

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
016	memo	Saunders to M. Bundy	S	2	2/8/68	A
021a	memo	Rostow to the President Duplicate of #78, this file; dup. #207, NSF, Country File, Jordan, Vol. 4, Box 147; and, #98, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 58, Box 28	S	1	1/25/68	A
021b	memo	Intelligence Memo Duplicate of #207a, NSF, Country File, Jordan, Vol. 4, Box 147; and, #98a, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 58, Box 28	S	2	1/25/68	A
031	memo	Saunders to Rostow	S	1	8/8/67	A
032	memo	Saunders to M. Bundy	TS	1	7/18/67	A
032a	draft	M. Bundy to President	TS	3	7/18/67	A
041	memo	Wriggins to Rostow	S	1	12/14/66	A
042a	memcon	From Saunders	S	3	12/12/66	A
046a	rpt	"Jordan's Arms Request & US Reponse" <i>opened 6/10/11 NLJ 11-59</i> Duplicate of #46b & 101	S	2	12/13/66	A
046b	rpt	Duplicate of #46a & 101 <i>opened 6/10/11 NLJ 11-59</i>	S	2	12/13/66	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders

Folder Title "Jordan Arms, 4/1/66 - 2/29/68"

Box Number 22

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[Handwritten Signature]
Initials

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
049	notes	re: Jordan	PCI	2	undated	A
078	memo	Duplicate of #21a Duplicate of #21a, this file; dup. #207, NSF, Country File, Jordan, Vol. 4, Box 147; and, #98, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 58, Box 28	S	1	1/25/68	A
090	memcon	Khammash, Jordan & Stoddart open 3/10/13 per NLJ 11-58	S	4	8/14/67	A
101	rpt	Duplicate of #40a & 40b opened 4/10/11 NLJ 11-59	S	2	[12/13/66]	A
102	rpt	re: Jordan Exempt per RAC, 3/04	S	3	[1966]	A
102a	rpt	"Equipment..." Exempt per RAC, 3/04	S	2	[1966]	A
102b	draft	President Johnson to King Hussein Exempt per RAC, 3/04	PCI	1	12/13/66	A
111	rpt	JCS Recommendations...	S	2	[1966]	A
112	rpt	"Equipment..."	S	1	12/7/66	A
114	memo	Memo for the Record Exempt per RAC, 3/04	S	2	12/2/66	A
116	memo	Roy to Hal [Saunders]	S	1	12/1/66	A

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Initials

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
116b	draft	"Strategy Paper for Khammash.."	S	8	11/29/66	A

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7/23/2010

Initials

Jordan Arms

1

February 29, 1968

Dear Mr. Howard:

Mr. Sanders has already acknowledged your letter to the President expressing concern over the situation in the Middle East. However, I wish to reaffirm that Hal Sanders of my staff would be happy to talk with you any time you wish to discuss the problem in detail. I believe he has already been in touch with your Assistant with this offer.

Sincerely yours,

W. W. Rector

Honorable James J. Howard
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

cc: Bancroft Sanders

February 29, 1968

MEMO FOR MR. SANDERS

I have discussed with Walt whether we should try to answer messages and letters on Jordan arms in writing. He feels it would be better to send only simple acknowledgments and then for me to offer to talk with the writers if they wish. I have already been in touch with the offices of both of these Congressmen but have not heard anything further from them. I suspect they are just writing for the record, but I will go and see them if they wish.

Harold H. Saunders

Att: Cy, WWRostow letter to Congressman John G. Dow,
2/29/68
Cy, WWRostow letter to Congressman James J. Howard,
2/29/68

Jordan Arms
x Cong. Contacts
3

February 29, 1968

Dear Mr. Dow:

We understand the concern you expressed in your recent telegram to the President on the resumption of U. S. military shipments to Jordan.

This is a complex problem, and if you wish to discuss it in detail, Hal Saunders of my staff would be happy to come and see you. He has already been in touch with your Assistant. I believe this would be a more satisfactory way to discuss your concerns than for me to try to write you in detail.

Sincerely yours,

W. W. Rostow

Honorable John G. Dow
Member, United States House
of Representatives
United States Post Office
Nyack, New York

cc: Barefoot Sanders

Encl: Remarks of the President at the National Foreign Policy Conference for Educators, State Department
June 19, 1967
Press Release of January 8, 1968, Joint Statement of President Johnson and Prime Minister Eshkol

Jordan
Arms
4

February 27, 1968

Dear Dr. Bernstein:

The President indeed shares the dilemma created by our conflicting attachments and concerns in the Middle East.

To begin with, as the President has said, we have opposed the arms race in the Middle East and continue to exercise restraint in our own shipments in an effort to encourage general restraint and to discourage wasteful expenditures on arms. There are Israelis and Arabs alike who share the hope of achieving some sort of arms limitation.

However, until other suppliers show similar restraint our choice is between abandoning some governments in the area to heavy Soviet pressures or helping them preserve their own independence and their ties to the West. We believe that abandoning them would surely jeopardize the hopes of all who want to put an honorable end to twenty years of hot and cold war in the area. That would not serve our interests or those of any of our Arab or Israeli friends.

Therefore, while we will continue to show restraint in all arms shipments to the area and to work toward arms limitation, we believe it is important to our own interests, to Israel's and to those of our Arab friends that we compete for a strong position in the Middle East.

This is the reasoning behind the decision about which you wrote. It is a painful subject for all of us to deal with. I have written frankly in the spirit of your earlier exchange with the President because we share your depth of feeling about this dilemma. We can only ask you to respect our belief that we have made the best of a difficult choice for ourselves and for our friends.

I am enclosing a copy of the important statement issued jointly by President Johnson and Prime Minister Eshkol following the Prime Minister's visit to the President's home in Texas. If you will read this carefully against the background of the concerns described above, I believe you will find the reassurance you seek.

Our main objective remains as the President has described it-- to seek a peace based on the five principles he described last June 19th (attached). Each step we take, we take with that objective fully in mind.

Yours sincerely,

Dr. Donald E. Bernstein
180 Palo Alto Avenue
San Francisco, California 94114

Harold H. Saunders

February 26, 1968

WWR:

I will go and respond orally to Congressional inquiries on the Jordan arms decision and avoid putting our responses in writing wherever possible.

However, I don't know what else to do with a file like the attached but to answer frankly. A polite but evasive reply will lose the President a friend--maybe two. An honest answer risks controversy but has the advantage of being truthful and stating a policy we've chosen to stand on.

I just don't see much choice but a straight answer. Every wafflely response makes one more angry citizen who thinks we're stupid. But if you want to get this farther from the President, I could send it out on NSC stationery.

HHS

5a

February 26, 1968

Dear Dr. Bernstein:

The President indeed shares the dilemma created by our conflicting attachments and concerns in the Middle East.

To begin with, as the President has said, we have opposed the arms race in the Middle East and continue to exercise restraint in our own shipments in an effort to encourage general restraint in wasteful expenditures on arms. There are Israelis and Arabs alike who share our hope of achieving some sort of arms limitation.

However, until other suppliers show similar restraint our choice is between abandoning some governments in the area to heavy Soviet pressures or helping them preserve their own independence and their ties to the West.

We do not believe that abandoning these nations will serve our interests, theirs or Israel's. It would surely jeopardize the hopes of all who want to put an honorable end to twenty years of hot and cold war in the area.

Therefore, while we will continue to show restraint in all arms shipments to the area and to work toward arms limitation, we believe it is important to our own interests, to Israel's and to those of our Arab friends that we compete for a strong position in the Middle East. This is the reasoning behind the decision about which you wrote.

I know this is a painful subject for the President to deal with, as it is for all of us. We share your depth of feeling about this dilemma. We can only ask you to respect our belief that we have made the best of a difficult choice for ourselves and for our friends.

Sincerely yours,

W. W. Rostow

Dr. Donald E. Bernstein
180 Palo Alto Avenue
San Francisco, California 94114

Jordan Arms

6

WWR:

February 21, 1968

Attached is the one Congressional telegram I've received so far on the Jordan arms package. Barefoot has asked us to reply directly.

In drafting a reply, I had to choose between (a) writing something non-controversial that wouldn't cause trouble but wouldn't defend our position and (b) getting right to the point. I chose the latter and have cleared the attached with Luke Battle and Nat Davis. Nat says "OK" but is anxious that we not be too contentious with the USSR while we're trying to carry on some sort of dialogue on arms limitation. I think I've toned this down into the zone of making our point without being too combative.

If, however, you'd rather not sign it but think it ought to go, maybe I could sign it. Or, of course, I could rewrite anything controversial out of it. But I'd rather stand our ground firmly but politely.

HHS

cc: Nat Davis

February 21, 1968

not print
see WWR reply
of 2/29/68. 6a

Dear Mr. Dew:

We understand the concern you expressed in your recent telegram to the President on the resumption of US military shipments to Jordan.

As the President has said, we have opposed the arms race in the Middle East and will continue to exercise restraint in our own shipments to the area.

However, until other suppliers show similar restraint, our choice is between abandoning friendly governments in the area to heavy Soviet pressures or helping them preserve their own independence and their ties to the West.

We do not believe that abandoning these friends will serve our interests or theirs. It would surely jeopardize the hopes of all who would like to put an honorable end to twenty years of cold and hot war in the area.

Therefore, while we will continue to show restraint in all arms shipments to the area, we believe it is important to our own interests, to Israel's and to those of our Arab friends that we continue to compete for a strong position in the Middle East.

I know this is a painful subject for many of us. Hal Saunders of my staff would be pleased to talk with you in greater detail about it should you wish.

Sincerely yours,

W. W. Rostow

Honorable John G. Dew
Member, United States House
of Representatives
United States Post Office
Nyack, New York

*Jordan arms
x Cong Contacts
7*

February 19, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR LUKE BATTLE

I have been asked to draft a reply to the attached telegram from Congressman Dow on our Jordan arms decision. I would appreciate it if you could give me your advice on the attached.

Since this would probably be signed by Walt Rostow, I am torn between the desire not to put anything controversial in writing and the equally strong desire to make unmistakably clear the broader reasons for our decision. Do you think the attached is too straightforward? Since we have a policy of responding immediately to Congressional inquiries, maybe Rodger could call me later today on this.

Harold H. Saunders

cc: Rodger Davies

Att: Telegram from Congressman John G. Dow, 2/16/68
Draft reply to Congressman Dow

7a

February 19, 1968

DRAFT REPLY TO CONGRESSMAN DOW

We understand the concern you expressed in your recent telegram to the President on the resumption of US military shipments to Jordan.

As the President has said, we have opposed the arms race in the Middle East and will continue to exercise restraint in our own shipments to the area.

However, until other suppliers show similar restraint, our choice is between abandoning friendly governments in the area to heavy Soviet pressures or helping them preserve their own independence and their ties to the West.

We do not believe that abandoning these friends will serve anyone's interests but Moscow's. It would surely be a blow to the hopes of all who would like to put an honorable end to twenty years of cold and hot war in the area.

Therefore, while we will continue to show restraint in all arms shipments to the area, we believe it is important to our own interests, to Israel's and to those of our Arab friends that we continue to compete for a strong position in the Middle East.

*Jordan Arms
x Israel
8*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 19, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR HARRY McPHERSON
BAREFOOT SANDERS

Just to keep you primed with useful Israeli opinion on our resuming arms shipments to Jordan, I call your attention to paragraph 2 of the attached cable from our embassy in Tel Aviv. We know it's right on the mark--as "authoritative" as it claims to be.

I have asked State for a direct translation of the article and will give it to you as soon as I get it. Is there any virtue in having something like this (when we get it) inserted in the Congressional Record along with the Dayan statement I gave you last week if reaction blows up this week?

The attached is admittedly a mixed bag. But even the article described in paragraph 3, which appears contradictory, simply says that the "formal" Israeli position must be to deplore any arms supply to an Arab state. We have to expect a certain amount of record-making for their own electorate.

I understand Cy Kenen is working on the Hill to quiet opposition.

Harold H. Saunders

cc: Walt Rostow
Mike Manatos

Att: Tel Aviv 2553, 2/16/68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 85-322 (296)
By cbm/ajg, NARA, Date 8-26-05

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, February 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Jordan Arms Package

This is to refresh your memory as to the details of the proposed arms agreement with Jordan. There are three main parts to the package: (1) about \$10 million worth of equipment we had agreed to send to Jordan before the war broke out last June; (2) about \$38 million in new ground equipment including 88 Patton tanks; and (3) 18 F-104 jet fighters (\$33 million). Just in case you want more details, I've attached a more complete list. On a lot of the smaller items there are specifics which no one has yet tried to work out.

King Hussein has expressed initial disappointment with the package and the draft memo of understanding we proposed. Our first response will be to help out with his problems in the wording of the memo and to urge him to accept the package as is and get on with delivery. However, we may have a little more bargaining to do yet. He is obviously relieved that we have come this far, and we should be able to bring him around.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, #83
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

HS:sln

~~SECRET~~

9a

JORDAN ARMS PACKAGE

Equipment under FY 1966-67 MAP Grant (\$3.8 million)

- 61 radios and related equipment
- Public address systems
- Parachutes
- 30 vehicles
- 20 target drones
- mortar sites
- 1 million rounds of small arms ammunition
- miscellaneous spare parts

Remainder of equipment from 1965, delivery of which was suspended (\$7.0 million)

- 293 radios and related equipment
- protective clothing
- parts for armored personnel carriers, M-48 tanks, vehicles, weapons and electronic equipment

Ground Forces equipment newly agreed to (\$30.5 million)

- 88 M-48A1 Tanks
- 23 105mm Howitzers
- 43 Armored Personnel Carriers
- 4 40 mm self propelled anti-aircraft guns
- 138 106 mm jeep mounted recoilless rifles
- 40 2-1/2 ton trucks
- 3 81 mm mortars
- \$3 million in 1 and 3 ton vehicles
- \$2 million in small arms
- \$12.8 million in ammunition
- Engineering equipment
- spare parts
- Radios and related equipment
- Telephones and related equipment

Air Force equipment (\$33.3 million)

- 18 F-104 aircraft with necessary auxiliary equipment and spare parts
- Ground control radar system worth approximately \$2.8 million
- An agreement to consider the supply of 18 additional aircraft at some future date

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#200a)

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By cbu/rq, NARA, Date 8-26-05

*Jordan Arms
x Israel*

10

February 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR BAREFOOT SANDERS

In view of yesterday's State Department announcement that we are resuming arms shipments to Jordan, I am attaching for you and your staff an excerpt from a recent interview with Israeli Minister of Defense, General Moshe Dayan, published in one of the major Israeli dailies on January 19.

Our main reason for making this painful decision was to prevent the Soviet Union from completing the ring around Israel which would surely have resulted from movement of Soviet arms into Jordan.

You will see in the attached that Dayan underscores the aims of our maintaining our position in the Middle East. He specifically says that he would rather see American arms in Jordan than Soviet aircraft and military missions.

I will be glad to talk to any of the Congressmen. You may want to discuss this matter in greater detail but I thought it might help you and your colleagues to have this simple response ready at hand.

Harold H. Saunders

Att: Ps. 6 and 7 of Tel Aviv A-513, 1/24/68

cc: Mr. Rostow cc: Mr. Robert Hardesty
 Mr. Leo Janos Mr. Sherwin Markman

Jordan Arms

11

CONFIDENTIAL

February 14, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR DICK MOOSE

This is just to let you know that Bob McCloskey is making the announcement on our Jordan arms package today at noon.

Just for the record, Secretary Rusk made one slight change in the text of the statement as I gave it to you the other day. The complete text now reads: " We are prepared to resume arms shipments to Jordan as we have done in the case of other Near Eastern countries. Details are now being negotiated with the Jordan Government. We continue to believe that restraint on all arms shipments to the area is essential to the stability of the area. "

Since the President wished to keep this low key, I should think George would simply want to stand on McCloskey's statement and refer further questions to him. If by any remote chance, he is pressed to explain why we chose to go ahead at this time, he might say strictly on background that we have always felt that the stability of Jordan is crucial to efforts to achieve a peace settlement. FYI, what lies behind that statement is our desire to keep the USSR from rushing in with military aid--a danger which even the Israelis recognize. I doubt George should get into that angle, but if anybody is particularly interested, I would be glad to furnish a public statement made by General Dayan to the effect that he would rather see American arms in Jordan than Soviet arms.

Harold H. Saunders

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#201)
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By cbm/rq, NARA, Date 8-26-05

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

February 14, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Hussein's First Reaction to Our Arms Package

While Hussein seemed more relaxed and friendly than Symmes has seen him for some time, his first response is that our package doesn't meet Jordan's needs. He told Harry that if this was the best we could do, he "is still faced with the question whether it was not in Jordan's best interest to find arms from another source."

His main objections are that the delivery dates are too far in the future, that he is getting far too few tanks, that F-104s are the wrong kind of airplane and that the agreement we drafted ties his hands (he's worried about its leaking). Part of the problem is that he's trying for an arms agreement as good as the immediate-delivery, no-apparent-strings deal Nasser got from the Russians. Hussein says he may have to show his agreement with us to other Arabs, and this could embarrass him.

So far, he hasn't rejected the offer. He alone knows whether he's bluffing about turning to Moscow. Apparently our offer did cheer him up, and we know he sees dangers in any deal with the Russians, so he may well be trying to bargain for the best he can get.

Whether he is bargaining or not, it looks as if we can bring him around by upping our offer. We might be able to work this with some fairly minor changes in the package or ring in a bit of Saudi financial help. The big question is whether to chance that this is a bluff and that if we sit tight he'll accept our present offer. State and Defense are working on this now, but we wanted you to know that the ball is now back in our court.

John Foster

Hal Saunders

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4(#202)

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By abm/rjg, NARA, Date 8-26-05

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 12, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR DICK MOOSE

SUBJECT: Low Key Announcement on Jordan Arms

State may announce today at noon our resumption of arms shipments to Jordan. However, in view of the fighting over the weekend, they agree that we might be better to delay until tomorrow and Walt has asked that Secretary Rusk personally OK timing of the announcement. In any case, to make the most out of this argument, we probably will have to do it tomorrow at the latest.

