 3770/1A ~~SECRET~~

NEED SPECIFICS WITH REGARD TOWHERE THE ISRAELIS EXPECT TO REDRAW WEST BANK BORDERS, WHAT THEY ACTUALLY MEAN BY DEMILITARIZATION, AND WHETHER THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER SOMETHING LIKE THE JOSEPH JOHNSON PLAN FOR REFUGEES. UNLESS WE COULD OBTAIN SUCH SPECIFIC STATEMENTS FROM ISRAEL, I WOULD BE OPPOSED TO OUR APPROACHING THE KING ON BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. IN FACT, I WONDER IF WE SHOULD NOT NOW SEEK TO ELICIT WHAT ISRAEL IS PREPARED TO OFFER AGAINST CONTINGENCIES SHORT OF OUTRIGHT, SECRET CONTACTS.

BT

~~SECRET~~

Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

2

AS RUENQ
DE RUMKXG 3777/2A 0721300
ZNY 05005 ZZH
R 121515Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4877
STATE GRNC

CONTROL : 31220
RECEIVED : March 13, 1968
1:56A.M.

BT
~~SECRET~~ FINAL SECTION OF TWO AMMAN 3777

NOBIS
SANDSTORM

7. I WISH TO MAKE CLEAR I AM NOT BY ANY MEANS SUGGESTING WE SHOULD ALIGN OURSELVES WITH JORDAN TO ACT AS JORDAN'S AGENT IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS ITSELF. I DO BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE KING AND THE OFFICIALS WHO MIGHT GO ALONG WITH HIM HAVE EVERYTHING TO LOSE BY MOVING TO ANYTHING SMACKING OF SEPARATE PEACE AND THAT THEY THEREFORE DESERVE TO HAVE FROM US AND FROM THE ISRAELIS THROUGH US A GUARANTEED FLOOR FOR COMMENSURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE SUBSTANCE OF SUCH DIRECT CONTACTS THAT PREVIOUSLY HAVE TAKEN PLACE BETWEEN JORDAN AND ISRAEL (AT LEAST THOSE OF WHICH WE ARE AWARE) LARGELY HAVE BEEN DEVOID OF DETAIL. WE GATHER THAT THE KING HAS FOUND ISRAELI GENERALIZATIONS BROUGHT OVER BY EMISSARIES SUCH AS MUSEIBEH QUITE UNATTRACTIVE FOR THIS REASON.

8. IF WE WERE TO MOVE TOWARDS BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS, I THINK WE SHOULD BE PREPARED WITH CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR HELPING TO HANDLE CIVIL STRIFE AND EFFORTS BY OTHER ARAB STATES TO INTERFERE. I WOULD SUGGEST WE GIVE THOUGHT IMMEDIATELY TO THIS KIND OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN ANY CASE BECAUSE KING HUSSEIN MIGHT WELL MOVE TOWARDS BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT OUR

PAGE TWO RUMKXG 3777/1B ~~SECRET~~
ENCOURAGEMENT.

9. IDEALLY, WE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE IRONCLAD ASSURANCES FROM THE ISRAELIS WITH REGARD TO (1) PUBLICITY (BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER TALKS--PARTICULARLY IF THE TALKS SHOULD BE INCONCLUSIVE THE ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE TO AVOID SURFACING THE CONTACTS) AND (2) THE CESSATION OF MANIPULATIVE ACTIVITIES (SUCH AS RETALIATION AND THREATS) AT LEAST DURING THE COURSE OF THE TALKS.

6YMMES



Department of State

TELEGRAM

104

Jordan

23

~~SECRET~~ 496

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03672 021945Z

45
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /030 W

P 021725Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4818

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3672

EXDIS:

SUBJ: LETTER FROM KING HUSSEIN TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON

REF: STATE 113645

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER DATED MARCH 2, 1968, ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON BY KING HUSSEIN:

2. QUOTE DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I AM GRATEFUL FOR YOUR PERSONAL MESSAGE WHICH PRECEDED THE RETURN OF GENERAL KHAMMASH FROM HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

3. OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE INDEED ENJOYED A WARM, CLOSE AND

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3672A ~~SECRET~~
MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME, AND I AM PLEASED TO RECEIVE YOUR ASSURANCES THAT IT IS IN THE UNITED STATES POLICY AND INTEREST TO CONTINUE THIS RELATIONSHIP WITH US AND THAT THE STRAINS AND PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE JUNE WAR HAVE NOT ALTERED THE UNITED STATES FUNDAMENTAL POLICY TOWARDS JORDAN.

4. THE ARMS PACKAGE, WHICH GENERAL KHAMMASH BROUGHT US IN ANSWER TO OUR REQUEST AND WHICH WAS AIMED AT MEETING OUR LEGITIMATE ARMS REQUIREMENTS, DID INDEED MANIFEST A STRONG REAFFIRMATION OF YOUR SUPPORT. WE, AND IN THE FACE OF THE ENORMITY OF THE PROBLEMS THAT CONFRONT US, HAVE EVERY HOPE THAT THIS PACKAGE, WITH SOME SLIGHT MODIFICATIONS, CAN FINALLY BE AGREED UPON, TO ENABLE US TO OVERCOME THE CURRENT PROBLEMS.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, #99
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

~~SECRET~~

Hussein
to RBJ
3/21/68



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

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5. AS FOR YOUR UNALTERED AND FIRM RESOLVE TO EXTEND FULL DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL SUPPORT TO AMBASSADOR JARRING TO REACH A JUST AND DURABLE SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, I CAN ASSURE YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT WE HAVE EXTREMELY HIGH HOPES THAT THIS VALUABLE SUPPORT MAY ENABLE AMBASSADOR JARRING TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE PURSUIT OF HIS MISSION. HOWEVER, I REGRET TO INFORM YOU,

