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DELIVER TO ACTION OFFICER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS FEB 11.

1. FOLLOWING DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING HANDED TO
GEN. KHAMMASH BY SECRETARY MCNAMARA FEB 10.

"MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

"I. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN, THROUGH THEIR
REPRESENTATIVES, HAVE RECENTLY CONFERRED CONCERNING JORDAN'S
NEED TO MEET IN A REASONABLE MANNER ITS LEGITIMATE DEFENSIVE
REQUIREMENTS.

"II. IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD THAT ANY ASSISTANCE IN THE
FORM OF DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES RENDERED BY THE UNITED
STATES, EXCEPT FOR U.S. GRANT AID, WILL BE ON A REIMBURSABLE

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By com/jed, NARA, Date 8-28-05

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BASIS.

*III. THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN REAFFIRMS ITS POLICY OF PROCURING FROM THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER FREE WORLD SOURCES ALL OF ITS REQUIREMENTS FOR DEFENSE ARTICLES AND DEFENSE SERVICES FOR ITS ARMED FORCES. SHOULD JORDAN FIND ITSELF UNABLE TO MAINTAIN THIS POLICY, THE COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN BY THE U.S. IN THIS MEMORANDUM AND THE MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING OF 18 MARCH 1965 AND 29 MARCH 1966 WILL CEASE TO BE VALID.

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"IV. ACCORDINGLY, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, SUBJECT TO CONTINUING LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS, AND PURSUANT TO OTHER STIPULATIONS SET FORTH BELOW, THE UNITED STATES AGREES TO:

"A. RESUME SHIPMENT OF THE UNDELIVERED FY 66-67 MAP GRANT AID.

"B. RESUME SHIPMENT OF THE PREVIOUSLY SUSPENDED GROUND FORCE EQUIPMENT SOLD TO JORDAN UNDER THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING OF 13 MARCH 1965 AND COVERED BY SALES CASES (DD FORM 1513-OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE) UBM, UBW, UDB, UBQ, UBR, UBS, UBT, UBU, AND UBW.

"C. REPLACE BULK OF GROUND FORCE EQUIPMENT LOST IN JUNE BY SELLING ON A REIMBURSABLE BASIS THE FOLLOWING GROUND FORCE EQUIPMENT:

"(33) M48A1 TANKS, (23) 105 MM HOWITZERS, (43) ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS, (4) 40 MM SP AAA GUNS, (138) 106 MM JEEP MOUNTED RECOILLESS RIFLES, (40) M35A2 2-1/2 TON TRUCKS, AND, AS MAY BE MUTUALLY AGREED, SMALL ARMS, AMMUNITION, SPARE PARTS, COMMUNICATIONS AND ENGINEER EQUIPMENT. SUBJECT TO THE CONDITION SET FORTH BELOW THESE ARTICLES AND SERVICES ARE PROPOSED FOR DELIVERY DURING U.S. FISCAL YEARS 1968, 1969, AND 1970. ITEMS OFFERED FOR SALE TO JORDAN SHALL BE SUBJECT TO U.S. STANDARD SUPPLY PROCEDURES INVOLVING QUANTITIES, AVAILABILITY, DELIVERY SCHEDULE, PRICE AND OTHER DETAILS AND SHALL BE THE BASIS OF FURTHER DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND WILL BE SET FORTH IN THE NECESSARY SALES AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THESE TWO GOVERNMENTS.

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"D. DELIVER 18 F104 AIRCRAFT AND RELATED EQUIPMENT TO JORDAN AT A COST OF APPROXIMATELY DOLS 30.5 MILLION. SUBJECT TO JORDAN'S ABILITY TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN THESE AIRCRAFT, DELIVERIES COULD BEGIN BY JUNE 1968.

"E. SELL EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR A GROUND CONTROL RADAR SYSTEM FOR THE F104 AND HAWKER HUNTER AIRCRAFT AT A COST OF APPROXIMATELY DOLS 2.8 MILLION.

"(AS IN THE CASE OF THE GROUND FORCE EQUIPMENT, THE QUANTITIES, AVAILABILITY, DELIVERY SCHEDULE, PRICES, ETC., WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF FURTHER DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.)

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"F. AGREE TO CONSIDER AT SOME POINT IN THE FUTURE, IN LIGHT OF CIRCUMSTANCES THEN PERTAINING, UP TO 18 ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT OF A TYPE TO BE MUTUALLY AGREED UPON.

"V. IN ADDITION, AS A CONTINUING MATTER, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS UNDERSTANDING IS CONDITIONED UPON:

"A. JORDAN'S AGREEMENT TO UNDERTAKE ANNUAL REVIEWS WITH THE UNITED STATES. THESE ANNUAL REVIEWS, AMONG OTHER MATTERS, WILL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT (1) JORDAN'S MILITARY REQUIREMENTS RESULTING FROM PROGRESS TOWARDS AN ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT; (2) JORDAN'S ECONOMIC SITUATION AND THE EXTENT OF ITS FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES; (3) PROGRESS TOWARDS ARMS LIMITATIONS IN THE AREA, AND (4) THE CONTINUED ABILITY OF JORDAN'S ARMED FORCES TO ABSORB AND MAINTAIN MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

"B. JORDAN'S ASSURANCE OF ITS INTENT TO MAINTAIN ITS INDIGENOUSLY FINANCED MILITARY BUDGET DURING CY 1968 AT NO MORE THAN DOLS 56.5 MILLION. THIS MILITARY BUDGET AS WELL AS JORDAN'S MILITARY MANPOWER LEVEL WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF AN ANNUAL REVIEW BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, AND JORDAN AGREES THAT THE LEVEL OF ITS MILITARY EXPENDITURE DURING THE TERM OF THIS UNDERSTANDING WILL BE MUTUALLY AGREED BY THE USG AND THE GOJ. DURING THE ANNUAL REVIEWS CONSIDERATION WILL BE GIVEN TO REDUCING THE MANPOWER LEVELS OF THE GOJ.

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"C. THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN AGREES TO FULL SECRECY ON ALL MATTERS CONCERNING THIS OFFER BY THE UNITED STATES. IN THE EVENT THE UNITED STATES DECIDES TO MAKE THE MATTER PUBLIC, JORDAN AGREES TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO THE TIMING, METHOD AND EXTENT OF THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE.

"D. JORDAN'S ASSURANCE THAT IT WILL NOT PURCHASE MAJOR ITEMS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT, EITHER GROUND OR AIR, FROM OTHER THAN U.S. SOURCES WITHOUT U.S. APPROVAL.

"VI. SINCE THE DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES OFFERED UNDER THIS MEMORANDUM, EXCEPT THOSE SET FORTH IN IV A. ABOVE, ARE TO BE FURNISHED ON A REIMBURSABLE BASIS, ONLY PARAGRAPHS 2 THROUGH 5 OF THE CLASSIFIED AGREEMENT EFFECTED BY AND EXCHANGE OF NOTES SIGNED ON 27 JUNE AND 29 JUNE, 1957, AS AMENDED, SHALL BE APPLICABLE TO THEM. THESE PARAGRAPHS ARE SET FORTH AS ANNEX A HEREOF. IN THIS CONNECTION, JORDAN CONFIRMS THAT THERE IS NO INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN ITS COMMITMENTS UNDER PARAGRAPHS 2 THROUGH 5 OF THE CLASSIFIED AGREEMENT AND ITS COMMITMENTS UNDER OTHER AGREEMENTS TO WHICH JORDAN MAY BE A PARTY."

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ANNEX A

APPLICABLE CONDITIONS

(TAKEN FROM CLASSIFIED US-JORDAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT WHICH ENTERED INTO FORCE ON JUNE 29, 1957)

2. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN REQUIRES AND SHALL USE THE MILITARY EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS AND SERVICES FURNISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES SOLELY TO MAINTAIN ITS INTERNAL SECURITY AND LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENSE. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN SHALL NOT UNDERTAKE ANY ACT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST ANY OTHER STATE.
3. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN SHALL

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NOT RELINQUISH OR TRANSFER TITLE TO, OR POSSESSION OF, THE MILITARY EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS AND SERVICES FURNISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT THE PRIOR CONSENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

4. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN SHALL MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THE MILITARY EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS AND SERVICES FURNISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

5. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN SHALL PROVIDE INFORMATION CONCERNING THE UTILIZATION OF THE MILITARY EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS AND SERVICES FURNISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES. GP-1. RUSK

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EXDIS

DELIVER TO ACTION OFFICER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS FEB 11.

1. GEN KHAMMASH MET WITH SECDEF MCNAMARA ON FEB 10. FOL IS SUMMARY OF CONVERSATION BASED ON UNCLEARED MEMCON.

2. MR MCNAMARA APOLOGIZED FOR LENGTH OF TIME GEN HAD BEEN KEPT WAITING IN THE UNITED STATES. GEN INDICATED HE UNDERSTOOD WHY. GEN DESCRIBED SITUATION IN JORDAN AND POINTED OUT THAT MAXIMUM GOOD POLITICAL EFFECT WOULD FLOW FROM RAPID ARRIVAL IN HIS COUNTRY OF ARMS FROM U.S. HE ASKED FOR AIR SHIPMENT OF SOME ITEMS.

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By cbm, NARA, Date 8-28-05



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PAGE 02 STATE 113633

3. SEC OF DEF MADE CLEAR THAT GENERAL'S ORIGINAL LIST WAS FOR US A VERY TOUGH ONE AND WOULD CAUSE US MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH CONGRESS. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT JORDAN AND U.S. HAVE SAME BASIC OBJECTIVE OF STABLE RELATIONS BETWEEN COUNTRIES OF AREA AND THIS WAS OBJECTIVE WHICH WOULD NOT PRIMARILY BE MET BY ARMS. WE WERE LIMITED BY NEED TO JUSTIFY SUPPLYING ARMS TO BOTH JORDAN AND ISRAEL JUST AFTER THEY HAVE HAD A WAR. ALSO THERE WERE PROBLEMS OF DIVERTING RESOURCES FROM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

4. MCNAMARA THEN BRIEFLY OUTLINED WHAT WE COULD DO:

A. 12 F-104S BY JUNE (POSSIBLY AIR SHIPPED IF THIS SEEMS NECESSARY) AND 6 MORE BY DEC.

B. WE PROPOSE AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF THE PROBLEM. DURING SUCH REVIEWS WE COULD CONSIDER POSSIBILITY SOME TIME IN FUTURE OF 18 MORE SUCH AIRCRAFT.

PAGE 3 RUEHC 113633 ~~SECRET~~

C. WE WOULD SHIP SUSPENDED MAP ITEMS AT EARLY DATE BY SEA.

D. WE WOULD SHIP REMAINING GROUND EQUIPMENT FROM PAST SALES AT EARLY DATE BY SEA.

E. WE WOULD REPLACE JORDAN'S JUNE LOSSES OF GROUND EQUIPMENT EXCEPT FOR TANKS AND HEAVY ARTILLERY.

5. MR MCNAMARA POINTED OUT WE HAD RECD RECENT INFO FROM BRITISH ON AVAILABILITY OF CENTURIONS, SPECIFICALLY THAT IF 200 WERE REALLY WHAT JORDAN NEEDED THEY COULD BE BOUGHT IN BRITAIN AND SPARES AND AMMO WERE AVAILABLE AND WOULD BE AVAILABLE WELL INTO 1970S. THEY COULD ALSO BE CONVERTED TO 105 MM GUNS IN JORDAN. GEN KHAMMASH'S LACK OF INTEREST IN TANKS FROM BRITISH, HOWEVER DESCRIBED, WAS CLEAR. MR MCNAMARA THEN RESPONDED THAT WE COULD ONLY MAKE AVAILABLE 88 M48A1S (AND THIS NUMBER WAS INSERTED IN THE DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WHICH GEN KHAMMASH TOOK WITH HIM).

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6. GEN KHAMMASH EXPRESSED A STRONG NEED FOR 7 TO 10 155 MM

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GUNS WHICH HE HAD LOST DURING THE WAR AND MR MCNAMARA PROMISED TO SEE WHAT WE COULD DO FOR HIM IN THIS RESPECT.

7. GEN KHAMMASH WENT ON TO POINT OUT THAT PAYMENTS COULD BE SPREAD OVER A PERIOD OF 2-1/2 YEARS AND TOTAL COST OF PACKAGE BETWEEN \$80 AND \$85 MILLION, INCLUDING THE \$10 MILLION JORDAN HAS ON DEPOSIT HERE. HE SAID WE WOULD NEED \$22 MILLION IN ADDITION TO THE \$10 MILLION ON DEPOSIT BEFORE JULY 1, 1968.

8. GEN KHAMMASH ASKED WHAT NEGOTIATING LATITUDE THERE WAS ON THE PLANES AND MR MCNAMARA REPLIED THAT IN OUR OPINION THE F-104 IS A GOOD PLANE FOR JORDAN AND THAT OTHERS ARE EITHER NOT AVAILABLE OR NOT AS APPLICABLE TO JORDAN'S REQUIREMENTS AS THE F-104.

9. MR MCNAMARA SAID, IN RESPONSE TO THE GENERAL'S QUESTION, THAT A PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION UNDER THE CONTE-LONG AMENDMENT WOULD NOT CHANGE THE TYPE OF PLANE WHICH WE ARE CONSIDERING. MR MCNAMARA DID SAY, HOWEVER, THAT ONCE THE 18 F-104S ARE DELIVERED, WE COULD CONSIDER SOME TIME IN THE

PAGE 5 RUEHC 113633 ~~SECRET~~

FUTURE ANOTHER 18. AS TO THE NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY OF OTHER ITEMS MR MCNAMARA SAID THAT AS TO TANKS, THIS DEPENDED ON THE ACCEPTABILITY OF BRITISH TANKS. ON OTHER ITEMS THERE WAS SOME BUT NOT MUCH NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY BECAUSE OF FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS.

10. FINALLY, THE SEC OF DEF SUGGESTED THAT GEN KHAMMASH TAKE THE DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WITH HIM, ASK US ANY QUESTIONS HE HAD, AND THEN PRESENT IT TO THE KING. HE POINTED OUT THAT IT COULD BE SIGNED IN JORDAN BY OUR AMB IF GEN KHAMMASH WISHED TO AVOID MAKING ANOTHER TRIP TO THE US.

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PAGE 04 STATE 113633

11. GEN KHAMMASH THANKED THE SEC FOR ALL THE WORK THAT HAD BEEN DONE IN HIS BEHALF AND SAID HE WOULD NOW SEE WHAT HE COULD DO WITH THE KING. GP-1 RUSK

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EXDIS

DELIVER TO ACTION OFFICER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS FEB 11.

1. KHAMMASH LEAVING FEB 10 FOR AMMAN VIA LONDON AND EXPECTS ARRIVE AMMAN FEB 12. HE SAW SECDEF TODAY AND SUMMARY MEMCON BEING SENT SEPTEL. DRAFT MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING HANDED TO KHAMMASH ALSO BEING SENT SEPTEL.

2. WE BELIEVE YOU SHOULD NOT DISCUSS PACKAGE WITH KING UNTIL KHAMMASH HAS HAD OPPORTUNITY TO REPORT ON HIS WASHINGTON TALKS. IT MIGHT BE EMBARRASSING TO HIM IF WE TOOK THE INITIATIVE. WE BELIEVE TACTICALLY IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE

PAGE 2 RUEHC 113632 ~~SECRET~~
FOR HIM TO CARRY THE BALL, AT LEAST IN THE FIRST INSTANCE.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4(421)
State Dept. Guidelines
By *cbm/rq*, NARA, Date *8-28-05*

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 113632

3. THE FOLLOWING POINTS MAY BE HELPFUL TO YOU IN DISCUSSING PACKAGE AT APPROPRIATE TIME WITH GOJ.

(A) IN GENERAL, WE ARE REPLACING LOSSES SUFFERED BY JAA IN JUNE HOSTILITIES.

(B) AS FOR TANKS, WE ARE OFFERING 88 M48A1S WHICH WOULD BRING JAA'S TOTAL OF AMERICAN TANKS TO 181, ENOUGH TO EQUIP BOTH OF THEIR ARMORED BRIGADES.

(C) WE HAVE NOT AGREED TO DELIVER M48A4 TANKS WITH DIESEL ENGINE AND 105 MM GUNS BECAUSE WE HAVE NO TANKS OF THIS TYPE AND IT WOULD TAKE APPROXIMATELY TWO YEARS TO CONVERT TANKS WE DO HAVE. JORDAN'S NEEDS ARE MUCH MORE IMMEDIATE. IN ADDITION, THESE CONVERSIONS WOULD TRIPLE THE COST OF THE TANKS. FYI. IN FACT, RANGE OF 90 MM GUNS ALMOST IDENTICAL TO THAT OF 105 MM GUN ALTHOUGH LATTER WOULD DELIVER SOMEWHAT LARGER PROJECTILE. END FYI.

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(D) OUR CAPABILITY TO EXTEND CREDIT FOR MILITARY SALES HAS BEEN DRASTICALLY IMPAIRED BY CONGRESS. WE WERE TOLD BY GEN. KHAMMASH THAT TAA HAS JD 10 MILLION FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THIS WILL BE ADEQUATE FOR DELIVERIES DURING BALANCE THIS FISCAL YEAR AND AT LEAST PART OF NEXT FISCAL YEAR. WE WILL DISCUSS FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS FOR BALANCE OF PACKAGE DURING ANNUAL REVIEWS. OUR POSITION, OF COURSE, WILL BE GOVERNED BY FUTURE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION EFFECTING CREDIT AVAILABILITY.

(E) CONSIDERING PROBLEMS WE FACED, ARMS PACKAGE IS IN OUR OPINION A REASONABLE MEETING OF JORDAN'S REQUIREMENTS (WHICH ARE TO A LARGE EXTENT POLITICAL), AND IN A CONCRETE WAY DEMONSTRATED OUR DESIRE CONTINUE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH JORDAN. GP-1. RUSK

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70



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

February 10, 1968

I-20792/68

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

*Jordan
Arms
\$80 million
package*

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

February 10, 1968, 4:15 pm, Mr. Schwartz with General Khammash.

I told General Khammash there seemed to be no such articles (155mm guns) in the U.S. but that I thought we might be able to find some elsewhere. We would do it if possible.

General Khammash thanked me and Mr. McNamara.

Harry H. Schwartz
Harry H. Schwartz
Deputy Assistant Secretary

cc: Mr. Harold Saunders ←

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Authority DDP Div. 5200.10

By JW, NARA, Date 4-25-94

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

February 10, 1968

I-20791/68

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Secretary of Defense Meeting with General Khammash

Participants:

U.S. Side

Honorable Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense
Honorable Paul C. Warnke
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)
Mr. Harry H. Schwartz
Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense (ISA)

Jordanian Side

Major General Amer Khammash
Chief of Staff, Jordan
Armed Forces

Time: Saturday, February 10, 1968, 12:30 pm

Place: Office of the Secretary of Defense

Mr. McNamara expressed his admiration for the King which General Khammash said was reciprocated; Mr. McNamara also apologized for the length of time that the General had been kept waiting in the United States and General Khammash indicated that he understood why. Mr. McNamara invited the General to expose his views on the situation in Jordan.

General Khammash made reference to the enormous pressure under which the King is now living, including the division of the country and almost daily clashes on the border, and he alluded to the restlessness of the Jordanian army. He hoped that what would be offered him would be something the King could approve. But he was worried about the results if the King did not because he considers that this mission is the last chance the King will give him in the United States. He asked for help and made the point that the maximum good political effect will flow from the rapid arrival in his country of arms from the U.S. He asked in this connection concerning air shipment of some items and the possible negotiability of the package.

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The Secretary of Defense made clear that General Khammash's original list of items was for us a very tough one and would cause us most serious problems with the Congress. He pointed out also that Jordan and the U.S. have the same basic objective of stable relations between countries of the area and that this was an objective which would not primarily be met by arms. We are limited in what we can do with respect to arms particularly because of the need to justify supplying arms to both Jordan and Israel just after they have had a war. Also there is the problem of diversion of resources from economic development which the purchase of arms causes.

Mr. McNamara then briefly outlined what we could do:

1. 12 F-104s by June (possibly air-shipped, if this seems necessary) and 6 more by December.
2. We propose an annual review of the problem. In the course of such an annual review we could consider the possibility some time in the future of 18 more such aircraft.
3. We would ship the suspended MAP items, and
4. The remaining ground equipment from past sales (both of these could be shipped at an early date by sea).
5. Replace ground equipment losses, except for tanks and heavy artillery.

Mr. McNamara then pointed out that we had gotten some very recent information from the British on the availability of Centurions, specifically, that if 200 were really what Jordan needed, they could be bought in Britain, that the spares and ammunition were available - and would be available well into the 70s - that they could be converted to 105mm guns in Jordan. General Khammash's lack of interest in tanks from the British, however described, was clear. Mr. McNamara then responded that we could only make available 88 M48A1s (and this number was inserted in the draft Memorandum of Understanding which General Khammash took with him).

General Khammash expressed a strong need for 7 to 10 155mm guns which he had lost during the war and Mr. McNamara promised to see what we could do for him in this respect.

6. Mr. McNamara went on to point out that the payments would be spread over a period of 2-1/2 years and that the cost of the package described would be between \$80 and \$85 million, including the \$10 million

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Jordan has on deposit here. He said that we would need \$22 million, in addition to the \$10 million on deposit, before July 1, 1968.