Following is the line State intends to use: "We are prepared to resume arms shipments to Jordan as we have done in the case of other Near Eastern countries. Details have not yet been negotiated with the Jordan Government. We continue to believe that restraint on all arms shipments to the area is essential to the stability of the area." If any reporter tries to pin us down on our specific rationale, State will say very simply that we consider that the US and other Western ties to Jordan are important to the stability of the area. (That means that a Soviet presence in Jordan would not help us reach a peace settlement.) If asked what we are doing for Israel, we would refer the questioner to the Eshkol-Johnson communique.

I will try to keep you posted on the timing of State's move, but I thought you would want to have this background as early as possible.

Harold H. Saunders

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

February 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Your Talk with Khammash and Sharaf--2:00 p. m. Today

In addition to urging everyone to get down to business with Jarring, our main tactical job with Khammash is to give him the ammunition he needs to persuade the King that our arms package is adequate and, even more important, to persuade him that we are not walking out on him. If I were you, I'd leave the package to McNamara and concentrate on these two points:

1. The main point is that we will continue to do all we can to restore and preserve a prosperous Jordan. You would be most convincing if you could describe the President's own feelings.

2. To make this point credible, I think you have to give him a convincing explanation of why we've been partly out to lunch the past few months (especially on arms aid but also in giving no budget support this year). I'd begin by saying that we've been more active than appears on the surface (e. g. pushing the Israelis to get behind Jarring). But then I'd frankly admit that we were semi-paralyzed during the fall and explain why:

a. Nothing has upset the US Congress more in recent years than seeing American weapons used against a friend (e. g. India-Pak, Greece-Turkey almost). The fact that US guns shelled Israeli Jerusalem from Jordan made resuming arms aid for Jordan more difficult than for any other Arab state. Forget any argument about whether Jordan was justified or not; that's not politically relevant.

b. This problem falls into the midst of a broader and deeply emotional debate the likes of which the US hasn't seen for some years. It has many strands, ranging from disillusionment with Vietnam and our worldwide commitments to the renewed intensity of our chronic battle between executive and legislative control. These have nothing to do with Jordan, but the President must work within their limits.

Fortunately, you can say that some of the post-war shock has now worn off and there is a returning sense of realism about Jordan's importance. That's why we can move now.

After making these points, any free-wheeling discussion you wish is in order. But both Khammash and Sharaf are returning to Jordan in the next few days. They must--and I think you should say this--explain accurately our intentions and our problems.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLT 95-219 (82)
By Chw/lyp NARA, Date 8-26-05

~~SECRET~~

Harold H. Saunders

*Jordan arms
x P.D.*

15

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

Friday, February 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Jordan Arms Package

Luke Battle and his Defense counterparts have completed the Congressional consultations you directed at Tuesday lunch. A complete rundown of whom they saw with what reactions is attached. Secretary Rusk believes the way has been paved to move ahead and recommends (Tab A) the following actions:

1. That you now authorize Secretary McNamara to offer to General Khammash the package you tentatively approved Tuesday. Bob is holding late this afternoon open on his schedule pending your response.

Go ahead Call me

2. That you invite Khammash to see you before he leaves. The purpose would be to back this package with the necessary political warmth to persuade Hussein that we have not washed our hands of him and that he can count on us. Because it's important to get Khammash back to Jordan with the package quickly, we would like to get him on your schedule off the record--if you approve--as soon as possible after he sees Bob.

I'll see him No

3. That you sign the attached determination waiving the Conte-Long amendment. Nick Katzenbach discussed this aspect of the Jordan package yesterday with Conte, Long, Reuss and Symington. All said they would not make an issue of a waiver for Jordan. Waiver at Tab B for your signature if you approve.

Once we have your final go-ahead, it would probably be desirable to make some routine announcement at State. They would simply say we are resuming arms shipments to Jordan as to other Near Eastern countries but that arms limitation continues to be our main concern.

keep it low key

Approve Call me

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13232, Sec. 3.4
By *cm/18* NARA, Date 6-29-10

W. W. Rostow

Cc: George Christian

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

561
15a

A

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Negotiations on Arms for Jordan

Recommendations:

(1) That you authorize the Secretary of Defense to offer the Chief of Staff of the Jordan Arab Army, General Khammash, the arms package outlined in my memorandum of February 5.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

(2) That you see General Khammash for a few minutes before he returns to Amman.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Discussion:

We have completed our Congressional consultations and the results indicate that we should move ahead with the arms package for Jordan. I am enclosing summaries of the conversations which we have had with the various Senators and Representatives. Based on these consultations we have no reason to change our previous recommendation that you make a formal determination under the Conte amendment. We have also informed the Israelis. If you approve, Bob McNamara will present the package to General Khammash.

I also believe it would be highly useful if you could see General Khammash for a few minutes before he returns to Jordan. King Hussein respects and has confidence in you. Consequently your meeting with Khammash could be crucial in allaying the King's expected disappointment that our arms package falls far short of his request, particularly on tanks. Even more important, it would reassure him of our support at a time when he desperately feels the need of such assurance. We can

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NWJ96-29 (#21d)
By: cb/ky, NARA, Date: 7-13-70

expect the General to present the arms package to Hussein in the best possible light; however, given the King's present mood of frustration, Khammash will need all the support which we can afford him.

The King is a desperate man with a diminishing number of choices. Given his limited resources and the enormity of his problems, he feels strongly the need for support of a major power. In the past, he has relied on the United States -- and with profit -- to provide him with the political and military support which he needed to meet his problems. For reasons familiar to you, he has in recent months come to question seriously our interest in him and his country. As an act of desperation, he has considered turning to the Soviet Union as a source of arms and even of political support for regaining Jerusalem and the West Bank. As he indicated in his December message to you, he wants to continue his traditional ties with us. I believe it would buttress his resolve if you, through Khammash, were (a) to reaffirm our intention to support his efforts to reach an equitable settlement with Israel and (b) to assure him that we stand ready to help him meet his legitimate defensive military requirements.

I am enclosing suggested talking points.


Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Enclosures:

- (1) Summary of Congressional consultations
- (2) Talking points for General Khammash

15b
561

Enclosure I

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

SENATE

LEADERSHIP

Majority Leader Mansfield -- Agreed that under the circumstances, supplying arms to Jordan was the right thing to do. (Macomber)

Minority Leader Dirksen -- Said that he would not object to our supplying arms to Jordan at this time, provided the Israelis were satisfied that we were also taking care of them. (Macomber)

Minority Whip Kuchel -- In Senator Kuchel's absence, we talked to his Administrative Assistant, Mr. Merriam, who said this is no problem for the Senator. "We both know the Senator feels we have to move back into the Jordan picture. The Senator believes in a balanced Middle East position". (Folger)

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Chairman Fulbright -- Stated that he "does not support" the decision to supply arms to Jordan. However, he added that his major preoccupation was with the error of our Viet Nam policy, and he therefore thought he would probably not actively concern himself with the Jordanian transaction. (Macomber)

Ranking Minority Member Hickenlooper -- We will talk to him about Jordan arms Friday. Based on his past positions, we do not anticipate any particular difficulty. (Macomber)

Sub-Committee Chairman Symington -- When told by Battle on Wednesday about the matter he raised no objection. Battle is seeing him again on Saturday at which time he will discuss the matter further.

In talking Thursday with Under Secretary Katzenbach, Senator Symington raised no objection about the Jordan transaction.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

SENATE

ARMED SERVICES. (Department of Defense)

Chairman Russell -- In the Senator's absence, Bill Darden, Chief of Staff, stated that Jordan Arms will not cause trouble for the Chairman. He will tell the Senator about this matter. (Gen. Lawrence)

Acting Chairman Stennis -- After being given certain information and assurances that items involved were excess to our other defense requirements, Senator Stennis apparently had no problem with this matter. There were a couple of conversations between his personal staff member, Bill Spell, and Department of Defense in getting what the Senator wanted. (Gen. Lawrence)

Ranking Minority Member Margaret Chase Smith -- Mrs. Smith said our plan is fine with her. (Gen. Lawrence)

Appropriations

(See Senator Russell and Senator Smith).

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SUBJECT: Consultations on Jordan Arms

HOUSE

LEADERSHIP

The Speaker -- On the Jordan problem, he said that he personally had a very high regard for King Hussein, and felt that we should do everything possible for him personally, and to protect our interest in the area. The furnishing of arms was a very delicate matter, but he assumed we had examined the problem carefully, and were taking all possible steps to reduce the political impact. (Torbert)

Majority Leader Albert -- In respect to Jordan arms, Mr. Albert expressed no objection to the proposal. He said he hoped we would do a good job of explaining it to Congressmen with Jewish constituents, since they might not be as understanding as the Israeli Government. (Torbert).

Minority Leader Ford -- With regard to the Jordan problem, he asked whether we were asking for a revision of legislation in order to complete the transaction. I said we were not because, if we went ahead, he could anticipate a Presidential finding of vital national interest in accordance with the amendments. In response to his question, I said I assumed that this would be forwarded to the Congress in accordance with the legislation. He said that he thought that his position would be neither to support nor oppose the transaction. However, he would consider it further and might wish to have more detail. (Torbert)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

Chairman Morgan -- He stated he thought we have to go ahead with military assistance for Jordan. He also said he hopes it works (referring to the level at which we may go.) In answer to our inquiry regarding other members of his Committee who should be consulted he asked that we tell Mrs. Bolton. He didn't refer to any others. (Battle and Folger)

HOUSE (continued)

Ranking Minority Member Mrs. Bolton -- She responded to our telling her with the quote "good". She asked if we would call Ross Adair. (Battle)

Second Ranking Minority Member Ross Adair -- He said he shared our view that we have to do something. He also said if the opportunity arose he would say so. (F.Y.I. Adair's friend, Charles Malik, (former Lebanese Ambassador), has recently talked to 60-70 of his colleagues, mostly Republicans, at which time he stressed the importance of Jordan. Adair thought this might have some good effect on later general congressional reception to aid for Jordan. (Battle)

Middle East Sub-Committee Member John Monagan -- In a debriefing conference with the Congressman on his visit to Saudi Arabia and the UAR, we indicated we had to do something for Jordan, without giving him details. He said he thought we absolutely had to do so and should do it quickly. (Battle and Folger)

Armed Services

Through the Chief Counsel, John R. Blandford, Defense checked this committee. They have no trouble with this, in fact, they favor military sales to Jordan. (Gen. Lawrence)

Appropriations

Chairman Mahon -- Will be told by Mr. Gaud.

Sub-Committee Chairman Passman -- Will be told by Gaud.
Mr. Gaud will be lunching with him tomorrow.

Members

Conte -- Said he will say nothing if waiver is granted to Jordan. (Katzenbach)

Long -- Stated he recognized we have a real problem. He went on to say he was willing to quote consider an exception unquote. (Katzenbach)

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HOUSE (continued)

OTHERS:

Congressman Henry Reuss -- Said he understood the necessity for our supplying arms to Jordan and would raise no objection. He added that he was of course unhappy that we were required to do this, but the "geography of the situation" is just too compelling. (Katzenbach and Macomber)

Congressman Jonathan Bingham -- Said he would not object. He urged that when an announcement was made on Jordan, we should balance it by telling what we are doing for Israel. (Schnee)

561
15c

~~SECRET~~-EXDIS

Enclosure No. 2

TALKING POINTS

The Problem:

To reassure King Hussein (a) of our willingness to help him meet his legitimate defensive arms requirements and (b) of our continued intention to support Jordan's efforts to reach an equitable settlement with Israel.

Response:

(a) You might explain that although our arms package is not all King Hussein requested, we believe it is a substantial response to his request and meets Jordan's legitimate defense requirements. In the light of problems we ourselves are facing, we consider it a strong reaffirmation of our support for Jordan. We wish to continue our close relationship with King Hussein and Jordan. You might add that in making these arms available, you will be required by legislation to determine that the provision of these arms is "vital to the national security of the United States." As time goes by, we stand ready to discuss further Jordan's arms requirements.

(b) You might note that when King Hussein was in Washington in November, we outlined our position on the West Bank and Jerusalem. We have not changed that position. Neither have we altered our resolve to extend full diplomatic and political support to the efforts of King Hussein and others to reach an equitable Arab-Israel settlement. You might add that in recent days we have actively intervened with the Israelis to obtain a more forthcoming position on their part towards the November 22 Security Council Resolution.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *ebm/ky*, NARA, Date 6-29-10

~~SECRET~~-EXDIS

15d

Presidential Determination
No. _____

SUBJECT: Determination under Section 119 of the
Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies
Appropriation Act of 1968

In accordance with the recommendation in your memorandum of February 6, 1968, I hereby determine that the purchases of defense articles described therein are vital to the national security of the United States.

You are requested on my behalf to give notice of this determination to the Congress.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cbm/ly, NARA, Date 7-13-70

15e

Justification for Determination Required by Conte-Long Amendments

The Conte-Long Amendments to the FY 1968 Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Act deal with the acquisition of "sophisticated weapon systems." One directs the withholding of economic assistance in an amount equivalent to the amount spent for the purchase of such weapons. The other bars the use of the military credit sales revolving fund to finance directly or indirectly the acquisition of such weapons.

There is some question as to the coverage of these amendments with regard to specific transactions in specific areas of the world. If the weapons systems in this case are determined to be "sophisticated weapons systems," the Conte-Long Amendments would necessitate, if the sale is to continue, determinations that what is being proposed now is "vital to the national security of the United States" if (1) further economic assistance is to be provided or (2) if credit funds will be required to finance any of the deliveries.

A cash purchase for the sale of 12 F-104 aircraft with an option for the purchase of an additional 24 and related spares and ground equipment was signed between Jordan and the U.S. on March 29, 1966. Ten million dollars had been deposited prior to June 1967 as an advance against the full purchase price of 30.5 million dollars for the first 18 aircraft. The Jordanians have an open option on the second 18. Some of the related spares and ground equipment but no aircraft were delivered before the outbreak of hostilities, when all further deliveries were suspended. Under the present proposal, the suspension would be lifted. Twelve aircraft which are now in storage would be delivered by the end of June 1968, and the remaining six, by the end of the year.

The current proposal includes the sale of 23 105mm self-propelled howitzers and 88 M48A1 tanks, at a total price of approximately \$4.6 million to be delivered and paid for over a period of two and one-half years.

There is assurance that Jordan has available for these purchases approximately \$28 million which it has received from other Arab states. These funds can be applied to the purchase of F-104 aircraft, howitzers, tank and other ground force requirements. The ability of Jordan to pay cash for the entire range of requirements is in doubt. Therefore, it may become necessary later to decide on some credit assistance to Jordan to complete the required financing.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NWJ 96-29 (#2/e)
By cb/s, NARA, Date 7/13/70

It may reasonably be argued, that the Conte-Long Amendments do not apply to the F-104 transaction because the agreement with Jordan was formalized prior to this amendment and the amendment does not by its terms apply retroactively. It has not been determined whether the tanks and howitzers recommended in this proposal are "sophisticated."

Thus it can be argued that the Conte-Long Amendments do not apply to any of the proposals although there is a question with regard to the F-104 aircraft, the 105 mm self-propelled howitzers, and the M48A1 tanks. The Executive Branch has not yet decided on nor has it had a chance to discuss fully the interpretation and implementation of the law. Because of these circumstances, and because it is urgent to move forward on these proposals without delay, it would be advisable to make and communicate to Congress a determination that the proposals are vital to the national security of the United States.

The howitzers and tanks represent no higher degree of sophistication than the equipment now possessed or known to be on order by Israel, the UAR, Iraq, and Syria. The howitzers and tanks will, moreover, replace comparable equipment which Jordan possessed before hostilities and will not raise Jordan's pre-hostilities level of military sophistication.

The provision of these arms to Jordan by the United States is "vital to the national security of the United States," because if we do not provide these arms, there is little doubt but that Jordan would acquire them from the Soviet Union. Such a military relationship between the Soviet Union and Jordan would seriously threaten the vital security interests of the United States in the Middle East.

First it would reduce the chances of an Arab-Israel settlement. Although we believe that the Soviet Union does not desire a resumption of hostilities in the area, we also believe that the Soviet Union sees advantages to its own interests in the continuation of tension in the area short of war. The Soviet Union could consequently use its resultant increased presence in Jordan to influence the course of events to achieve this objective. In addition, Israel is likely to take an even harder position towards a settlement with Jordan than Israel is taking now and would feel less restrained in responding militarily against Jordan for terrorist incidents.

Secondly, the provision of Soviet arms to Jordan would be a blow to our prestige and credibility throughout the area. The moderate Arab leaders would interpret this development as resulting from a change in USG policy towards the area. Serious doubts would arise in their minds as to our willingness or desire to support them. Such countries would include Saudi Arabia and Kuwait where our oil interests are, of course, substantial. The position of the Arab moderates who have based their survival on a close relationship with the West and particularly with the United States would be weakened in Arab councils and the position of the extremists consequently strengthened. Our capability of influencing the course of events and our ability to protect our interests in the area would be further weakened.

Thirdly, such a military relationship with Jordan would increase the risk of a critical US-USSR confrontation. It would increase the identification of Arab and Soviet interests in opposition to US and Israeli interests. It would enlarge the Soviet commitment to the Arab side and would make it even more important to them to protect their prestige in the event of a resumption of Arab-Israel hostilities.

Jordan Arms

17

INFORMATION

Thursday
February 8, 1968

SECRET EXDIS

Mr. President:

State and Defense this afternoon are winding up their Congressional consultations on the Jordan arms package. Secretary Rusk's final recommendation should be over early tomorrow.

He is also considering recommending that you invite General Khammash in for a short reassuring talk before he leaves.

On the chance that you might be seeing Khammash, and knowing that you will want to talk to Gene Black when he returns, I thought you would be interested in the attached report of Black's talk with Hussein. You will note that, as important as the arms are, at the top of King Hussein's request for US help is that we put our muscle into support of the peacemaking process.

W. W. R.

Amman 3316, 2/7/68

SECRET EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 96-206 (413)
By cbm/cb, NARA, Date 8-26-05

Jordan Arms

18

~~SECRET~~-EXDIS

February 7, 1968

MEMO FOR JAMES CLARK

Jim, here's the Jordan package I promised you.

Harold H. Saunders

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

Att: Dean Rusk Memo for the President, 2/6/68, Subj:
Recommended Arms Package for Jordan as a Result
of the Khammash Negotiations
Rusk-McNamara Memo for the President, 2/6/68,
same subject

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *ckm/hj* NARA, Date 6-29-10

Jordan Arms
x P.D.