P/A3 RUQMKG 3672A ~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT, THAT I HAVE BECOME EXTREMELY DISHEARTENED BY WHAT APPEARS TO BE LACK OF GENUINE INTEREST IN A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE BY THE ISRAELIS. IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT THEIR VICTORY SHOULD DIRECT THEM TO FOLLOW A VERY NARROW AND SHORT-SIGHTED APPROACH. FOR THOUGH THE ISRAELIS HAVE WON A BATTLE THEY SEEM UNABLE TO APPRECIATE THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT WON A WAR. THIS IS MANIFESTED IN THEIR LACK OF CLARITY OVER THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION UNDER THE MANDATE OF WHICH AMBASSADOR JARRING IS PURSUING HIS MISSION; IN THEIR ARBITRARY ACTIONS IN DEFIANCE OF A SEMI-UNANIMOUS UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION ON JERUSALEM; IN THEIR CONTINUING ACTIONS AIMING AT MAJOR ALTERATIONS IN THE CITY WHICH, AS YOU WELL-KNOW, MR. PRESIDENT, DOES NOT BELONG TO US ALONE BUT TO ALL ARABS AND MUSLIMS WHO HAVE ENJOYED THE PRIVILEGE OF BEING THE PROUD CUSTODIANS OF THE HOLY PLACES WITHIN IT SINCE THE TIME OF THE KHALIFA OMAR, OVER THIRTEEN CENTURIES AGO; IN COMPELLING THOUSANDS UPON THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE TO CONTINUE TO LEAVE THE AREAS ACQUIRED BY ISRAEL THROUGH AGGRESSION AND TO FLEE IN THE FACE OF TERROR AND PERSECUTION, THUS ADDING AN UNIMAGINABLE STRAIN TO THE ALREADY HEAVY BURDENS WHICH WE SHOULDERS, AND FINALLY IN THEIR MOST RECENT DECISION TO ALTER THE STATUS AND

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 3672A ~~SECRET~~

EVEN THE NAME OF THE OCCUPIED WEST BANK, THUS DEALING A SEVERE BLOW TO THE JARRING MISSION AND ANY CHANCE OF ITS SUCCESS. SUCH ACTIONS DO NOT CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE CONDUSIVE TO THE LAYING OF FOUNDATIONS FOR A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE AND ARE IN DEFIANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS THROUGH WHICH ISRAEL WAS CREATED, AND WHICH HAS REPEATEDLY CALLED UPON ISRAEL TO RESPECT

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 AMMAN 03672 021945Z

THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE SHE PERSECUTED AND TO PERMIT THEM TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES AND LAND.

6. FURTHERMORE, ISRAEL HAS PERSISTED IN THE USE OF BRUTAL FORCE AND HAS CONSTANTLY ATTACKED OUR PEOPLE ON THE EAST BANK OF JORDAN, INFLECTING HEAVY LOSSES OF LIFE AND PROPERTY. HER RIDICULOUS AND TOTALLY INCOMPREHENSIBLE EXCUSE FOR DOING ALL THIS IS THAT I AM NOT FULFILLING MY SO-CALLED DUTY OF ENSURING THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF HER FORCES WHICH OCCUPY A GOOD PORTION OF MY COUNTRY. ISRAEL SEEMS UNWILLING TO UNDERSTAND THAT SO LONG AS SHE REMAINS IN SUCH OCCUPATION SHE WILL BE MET BY MOUNTING RESISTANCE BY THE PEOPLE UNDER OCCUPATION AND WHO ARE VICTIMS OF HER AGGRESSION. THE SUM TOTAL OF ALL THIS IS A GREAT TRAGEDY FOR PEACE AND FOR THOSE WHO BELIEVE THAT A JUST, HONOURABLE AND DUR-

PAGE 5 RUQMK 3672A ~~SECRET~~

ABLE PEACE CAN AND MUST EXIST IN THIS AREA, AND A GROWING REALISATION THAT THE CHANCE OF ACHIEVING SUCH A PEACE WHICH, IN MY OPINION, IS THE FIRST AND LAST SUCH CHANCE, MAY BE LOST TO ALL FOREVER.

7. I HOPE MY READINGS ARE WRONG, ALTHOUGH WHAT I LIVE AND SEE MAKES ME TEND TO BELIEVE THAT I AM RIGHT. I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, WILL SPARE NO EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT SUCH A CHANCE IS NOT LOST.

8. I MUST CONFESS, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT PATIENT AND OPTIMISTIC AS I AM, I AM BEGINNING TO HAVE SOME DOUBTS ABOUT THE WISDOM OF CONTINUING TO BE SO.

9. I WISH YOU, SIR, THE VERY BEST IN SURMOUNTING THE MANY DIFFICULTIES THAT YOU FACE AS LEADER OF ONE OF THE WORLD'S GREATEST POWERS THROUGHOUT THIS CRITICAL PERIOD IN THE HISTORY OF MANKIND. I WISH TO SHARE WITH YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, YOUR CONFIDENCE THAT WE CAN SOLVE OUR PROBLEMS AND OBTAIN THE OBJECTIVE WE BOTH SO FERVENTLY DESIRE- A PEACEFUL MIDDLE EAST IN

PAGE 6 RUQMKG 3672A ~~SECRET~~

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 04 AMMAN 03672 021945Z

WHICH A UNITED JORDAN CAN CONTINUE TO PLAY ITS HISTORIC ROLE.

10. WITH MY BEST REGARDS. (SIGNED) HUSSEIN END QUOTE:
SYMMES

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~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

Jordan 105 21

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 302

See H/S memo to WWR - 2/21/68

PAGE 01 AMMAN 00001 191910Z

47
ACTION NEA 15

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, NSAE 00, NSCE 00, SSO 00, USIE 00, CCO 00, GPM 03,
H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SC 01, SP 02, SS 20, SAH 03,
IO 13, ACDA 16, AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03, RSR 01, /133 W

- BOWLER
- BUDGET
- DAVIS
- FRIED
- GINSBURGH
- HAMILTON
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- JORDEN
- KEENEY P
- LEONHART
- ROONE
- SAUNDERS
- TAYLOR

O P 191642Z FEB 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4695
INFO RUQMJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 1441
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1294
USMISSION UN NY 711

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTIONS AMMAN 3498

SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER AGREES POSTPONE JORDAN REQUEST FOR SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON JERUSALEM