When General Khammash asked what negotiating latitude there was on the planes, Mr. McNamara replied that in our opinion the F-104 is a good plane for Jordan and that others are either not available, or not as applicable to Jordan's requirements as the F-104.

He said, in response to the General's question, that a Presidential Determination under the Conte-Long Amendment would not change the type of plane which we are considering. Mr. McNamara did say, however, that, once the 18 F-104s are delivered, we could consider some time in the future another 18. As to the negotiating flexibility of other items Mr. McNamara said that, as to tanks, this depended on the acceptability of British tanks. On other items, there was some but not much because of financial considerations.

Finally, the Secretary of Defense suggested that General Khammash take the draft Memorandum of Understanding with him, ask us any questions he had, and then present it to the King. He pointed out that it could be signed in Jordan by our Ambassador if General Khammash wished to avoid making another trip to the United States.


General Khammash thanked the Secretary for all the work that had been done in his behalf and said he would now see what he could do with the King.

Approved by:



Paul C. Warnke
Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA

Prepared by:



Harry H. Schwartz
DASD (ISA) NESA

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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I. The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, through their representatives, have recently conferred concerning Jordan's need to meet in a reasonable manner its legitimate defensive requirements.

II. It is further understood that any assistance in the form of defense articles and services rendered by the United States, except for U.S. grant aid, will be on a reimbursable basis.

III. The Government of Jordan reaffirms its policy of procuring from the United States and other Free World sources all of its requirements for defense articles and defense services for its armed forces. Should Jordan find itself unable to maintain this policy, the commitments undertaken by the U.S. in this Memorandum and the Memoranda of Understanding of 18 March 1965 and 29 March 1966 will cease to be valid.

IV. Accordingly, in view of the foregoing, subject to continuing legislative authority and the availability of funds, and pursuant to other stipulations set forth below, the United States agrees to:

- a. Resume shipment of the undelivered FY 66-67 MAP grant aid.
- b. Resume shipment of the previously suspended ground force equipment sold to Jordan under the Memorandum of Understanding of 18 March 1965 and covered by sales cases (DD Form 1513 - Offer and Acceptance) UBM, UBN, UDB, UDB, UBR, UBS, UBT, UBU, and UBW.
- c. Replace, with some exceptions, ground force equipment lost by Jordan in June by selling on a reimbursable basis the following ground

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS/RAC 02-1206-233-c)
By cm/ies, NARA, Date 8-28-05

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2

force equipment: (88) M48A1 tanks, (23) 105mm howitzers, (43) armored personnel carriers, (4) 40mm SP AAA guns, (138) 106mm jeep mounted recoilless rifles, (40) M35A2 2-1/2 ton trucks, and, as may be mutually agreed, vehicles, small arms, ammunition, spare parts, communications and engineer equipment. Subject to the conditions set forth below these articles and services are proposed for delivery during U.S. Fiscal Years 1968, 1969, and 1970. Items offered for sale to Jordan shall be subject to U.S. standard supply procedures involving quantities, availability, delivery schedule, price and other details and shall be the basis of further discussions between the two governments and will be set forth in the necessary sales agreements between these two governments..

d. Deliver 18 F104 aircraft and related equipment to Jordan at a cost of approximately \$30.5 million. Subject to Jordan's ability to operate and maintain these aircraft, deliveries could begin by June 1968.

e. Sell equipment required for a ground control radar system for the F104 and Hawker Hunter aircraft at a cost of approximately \$2.8 million.

(As in the case of the ground force equipment, the quantities, availability, delivery schedule, prices, etc., will be the subject of further discussions between the two governments.)

f. Agree to consider at some point in the future, in light of circumstances then pertaining, up to 18 additional aircraft of a type to be mutually agreed upon.

~~SECRET~~

V. In addition, as a continuing matter, the implementation of this understanding is conditioned upon:

a. Jordan's agreement to undertake Annual Reviews with the United States. These Annual Reviews, among other matters, will take into account (1) Jordan's military requirements resulting from progress towards an Arab-Israeli settlement; (2) Jordan's economic situation and the extent of its financial support from other Arab countries; (3) progress towards arms limitations in the area, and (4) the continued ability of Jordan's Armed Forces to absorb and maintain military equipment.

b. Jordan's assurance of its intent to maintain its indigenously financed military budget during CY 1968 at no more than \$56.5 million and its military manpower level at not more than 53,000. This military budget as well as Jordan's military manpower level will be the subject of an Annual Review by the two governments, and Jordan agrees that the level of its military expenditures during the term of this Memorandum of Understanding will be mutually agreed by the two governments. Consideration will also be given to reducing the manpower level of Jordan Armed Forces.

c. The Government of Jordan agrees to full secrecy on all matters concerning this offer by the United States. In the event the United States decides to make the matter public, Jordan agrees to cooperate fully with the United States with respect to the timing, method and extent of the public disclosure.

d. Jordan's assurance that it will not purchase major items of military equipment, either ground or air, from other than U.S. sources without U.S. approval.

~~SECRET~~

VI. Since the defense articles and services offered under this Memorandum, except those set forth in IV a. above, are to be furnished on a reimbursable basis, only paragraphs 2 through 5 of the classified agreement effected by an exchange of notes signed on 27 June and 29 June, 1957, as amended, shall be applicable to them. These paragraphs are set forth as Annex A hereof. In this connection, Jordan confirms that there is no inconsistency between its commitments under paragraphs 2 through 5 of the classified agreement and its commitments under other agreements to which Jordan may be a party.

For the United States of America

For the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APPLICABLE CONDITIONS
(Taken from Classified US-Jordan Military
Assistance Agreement which Entered into
Force on June 29, 1957)

2. The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan requires and shall use the military equipment, materials and services furnished by the Government of the United States solely to maintain its internal security and legitimate self-defense. The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan shall not undertake any act of aggression against any other state.

3. The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan shall not relinquish or transfer title to, or possession of, the military equipment, materials and services furnished by the Government of the United States without the prior consent of the Government of the United States.

4. The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan shall maintain the security of the military equipment, materials and services furnished by the Government of the United States.

5. The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan shall provide information concerning the utilization of the military equipment, materials and services furnished by the Government of the United States.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLT/RAC 02-120 (#233d)
By cbayles, NARA, Date 8-28-05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Please return to HHSaunders
Room 372-a EOB when signed.

INFORMATION

*Jordan
Arms 71*

Friday
~~Thursday~~
February 9, 1968 - 12:50pm

SECRET-EXDIS

Mr. President:

State and Defense this afternoon are winding up their Congressional consultations on the Jordan arms package. Secretary Rusk's final recommendation should be over early tomorrow.

He is also considering recommending that you invite General Khammash in for a short reassuring talk before he leaves.

On the chance that you might be seeing Khammash, and knowing that you will want to talk to Gene Black when he returns, I thought you would be interested in the attached report of Black's talk with Hussein. You will note that, as important as the arms are, at the top of King Hussein's request for US help is that we put our muscle into support of the peacemaking process.

W. W. R.

Amman 3316, 2/7/68

SECRET-EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 96-206 (#13)
By ctm/clr, NARA, Date 8-28-05

*Jordan
arms*

72

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

Friday, February 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Jordan Arms Package

Luke Battle and his Defense counterparts have completed the Congressional consultations you directed at Tuesday lunch. A complete rundown of whom they saw with what reactions is attached. Secretary Rusk believes the way has been paved to move ahead and recommends (Tab A) the following actions:

1. That you now authorize Secretary McNamara to offer to General Khammash the package you tentatively approved Tuesday. Bob is holding late this afternoon open on his schedule pending your response.

Go ahead _____ Call me _____

2. That you invite Khammash to see you before he leaves. The purpose would be to back this package with the necessary political warmth to persuade Hussein that we have not washed our hands of him and that he can count on us. Because it's important to get Khammash back to Jordan with the package quickly, we would like to get him on your schedule off the record--if you approve--as soon as possible after he sees Bob.

I'll see him _____ No _____

3. That you sign the attached determination waiving the Conte-Long amendment. Nick Katzenbach discussed this aspect of the Jordan package yesterday with Conte, Long, Reuss and Symington. All said they would not make an issue of a waiver for Jordan. Waiver at Tab B for your signature if you approve.

Once we have your final go-ahead, it would probably be desirable to make some routine announcement at State. They would simply say we are resuming arms shipments to Jordan as to other Near Eastern countries but that arms limitation continues to be our main concern.

Approve *Keep it low key* _____ Call me _____

Cc: George Christian

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *dmly*, NARA, Date 6-29-10

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS



Department of State

Jordan Arms

TELEGRAM

73/26

~~SECRET~~ 907

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03316 071659Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO MM 01, /031 W

*Attached to WWR's
memo to President
2/5/68.*

P R 071600Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4587
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1246
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1253
USMISSION USUN NY 677

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3316

EXDIS

SUBJ: EUGENE BLACK'S CALLSON KING HUSSEIN

1. I ACCOMPANIED EUGENE BLACK AND HIS ASSISTANT JOSEPH REED
IN CALL ON KING HUSSEIN ON SIXTH.

2. BLACK EXPLAINED THAT IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY AS SPECIAL
ADVISER TO PRESIDENT ON EAST ASIAN ECON DEVELOPMENT HE HAD
NO OFFICIAL MISSION IN JORDAN BUT NEVERTHELESS HAD GREAT

PAGE 2 RUQMGK 3316A ~~SECRET~~

INTEREST IN MIDDLE EAST AS PRIVATE AMERICAN. PRESIDENT
JOHNSON HAD ASKED THAT HE REPORT HIS REACTIONS AND OBSER-
VATIONS WHEN HE RETURNS TO WASHINGTON. BLACK SAID DURING
HIS TALKS IN KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA AND UAR HE HAD BEEN IM-
PRESSED BY EXTENT TO WHICH VARIOUS ARAB LEADERS SEEM BELIEVE
(1) ISRAEL DOES NOT REALLY WANT PEACE AND IS BECOMING
INCREASINGLY INFLEXIBLE AND EXPANSIONIST; (2) US HAS BECOME
IDENTIFIED WITH ISRAELI POLICY AND IS NOT RESPONSIVE ARAB
VIEWS; (3) US SO OCCUPIED IN FAR EAST IT DISINTERESTED IN

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WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
~~SECRET~~
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

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Authority *NLT 96-196 (13a)*
By *dm/sg*, NARA, Date *8-28-05*



~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 AMMAN 03316 071659Z

MIDDLE EAST AND LESS AND LESS INFLUENTIAL IN MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS. IN CAIRO HE HAD FOUND CONSIDERABLE PESSIMISM REGARDING JARRING MISSION. EVERYWHERE HE HAD FOUND GLOOMINESS CONCERNING RECENT SOVIET SUCCESSES IN THE AREA. IN COURSE HIS REMARKS BLACK ALSO REFERRED TO KING FAISAL'S APPROACH TO HIM ON JORDAN ARMS AND SAID HE HAD NOW BEEN INFORMED FROM WASHINGTON THAT JORDAN'S ARMS NEEDS ARE RECEIVING ACTIVE AND SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION. BLACK CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE WOULD LIKE KING'S FRANK COMMENTS ON FOREGOING SUMMARY.

3. KING HUSSEIN WENT THROUGH PRESENTATION HE HAS MADE TO

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3316A ~~SECRET~~

RECENT US VISITORS EMPHASIZING HIS BELIEF THAT AFTERMATH OF JUNE HOSTILITIES HAD CREATED A REAL CHANCE FOR AREA PEACE. HE RECITED HIS EFFORTS AT KHARTOUM AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO BRING ABOUT A CONSENSUS LEADING TO THE UK RESOLUTION OF NOV 22, 1967. HE SAID JORDAN IMMEDIATELY INFORMED JARRING OF ITS UNCONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION. OTHDR ARABS IMMEDIATELY INVOLVED HAD ALSO TRIED TO COOPERATE WITH JARRING. BUT AFTER SEVERAL VISITS JARRING STILL HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO INDICATE WHETHER ISRAEL ACCEPTS THE RESOLUTION. MEANSHILE ISRAEL HAS FOLLOWED A RUTHLESS AND ARROGANT POLICY OF EXPROPRIATION, DEPORTATION, DEPRIVAL OF PERSONAL RIGHTS, AND OTHER ACTIONS THAT CONSIDERED ALL TOGETHER INDICATED THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT WANT TO LIVE AT PEACE WITH ITS NEIGHBORS.

4. ACKNOWLEDGING BLACK'S REMARK THAT THE USG HAS ONLY LIMITED INFLUENCE WITH ISRAEL OR ANY OTHER INDEPENDENT GOVT, KING HUSSEIN QUESTIONED NEVERTHELESS WHETHER US HAS EXERCISED THE CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE IT DOES HAVE WITH ISRAEL. HE THEN SAID THAT SINCE THE SAMUA RAID HE HAS COME INCREASINGLY TO QUESTION WHETHER USG REALLY UNDERSTANDS NATURE OF ITS

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 3316A ~~SECRET~~

INTERESTS IN MIDDLE EAST AND, IF IT DOES, WHETHER IT WILLING OR ABLE TO TRY TO MAINTAIN AND PROMOTE THEM. HE BRIEFLY

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED

~~SECRET~~ THE AUTHORIZATION

OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 AMMAN 03316 071659Z

CITED SUSPENSION US ARMS SUPPLY AS ONE OF SEVERAL SERIOUS DISAPPOINTMENTS TO JORDAN. BUT, HE EMPHASIZED, IMPORTANT AS ARMS SUPPLY IS TO JORDAN (AND AGAIN HE INDICATED HE WOULD GO TO SOVIETS IF NECESSARY), THE JARRING MISSION AND THE UK RESOLUTION ARE EVEN MORE IMPORTANT. THEY REPRESENT A "LAST CHANCE FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST." KING REFERRED TO ASSURANCES US WOULD PUT "MUSCLE" INTO ITS SUPPORT OF UK RESOLUTION. USG NOW HAS CHANCE TO ACT. QUESTION IS WILL USG ACT AND, IF SO, WHEN. TIME WAS RUNNING OUT. IF THE MATTER WENT BACK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE CHANCE FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WOULD BE LOST. THE RUSSIANS WOULD INCREASE THEIR INFLUENCE AT US EXPENSE, AND THE ULTIMATE RESULT WOULD BE CHAOS WHICH WAS IN NO ONE'S INTEREST, INCLUDING ISRAEL'S. KING CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE ALSO SHARED BELIEF OF THOSE ARAB LEADERS WHOSE VIEWS HAD BEEN SUMMARIZED BY BLACK. HE HOPED THEREFORE BLACK WOULD PASS HIS VIEWS TO PRESIDENT AND OTHER US OFFICIALS.

PAGE 5 RUQMG 3316A ~~SECRET~~

5. AFTER KING HAD CONCLUDED HIS REMARKS, I TOOK OCCASION TO PASS ON TO HIM SUBSTANCE OF STATE 110500. HE EXPRESSED THANKS BUT INDICATED IN PLEASANT WAY THAT WHAT HE NEEDS AND WANTS ARE CONCRETE RESULTS RATHER THAN ASSURANCES WE ARE PRESSING ISRAELIS AND HOPE THEY WILL PRODUCE.

6. BLACK IS TO MAKE FAREWELL COURTESY CALL ON KING ON EIGHTH.

GP-1 SYMMES

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WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
~~SECRET~~
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Jordan Arms
Please return to HHSaunders
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ACTION

74

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, February 6, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Jordan Arms Package

In the attached, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara recommend what they feel is the minimum package that King Hussein might see as meeting his legitimate needs. This poses two separate issues: (1) whether you are now ready to go ahead with a substantial program; and (2) if so, how to handle the difficult Conte-Long amendments.

I. The package contains 18 F-104 aircraft, 88 M-48 A-1 tanks, medium artillery and a range of support equipment. This \$82 million (FY 1968-FY 1970) package contrasts to Hussein's \$200 million request, which included 36 aircraft and 200 M-48 A-4 tanks. Our rationale for paring his request is to help replace war losses except for some planes and tanks and heavy artillery. We would have to be willing to consider something beyond this package later but would suggest starting with this.

Our paring may leave this too little to meet what Hussein considers his needs. He lost 179 tanks in June, and we are offering half that. He wants tanks with a diesel engine (greater range) and a 105 mm. gun (which we sold the Israelis). We couldn't supply what he wants for two years. Our plane offer has a better chance, since we would just pick up our 1966 contract where it was suspended but offer half the number of planes now.

Our two hopes for flexibility are (a) that he can get British tanks to his specifications much sooner (they're available) and (b) that he might take some British aircraft if the Saudis would give them and we would supply a few more tanks instead. But the Secretaries feel we have to offer to supply both if neither of these deals works out.

Jordan could pay cash for the FY 1968 installment (about \$32 million, of which \$10 million already paid under the 1966 contract). The cost in FY 1969 would be \$36.3 million and in FY 1970 \$10.3 million. Neither Khammash nor the USG yet knows definitely how the FY 1968 and FY 1969 tranches might be financed, so we would have to feel our way.

This package will be painful to approve, but the alternative is accepting the probable consequences of not going ahead now. Eshkol acknowledged to you that he wished no one had to give arms to Jordan but he'd rather see us there than the USSR. Dayan in a published interview on January 19 said: "We shall not profit by it in any way if the Americans lose their influence in Jordan."

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, # 72
By ebm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

I should hate to see this presented to you simply as selling arms to block Soviet military aid, because the issue is now much broader. We have reached the point in Jordan where the question is whether they think they have a better chance of achieving their objectives with US or Soviet help. If we are ending our aid relationship and are unable to press Israel toward a settlement, then Hussein is wondering whether a Soviet ring around Israel wouldn't better bring Israel to terms. This is, of course, the thinking of an increasingly desperate man who sees his choices diminishing. It would just about end chances for the kind of settlement we'd like.

There are other things we must do on the diplomatic front such as presenting a clearer position on Jerusalem and helping get the Jarring exercise moving. But unfortunately, this military aid decision has become a symbol to Hussein. We have strung him along since last June, and Khammash has been here since January 17. Now Hussein has told you he would continue to avoid Soviet arms if he could be sure of meeting his legitimate needs in the US. That is the purpose of this exercise.

Approve Secretaries' approach _____ Disapprove _____ Call me _____

II. The Conte-Long amendments require you to withhold aid from Jordan in an amount equal to its expenditure for sophisticated weapons unless you waive on the ground that the Jordanian purchases are "vital to the national security of the United States." The airplanes, the tanks, and the howitzers in this package are pretty clearly sophisticated weapons. If you do not waive, we would have to eliminate all economic aid to Jordan for at least the next two years.

It would be possible to weave a complicated legal argument which might allow you to maintain aid without a waiver. But it would be very dubious and would certainly cause serious trouble on the Hill. Therefore, Rusk and McNamara recommend that you make the waiver.

This will be the first use of the waiver provision. I think the Secretaries have a strong case, but you may want to have some fast checking done on the Hill. I don't think we should seek agreement from Conte, Fulbright, Morse, Church and the others most interested in this topic, but you may want to be able to say that you notified them beforehand. (The law requires you to make formal notification of waiver to the Congress within 30 days.)

~~SECRET~~

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- 3 -

III. If you approve this package, Secretary McNamara would go over it in detail with Khammash. In view of the importance of your personal intentions as Hussein sees them, there could be great advantage in your inviting him in before he leaves for a heart-to-heart talk.

I'll see him _____

I'd rather not _____

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

*Jordan Arms
+ P.D.
See WWR memo to
President 2/6/68.*

February 6, 1968

75

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Recommended Arms Package for Jordan as a
Result of the Khammash Negotiations

The attached memorandum from Bob McNamara and myself seeks your authorization to negotiate an arms sales agreement with Jordan. Both Defense and State are convinced that the package described in the memorandum is the minimum which would be acceptable to the Jordanians and might not even be enough. There is little doubt that Hussein will accept Russian arms if we are unable to make what he considers a reasonable offer.

In essence, the package replaces the losses suffered in June except for heavy artillery and some of the tanks. It does include some tanks and F-104 aircraft. Deliveries and the financing of the \$86 million program is phased over two-and-a-half fiscal years, with provisions for review at the end of the first and second years. These reviews would permit changes in the arms package should, inter alia, progress on an arms limitation agreement or on an Arab-Israel settlement so dictate. The Jordanians can pay cash, at least for the initial deliveries. We will postpone a decision on financing the balance. Congress will be consulted and we will come back to you if strong Congressional objection is encountered. We also intend to consult with the Israelis on the types of equipment involved.

An activist by nature, Hussein is in an increasingly frustrated mood. His domestic situation is disturbing. Despite his efforts there is little progress towards a settlement. His army is the only army in the general area which has not been significantly re-equipped since last June. The King wants the assurance of continued American support which our supply of major military items would imply. Given

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By *clm/ly*, NARA, Date 6-29-10

our traditional close relationship with Jordan, Hussein's desire or acceptance of Soviet arms would be a serious blow to U.S. credibility, prestige and interests in the area and would be interpreted as a significant Soviet victory. It would weaken the position of the moderate Arabs and would lessen the chances of reaching an Arab-Israel settlement. The increasing Soviet presence in the area and the planned withdrawal of the British from the Persian Gulf underline the importance of our maintaining the assets we now have in the Middle East.