19

February 6, 1968

~~SECRET~~

WWR:

You will probably want to look at this without waiting for the State memo which was supposed to accompany it. State is having production problems, and they guess that their memo will arrive about 12:15.

John Foster

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *clm/lj*, NARA, Date 6-29-10

SECRET

Tuesday, February 6, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Jordan Arms Package

In the attached, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara recommend what they feel is the minimum package that King Hussein might see as meeting his legitimate needs. This poses two separate issues: (1) whether you are now ready to go ahead with a substantial program; and (2) if so, how to handle the difficult Conte-Long amendments.

I. The package contains 18 F-104 aircraft, 38 M-48 A-1 tanks, medium artillery and a range of support equipment. This \$82 million (FY 1968-FY 1970) package contrasts to Hussein's \$200 million request, which included 36 aircraft and 200 M-48 A-4 tanks. Our rationale for paring his request is to help replace war losses except for some planes and tanks and heavy artillery. We would have to be willing to consider something beyond this package later but would suggest starting with this.

Our paring may leave this too little to meet what Hussein considers his needs. He lost 179 tanks in June, and we are offering half that. He wants tanks with a diesel engine (greater range) and a 105 mm. gun (which we sold the Israelis). We couldn't supply what he wants for two years. Our plane offer has a better chance, since we would just pick up our 1966 contract where it was suspended but offer half the number of planes now.

Our two hopes for flexibility are (a) that he can get British tanks to his specifications much sooner (they're available) and (b) that he might take some British aircraft if the Saudis would give them and we would supply a few more tanks instead. But the Secretaries feel we have to offer to supply both if neither of these deals works out.

Jordan could pay cash for the FY 1968 installment (about \$32 million, of which \$10 million already paid under the 1966 contract). The cost in FY 1969 would be \$36.3 million and in FY 1970 \$10.3 million. Neither Khammash nor the USG yet knows definitely how the FY 1968 and FY 1969 tranches might be financed, so we would have to feel our way.

This package will be painful to approve, but the alternative is accepting the probable consequences of not going ahead now. Eshkol acknowledged to you that he wished no one had to give arms to Jordan but he'd rather see us there than the USSR. Dayan in a published interview on January 19 said: "We shall not profit by it in any way if the Americans lose their influence in Jordan."

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DECLASSIFIED
 Authority: E.O. 12812, 12958, 13526, 13527, 13528, 13529, 13530, 13531, 13532, 13533, 13534, 13535, 13536, 13537, 13538, 13539, 13540, 13541, 13542, 13543, 13544, 13545, 13546, 13547, 13548, 13549, 13550, 13551, 13552, 13553, 13554, 13555, 13556, 13557, 13558, 13559, 13560, 13561, 13562, 13563, 13564, 13565, 13566, 13567, 13568, 13569, 13570, 13571, 13572, 13573, 13574, 13575, 13576, 13577, 13578, 13579, 13580, 13581, 13582, 13583, 13584, 13585, 13586, 13587, 13588, 13589, 13590, 13591, 13592, 13593, 13594, 13595, 13596, 13597, 13598, 13599, 13600, 13601, 13602, 13603, 13604, 13605, 13606, 13607, 13608, 13609, 13610, 13611, 13612, 13613, 13614, 13615, 13616, 13617, 13618, 13619, 13620, 13621, 13622, 13623, 13624, 13625, 13626, 13627, 13628, 13629, 13630, 13631, 13632, 13633, 13634, 13635, 13636, 13637, 13638, 13639, 13640, 13641, 13642, 13643, 13644, 13645, 13646, 13647, 13648, 13649, 13650, 13651, 13652, 13653, 13654, 13655, 13656, 13657, 13658, 13659, 13660, 13661, 13662, 13663, 13664, 13665, 13666, 13667, 13668, 13669, 13670, 13671, 13672, 13673, 13674, 13675, 13676, 13677, 13678, 13679, 13680, 13681, 13682, 13683, 13684, 13685, 13686, 13687, 13688, 13689, 13690, 13691, 13692, 13693, 13694, 13695, 13696, 13697, 13698, 13699, 13700, 13701, 13702, 13703, 13704, 13705, 13706, 13707, 13708, 13709, 13710, 13711, 13712, 13713, 13714, 13715, 13716, 13717, 13718, 13719, 13720, 13721, 13722, 13723, 13724, 13725, 13726, 13727, 13728, 13729, 13730, 13731, 13732, 13733, 13734, 13735, 13736, 13737, 13738, 13739, 13740, 13741, 13742, 13743, 13744, 13745, 13746, 13747, 13748, 13749, 13750, 13751, 13752, 13753, 13754, 13755, 13756, 13757, 13758, 13759, 13760, 13761, 13762, 13763, 13764, 13765, 13766, 13767, 13768, 13769, 13770, 13771, 13772, 13773, 13774, 13775, 13776, 13777, 13778, 13779, 13780, 13781, 13782, 13783, 13784, 13785, 13786, 13787, 13788, 13789, 13790, 13791, 13792, 13793, 13794, 13795, 13796, 13797, 13798, 13799, 13800, 13801, 13802, 13803, 13804, 13805, 13806, 13807, 13808, 13809, 13810, 13811, 13812, 13813, 13814, 13815, 13816, 13817, 13818, 13819, 13820, 13821, 13822, 13823, 13824, 13825, 13826, 13827, 13828, 13829, 13830, 13831, 13832, 13833, 13834, 13835, 13836, 13837, 13838, 13839, 13840, 13841, 13842, 13843, 13844, 13845, 13846, 13847, 13848, 13849, 13850, 13851, 13852, 13853, 13854, 13855, 13856, 13857, 13858, 13859, 13860, 13861, 13862, 13863, 13864, 13865, 13866, 13867, 13868, 13869, 13870, 13871, 13872, 13873, 13874, 13875, 13876, 13877, 13878, 13879, 13880, 13881, 13882, 13883, 13884, 13885, 13886, 13887, 13888, 13889, 13890, 13891, 13892, 13893, 13894, 13895, 13896, 13897, 13898, 13899, 13900, 13901, 13902, 13903, 13904, 13905, 13906, 13907, 13908, 13909, 13910, 13911, 13912, 13913, 13914, 13915, 13916, 13917, 13918, 13919, 13920, 13921, 13922, 13923, 13924, 13925, 13926, 13927, 13928, 13929, 13930, 13931, 13932, 13933, 13934, 13935, 13936, 13937, 13938, 13939, 13940, 13941, 13942, 13943, 13944, 13945, 13946, 13947, 13948, 13949, 13950, 13951, 13952, 13953, 13954, 13955, 13956, 13957, 13958, 13959, 13960, 13961, 13962, 13963, 13964, 13965, 13966, 13967, 13968, 13969, 13970, 13971, 13972, 13973, 13974, 13975, 13976, 13977, 13978, 13979, 13980, 13981, 13982, 13983, 13984, 13985, 13986, 13987, 13988, 13989, 13990, 13991, 13992, 13993, 13994, 13995, 13996, 13997, 13998, 13999, 14000

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- 2 -

I should hate to see this presented to you simply as selling arms to block Soviet military aid, because the issue is now much broader. We have reached the point in Jordan where the question is whether they think they have a better chance of achieving their objectives with US or Soviet help. If we are ending our aid relationship and are unable to press Israel toward a settlement, then Hussein is wondering whether a Soviet ring around Israel wouldn't better bring Israel to terms. This is, of course, the thinking of an increasingly desperate man who sees his choices diminishing. It would just about end chances for the kind of settlement we'd like.

There are other things we must do on the diplomatic front such as presenting a clearer position on Jerusalem and helping get the Jarring exercise moving. But unfortunately, this military aid decision has become a symbol to Hussein. We have strung him along since last June, and Khamzash has been here since January 17. Now Hussein has told you he would continue to avoid Soviet arms if he could be sure of meeting his legitimate needs in the US. That is the purpose of this exercise.

Approve Secretaries' approach _____ Disapprove _____ Call me _____

II. The Conte-Long amendments require you to withhold aid from Jordan in an amount equal to its expenditure for sophisticated weapons unless you waive on the ground that the Jordanian purchases are "vital to the national security of the United States." The airplanes, the tanks, and the howitzers in this package are pretty clearly sophisticated weapons. If you do not waive, we would have to eliminate all economic aid to Jordan for at least the next two years.

It would be possible to weave a complicated legal argument which might allow you to maintain aid without a waiver. But it would be very dubious and would certainly cause serious trouble on the Hill. Therefore, Rusk and McNamara recommend that you make the waiver.

This will be the first use of the waiver provision. I think the Secretaries have a strong case, but you may want to have some fast checking done on the Hill. I don't think we should seek agreement from Conte, Fulbright, Morse, Church and the others most interested in this topic, but you may want to be able to say that you notified them beforehand. (The law requires you to make formal notification of waiver to the Congress within 30 days.)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

III. If you approve this package, Secretary McNamara would go over it in detail with Khammash. In view of the importance of your personal intentions as Hussein sees them, there could be great advantage in your inviting him in before he leaves for a heart-to-heart talk.

I'll see him _____

I'd rather not _____

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Jordan Arms

20

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday, February 5, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Background on Jordan Arms Package

The attached from Harry Symmes is the best background I could give you for your decision on the arms package for Jordan, which will be coming up in the next day or two. It also provides a useful backdrop for Harman's farewell call tomorrow.

What strikes me is not the familiar point about buying Soviet arms if we can't meet Jordan's needs but the increasing Jordanian conviction that we are bowing out of the Middle East and only the USSR can bring justice to the Arabs.

We told our Arab friends last fall that, if they went along with a balanced UN resolution, we'd do all in our power to help bring Israel around. Until last Thursday, the Israelis had refused to tell Jarring they accepted that resolution. In addition, they keep making their own changes in Jerusalem, either feeling they have us in their pockets or discounting our view entirely. The Arabs are beginning to believe that we aren't even trying to press Israel.

In fact, we can take some credit for Eban's acceptance of the resolution last week. But we haven't made a dent on his Jerusalem position, and we are trying today to keep the Jordanians from calling a Security Council meeting on Jerusalem.

Our dilemma is that it's hard to lean on the Israelis until negotiations produce a reasonable proposition to throw our weight behind. But if we can't persuade the Arabs now that we're willing and able to get some results, we may not get to negotiations because they may figure the Jarring mission is hopeless without our behind-scenes help.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, #68
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

W. W. Rostow

Attachment: Amman 3270, 2/3/68

Jordan Arms

21

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

January 25, 1968

SUBJECT: Where We Stand with General Khammash

I think the attached from Dick Helms is worth passing to the President. However, I don't know how much of this he got at lunch Tuesday, and my covering note may be redundant.

The main purpose of this note is to tell you where we stand and what we're planning. I'd appreciate a word if this looks like more than the President will accept.

Khammash's ground force list totals \$117 million. This includes 200 M-48A-3 tanks with deisel engines and 105 mm. guns @ \$150,000. He also wants 36 multipurpose aircraft. European models are too expensive, and he'd settle for either the F-104 or F-5.

Harry Schwartz has tentatively worked out with Luke a counter-proposal which:

--On the ground starts with the purpose of replacing Jordan's war losses less some tanks (88 M-47 A-1s instead of 200 M-48A-3s) and artillery. This would make a \$54 million ground package over 2-1/2 years (FY 68, \$15m.; FY 69, \$25m; FY 70, \$14m.).

--in the air, would release the 12 F-104s ready for delivery from the 1966 contract and would add 6 more in 1970. Some of these are already paid for, but this would add \$13 million in FY 68 and \$6.5 million in FY 69.

This may not be enough to satisfy Hussein. It cuts his tank request way back, and it leaves him with nothing but light artillery.

Even at that, it would be painful for us. He can pay cash for the FY 68 slice, but the real problem is selling tanks and planes to Jordan. We can argue that the planes are from an old contract (which the Israelis accepted with the first 48 Skyhawks), but there has been a war since. We are still trying to bring the Brits in so we can make it tanks or planes, but that angle won't be clear for several days.

In the attached, I have alerted the President to Khammash's request while trying not to provoke a reaction from him until Defense makes a formal proposal it believes it can sell to Khammash. But I do want you to know what a painful decision blocking the USSR in Jordan may require. Above all, do you believe from talking with the President that tanks and/or planes are in the ballpark?

Harold H. Saunders

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLT/RAC 02-122 (506)
By ebw/lcc, NARA, Date 8-28-05

Yes No

Jordan Arms
& Israeli Arms

22

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ January 15, 1968

Christian
George:

You could do your colleague,
Bob McCloskey, a great favor if you
could get the President's guidance
this morning on the attached. He's
been under heavy pressure since the
New York Times story Saturday.

Since we want to get this news out
anyway, the sooner we go ahead, the
better chance we'll have of making it
come out our way.

Hal Saunders

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#123)
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *cbu/jc*, NARA, Date *8-26-05*

22a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, January 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Press Guidance on Israeli Aircraft and Jordanian Arms

We would like to deal in two ways this morning with press reports that you promised Eshkol a few more Skyhawks but that no commitment was made on Phantoms. The stories I've seen so far haven't been bad, but they haven't given us enough credit for restraint or for making an honest effort to achieve some sort of arms limitation. Therefore, we would like to give the following guidance to Bob McCloskey for use at noon and to our Ambassadors in Arab capitals to put your decision in the right perspective:

The joint statement issued at the conclusion of Prime Minister Eshkol's visit makes clear our continuing interest in Israel's security. In this spirit we are continuing the delivery of planes under our 1966 agreement and, in light of deliveries to other states in the area since the June war, have agreed to an extension of the 1966 agreement in order to provide a limited number of additional planes of the same type to Israel. For the immediate future, however, we are convinced that Israel's military situation gives us time to consider further a decision on F-4 Phantoms, which Israel also wants. We want to use that time to explore further the opportunities for arms limitation in the area and to work for the success of the Jarring Mission. Peace was the first order of business in our talks with Prime Minister Eshkol, and the search for peace has top priority in our present efforts. What we do about Israel's request for more aircraft will depend on developments in the area in the coming months, including the arms supply policies of others and the progress made toward a peaceful settlement.

If asked whether lead times require a decision soon, we would say that we have examined this question and concluded that lead time is a problem that can be handled. Beyond that, we would refuse to discuss details.

Some stories have also said we have informed Jordan we would relax our ban on arms sales. This has attracted less attention, so our spokesmen will not have to deal with it today. We would plan soon, however, after informing key Congressional leaders, to say in response to questions that we decided at the beginning of January to include Jordan among those countries for whom we would make limited exceptions to our arms freeze and that we are studying requests.

Approve guidance on Israeli story _____

W. W. Rostow

Call me _____

Approve your proposed course on Jordan _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (a)(3)
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By ebm/jk, NARA, Date 8-26-05

Jordan Arms
x P.O.

23

SECRET/NODIS

January 3, 1968

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WALT ROSTOW

King Hussein has responded to your request for assurance against getting Soviet arms with the following message:

"I have always been a friend of the West and I have no desire to buy arms from the Soviet Union. For this reason I have waited some months for the US to decide whether it will resume the supply of the legitimate arms requirements of my country. I hope you will agree that we have been patient. I can assure you that if the USG will supply our needs, I have no intention of buying any of our military equipment from the Soviet Union. In making this assurance I have to assume that in due course our legitimate requirements will be met. It is imperative for me that we reach a general understanding on these legitimate requirements prior to the Summit meeting on January 17 since at that time I shall have to assure the other Arab states that our arms needs will be met. Given the time factor, I see no other way to reach the necessary understandings than to send my Chief of Staff Major General Amer Khammash to Washington immediately to discuss our requirements with the appropriate American authorities. In this way I shall be able to put off discussing my military requirements with the Soviet Union. If you prefer, we see no need for any publicity concerning General Khammash's visit. I hope arrangements for him to proceed to Washington can be made as soon as possible."

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (215b)
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By abw/hg, NARA, Date 8-26-05

SECRET/NODIS

Secretary Rusk recommends you send the following oral message in reply:

"I appreciate the assurances you have given me in your oral message of December 30 with regard to Jordanian procurement of arms from the Soviet Bloc. On our part, we are prepared in principle to resume arms shipments to Jordan and would begin with the following items from the priority requirement list which General Khammash gave to Colonel Jordan in London August 1967:

106 mm rifles

2-1/2-ton trucks

communications equipment

aerial target drone systems

ammunition

and spare parts for previously delivered US equipment.

We welcome General Khammash's contemplated visit to Washington and would expect to discuss with him details (including quantities) of the above shipments and various aspects of the arms question in general. We would hope that he might arrive in Washington around January 8."

You will note that the Secretary's draft deliberately avoids direct response to the King's assumption that his requirements will be met. However, the Secretary points out that the King will interpret this reply as assurance that either we or other western sources will meet his legitimate needs. In other words, this initial package will be just the first installment

in a renewed military supply relationship, albeit to a probably smaller Jordan army.

The Israelis seem fairly relaxed about this for the moment, although their acquiescence may assume they'll get Phantoms as well as Skyhawks. They seem finally to have realized the dangers of a Soviet military presence in Yemen.

In any case, Hussein now wants French Mirage aircraft or British Lightnings rather than our F-104 and he may be persuaded to standardize his tank corps on the British Centurion. But we probably won't always be able to get away with the sort of harmless equipment on this list.

Secretary Rusk recommends we move quickly if you are ready to take this step. There is some advantage to both Jordanians and Israelis in not having it appear that your decision followed your talk with Eshkol. Besides, a Soviet "economic mission" including three military experts in mufti is scheduled to arrive in Jordan on January 5, and your message would bring General Khammash to Washington next Monday in order to reach some understanding before the Arab summit uncertainly scheduled for January 17.

This is a painful decision but I don't see any other way to keep the Soviets out at this point. Fortunately, the Israelis seem more manageable now than they did even six weeks ago.

Approve message to Hussein _____

Call me _____

Jordan Arms

24

~~SECRET~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

December 28, 1967

On your instruction we passed the following message to King Hussein:

"The President has indicated that he will make decision on Jordan arms recommendation by New Year's. He is inclined to be sympathetic to Jordan's needs, and hopes the King will not make a major decision before hearing from us."

We continue to get reports from Jordan that time is running out and that King Hussein feels it necessary to make some decision on Soviet arms by the first of the ^{year} ~~week~~. We have strung him along since mid-August and doubt we can do so much longer.