1. SUMMARY: PRIMIN TALHOUNI HAS AGREED TO HOLD OFF FOR A BRIEF PERIOD REQUESTING A SC MEETING ON JERUSALEM. HE HAD CALLED ME IN THIS MORNING TO INFORM ME JORDAN WAS ASKING FOR SC MEETING BUT I WAS ABLE TO PERSUADE HIM AND ABDUL MUN'IM RIFA'I, WHO WAS PRESENT, TO HOLD OFF FOR A "FEW MORE DAYS." IN AGREEING TO DO SO PRIMIN REQUESTED I OBTAIN CLARIFICATION AS TO WHAT USG INTENDS TO DO IF ISRAEL DOES NOT CEASE ITS EXPROPRIATION AND OTHER ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM.
2. PRIMIN TALHOUNI SUMMONED ME THIS MORNING TO MEET WITH HIM AND MINISTER OF STATE FOR FONAFFS ABDUL MUNIIM RIFA'I. HE

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3498A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EXPLAINED HE WISHED TO TAKE UP AGAIN THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM

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Authority NLT 02-155 (#199a)
By cmj/ies, NARA, Date 8-26-05



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 AMMAN 00001 191910Z

AND TO INFORM ME THAT JORDAN HAD DECIDED TO TAKE THE MATTER TO THE SC. HE SAID THAT, GIVEN THE INTENSITY OF INTERNAL JORDANIAN FEELING AND ARAB AND MOSLEM FEELING ON THIS MATTER, GOJ SAW NO ALTERNATIVE TO PROCEEDING WITH A REQUEST FOR A SC MEETING. HE REFERRED TO AMB AL-FARRA'S RECENT CONVERSATION WITH AMB GOLDBERG. (USUN 3812, STATE 117356) HE RECALLED THAT THROUGH ME HE HAD BROUGHT THE QUESTION TO THE URGENT ATTENTION OF THE USG. HE SAID ISRAELI ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM HAD BEEN RAISED THREE TIMES WITH JARRING, AND AL-FARRA ALSO HAD BROUGHT THE JERUSALEM SITUATION TO THE ATTENTION OF THE UNSECGEN IN NEW YORK.

3. REGRETTABLY, THE PRIMIN SAID, GOJ HAD OBTAINED NO POSITIVE ANSWER FROM JARRING, WHO REPORTED ISRAELIS WERE CALLING CURRENT ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM "MUNICIPAL REFORM." TWO DAYS AGO GOJ HAD RECEIVED TELEGRAM FROM AL-FARRA REPORTING HIS INTERVIEW WITH AMB GOLDBERG. ACCORDING TO REPORT GOLDBERG SAID US HAD MADE DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS WITH ISRAEL ON JERUSALEM, BUT GOLDBERG HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO POINT TO ANY POSITIVE RESULTS OF US INTERVENTION. PRIMIN THEN SAID THAT HIS REQUEST TO ME ALSO HAD PRODUCED NO POSITIVE RESULTS ON STOPPING ISRAELI ACTIONS. ALTHOUGH JORDAN

PAGE 3 RUQMG 3498A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WAS GRATEFUL FOR US STATEMENTS AND EFFORTS, UNFORTUNATELY THESE ARE NOT ENOUGH.

4. THUS, SAID THE PRIMIN, WE HAVE RECONSIDERED THE MATTER THOROUGHLY. DESPITE US AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS WE HAVE GOTTEN NOWHERE. IN VIEW OF THE STRONG PRESSURES ON US FROM OUR OWN PEOPLE AND FROM ARAB PUBLIC OPINION GENERALLY AND SCLECC CURRENT INFORMATION FROM JERUSALEM INDICATES THAT THE ISRAELIS, IF ANYTHING, HAVE INTENSIFIED THEIR ACTIVITIES TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM. WE HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO GO TO THE SC. IN FURTHER EXPLANATION OF THIS DECISION, THE PRIMIN SAID THAT A "NATIONAL MEETING" IS TO BE HELD IN AMMAN ON TWENTY FIRST, AND THE GOVT HAS BEEN NOTIFIED THAT THE MEETING WILL INSIST UPON REFERRING JERUSALEM TO THE SC. MOREOVER, THE PRIMIN SAID, A SECRET MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF DEPUTIES IS TO BE HELD TOMORROW AND HE HAS BEEN WARNED IT WILL ALSO INSIST UPON REFERRING THE MATTER TO THE SC. HE IMPLIED THAT THE GOVT FELT IT COULD NOT STAND UP TO THESE PRESSURES

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 00001 191910Z

AND, THEREFORE, MUST ACT BEFORE BEING FORCED TO ACT. (TODAY'S PRESS REPORTED THAT WEDNESDAY MEETING HAS BEEN CALLED BY "PREPARATORY COMMITTEE TO SAVE JERUSALEM" AND THAT GOVT OFFICIALS, DEPUTIES, RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND INTELLECTUALS HAVE BEEN

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 3498A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
INVITED.)

5. I RESPONDED THAT I WAS VERY UNHAPPY TO HEAR THE PRIMIN'S DECISION AND THAT I HOPED IT WAS NOT FINAL. I SAID I BELIEVED JORDAN'S GOING TO THE SC ON THIS MATTER WOULD RISK FAILURE OF THE JARRING MISSION. I REMINDED HIM THAT HE KNOWS ALREADY THE US POSITION ON JERUSALEM WHICH, IN EFFECT, SUPPORTS THE FULL POSITION OF NEITHER JORDAN NOR ISRAEL ON THE MATTER. I COULD UNDERSTAND THE CURRENT PRESSURES HE FACES WITH REGARD TO JERUSALEM SPECIFICALLY, IN FACT, WE ARE WELL AWARE OF WHAT IS GOING ON IN JERUSALEM AND, AS HE KNEW, HAD TAKEN STEPS TO MAKE OUR POSITION KNOWN. NEVERTHELESS,