I do not believe that this sales agreement will invoke the provisions of the Symington Amendment. McNamara, Gaud and Katzenbach agree with me that a determination will be needed to meet the requirements of the Conte-Long Amendments. A suggested determination and a memorandum justifying such a determination are enclosed. I recommend that you sign the determination.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum from State and Defense to the President
2. Determination under Conte-Long Amendment
3. Justification for determination under Conte-Long Amendment

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

75a

February 6, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Recommended Arms Package for Jordan as a Result
of the Khammash Negotiations

General Khammash, Chief of Staff of the Jordan Arab Army, arrived in Washington on January 17 as a result of our decision to resume arms deliveries to Jordan.

Since the June Arab-Israeli hostilities the Jordanians have pressed us to resume arms shipments to make up at least part of the losses they suffered in June. We were not responsive until January 7. You will recall that in December in an oral message to you King Hussein agreed that he would not purchase arms from the Soviet Union if the United States would meet his legitimate defensive arms requirements. Not having heard from us, the King decided that the pressure for arms from his army was such that he could no longer resist persistent Soviet offers of military equipment. As a result of our Ambassador's intervention, Hussein postponed his decision until General Khammash could determine in Washington what we are willing to do. Unless we can convince the King that we are willing to resume our previous role of arms supplier to Jordan, there is little doubt that, in his present critical situation, he will turn to the Soviets for arms.

Upon his arrival, General Khammash presented us with a list of military requirements totalling approximately \$200 million. (The details are outlined in Tab A.) We have met with him periodically during the last two weeks to discuss his requirements and we have explained to him our very serious problems in meeting them. He admitted that his requests were the maximum. Because of the critical situation in which Jordan now finds itself he maintains this list, which in fact exceeds Jordan's losses by a substantial amount, is necessary to restore the morale of the armed forces. It is apparent that he will stand on his original request until we make a counter proposal.

Khammash argues strongly that he must go back with explicit assurances of resumed US support for the Jordan armed forces; that he, Khammash, has continually assured his officers and men (based on discussions with us last summer) that American help was coming, but that his assurances are wearing dangerously thin; and that pressures on the

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Authority ERUS Vol. XX # 71
By ny NARA, Date 6-29-10

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Sec Def Cont No. Y-.....

King to meet arms needs, even from the USSR if necessary, are mounting. Our Ambassador confirms this assessment. We have also had disturbing reports of a deterioration in the internal security situation in Jordan.

It is clear that the very modest arms package we recommended to you in December will not meet the political objectives we have set ourselves, namely, (1) to shut off any further temptation on the part of the King to accept Russian arms; (2) to increase the morale of the armed forces and their loyalty to the King; (3) to increase his prestige and stature with respect to his Arab neighbors; and (4) to strengthen Hussein so that he can better carry out his role as principal proponent of a settlement with Israel.

The principal problems presented by the Khammash list, in addition to its size, are his requests for tanks and aircraft. Khammash wishes to pursue his pre-war plan of standardizing on American tanks and phasing out his British Centurions. He has asked for 200 M-48 A-4s with diesel engines and 105mm guns. He has also asked for 36 "multi-purpose, versatile jet aircraft."

Both the tanks and the aircraft are troublesome because of their high cost and relatively large numbers, and because we would then be almost the sole supplier of major equipment items for Jordan. The problems with Israel would be increased if we agreed to supply Jordan with tanks with 105mm guns as opposed to the 90mm guns with which their present tanks are equipped.

Recommendations

We have put together a counter proposal which we recommend that our negotiator offer to Khammash. The details of this proposal are at Tab B. In essence, we would: (a) Agree to deliver ground force items suspended after the war. These are a combination of cash sales and prior year grant MAP items totalling about \$10 million. There are no major items of consequence included. (b) Make up Jordan's war losses not included in (a) with the exception of heavy artillery and some of the tanks. (c) Offer 88 M-48s instead of 200-- and without the larger 105mm gun, and (d) Agree to go ahead with our F-104 contract by selling 18 F-104s now and, subject to certain conditions, consider a second 18 aircraft at some point in the future. We would plan deliveries and financing over two and a half fiscal years; actual deliveries after 1968 would be subject to an annual review of Jordan's military requirements, taking into consideration the political and economic situation then prevailing and particularly progress towards

an Arab-Israeli settlement and progress of efforts towards arms limitations in the area. The considerations which would be the subject of the annual reviews are at Tab D.

The installment for the first fiscal year would cost approximately \$32 million in cash sales for both ground and air force items. Of this amount, \$10 million has already been paid under the previously concluded F-104 contract. The installment for the second fiscal year would cost approximately \$36.3 million while the third would be \$10.3 million. The estimated cost of the total program would be approximately \$49 million for ground force items and \$33 million for air force items, a total of \$82 million inclusive of shipping and related charges -- a substantial reduction from the cost of his request. About \$3.8 million of this would be in prior year grant MAP and the balance in cash sales. Jordan can pay cash for the 1968 tranche; neither we nor they can promise anything definite about availability of funds thereafter. We believe cash sales will cause less opposition in Congress than credit sales. (See financial summary at Tab C.)

We propose the F-104 aircraft for the following reasons: (a) By resuming arms shipments to Jordan we are in effect placing it in the category of countries for whom we selectively lifted our arms suspension on 23 October. The suspension for Jordan specifically included the F-104's, and we would thus be doing for Jordan now what we did for the other "moderates" last October. (b) Jordan has on deposit \$10 million against the F-104 contract. Spares, ground support and other equipment were shipped to Jordan prior to June. Twelve aircraft are currently in storage awaiting delivery. Some Jordanian pilots and technicians have been trained and others are now in training, and (c) the delivery time for the F-104 is almost immediate. If the morale of the armed forces is the key political factor in our aid to Jordan, they should have on their airfields some US planes as soon as possible.

We could put to Khammash a counter proposal which included 18 F-104's but excludes any tanks, making him meet his tank requirements in Great Britain. We consulted the British last week and they could make available their Centurion tank at a price comparable to our M48A1, in quantities of up to 200, with deliveries beginning in six months. They could, in about two years, upgun these Centurion to 105mm.

This proposal is not, however, likely to meet Jordan's minimum requirements; Jordan would want at least a partial fulfillment of its tank needs from American sources. Part of their reasoning is military: they now have a mixture of American and British tanks, but very few of the latter are in operable condition. It would be less expensive and more efficient to standardize, at least for their two armored brigades, on American tanks. An offer of about 88 US M48A1 tanks would permit them to equip their two brigades with American tanks. (Their total inventory of American tanks would then be 181, 64 less than pre-war.) The more important reason is political. Tanks are the most important element of their ground forces and consequently they want them to be American, as evidence of our continued support.

The King's mood is one of increasing frustration. In spite of his efforts, there has been no significant progress towards a settlement. His army is the only one in the area which has not been substantially re-equipped since the June war. The King wants the assurance of continued American support which our supply of major military items would imply. Given our traditional close relationship with Jordan, Hussein's demise or his acceptance of Soviet arms would be a serious blow to US prestige and interests in the area and would be interpreted as a significant Soviet victory.

In the circumstances, we recommend that you approve the recommendation below. If you approve, the Secretary of Defense will present this proposal to General Khammash.

Recommendation: That you authorize us to negotiate on the basis of the arms package outlined in Tab B on the understanding that we would first try to persuade the Jordanians to accept British tanks. We would plan deliveries and financing over two and a half fiscal years; actual deliveries after FY 1968 would be subject to an annual review of Jordan's military requirements, taking into consideration the political and economic situation then prevailing. If you approve, we would consult with members of Congress. Should they raise strong objections, we would return to you.

APPROVE: _____

DISAPPROVE: _____

Dean Rusk
DEAN RUSK

Robert S. McNamara
ROBERT S. McNAMARA *RS*

~~SECRET~~

75b

General Khammash's Stated Requests

- a. In dollars - approximately 200 million, as follows:

Previously suspended and undelivered MAP and sales items,
\$10.8 million

Ground force equipment losses during June war, \$38.3 million

Additional ground force requirements over losses, \$90.8 million

36 "modern, multipurpose, versatile jet aircraft" (Price based
on F-104) \$54.6 million

Related air force equipment (ground control radar) \$2.9 million

- b. Included in a above are:

1. 200 M48A4 tanks (with diesel engine and 105mm gun)

2. 8" Howitzers (new request) and 155mm guns (replacement of losses)

- c. Khammash says he has been allocated for purchases of equipment for CY 68 \$28 to \$30 million, and has no idea what, if any, he will be granted in the following years, primarily because Khartoum payments of \$112 million a year cannot be calculated for the future.

- d. Most of his major ground equipment requests exceed his June 4 inventory.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *chm/ky* NARA, Date 6-29-10

~~SECRET~~

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75c

Counter-Proposal

Ground Force Equipment

1. Offer to ship undelivered balance of FY 66-67 MAP grant. Materiel value is \$3.8 million.
2. Offer to release previously suspended ground force equipment.
Cost: \$7.0 million
3. Offer to make up the bulk of Jordanian ground force losses, including 88 M48A1 tanks but excluding heavy artillery. Cost: \$38.3 million.

Air Force Equipment

4. Offer to deliver 18 F104s with all equipment beginning by June 1968. This would then give Jordan 18 Hawker Hunter and 18 F104 aircraft.
Cost: \$30.5 million.
5. Offer to sell equipment required for a limited ground control radar system for the F104 and Hawker Hunter aircraft. Cost: \$2.8 million.
6. Agree to consider at some point in the future, in light of circumstances then pertaining, up to 18 additional aircraft (These could be F104 if decision were made to take from National Guard; otherwise F-5). This would be subject to Jordan's (a) continued refusal to accept Soviet type equipment, (b) military requirements in the light of progress toward an Arab-Israel settlement, and (c) a demonstrated need and an ability to pay for such aircraft.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13232, Sec. 3.4
By dm/ly, NARA, Date 6-29-10

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FINANCING

The counter-proposal involves equipment valued at about \$82.4 million, including shipping and related costs. \$49.1 million of this is ground force items (war losses plus undelivered MAP and sales items) and \$33.4 million is 18 F104 aircraft and related radar.

Of the \$82.4 million, \$3.8 million would be financed from prior year MAP grant funds and \$10 million has already been paid by Jordan on the F104 contract. There is therefore \$68.6 million of equipment to be financed. We would propose to sell this amount for cash. The cash Jordan would be required to fund, by fiscal year, is estimated as follows:

	<u>Ground</u>	<u>Air</u>	<u>Total</u>
FY 1968	\$12.0	\$10.0	\$22.0
FY 1969	\$23.0	\$13.3	\$36.3
FY 1970	\$10.3	0	\$10.3

General Khammash has indicated that he has only \$28-30 million to spend in calendar year 1968. This would cover him only for the next six-twelve months. Our ability to order and deliver beyond that point would depend on his ability to pay cash or our willingness to make available credit financing. Decisions on funding arrangements, for the second and third fiscal years, will be made during the annual reviews.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By Clm/s, NARA, Date 6-19-10

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Subjects for Consideration During Annual Reviews

1. Changed military requirements of Jordan as a result of progress towards an Arab-Israeli settlement.
2. Internal political changes and the orientation of Jordan's foreign policy.
3. Jordan's economic situation and the extent of its financial support from other Arab countries.
4. Progress towards arms limitations in the area.
5. Legislative authority to sell military equipment.
6. Ability of the Jordan Arab Army to absorb military equipment.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *CBM/14*, NARA, Date 6-29-10

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SECRET/EXDIS

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Enclosure No. 2

Presidential Determination
No. _____

SUBJECT: Determination under Section 119 of the
Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies
Appropriation Act of 1968

In accordance with the recommendation in your memorandum of February 6, 1968, I hereby determine that the purchases of defense articles described therein are vital to the national security of the United States.

You are requested on my behalf to give notice of this determination to the Congress.

SECRET/EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By Clm/ky, NARA, Date 6-25-10

Justification for Determination Required by Conte-Long Amendments

The Conte-Long Amendments to the FY 1968 Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Act deal with the acquisition of "sophisticated weapon systems." One directs the withholding of economic assistance in an amount equivalent to the amount spent for the purchase of such weapons. The other bars the use of the military credit sales revolving fund to finance directly or indirectly the acquisition of such weapons.

There is some question as to the coverage of these amendments with regard to specific transactions in specific areas of the world. If the weapons systems in this case are determined to be "sophisticated weapons systems," the Conte-Long Amendments would necessitate, if the sale is to continue, determinations that what is being proposed now is "vital to the national security of the United States" if (1) further economic assistance is to be provided or (2) if credit funds will be required to finance any of the deliveries.

A cash purchase for the sale of 12 F-104 aircraft with an option for the purchase of an additional 24 and related spares and ground equipment was signed between Jordan and the U.S. on March 29, 1966. Ten million dollars had been deposited prior to June 1967 as an advance against the full purchase price of 30.5 million dollars for the first 18 aircraft. The Jordanians have an open option on the second 18. Some of the related spares and ground equipment but no aircraft were delivered before the outbreak of hostilities, when all further deliveries were suspended. Under the present proposal, the suspension would be lifted. Twelve aircraft which are now in storage would be delivered by the end of June 1968, and the remaining six, by the end of the year.

The current proposal includes the sale of 23 105mm self-propelled howitzers and 88 M48A1 tanks, at a total price of approximately \$4.6 million to be delivered and paid for over a period of two and one-half years.

There is assurance that Jordan has available for these purchases approximately \$28 million which it has received from other Arab states. These funds can be applied to the purchase of F-104 aircraft, howitzers, tank and other ground force requirements. The ability of Jordan to pay cash for the entire range of requirements is in doubt. Therefore, it may become necessary later to decide on some credit assistance to Jordan to complete the required financing.

It may reasonably be argued, that the Conte-Long Amendments do not apply to the F-104 transaction because the agreement with Jordan was formalized prior to this amendment and the amendment does not by its terms apply retroactively. It has not been determined whether the tanks and howitzers recommended in this proposal are "sophisticated."

Thus it can be argued that the Conte-Long Amendments do not apply to any of the proposals although there is a question with regard to the F-104 aircraft, the 105 mm self-propelled howitzers, and the M48A1 tanks. The Executive Branch has not yet decided on nor has it had a chance to discuss fully the interpretation and implementation of the law. Because of these circumstances, and because it is urgent to move forward on these proposals without delay, it would be advisable to make and communicate to Congress a determination that the proposals are vital to the national security of the United States.

The howitzers and tanks represent no higher degree of sophistication than the equipment now possessed or known to be on order by Israel, the UAR, Iraq, and Syria. The howitzers and tanks will, moreover, replace comparable equipment which Jordan possessed before hostilities and will not raise Jordan's pre-hostilities level of military sophistication.

The provision of these arms to Jordan by the United States is "vital to the national security of the United States," because if we do not provide these arms, there is little doubt but that Jordan would acquire them from the Soviet Union. Such a military relationship between the Soviet Union and Jordan would seriously threaten the vital security interests of the United States in the Middle East.

First it would reduce the chances of an Arab-Israel settlement. Although we believe that the Soviet Union does not desire a resumption of hostilities in the area, we also believe that the Soviet Union sees advantages to its own interests in the continuation of tension in the area short of war. The Soviet Union could consequently use its resultant increased presence in Jordan to influence the course of events to achieve this objective. In addition, Israel is likely to take an even harder position towards a settlement with Jordan than Israel is taking now and would feel less restrained in responding militarily against Jordan for terrorist incidents.

Secondly, the provision of Soviet arms to Jordan would be a blow to our prestige and credibility throughout the area. The moderate Arab leaders would interpret this development as resulting from a change in USG policy towards the area. Serious doubts would arise in their minds as to our willingness or desire to support them. Such countries would include Saudi Arabia and Kuwait where our oil interests are, of course, substantial. The position of the Arab moderates who have based their survival on a close relationship with the West and particularly with the United States would be weakened in Arab councils and the position of the extremists consequently strengthened. Our capability of influencing the course of events and our ability to protect our interests in the area would be further weakened.

Thirdly, such a military relationship with Jordan would increase the risk of a critical US-USSR confrontation. It would increase the identification of Arab and Soviet interests in opposition to US and Israeli interests. It would enlarge the Soviet commitment to the Arab side and would make it even more important to them to protect their prestige in the event of a resumption of Arab-Israeli hostilities.

Jordan Arms
Pls. return HHSaunders
Room 372-a EOB when signed. *70*

INFORMATION

SECRET

Monday, February 5, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Background on Jordan Arms Package

The attached from Harry Symmes is the best background I could give you for your decision on the arms package for Jordan, which will be coming up in the next day or two. It also provides a useful backdrop for Harman's farewell call tomorrow.

What strikes me is not the familiar point about buying Soviet arms if we can't meet Jordan's needs but the increasing Jordanian conviction that we are bowing out of the Middle East and only the USSR can bring justice to the Arabs.

We told our Arab friends last fall that, if they went along with a balanced UN resolution, we'd do all in our power to help bring Israel around. Until last Thursday, the Israelis had refused to tell Jarring they accepted that resolution. In addition, they keep making their own changes in Jerusalem, either feeling they have us in their pockets or discounting our view entirely. The Arabs are beginning to believe that we aren't even trying to press Israel.

In fact, we can take some credit for Eban's acceptance of the resolution last week. But we haven't made a dent on his Jerusalem position, and we are trying today to keep the Jordanians from calling a Security Council meeting on Jerusalem.

Our dilemma is that it's hard to lean on the Israelis until negotiations produce a reasonable proposition to throw our weight behind. But if we can't persuade the Arabs now that we're willing and able to get some results, we may not get to negotiations because they may figure the Jarring mission is hopeless without our behind-scenes help.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, #68
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

Attachment: Amman 3270, 2/3/68



Department of State

Jordan Aums

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Jawad

1042Q
FEB 3, 1968
8:14 P.M.

(4)
Jordan

Att. to WWR memo to President 2/5/68

NODIS

SUBJECT: ACTIONS NEEDED FORESTALL FURTHER JORDANIAN MOVES TOWARD SOVIETS

1. AFTER SENDING KING'S MESSAGE TO GENERAL KHAMMASH TODAY THROUGH SPECIAL CHANNELS (IN ESSENCE KING TOLD KHAMMASH THAT IF USG DOES NOT MEET HIS REQUIREMENTS HE WILL BUY SOVIET ARMS), I ARRANGED MEETING WITH KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY AND CONFIDANT ZAID AL-RIFA'I TO TRY TO OBTAIN BETTER INSIGHT INTO KING'S CURRENT MOOD. I ALSO WANTED TO GET ZAID'S ADVICE ON WHETHER IT WOULD BE WISE FOR ME TO TRY TO SEE KING BEFORE KHAMMASH RETURNS WITH ARMS PACKAGE.
2. ZAID TOLD ME THAT HUSSEIN HIMSELF HAD DRAFTED MESSAGE TO KHAMMASH. HE SAID THAT KING HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY CONVINCED ABOUT THE CORRECTNESS OF HIS VIEW OF LARGER CONTEXT IN WHICH HE NOW SEES USG POLICY TOWARD MIDDLE EAST. ZAID THEN EXPLAINED KING'S ANALYSIS VERY MUCH ALONG LINES KING HAD TAKEN WITH ME ON JAN 25 (AMMAN 3129). US IS TIED DOWN IN FAR EAST AND OTHER AREAS AND HAS LITTLE FLEXIBILITY OR, FOR THAT MATTER, WILL TO ACT CONSTRUCTIVELY TO PROMOTE JUST PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST. SOVIETS HAVE BEEN MOVING IN, PARTICULARLY SINCE JUNE WAR AND, RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, ARE CREDITED BY ARAB LEADERS WITH RIGHT MOTIVES AND SYMPATHETHIC POLICIES IN MIDDLE EAST. USG IS JUDGED TO BE BOTH UNWILLING AND UNABLE TO CONTROL ISRAEL. THUS, MODERATE JORDANIANS AGREE WITH KING HUSSEIN THAT TIME HAS COME TO "STAY A STEP AHEAD OF SITUATION BY MOVING TOWARD SOVIETS".
3. KING FEELS HE HAS GONE "NINETY PERCENT OF THE WAY" WITH THE US. AFTER JUNE THE US SEEMED TO FORGET COMPLETELY ALL THAT HE AND OTHER MODERATE JORDANIANS HAD DONE OVER PAST DECADE AND MORE TO HELP PRESERVE STABILITY AND MODERATION IN MIDDLE EAST. US HAD DONE NOTHING TO HELP JORDAN OUT SINCE JUNE. TO THE CONTRARY,

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Authority *FRUS, Vol. XX, #66*
By *cbm*, NARA, Date *8-24-05*

WE HAD IN EFFECT, VOTED AGAINST JORDAN ON JERUSALEM QUESTION; WE HAD POSED CONTINUOUS DIFFICULTIES ABOUT MATTERS OF MERE WORDS IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS; WE HAD FINALLY LIFTED ARMS EMBARGO FOR ISRAEL AND CERTAIN OTHER ARAB STATES BUT POINTEDLY EXCLUDED JORDAN; AND THEN WE HAD DISCONTINUED BUDGETARY SUPPORT WHICH HAD BECOME SYMBOL OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. ALTHOUGH SUBSEQUENTLY WE HAD AFFIRMED OUR CONTINUED SUPPORT OF JORDAN IN GENERAL WAY, FACT WAS THAT TOTALITY OF OUR ACTIONS TOWARD JORDAN HAD BEEN NEGATIVE RATHER THAN POSITIVE. FINALLY, KING'S RECEPTION IN US IN NOVEMBER, PARTICULARLY IN CONTRAST TO LATER RECEPTION OF ESHKOL, HAD BEEN SERIOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL BLOW.