The package which Nick Katzenbach recommends would total about \$6.5 million of spare parts, automotive and communications gear, some anti-tank guns and ammunition. We all know the Israelis won't like this but we have been interested to note in the last few weeks a much more relaxed Israeli attitude toward Hussein. In any case, this equipment will not affect the Israeli-Jordanian arms balance.

Since this is a token move to reopen the door and ^{block} ~~look~~ at the Soviets, I should think ^{we} ~~you~~ would ~~be able to~~ sell it to the Israelis who will not want to jeopardize their aircraft requests by making a fuss ^{over} ~~out of~~ such an inconsequential package for Jordan.

DECLASSIFIED
F-104 Guidelines
Authority: FRUS, Vol. XX, #26
By: cbm, NARA, Date: 8-24-05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

If you are ready to go ahead, the next step would be to authorize Ambassador Symmes to offer this package to Hussein.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

~~SECRET~~

Jordan Arms
x PLS

25

~~SECRET~~

December 26, 1967

WWR:

This is the way Luke interpreted your instruction from the President this morning. However, I think you ought to look at it very carefully to make sure we are right in tying ourselves to a decision by 1 January. If that's what is in the President's mind, fine. But we've made a couple of promises we couldn't keep before, and I don't think we want to put the President on the line for a deadline unless that's exactly what he intended.

An alternative formulation might be: ". . . decision . . . before the second week in January." That would allow time for the Eshkol talks. There are clear disadvantages to linking the two, but at this point I am not sure enough what the President has in mind not to propose such a loophole.

Hal Saunders

~~SECRET~~

Att: W-4-4810

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *Chen/f*, NARA, Date 6-29-10

25a

~~SECRET~~

December 26, 1967

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WALT ROSTOW

To carry out your instruction this morning, State proposes that Ambassador Symmes pass the following to King Hussein:

"The President has indicated that he will make decision on Jordan arms recommendation by New Year's. He is inclined to be sympathetic to Jordan's needs, and hopes the King will not make a major decision before hearing from us."

Approve ✓
Disapprove —
Call me —

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (2162)
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By ebm/sg, NARA, Date 8-26-05

~~SECRET~~

December 18, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Arms for Jordan and Israel

I don't know whether you'll be discussing this at all en route. Just in case, I want you to have the two following points deriving from today's business:

1. Mac Bundy called after reading the memos before the President. He asked me to tell you that his judgement remains the same as it was yesterday—that we should go ahead sooner rather than later on the Skyhawks. He says he used to be convinced that we could haggle with the Israelis over arms, but he now believes their ^{self-interest} ~~security~~ is so important to us that there isn't really any bargain here. And the Israelis know it.

2. In my conversation with Eppie Evron today, I gleaned two important points:

--He believes Rabin is with him in the comment he made to you about helping with Jordan. (I found Eppie taking a quite different position on Jordan today. He was stressing the overriding importance of blocking the Soviet thrust into the Mid-East and more or less admitted that having US arms in Jordan would be the least of evils for Israel.)

--However, it was also clear from what he said to me that Israeli help on Jordan assumes that we agree to the whole Weizman package. The Phantoms are the big target, and when he spoke to you, he may not have had any inkling that we are considering splitting the package. This may be part bargaining, and help on our small ~~Syrian~~ deal may be negotiable. But what Eppie told you the other night may not be quite so firm as it may have sounded.

Hal Saunders

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4(c)(138)

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By abm/jc, NARA, Date 8-26-05

*Jordan Arms
x Israel Arms*

*(See copy filed in Israel
Arms for attachments.) 27*
Friday, December 15, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Arms for Israel and Jordan

You have asked to discuss these decisions: (1) Shall we resume now a limited (\$6.5 million) program for Jordan to keep the USSR out? (2) When should we answer Israel's aircraft requests?

I. Time is running out on our stringing Hussein along without resuming military shipments. We would go ahead in a minute except for one problem--reaction from Israel, our Jewish community and Congress. But we still feel Israel is better off with a controlled number of US arms in Jordan than with unrestrained Soviet shipments. This is a painful decision, but the Secretaries feel we must go ahead.

II. We must provide Israel with some aircraft (Tab C), but we're divided on two issues--how many? and when? The Arab-Israeli balance today is at least as favorable to Israel as on June 5. The question is how quickly we must act to keep pace with Soviet resupply. The 48 Skyhawks we are already delivering will replace Israel's war losses by the end of 1968 and bring Israel's air strength qualitatively somewhat above its June 5 level. General Weizman asked for 27 more Skyhawks and 50 F-4 Phantoms to increase that level (from 200 to 250) and permit modernization. Everyone agrees that we should go ahead with the 27 added Skyhawks soon and hold on the Phantoms until the need is clearer (e.g. French decision on 50 Mirages). But a debate on timing ranges between these choices:

--Nick Katzenbach (Tab A) would hold our decision until the Eshkol visit. He believes that we should not jeopardize Jarring's mission and that we can keep the Israelis quiet about Jordan by assuring them we'll avoid lead time delays and will divert aircraft from other contracts if Israel needs help quickly.

--Gene Rostow (Tab B) believes we must go ahead now, mainly to disabuse the Arabs of any false hopes that rapid supply of Soviet equipment has given them.

I doubt we can hold domestic pressures comfortably until Eshkol comes. I'd be inclined to go ahead now with the 27 Skyhawks, both to balance our Jordan move (if you approve) and to show we mean it about wanting Israel to be militarily self-sufficient.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, #20
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

~~SECRET~~

W. W. Rostow

*Jordan Arms
x Israeli Arms*

28

~~SECRET~~

December 14, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR WWR

SUBJECT: President's Response on Middle East Arms

The attached came down from the President after you had left this morning, so I relayed his instructions to Luke who had to testify before the Symington subcommittee this afternoon. Luke and I agreed that he could certainly explain the situation as we see it and the problems we face, just so long as he did not indicate the timing of any decision on the Jordanian and Israeli arms requests. I told him exactly what you had done with Farbstein's group yesterday and told him that you got your guidance from the President and that he should feel comfortable saying about what you did.

You will also note that the President basically wants to hold the major decisions for discussion with Secretaries Rusk, McNamara and Katzenbach. Until that discussion has taken place, I would disregard his check authorizing us to delay decision but assure the Israelis our delay won't delay delivery. Since that is an alternative to going ahead with 27 additional Skyhawks now, I don't think the President could have intended to make this decision prior to the discussion he also requested. I think his check reflects a simple desire that the Israelis be reassured. That should not be done until we are sure there is something we have to reassure them about.

This leaves the question of how to arrange the talk that he has asked for with Rusk, McNamara and Katzenbach. There are three possibilities:

-- This could be a top agenda item on the next Tuesday lunch meeting. But that would not involve Nick Katzenbach who has been the senior desk officer on this complex problem and who has also seen this recommendation through the IRG and SIG structure.

-- If we are trying to bless the IRG/SIG system, we might want to find some way to include Nick in the White House discussion of one of its major products. Therefore, you might want to consider an NSC meeting on the whole Middle East arms problem with special focus on Jordan and Israel. The one problem with this is that it may not be possible for the President to discuss as frankly as he needs to the problem of handling domestic Jewish reaction to these decisions.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#22)
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *cbm/sq*, NARA, Date *8-26-05*

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

- 2 -

--If either the Tuesday lunch or an NSC meeting seems impractical in this case, you could just arrange a special meeting of interested parties with the President including such others as Harry McPherson.

I don't mean to make a big deal out of this. However, I know the President is interested in making the SIG work and it is still a largely unestablished relationship between the products of the SIG and the NSC, which I know Brom is interested in. Therefore, when you have had a chance to think this over, you might want to discuss it with him before deciding how to handle this.

Harold H. Saunders

cc: Bromley Smith

SECRET

Jordan Arms
& Israel Arms
& P.O. 29

Wednesday, December 13, 1967

~~SECRET~~
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Israeli and Jordanian Arms Requests

Attached is Nick Katzenbach's recommendation for handling our pending decision on Jordan and Israeli arms requests. You will probably want more time to consider the substance of his proposals and may want to discuss them before deciding.

However, you should know that Luke Battle has been summoned to appear before Senator Symington's Mid-East subcommittee tomorrow and probably will be unable to avoid saying something about this problem. Luke would propose to take the following line, which Nick Katzenbach wants to be sure you approve:

(No decisions have been made.) However, we may have to move on both Jordanian and Israeli requests while the Senate is in recess. *Stop here.*

We are fully aware of Israel's needs and will help provide for its basic security. We have not yet, however, determined precisely what are Israel's essential equipment needs. We believe there is no immediate threat to Israel--a belief which the Israelis also share. The problem is one of lead time, particularly in light of the uncertainty that other sources, e.g. France, will deliver aircraft already contracted for. We are now actively and sympathetically examining these questions with the Israelis.

On Jordan, the question of whether we move on supplying a small amount of equipment depends on whether we want to keep the Jordanians from accepting Soviet offers for a major arms supply program. A Soviet arms presence in Jordan would not make a Middle East settlement easier. If we do decide to give some arms to Jordan, we will do only enough to keep the Jordanians from turning to the East--not enough to give them an offensive capability, and certainly much less than they would get from the Soviets.

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cm/s*, NARA, Date 6-29-10

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Luke is fully aware of the importance of not creating substantial Jewish reaction on the Hill and will do his best to keep his answers within the above positive framework unless you would rather see him take some other line.

Related subject. I might report that I delivered your message to Congressman Farbstein and other Jewish Congressmen this afternoon and assured them that we're on top of the Mid-East arms situation. They got the point and asked me, in return, to let you know of their concern over the Arab-Israeli military balance and their thanks for all you've done for Israel this summer. *

W. W. Rostow

Luke's line is OK

Call me _____

*Just pay no decision on acct.
Cong. bid provisions, etc.
L.*

* Farbstein's last word: he wants a positive decision on Israeli aircraft by Friday!!

~~SECRET~~

29a

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, December 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Arms for Jordan and Israel

The attached memos from Nick Katzenbach lay out the trickiest Mid-East arms decisions we face--Jordan and Israel.

We don't believe we can string King Hussein along much longer. A Soviet economic delegation with a few military members is in Jordan now. The King feels he has to give his army some assurance that US equipment will be available or consider Soviet offers.

Nick thinks we should do something before Christmas. He recommends a small package from pre-war programs (roughly \$6.5 in spares, automotive and commo gear, some anti-tank guns and ammo). He knows the Israelis won't like this, but says it won't affect the arms balance. He proposes letting the key members of Congress know what we plan to do and then informing King Hussein.

That would leave us with the problem of how to handle Israeli aircraft requests. As you know, they've asked for (a) 27 additional A-4 Skyhawks to be delivered in 1969 on top of the 48 that will be delivered in 1968 and (b) 50 F-4 Phantoms for delivery in 1969-70.

The questions with Israel are not so much "whether" but "when" and "how many."

In principle, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara believe we should go ahead with the 27 additional Skyhawks to replace Israel's war losses and provide a margin of safety. They do not believe we have to decide on the 50 Phantoms until later in 1968 since the Arab-Israeli military balance today is at least as favorable to Israel as it was on June 5.

Nick would prefer not to give the Israelis a definite answer now because he does not want to do anything to jeopardize Ambassador Jarring's peacemaking mission or trigger a new round of Arab demands on Moscow. He would like to hold off at least until Eshkol's visit in early February. To meet predictable Israeli pressures, he'd assure them that we can't decide for another month or two but we will take steps to be sure that this delay will not delay eventual delivery of the aircraft if we go ahead. He would also say that, if the military balance tips sharply against Israel, we would be prepared to divert aircraft from other contracts to meet Israel's needs quickly.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: FRUS, Vol. XX, #19
By: Cbm, NARA, Date: 8-24-05

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

The alternative is to go ahead with 27 Skyhawks now to balance our move with Jordan. With the substantial Soviet resupply to the Arabs over the summer, no one could argue seriously that 27 aircraft to Israel would upset chances for peace. The Israeli pressure is beginning to build up here.

Therefore, the following decisions are before you:

1. Can we go ahead with a limited program for Jordan in the next week or two, after appropriate Congressional consultation?

Yes _____ No _____ Hold for discussion _____ ✓

2. If so, which is the better way to handle the Israelis?

--Delay decision but assure Israelis our delay won't delay delivery? _____ ✓

--Or tell the Israelis now we'll go ahead with the 27 additional Skyhawks and talk about the rest later? _____

This situation is complex enough that you may want to talk it over with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and Nick Katzenbach before you decide. However, this will give you a chance to consider the problem beforehand.

Hold for discussion _____ ✓

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

August 11, 1967

*Jordan
arms*

30

Walt:

I need to check the attached against your recollection of the Tuesday lunch discussion a couple of weeks ago, when you considered military aid for Jordan. Joe Jordan will see Khammash again on Sunday, and the attached are his guidelines.

Secretary McNamara and Gene have cleared this. They have obviously tried to squeeze out the most positive statement we can make given our troubles on the Hill.

It looks ok to me if McNamara is ^{ins}will to stand behind it. I shouldn't think it would hurt on the Hill since we're deliberately saying, "not now, later."

Ok ✓

Ok as changed _____

Hal Saunders

Jordan Arms
x McGB memo

~~SECRET~~-EXDIS June 16, 1967

33

McGB:

State feels it can answer Burns satisfactorily in the framework of our current policy. I suggested they add your point about doing what they can to prevent another arms race.

HNS

~~SECRET~~-EXDIS

Att: Wire copy from Amman 4355, 6/16/67
To Amman 211613, 6/15/67

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *clm/ly* NARA, Date 6-29-10

EXDIS

RECEIVED
WHCA

33a

067 JUN 16 10 38

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BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4355

EXDIS

DELIVER TO ACTION OFFICERS OPENING OF BUSINESS JUNE 16
AONS FOR JORDAN

REFERENCE: STATE 211613

1. I PLAN SEEK MEETING WITH HUSSEIN TO CONVEY CONTENTS
REFTEL ON JUNE 17.
2. I PREDICT HUSSEIN WILL PRESS ME FOR ASSURANCES ON ONLY
ONE POINT, NAMELY THAT WE ARE MAKING ABSOLUTELY NO RFT NO
DISTINCTION IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE MATTERS BETWEEN JORDAN AND
ISRAEL. MAY I GIVE HIM CATEGORICAL ASSURANCE ON THIS POINT
IN THE LIVET OF SECDEF 7852 OF JUNE 15 WHICH APPEARS TO PLACE
ISRAEL IN A SLIGHTLY MORE FAVORED CATEGORY?
3. IF MY INTERPRETATION OF SECDEF MESSAGE IS CORRECT, I STRONGLY
URGE THAT WE REVIEW THE DECISION IT REFLECTS AND THAT ISRAEL BE
PLACED, HOWEVER TEMPORARILY, IN PRECISELY THE SAME CATEGORY AS
THE ARAB COMBATANTS. PAST EXPERIENCE LEAVES NO GROUND FOR US

PAGE 2 RUONKG 4355A ~~SECRET~~
TO ASSUME THAT NEWS LEAKS ON OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE POLICY TO
CRISIS AREAS CAN BE AVOIDED. WHEN SUCH A LEAK DOES OCCUR, I AM
APPREHENSIVE THAT THE RATHER FINE DISTINCTION WE SEEM TO BE
MAKING WILL BE MAGNIFIED BY THE PRESS TO THE SERIOUS EMBARRASS-
MENT BOTH OF JORDAN AND OURSELVES. IT WILL BE TRUMPETED ABROAD
BY OUR CRITICS AS A STANCE TOTALLY INCONSISTENT WITH OUR STATED
POLICY OF EVEN-HANDEDNESS AND NEUTRALITY.

GP-31. BURNS
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *clm/h*, NARA, Date 6-29-10

~~SECRET~~
SECRET
EXDIS

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

211613
3
336

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

80
Origin
SS
Info:

ACTION: ~~Amembassy AMMAN~~ IMMEDIATE
STATE 211613
EXDIS

JUN 15 10 27 PM '67

SUBJ: Arms for Jordan

REF: Amman's 4312

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cbm/ls, NARA, Date 6-29-10

1. You should assure Hussein that we are and shall ~~continue~~ continue to be deeply concerned with Jordan's security. We believe the survival and reconstruction of Jordan to be essential to stability and peace in the Middle East.

2. Our hope is to avoid a new arms race in the area. It ~~seems~~ seems to us to be in the interest both of the countries of the Middle East and of the rest of the world to restrain arms sales which stimulate arms races among ~~near~~ Near Eastern countries and inevitably exacerbate tension.

As we begin working towards
3. ~~reaching a comprehensive understanding~~ such an understanding -- and our efforts in order not to prejudice ~~that~~ -- we are not approving any new export licenses, or any further shipments under the Military Assistance Program, to any of the participants in the ~~current~~ conflict at this time rpt at this time.

Drafted by:
G/PM - Mr. Gartoff

Tel. Ext. _____
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

NEA - Mr. Battle

Checked by: Mr. Sanders

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED

NEA - Mr. Houghton

WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION

OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
S/S - Mr. Walker

4. Subject to foregoing, we wish Hussein to know we have made
supplying
no rpt no decision in principle against ~~supplying~~ arms to Jordan.

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

December 29, 1966

Jordan Amos
x P.B. 34

WWR:

The attached message to Hussein would be easy to handle by wire since it is short. I believe you sent the King's original message to the Ranch last week so the President should have it there for reference if he wants it.

Hal Saunders

~~SECRET~~

Re: wit - 5349, 12/24/66.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *clm/ky* NARA, Date 6-29-10

34a

~~SECRET~~

December 29, 1966

FOR PRESIDENT FROM ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Message to King Hussein

You'll recall that King Hussein sent you a letter via Bill Macomber thanking you for your understanding and help in his present crisis. This does not require a substantive response, but State recommends the following acknowledgment:

"Your Majesty:

"Thank you for your kind letter and thoughtful holiday greetings which were conveyed to me by Ambassador Macomber.