JERUSALEM IS ONLY A PART OF THE WHOLE PROBLEM WHICH JARRING IS NOW TRYING TO SETTLE. MOREOVER, IN ALL FRANKNESS I FELT I HAD TO REMIND HIM THAT WE SHARE RESPONSIBILITY FOR WORKING TOWARD A SETTLEMENT. IT SEEMED TO ME THAT OUR PRESENT DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF THE JARRING MISSION WERE THE BEST WAY TO PROCEED, AND I THEREFORE HOPED HIS GOVERNMENT COULD FURTHER POSTPONE THE DECISION TO GO TO THE SC. I TURNED TO RIFA'I AND ASKED WHAT HE THOUGHT JORDAN WOULD GET OUT OF GOING TO THE SC AT THIS TIME. ANSWERING MY OWN QUESTION, I SAID THERE WOULD BE MANY RECRIMINATIONS AND SPEECHES BUT PROBABLY NOTHING CONCRETE WOULD COME OUT OF SUCH A MEETING. WE WOULD STILL

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 3498A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
BE LEFT WITH TRYING OTHER WAYS TO PERSUADE ISRAEL TO DESIST FROM ITS UNILATERAL ACTIONS TO CHANGE THE CHARACTER OF THE CITY. I MENTIONED TO HOWAR CASE (STATE 116833) AS A LATE INDICATION OF THE WAY THE USG SEES THE JERUSALEM PROBLEM AND AGAIN URGED THEY DELAY THEIR DECISION FURTHER WHILE CURRENT APPROACHES WERE FULLY TESTED.

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PAGE 04 AMMAN 00001 191910Z

6. PRIMIN BROUGHT UP THE REPORTED STATEMENT OF ISRAELI PRES SHAZAR THAT NO POWER IN THE WORLD COULD MAKE ISRAEL DESIST FROM ITS ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM. I SAID MY INFORMATION INDICATED SHAZAR'S STATEMENT HAD NOT BEEN ACCURATELY REPORTED IN WORLD PRESS. RIFA'I THEN SAID THAT GOING TO THE COUNCIL WOULD SERVE TWO PURPOSES IN HIS VIEW--IT WOULD SURELY PRODUCE A RESOLUTION CALLING UPON ISRAEL TO DESIST FROM ITS ACTIONS AND HOPEFULLY THIS WOULD RESTRIAN ISRAEL. EVEN IF IT DID NOT, IT WOULD ENCOURAGE ARAB PROPERTY OWNERS NOT TO ACCEPT COMPENSATION AND NOT TO GO ALONG WITH ISRAEL'S ILLEGAL ACTIONS.

7. AT THIS POINT, THE PRIMIN EXPANDED OUR DISCUSSION INTO A REVIEW OF THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE JARRING MISSION AND THE RECENT ISRAELI ACTIONS IN THE VALLEY. RIFA'I COMMENTED THAT JORDANIAN OFFICIALS ARE GIVING LIP SERVICE TO THE IDEA THAT THERE HAS BEEN FORWARD

PAGE 6 RUQMKG 3498/JA ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
MOTION WITH REGARD TO JARRING'S MISSION. IN FACT, HE SAID THERE HAS BEEN NO PROGRESS, AND JORDAN, SPECIFICALLY ON THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM, IS PAYING THE PRICE FOR THIS INACTIVITY. THE PRIMIN ADDED THAT THIS INACTIVITY IS DIGGING THE GRAVES OF THE PRESENT JORDANIAN REGIME AND IS HOLDING JORDAN UP TO RIDICULE IN THE ARAB WORLD AND EVEN INTERNATIONALLY. IT WAS POSSIBLE A SC RESOLUTION IN SUPPORT OF THE JORDANIAN POSITION ON JERUSALEM COULD EVEN STRENGTHEN THE JARRING MISSION. IN ANY CASE SUCH A RESOLUTION WOULD BE BETTER THAN DOING NOTHING. I SAID I COULD NOT AGREE BECAUSE OF THE ADVERSE EFFECTS I THOUGHT IT WOULD HAVE ON THE JARRING MISSION.

8. AFTER MORE DISCUSSION ALONG THESE LINES, TALHOUNI AND RIFA'I FINALLY AGREED TO HOLD OFF GOING TO THE COUNCIL FOR A FEW MORE DAYS IN EXCHANGE MY UNDERTAKING TO REPORT OUR CONVERSATION URGENTLY TO WASHINGTON AND TO ASK (1) FOR AN URGENT CLARIFICATION OF USG VIEWS ON JERUSALEM AND (2) WHETHER THE USG COULD AND WOULD TAKE ADDITIONAL ACTIONS TO BRING ABOUT CESSATION OF CURRENT ISRAELI EXPROPRIATION ACTIVITIES IN JERUSALEM. MEANWHILE, THE PRIMIN SAID HE WOULD TELL THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES AND THE "NATIONAL MEETING" THAT THE GOVT WOULD STUDY THE QUESTION OF GOING TO THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 300

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03498 02 OF 02 191803Z

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ACTION NEA 15

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, NSAE 00, NSCE 00, SSO 00, USIE 00, CCO 00, GPM 03,
H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SC 01, SP 02, SS 20, SAH 03,
IO 13, ACDA 16, AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03, RSR 01, /133 W

O P 191642Z FEB 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4696
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 1442
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1295
USMISSION USUN NY 712

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SECTIONS AMMAN 3498

COUNCIL. HE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT UNLESS IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS I COULD SHOW HIM SOME ADVANTAGE IN DELAYING FURTHER--AN ADVANTAGE THAT HAD CONCRETE AND TANGIBLE EFFECTS SO FAR AS JORDAN IS CONCERNED--JORDAN WOULD BE FORCED TO GO TO THE COUNCIL.

9. COMMENT: I THINK TALHOUNI AND RIFA'I ACCEPT WE HAVE MADE EFFORTS IN THIS MATTER AND ARE GRATEFUL. THEIR PROBLEM IS TO GET RESULTS, AND THEY HAVE BECOME CONVINCED SC RESOLUTION BETTING THAN NOTHING. I AM FRANKLY SURPRISED THAT TALHOUNI, WHO IS WELL KNOWN FOR HIS UNWILLINGNESS TO FACE UNPOPULARITY, AGREED TO GO ALONG

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3498/2A-~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WITH ANY FURTHER DELAY. I AM AFRAID, THEREFORE, THAT WE HAVE ONLY A FEW MORE DAYS IN WHICH TO PRODUCE SOMETHING TANGIBLE AS RESULT OUR EFFORTS.