4. ZAID EXPLAINED THAT HE SEPARATELY AND LATER TOGETHER WITH PRIMIN TALHOUNI TODAY HAD ARGUED AT SOME LENGTH WITH KING TO EFFECT HE SHOULD ACCEPT US ARMS PACKAGE, EVEN IF IT PROVIDES ONLY 50 PERCENT OF JORDAN ARMS STRENGTH AS OF JUNE 4. THEY HAD URGED IT WOULD BE BETTER GO ALONG WITH US IN PRESENT SITUATION BECAUSE SOVIET ARMS DEAL WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO SOLUTION MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM AND, IN THEIR VIEW, WOULD FURTHER OBSTRUCT SOLUTION. KING HAD PRESSED HIS OWN ANALYSIS IN PARAGRAPH TWO ABOVE IN RESPONSE TO THIS ADVICE.

5. IN ZAID'S VIEW THERE IS MUCH TO WHAT KING SAYS. HE SAID HE BELIEVES THAT IF US ARMS PACKAGE PROVES INADEQUATE IN KING'S VIEW ONLY WAY TO KEEP KING FROM GOING TO SOVIETS FOR ARMS IS TO BE ABLE TO CITE SOMETHING TANGIBLE AND DRAMATIC TO INDICATE THAT US DOES HAVE CONTINUING POSITIVE INTEREST IN JORDAN AND DOES IN FACT INTEND "USE ITS MUSCLE" TO PREVENT ISRAELIS FROM CARRYING OFF A MASSIVE FAIT ACCOMPLI. ZAID SAID THAT "STATEMENTS WITHOUT PRACTICAL EFFECT" SIMPLY ARE NOT ENOUGH. JORDAN MUST BE ABLE TO POINT TO SOMETHING TANGIBLE TO SHOW THAT USG INTENDS TO IMPLEMENT ITS STATEMENTS ABOUT JERUSALEM AND THE JARRING MISSION. IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO SAY USG WILL EXERT PRESSURE; USG MUST ACTUALLY EXERT PRESSURE AND POINT TO RESULTS. IN THE PAST DECADE AND MORE THE KING FELT THAT JORDAN HAD GIVEN EVERYTHING AND GOTTEN NOTHING IN TRYING TO LIVE WITH ISRAEL. USG HAD SPOKEN A GREAT DEAL ABOUT HUMAN AND LEGAL RIGHTS IN VIET NAM. WHAT ABOUT ARAB RIGHTS? WHAT ABOUT VILLAGES THAT HAD BEEN LEVELLED ON WEST BANK BY ISRAEL? WHAT ABOUT PEOPLE WHO HAD BEEN EVICTED FROM THEIR HOMES IN GAZA, JERUSALEM, AND WEST BANK? WHAT ABOUT UN DECISIONS THAT HAD BEEN CONSISTENTLY FLOUTED? WHAT ABOUT RECENT US STATEMENTS ABOUT NOT ACCEPTING UNILATERAL ISRAELI ACTIONS? FACT IS THAT USG IS ACCEPTING ISRAELI ACTIONS AND DOING NOTHING ABOUT THEM.

6. THROUGHOUT THIS CONVERSATION ZAID EMPHASIZED THAT THESE ARE THINGS KING IS THINKING. THIS IS HIS READING OF SITUATION. ACTUALLY HIS ADVISERS ARE TRYING WITHOUT MUCH HOPE OF SUCCESS TO CONVINCE HIM TO MAKE NO DRASTIC MOVES. YET, MANY JORDANIANS NOW BELIEVE THE SOVIETS CAN CALL THE TUNE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE MEDITERRANEAN. THEY ARE BEGINNING TO BELIEVE THE SOVIETS

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ARE ABLE

TO CHALLENGE THE US SIXTH FLEET IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THAT THE SOVIETS ALSO HAVE MARINES AND HELICOPTERS TO LAND IN MIDDLE EAST IF NECESSARY. THUS, MANY JORDANIANS AND OTHER ARABS NOW SEE A POSSIBILITY OF SECURITY COUNCIL OR OTHER UN ACTION TO FACE ISRAEL WITH SANCTIONS SIMILAR TO THOSE THAT HAD BEEN PUT ON ISRAEL IN 1956 BY THE US. BUT IN THIS CASE IT WOULD BE THE SOVIETS THAT WOULD TAKE THE CREDIT FOR FORCING THE ISRAELIS TO RESPECT WORLD OPINION, NOT THE US.

7. I SHALL NOT DETAIL REJOINDERS AND COMMENTS I MADE TO ZAID WITH REGARD TO FOREGOING. I SOUGHT HIS REACTION TO IDEA I MIGHT SEEK AN AUDIENCE WITH HUSSEIN TOMORROW OR MONDAY BEFORE KHAMMASH RETURNS IN ORDER TO TRY TO DISPEL SOME OF KING'S APPARENT MIS-INTERPRETATIONS OF OUR POLICIES AND ACTIONS. ZAID COUNSELLED ME AGAINST SEEING KING BUT SAID HE WOULD LET HUSSEIN KNOW I WAS AVAILABLE WHENEVER HE WANTED TO SEE ME. (I WILL IN ANY CASE ACCOMPANY EUGENE BLACK IN CALL LATE ON SIXTH). HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR ME NOT TO SEE KING UNTIL KHAMMASH HAS RETURNED WITH "PACKAGE", BUT HE EMPHASIZED IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL FOR PACKAGE TO BE APPROXIMATELY WHAT KING WANTED AND FOR IT TO BE PLACED IN BEST POSSIBLE LIGHT. MORE IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, WOULD BE SOME KIND OF US ACTION WITH REGARD TO JERUSALEM OR JARRING MISSION THAT COULD BE CITED AS REAL EVIDENCE OF US INTENTIONS TO USE ITS MUSCLE TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

8. AS ZAID WAS LEAVING HE SAID HE AND PRIMIN TALHOUNI HAD OBTAINED KING'S GRUDGING AGREEMENT TO LET KING FAISAL KNOW IF HE FINDS US PACKAGE UNACCEPTABLE. ACCORDING TO ZAID, TALHOUNI HAD SAID TO KING THAT EVEN HE, WHO HAD NEVER HAD GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH AMERICANS, BELIEVED IT WOULD BE IN JORDAN'S INTEREST TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE AVOID CHANGING "POLITICAL BALANCE" IN AREA AT THIS TIME. ZAID AND TALHOUNI, HOWEVER, ARE NOT SANGUINE HUSSEIN WILL GO AGAIN TO FAISAL IF US PACKAGE APPEARS TOO FAR SHORT OF HIS REQUIREMENTS. (DEPT. MAY WISH INFORM AMBASSADOR EILTS OF MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS.)

9. COMMENT: A. AT THIS STAGE WE NEED SOMETHING MORE THAN A GIMMICK. WE NEED AN EARNEST OF OUR INTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO JERUSALEM AND THE UK RESOLUTION. JORDAN ACCEPTED THE UK RESOLUTION AND HAS CATEGORICALLY STATED THIS TO JARRING. JORDAN IS WILLING TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT TO THIS EFFECT AS SOON AS ISRAEL SIMILARLY COMMITS ITSELF TO JARRING AND PUBLICLY ACCEPTS RESOLUTION. IN MY OPINION EVEN MORE IMPORTANT THAN GIVING HUSSEIN DOUBLE THE ARMS HE HAS REQUESTED WOULD BE A CLEARCUT PUBLIC STATEMENT WITH PRACTICAL EFFECT OF OUR INTENTIONS RE JERUSALEM AND JARRING (OR FAILING THAT, UNPUBLICIZED EVIDENCE THROUGH JARRING OR OTHERWISE THAT ISRAELIS WILL CEASE THEIR UNILATERAL

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ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM AND WILL ACCEPT UK RESOLUTION AS BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS). IN THIS REGARD, I MUST EMPHASIZE THAT JORDANIANS IMMEDIATELY PICKED UP AND BEGAN TO SUSPECT PHRASE "IN SPIRIT OF" IN REFERENCE TO ISRAELI ATTITUDE TOWARD JARRING MISSION AS CARRIED IN ESHKOL-JOHNSON COMMUNIQUE.

B. I THINK WE ALSO MIGHT CONSIDER GIVING IMMEDIATE PUBLICITY TO OUR DECISION SUPPLY ARMS TO JORDAN THUS MAKING IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR KING TO MOVE TOWARDS SOVIET ARMS RELATIONSHIP. THIS STATEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE TO EFFECT WE HAVE DECIDED SATISFY LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS OF JORDAN BECAUSE OF OUR LONG AND CORDIAL RELATIONSHIP, BECAUSE OF ITS MODERATE VIEWS, AND BECAUSE WE THINK JORDAN IS ENTITLED SATISFY ITS DEFENSIVE REQUIREMENTS.

C. DEPT MAY WISH REPEAT THIS ON NODIS BASIS TO USUN AND TEL AVIV.

GP-1

SYMMES

Jordan Arms

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Returned to
JCS - 2/13/68
317

CHAIRMAN

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Mr. Rostow, White House

- 1. ~~Rostow~~
- 2. ~~Laundery~~ *KS*

~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

CM-2929-68
21 Jan 1968

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: ARMS FOR JORDAN

1. I met with Major General Khammash, Chief of Staff, Jordan Arab Army, from 1030 until 1130 hours on 20 January. He did most of the talking, responding readily and, I think, quite frankly to my questions. Not necessarily in the order set forth he made these points:

a. Soviet presence and influence in the Middle East is increasing. The United States must take action to establish stability. Jordan, a moderate State, is a key factor.

b. The JAA must have arms to replace the heavy losses suffered in June. Army morale is precarious, and time is running out for King Hussein. The USG invitation for him to travel to the U.S. to discuss arms came at the eleventh hour; the King had already agreed to receive a Soviet military mission headed by two Russian lieutenant generals to discuss arms supply. Apropos of this, when he visited Moscow with King Hussein, he had met with Marshals Grechko and Yakubovskiy. The latter had handed him a pad of paper and urged him to list anything and everything the JAA wanted; the Soviets would respond freely, promptly and fully.

c. He does not trust the Soviets; they are double-dealers who pursue different courses at various levels. They seek to create dissention and turmoil upon which they can capitalize.

d. The Syrians are madmen, uncontrollable; undoubtedly there will be another change of government. Iraq is also unstable. Jordan can be stable and a moderating influence if, but only if, the U.S. provides them arms and does not drive the King into Soviet hands. The Jordanians value and want to continue their long-term ties with the U.S.

e. At the Cairo meeting, just before he left for the U.S., Nasser was told by Hussein that Khammash was going to seek arms from the U.S. Nasser expressed no opposition, seeming to adopt a "wait-and-see" attitude.

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Authority NLS/RAC 02-120 (#208a)
By cbm/les, NARA, Date 8-28-05

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f. King Faisal and the Shah are greatly concerned about British withdrawal from Aden and the Persian Gulf. The U.S. is the only power which can face the Soviets because the only thing they fear is U.S. strength. Hence, as the greatest power in the world, the U.S. must act to thwart Soviet Middle East ambitions.

g. The Israelis are stupid not to seek a just settlement now before it is too late. Moreover, a punitive attack against Jordan in reprisal for Syrian terrorism will foreclose on any chance of a peaceful settlement because the moderate Arabs will be overwhelmed by the extremists in gaining public support.

h. He can accept a demilitarized West Bank. He thinks the Pope's proposals re Jerusalem are unacceptable to Jews and Muslims alike.

2. As to military items, General Khammash said:

a. Despite reports to the contrary, he wants three squadrons (12 UE each) of F-104's. He wants a versatile aircraft and does not believe Mirages or Lightnings meet his needs. Also, Jordan has no money to buy aircraft or for expensive maintenance and operations. Therefore, he wants as small a force as is compatible with defense needs.

b. He wants about 175 M-48 A-3's with 105 m.m. guns. This will replace his war losses and wear out.

c. He is greatly in need of AAA, not missiles because of their expense, but the Quad 50-caliber machine guns and the M-42. Also, he requires some APC's.

3. Comment: General Khammash was serious and determined in attitude throughout our conversation. I got the strong impression that he is a very worried soldier. He said time and again that time is running out; Jordan must have favorable action from the U.S.; the King's position is fragile; the Israeli's must be forced to deal sensibly; etc. However, he was always coherent and articulate. I judge that he knows his job and spoke the truth as he sees it. In sum, he made a good impression on me. Also, from the military point of view, I concur generally in his estimate of his military hardware requirements.

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Department of State

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CONTROL : 1715Q
 RECD : JAN. 9, 1968
 5:06 A.M.

*subject file
 Jordan amman*

NODIS

FOR ASST SECY BATTLE OR DEPUTY ASST SECY DAVIES

DELIVER OPENING OF BUSINESS JANUARY 9

1. WE HAVE HAD A SERIES OF VERY GRIM DISCUSSIONS WITH JORDANIANS TODAY. WITH CONSIDERABLY DIFFICULTY WE HAVE JUST OBTAINED KING HUSSEIN'S AGREEMENT TO POSTPONING THE VISIT OF A HIGH-LEVEL SOVIET MILITARY DELEGATION (TWO LIEUTENANT-GENERALS AND FOUR OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN JORDAN ON THE ELEVENTH) PENDING DISCUSSIONS OF GENERAL KHAMMASH WITH OUR MILITARY

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 2912A ~~SECRET~~
 PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON. (KHAMMASH'S TRAVEL PLANS WILL BE SUBJECT SUBSEQUENT MESSAGE. THE KING HAS ALSO AGREED TO WITHDRAWAL OF A LETTER WRITTEN BY ZAID RIFA'I TO ME INCORPORATING THE KING'S RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S ORAL MESSAGE I DELIVERED TO THE KING YESTERDAY. I OBTAINED THE KING'S AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAWAL OF THIS LETTER, WHICH STATED BASICALLY THAT OUR RESPONSE HAD COME TOO LATE, AGAINST MY PERSONAL ASSURANCES TO HIM THAT THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE IMPLIED THAT THE "LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS" OF JORDAN WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN A POSITIVE WAY WITH KHAMMAHS IN WASHINGTON. THE NATURE OF THESE "LEGITAMTE REQUIREMNTS" AS THE EMBASSY UNDERSTANDS THEM FROM THE KING AND KHAMMASH WILL BE SPELLED OUT IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE.,

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Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, #42
 By ctm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

~~S E C R E T~~

PAGE 2 AMMAN 2912, Jan 9, 1968 NODIS

3. TODAY'S SITUATION CAME ABOUT PRIMARILY BECAUSE WE WERE LATE IN RESPONDING TO THE KING'S ORAL MESSAGE OF DECEMBER 11 TO THE PRESIDENT. BEYOND THAT, HOWEVER, THE KING APPARENTLY HAD DECIDED WE WERE ONLY STRINGING HIM ALONG, THAT WE HAD NO INTENTION OF DISCUSSING OR

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 2912A ~~S E C R E T~~

SUPPLYING MORE THAN TOKEN ARMS TO JORDAN, AND THAT IN EFFECT WE HAD CALLED HIS HAND. RELIABLE JORDANIAN SOURCES AND AN EMBASSY OFFICER WHO KNOWS HIM WELL SAID THE KING HAS BEEN UNDER CONSIDERABLE PSYCHOLOGICAL TENSION ON THIS MATTER. MY OWN LIMITED EXPERIENCE WITH HUSSEIN CONFIRMS THAT HE HAS BECOME QUITE DESPERATE AND WHAT OVERWROUGHT. PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL'S VISIT AND THE RECENT SERIES OF DIFFICULTIES ON THE BORDER HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO HIS SENSE OF BEING CORNERED. WE ARE ALSO INFORMED HE HAS DEVELOPED A DEEP SENSE OF GUILT ABOUT THE EVENTS OF JUNE.

4. I WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT IN AGREEING (1) TO POSTPONE THE VISIT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY DELEGATION (2) TO WITHDRAW THE LETTER AND (3) TO SEND GENL KHAMMASH TO WASHINGTON THE KING UNDERSTANDS WE SERIOUSLY INTEND TO COME TO A MEETING OF THE MINDS WITH GENL KHAMMASH ON WHAT ARMS WE ARE WILLING TO SUPPLY TO JORDAN. KHAMMASH

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 2912A ~~S E C R E T~~

WILL HAVE FULL POWERS TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER. I THINK HE AND THE KING RECOGNIZE THEY MAY NOT GET ALL THEY WANT, BUT THEY DO EXPECT MORE THAN TOKEN SATISFACTION AND PLAYING FOR TIME. IF WE ARE NOT ABLE TO AGREE ON "LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS", THEN THE KING WILL CONSIDER HE HAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO RESCHEDULING THE VISIT OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION AND, PRESUMABLY, ACCEPTING SOVIET OFFERS.

5. KING HUSSEIN REQUESTED MY PERSONAL UNDERTAKING THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD WE REVEAL THAT AT OUR REQUEST (1) HE HAD POSTPONED THE SOVIET VISIT OR (2) WITHDRAWN ZAID RIFA'I'S LETTER. I ASSURED HIM HE WOULD BE PROTECTED IN BOTH CASES.
GP-1 SYMMES
BT

~~S E C R E T~~

NOTE:
ABOVE TEL BEING SERVICED FOR OMISSION OF NUMBERED
PARA TWO (2).



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

6

81

OO. RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 2913A 090658
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 090658Z JAN 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4337
STATE GRNC
BT

1741 Q
Jan 9, 1968
7:08 A.M.

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2913

*Jordan
ans -
subject file*

NODIS

REF: STATE 94729

DELIVER TO ACTION OFFICER OPENING OF BUSINESS JANUARY 9

1. UPON RECEIPT REFTEL ABOUT NOON JAN 7 I SOUGHT IMMEDIATE AUDIENCE WITH KING HUSSEIN (WHO WAS IN MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER AND SENIOR SECURITY OFFICIALS) AND READ HIM QUOTED ORAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT. HUSSEIN EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR MESSAGE, BUT INDICATED HE HAD SOME RESERVATIONS REGARDING POSSIBLE TRIP BY GENL KHAMVASH AND THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO GET IN TOUCH WITH ME LATER. FROM WHAT WAS SAID DURING OUR BRIEF MEETING,

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 2913A ~~SECRET~~
AND IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATIONS EMBOFFS AND I HAD WITH OFFICIALS CLOSE TO KING INCLUDING GENL KHAMMASH, IT BECAME CLEAR THIS MORNING THAT IN A MEETING WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR JAN 6 HUSSEIN HAD AGREED RECEIVE HIGH LEVEL SOVIET MILITARY DELEGATION TO ARRIVE JAN 11.

2. I WAS FINALLY ABLE TO ARRANGE FURTHER MEETING WITH KING THIS EVENING (JAN 8). IN LONG CONVERSATION THAT TRNSPIRED, IT BECAME CLEAR THAT HUSSEIN HAD BY JAN 5 WRITTEN OFF POSPOECTS OF FAVORABLE RESPONSE BY US TO WHAT HE CONSIDERS HIS LEGITIMATE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AND HAD MADE DECISION IN OWN MIND THAT HE HAD NO REAL OPTION BUT TO GO SOVIET SO FAR AS MILITARY REQUIREMENTS WERE CONCERNED.

3. IN OUR DISCUSSION THIS EVENING I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY EMBOFF WHO HAS KNOWN KING FOR SOME YEARS. (EMBOFF SAID LATER HE HAS NEVER SEEN HUSSEIN SO UPSET OR SO

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority UJT 02-155 (#169)
By clm/jcs NARA, Date 8-28-05

PAGE TWO AMMAN 2913, Jan. 9, 1968 NODIS

UNRESPONSIVE TO LOGICAL ARGUMENTATION.) WE REVIEWED LONG AND SHORT-TERM DANGERS TO BOTH OUR INTERESTS FROM SOVIET ARMS SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH JORDAN. KING MAINTAINED THAT US RESPONSE HAD COME TOO LATE AND HE HAD NOW GONE TOO FAR TO CANCEL THE SOVIET MISSION. (A FORMULATION OF THE JORDANIAN'S POSITION RECEIVED FROM THE KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY BEFORE THE MEETING WAS THAT IF WORD HAD BEEN RECEIVED OF THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO ON SHIPMENT OF ARMS TO JORDAN BY JAN 5 THE DATE OF THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR'S DEFINITIVE PROPOSAL - HUSSEIN'S HANDS WOULD HAVE BEEN FREE TO SEND GENL KHAMMASH TO WASHINGTON BY JAN 10.) IN OUR DISCUSSION I EMPHASIZED AMONG OTHER THINGS THAT WE WERE NOT AWARE OF A DEADLINE FOR OUR REPLY AND THAT SINCE THE KING NOW HAD WHAT HE WANTED FROM US HIS REACTION WOULD BE SUBJECT TO SERIOUS MISINTERPRETATION. HUSSEIN FINALLY REAFFIRMED HIS UNDERTAKING AND POSITION THAT HE HAD NO DESIRE OR INTENTION PROCURE ANY ARMS FROM SOVIET BLOC SO LONG AS JORDAN WAS ABLE TO OBTAIN FROM FREE WORLD SOURCES IN GENERAL AND FROM US IN PARTICULAR ARMS FOR LEGITIMATE SELF DEFENSE AND SECURITY.