"We continue to follow with admiration the way you and your government are dealing with the difficult situation confronting you. I am pleased that we have been able to be of assistance. You may be sure that we will continue to watch closely the events now unfolding in your area. In conveying to you my warm best wishes, I also take this opportunity to renew to you my assurance of continued U. S. friendship and support.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson"

I recommend you approve. General Khammash did a good job in Cairo last weekend fending off other Arab troops for Jordan, so this general

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *dm/s*, NARA, Date 6-29-10

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

word of encouragement is appropriate. This should wrap up your current exchange.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

Jordan
arms

December 20, 1966

TO: W. W. Rostow

FROM: Howard Wriggins

SUBJECT: Handling of public relations on the Jordan package

1. The package for Jordan is taking shape. A 2,000-man increase is the preferred position; 3,000 would be a fall back. The cost of the pay raise would be shared between ourselves -- using PL 480 dinars -- and the Government of Jordan. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait will be tapped by Hussein, with our support. The cost of the pay raise and the manpower increase are easy to carry for 1967. We are retaining our option for a rigorous review of our share for 1968, when UAC funds may not be available.
2. The P.R. position is as follows:
 - (a) A telegram has already gone to Amman alerting them to our special problems in New York, calling for at least a 24-hour delay and a coordinated announcement.
 - (b) State is preparing a talking paper for Doug McArthur to use on the Hill. Nick will be clearing it.
 - (c) Hal's earlier talking paper covers points for your talks with the Jewish community. I also attach a draft framework for a backgrounder in case this is something you would want to handle here. If you would prefer to have State deal with the press, Bob McCloskey could cope. I do not include references to Hussein's statements regarding Israel being there to stay, for this is truly anathema in the Arab world (though I am pursuing this in the event you still want them).
3. I am in close touch with Roger Davies and will keep you informed.

December 20, 1966

Draft Backgrounder for use with the press on
Emergency Assistance to Jordan

1. Hussein badly shaken by the raid on El Samu.

(a) His army's loyalty weakened by:

- (i) exposure of Jordan's vulnerability to Israeli attack;
- (ii) his policy of moderation toward Israel, which is in such contrast to the hostility and anti-Israeli agitation of UAR and Syria.

(b) Elements among West Bank Palestinians again actively oppose the regime. After El Samu they turned their anger

- (i) first against Israel as the historic cause of their difficulties, and
- (ii) then against Hussein and his army for their inability to defend them against Israel.

(c) The Arab extremists in Syria and the UAR took advantage of Hussein's difficulties and provoked further disorders amongst Palestinians, egging them on to demand the end of the regime. Infiltrators crossed from Syria into Jordan to sabotage. The Palestine Liberation Organization is openly agitating for his downfall. Hussein believes Soviet military assistance goes to his Arab neighbors in order to promote local conflict.

2. It is to Israel's interest that Hussein remain in power.

(i) Hussein is working toward a Jordanian nation which will provide opportunity and outlet for West Bank Palestinians, if he is given a chance. His policy toward Israel has not been extreme, like that of the radicals.

- (ii) He has conscientiously worked for stability in the area.
- (iii) Those who know official Israeli opinion are aware they do not wish to bring down Hussein.
- (iv) A collapse in Jordan could precipitate open warfare between Arabs and Israel, and this would be to no one's advantage.

3. Our assistance to Hussein is designed to help Jordan improve its defensive capability.

- (i) Frontier control will be improved, mobility and communications will be stepped up.
- (ii) Equipment will be largely that already in the pipeline, with delivery dates accelerated. Six of the F-104's already approved, will be delivered promptly. No additional planes or tanks are involved.
- (iii) A pay raise, long under study, will be put into effect promptly; there will be a limited increase in forces to bring units up to strength.

This package will not alter present balance of forces in the Near East. It is not of an importance comparable to sales of planes or tanks. /FYI - If we down play it too much, the Arabs will feel they got nothing; if we up-play it too much, the friends of Israel will be unduly alarmed. The above, therefore, may be the best way to handle it. /

4. We are confident that Jordan's intention is the continued stability of the area. King Hussein will bend his efforts to defend the territorial integrity and independence of Jordan and to prevent the use of Jordan territory for activities directed against its neighbors. Our urgent assistance is to help make this possible.

December 20, 1966

Saunders

37

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Hussein on the existence of Israel -- accentuating the positive.

1. On November 17 King Hussein said to all Diplomatic Chiefs of Mission that Israel's action has been not a retaliatory raid but "an act of war." His subsequent remarks were to the effect that:

"although the Arabs tended to make extravagant and bombastic statements, all that any Arab leader really aimed for was to attain a military balance between all the Arabs on the one side and Israel on the other."

While he did not say so, put another way, this sounds very much like an admission that Israel is here to stay and we must recognize that hard fact. But the Israeli action at El Samu makes it very hard to believe that they want only a balance, so we must build up our strength (the text of Amman's 1154 is attached, see paragraph 6).

2. The second citation, which is more to the point, is from James Murray's interview with Hussein, reported in the Sunday Express, December 11, 1966. It went as follows:

"And one day we hope the Jews will see sense and learn that the real enemies here are the barren mountains and the deserts which we all have to try to control for the good of all our people.

"It makes me sad to have to spend money on arms and planes when there are so many other things we could do.

"It is a tragedy for humanity here. And yet there have been times when the Jews and the Arabs have lived peacefully. Common sense might come again."

HWriggins:lw

*Jordan arms*38~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 20, 1966

TO: W. W. Rostow

FROM: Howard Wriggins

SUBJECT: Arms for Hussein

Hussein and Macomber are bargaining hard.

Hussein welcomes the McNamara package, believes that the drama of the airlift will be very helpful, as will 6 F-104's in advance. He will do all in his power to prevent the stationing of non-Jordanian Arab troops in Jordan; he will continue his moderate policy toward Israel.

Now remains at issue his force level. Macomber has pressed hard for no increase but for a substantial improvement in quality. General Khammash wants an increase of 10,000 from the present 50,000 on deck to 60,000. However, Macomber believes the King is under pressure to increase numbers as well as quality -- his generals do not find it credible that they can meet the threat from both Israel and Syria without a numerical increase. (NOTE: The United Arab command's plans for Jordan implied a total strength of 75,000 including an 8,500 national guard. The Government of Jordan has authorized a strength of 55,000, but had not gone farther than 50,000, a level we had never formally agreed to.) Macomber believes a 2,000-man increase is reasonable to absorb the new equipment we are adding. He hopes to hold the line at that. But if he can't, he feels the pressure is strong enough to warrant taking out a small insurance policy by accepting a 5,000-man increase, but for one year only.

On budget costs, we and they had reached agreement on the Jordanian defense budget of some \$54 million. We have been providing a declining level of budgetary support (\$37 million in 1962, \$32 million in 1966). We have told Congress that we are continuing to reduce this support. And we had planned cuts of \$5 million a year beginning this year.

DoD estimates that apart from the costs of the McNamara package, the add-on costs are as follows:

1. pay raise	\$ 6 million
2. 2,000 men to handle new equipment	2.5 "
3. 3,000 men to 55,000 total	<u>3.5 "</u>
	\$12.0 "

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Authority FRUS, vol. xviii, #372
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

Where will this \$12 million additional come from?

1. Khammash says he can cover these costs for one year out of UAC funds (though we are somewhat skeptical).
2. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait could be tapped by Jordan, with our backing, in the event the UAC contribution does not come through (but we're already expecting them to pick up the \$70 million balance from the tank and plane sales and therefore can't expect much more).
3. We ourselves could scratch our \$5 million cut in budget support, and might put in some additional contingency fund if necessary (though this would undercut the important goal of shifting Jordan to development funding).

I assume the President would prefer to satisfy them with a bit more cash in the form of budget support than have a new crisis on his hands.

Have you any reaction to the above before I join in a State-Defense meeting at 10:45?

*Jordan arms
x Israel arms*

39

~~SECRET~~

Friday, December 15, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Arms for Israel and Jordan

You have asked to discuss these decisions: (1) Shall we resume now a limited (\$6.5 million) program for Jordan to keep the USSR out? (2) When should we answer Israel's aircraft requests?

I. Time is running out on our stringing Hussein along without resuming military shipments. We would go ahead in a minute except for one problem--reaction from Israel, our Jewish community and Congress. But we still feel Israel is better off with a controlled number of US arms in Jordan than with unrestrained Soviet shipments. This is a painful decision, but the Secretaries feel we must go ahead.

II. We must provide Israel with some aircraft (Tab C), but we're divided on two issues--how many? and when? The Arab-Israeli balance today is at least as favorable to Israel as on June 5. The question is how quickly we must act to keep pace with Soviet resupply. The 48 Skyhawks we are already delivering will replace Israel's war losses by the end of 1968 and bring Israel's air strength qualitatively somewhat above its June 5 level. General Weizman asked for 27 more Skyhawks and 50 F-4 Phantoms to increase that level (from 200 to 250) and permit modernization. Everyone agrees that we should go ahead with the 27 added Skyhawks soon and hold on the Phantoms until the need is clearer (e.g. French decision on 50 Mirages). But a debate on timing ranges between these choices:

--Nick Katzenbach (Tab A) would hold our decision until the Eshkol visit. He believes that we should not jeopardize Jarring's mission and that we can keep the Israelis quiet about Jordan by assuring them we'll avoid lead time delays and will divert aircraft from other contracts if Israel needs help quickly.

--Gene Rostow (Tab B) believes we must go ahead now, mainly to disabuse the Arabs of any false hopes that rapid supply of Soviet equipment has given them.

I doubt we can hold domestic pressures comfortably until Eshkol comes. I'd be inclined to go ahead now with the 27 Skyhawks, both to balance our Jordan move (if you approve) and to show we mean it about wanting Israel to be militarily self-sufficient.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, #20
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

151

~~SECRET~~

W. W. Rostow

Jordan
arms

40

December 14, 1966

TO: W. W. Rostow
FROM: Howard Wriggins
SUBJECT: Jordan military package

The attached is not the exact text of Macomber's instructions. These are now being worked on in Handley's office with Hoopes and Davies, but I have gone over this formulation and made the following suggestions, most of which they have already incorporated in the instructions now being drafted:

1. The whole package will be made conditional upon three commitments by Hussein: (a) to maintain his policy of restraint vis-a-vis Israel; (b) he will successfully resist efforts of other Arab states to station non-Jordanian armies in Jordan; (c) manpower levels will remain virtually the same.
2. A new paragraph will be added making specific mention of frontier stabilization. (This may involve stepping up our present program of working with border police and may call for some new border surveillance equipment. Funding would likely come from AID's public safety program.)

Att.

Jordan Arms 42
x Israel

~~SECRET~~

December 16, 1966

Memo for Lois Nivens

Your copies of a memorandum on Mr. Rostow's conversation with Abba Eban Monday are attached for you to dispose of as you wish in WWR's files and elsewhere.

HHS

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *Chm/s*, NARA, Date 6-29-10

Jordan Arms
43

~~SECRET~~

December 14, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR RODGER DAVIES

I prepared the attached on a crash contingency basis yesterday. The immediate need may have passed, though I suspect the subject will be with us for many weeks.

I pass it along only in case it might save you some basic drafting if you or Doug MacArthur has to jump into the breach in a hurry. (Obviously, you would drop any reference to the President unless appropriate.) You'll note that I've married the current Jordan problem with the basic memo on what we're doing for Israel that Jim Matter and AID helped me with last month.

I'd also like to know if I'm seriously off base anywhere so I can correct future editions.

Harold H. Saunders

~~SECRET~~

Att: Suggested Talking Points Briefing Israel's Friends on the Jordan Package, 12/14/66

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *Chm/ly*, NARA, Date 6-29-10

Jordan Arms

44

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 14, 1966

WWR:

To follow up your injunction against publicity on Macomber's trip, State has decided (a) that they will have to admit Macomber is there if the press spots him but (b) that they will not comment on any further questions.

Macomber is so well known in Jordan that it would be silly to deny his presence if the press sees him. However, we can't say it's a routine AID trip because he has three DOD fellows with him and State acknowledged several weeks ago that we have a military aid request from Jordan. It's better to say nothing than to say something that's obviously untrue.

"No comment" gives the press free rein to speculate irresponsibly, and the Middle East press may. However, the President's main concern is the responsible US press--particularly the NYT and Washington Post. It seems to me they'll be hard pressed to print big-headline stories if they can't confirm Mid-East stories here--whereas any official explanation immediately gives them something hard to go on.

State is preparing guidance along these lines tonight. Does this make sense to you?

Hal Saunders

Yes _____

No _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By Chm/s, NARA, Date 6-29-10

Jordan arms
45

~~SECRET~~

December 14, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER

Here are the papers I promised you at lunch.

The first is a general unclassified rundown of what we've done for Israel over the past few years. We've used this a number of times here to point out to Israel's friends how broad our commitment really is. You will see that your present enterprise figures prominently.

The second is a more confidential explanation of our Near East policy designed to show how the new Jordan arms package actually serves Israel's interests. These talking points were written to be used here with members of Congress and other such semi-insiders. Obviously, the Israelis you meet will be more sophisticated, but the line of argument may still be useful, I hope, in helping you arrange your thoughts.

Finally, you may be interested in two charts we had made for the President last summer to show how well Israel's economy is doing and to make graphic how great our contribution has been.

Bon voyage!

Harold H. Saunders

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cm/s*, NARA, Date 6-29-10

November 2, 1966

US HELP FOR ISRAEL
1964 - 1966

Perhaps the best way to characterize US-Israeli relations in this period is to say that they are closer today than ever. As Foreign Minister Eban himself said in July:

"We stand at a high point in the evolution of American-Israel friendship. . . . President Johnson has contributed in abundant measure to the reinforcement of Israel's strength and spirit. He has inspired our confidence in the sincerity of the American commitment to Israel's security. He has shown a perceptive understanding of our need to develop our defensive strength. He has maintained a constructive interest in Israel's economic progress and in all of this he shows a sensitive regard for the principle of international peace and for the preservation of small states."

The breadth and depth of US help for Israel, even more than aid levels themselves, are impressive:

1. The US economic aid program in Fiscal Years 1964, 1965 and 1966 has totaled \$134 million. This breaks down as follows (in \$millions):

	<u>FY 1964</u>	<u>FY 1965</u>	<u>FY 1966</u>
Development Loans	20.0	20.0	10.0
EXIM Bank Long-term Loans	--	4.0	*--
Food Aid	19.9	33.9	26.6

*\$10 million in EXIM credit was offered, but the Israeli Government did not use it within the Fiscal Year. However, in the first four months of FY 1967 EXIM loans totaling \$12.9 million have been made to three Israeli firms or institutions.

These three years, 1964-66, cap a total of \$1.1 billion in public grants, loans, and credits on concessionary terms which the US has extended to Israel from 1948 through FY 1966.

2. In addition to this economic aid, the US made important sales to Israel of tanks and combat aircraft in 1965 and 1966. This decision was taken after long and careful consideration to prevent development of a destabilizing arms imbalance in the area. We do not intend to become a major arms supplier there, but we have recognized legitimate

defensive needs. The sales were made on liberal credit terms. Costs are classified by both governments, but in general one can say that our total economic and military aid in FY 1966 was higher than in any single previous year. In addition we have allowed commercial purchase of other equipment.

3. These aid levels stand out against the background of general aid policy designed gradually to phase out concessional aid in countries like Israel which have moved impressively toward self-sustaining growth. Israel's per capita GNP of \$1400 in 1965 was about 75% of the UK's, 90% of Holland's, 110% of Austria's, 125% of Italy's and 200% of Greece's. Our aid policy has grown out of the pressures of low appropriations and our belief that it is healthy for nations to push away aid props just as soon as possible.

4. These gross figures, impressive as they are, do not nearly convey the breadth of US activity in Israel. From US-owned local currency accumulated principally from PL-480 food sales, the US makes loans and grants which play a major role in Israel's economy:

- a. The US is now supporting scientific research in Israel at the level of \$8 million a year--about 25% of all the funds Israel spends on non-military research and development. This represents the work of 15 US Government agencies supporting some 350 science projects in fields ranging from health and education to weather and vocational rehabilitation. We have spent at least \$18 million on such projects FY 1964 - FY 1966. These programs are a substantial contribution to keeping an already outstanding scientific community constructively employed.
- b. The US Government has also aided the Israeli Development Budget in grants and loans in the last three fiscal years to the extent of \$61.5 million in Israeli pounds. The significance of this program is apparent from a breakdown of the FY 1967 program which has just been put in final form in Tel Aviv. Note that the sums to be loaned represent substantial percentages of the total Israeli government expenditures for these purposes:

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>Equivalent Amount in \$</u>	<u>% of Total Israeli Expenditures for this Purpose</u>
Development of Agriculture	\$1.3 million	59%
Improvement of Telephone Services	10.5 million	35%
Development of Railways	1.3 million	58%
Construction of Schools	3.3 million	64%
	<u>\$16.4 million</u>	

- c. In FY 1964 - FY 1966 we loaned Israeli pounds worth \$7.9 million to the Industrial Development Bank of Israel (IDBI), which re-lends the money to Israeli firms under its own criteria.
- d. In addition, in FY 1966 alone the US Government loaned the equivalent of \$5.0 million to 4 Israeli institutions of higher learning and the American-Israeli Cultural Institute. Similar loans totaled \$14.1 million FY 1964 - FY 1966.
- e. We have also loaned \$8.5 million in Israeli pounds (Cooley loans) over these years to support private American investors in Israel.

5. On February 6, 1964, President Johnson stated in a speech before the Friends of The Weizmann Institute in New York City that the US would begin discussions with representatives of Israel on cooperative research in the field of desalting. During Prime Minister Eshkol's visit that June, we outlined a program. Since that time, the US and Israel have completed a 14-month study of the technical feasibility of building a nuclear-fueled desalting and electric power plant capable of producing, by the early 1970's, 100 million gallons of fresh water daily and 175-200 megawatts of electricity. On October 13, the President appointed Ambassador-at-Large Ellsworth Bunker to review progress to date, recommend next steps and begin discussing remaining problems with an Israeli counterpart.

6. On the diplomatic front, President Johnson reaffirmed publicly during the 1964 visit of Prime Minister Eshkol and again during the August 1966 visit of President Shazar the US commitment to support the integrity of states in the Near East and to oppose aggression in any form. In addition, our presence in key Arab countries has enabled us to work usefully for peace and moderation. We have produced no final solutions for any of the Arab-Israel problems but our activities have:

- Safeguarded access to Israel's fair share of the Jordan's waters.
- Helped reduce tensions and incidents along Armistice lines.
- Preserved effective UN peacekeeping machinery.
- Supported Israel, where warranted, in the United Nations.
- Tried to make progress on the refugee problem.
- Encouraged more realistic Arab attitudes toward the Arab-Israel dispute.