10. ACTION REQUESTED: REQUEST SPECIFIC GUIDANCE FROM THE DEPT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 AMMAN 03498 02 OF 02 191803Z

AS TO WHAT (1) I SHOULD NOW SAY TO TALHOUNI WITH REGARD TO ANY FURTHER STEPS WE INTEND TO TAKE, AND (2) HOW WE WOULD EXPECT TO FACE THE QUESTION IF IT IS NOW TAKEN TO THE COUNCIL.

SYMMES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Jordan

Pls. return to HHSaunders
Room 372-a eob when signed.

106

February 13, 1968

Dear Professor Smith:

I appreciate the concern for Jordan which you expressed in your recent letter. We, too, have a deep interest in the progress and prosperity of a united Jordan. We believe we are working in that direction.

We understand how difficult it is for our Arab friends to understand the position we have taken since June 5. Our position as outlined by the President on June 19, 1967, arises from our deep conviction that a lasting peace in the Middle East can not grow from simple slogans or easy half-solutions. We believe it can come about only if the parties to the June war can reach some kind of agreement on the issues dividing them.

This was also the sense of the United Nations Security Council when it passed its resolution of November 22. We sincerely hope that Ambassador Jarring, who is now at work, will be able to bring about this sort of agreement.

Sincerely yours,

(signed) W. W. Rostow

W. W. Rostow

Professor Robert H. Smith
Professor of Religion
The College of Wooster
Wooster, Ohio

Att: Remarks of the President at the National Foreign
Policy Conference for Educators, State Department, 6/19/67



Department of State

TELEGRAM

Leuchter

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Jordan

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PAGE 01 STATE 113645

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ORIGIN SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:RBHOUGHTON
APPROVED BY: S/S-9:MR.FINCH
NEA:RPDAVIES (INSUBST)
IO:JSISCO (INSUBST)
NEA/IAI:AATHERTON
WH:MR.WALT W.ROSTOW

O 110636Z FEB 68 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0792

~~SECRET~~ STATE 113645

EXDIS

FOR DELIVERY TO THE AMBASSADOR AT OPENING OF BUSINESS

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO KING HUSSEIN. BEGIN TEXT, QUOTE: HIS MAJESTY, KING HUSSEIN, AMMAN, JORDAN. YOUR MAJESTY: I SEND YOU THIS PERSONAL WORD IN ADVANCE OF THE REPORT GENERAL KAMMASH WILL GIVE YOU. THE GENERAL HAS ARGUED HIS CASE WELL.

OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE ENJOYED A WARM, CLOSE, MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP FOR A LONG PERIOD. THERE ARE FEW OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD WITH WHICH WE HAVE WORKED AS

PAGE 2 RUEHC 113645 ~~SECRET~~

LEG to Hussein 2/11/68

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By cbm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 113645

CLOSELY AS WITH JORDAN. I ASSURE YOUR MAJESTY THAT IT IS OUR POLICY AND OUR INTEREST TO CONTINUE THAT RELATIONSHIP AND OUR SUPPORT OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN. WHILE THE JUNE WAR HAS CREATED STRAINS AND PROBLEMS FOR BOTH OF US, IT HAS NEVER ALTERED OUR FUNDAMENTAL POLICY TOWARDS JORDAN.

DESPITE THE CURRENT HEAVY DEMANDS ON OUR RESOURCES, GENERAL KHAMMASH IS RETURNING WITH AN ARMS PACKAGE WHICH WE CONSIDER TO BE A SUBSTANTIAL RESPONSE TO YOUR REQUEST FOR US TO MEET YOUR LEGITIMATE ARMS REQUIREMENTS. WE INTEND THIS PACKAGE TO BE A STRONG REAFFIRMATION OF OUR SUPPORT.

I ALSO ASSURE YOU THAT WE HAVE NOT ALTERED OUR FIRM RESOLVE TO EXTEND OUR FULL DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL SUPPORT OF AMBASSADOR JARRING TO REACH A JUST AND DURABLE SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. DURING YOUR VISIT HERE IN NOVEMBER, WE EXPLAINED TO YOU OUR POSITION ON THE WEST BANK AND JERUSALEM. WE HAVE NOT CHANGED THAT POSITION. AS AMBASSADOR JARRING MAKES PROGRESS, WE HOPE AND EXPECT THAT THERE WILL BE OPPORTUNITIES FOR US TO SUPPORT HIS EFFORTS IN MORE

PAGE 3 RUEHC 113645 ~~SECRET~~
SPECIFIC WAYS.

YOUR MAJESTY, WE ARE BOTH PASSING THROUGH A CRITICAL PERIOD IN THE HISTORY OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES. WITH PATIENCE, WISDOM AND MUTUAL TRUST, I AM SURE THAT WE CAN SOLVE OUR PROBLEMS AND OBTAIN THE OBJECTIVE WE BOTH SO FERVENTLY DESIRE--A PEACEFUL MIDDLE EAST IN WHICH A UNITED JORDAN CAN PLAY ITS HISTORIC ROLE.

WITH ALL GOOD WISHES, SINCERELY, LYNDON B. JOHNSON. END
QUOTE. RUSK

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

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1968 FEB 11 07 14

Jordan

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PAGE 01 STATE 113645

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ORIGIN SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:RBHOUGHTON
APPROVED BY: S/S-9:MR.FINCH
NEA:RPDAVIES (INSUBST)
IO:JSISCO (INSUBST)
NEA/IAI:AATHERTON
WH:MR.WALT W.ROSTOW

O 110636Z FEB 68 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0792

~~SECRET~~ STATE 113645

EXDIS

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PERSONAL WORD IN ADVANCE OF THE REPORT GENERAL KAMMASH WILL
GIVE YOU. THE GENERAL HAS ARGUED HIS CASE WELL.

OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE ENJOYED A WARM, CLOSE, MUTUALLY
BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP FOR A LONG PERIOD. THERE ARE FEW
OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD WITH WHICH WE HAVE WORKED AS

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By ctm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

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King Hussein
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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 113645

CLOSELY AS WITH JORDAN. I ASSURE YOUR MAJESTY THAT IT IS OUR POLICY AND OUR INTEREST TO CONTINUE THAT RELATIONSHIP AND OUR SUPPORT OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN. WHILE THE JUNE WAR HAS CREATED STRAINS AND PROBLEMS FOR BOTH OF US, IT HAS NEVER ALTERED OUR FUNDAMENTAL POLICY TOWARDS JORDAN.