4. KING THEN SUMMONED PRINCE TALHOUNI AND ZAID RIFA'I. AFTER EXTENSIVE PRIVATE CONSULTATION WITH THEM AND KHAMMASH IN ANOTHER ROOM, HE TOLD ME HE HAD DIRECTED THAT THE SOVIETS BE ASKED TO POSTPONE THEIR MISSION AND THAT HE WOULD ACCEPT OUR INVITATION TO SEND GENL KHAMMASH TO WASHINGTON. HE SAID HE WAS UNABLE TO FIX A DATE IMMEDIATELY BUT UNDERTOOK TO LET US KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, WITH THE EXPECTATION THAT KHAMMASH WOULD ARRIVE AS CLOSE TO JAN 10 AS POSSIBLE.

5. IN DISCUSSIONS LATE THIS AFTERNOON WITH ZAID RIFA'I, THE KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY, AND SUBSEQUENTLY IN THE MEETING WITH THE KING IN WHICH GENL KHAMMASH PARTICIPATED, THE JORDANIANS EMPHASIZED THAT GENL KHAMMASH'S "EMERGENCY LIST" OF LAST AUGUST HAD BEEN A LIST OF PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS AT THAT TIME BUT THAT IT IS NOW INCOMPLETE. HAD DELIVERIES BEGUN IN OCTOBER AS ORIGINALLY EXPECTED IT WOULD HAVE HAD A GREAT PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT. NOW, KHAMMASH STRESSED, HE MUST ADDRESS HIMSELF TO CERTAIN BASIC OVERALL REQUIREMENTS. WHILE HE DID NOT WISH TO BE SPECIFIC ON THOSE IN THE CONVERSATION THIS EVENING, WE UNDERSTAND HE HAS IN MIND REPLACEMENT OF AT LEAST SOME OF HIS JUNE BATTLE LOSSES OF TANKS (SEE USDAO JAN 68) AND A BEGINNING ON HIS SUPERSONIC AIRCRAFT PROGRAM. JORDANIAN TANK LOSSES IN JUNE WERE OVER 150. ON THE BASIS OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION WE JUDGE THAT WHAT KHAMMASH HAS IN MIND IS SOMETHING BETWEEN 50 AND 75 M48S. ON AIRCRAFT, THE JORDANIANS ARE NO LONGER INTERESTED IN

~~SECRET~~

PAGE THREE AMMAN 2913, JAN. 9, 1948 NODIS

THE F-104 AND ARE TALKING ABOUT EITHER THE LIGHTNING OR MIRAGE. AT THIS STAGE HE WILL PROBABLY BE LOOKING TO THE US MAINLY FOR SUPPORT ON THE AIRCRAFT QUOTATION

AND, PERHAPS, A LIQUIDATION OF THE 104 DEAL. IN THE CONVERSATION TONIGHT KHAMMASH ALSO EXPRESSED GREAT INTEREST IN ADDITIONAL ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN CAPABILITY.

PAGE 6. RUOMKC 291E A ~~SECRET~~

S. IN SUMMARY, THE PASSAGE OF TIME HAS MADE INSUFFICIENT THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS ON ARMS WITH WHICH THE JORDANIANS WERE PREPARED TO LIVE. THE REACTION TODAY OF THE KING AND HIS ADVISORS INCLUDING THE PRIMIN CONVINCED ME THAT IN FACT THE KING HAD GIVEN UP ON RECEIVING AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE AND HAD TAKEN THE BASIC DECISION TO GO TO THE SOVIETS-- A DECISION WHICH HE HAS AT LEAST TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED. OUR DISCUSSION WITH GENL KHAMMASH WILL I THINK BE DECISIVE AS TO WHETHER THE SOVIETS HAVE ANOTHER CHANCE TO TAIN ENTREE HERE OR NOT. PHASING AND STAGING OF DELIVERIES CAN, WE BELIEVE, BE WORKED OUT BUT WE MUST BE PREPARED TO COMMIT OURSELVES ALONG THE LINES OUTLINED ABOVE. THE KING HAS FULLY REAFFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT THAT IF HE CAN BE ASSURED THAT WHAT HE CONSIDERS LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS ARE TO BE MET HE WILL MAKE NO PROCUREMENT FROM THE SOVIET BLOC.

GP-1 SYMMES

BT

~~SECRET~~

Jordan Arms

Pls. return to HHSaunders
Room 372-a EOB when sent

82

SECRET/NODIS

January 3, 1968

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WALT ROSTOW

King Hussein has responded to your request for assurance against getting Soviet arms with the following message:

"I have always been a friend of the West and I have no desire to buy arms from the Soviet Union. For this reason I have waited some months for the US to decide whether it will resume the supply of the legitimate arms requirements of my country. I hope you will agree that we have been patient. I can assure you that if the USG will supply our needs, I have no intention of buying any of our military equipment from the Soviet Union. In making this assurance I have to assume that in due course our legitimate requirements will be met. It is imperative for me that we reach a general understanding on these legitimate requirements prior to the Summit meeting on January 17 since at that time I shall have to assure the other Arab states that our arms needs will be met. Given the time factor, I see no other way to reach the necessary understandings than to send my Chief of Staff Major General Amer Khammash to Washington immediately to discuss our requirements with the appropriate American authorities. In this way I shall be able to put off discussing my military requirements with the Soviet Union. If you prefer, we see no need for any publicity concerning General Khammash's visit. I hope arrangements for him to proceed to Washington can be made as soon as possible."

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (# 2156)
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *cmf/sg*, NARA, Date *8-28-05*

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Secretary Rusk recommends you send the following oral message in reply:

"I appreciate the assurances you have given me in your oral message of December 30 with regard to Jordanian procurement of arms from the Soviet Bloc. On our part, we are prepared in principle to resume arms shipments to Jordan and would begin with the following items from the priority requirement list which General Khammash gave to Colonel Jordan in London August 1967:

106 mm rifles

2-1/2-ton trucks

communications equipment

aerial target drone systems

ammunition

and spare parts for previously delivered US equipment.

We welcome General Khammash's contemplated visit to Washington and would expect to discuss with him details (including quantities) of the above shipments and various aspects of the arms question in general. We would hope that he might arrive in Washington around January 8."

You will note that the Secretary's draft deliberately avoids direct response to the King's assumption that his requirements will be met. However, the Secretary points out that the King will interpret this reply as assurance that either we or other western sources will meet his legitimate needs. In other words, this initial package will be just the first installment

SECRET/NODIS

- 3 -

in a renewed military supply relationship, albeit to a probably smaller Jordan army.

The Israelis seem fairly relaxed about this for the moment, although their acquiescence may assume they'll get Phantoms as well as Skyhawks. They seem finally to have realized the dangers of a Soviet military presence in Yemen.

In any case, Hussein now wants French Mirage aircraft or British Lightnings rather than our F-104 and he may be persuaded to standardize his tank corps on the British Centurion. But we probably won't always be able to get away with the sort of harmless equipment on this list.

Secretary Rusk recommends we move quickly if you are ready to take this step. There is some advantage to both Jordanians and Israelis in not having it appear that your decision followed your talk with Eshkol. Besides, a Soviet "economic mission" including three military experts in mufti is scheduled to arrive in Jordan on January 5, and your message would bring General Khammash to Washington next Monday in order to reach some understanding before the Arab summit uncertainly scheduled for January 17.

This is a painful decision but I don't see any other way to keep the Soviets out at this point. Fortunately, the Israelis seem more manageable now than they did even six weeks ago.

Approve message to Hussein _____

Call me _____

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Jordan Arms ?

See WWR memo to President - 1/3/68 83

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 2, 1968

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Oral Message to King Hussain on Arms Supply

Recommendation:

That you send the enclosed telegram to Ambassador Symmes as a reply to King Hussain's oral message of December 30.

Discussion:

The enclosed draft telegram authorizes Ambassador Symmes to convey your response to King Hussain's oral message of December 30 giving assurances that Jordan has no intention of acquiring Soviet arms. The assurance is predicated on the King's assumption that we can reach a general understanding that Jordan's "legitimate requirements" for arms can be met. The proposed reply accedes to the King's request to send his Chief of Staff to Washington prior to the Arab Summit meeting now scheduled for January 17.

The King will almost certainly interpret the reply as an assurance that Jordan's legitimate arms requirements will be met either from other western sources or by us if he foregoes Soviet offers.

He has told us he does not want the F-104 aircraft we previously agreed to sell him, but will seek to acquire either the French Mirage or the British Lightning. We believe that having lost most of his modern U.S. M-48's to Israel, Hussain may be persuaded to standardize on the British Centurion, now the mainstay of his armored units, if we do not wish U.S. tanks in Jordan. For most of his other requirements, Hussain will look to us. Thus, it is unlikely that the sales recommended to you earlier and referred to in this draft

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (215c)

State Dept. Guidelines


By cbm/rq, NARA, Date 8-28-05

SECRET/NODIS

-2-

will be more than an initial increment in a renewed military supply relationship, albeit to a probably smaller Jordan Army.

I recommend strongly that you approve transmission of this message. Time is running out on this difficult decision and delay can expose our position in Jordan and the moderate Arab states to most serious risks. A Soviet "Economic Mission," including three military experts in mufti is scheduled to arrive in Amman January 5. A Soviet breakthrough in Jordan would have dangerous implications for orientation of the region in Cold War terms, and for chances of achieving a just and enduring Near East settlement.



Dean Rusk

SECRET/NODIS

83a

~~SECRET~~

Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE

STATE

NODIS

Ref: AMMAN's 2831

1. President has requested following oral message be passed to King Hussein in reply King's message of December 30:
2. QUOTE I appreciate the assurances you have given me in your oral message of December 30 with regard to Jordanian procurement of arms from the Soviet Bloc. On our part, we are prepared in principle to resume arms shipments to Jordan and would begin with the following items from the priority requirement list which General Khammash gave to Colonel Jordan in London August 1967:

106 mm rifles

2-1/2-ton trucks

communications equipment

aerial target drone systems

ammunition

and spare parts for previously delivered US equipment.

We welcome General Khammash's contemplated visit to Washington and would expect to discuss with him details (including quantities) of the above shipments and various aspects of the arms question in general. We would

The Secretary

NEA/ARN:RDBoughton/mc 1/2/68

5617

NEA - Mr. Davies
NEA - Mr. Battle
DOD/ISA - Mr. PC Warnke

S/S -
S/C - Mr. Bowie
White House -

DECLASSIFIED
Authority ERUS, Vol. XX, #37
By ebm, NARA, Date 8-28-05

~~SECRET~~

2

AMMAN

~~SECRET~~

hope that he might arrive in Washington around January 8. END QUOTE

3. FYI We would resume arms shipments to Jordan with the \$6.5 million package contained in Amman's 2396. END FYI.

GP-1.

END

~~SECRET~~

Snyder W 10 84
5

OO RUEHC
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1967 DEC 30 PM 3 27

Jordan arms

~~SECRET~~, AMMAN 2831

NODIS

*See WWR message
to LBJ - 1/3/68.*

REF STATE 91434

1. WHEN I SAW HIM TODAY TO DISCUSS REFTEL (CONVERSATION REPORTED SEPARATELY), KING HUSSEIN REQUESTED FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE BE PASSED TO PRESIDENT ON URGENT BASIS:

2. QTE [I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN A FRIEND OF THE WEST AND I HAVE NO DESIRE TO BUY ARMS FROM THE SOVIET UNION. FOR THIS REASON I HAVE WAITED SOME MONTHS FOR THE US TO DECIDE WHETHER IT WILL RESUME THE SUPPLY OF THE LEGITIMATE ARMS REQUIREMENTS OF MY COUNTRY. I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE THAT WE

PAGE TWO RUQMKG 2831A ~~SECRET~~

HAVE BEEN PATIENT. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT IF THE USG WILL SUPPLY OUR NEEDS, I HAVE NO INTENTION OF BUYING ANY OF OUR MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM THE SOVIET UNION. IN MAKING THIS ASSURANCE I HAVE TO ASSUME THAT IN DUE COURSE OUR LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS WILL BE MET. IT IS IMPERATIVE FOR ME THAT WE REACH A GENERAL UNDERSTANDING ON THESE LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS PRIOR TO THE SUMMIT MEETING ON JANUARY 17 SINCE AT THAT TIME I SHALL HAVE TO ASSURE THE OTHER ARAB STATES THAT OUR ARMS NEEDS WILL BE MET. GIVEN THE TIME FACTOR, I SEE NO OTHER WAY TO REACH THE NECESSARY UNDERSTANDINGS THAN TO SEND MY CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GENERAL AMER KHAMMASH TO WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY TO DISCUSS OUR REQUIREMENTS WITH THE APPROPRIATE AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. IN THIS WAY I SHALL BE ABLE TO PUT OFF DISCUSSING MY MILITARY REQUIREMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IF YOU PREFER, WE SEE NO NEED FOR ANY PUBLICITY CONCERNING GENERAL KHAMMASH'S VISIT. I HOPE ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIM TO PROCEED TO WASHINGTON CAN BE MADE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. UNQTE.
GP-1. SYMMES

*Hussein
to LBJ
12/30/67*

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED (42159)
Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, #29 footnote 3
By *cm/ig*, NARA, Date 8-28-05

~~SECRET~~

Senders
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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
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1967 DEC 30 PM 330

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2832

NODIS

REF STATE 91343, AMMAN 2831

1. I SAW KING HUSSEIN THIS AFTERNOON TO TAKE UP REFTTEL. I TOLD HIM I HAD ANOTHER PERSONAL MESSAGE FOR HIM FROM THE PRESIDENT AND EXPLAINED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD LIKE ASSURANCES WE WOULD NOT SUBSEQUENTLY BE FACED WITH JORDAN'S ACCEPTANCE OF SOVIET ARMS OFFERS.

2. KING RESPONDED THAT PROVIDING SUCH ASSURANCES GAVE HIM NO DIFFICULTY AT ALL. THIS HAD ALWAYS BEEN HIS UNDERSTANDING OF ARMS ARRANGEMENTS WITH US. HE HAS NO DESIRE TO BUY ARMS

PAGE TWO RUQMKG 2832A ~~SECRET~~
FROM THE SOVIETS PROVIDED HIS LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS CAN BE MET BY THE UNITED STATES. HE SAID HE REALIZED THAT RESUMPTION OF SHIPMENTS WOULD NOT "BRING TANKS TO JORDAN IMMEDIATELY". BUT HE DID NEED TO HAVE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THE USG IS PREPARED TO DO FOR JORDAN. IN GIVING US ASSURANCES ABOUT NOT GOING TO THE SOVIETS HE DID NOT WANT TO BE LEFT IN POSITION OF HAVING SOME OF HIS ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS UNSATISFIED.

3. I RESPONDED THAT SHIPMENTS TO BE RESUMED INITIALLY WOULD INCLUDE SOME OF ITEMS ON GENERAL KHAMMASH'S "EMERGENCY LIST." I SAID I SAW THIS AS AN IMPORTANT BEGINNING. IT WOULD REMOVE PRESSURES FROM HIM AND WOULD GIVE US ALL TIME TO SEE WHAT SUCCESS JARRING WOULD HAVE. WE WOULD ALL GAIN TIME TO FORM A BETTER PICTURE OF WHAT KIND OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT JORDAN WOULD NEED IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

4. THE KING SAID HE WOULD WANT IN ANY CASE TO HAVE GENERAL KHAMMASH PROCEED AT ONCE TO THE US TO DISCUSS JORDAN'S REQUIREMENTS. I SAID I RECOGNIZED HE WOULD WANT KHAMMASH

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS Vol. xx, #29
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-28-05

~~SECRET~~

-2- 2832 FROM AMMAN DECEMBER 30, 1967 (NODIS)

PAGE THREE RUQMKG 2832A ~~SECRET~~
TO DISCUSS JORDAN'S REQUIREMENTS IN DETAIL AT SOME POINT,
BUT I BELIEVED IT SHOULD BE PUT OFF UNTIL THINGS HAD SETTLED
A BIT, UNTIL WE COULD SEE WHERE WE STOOD.

5. AT THIS POINT KING ASKED IF I COULD WAIT WHILE HE CALLED
KHAMMASH TO THE PALACE TO JOIN OUR DISCUSSION.
WHEN KHAMMASH ARRIVED WE WENT OVER MOST OF THE SAME GROUND
AGAIN WITH KHAMMASH EMPHASIZING THAT HE COULD NOT KEEP THE
ARMY LOYAL TO THE KING IF JORDAN WAS ONLY TO BE PROVIDED
WITH A "FEW SPARES" AND OTHER EQUIPMENT FROM HIS "EMERGENCY
LIST." HE WAS NOT ASKING FOR ALL OF JORDAN'S NEEDS AT ONCE,
BUT HE BELIEVED HIS MAJESTY WOULD HAVE TO HAVE A CLEAR UNDER-
STANDING OF WHAT THE USG PROPOSES TO DO BEYOND THE "EMERGENCY
LIST." DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS COULD BE POSTPONED, BUT JORDAN
WAS FACED WITH A SUMMIT MEETING ON JAN 17 AND HAD
TO BE IN A POSITION TO STATE AUTHORITATIVELY THAT ITS
NEEDS WERE GOING TO BE MET BY THE USG. REVIVAL OF THE UAC
IS ON THE SUMMIT AGENDA, AND HE (KHAMMASH) HAS ALREADY BEEN
TOLD THAT JORDAN AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES AT THE SUMMIT
WILL BE EXPECTED TO INDICATE HOW THEIR RE-EQUIPPING IS

PAGE FOUR RUQMKG 2832A ~~SECRET~~
BEING ACCOMPLISHED. BEYOND THIS, THERE IS THE SERIOUSLY
DETERIORATING MORALE OF THE JORDAN ARMY TO BE CONSIDERED.
THEY HAD TO HAVE AN IDEA OF WHAT COMES AFTER THE "EMERGENCY
LIST."

6. DISCUSSION WENT BACK AND FORTH OVER THE SAME GROUND.
THE KING AT ONE POINT INTRODUCED THE ISRAELI F-4 PHANTOM
REQUEST AND SAID HE EARNESTLY HOPED THE USG WOULD NOT TAKE
THIS STEP. IN THE COURSE OF OUR CONVERSATION I, OF COURSE,
EMPHASIZED THAT BUYING SOVIET ARMS MIGHT HELP TO MEET A
SHORT-TERM PROBLEM BUT WOULD IN ITS TRAIN BRING A HOST OF
LONG-TERM PROBLEMS. THE KING'S COMMENT WAS "I AM SORRY TO
HAVE TO SAY THAT YOU WILL HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE IF THAT
HAPPENS."

7. OUR DISCUSSION WAS CONCLUDED WITH THE KING SUGGESTING AN
ORAL MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT. WE WENT OVER THE SUBSTANCE
OF SUCH A MESSAGE SEVERAL TIMES, AND IT HAS BEEN TRANS-
MITTED SEPARATELY.

~~SECRET~~

-3- 2832 FROM AMMAN DECEMBER 30, 1967 (NODIS)

PAGE FIVE RUQMKG 2832A ~~SECRET~~

8. COMMENT: I TRIED THROUGHOUT CONVERSATION TO TALK THE KING INTO GOING ALONG WITH A GENERAL STATEMENT OF RESUMPTION OF SHIPMENTS AT THIS TIME AND PUTTING OFF A KHAMMAS VISIT UNTIL WE COULD SEE WHERE THINGS WERE GOING. BOTH HE AND KHAMMASH WERE PREPARED FOR SUCH MOVES ON MY PART AND HAD NO INTENTION OF LEAVING THINGS FUZZY. ALTHOUGH THEY DID NOT SAY SO, IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT KHAMMASH'S VISIT WOULD MEAN MUCH TO THEM PSYCHOLOGICALLY. IT WOULD BE A SIGN THAT WE HAD MOVED BACK TOGETHER AND WOULD BE SO INTERPRETED BY JORDANIANS AND OTHER ARABS. BOTH THE KING AND KHAMMASH MADE A SPECIAL POINT OF EMPHASIZING "LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS," AND THEY REITERATED STATEMENTS MADE IN OTHER RECENT CONVERSATIONS TO THE EFFECT THAT IF JARRING IS SUCCESSFUL, THEIR LONGER TERM MILITARY REQUIREMENTS WOULD CHANGE. ALTHOUGH THEY WERE FAIRLY INSISTENT THAT THEY WILL NEED TO KNOW BEFORE JANUARY 17 WHAT WE ARE PREPARED TO DO (WITH THE IMPLICATION THAT THIS MEANS THE LONGER TERM), WE BELIEVE THAT DISCUSSIONS WITH KHAMMASH NEED NOT TAKE THE FORM OF A COMPLETE LONG-TERM STATEMENT OF FORCE GOALS AND EQUIPMENT. IT SEEMS TO US THAT IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE KING AND KHAMMASH IF

PAGE SIX RUQMKG 2832A ~~SECRET~~

WE APPROACHED THE PROBLEM IN STAGES. WE COULD RESUME SHIPMENT OF OUR RECOMMENDED LIST NOW AND TRY TO AGREE WITH KHAMMASH ON MAKING UP SOME OF JORDAN'S OTHER LOSSES AND DEFICIENCIES IN A SERIES OF STAGES. THIS WILL ENABLE BOTH SIDES TO BUY TIME AND PROVIDES, WE BELIEVE, SUFFICIENT SCOPE FOR KHAMMASH'S DISCUSSIONS TO SATISFY THE KING BEFORE THE SUMMIT MEETING.