7. In addition to this diplomatic activity, the US has given all financial support (\$87.3 million since 1949 and \$25.3 million FY 1964-FY 1967) for the elaborate peacekeeping machinery on Israel's borders and has helped support over a million Arab refugees at a cost of some \$71 million 1964 - 1966 (over \$387 million since 1948).

45b

SECRET

December 14, 1966

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS
BRIEFING ISRAEL'S FRIENDS ON THE JORDAN PACKAGE

Purpose--To reassure our friends by putting the new Jordan package in proper perspective on a confidential basis. We want to convince them that we support Israel fully and anything we do for the Arab countries is done with Israel's interests in mind.

1. The President wanted me to have this talk about our Israeli affairs because he feels that many friends of Israel are insufficiently aware of our real policies. As a result of misinformation, they have sometimes brought undue (and often counter-productive) pressure on the Administration when it seeks to preserve US--and even Israeli--interests elsewhere in the Near East.

2. No one who has an insider's view of the many aspects of our Israeli relations could contest the proposition that the US is 100% behind the security and wellbeing of Israel. We are Israel's chief supporters, bankers, direct and indirect arms purveyors, and ultimate guarantors. This has been US policy since 1947, but has reached a new level since 1964. There is no question that Israel regards us as its best friend.

3. A cardinal principle of our Middle East policy is to create an environment in which Israel can survive and prosper. We do a number of things to affect this environment:

--We have spent since 1949 \$87 million for the elaborate UN peacekeeping machinery on Israel's borders.

--We have helped support over a million Arab refugees, who are the recruiting pools for terrorist organizations, at a cost of over \$387 million.

--Our aid to a number of other Arab countries is given with an eye to stability on the Arab-Israeli front. Moscow and Peiping are violently pro-Arab and use the Arab Israeli issue for their own purposes. It serves Israeli interests if we keep the Soviets and Chicoms from attaining undue influence.

4. A most important part of stabilizing this environment is to foster a sound regime in Jordan. Israeli officials are the first to say that this is also a major objective for them. They point out that King Hussein has realistically accepted the existence of Israel and has admitted the emptiness of Arab threats to drive Israel into the sea. He has also

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (495a)
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By cbm/ky, NARA, Date 8-28-05

worked hard to create a Jordanian national entity which would meld the East and West Banks, thereby extinguishing Palestinian nationalism.

5. To date we have spent \$550 million to build stability in Jordan-- with outstanding results. We have bought a decade of relative peace on Israel's longest border and have turned Jordan from a nation without hope into a nation with hope of standing on its own feet and resisting pressures to become a pawn of the radical Arabs. Our help has been mainly economic, but it has also included a small on-going military assistance program as well as two special sales of military equipment. We have fully informed the Government of Israel on all of these, and it has shown its understanding of our purpose. Israeli officials tacitly admit that our economic program serves Israeli interests.

6. The Israeli raid on Jordan has severely undercut King Hussein. It deeply humiliated his army--his main support--and sharpened long-standing discontent among the Palestinians on Jordan's vulnerable West Bank. The radical Syrian government is encouraging this discontent and has stepped up terrorist infiltration against Jordanian targets. The raid also increased pressure on him from other Arab governments to accept stationing non-Jordanian troops in Jordan--a move aimed at his possible overthrow, which would place hostile forces on Israel's most vulnerable border. To resist these pressures and to retain the loyalty of his army, he feels he must improve Jordan's defenses against repetition of the 13 November raid or abdicate his responsibilities as Jordan's leader.

7. We believe this is a political-psychological problem--not chiefly a military one, as Hussein sees it. We have Israel's firm assurance that the 13 November raid does not constitute a change in Israel's policy toward Jordan--that it was a response to terrorism and not the first step in seizing the West Bank. Nevertheless, we must meet Hussein's political problem--in our interests and in Israel's. While Hussein has asked for an extravagant \$200 million of new military equipment, we have responded with a package worth less than 4% of that designed to:

- Prevent diverting resources from economic development.
- Improve pay and equipment enough to preserve army loyalty.
- Not upset the military balance to Israel's disadvantage.

8. I want to underscore that this is an effort to meet problems which both we and the Israeli government feel must be solved. This package will not affect the military balance because it is not primarily a military program. It is the starting point for what will undoubtedly be a long series of general aid negotiations which will be required to help Hussein resist Arab pressures to move into the West Bank and retain the respect of the army and security forces which alone can restrict anti-Israeli terrorist activity from Jordanian bases.

9. Meanwhile it is possible that many of you do not realize the extent to which we have helped Israel over the years and continue to do so:

a. US public grants, loans and sales on concessional terms have totalled \$1.1 billion through FY 1966. This has helped Israel achieve probably the highest sustained growth rate in the world (10-11% per annum for the last twelve years). Their foreign exchange reserves are up from around \$280 million at the end of 1961 to over \$600 million now. It is a real success story.

These aid levels stand out against the background of general aid policy designed gradually to phase out concessional aid in countries like Israel which have moved impressively toward self-sustaining growth. Israel's per capita GNP of \$1400 in 1965 was about 75% of the UK's, 90% of Holland's, 110% of Austria's, 125% of Italy's and 200% of Greece's. Our aid policy has grown out of the pressures of low appropriations and our belief that it is healthy for nations to push away aid props just as soon as possible.

b. We have made quite sure that Israel could meet its minimum military aid requirements, either here or from other Western sources. Our JCS regularly review the situation and still estimate that Israel can defeat any likely Arab combination, now or in the next few years. The Israelis believe the same thing.

--So long as Israel could meet its arms needs from France, the UK (or for a time Germany), we sought to avoid becoming major direct suppliers in order to: (1) fend off Arab pressures; (2) forestall excessive Arab requests; (3) avoid driving the Arabs to Moscow and Peiping for even more. This policy makes sense, and in fact has given Israel better arms cheaper than it could get them from us.






--But in those cases where Israel could not meet legitimate defensive needs elsewhere, we've helped quietly and directly. In 1962 we sold 5 HAWK batteries, and in 1965 and 1966 we sold tanks and combat aircraft. These decisions were made after long and careful consideration to prevent development of a destabilizing arms imbalance in the area, and the sales were made on liberal credit terms. Also, most people don't know that we've provided 106 mm. recoilless rifles, armored half tracks, extensive electronic equipment, C-97s, and other items over the years. We've trained over 300 Israeli military here.

c. We do a great deal to enhance Israel's technological edge over the Arabs--which is in many respects its secret weapon. We gave a nuclear research reactor and we now support scientific research in Israel at the level of \$8 million a year--about 25% of all the funds Israel spends on non-military research and development. This represents the work of 15 USG agencies supporting some 350 science projects. These programs are a substantial contribution to keeping an already outstanding scientific community constructively employed.

d. To help preserve and develop vital water supplies, we have given quiet assurance that we will help Israel maintain access to its share of the Jordan waters. We have also engaged in discussions with Israeli representatives on cooperative research in the field of desalting, and the President has appointed Ambassador-at-Large Ellsworth Bunker to recommend next steps in this program.


e. On the diplomatic front, President Johnson reaffirmed publicly during the 1964 visit of Prime Minister Eshkol and again during the August 1966 visit of President Shazar the US commitment to support the integrity of states in the Near East and to oppose aggression in any form. In addition, our presence in key Arab countries has enabled us to work usefully for peace and moderation. We have produced no final solutions for any of the Arab-Israel problems, but our activities have:

- Safeguarded access to Israel's fair share of the Jordan's waters.
- Helped reduce tensions and incidents along Armistice lines.
- Preserved effective UN peacekeeping machinery.
- Supported Israel, where warranted, in the United Nations.
- Tried to make progress on the refugee problem.
- Encouraged more realistic Arab attitudes toward the Arab-Israel dispute.

- LEGEND**
-  Military Credit Assistance (Program)
 -  Export-Import Loans (Long-term)
 -  P.L. 480
 -  AID Loans
 -  AID Grants

U. S. ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL

OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By clm/s, NARA, Date 6-29-10

45c

ISRAEL - - ECONOMIC COMPARISONS

ITEM	ISRAEL	JAPAN	MEXICO	PAKISTAN	NETHERLANDS
GNP PER CAPITA 1965	\$1,417	\$856	\$474	\$85	\$1,504
GNP GROWTH ANNUAL RATE 1960-1965	10.7%	9.7%	5.9%	5.4%	4.7%
DEFENSE EXPEND. AS PERCENT OF GNP	11.3%	1.1%	0.6%	3.1% (BEFORE KASHMIR)	4.0%
GOLD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE AS PERCENT OF 1965 IMPORTS	92%	23%	31%	23%	36%
DEBT OF CENTRAL GOY'T AS PERCENT OF GNP	Develop. Bonds 18% 65% Other 47%	5%	9%	24%	32%

December 13, 1966

Walt,

Here is the comparison of Jordan's request and our response.

Page 1 lists major items side by side.

Page 2 shows the comparative cost of major components of these contrasting programs.

You are aware that we have not provided Israel with specific details in the past of military programs for Jordan. But we have given them a general idea.

Howard Wriggins

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46a

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
By isj NLJ 11-59
NARA, Date 5-18-11

Prepared by ISA
at my request today.
Dec 13, '66

Jordan's Arms Request & U. S. Response

Description	Jordan Request	U. S. Proposal	Remarks
APC M-113 with radios	150 items	60 items	
Gun SP Twin 40mm AA, M42A1	42 "	36 "	
Howitzer 155mm	24 "	24 "	
Truck 5-ton prime mover	48 "	36 "	21 already funded in FY 66 MAP
Howitzer 105mm SP M52A1	24 "	18 "	18 already funded in FY 66 MAP
Truck 2-1/2 ton 6x6	200 "	50 "	
Rifle 106mm M40A1 w/truck 1/4 ton	180 "	27 "	
Machine Gun, cal 30 M1919A6 w/mount M2 1100	"	300 "	
Rifle M-1	5000 "	5000 "	
Machine Gun, cal 50 Browning M2 w/mount M3	400 "	200 "	
Rocket Launcher 3.5" M20A1B1	550 "	300 "	
Mortar 81mm	250 "	100 "	
Wrecker M543	30 "	8 "	Approved original FY 67 MAP
Truck (special purpose)	1400 "	15 "	Approved original FY 67 MAP
Truck 1/4-ton	0 "	10 "	Approved original FY 67 MAP
Tanks M-48 with 105mm Gun	100 "	0 "	
Tanks M48 with 90mm Gun	12 "	0 "	
Browning Automatic Rifles	1500 "	0 "	
Carbines	5000 3000 "	0 "	
Tank Recovery Vehicles	20 "	0 "	

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Helicopters, Assault	6 "	0 "
Fast Armed Boats	4 "	0 "
Plus Misc other items	--	--
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	Value \$107,606,200	\$6,741,600
Communications Equipment	2,996,300	165,000
Fortification Materials (barbed wire, etc.)	1,949,800	180,800
Selected engineer equipment (graders, cranes, scrapers, tractors, generators, concrete mixers, etc.)	9,400,000	150,000
Selected target acquisition equipment (flash ranging, survey sets, plotting boards, etc.)	3,800,000	70,000
Selected Ammunition	34,679,600	200,000
Spares for equipment	<u>37,715,700</u>	<u>Undetermined</u>
	\$198,147,600	\$7,507,400

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468

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

By isj NLJ 11-59
NARA, Date 5-18-11

Prepared by ISA at
my request today.
Dec 13, 66 HED

Jordan's Arms Request & U. S. Response

Description	Jordan Request	U. S. Proposal	Remarks
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Howitzer 105mm SP M52A1	24 "	18 "	18 already funded in FY 66 MAP
Truck 2-1/2 ton 6x6	200 "	50 "	
Rifle 106mm M40A1 w/truck 1/4 ton	180 "	27 "	
Machine Gun, cal 30 M1919A6 w/mount M2 1100	"	300 "	
Rifle M-1	5000 "	5000 "	
Machine Gun, cal 50 Browning M2 w/mount M3	400 "	200 "	
Rocket Launcher 3.5" M20A1B1	550 "	300 "	
Mortar 81mm	250 "	100 "	
Wrecker M543	30 "	8 "	Approved original FY 67 MAP
Truck (special purpose)	1400 "	15 "	Approved original FY 67 MAP
Truck 1/4-ton	0 "	10 "	Approved original FY 67 MAP
Tanks M-48 with 105mm Gun	100 "	0 "	
Tanks M48 with 90mm Gun	12 "	0 "	
Browning Automatic Rifles	1500 "	0 "	
Carbines	5000 3000 "	0 "	
Tank Recovery Vehicles	20 "	0 "	

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Helicopters, Assault	6 "	0 "
Fast Armed Boats	4 "	0 "
Plus Misc other items	--	--
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	Value \$107,606,200	\$6,741,600
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Selected target acquisition equipment (flash ranging, survey sets, plotting boards, etc.)	3,800,000	70,000
Selected Ammunition	34,679,600	200,000
Spares for equipment	<u>37,715,700</u>	<u>Undetermined</u>
	\$198,147,600	\$7,507,400

~~SECRET~~

Saunders

*Jordan
armies*

47

December 13, 1966
6:30 p. m.

SECRET
WAL T,

Jordanian package - Keeping Hussein calm.

Hussein's Chief of Staff is taking off tonight a deeply disappointed man, since his package is not yet confirmed. He was impressed by McNamara, but bewildered that we couldn't decide after two weeks what we wanted to do. When he reaches London early tomorrow London time, he will doubtless telephone the King (they have a secure radio-telephone link from London). Khammash will in evitably communicate his disappointment to Hussein.

Accordingly, it would save Hussein's nerves - and surely prevent him from doing something foolish - if, after your discussions today, you were in a position to instruct the Sit Room to call Jock Stoddard, ISA's man in London, who will meet Khammash at the airport tomorrow, and give him the following message for Khammash :

THE PRESIDENT HAS APPROVED THE PROPOSALS
YOU DISCUSSED WITH SECRETARY MCNAMARA.
AMBASSADOR MACOMBER WILL COME SHORTLY TO
DISCUSS THEIR ECONOMIC AND OTHER IMPLICATIONS.

I know the chances of this are slim, but we play on narrow margins here, and no harm in trying!

Howard

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *clm/ky*, NARA, Date 6-29-10

~~SECRET~~

Jordan Arms + Israel 50
December 8, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR WWR

SUBJECT: Ambassador Harman's Call at 4:30 p. m.

Harman on instructions wants to register Israel's concerns about additional military aid for Jordan before we make our decision. The Israelis finally learned yesterday that Khammash is in town, and the alarm bells rang from here to Jerusalem and back. They're privately upset because we didn't take them into our confidence about the Jordanian military aid request and now they're trying to learn its details.

The main reason for your seeing them is to take some of the steam out of their alarm by showing that we're still accessible and ready to consider their views. Although we can show our annoyance at the mess they've got us into, we do want to maintain a good working relationship with them. We may need it.

Harman will probably make the same points he made to Handley at noon. We don't need to be defensive and can respond this way:

1. We're only trying to repair the damage done by their raid. While we understand their concern and will listen to their views, we expect some understanding from them. We don't want to send weapons to Jordan and are forced to do so only because of what the Israelis themselves have done. So we don't expect a big mail campaign from Israel's friends here, since their action precipitated this mess.

2. We can't give any details on our response to King Hussein's request. We haven't made any decision yet, and besides we don't pass this information around--we don't give Jordan details of our Israeli program.

3. We can say we are not thinking of anything that would upset the military balance we so painfully struck over the past two years. Moreover, we're deeply concerned about the economic effects of too much military assistance in Jordan and this will be another guiding principle in our decision.

4. We must also say that we'll probably have to do something. The Israeli raid has weakened the underpinnings of the King's regime, and we think it's Israel's interest as well as ours to pick up the pieces if we can. The Army is the key to stability and to keep his army with him, the King must show that he's attending to Jordan's defenses.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/ly* NARA, Date *6-29-10*

Hal Saunders

~~SECRET~~

Jordan Arms

51

~~SECRET~~

December 8, 1966

WWR:

I wouldn't normally suggest bothering with this today since we are so close to sending him a formal proposal on Jordan. However, the Israelis do move fast and I wonder whether we shouldn't send this preliminary note down just to put him on guard.

HMS

~~SECRET~~

Att: Message for President from Rostow, 12/8/66

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13202, Sec. 3.4
By *dom/ly*, NARA, Date 6-29-10

51a

~~SECRET~~

December 8, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ROSTOW

Forewarned is forearmed and you should be aware that the Israelis are now zeroing in on our proposed small military aid package for Jordan. Ambassador Harman was in to see me this afternoon and conveyed the clear message that the Israeli Government is very much concerned that anything we do for Jordan will unsettle the delicate military balance in the area. We will be sending you more formally in the next day or two a specific proposal on Jordan. Defense still has not quite wrapped up all the details, but it is fair to say that the package will be minimal and will not seriously affect the Israeli-Jordanian military balance. However, we will have to reckon with an Israeli reaction no matter what we do. We are on firm logical ground in saying that we would be doing nothing more for Jordan than already planned if the Israelis had not raided on 13 November. But regardless of how firmly we take that line, the Israelis have regained their composure and are going to be pretty tough to deal with.

We will include recommendations for handling the Israeli side of the proposal when we send our final proposal to you. However, I wanted you to be forewarned of this aspect of the problem in case someone should try to reach you at the Ranch.

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#110)
 NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
 By *cbm/rq*, NARA, Date 8-28-05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Jordan Arms
52
December 1, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR WWR

FROM: Wriggins - Saunders

SUBJECT: Macomber's Talk with Khammash

This doesn't change the signals in our earlier briefing memo, but you might want the flavor of Bill Macomber's heart-to-heart talk with Khammash this morning.

Khammash tacitly admitted that the US can't come up with the full \$200 million package he's asking for. However, he reiterated that it's important that we not say, "No." He hinted that "requirements change over time" and "we don't need all this equipment now." The implication was that if he could take something home with him we might regard the rest of the list as a reference list for future programs. We wouldn't reject it but we certainly wouldn't commit ourselves to it. All of this was said by inference, but Bill thinks it points the way to a deal.