DESPITE THE CURRENT HEAVY DEMANDS ON OUR RESOURCES, GENERAL KHAMMASH IS RETURNING WITH AN ARMS PACKAGE WHICH WE CONSIDER TO BE A SUBSTANTIAL RESPONSE TO YOUR REQUEST FOR US TO MEET YOUR LEGITIMATE ARMS REQUIREMENTS. WE INTEND THIS PACKAGE TO BE A STRONG REAFFIRMATION OF OUR SUPPORT.

I ALSO ASSURE YOU THAT WE HAVE NOT ALTERED OUR FIRM RESOLVE TO EXTEND OUR FULL DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL SUPPORT OF AMBASSADOR JARRING TO REACH A JUST AND DURABLE SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. DURING YOUR VISIT HERE IN NOVEMBER, WE EXPLAINED TO YOU OUR POSITION ON THE WEST BANK AND JERUSALEM. WE HAVE NOT CHANGED THAT POSITION. AS AMBASSADOR JARRING MAKES PROGRESS, WE HOPE AND EXPECT THAT THERE WILL BE OPPORTUNITIES FOR US TO SUPPORT HIS EFFORTS IN MORE

PAGE 3 RUEHC 113645 ~~SECRET~~
SPECIFIC WAYS.

YOUR MAJESTY, WE ARE BOTH PASSING THROUGH A CRITICAL PERIOD IN THE HISTORY OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES. WITH PATIENCE, WISDOM AND MUTUAL TRUST, I AM SURE THAT WE CAN SOLVE OUR PROBLEMS AND OBTAIN THE OBJECTIVE WE BOTH SO FERVENTLY DESIRE--A PEACEFUL MIDDLE EAST IN WHICH A UNITED JORDAN CAN PLAY ITS HISTORIC ROLE.

WITH ALL GOOD WISHES, SINCERELY, LYNDON B. JOHNSON. END
QUOTE. RUSK

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

~~SECRET~~

109

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

FEB 10 1968

Jordan

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Suggested Message from you
to King Hussein of Jordan

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached letter to King Hussein.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

The Secretary of Defense is presenting our arms package to General Khammash at 12:30 today February 10. The General plans to leave Washington tonight for Amman via London. He expects to arrive in Amman on February 12.

As we have mentioned in our previous memoranda, part of our current difficulties with Jordan stems from a crisis in confidence. King Hussein has, in recent months, come to question seriously our interest in him and his country. We hope that our arms package will be reassuring to him. In this respect, however, in view of his respect for and confidence in you, we believe that a message to him at this time would contribute greatly to easing his mind as to our continued interest in Jordan and his moderate regime.

Richard B. Wright

Under Secretary

Enclosure:

Draft letter

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13202, Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/ly*, NARA, Date 6-28-70

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

His Majesty
King Hussein
Amman, Jordan

Your Majesty:

*In addition to the report
General Khammash will give
you, I wish you to have this
personal word from me.*

~~I wanted to avail myself of the opportunity of
General Khammash's visit to Washington to send a
personal word to you.~~ The General has argued your
case well and I believe our talks have been fruitful.

Our two countries have enjoyed a warm close,
mutually beneficial relationship for a long period.
There are few other countries in the world with whom
we have worked as closely as with Jordan. I ~~wish to~~
assure Your Majesty that it is our policy and our
interest to continue that relationship and our support
of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. While the June war
has created strains and problems for both of us, it has
never altered our fundamental policy towards Jordan.

Despite the current heavy demands on our resources,
General Khammash is returning with an arms package which
we consider to be a substantial response to your request
for us to meet your legitimate arms requirements. We
intend this package to be a strong reaffirmation of our
support.

I also ~~wish to~~ assure you that we have not altered
our firm resolve to extend our full diplomatic and
political support of Ambassador Jarring to reach a just
and durable settlement in the Middle East. During your

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED *with brackets*
Authority *FRUS. Vol. 44, #77*
By *ly*, NARA, Date *6-28-10*

visit here in November, we explained to you our position on the West Bank and Jerusalem. We have not changed that position. As Ambassador Jarring makes progress, we hope and expect that there will be opportunities for us to support his efforts in more specific ways.

Your Majesty, we are both passing through a critical period in the history of our two countries. With patience, wisdom and mutual trust, I am sure that we can solve our problems and obtain the objective we both so fervently desire--a peaceful Middle East in which a united Jordan can play its historic role.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely yours,

Jordan

110

ACTION

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, February 10, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

rsf

SUBJECT: Message to King Hussein

Since you are not seeing General Khammash, Nick Katzenbach is suggesting a short message direct to Hussein. You have already exchanged messages saying we're willing to resume if he won't turn to the Soviets, and he won't if we meet his legitimate needs. The attached is designed to wrap up this exchange.

Hussein's agreement not to buy Soviet weapons is specifically included in the draft memorandum of understanding Secretary McNamara gave Khammash this morning, so State has not labored this point beyond saying this meets his legitimate requirements.

We will send this telegraphically to Harry Symmes, and he can deliver it as either an oral or written message. Your previous exchanges on this subject have been oral, but a written message now might be just a little firmer and help marginally in Symmes' and Khammash's efforts to persuade the King that our response is adequate.

We would like to get this to Hussein by the time Khammash returns Monday.

W. W. Rostow

Approve as written message _____

Approve as oral message _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/s*, ISARA, Date 6-28-70

HSaunders:WWR:rln
~~WWR:rln~~

~~SECRET~~

110a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 10, 1968

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Suggested Message from you
to King Hussein of Jordan

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached letter to King Hussein.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

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Richard L. Holman
Under Secretary

Enclosure:
Draft letter

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *ebm/s* NARA, Date 6-28-10

1106

Suggested Message to King Hussein

~~SECRET~~

His Majesty
King Hussein
Amman, Jordan

Your Majesty:

I send you this personal word in advance of the report General Khammash will give you. The General has argued your case well.