9. THE OBJECT OF THIS WHOLE EXERCISE HAS BEEN TO BUY TIME, TO MAINTAIN OUR POSITION HERE WHILE A MIDDLE EASTERN SETTLEMENT IS BEING WORKED OUT. THIS OBJECT IS STILL IMPORTANT TO US, AND THEREFORE WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT KHAMMASH BE INVITED TO PROCEED TO WASHINGTON AS REQUESTED BY THE KING.

GP-1.
BT

SYMMES

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~
Classification

FOR OCIT USE ONLY

4869

85

Origin

Index

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN

PRIORITY

STATE

NODIS

Jordan arms

1. You should ensure that King Hussein knows that message sent in DEPTTEL 89454 was a personal one directly from President Johnson. The President would like assurance that if we move to meet some of Jordan's military needs we will not subsequently be faced with Jordan's acceptance of Soviet offers. We leave to your judgment how best to elicit such assurances.

2. FYI You will recall that both ground and air sales packages negotiated with Jordan had condition that Jordan would not acquire ^{military} equipment from US and other Free World sources. other than ~~US and other Free World sources~~. This condition still obtains and part of recommended package would come under existing sales agreement. The King may consider our response minimal particularly in face of termination of budget support by decision taken in light of possible adverse domestic and Congressional reaction and represents an effort to manifest continuing US support of Hussein's regime. END FYI.

GP-3

END

*Cleared by Postow
S/S told 12/29/67*

Drafted by
NEA:RPDavies:av *RVD*

Tel. Ext.
2107

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - William J. Handley *WJH*

Clearances

S/S
White House

~~SECRET/NODIS~~
Classification

FORM 8-65 D5-322

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *chm/s*, NARA, Date 6-29-10

Jordan arms 86

~~SECRET~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

December 28, 1967

On your instruction we passed the following message to King Hussein:

"The President has indicated that he will make decision on Jordan arms recommendation by New Year's. He is inclined to be sympathetic to Jordan's needs, and hopes the King will not make a major decision before hearing from us."

We continue to get reports from Jordan that time is running out and that King Hussein feels it necessary to make some decision on Soviet arms by the first of the ^{year} ~~week~~. We have strung him along since mid-August and doubt we can do so much longer.

The package which Nick Katzenbach recommends would total about \$6.5 million of spare parts, automotive and communications gear, some anti-tank guns and ammunition. We all know the Israelis won't like this but we have been interested to note in the last few weeks a much more relaxed Israeli attitude toward Hussein. In any case, this equipment will not affect the Israeli-Jordanian arms balance.

Since this is a token move to reopen the door and ^{block} ~~look at~~ the Soviets, I should think ^{we} ~~you~~ would ~~be able to~~ sell it to the Israelis who will not want to jeopardize their aircraft requests by making a fuss ^{over} ~~out of~~ such an inconsequential package for Jordan.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/hj*, NARA, Date 6-29-10

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

If you are ready to go ahead, the next step would be to authorize Ambassador Symmes to offer this package to Hussein.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

~~SECRET~~

Pls. return to HHSaunders
Room 372-a EOB when signed.

Jordan arms
87

~~SECRET~~

December 26, 1967

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WALT ROSTOW

To carry out your instruction this morning, State proposes that Ambassador Symmes pass the following to King Hussein:

"The President has indicated that he will make decision on Jordan arms recommendation by New Year's. He is inclined to be sympathetic to Jordan's needs, and hopes the King will not make a major decision before hearing from us."

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *clm/ly*, NARA, Date 6-29-10

Jordan Arms 7601
Israeli Arms
88

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 11, 1967

~~SECRET~~

*See W W R memos (2)
to President 12/13/67.*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Arms for Jordan and Israel

The attached memorandum (concurrent in by Rusk and McNamara) sets out alternative courses of action for dealing with the priority arms problem in the Middle East. We have deliberately given you these various options, although I am sure you will recognize that the choices on Jordan are narrow indeed.

It may be useful to you, in making this difficult decision, to have my views on how you might play it-- particularly in light of the potential domestic problems.

* * *

Israel has asked for 27 A-4 Skyhawk aircraft, to be delivered in 1969. (These are in addition to the 48 Skyhawks now scheduled for delivery in 1968). It has also asked for 50 F-4 Phantom jets, to be delivered in 1969-70.

The military balance is in Israel's favor and should remain so for at least a year. But I believe there is a legitimate Israeli concern about their continued air superiority beyond 1968.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, vol. xv #15
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

~~SECRET~~

-2-

King Hussein is pressing hard for some arms deliveries--both as evidence of our continued support and to meet minimum equipment needs for his defeated army.

Hussein's position is threatened by his efforts in favor of a settlement, his association--in Arab eyes--with the West, and his resistance to attractive Soviet arms offers.

If it can be done without endangering Israel's security, it is in our national interest--as well as Israel's--to avoid further substantial US arms commitments until we know more about the chances for a negotiated settlement.

I therefore conclude that:

1. The US should tell Hussein before Christmas that we are willing to supply certain of Jordan's minimum requirements. But doing something for Jordan, no matter how little, will almost certainly be strenuously opposed by Israel. This will mean some political trouble for you on the domestic front.

2. We must give some indication now to the Israelis on how we propose to deal with their requests. We could:

- assure Israel that a delay in committing ourselves to sell them A-4s does not mean that the 1969-70 delivery date would slip (assuming we decide to go ahead with the sale);
- indicate that the US would be prepared to divert F-4s from other contracts in order to meet a clearly demonstrated Israeli need (i.e., French cancellation of Mirage deliveries; delivery of substantial


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-3-

numbers of Mirages to the Arabs, escalation of Soviet aircraft supplies to Arabs.)

3. In terms of dealing with the domestic situation here, and the likely Israeli reaction to our moving on Jordan, I do not believe we should tell the Israelis more than the foregoing. By withholding firm word on our intentions until Eshkol's visit in February, we may be able to dampen Israeli opposition to Jordan sales.


Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Acting

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

7668
88a

December 11, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Arms for Jordan and Israel

The IRG for the Near East and South Asia, chaired by Luke Battle, and the SIG under my chairmanship have just completed a review of our arms supply policy for the Near East, with particular attention to pending arms requests from Jordan and Israel.

We have concluded that we should resume limited arms shipments to Jordan in the very near future, and that some increment of aircraft should be provided to Israel. We are recommending for Israel a good deal less at this time than it has asked for, but enough to assure its continued air superiority and to provide an extra margin of safety.

Discussion

The following have been key factors in our review:

- Israel's military superiority over the Arabs is assured at least through the end of next year. How long it will retain its superiority will be affected by the rate and nature of Soviet resupply and training of the Arabs and by Israel's ability to maintain adequately modern weapons in its own inventory.

- We continue to have a major interest not only in Israel's continued ability to defend itself, but also in maintaining influence in the Arab world. We need to retain friendly ties with the moderate Arab states, which have looked to us or other Western sources for their minimum requirements of weapons.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By Cbm/lyf NARA, Date 6-29-10

SECRET

- 2 -

--The Soviets have made important inroads among the Arabs in recent years, and we are faced with the threat of further Soviet penetration via arms aid in the Near East.

For the short term at least, our hopes for progress towards some political accommodation between the Arabs and Israel--and, flowing from that, for some effective arms limitation in the area--ride on the success of Swedish Ambassador Jarring as U Thant's Special Representative under the Security Council's resolution of November 22. The Soviets voted for the Security Council resolution and even tabled their own draft resolution with a clause on arms control reminiscent of your proposal of June 19. They are continuing to ship arms to the Arab radicals, but they are probably not making decisions on shipments over the long term pending further developments.

Jordan

We led King Hussein to believe last August that we were sympathetic to his need to get some arms from the U. S., but we excluded Jordan from the partial lifting of our arms freeze in October. We put King Hussein off when he raised the issue in his visit here in November. Hussein stuck his neck out, played a helpful role in the Arab acceptance of the Security Council resolution, and has been working actively towards a settlement. He has staked his fate on working with the West and, particularly, the U. S.

Our principal conclusions are:

- Unless we indicate in the very near future that we will make some supplies available, we run a serious risk--acceptance by Jordan of Soviet arms or erosion of the King's support by the Jordanian military, with a consequent threat to his very survival. We should tell the King of our decision before the end of the year.
- U. S. supply commitments should, for the present, be kept to the minimum necessary to preserve stability in Jordan. We should work on the basis of the minimum list of roughly \$6.5 million (including \$1.5 million in the MAP pipeline) recommended by Embassy Amman--spare parts, automotive and communication gear, some anti-tank guns and ammunition. The Israelis won't like it, but the supply of these items will not have a noticeable effect on the arms balance in the area.

SECRET

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- 3 -

- Except for drawing on acceptable items in the existing MAP pipeline (funded prior to this fiscal year), supplies should be provided on a cash sales basis.
- We should continue to encourage Jordan to find the major part of its needs in Western Europe.

Israel

The Israelis have given us a request for 27 A-4H Skyhawk aircraft (additional to the 48 to be delivered between now and the end of 1968) and 50 F-4 Phantom jets. The Israelis were able to prevail despite a 3 to 1 ratio against them in aircraft in June--they would have done so even without their preemptive strike--and they consider continued control of the air to be crucial for their future security. Israel lost about 40 out of an inventory of slightly under 200 tactical aircraft during the June war. It wants not only to make up its losses, but to modernize and expand its air force during the next few years.

Soviet supply to the Arab radicals is a major element in the equation. Arab aircraft inventories are edging back toward prewar levels. Soviet deliveries of jet fighters have brought the figure up to 60-80% of the prewar level in the UAR and about 90% in Syria. Arab bomber inventories are still only about half of prewar. Deliveries since June have been largely under contracts negotiated prior to the war and have consisted, by and large, of less advanced types of aircraft similar to those previously supplied. (The attached table shows the trend of Soviet deliveries since the war.) Our intelligence indicates that recent Arab pleas for large amounts of additional military equipment are still the subject of haggling and negotiation with the Soviets. We have no firm basis for predicting the volume and nature of Soviet deliveries over the months and years ahead.

French actions will also be of key importance. It now looks very uncertain whether France, which is the source of Israel's total current tactical air inventory, will actually deliver 50 Mirage V jets ordered in 1966 and scheduled for delivery in 1968.

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- 4 -

Our principal conclusions are:

- We should continue very carefully to study Israel's needs and assure its access to a supply of aircraft essential to preserve its security.
- We should take action in the near future to assure at least an option to supply 27 additional A-4s in 1969. These planes would provide an extra margin of safety in the light of present uncertainties in the equation. They could play a role in deterring future military action by the Arabs.
- We should not accede at this time to Israel's request for 50 F-4s. These planes are not justified by the threat Israel faces, and would tend to add unnecessarily to the arms race, not only in numbers but in sophistication of arms in the area.
- We should handle any action on the additional A-4s in such a way as to minimize possible damage to Jarring's peacemaking mission and the possibility of provoking an arms escalation by the Soviets.

We are now examining various alternatives for handling the request for additional A-4s. These include:

- (a) Deferring a commitment to the Israelis, perhaps for several months while the Jarring mission is under way, but taking measures on our own side for the procurement of components with a long lead time so as to protect the option to supply the aircraft in 1969. This would entail some obligation against our own funds.
- (b) Roughly the same as (a) above but getting the Israelis to stand the financial obligation of procurement of the long-lead items.

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- 5 -

- (c) Finding a formula to enter into an agreement to supply the planes under terms explicitly reserving our option to deliver them in the event we find they are not needed after all.
- (d) Agreeing to supply the additional planes and entering into an early agreement to that effect. The political visibility of our action would be reduced if we could simply amend the existing 1966 contract calling for 48 A-4s.
- (e) On any of the above, although we might find the funds to provide credit despite the current stringency, a straight cash sale is justified by Israel's current financial situation.

If the French actually renege on supplying the 50 Mirage Vs to Israel in 1968, we shall have to reconsider the impact on Israel's security and the implications for our arms supply policy. In that event we may have to come back to you with additional recommendations.

In any event, France's apparent decision to supply a substantial military package to Iraq--possibly including Mirage planes--and to lift its arms embargo for certain other Arab states will increase Israel's concern. It heightens the urgency of some action by us on Israel's pending request.

Scenario: We all agree that we should not take any action until we have consulted with the key people on the Hill. In view of the urgency on Jordan we should like to do so just as soon as Congressional action is completed on the foreign aid appropriation. We believe it will be desirable to inform the key people that we are considering sympathetically some additional commitment to Israel, at the same time as we inform them of our conclusion that it is essential to resume limited shipments to Jordan.

What we need now is authority from you to go ahead with consultations on the above basis. Subject to the satisfactory conclusion of those consultations, we would envisage informing King Hussein of our decision to supply him some arms. We would come back to you for a go-ahead on talking to the Israelis about additional A-4s, as soon as we have worked out more specific terms of a feasible approach to them.

SECRET

SECRET

- 6 -

Dean Rusk and Bob McNamara agree with this memorandum.

Go ahead with consultations _____

No _____

See me before you do anything _____

Walter D. Hight
Under Secretary

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

ESTIMATES OF SOVIET RESUPPLY OF FIGHTER AND BOMBER AIRCRAFT

(Inventories before, immediately following, and six months
after the Arab-Israeli war)

	<u>UAR</u>			<u>Syria</u>			<u>Iraq</u>			<u>Algeria</u>		
	<u>June</u> <u>5</u>	<u>June</u> <u>12</u>	<u>Dec</u> <u>5</u>	<u>June</u> <u>5</u>	<u>June</u> <u>12</u>	<u>Dec</u> <u>5</u>	<u>June</u> <u>5</u>	<u>June</u> <u>12</u>	<u>Dec</u> <u>5</u>	<u>June</u> <u>5</u>	<u>June</u> <u>12</u>	<u>Dec</u> <u>5</u>
Fighter aircraft	365	119	304	85	30	81	95	76	106	122	120	129
Bombers	69	13	43	4	2	2	22	21	29	33	33	21*

*Some bombers transferred to UAR during the war.

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

~~SECRET~~

W/d @
Launders
89
Jordan military (file with aid freeze subject file)

Action

Info

PP RUENC
DE RUEHDT 2194 3170020
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NODIS

AS DEPT AWARE, WE RECEIVED WORD HUSSEIN EXPECTING SOME FURTHER MESSAGE RE ARMS AS FOLLOW-UP TO HIS DISCUSSIONS IN WASH. PURSUANT TO DEPT'S INSTRUCTIONS, SISCO CALLED ON KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY (RIFAI) JUST SHORTLY BEFORE KING'S DEPARTURE AND CONVEYED THE FOLLOWING:

1. WE RECOGNIZE JORDAN'S LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS FOR SOME ARMS. WE HAVE EXPLAINED TO THE KING OUR CONGRESSIONAL PROBLEM AND SERIOUS TROUBLE WE ARE HAVING IN GETTING A FOREIGN AID BILL OUT OF THIS CONGRESS.
2. THOUGH WE IN NO POSITION TO MAKE ANY COMMITMENTS, QUESTION OF RESUMING ARMS SHIPMENTS TO JORDAN WILL REMAIN UNDER REVIEW. WE WOULD HOPE RESOLUTION OF OUR CONGRESSIONAL PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD BE FACILITATED BY FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS LOOKING TOWARDS A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN THE ME WOULD PERMIT US TO RESUME SOME SHIPMENTS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN FAIRLY NEAR FUTURE. IN THIS RESPECT, PASSAGE OF AN ACCEPTABLE SC RES WOULD HELP EASE OUR PROBLEM.
3. IMMEDIATELY WE ARE ALSO PREPARED TO SUPPORT JORDAN IN OBTAINING SOME SHIPMENTS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM WESTERN EUROPEAN SUPPLIERS.

RIFAI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND SAID HE WOULD CONVEY ABOVE TO HIS MAJESTY. HE SAID HE WISHED TO UNDERSCORE THAT KING IS UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE ON ARMS QUESTION, THAT IT IMPORTANT HE BE ABLE TO SHOW THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN US AND JORDAN HAD BEEN RESTORED TO WHAT THEY WERE HERETOFORE. HE SAID TALKS IN WASH HAD BEEN VERY USEFUL AND THAT OTHERWISE SITUATION WOULD HAVE REMAINED STALEMATED.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 97-74 (#146)
By *cm/ics*, NARA, Date 8-28-05

~~SECRET~~

-2- 2194 FM USUN NOVEMBER 12 (NODIS)

SISCO TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO FILL IN RIFAI ON JUST CONCLUDED DISCUSSION WITH RIAD, WHOM GOLDBERG HAD SEEN AT JORDAN'S REQUEST. SISCO SAID WE FOUND OUR CONVERSATION WITH RIAD DISAPPOINTING. WE HAD ASSURED RIAD THAT REFERENCE IN SC RES TO RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL DID NOT MEAN DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION. HOWEVER, RIAD CONTINUED TO PRESS FOR CLARITY ON WITHDRAWAL PARA, I.E., WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES TO POSITIONS OF JUNE 4. RIFAI SAID HE HOPED VERY MUCH THAT CONSTRUCTIVE SC ACTION COULD BE CONCLUDED PROMPTLY THIS WEEK, AND BEFORE THURSDAY WHEN THE KING WOULD PROBABLY BE LEAVING PARIS OR LONDON FOR JORDAN. HE SAID US SHOULD NOT TAKE ABOVE AS FINAL POSITION FROM RIAD SINCE FINAL WORDING WHICH WOULD EMERGE IN THE RES WOULD BE AS A RESULT OF DISCUSSIONS WITHIN THE SC FRAMEWORK. IN UNDERSCORING HOPE FOR PROMPT AND CONSTRUCTIVE ACTION BY SC, HE DESCRIBED SUCH CONSTRUCTIVE ACTION AS US RES AS IT PRESENTLY STANDS OR POSSIBLY WITH A CHANGE OR TWO. HE SAID JORDAN WOULD HELP TO ACHIEVE THIS RESULT.

REVERTING AGAIN TO ARMS, HE SAID HE VERY MUCH HOPED THAT IF SC RES EMERGED ACCEPTABLE TO US, AND SOME PROGRESS WAS MADE TOWARDS A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, THAT IT WOULD THEN BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO MAKE "SOME KIND OF ANNOUNCEMENT" AT AN EARLY DATE, THOUGH NOT NECESSARILY ACTUALLY RESUME SHIPMENTS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THIS WOULD HELP REASSURE THE JORDANIAN PEOPLE, RIFAI SAID. DEPT MAY WISH REPEAT TO AMMAN.

GP-2 GOLDBERG

BT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

90

*Jordan
military*



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

14 August 1967

I-24883/67

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DOD Dir. 5200.10

By JW, NARA, Date 4-25-94

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Major General Amir Khammash, Chief of Staff, JAA
Colonel Amos A. Jordan, Director, NESA (ISA) OSD
Jonathan Stoddart, Assistant Politico-Military Officer,
U.S. Embassy London

Place: Mr. Stoddart's apartment - London

Time: 13 August 1967

In addition to the points covered in London's 1017 the following points emerged from the conversation.

General Khammash said that he had persuaded the King not to take a military mission with him to Moscow on the grounds of the image which the inclusion of a military team in the entourage would create in the U.S. Khammash said that he had told the King that a Hussein visit to other countries in the area would be third page New York Times material, and his visits to other European states second page material; a visit to Moscow would be on the front page, however, and pictures of a Jordanian military mission at the Moscow airport would be very damaging. Even if the King were not to negotiate with the Russians for arms (and he said the King has no intention of so doing) his taking a military delegation would be interpreted in some quarters, Khammash explained, as blackmail of traditional suppliers.

Khammash went on to explain that the King was not only interested in a Moscow visit in order to have ammunition to use against his radical Arab colleagues, but also because he wanted to hear firsthand the Russian viewpoint on the Near East situation. Khammash says he has counseled the King not to be taken in by what the Russians tell him or show him; yet, Khammash cautioned, Hussein is only human, is subject to conflicting advice about relations with the USSR, and needs support from somewhere. The General said, however, that he believed his own views and those of like-minded counsellors would prevail and that the King would "not go through the Soviet door until every other door was closed."

The Soviet Union, having unsuccessfully tried approaches to Jordan in the past, both directly and through the UAR and UAC, is now attempting to use

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 11-58
By cbw NARA, Date 2-21-2013

SENSITIVE

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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SENSITIVE

Iraq as a channel. In response to the Iraqi offer to (Sharif Nasir) to serve as a middleman in funneling Soviet equipment to Jordan, Khammash said he had suggested to Sharif Nasir that the Iraqis be asked whether they are (a) trying to improve Jordanian forces or (b) trying to be Moscow's agent in communicating with Jordan; if they answer that (a) is the motive, Khammash says Jordan should press Iraq to let it have Iraq's remaining western equipment, which is similar to that already in Jordanian hands and which can be quickly assimilated, with the Iraqis getting replacements from the USSR; if the Iraqis say that (b) is the motive, Khammash suggested they be told that Jordan already knows how to talk to the Soviet Union and does not need a middleman.

Khammash said that in inter-Arab councils the Egyptians, Syrians and Iraqis were coming back from Moscow with tall tales of the supplies the Soviet Union is furnishing them and were asking the senior Jordanian military officers what Jordan was receiving from the West. Khammash went on to say that the Jordanian military were naturally responding with exaggerated statements about the scale and imminence of Western support and that he had deemed it unwise to try at this stage to deflate such stories and the expectations behind them. He said that he hoped at this juncture we would state that we would be willing to resume discussions soon about supply of significant hardware items such as tanks and APCs. Colonel Jordan responded by saying that he could not anticipate when the USG would be ready to talk regarding those particular items but it would certainly not be soon. We would, however, be happy to continue our dialogue about Jordan arms supply as our own Congressional situation became clearer. Khammash intimated that he hoped that for the next round of arms conversations he would be coming to Washington. He made the point indirectly by observing that unfortunately he could not now come to Washington on an arms mission under the guise of selling his government's bonds as senior officers from other countries could (This obvious reference to the forthcoming Weizmann visit suggests that Jordan's political intelligence may be a little better than some have suspected).