This is a delicate game, and you needn't get involved. You can help by giving Khammash a good hearing and by nurturing his instinct that a \$200 million package just doesn't make sense. While Macomber doesn't discount Hussein's problem, he feels there's a good bit of rug-merchant trading in Khammash's mission. He feels the Jordanians' first step in any crisis--once it's physically under control-- is to see how they can use it to get something out of us.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *Chm/sy* NARA, Date 6-29-10

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

December 1, 1966

Jordan Arms
53

MEMORANDUM FOR WWR

FROM: Wriggins - Saunders

SUBJECT: Your Talk with General Khammash

After Khammash's talks today with you and Bill Macomber, we will have to decide how to respond to King Hussein's incredible shopping list. Your job is not to give him answers but to help put him in a frame of mind where Defense can talk sense with him. Our main purpose is to give Hussein's emissary a sympathetic hearing at high levels.

His request is out of our ballpark. He wants us to pay \$130 million for new equipment; the \$70 million balance of the tank and plane sales since it now looks as if the UAC will default on further payments; and \$28 million in recurring annual costs of the buildup. Bill Jordan's memo (Tab A) details these requests.

But we can hardly give him a flat no and expect to hold our position in Jordan. Defense will try to devise a realistic package, but before they can get into details, they have to get him into our ballpark. Secretary Rusk began laying the groundwork (Tab B), and we're counting on you to follow up.

Our main difference with Hussein is that we do not see this as a military problem. It's really a problem of how to improve the organization, armament and pay of the armed forces enough to assure their continued loyalty to the King. Without stating this proposition quite so baldly to Khammash, we want to persuade him that his government is misreading the external threat and is ignoring or underestimating the increased internal threat that would result from the proposed massive buildup. You might take this line:

--We were shocked by Israel's raid, and, as the President's message said, are deeply concerned for the King's survival and strength.

--Khammash's request will receive thorough study. We will look into ways to improve the army's efficiency and control of the borders.

--However, you would like to talk about Jordan from your perspective: A nation with little hope for viability a few years ago now has a chance. The Jordanian government can ruin that chance by building a defense establishment beyond any reasonable ability to support it.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4(2/12)

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By cbm/jg, NARA, Date 8-28-05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

You would hate to see this happen and believe the King would thereby lose his main long-term claim for popular support.

--Although you know how hard it is for Khammash to accept this point, we don't believe Israeli invasion is the main threat to Jordan. The Israeli government has assured us that it doesn't intend invasion and will do what it can to rebuild a base for peaceful coexistence with Jordan. Although you recognize that King Hussein must keep the army's loyalty, you believe the most important military job is to find a way to control the borders--not to build a large defense establishment. Terrorism and internal economic weakness are the main threats.

~~SECRET~~

Saunders
Jordan
Amman
54

November 30, 1966

TO: W. W. Rostow

FROM: Howard Wriggins

SUBJECT: A brief discussion with Khammash, Jordanian
Chief of Staff

Defense Dept. very much hopes you could spare half an hour to talk to Khammash. He comes from Hussein with a request for over \$100-million worth of military equipment -- much of it heavy stuff -- and a \$28-million increase in Jordan's annual defense budget. This is an increase of roughly 50% in the defense budget which already accounts for 43% of the total Jordanian budget.

It would be helpful in the negotiations if you could communicate "from the highest level" the unrealism of such figures. You are knowledgeable on the Israeli side, and there is no better spokesman on behalf of the costs to economic development of such levels of defense expenditures.

If you could see him, DoD would prepare a talking paper.

Because of the anxious situation in Amman, Khammash is naturally itchy and wants to return the end of next week. A reasonably prompt discussion with you would be helpful.

Yes, half an hour Thursday afternoon _____

Yes, half an hour Friday _____

No, can't do it _____

Jordan Arms

55

~~SECRET~~

November 29, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ROSTOW

The new elements in the AP and UPI stories (AP 38, UPI 85) on our F-104 sale to Jordan is identification of types and numbers of planes. When we let the Jordanians announce the sale on 2 April, they specified only "a number of military jet aircraft." You will recall that the deal you approved in February included "up to 36" planes, 12 to be bought then and 24 more available for order around 1 January 1967. This is a dollar sale. All we have done so far in the current crisis is to speed up delivery of the first planes by a couple of months.

While we'll continue to refuse comment on details, we long ago acknowledged this sale, and we're not upset by appearance of these stories now. Our main job right now is to bolster Hussein, and these help, though they are nothing new. Chances are the details slipped out through release of letters exchanged between the Jordanian military and the United Arab Command.

There may be more stories of this kind since General Khammash, Hussein's chief of staff, arrived here yesterday and is holding talks in State and Defense today. He will see Secretary Rusk this afternoon and may remain here for as long as two weeks going over his requests for new equipment. Rolling out the red carpet for him is one way to help ease Hussein's regime through this tense period.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13202, Sec. 3.4
By *am/ly*, NARA, Date 6-29-10

~~SECRET~~

November 29, 1966
1:10 p. m.

Mr. Saunders -

Dick Moose phoned and gave me the following information on which he said you would need to take some action:

"AP carries an item - #38 - US is sending 36 F-104s to Jordan. There is similar UPI item which has just run a few minutes ago and on which he does not have the number. UPI item identifies this information as coming from the State Department sources.

"We feel we need a short item to send down to the President which relates these two reports to our actual agreement with Jordan of last summer and to our very recent agreement to speed up deliveries, in order to put this report in right context for the President. I talked to Mr. Wiley on Jordanian desk, who feels that a fair press guidance is to acknowledge the earlier agreement for an unspecified number of supersonic aircraft; however, to decline to discuss specifics."

T.

Jordan arms
See Rostow message
to President 11/29/66. 56

*Jordan
arms*57~~SECRET~~

November 25, 1966

TO: W. W. Rostow

FROM: Howard Wriggins

SUBJECT: Accelerating military equipment deliveries to
Jordan

A cable went out last night instructing Amman to inform Hussein that we were speeding up deliveries. Burns was to discuss with Hussein the problem of publicity on this and report back before there was to be any announcement.

Would it not be prudent for you to get in touch with Feinberg (or anyone else in the community you might feel appropriate) in order to indicate (a) the supplies being talked of are part of the agreed military program; (b) only the dates are being put forward (the quantities are not being increased; (c) the new schedule has proved necessary because of Israel's ill-judged disproportionate action in an effort on our part to shore up Hussein's prestige -- which is important to maintaining stability on the long Israel/Jordan frontier.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *dm/f* NARA, Date 6-29-10

H.S.

Jordan arms

58

MEMORANDUM

November 24, '66

WALT,

Amman's recommendation on upping military sales by \$2.4 million to Jordan, and upping military support by \$16 million annually.

Amman's 1231 gives the most detailed rationale for substantially upping our programmed military sales and support. In sum, it argues:

1. Jordan is at a crossroads, and so are we in our relationship with Jordan.
2. The critical point is how promptly we respond to the King's urgent request for a substantial increase in military assistance;
3. The King, and our MATT office feels he needs additional stuff ~~xxxx~~ in order to assure himself and his people that there won't be another Sanu. Unless he can give such an assurance for the future, he loses his army and his people.
4. They estimate he needs about ~~xx~~ \$2.6 million one-time grant for equipment and \$16 million annually to cover increased army pay and an expansion of army personnel.
5. He can get these added resources from (a) the US, (b) arab neighbors or (c) the Soviets. He has turned to us first.
6. Admittedly his regime is weaker than we thought, for a number of reasons spelled out in para. 9. But he and his regime have major advantages from our point of view (para. 10).
7. If he were replaced, would the radical Arab successor be adverse to our interests? Yes, because it would bring threat and disorder to that much longer Jordanian-Israeli frontier, similar to Israel's problems with the much shorter Syrian border.
8. ~~xxxx~~ We've already put a billion and a half \$ into Jordan. By comparison, a relatively small increment now would be considerable insurance for another five to ten year period.
9. State thinks he overdoes it. AID is totally uninterested. DOD is responsive at the working level. Burns is right that if we niggled here, ~~xxxx~~ Hussein fell and the Middle East caught fire, we'd be in for much heavier expenses than this would require. Yet, ~~xxx~~ the real problem is stabilizing these frontiers

\$550 million

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cbm/hg, NARA, Date 6-29-10

for much heavier costs than this program requires. Yet the real issues are: What other steps, political, economic and other, can Hussein take to broaden his support at home? and what steps can both he and Israel, with our help, take to stabilize that frontier. We shouldn't entirely foreclose examination of Burns' proposal, but it doesn't attract much support as yet.

~~SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

April 1, 1966

*Jordan
Arms* file
59

MEMORANDUM FOR BILL MOYERS

No action required but you ought to know that our sale of jet fighters to Jordan may provoke a press flurry tomorrow. The Jordanian government will release the news (our text attached) at 11:00 a. m. EST Saturday. Our press may pick this up quickly since they're looking for examples of how we're changing our arms policy in the Middle East. They'll also want to know whether we're balancing this with Israel.

The facts. We've just signed an agreement with Jordan to sell 12 F 104 A/B's this year with another 24 to be ordered next year if all goes well. This is a dollar sale (\$54 million total) financed by the United Arab Command, but we're going ahead in order to keep the Soviets from putting planes and technicians on Israel's border.

We've also agreed to sell 48 A-4F "Skyhawks" to Israel. We've pledged them to strict secrecy until we're ready to let the news out because we don't want this to appear to be a twin deal (that might hurt King Hussein) and we want time to pave the way with Nasser (the Arabs could react by cutting off relations).

The tactics. State will answer questions sparked by Jordan's announcement with the attached statement. We want to soft pedal this as much as we can--though that's a tough order. You may want initially to refer questions to State, since any word from the White House will attract more attention. However, the State line is a good one if you have to use it.

The big problem will be to keep Israel's friends from blowing their stacks. The Israelis have agreed to try to do all they can to keep their most vocal supporters under control, but that's easier said than done. State has been quietly briefing key people on the Hill this week. Our current plan is not to let news of the Israeli deal out for another month. The Israelis are pressing us hard to let it out sooner since Eshkol has his own opponents to contend with, and we're negotiating. When we do, we'll put out a statement here (we'll have better control).

The President knows these deals have been signed, but you may want to warn him of tomorrow's release. We want to continue holding details of these deals closely, even within USG.

Harold H. Saunders

cc: Mr. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13282, Sec. 3.4
By *chm/ly*, NARA, Date 6-29-10

59a

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

Enclosure No. 1

PROPOSED JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT PRESS RELEASE

The Government of Jordan announces that an agreement has been reached for purchase from the United States of a number of military jet aircraft for service in the Royal Jordanian Air Force. Delivery will be spaced over a specified period. The training of pilots is underway in the United States and in other countries.

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *dbm/sf*, NARA, Date 6-24-10

596

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

Enclosure No. 2

PROPOSED STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT

As the Department stated on February 5, the USG has, over the years, provided Jordan with limited amounts of arms to meet its defense requirements. We can confirm that an agreement has recently been reached between the United States and Jordan providing for Jordanian purchase of a limited number of military jet aircraft for its air defense system to replace older models.

Just as we will continue to refrain from becoming a principal supplier of arms to the Near East, so does it remain our policy not to discuss the specifics of such arms transactions as occur. Therefore, we are not in a position to go into the details of the equipment sold in this case. Our sale to Jordan was made both in the light of Jordan's defense requirements and in accordance with our policy of preventing instability from developing in the Near East. It is consistent with our due regard for area security and our general restraint as to the equipment supplied. We do not believe that this sale will be a destabilizing factor or contribute to imbalance in the area. In this connection, we continue to regret the massive Soviet sales of arms to the Near East which have intensified the arms race in that area, and we will continue to strive for agreed limitations on arms buildups there.

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By chm/s, NARA, Date 6-29-10

Pls. return to HHSaunders
Rm. 372-a EOB when signed

Jordan Aums

60

February 29, 1968

Dear Mr. Dow:

We understand the concern you expressed in your recent telegram to the President on the resumption of U. S. military shipments to Jordan.

This is a complex problem, and if you wish to discuss it in detail, Hal Saunders of my staff would be happy to come and see you. He has already been in touch with your Assistant. I believe this would be a more satisfactory way to discuss your concerns than for me to try to write you in detail.

Sincerely yours,

W. W. Rostow

Honorable John G. Dow
Member, United States House
of Representatives
United States Post Office
Nyack, New York

cc: Barefoot Sanders

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Jordan Arms
X Cong Contacts*

(6)

February 16, 1968

*See wa Rostow
reply 2/29/68*

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Harold Saunders
Office of Walt Rostow

FROM: Barefoot Sanders

The attached telegram about arms for Jordan from Congressman John Dow has not been acknowledged. It is forwarded for direct reply, with a copy for our files. Many thanks.

The White House
Washington

61a ↑

1968 FEB 16 AM 5 23

WA039 NL PDF

NYACK NY 15

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

ANNOUNCEMENT YESTERDAY THAT UNITED STATES IS SUPPLYING TANKS
SELFPROPELLED WEAPONS HIGH CALIBER ARTILLERY AND OTHER EQUIPMENT
TO JORDAN AND MAY SUPPLY JETS ALSO DISTURBS US WHO FEEL THAT
UNITED STATES WAS SUPPORT TO ISRAEL. WE UNDERSTAND THAT SOVIET
IS SUPPLYING ARMS TO ARAB NATIONS THEN WHY SHOULD UNITED STATES
DO THIS TOO WHEN IT IS PREFERABLE THAT ISRAEL ARMS SHOULD BE

KEPT AT A LEVEL TO PROTECT AGAINST ARAB ATTACKS

JOHN G DOW US CONGRESSMAN US POST OFFICE NYACK NY.

John Dow
to the
2/16/68

Ketchum

616

WWR:

February 21, 1968

Attached is the one Congressional telegram I've received so far on the Jordan arms package. Barefoot has asked us to reply directly.

In drafting a reply, I had to choose between (a) writing something non-controversial that wouldn't cause trouble but wouldn't defend our position and (b) getting right to the point. I chose the latter and have cleared the attached with Luke Battle and Nat Davis. Nat says "OK" but is anxious that we not be too contentious with the USSR while we're trying to carry on some sort of dialogue on arms limitation. I think I've toned this down into the zone of making our point without being too combative.

If, however, you'd rather not sign it but think it ought to go, maybe I could sign it. Or, of course, I could rewrite anything controversial out of it. But I'd rather stand our ground firmly but politely.

Hal
HHS

cc: Nat Davis

HS
First see if
he's willing
to have you
call on him
rather than
put it in
writing.

Walt

61C

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 21, 1968

Dear Mr. Dow:

We understand the concern you expressed in your recent telegram to the President on the resumption of US military shipments to Jordan.

As the President has said, we have opposed the arms race in the Middle East and will continue to exercise restraint in our own shipments to the area.

However, until other suppliers show similar restraint, our choice is between abandoning friendly governments in the area to heavy Soviet pressures or helping them preserve their own independence and their ties to the West.

We do not believe that abandoning these friends will serve our interests or theirs. It would surely jeopardize the hopes of all who would like to put an honorable end to twenty years of cold and hot war in the area.

Therefore, while we will continue to show restraint in all arms shipments to the area, we believe it is important to our own interests, to Israel's and to those of our Arab friends that we continue to compete for a strong position in the Middle East.

I know this is a painful subject for many of us. Hal Saunders of my staff would be pleased to talk with you in greater detail about it should you wish.

Sincerely yours,

W. W. Rostow

Honorable John G. Dow
Member, United States House
of Representatives
United States Post Office
Nyack, New York



Department of State

*Jordan Amman
x Israel*

TELEGRAM

62

23

UNCLASSIFIED 276

*See HHS memo to
McPherson & Sanders
2/19/68*

PAGE 01 TEL AV 02553 161425Z

53
ACTION NEA 15

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 03, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,
RSC 01, SC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, ACDA 16, MC 01, GDF 01,
AID 28, EUR 15, RSR 01, /145 W

R 161330Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3242
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 943
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 995

UNCLAS TEL AVIV 2553

PRESS REACTION TO RENEWED US ARMS SUPPLY TO JORDAN

1. THUS FAR THERE HAS BEEN RELATIVELY LITTLE EDITORIAL COMMENT BUT FULL NEWS COVERAGE OF RENEWAL OF US ARMS SUPPLIES TO JORDAN.

2. HAARETZ (INDEPENDENT) QUOTES AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES AS SAYING THAT ISRAEL WILL EXPRESS NO OBJECTIONS TO OR DISPLEASURE AT THIS US DECISION ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT IS BETTER IF SUCH ARMS COME FROM THE US THAN FROM THE USSR. IT HAS BEEN OBVIOUS FOR SOME

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 2553 UNCLAS
TIME THAT US WOULD EVENTUALLY SHIP ARMS TO JORDAN AGAIN. HUSSEIN KNOWN TO BE UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE AT HOME AND FROM ARAB STATES TO OBTAIN MORE ARMS AND US REFUSAL WOULD ONLY HAVE FORCED HIM TO LOOK TO SOVIETS.

3. LAMERHAV (AH DUT HAAVODA) CORRESPONDENT REPORTS ON OTHER

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 TEL AV 02553 161425Z

HAND, THAT OFFICIAL ISRAELI SOURCES HAVE AFFIRMED THE FORMAL GOI POSITION WHICH IS THAT ARMS SUPPLIES TO AN ARAB STATE HOSTILE TO ISRAEL DO NOT CONTRIBUTE TO AREA STABILITY, RATHER, THEY CAN ONLY SYMULATE REGIONAL ARMS RACE. MOREOVER, US DECISION ANNOUNCED AT PARTICULARLY INOPPORTUNE MOMENT.

4. MASS CIRCULATION MAARIV (INDEPENDENT) SAYS "POLITICAL CIRCLES IN JERUSALEM" REACTED TO THIS NEWS "WITH CONSIDERABLE CONCERN."