Our two countries have enjoyed a warm, close, mutually beneficial relationship for a long period. There are few other countries in the world with which we have worked as closely as with Jordan. I assure Your Majesty that it is our policy and our interest to continue that relationship and our support of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. While the June war has created strains and problems for both of us, it has never altered our fundamental policy towards Jordan.

Despite the current heavy demands on our resources, General Khammash is returning with an arms package which we consider to be a substantial response to your request for us to meet your legitimate arms requirements. We intend this package to be a strong reaffirmation of our support.

I also assure you that we have not altered our firm resolve to extend our full diplomatic and political support of Ambassador Jarring to reach a just and durable settlement in the Middle East. During your visit here in November, we explained to you our position on the West Bank and Jerusalem. We have not changed that position. As Ambassador Jarring makes progress, we hope and expect that there will be opportunities for us to support his efforts in more specific ways.

Your Majesty, we are both passing through a critical period in the history of our two countries. With patience, wisdom and mutual trust, I am sure that we can solve our problems and obtain the objective we both so fervently desire -- a peaceful Middle East in which a united Jordan can play its historic role.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, #77
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

~~SECRET~~

THE COLLEGE OF WOOSTER
WOOSTER, OHIO

Jordan
III

February 1, 1968

*Reply by WWR
2/13/68*

The Honorable Walter Rostow, Director
Policy Planning Board
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Rostow:

During the past ten years I have spent almost two years in the Middle East, chiefly in Jordan while engaged in archaeological work. My interest in this part of the world is non-political, but no thinking person can be insensitive these days to the turmoil in the Middle East.

I am writing to let you know that I do not believe that the one-sided pro-Israel policy which the White House has followed during recent months is in the long range interests of either our nation or those of the Middle East. We appear to be in danger of losing all effective contact with the Arab nations. Twice since the June war I have visited Jordan and have found there a deep sense of isolation from the United States.

In years past the United States has enjoyed friendship with Jordan to a degree perhaps greater than with any other Arab nation. Although time is running short, the two nations can once again enjoy a cordial relationship if the United States considers more seriously the merits of the case which Jordan presents.

May I, as a concerned citizen--I speak for myself, of course, and not for my institution--urge you to use every means to see that the United States goes as far as possible in restoring the friendship between our country and the Arab States. A good place to begin might be some official expressions of friendship and awareness of the problems and attitudes of the people of Jordan.

Respectfully yours,

Robert H. Smith

Robert H. Smith
Professor of Religion

RHS:jay



Department of State

Jordan

TELEGRAM

21

112

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 711

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02879 041531Z

45
ACTION SS 70

INFO MM 01,071 W

R 041510Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4319

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE AMMAN 2879

LIMDIS

REF: STATE 91747

1. THE EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM KING HUSSEIN:

2. "DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
"I WISH TO THANK YOU WARMLY FOR YOUR KIND MESSAGE OF GREETINGS FOR THE NEW YEAR. THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN JOIN ME IN EXTENDING TO YOU OUR SINCERE AND

PAGE 2 RUQMGK 2879A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
HEARTFELT WISHES FOR A HAPPY AND PEACEFUL NEW YEAR.

" AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE, WE ARE STILL DOING OUR BEST TO ACHIEVE A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN OUR PART OF THE WORLD. I SINCERELY HOPE THAT OUR EFFORTS WILL BE ASSISTED BY THE ACTIONS AND CONTINUED SUPPORT OF OUR FRIENDS.

SINCERELY,

AL-HUSSEIN."

SYMMEs

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cbm/f, NARA, Date 6-28-10

King Hussein
to US
1/4/68

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Walt:

An interesting conversation
between Senator Ribicoff and
King Hussein:

1. A champion of your views
on Israeli-Jordanian economic
cooperation.
2. Hussein's comment on
direct negotiation.
3. Ribicoff's endorsement
of resuming US military
aid to Jordan.

Hal



Department of State

Jordan

TELEGRAM

113a

26

~~SECRET~~ 955

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02519 061444Z

42
ACTION SS 25

INFO MM 01, /026 W

R 051730Z DEC 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4135
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 707
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1132
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1282
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1109

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2519

EXDIS

SUBJECT: TOUR D'HORIZON OF SENATOR RIBICOFF WITH KING HUSSEIN

1. KING HUSSEIN RECEIVED SENATOR RIBICOFF AND MR. GRANQUIST WITH ME THIS MORNING. SENATOR RIBICOFF HAD BEEN RECEIVED EARLIER BY PRIMIN TALHOUNI AND DEPRIMIN TOUGAN AND HAD HAD EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM IN WHICH HE DELVED INTO SPECIFICS OF POSSIBLE SETTLEMENT. IN MEETING WITH

PAGE TWO RUGMKG 2519A ~~SECRET~~
KING, SENATOR REFERRED TO THOSE EARLIER DISCUSSIONS. HE SAID HE HAD JUST COME FROM ISRAEL WHERE HE HAD HAD TALKS WITH PRIMIN ESHKOL AND FONMIN EBAN. HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH PRIMIN TALHOUNI HIS OWN PERSONAL VIEWS RE POSSIBLE STEPS TOWARDS PEACE IN THE AREA. SENATOR THREWOUT SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF MUTUALITY OF ISRAELI-JORDANIAN INTEREST IN SUCH AREAS AS FILAT/AGABA PORT DEVELOPMENT, JOINT POTASH DEVELOPMENT IN DEAD SEA, JORDAN USE OF ASHDOD OR HAIFA, JOINT TOURIST DEVELOPMENT IN JERUSALEM, JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF WATER AND AGRICULTURAL

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Authority NLSJ02-155 (482)
By *dm/ics* NARA, Date 8-26-05

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~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 AMMAN 22519 061444Z

RESOURCES AND SETTLEMENT REFUGEE PROBLEM. SENATOR ALSO OUTLINED POSSIBILITY JORDAN SUPERVISION MUSLIM SHRINES IN JERUSALEM. SENATOR THEN LED INTO ISRAELI VIEW THAT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS ARE NECESSARY TO MOVE TOWARD ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT OF LASTING NATURE. HE SAID HE RECOGNIZED THAT KING COULD NOT MOVE ALONE AND THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR HIM TO CONSULT HIS ARAB ALLIES BUT HE WONDERED HOW KING SAW POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS.