In answer to Colonel Jordan's question about alternative sources of military supply for Jordan, General Khammash said that Jordan had an outstanding request to Iraq for two battalions of Centurions. Iraq had already furnished one battalion (41 tanks) but had not yet responded about the second battalion. King Hussein will talk to President Arif about the second battalion.

Hussein will probably not raise the topic of getting Hawkers from Iraq inasmuch as the recent Iraqi refusal of an earlier request for Hawkers seems final. Iraq has explained that the Hawkers are better than any of the Soviet Bloc fighter-bombers and that they are particularly effective in a close support role such a might arise if fighting with the Kurds recurs. Jordan now has a number of pilots, apparently on a rotational basis, in Iraq flying Iraqi Hawkers, since Jordan has only one of its own in-country. Khammash was clear, however, that this was an intolerable situation over any period of time.

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SENSITIVE

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SENSITIVE

Expanding further on the subject of Hawkers, Khammash pointed out that he could understand British reluctance to tap their own inventory in view of their concern about the durability of Hussein's regime and whether there are any real prospects for a satisfactory Near East settlement. Nevertheless, he said, if Britain wanted to improve the prospects of Hussein's survival and of a moderate Jordan which could and would make a settlement with Israel, it should provide the 13 Hawkers Jordan needs out of the three British squadrons sitting on airfields within the UK.

Khammash said that Jordan has a delicate problem of timing in reaching for a settlement with Israel; if it tries too soon the regime will topple, and if it waits too long the country will disintegrate. His own estimate of the right timing was contained in an observation that it will probably be at least six months before there are really good prospects, either in terms of Jordan's being strong enough to negotiate or the Israelis being ready to make concessions. Khammash believes that, after the outlines of an agreement have been worked out with the various parties, the Security Council must "force" the solution on the Arab states. He asserts that a number of Arab leaders, even among the radicals, are willing and anxious for a solution but that they cannot admit it and must be forced into agreement.

Khammash said that Jordan will be able to keep afloat financially until the end of the year (he complained that the civil government has impounded the 3 million pounds the Saudis have recently contributed to complete their post-Samu commitment for arms purchases). Jordan will need a settlement by the end of the year or will need continued substantial infusion of extra help. Since it cannot hope to be ready to "move out alone" on a settlement by the end of the year, it must depend on its friends' continuing extraordinary support while a settlement takes shape. In this connection, he said he believes that the Egyptians will be increasingly looking for ways out of their predicament and that Nasser will be expendable in the search. He believes that General Riyadh has many of Nasser's talents but is moderate and pro-western in his basic attitudes. He went on to say that he believes Riyadh and Vice President Muhieddine would make a good team in the post-Nasser era even though Riyadh is a more capable individual than his ostensible superior, Muhieddine.

Khammash spoke for some time about the importance of Jordan's and Saudi Arabia's drawing closer together. He underlined his great respect for Faisal, and said that Faisal was not entirely satisfied with Hussein's explanation of his joining Nasser in the immediate pre-war period. One of the reasons that Khammash had counselled Hussein to make the first stop of his forthcoming trip in Saudi Arabia was to reassure Faisal about Hussein's position vis-a-vis Cairo and to solicit the "elder brother's" views on what Hussein should do next.

Khammash remarked on the fact that the Saudis have made no governmental contribution to Jordan since the war, except for the balance of the earlier

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SENSITIVE


~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

defense contribution. King Hussein hopes to get a liberal economic contribution and will also raise the question of receiving some of the Saudi Hawkers, either as a loan or as a gift. (Since Khammash remarked that the Saudi brigade in Jordan has been shifted to the Zerka area in order to facilitate the training of officers and men at nearby JAA schools, one can speculate that Hussein may also talk to Faisal about extending the Saudi brigade's stay in Jordan indefinitely.)

Colonel Jordan asked Khammash if there had been any further thinking in his government about the 104's, noting that we had information that RJAF pilots had tried out both the F-5 and the MIG 21 and had found them wanting. Khammash's reaction was to throw up his hands and say "Please let us deal with our air force problems one at a time; we need very much to get the Hawker question settled before we can address the 104 question."

The net impression from the various exchanges recorded above was that Khammash continues to be a key figure in the evolution of Jordanian policies and that Jordan has not yet worked out the larger shape of those policies. The U.S. can have a major share in defining their content, if it is willing to invest the economic, military and diplomatic resources required.



Amos A. Jordan, Jr.
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, NESA

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

Colonel Jordan Meeting with General Khammash
London - August 12-13, 1967

Proposed Talking Paper

91
See 2/25 memo to
WWR - 8/11/67.

I have been authorized to state that the USG intends to resume its shipments of the suspended grant military assistance as soon as the present delicate congressional situation has been clarified. We expect this to be on or about September 1. You must appreciate that there is very serious congressional and popular opposition to the military and economic aid programs this year, and that our authority to carry out current and future programs is in jeopardy. But if we escape the worst, we should be able to resume our FY 67 program to Jordan. Circumnavigating the Cape of Good Hope, the initial shipment might arrive at Aqaba sometime in October.

I have further been authorized to say that the USG has discovered that the material available in the MAP pipeline for Jordan is somewhat greater than earlier reported. Rather than the \$1.8 million value which we spoke of at our last meeting, we are now able to talk in terms of an FY 67 undelivered balance of \$3 million.

In addition, but also dependent on a favorable outcome of the current congressional debates, we could hope to begin shipments of the suspended ground force package some time in the early fall. This would add \$6.1 million to the \$3 million figure, so that we could discuss your priority requirements in terms of about a \$9 million availability. As with the grant program, it is imperative for the Executive Branch to bring the Congress along in our support of Jordan; therefore we cannot move more quickly than we can persuade the legislature.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By chm/ly NARA, Date 6-29-10

PRESERVATION COPY

But we are hopeful of a reasonably satisfactory result.

With respect to the requirements for Jordan's public safety program which you gave me to transmit to Washington during our last meeting, ~~I have been advised that the Agency for International Development has accepted the list, except for a few items, and is now engaged in locating the supplies. They will be dispatched to Jordan within the next two or three weeks.~~ *an authorized to say that we intend to respond promptly + positively to Jordan's request for public safety equipment.*

Secretary McNamara has asked me to convey his concern about the adequacy of the Jordan Army's shelter in the coming winter months and to say that, within the fund availabilities I have previously mentioned, he will try to assist you in seeing that your troops have adequate tentage or other shelter. In this connection, he has asked me to inquire as to the number of troops which cannot be accommodated in cantonments on the East Bank or in other permanent or semi-permanent shelters. Can you tell me what number of this total can be provided tentage from the output of the factory at South Shuna or from tents acquired from other sources? And what, therefore, would be the net requirement which the USG might help to fill. In this connection, Secretary McNamara is also interested in knowing your precise needs for blankets, taking into account the maximum possible production of the blanket factory at Zerqa.

Secretary McNamara has further asked me to assure you that the USG will do everything possible to accelerate the delivery of both MAP and ground force sales equipment, once we are in position to move ahead. Of course, the reprogramming which will be necessary if Jordan decides to change the content of these grant and sales packages will take some time, but if matters go well, we should see a visible flow of equipment

into Aqaba by October. It is not feasible to contemplate air shipments to Amman at this time, but we do not necessarily rule out that possibility in the months ahead.

Secretary McNamara has also asked me to assure you, and His Majesty through you, that the USG position continues to be one of firm and sympathetic support for Jordan and its armed forces. Not only will we pursue our traditional policy of friendship; we will also energetically seek support for Jordan in other Western countries.

~~SECRET~~

Amembassy LONDON

INFO.: Amembassy AMMAN
CINCSTRIKE

STATE

SUBJECT: Hawker-Hunter Aircraft for Jordan

REF.: ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ London 844

1. You may inform HMG officials in confidence that we are prepared approve delivery by UK of Hunter Aircraft (including those with U.S. financial strings) to Jordan in event such aircraft can be located in addition to the undelivered Hawkers which UK promised, with our concurrence, after Samu.

2. You should add that we ^{most interested} desire avoid^{ing} publicity on USG role in release of Hunter Aircraft for Jordan, and assume HMG does not ~~xx~~ have in mind publicizing US approval. ~~It~~ Important you keep ^{of this point and on timing of} us advised ^{British} shipment and extent ~~the~~ U.S. involvement those aircraft actually selected.

END

GP-3

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By ebm/s, NARA, Date 6-29-10

NEA/RA:SSober:lab 8/7/67 2545

M - Eugene V. Rostow

G/PM - Mr. Wolf ; NEA/ARN - Mr. Wiley ; EUR/BMI - Mr. Cheslaw
S/S - Mr. Walsh ; NEA - Amb. Strong ; NEA/RA - Col. Fredericks
DOD/ISA - Col. Jordan

~~SECRET~~

93

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

50-S

Action **NNNEW QMA085VV KGA580**

NEA **RR RUEHC
DE RUCMKG 2938A 1020920
ZNNSSSS**

Info **Q 120914Z APR 67**

SS **FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN**
GPM **TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC**
SP **INFO RUEDPSA/CINCSTRIKE**
SC **STATE GRNC**

L **BT**
~~SECRET~~ **AMMAN 2938**

SAL

AF **REF: DEPTTEL 250269**

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

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R SR

Jordan arms (subject file)

010904

1967 APR 12 AM 5 08

SUBJECT: REVISION OF F-104 OFFER

1. I MET YESTERDAY WITH GENERAL KHAMMASH WHO HAS BEEN EMPOWERED BY THE KING TO CONCLUDE REVISION OF F-104 PACKAGE.

2. GOJ EXERCISES OPTION FOR ADDITIONAL SIX AIRCRAFT, MAKING A TOTAL OF 18 AIRCRAFT NOW ON ORDER. DELIVERY OF THESE 18 AIRCRAFT IS UNDERSTOOD TO BE AT THE RATE OF TWO EACH IN JULY '67, SEPTEMBER '67, OCTOBER '67, NOVEMBER '67, DECEMBER '67, JANUARY '68, APRIL '68, MAY '68, JUNE '68.

3. GOJ WILL EXERCISE OPTION FOR REMAINING 18 AIRCRAFT IN MARCH '68. GOJ UNDERSTANDS THAT DELIVERY OF THESE LAST 18 AIRCRAFT WILL BE AT THE RATE OF TWO PER MONTH COMMENCING MARCH '69. GOJ FURTHER UNDERSTANDS THAT THERE COULD BE A HIATUS AFTER SOME REASONABLE NUMBER OF DELIVERIES ARE MADE ON THESE LAST 18 AIRCRAFT, OWING TO DIFFICULTIES IN PROCURING J-79-11A ENGINE, BUT THAT USG WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO AVOID THIS POSSIBLE HIATUS.

4. GOJ UNDERSTANDS TOTAL PAYMENTS DUE IN CY '67 ON GROND PACKAGE AND FIRST 18 AIRCRAFT WILL AMOUNT TO \$26.5 MILLION. GOJ FURTHER UNDERSTANDS THAT, DEPENDING ON THE AMOUNT EDOC* LIBYANS GIVE THEM IN CY '67, UP TO \$2*

MILLION DUE THE USG IN CY '67 CAN BE DEFERRED TO CY 68. IF IN CY '67 THE LIBYANS GIVE THE JORDANIANS \$2.8 MILLION, THEN \$.6 MILLION WOULD BE DEFERRED UNTIL CY '68. IF THE LIBYANS GIVE \$1.4 MILLION

THEN \$2.0 MILLION WILL BE DEFERRED UNTIL CY '68. IF THE LIBYANS GIVE THE JORDANIANS NOTHING IN 1967, THEN \$2.4 MILLION WILL BE DEFERRED UNTIL CY '68.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *ebm/ly*, NARA, Date *6-29-10*

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--2-- AMMAN 2938, APRIL 12

5. GOJ UNDERSTANDS THAT, ON THE ASSUMPTION GOJ EXERCISES OPTION FOR LAST 18 AIRCRAFT IN MARCH '68, TOTAL PAYMENTS DUE TO U.S. IN CY '68 FOR GROUND PACKAGE WSD AIRCRAFT WILL TOTAL \$16.2 MILLION, PLUS ANY SUM DEFERRED FROM CY '67 TO CY '68.

6. GOJ REQUESTS THAT REVISED COMPREHENSIVE PAYMENT SCHEDULE BE FURNISHED ASAP SO THAT NECESSARY PAYMENTS CAN BE MADE.

7. I OFFER MY DEEP APPRECIATION TO ALL CONCERNED FOR THE MAJOR AND SUCCESSFUL EFFORT MADE BY USG TO ACCOMMODATE TO GOJ FINANCIAL SITUATION AND TO MAINTENANCE OF DELIVERY SCHEDULE DESIRED BY GOJ.

GP3
BURNS

*AS RECEIVED.

COL
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010004
RECEIVED
APR 12 1968

SECRET

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* SUMMARY

94

BAYOR
BOWLER
BUDGET
DAVIS
GINSBURGH
HAMILTON
JESSUP
JOHNSON
JORDAN
KEENE
KORER
MOYERS
TAYLOR
WHIGGERS

SECRET

43
Action
SS
Info

PP RUEHC
DE RUMKMG 2571/1 0791025
ZNY SSSSS
P R 201000Z MAR 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEDPSA/CINCSRIKE
RUEKDA/DOD
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
STATE GRNC
BT

1967 MAR 20 AM 9 30

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2571 SE ONE OF TWO

LIMDIS

DOD/ISA FOR HOOPES

REF: AMMAN 2397

SUBJECT: JORDANIAN MILITARY EXPENDITURES

*Jordan
armies
subject file
x call file*

1. SINCE MR. HOOPES' DEPARTURE FROM AMMAN A LITTLE OVER A WEEK AGO, I HAVE BEEN IN FREQUENT AND LENGTHY CONTACT WITH GENERAL KHAMMASH, WASFI TELL AND SA'D JUMA. EMBOFF O'CONNELL ATTENDED ALL DISCUSSIONS WITH ME, WITH ADMIRABLE BACKSTOPPING PROVIDED BY DATT.

1. THE OBJECTIVE OF THESE MEETINGS WAS THREEFOLD: (A) TO DEFUSE WHAT HAD THE MAKINGS OF AN EMOTIONAL CRISIS; (B) TO BRING THE

PAGE 2 RUMKMG 2571/1 ~~SECRET~~

JORDANIANS TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSALS OUTLINED BY MR. HOOPES; AND (C) TO BRING THE RESPONSIBLE JORDANIANS TO REALIZE THAT THEIR MEANS CANNOT SUPPORT ALL OF THEIR DESIRES, THAT PRIORITIES HAVE TO BE ESTABLISHED, AND THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BE SACRIFICED FOR WHAT COULD RESULT IN ONLY A MARGINAL INCREMENT IN DEFENSE.

3. FROM THE OUTSET IT WAS DECIDED TO LEAVE THE KING OUT OF THE DISCUSSIONS TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE. HIS VOLATILITY CURVE WAS ON THE RISE, AS INDICATED BY HIS THRICE-REPEATED INDICATION TO MR. HOOPES THAT ABDICATION MIGHT BE THE ONLY WAY OUT FOR HIM FROM HIS PRESENT BIND. (IT WAS THE CONTENT OF OUR POSITION WHICH WAS PRODUCED THE REACTION. MR. HOOPES' PRESENTATION WAS EXECUTED MASTERFULLY AND WITH THE DELICACY APPROPRIATE TO THE OCCASION.) IF WE COULD GET THE KING'S CHIEF ADVISERS TO COME TO TERMS, WE

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/ly* NARA, Date 7-2-10

019441

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-2-Amman 2571, March 20 (SECTION I OF II)
COULD COUNT ON THEM TO BRING THE KING ALONG.

4. MY ONLY MEETING WITH THE KING WAS TO ASK HIM TO NAME MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ADVISERS WITH WHOM O'CONNELL AND I COULD DEAL. NOT UNEXPECTEDLY, HE NAMED KHAMMASH, TELL AND JUMA. (PRIME MINISTER SHARIF HUSSEIN IS A FIGUREHEAD, AND TELL AND JUMA ARE THE KING'S CHIEF ADVISERS ON THE CIVILIAN SIDE.)

5. IT WOULD BE SUPERFLUOUS TO DETAIL THE TORTUOUS COURSE OF THESE DISCUSSIONS, EXCEPT TO NOTE THAT THEY WERE CONDUCTED WITH

PAGE 3 RUCMKG 2571/1 ~~SECRET~~
A FRANKNESS UNPARALLELED FOR ALL FIVE OF US CONCERNED.

6. KHAMMASH, TELL AND JUMA HAVE NOW ACCEPTED, AND SO HAS THE KING, THE PROPOSAL MADE BY MR. HOOPES THAT JORDAN ORDER SIX ADDITIONAL F-104 AIRCRAFT NOW AND DEFER EXERCISE OF THE OPTION ON THE REMAINING EIGHTEEN AIRCRAFT UNTIL NEXT YEAR.

7. THE PAYMENT OWED TO US THIS YEAR ON THE GROUND PACKAGE (\$11.2 MILLION), THE FIRST TWELVE AIRCRAFT (\$12.8 MILLION), AND THE NEXT SIX AIRCRAFT (\$2.5 MILLION) TOTALS \$26.5 MILLION. INCLUDING THE LIBYAN CONTRIBUTION, JORDAN HAS COLLECTED, (#)

24.5 MILLIONS. THIS ENTIRE SUM IS EARMARKED TO THE U.S. NO FURTHER OUTSIDE FUNDS ARE EXPECTED IN 1967. JORDAN REQUESTS THAT THE SHORT-FALL (\$2.0 MILLION) BE COVERED UNDER THE GROUND PACKAGE CREDIT. THIS WILL BE DISCUSSED LATER IN THIS MESSAGE.

8. IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ENDLISTED MEN'S PAY RAISE, PLUS RAISING THE JAA FORCE LEVEL TO 53,000, WOULD REQUIRE AN INDIGENOUS MILITARY BUDGET OF

63.6 MILLION
(J.D. 22.7 MILLION) (AMMAN 2253). ADDITIONALLY, THE JAA OWES REHABILITATION COSTS ON THE THREE NEW HAWKER HUNTERS (\$100,000 IN 1967); THE JAA WAS CONTEMPLATING PURCHASING \$7.6 MILLION WORTH OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION FROM THE UK, OF WHICH

PAGE 4 RUCMKG 2571/1 ~~SECRET~~
\$1.4 MILLION WOULD FALL DUE IN 1967; AND, FINALLY, THE JAA WAS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-Amman 2571, March 20 (SECTION I OF II)

CONTEMPLATING ORDERING A SOPHISTICATED RADAR SYSTEM FROM THE UK, THOUGH NO PAYMENT WOULD BE REQUIRED IN 1967. AGAINST A TOTAL 1967 PROJECTED INDIGENOUS/UK OUTLAY OF \$65.1 MILLION (J.D. 23.24 MILLION) THE GQJ HAS ALLOCATED \$56.5 MILLION (J.D. 20.2 MILLION). THE SHORT-FALL WAS \$8.6 MILLION.