5. HATZOFEH (NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY) REFERRED TO FEBRUARY 15 INCIDENTS AND SUGGESTED THAT "WASHINGTON SHOULD RE-EXAMINE THE DATA BEFORE IMPLEMENTING ITS DECISION." BARBOUR

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

63/5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 817

PAGE 01 STATE 115582

!!
ORIGIN NEA 15

INFO AF 09, EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 03, H 02, INR 07, L 03,
NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03,
ACDA 16, MC 01, GDP 01, AID 28, /166 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN; MWWILEY
APPROVED BY: NEA/ARN - RBHOUGHTON
NEA/IAI - MR. ATHERTON
AF/AFN - MR. ROOT (SUBSTANCE)
NEA/P - MR. BROWN
DOD/ISA - MR. HARY SCHWARTZ (SUBSTANCE)
NEA/UAR - MR. JOHNSTONE
NEA/ARP - MR. BREWER
P/ON - MR. BARTCH

*Jordan
Jarnus
(subject file)*

R 150120Z FEB 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0000
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0000
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0000
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0000
CAIRO 1375
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0000
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 0000
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0000
AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0000
AMEMBASSY RABAT 0000
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0000
AMEMBASSY LONDON 0000
AMEMBASSY PARIS 0000
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *km/lf*, NARA, Date 6-29-10



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 STATE 115582

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 115582

REF: TEL AVIV 2500 NOTAL

1. DEPARTMENT PRESS SPOKESMAN MADE ANNOUNCEMENT ON JORDAN ARMS AT NOON PRESS BRIEFING FEBRUARY 14. TRANSCRIPT FOLLOWS:

QUOTE WE HAVE DECIDED TO RESUME ARMS SHIPMENTS TO JORDAN, AS WE HAVE DONE IN THE CASE OF OTHER NEAR EASTERN COUNTRIES. DETAILS ARE NOW BEING NEGOTIATED WITH THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT RESTRAINT ON ALL ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE AREA IS ESSENTIAL TO STABILITY IN THE AREA.

Q. CAN YOU GIVE US SOME DETAILS? WHAT ARE YOU RESUMING?

A. THAT IS WHAT IS NOW BEING NEGOTIATED WITH THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT.

Q. BOB, YOU SAY IN YOUR OPENING ANNOUNCEMENT THAT WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT RESTRAINT IS ESSENTIAL TO STABILITY IN THE AREA. NOW, IS THIS POLICY, THIS RESUMPTION DECISION, GOVERNED ANY WAY BY CONSIDERATIONS OF RESTRAINT IN THE SENSE THAT IT IS MORE LIMITED THAN IT MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN OR THAT IT WAS INDICATED TO THE SOVIETS BEFOREHAND AS AN EVIDENCE THAT YOU WANTED MORE COOPERATION IN THIS FIELD?

A. WELL, I THINK ALL OF THESE TRANSACTIONS ARE ENTERED INTO ONLY AFTER THE MOST SERIOUS CONSIDERATION AND DETERMINATION THAT THEY ARE LEGITIMATE NEEDS. FOR OUR PART, WE CONSIDER THAT CONTINUED UNITED STATES AND OTHER WESTERN NATION TIES WITH JORDAN ARE IMPORTANT TO AREA STABILITY.

Q. BOB, IS THIS A NEW AGREEMENT THAT IS BEING NEGOTIATED NOW OR IS THIS AN OLD AGREEMENT, THE DETAILS OF WHICH ARE NOW BEING FINALIZED?

A. FOR BACKGROUND, IT COULD IN FACT BE BOTH. SOME OF THESE REQUESTS BY THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT PREDATE THE FIGHTING OF LAST JUNE, AND I WOULD HAVE TO ALLOW FOR THE POSSIBILITY THAT

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PAGE 03 STATE 115582

THERE MAY HAVE BEEN ADD-ONS SINCE THEN.

Q. WELL, SPECIFICALLY, THEY HAVE HAD A REQUEST IN FOR A CERTAIN TYPE OF AIRCRAFT. I CAN'T RECALL THE SPECIFIC TYPE. ARE THEY ASKING TO RENEW THE REQUEST, OR REAFFIRMING THE REQUEST?

A. WELL, I WILL JUST HAVE TO LEAVE OPEN WHAT ITEMS THERE WILL BE IN THIS PACKAGE UNTIL IT'S NEGOTIATED. I WOULD LEAVE OPEN THE QUESTION OF AIRCRAFT.

A. BOB, MORE SPECIFICALLY THAN REQUESTS, THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT PREDATING THE FIGHTING, AND AMERICAN -- THERE WERE SIX AMERICAN TRAINERS IN THERE FOR ADVANCED FIGHTER BOMBERS. NOW, IS THIS DEAL AFFECTED, BEING RECONSIDERED, BECAUSE THAT WAS A CONCLUDED AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH THE PLANES WERE NOT SENT.

A. WELL, IN ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION I SAID THAT IT COULD BE PART BOTH -- AN OLD AGREEMENT; THERE COULD BE ADD-ONS SINCE THEN. SPECIFICALLY ON AIRCRAFT, I'VE LEFT OPEN THAT ITEM, ALONG WITH OTHERS THAT WILL DOUBTLESS BE PUT INTO THE PACKAGE.

Q. BOB, WHEN WAS THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT INFORMED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS READY IN PRINCIPLE TO ENTER INTO SUCH NEGOTIATIONS?

A. RECENTLY.

Q. WAS IT AS LONG AGO AS LATE DECEMBER?

A. I DON'T HAVE A SPECIFIC TIME ON IT.

Q. HAVE THE TALKS ON THE DETAILS OF THE AGREEMENT BEGUN?

A. YES, I BELIEVE THEY HAVE, AND THEY'LL BE CONDUCTED IN AMMAN.

Q. CAN YOU GIVE US ANY INDICATION OF HOW LONG THEY'VE BEEN GOING ON?

A. I THINK THAT IT WOULD BE PROPER TO SAY THEY'VE JUST BEGUN.

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TELEGRAM



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 04 STATE 115582

Q. WELL, NOW THAT YOU'RE DISCUSSING THE AREA, CAN YOU GIVE US ANY STATUS REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE U.S. POLICY ON ARMS AID TO ISRAEL, ARMS SALES TO ISRAEL?

A. I THINK THE BEST REFERENCE ON THAT AS TO WHERE THINGS ARE IS IN THE COMMUNIQUE AFTER PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL'S VISIT HERE TO THE UNITED STATES SOME WEEKS AGO.

Q. DOES THAT IMPLY IT HAS NOT GONE BEYOND THE COMMUNIQUE?

A. I'LL STAND ON WHAT THE COMMUNIQUE SAYS.

Q. BOB, I'D LIKE TO GO BACK TO THE QUESTION OF THE RESTRAINT POLICY, SINCE I'M STILL NOT QUITE CLEAR ON WHAT YOU'RE GETTING AT WITH THAT REFERENCE. DID THE UNITED STATES INFORM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT THAT IT WAS ABOUT TO RESUME ARMS AID TO ISRAEL, OR IS THE UNITED STATES USING THIS OCCASION TO RENEW TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ITS INTEREST IN RESTRAINT? IS SOMETHING HAPPENING ON THIS?

A. WELL, ON BACKGROUND, I THINK, UNFORTUNATELY, THERE HASN'T BEEN ANY MOVEMENT ON THE PRESIDENT'S STATED DESIRE FOR, BOTH SIDES, THE TWO BIG POWERS, TO RESTRAIN TO THE UTMOST ARMS DELIVERIES INTO THE AREA. WE HAVE MAINTAINED AN INTERNATIONAL ARMS BALANCE IN THE AREA. AND SPECIFICALLY ON THE CASE OF JORDAN, IT IS IMPORTANT, IN OUR VIEW THAT THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES MAINTAIN INFLUENCE THERE.

Q. DO YOU KNOW, BOB, WHETHER ANY SOVIET ARMS ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT WITH JORDAN?

A. I'VE NO INFORMATION ON THAT.

Q. BOB, DO YOU HAVE IMMEDIATELY AT HAND THE OTHER COUNTRIES, ON WHICH THE ARMS EMBARGO WAS PREVIOUSLY LIFTED AND WHAT THE DATE WAS OF THAT? YOU ANNOUNCED SEVERAL OF THEM AT ONCE.

A. OCTOBER 24TH WAS THE DAY ON WHICH WE ANNOUNCED THE LIFTING OF THE FREEZES WHICH HAD GONE INTO EFFECT AT THE TIME OF THE FIGHTING -- AND THAT INCLUDED ISRAEL, LEBANON, SAUDI ARABIA, MOROCCO, LIBYA, TUNISIA.

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PAGE 05 STATE 115582

Q. BOB, HAS THERE BEEN ANY CHANGE IN ROUGH ESTIMATES BY THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT OF THE LEVEL OF SOVIET ARMS SHIPMENTS TO ARAB COUNTRIES WHICH HAS INFLUENCED IN ANY WAY THE DECISION YOU'RE ANNOUNCING TODAY?

A. NO. NO, IN THE SENSE THAT I DON'T HAVE CURRENT INFORMATION ON THAT.

Q. BOB, THERE WERE REPORTS THAT IN THE NEW JORDANIAN REQUEST, A NEW ELEMENT IS ENTERED IN WHICH THEY ARE SAID TO BE ASKING FOR HAWK MISSILES, WHICH THEY REPORTEDLY DON'T HAVE THE PEOPLE TO OPERATE BUT ARE WILLING TO HIRE FRENCH MILITARY, EX-MILITARY TRAINED IN HAWK, WHICH WOULD CHANGE THE WHOLE PICTURE IN THAT JORDAN-ISRAEL AREA. CAN YOU GIVE US ANY BACKGROUND ON THAT?

A. NO. I HAVEN'T SEEN ANY REFERENCE TO THAT, AND I DON'T HAVE THE DETAILS THAT MIGHT EVENTUALLY BE NEGOTIATED HERE.

Q. BOB, I DON'T THINK I HEARD YOUR ANSWER TO JOHN HIGHTOWER'S QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER WE ADVISED THE SOVITS IN ADVANCE THAT WE ARE RESUMING, OR ABOUT TO RESUME, SHIPMENTS TO JORDAN.

A. NO COMMENT.

Q. BOB, WAS PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL INFORMED OF THIS WHEN HE WAS HERE?

A. NO COMMENT.

Q. BOB, ON THE QUESTION OF RESTRAINT, I'D JUST LIKE TO CLEAR THAT UP. PRESUMABLY JORDAN WOULD LIKE A BALANCE WITH ISRAEL. NOW, IN THE PAST THERE WAS TALK ABOUT JORDAN MAINTAINING A BALANCE WITH THE UAR. I JUST WONDERED WHERE THE BALANCES -- WHAT IS THE REASON FOR JORDAN TO REQUIRE ARMS. IS IT A DECISION TO GIVE ISRAEL MORE ARMS, OR THE GENERAL DEPLETION OF THEIR MILITARY?

A. NO COMMENT. END QUOTE

2. ADDRESSEES SHOULD NOT SPECULATE OR GO BEYOND TEXT IN ANSWERING QUESTIONS FROM PRESS OR HOST COUNTRY OFFICIALS. YOU SHOULD BE

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 06 STATE 115582

PARTICULARLY CAREFUL NOT TO MENTION OR SPECULATE ON ANY SPECIFIC ITEM SUCH AS AIRCRAFT WHICH THE PACKAGE MIGHT CONTAIN. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING CABLE CONTAINS GENERAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION. GP-3. RUSK

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11

Rec'd
Feb 27/68

DONALD E. BERNSTEIN, M.
180 PALO ALTO AVENUE.
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94114

Jordan Arms
Reply by H.H.S.
2/27/68

Thurs. Feb 15/68 64
Also see HHS memo
to WWR. 2/26/68.

Lyndon B Johnson
President of the United States of America.
Washington - D.C.

H

Dear Mr. President

Our mutual friend Eric Hoffer shared my surprise at the announcement yesterday that America plans to rearm Jordan. Today this news was followed by 7 hours of hostilities between Israel and Jordan, the longest since the June war. It shocks us to see our great country indirectly posing a threat to Israel - the only Democracy in the mid East. Mr. President, we all are confused, the thousands of Jews I have cared for and their Israeli brothers, who share such strong devotion to America and its democratic principles.

In my previous letter to you I hoped to convey my need to share your burden and harassment in your dilemma with Vietnam - Mr. President, can you reassure Eric and me in our dilemma resulting from American policy in the Mid East?

Donald
Bernstein
to LBJ
2/15/68

DONALD E. BERNSTEIN, M.
180 PALO ALTO AVENUE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94114

The letter you wrote me a few months ago remains my proudest possession, as a symbol of the uniqueness of our democracy - what a magnificent country we live in where the elected leader personally answers a letter written by one of its 200 million citizens!!! I beg you therefore, to forgive my presumption in writing once again.

Be assured Sir, it is our admiration for you and faith in your humanitarian principles that dictates this letter.

with kindest regards from Eric Hoffer and me,

I remain

Most sincerely

Donald E. Bernstein

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Encl #1 to PG 6 Tel Aviv A-513

*Jordan arms
x Israel*

*Att. to HWS memo to
Raufast Sanders
2/15/68*

have said, by retreat, why not retreat?

A: The old border, to which Nasser wants us to retreat, is, from our point of view, not a secure border. This has been proved by two wars in which we were forced to fight against the Egyptians since 1956; the Straits of Tiran are essential (vital) for us, and we cannot abandon them and leave them in the hands of the Egyptians, or rely on the U.N. Forces to guard them. 65

I want a settlement with Nasser, a settlement with a secure border, that will guarantee our freedom of shipping to Eilat; a settlement regarding Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal, because we got there and now we can say: "You want us to retreat - (O.K.) let us have passage for our ships!"

Q: If the Egyptians do not agree (to that) now, you prefer that we remain (sitting) on the spot where we are?

A: Yes, without such an arrangement (settlement as mentioned above) we must not make any concessions.

Q: Aren't you considering that it might be more desirable for the U.S. that the Suez Canal should remain blocked rather than that it should be a Russian waterway?

A: Perhaps. I don't know. Anyhow, the political moves that have to be made now have no direct connection with that question. From our point of view, I think that we must try to come to an agreement with the Americans as far as possible. I am in favor of it, that we should regard as a policy desirable for us the consolidation of the U.S. stand in the Middle East. We shall not profit by it in any way if the Americans lose their influence in Jordan. Instead of American aircraft and military missions there will be (in Jordan) Soviet aircraft and military missions. For us that is very important: Whether there are Americans or Russians in Jordan. I believe that there is cause for apprehension there.

I think that to the extent that there is a connection with foreign powers there, we shall try as far as possible, and we shall be interested in it, that it should not be the Soviet Union that will inherit all the

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influence in the Middle East, but that, if possible, it should be the U.S.

Q: And suppose that Hussein, who is subject to Western influence, should want to reach a settlement with us, aren't you in favor of it?

A: Definitely yes; however, we are obliged to do two things: The first thing that we have to do now is to reach, as far as possible, an understanding with the U.S., to strengthen their hand and make them stay in the Middle East.

Q: Does that depend on us?

A: It does not depend on us, but it is desirable for us. Another thing which we intend to do - to do some serious thinking about the entire complex of our relations with the West Bank and the Kingdom of Jordan. That is a very complicated matter. First of all, I don't see that we have been offered a final settlement now. I think that any presentation of the question - not the question you have asked - but a question as a guide to our final policy, is unrealistic. No one proposes peace to us. Therefore we have to decide now on an interim policy, not on a final policy.

Q: What ought the interim policy to be?

A: It is two-fold. (1) Not to get involved unnecessarily with the population in the occupied territories. (2) To hold on to a security line.

I am not in favor of the IDF being in Nablus, but of the IDF being on the ridges outside Nablus. We don't have to get engaged (involved) with the Arabs of Nablus, the town of Nablus, but to sit in the hills to prevent the passing of tanks from Iraq or Jordan to the West Bank. That's what must be done there. Not to govern the Arab population, but to govern the topography, to guard Israel. And that goes both for the short range as well as for the long range.

Q: Is it possible to be present, from a military viewpoint, without "getting involved", without governing the population?

A: Is that a mirage? I believe what I see. I see that it works. In the Armistice Agreements of 1948, when we fixed the lines, we wanted

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. Sullivan

Jordan arms 6/6

February 13, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR

WALT ROSTOW

FROM: Barefoot Sanders

*See WWR reply
of 2/29/68.*

BS

Attached is a letter to the President from Congressman James J. Howard regarding sell of arms to Israel which I have acknowledged.

Gba

February 13, 1968

Dear Congressman:

Thank you for your letter of February 9 to the President expressing your view that the government should sell arms to Israel.

We appreciate receiving your comments on this question and your suggestions will be carefully considered.

Sincerely,

Barefoot Sanders
Legislative Counsel
to the President

Honorable James J. Howard
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

fe/jf

JAMES J. HOWARD
3D DISTRICT, NEW JERSEY

TELEPHONE NUMBER:
AREA CODE 202
225-4671

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

COMMITTEE
ON PUBLIC WORKS
SUBCOMMITTEES:
RIVERS AND HARBORS
ROADS
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SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEES:
FEDERAL AID TO HIGHWAYS
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

666b

February 9, 1968

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

5
The present situation in Southeast Asia has, I know, taken a considerable amount of your time in recent days. The pressures in that part of the world and the United States' responsibility there weigh heavily on your shoulders.

Still, I feel compelled to write to you now and urge your renewed consideration of proposals to sell adequate arms and equipment to the government of the State of Israel.

The situation in the Middle East grows more tense each day and estimates have been published clearly indicating that the Soviet Union has replaced at least 80% of the arms and parts that were destroyed or captured by the Israelis in the June war.

The entire free world commended you on your statement last June indicating the five points that are essential if successful negotiations are to take place in the Middle East. However, we have not seen any indication on the side of the Arab countries that there will be good faith. They have continually expressed their contempt at the suggestion that a meeting be convened to thrash out the difficulties that have led to three wars in that area.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has taken steps to make the Mediterranean its "mare nostrum". I do not believe we can let this happen and risk not only a fourth war between the nations of the Middle East, but very possibly a Third World War.

I visited Israel last Spring, just prior to the outbreak of hostilities, and I was impressed by the progress the tiny nation has made in such a brief period of time. Its democratic form of government and the respect their people hold for our people impress the visiting American. Israel is truly the bright light of democracy in a very dark part of the world.

J.J. Howard
12-137
2/9/68


The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson

- 2 -

February 9, 1968

I urge you not to delay in responding to the request of the Israeli government to purchase arms with which to adequately defend itself and insure its territorial integrity. With other sources of supply closed to them, with the build-up of arms in every Arab country, and with continual threats of extermination emanating from Israel's neighboring countries, we must not fail to meet the challenges that communism and totalitarianism are brandishing in this area of the world.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "James J. Howard".

JAMES J. HOWARD
Member of Congress

JJH:bf