2. KING RESPONDED BY PROVIDING GENERAL OUTLINE OF RECENT JORDANIAN POLICY. HE STRESSED THAT HE SAW FORTHCOMING SUMMIT MEETING (FOR WHICH DEFINITE DATE HAD NOT BEEN SET)

PAGE THREE RUQMKG 2519A ~~SECRET~~

AS CHIEFLY A MEANS BY WHICH HE WOULD OBTAIN FLEXIBILITY TO PURSUE POLICIES IN JORDAN'S INTEREST. JORDAN WOULD PRESS FOR EARLY SUMMIT MEETING IN RABAT, PERHAPS BY TWELFTH. HE ELABORATED ON HUMAN, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS POSED FOR JORDAN BY LATEST CROP OF REFUGEES, BY PERENNIAL DIFFICULTIES ARISING FROM 1948 WAR, AND FROM CONTINUED, STRIDENT ATTACKS ON JORDAN'S POLICIES OF MODERATION BY VARIOUS ARAB EXTREMISTS. HE SAID HE COULD NOT, IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, MOVE TO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS, BUT IN RESPONSE TO APPOINTED QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR RIBICOFF HE SAID HE WAS NOT AGAINST DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS IN PRINCIPLE. THAT STAGE COULD ONLY BE REACHED THROUGH THE JARRING MISSION AND "WITH THE HELP OF FRIENDS." THE KING ALSO TOLD THE SENATOR THAT HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO AND, IN FACT, WOULD FAVOR THE SENATOR'S PASSING ON HIS VIEWS TO GOI LEADERS ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS. BECAUSE OF ENEMIES OF MODDEATION IN THE ARAB WORLD, HOWEVER, HE DID NOT WISH THESE VIEWS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS TO BE PUBLICLY ATTRIBUTED TO HIM.

3. THE KING STRONGLY REITERATED HIS OPPOSITION TO TERRORIST ACTIVITY. HE STRESSED THAT EVEN THE ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE

PAGE FOUR RUQMKG 2519A ~~SECRET~~

TO ADMIT THAT THOSE THEY HAD ARRESTED WERE NOT JORDANIAN AND

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 AMMAN 02519 061444Z

THAT THEIR ARMS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT, AS WELL AS THEIR TRAINING AND BRIEFING, HAD BEEN SUPPLIED BY SYRIA. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SYRIANS ARE FALSELY BRIEFING AND MISLEADING INFILTRATORS IN ORDER DELIBERATELY TO COMPROMISE JORDANIAN EFFORTS AGAINST TERRORISM IN THE EYES OF THE ISRAELIS.

4. THE KING OUTLINED IN WELL KNOWN TERMS JORDAN'S SITUATION WITH REGARD TO ARMS REQUIREMENTS. HE STRESSED THAT HE HAD ALMOST REACHED LIMITS OF HIS ABILITY TO DEAL WITH THIS SITUATION. HE IS BEGINNING TO SEE DANGER POINTS IN HIS OWN ARMY WHICH, HE SAID FRANKLY, IS HIS ONLY GUARANTEE OF CONTINUED STABILITY AND MODERATION.

THE ARMY'S MORALE CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE AS THEY SEE OTHER ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL SUPPLIED WITH NEW EQUIPMENT WHILE THEY GET NOTHING. KING STRESSED THAT HE HAS BEEN FORCED TO ACCEPT THE PRESENCE OF OTHER ARAB TROOPS IN HIS TERRITORY, AND THIS IS AN ADDED DANGER. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE CANNOT ASK FOR THE REMOVAL OF THESE TROOPS SO LONG AS HE OBTAINS NO MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THE SOVIETS HAVE OFFERED TO SUPPLY HIM WITH ARMS, AND HE WILL SOON BE FACED WITH HAVING TO TURN TO THAT SOURCE IF THERE IS NO OTHER

PAGE FIVE RUQMKG 2519A ~~SECRET~~

ALTERNATIVE. THE KING

SAID THIS WAS A MOST UNPLEASANT ALTERNATIVE.

FOR HIM AND THAT HE DID NOT CONSIDER IT IN THE INTEREST OF THE US OR OTHER STATES IN THE AREA FOR HIM TO BE FORCED TO MAKE THIS CHOICE.

THE SENATOR AGREED WITH THE KING AND ASKED ME TO BRIEF HIM AND THE KING ON THE PRESENT STATUS OF US ARMS SUPPLY TO JORDAN, WHICH I THEN DID. THE SENATOR ALSO SAID HE INTENDED TO DISCUSS THIS SITUATION WITH AMB BARBOUR ON HIS RETURN TO ISRAEL WITH A

VIEW TO

GIVING HIS PERSONAL ENDORSEMENT OF A RESUMPTION OF USG MILITARY SHIPMENTS TO JORDAN.

5. CONVERSATION THROUGHOUT WAS FRANK AND CORDIAL. SENATOR BIBICOFF'S SINCERITY AND OBJECTIVITY SEEMED ~~NOT TO BE~~ **PRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY**

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04 AMMAN 02519 061444Z

DISTINCTLY FAVORABLE IMPRESSION ON THE KING.

GP-3
SYMMES

[Faint, mostly illegible teletype text with large green 'EXDISE' watermark]

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~

114

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

November 13, 1967

MEMO FOR WWR:

25X1A

CIA is asking whether you would like to



Jack will be leaving Wednesday, so sometime later this afternoon or tomorrow would be our last shot at him. Your brother, Gene, has already seen him.

I would not normally suggest this kind of thing, but this is an unusual situation. I have talked to this fellow a number of times and he is good. If you want a sense of what motivates

25X1C



If you have any time at all today or tomorrow, I think 30 - 45 minutes of it spent just listening to this fellow would be time well spent.

Hal Saunders

Yes
No

with agent due to Sato, Bunker, et al. You tell me.

TOP SECRET

W

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ 034-022-3-11
By Ag, NARA, Date 5-28-10