9. BY THE TIME OUR DISCUSSIONS ENDED, KHAMMASH HAD TAKEN THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS TO REDUCE THE COST OF OPERATING THE JAA: (A) REORGANIZATION TO ABSORB ALL THE MCNAMARA EQUIPMENT WITHIN A FORCE CEILING OF 51,000 RATHER THAN THE 53,000 AUTHORIZED. TO DATE TWO OF THE 25-POUNDER ARTILLERY BATTALIONS HAVE BEEN REORGANIZED TO ABSORB THE 105MM SP AND THE 155 MM HOWITZERS. ADDITIONAL REORGANIZATION WILL BE REQUIRED TO ABSORB THE BATTALION OF 40MM SP AAA GUNS, BUT HE WILL SAVE SPACES BY DROPPING THE PLANNED BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS COMPANIES (AMMAN 2252). THESE MOVES HAVE NOT BEEN EASY TO ACHIEVE, AND REQUIRED LENGTHY MEETINGS WITH SENIOR JAA OFFICERS TO CONVINCE THEM OF THE NECESSITY FOR THESE AUSTERITY MEASURES AT THIS TIME. (B) THE PROPOSED ENLISTED MEN'S PAY RAISE WILL BE REDUCED BY AT LEAST ONE-THIRD. (C) EVEN STRICTER ECONOMIES WILL BE IMPOSED WITHIN THE JAA IN SUCH

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 2571/1 ~~SECRET~~

AREAS AS VEHICLE OPERATIONS TO REDUCE EXPENDITURES FOR POL, TIRES, SPARE PARTS, ETC. TO FURTHER REDUCE JAA CAPITAL OUTLAY. KHAMMASH HAS TAKEN THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS REGARDING UK PURCHASES: (A) JAA WILL FOREGO ENTIRELY PURCHASING RADAR EQUIPMENT FROM THE UK. GENERAL KHAMMASH ASKS, HOWEVER, THAT THE US SURVEY TEAM OFFERED BY MR. HOOPES BE SENT TO JORDAN. HE WOULD ABIDE BY THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS (WHICH HE SUSPECTS, AND I DARESAY CORRECTLY SO, WILL RESULT IN A FAR MORE MODEST SYSTEM THAN HE HAD ORIGINALLY HOPED FOR). SUCH EQUIPMENT AS THE TEAM MIGHT RECOMMEND WOULD BE OBTAINED FROM THE U.S. (B) THE CONTEMPLATED BRITISH GROUND EQUIPMENT PURCHASE WILL BE REDUCED FROM \$7.6 MILLION TO \$2.0 MILLION (WITH \$.3 MILLION INTEREST THIS WILL ACTUALLY AMOUNT TO \$3.1 MILLION SPREAD OUT OVER SIX YEARS). THIS PACKAGE HAS BEEN REDUCED TO ONLY THE AMMUNITION, 44 SARACENS AND 25 FERRETS OFFERED ON A GOVT-TO GOVT BASIS. ON AMMUNITION, GENERAL KHAMMASH STATES HE HAS A GOOD PRICE OFFER OUT OF EXISTING UK STOCKS WHICH WOULD COST MORE IF PURCHASED LATER. ON THE SARACENS AND FERRETS, HE IS APPARENTLY IN A BIND, BECAUSE WE GATHER THESE WERE PROMISED, RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, PERSONALLY BY

~~SECRET~~

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-4-Amman 2571, March 20 (SECTION I OF II)

THE KING. KHAMMASH RECOGNIZES THAT EVEN A REDUCED UK PURCHASE

PAGE 5 RUOMKG 2571/1 S E C R E T
AT THIS TIME WILL REQUIRE HIM TO SACRIFICE OTHER THINGS. HOWEVER, HE IS PREPARED TO FIND THE FUNDS FOR THE ANNUAL PAYMENTS FROM WITHIN THE INDIGENOUS BUDGET. IN ADDITION, HE PLANS TO ABSORB THE ANNUAL PAYMENT FROM HAWKER HUNTER REFURBISHING FROM WITHIN THE INDIGENOUS BUDGET.

10. ACCORDING TO KHAMMASH, REDUCING THE FORCE LEVEL AND PAY RAISE, AND OTHER ECONOMIES, WILL SAVE APPROXIMATELY \$5. MILLION IN OPERATING COSTS OVER THE 53,000 MAN, FULL-PAY-RAISE BUDGET OF \$63.6 MILLION. CONSIDERING THESE ECONOMIES ALONG WITH THE MINOR ANNUAL PAYMENTS TO THE UK, HE HAS REDUCED THE INDIGENOUS/UK DEFICIT FOR 1967 FROM \$8.6 MILLION TO \$2.5 MILLION.

GP-3. BURNS
BT

(#) Omission. Correction to follow.

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

43
Action

19358

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Info

1967 MAR 20 AM 10 07

VZCZCGMA088VV KGA76R
PP RUEHC
DE RUGMKG 2572/2 0791125
ZNY SSSSS
P R 201000Z MAR 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEDPSA/CINCSTRIKE
RUEKDA/DOD
RUDTOR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
STATE GRNC
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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2571 SECTWO OF TWO

LIMDIS

DOD/ISA FOR HOOPES

REF: AMMAN 0397

SUBJECT: JORDANIAN MILITARY EXPENDITURES

11. TELL DOES NOT WANT THE GOJ TO GIVE THE JAA A PENNY OF THE \$2.5 MILLION. HE HAS A SCHEME FOR REORGANIZING THE JAA WHICH HE IS TRYING TO SELL TO THE KING WHICH WOULD RESULT IN FORCE LEVEL CONSIDERABLY BELOW 51,000 AND WHICH, HE SAYS, WILL SAVE THE GOJ MILLIONS OF DOLLARS. KHAMMASH STATES HE HAS REDUCED DEFENSE EXPENDITURES TO AN IRREDUCIBLE MINIMUM AND HE MUST HAVE THE

PAGE 2 RUGMKG 2571/2 ~~SECRET~~
\$2.5 MILLION. HE DOES NOT WANT THE GOJ TO PROVIDE THE \$2.5 MILLION AT THE EXPENSE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; KHAMMASH WANTS THE GOJ TO CRACK DOWN ON TAX LOOPHOLES AND COLLECTION PROCEDURES WHICH ALONE WOULD PRODUCE AT LEAST \$2.5 MILLION. KHAMMASH INDICATED HE THOUGHT IT WAS WRONG THAT THE PEOPLE OF JORDAN, ESPECIALLY THE RICH PEOPLE, SHOULD NOT BE ASKED TO SHOULDER A GREATER SHARE OF DEFENSE COSTS NOW THAT THE UAC HAD COLLAPSED. TELL OBSERVES THAT THE RECENT POLITICAL SITUATION HAS FORCED THE GOJ TO STEP WARILY IN THE REALM OF TAXES, BOND ISSUES, AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES. TELL AND JUMA AGREE, HOWEVER, THAT AFTER THE FORTHCOMING ELECTION, LATER THIS SUMMER, IT WILL BE TIMELY TO REVIVE FORWARD MOVEMENT IN THE AREA OF TAXES, BONDS, ETC. AND ARE SO RECOMMENDING TO THE KING. BUT, SAYY TELL, NOT A CENT OF THE ANTICIPATED EXTRA REVENUE WILL GO TO THE JAA IF HE HAS ANYTHING TO DO WITH IT; IT WILL ALL GO TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

~~SECRET~~

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-2- AMMAN 2571, SECTION TWO OF TWO, MARCH 20,

12. SINCE O'CONNELL AND I HAD WITNESSED, AND ASSISTED IN, REDUCING THE JAA INDIGENOUS/UK SHORT-FALL FROM \$8.6 MILLION TO \$2.5 MILLION, AND THERE WAS NO LONGER ANY ARGUMENT FROM KHAMMASH, TELL O' JUMA THAT THE FUNDS SHOULD NOT BE DUG OUT OF JORDAN'S

PAGE 3 RUOMKG 2571/2 ~~SECRET~~
OWN POCKET, AND NOT AT THE COST OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, O'CONNELL AND I DECIDED WE COULD WITHDRAW AND LET THE JORDANIANS SETTLE THIS FINAL \$2.5 MILLION AMONG THEMSELVES.

13. I DID NOT INFORM THE JORDANIANS OF THE CONTENTS OF DEPTEL 154916, WHICH ARRIVED AFTER WE HAD NAILED DOWN WITH KHAMMASH, JUMA AND TELL, AND THEY HAD SOLD TO THE KING, POSTPONEMENT UNTIL NEXT YEAR OF EXERCISE OF THE OPTION ON THE LAST EIGHTEEN AIRCRAFT. LOGICALLY OR NOT, THIS TOOK A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF SELLING ON OUR PART. WHAT LARGELY DID THE TRICK WAS REVEALING TO THE JORDANIANS THAT EVEN IF THEY EXERCISED THE OPTION NOW FOR THE FINAL EIGHTEEN PLANES, DELIVERY OF THE FIRST TWO OF THESE PLANES COULD NOT OCCUR UNTIL FEBRUARY 1969. THIS FACT WAS VIEWED MOST DARKLY BY THE JORDANIANS, BUT WHEN THEY GOT OVER THE SHOCK THEY REALIZED THAT, UNDER THE TERMS OF MR. HOOPES' PRESENTATION, DELAY OF EXERCISE OF THE OPTION UNTIL MARCH 1968 WOULD RESULT IN DELIVERY SLIPPAGE OF ONLY ONE MONTH.

14. I RECOMMEND MOST STRONGLY THAT WE NOT CHANGE THE SIGNALS ON WHAT MR. HOOPES OFFERED TO THE KING--NAMELY, DELIVERY OF THE FIRST TWO AIRCRAFT ONE YEAR AFTER THE OPTION IS EXERCISED, WITH TWO AIRCRAFT PER MONTH THEREAFTER. TO SPRING NOW ON THE JORDAN-

PAGE 4 RUOMKG 2571/2 ~~SECRET~~
IANS THAT IF THE OPTION IS DELAYED UNTIL MARCH 1968, THEN AIRCRAFT DELIVERY WILL NOT START UNTIL JANUARY 1970, OR, ALTERNATELY, THAT TO INSURE DELIVERY IN MARCH 1969 AN ADDITIONAL \$3.3 MILLION WOULD HAVE TO BE PRODUCED IN 1967, WOULD LIKELY PULL EVERYTHING APART THAT HAS BEEN SO LABORIOUSLY WORKED OUT AND AGREED TO, AND WE WOULD BE REGARDED AS ACTING IN BAD FAITH, IF NOT WORSE.

15. THE JORDANIANS HAVE ASKED THAT CREDIT OF \$2.0 MILLION (\$3.0 IF THE LIBYANS WELCH ON THEIR PROMISE OF A HALF MILLION DINARS) BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THEM IN 1967 BY ADJUSTMENT IN THE BALANCE OF THE \$15 MILLION GROUND PACKAGE LOAN. THE JORDANIANS PAID \$1.5 MILLION AGAINST PRINCIPAL IN 1966. INCLUDED IN THE \$11.2 MILLION OWED IN 1967 ON THE GROUND PACKAGE IS AN ADDITIONAL \$1.5 MILLION AGAINST PRINCIPAL. PARA IV OF THE MEMORANDUM OF

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-3- AMMAN 2571, SECTION TWO OF TWO MARCH 20

UNDERSTANDING COVERING THE GROUND PACKAGE, DATED MARCH 18, 1965, PROVIDES THAT QUOTE THE UNITED STATES IS WILLING TO PROVIDE CREDIT TO FACILITATE PROGRAMMING AND DELIVERIES... PROVIDED THE AMOUNT OF CREDIT OUTSTANDING WOULD NOT EXCEED \$15 MILLION AT ANY ONE TIME UNQUOTE

16. I RECOMMEND THAT WE ACCEDE TO THIS REQUEST. IT APPEARS TO BE WITHIN THE TERMS OF OUR PRESENT GROUND PACKAGE AGREEMENT, AND

PAGE 5 RUCMKG 2571/2 ~~SECRET~~

THE AGREEMENT WOULD REQUIRE NO AMENDMENT OR MODIFICATION, ALTHOUGH, OF COURSE, REPAYMENT SCHEDULES WOULD HAVE TO BE READJUSTED. ALTHOUGH I HAVE BEEN QUITE FRANK WITH THE JORDANIANS AS TO WHY WE WILL NOT GRANT THEM CREDIT TERMS ON THE AIRCRAFT, AND THEY ARE NOW FULLY APPRISED OF THE FACTS OF LIFE IN THIS REGARD, THERE REMAINS NEVERTHELESS THE FEELING WE ARE NOT TREATING THEM AS A FRIEND SHOULD. THE FACT THAT WE HAVE BEEN WILLING TO GIVE BETTER TERMS TO NEARLY EVERYONE ELSE, INCLUDING THE SAUDIS AND ISRAELIS, REMAINS TO THEM PUZZLING, GALLIFY AND WOUNDING TO THEIR PRIDE. IT IS MY EXPERIENCE THAT IN A NEGOTIATION WHERE ONE APPLIES PRESSURE AS HARD AS WE HAVE APPLIED IT, AND HAVE OBTAINED A LARGE PART OF THE RESULTS DESIRED, IT IS SOULD PRACTICE TO THROW IN A LITTLE SWEETENER AT THE END IN THE INTERESTS OF FACE AND FUTURE AMICABLE RELATIONS.

GP3. BURNS

~~SECRET~~

Jordan Arms 95

To be destroyed after
March 6, 1967 -

(Material from Don Cotter)

(Returned to H. Wiggins 1/13/67.)

Jordan Arms
Pls. return to HHSaunders,
Rm. 372-a EOB when signed. *96*

*sent to Rusk
via wire*
December 29, 1966

~~SECRET~~

FOR PRESIDENT FROM ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Message to King Hussein

You'll recall that King Hussein sent you a letter via Bill Macomber thanking you for your understanding and help in his present crisis. This does not require a substantive response, but State recommends the following acknowledgment:

"Your Majesty:

"Thank you for your kind letter and thoughtful holiday greetings which were conveyed to me by Ambassador Macomber.

"We continue to follow with admiration the way you and your government are dealing with the difficult situation confronting you. I am pleased that we have been able to be of assistance. You may be sure that we will continue to watch closely the events now unfolding in your area. In conveying to you my warm best wishes, I also take this opportunity to renew to you my assurance of continued U. S. friendship and support.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson"

I recommend you approve. General Khammash did a good job in Cairo last weekend fending off other Arab troops for Jordan, so this general

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13202, Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/sg* NARA, Date *4-29-10*

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

word of encouragement is appropriate. This should wrap up your current exchange.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~



#19080

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 24, 1966

~~SECRET~~


Jordan Arms 5349
1- Wriggins 97
2- Ret. 45

*See WWR
message to
President 12/29/66.
+ HHS note to WWR
12/29/66.*

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter from King Hussein of Jordan
to President Johnson

King Hussein has sent the President a letter
expressing his gratitude for U.S. support for Jordan.
A copy of the text is enclosed. We recommend that
the President acknowledge the King's letter. A
proposed reply is also enclosed.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Text of Letter from King Hussein to President Johnson
2. Proposed Reply

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cbm/s, NARA, Date 6-28-10

97a

SUGGESTED REPLY

Your Majesty:

Thank you for your kind letter and thoughtful holiday greetings which were conveyed to me by Ambassador Macomber.

We continue to follow with admiration the way you and your government are dealing with the difficult situation confronting you. I am pleased that we have been able to be of assistance. You may be sure that we will continue to watch closely the events now unfolding in your area. In conveying to you my warm best wishes, I also take this opportunity to renew to you my assurance of continued U.S. friendship and support.

Sincerely yours,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Majesty

Hussein I,

King of the Hashemite

Kingdom of Jordan.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13272, Sec. 3.4
Cbmls, NARA, Date 6-29-10

976

~~SECRET~~

Amembassy AMMAN

EXDIS

STATE

Please deliver following letter to the King from the President:

QUOTE: Your Majesty:

Thank you for your kind letter and thoughtful holiday greetings which were conveyed to me by Ambassador Macomber.

We continue to follow with admiration the way you and your government are dealing with the difficult situation confronting you. I am pleased that we have been able to be of assistance. You may be sure that we will continue to watch closely the events now unfolding in your area. In conveying to you my warm best wishes, I also take this opportunity to renew to you my assurance of continued U.S. friendship and support. Sincerely yours, Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

White House does not plan to release text.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By clm/j, NARA, Date 6-29-10

NEA/ARN:MWwiley:es 12/23/66

S/S -

White House -

~~SECRET~~

97C
THE ROYAL PALACE,
Amman, Jordan,
21st December, 1966.

Mr. President,

I wish to seize the opportunity of the return to Washington of your Special Emissary, Ambassador Macomber to convey to you the deep gratitude which I feel and which is shared with me by my Government and the Armed Forces for your sympathy and your personal interest in our affairs at this difficult period of crisis. Our gratitude is boundless for the help and assistance of our friends and I can assure you, Mr. President that in the way in which we were able to face in the past many a crisis while fighting to maintain our freedom and the common ideals we share with you, we can but do our best once again, in the face of great odds, and hope that once more we may be successful.

I would wish here to reiterate the criteria that I have set out while developing the strength of the Armed Forces of Jordan: Firstly, that these forces must be prepared to fight the battles of free people and of freedom in this part of the world, when ever and where ever the need arises. Secondly, that they must have the highest degrees of ability to face the challenge, such ability, to be in part the result of the best possible training. Thirdly, that these forces be as well equipped as possible with the most modern available equipment to ensure their effectiveness, that they should have minimum man-power, maximum fire power and mobility.

At the same time I would like, Mr. President to assure you that we have and shall always attempt while striving to meet this criteria, to make maximum efforts to ensure that Jordan continues on a steady, rapid path of progress in building and maintaining a sound economy that will enable us to contribute towards the better future we seek in this area, for all, and to the cause of freedom.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cm/ly, NARA, Date 7-13-10


PRESERVATION COPY

The Challenge that confronts us at this time is indeed great, while we stand in the face of a common enemy as well as in the face of other threats to the security of Jordan, but at this critical time your sympathy, concern and prompt action in our support has not only been appreciated but, we hope, will be instrumental in our overcoming the crisis.

If we have been so anxious to obtain a little more than you have been kindly able to provide us with, possibly making a nuisance of ourselves in the process, this was only due to the fact that this crisis required it, and that the little extra help so badly needed now could make the greatest difference where as a great deal more at a later date may be too late. However, we understand your own difficulties, Mr. President and we appreciate all that you were able to do for us. We know that we are committed to fight for our beliefs, and for so much that is at stake in this area, with our lives, with courage and determination as well as with all the resources available to us.

With my very best wishes to you Mr. President, and to your family for a merry Christmas and a happy New Year.

Your Sincere Friend,


UNQTE

PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
THE WHITE HOUSE,
WASHINGTON D.C.,

102795

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Wriggins 98

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Dec 14 7 46 PM '66

Origin
Info

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN PRIORITY

INFO: CINCSTRIKE
USUN NEW YORK

STATE 102795

USUN FOR AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG

Jordan arms (subject file)

EXDIS

Following are talking points for use as appropriate by Ambassador Macomber in discussing GQJ arms request and USG reply with King.

a. The discussions with General Khammash were useful. Through him appropriate officials in Washington were able to gain at firsthand fuller appreciation of problems King faces.

b. We understand the great concern which the Israeli action of November 13 has caused His Majesty and the difficulties faced as a result of it. We continue to have strong reason to believe that this action does not presage a change in Israel's policy. This is an element in our calculations which it is important to underscore.

c. At same time we appreciate unfortunate effect which November 13 raid had on Jordan's sense of security and on morale of Jordan Arab Army. We fully recognize important role of Jordan Arab Army in maintenance of Jordanian stability and security. We also understand the threats to this stability and security from other quarters.

d. We recognize importance of stability and security to achievement of economic growth and self-sufficiency upon which, as King has often

DECLASSIFIED (#71)
E.O. 13526
Authority: State Guidelines 5.4
By: *cmj*, NARA, Date: 8-28-05

Drafted by: NEA/ARN:ALatherton/MWiley/
NEA:RPDavies:lab 12/14/66

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

THE ACTING SECRETARY

Clearances:

NEA - Mr. Handley
DOD/ISA - Mr. Hoopes
s/s - Mr. Walsh

AID/NESA - Mr. Macomber
WHITE HOUSE - ~~Mr. Boston~~
Mr. Wriggins

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

emphasized, so much in long run depends. It is for this reason that, in addition to our major and in many ways unique economic assistance program, we have provided military assistance to Jordan.

e. We are at same time seriously concerned by long-term financial and economic implications of current and projected force goals and of indicated equipment requirements of Jordan Arab Army. These concerns are strengthened by our understanding that some increase in enlisted men's pay will be essential in very near future. We agree in principle that some increase in salaries for enlisted men is necessary. FYI We wish to work out with appropriate officers of ~~the Jordanian~~ ^{the Jordanian} Government how the pay raise can be made with least adverse impact on the GOJ budget. Perhaps the raise could be less than 25% or could be adopted in two or more stages. The additional equipment and increased pay scales will have considerable effect on army morale. In any case we feel that qualitative improvement of the Jordanian armed forces through better organization and improved mobility and fire power within present force levels is the practical course to pursue. END FYI

f. The President has requested Macomber to visit Amman to give King benefit Washington deliberations re Jordanian request in perspective longer-term implications of problems now facing us in Middle East. This connection, would welcome opportunity to discuss (1) relationship of recent events to limits on GOJ budgetary expenditure as set forth in several U.S.-Jordan agreements, (2) appropriate size of Jordanian armed forces and nature of their equipment, (3) levels of external assistance likely to be available from traditional sources, and (4) what role U.S. might usefully play in Jordanian effort to develop supplementary financial support from other Arab states

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which have important stake in continued integrity and stability of Jordan.

g. Meanwhile, being aware that King's attention and energies must for present continue to be focused on immediate problem of surmounting internal difficulties, we were anxious to take additional steps now to help meet King's immediate problems. With this in mind, Secretary McNamara has been pleased to respond quickly to part of equipment needs which General Khamash outlined. This is substantial response in which we have been guided both by what can be made available relatively promptly and by need which Jordan Arab Army feels for upgrading firepower and improving of mobility and communications. Delivery over next few months is feasible and, when this equipment in place, we believe it will have significant effect in improving defensive capabilities of army. It is our hope, too, that knowledge of this prompt and substantial response on our part will have immediate and beneficial effect on army morale.

h. Our response is maximum feasible within current budgetary and equipment ~~availability~~ availabilities. As Secretary McNamara made clear to General Khamash there are three major restraints on our capabilities to respond to Jordan's request. These are (1) the availability of equipment, (2) the costs to the USG -- the appropriations by the Congress have imposed stringencies on our MAP capabilities, and (3) the enormous costs to Jordan implied in the projected manpower increases and equipment maintenance. We view our relationship with Jordan as a partnership; a partnership which involves mutual responsibility. We believe it would be irresponsible on our part if we did not frankly warn ^{King} ~~him~~ of the dangers we see in a projected course of action which would lead to unmanageable financial burdens.

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Nevertheless, we may be able to find within our present budgetary limits and equipment availabilities some additional small arms. FYI As fallback we could consider upgunning up to 50 of Jordan's M-48 tanks to 105mm gun in the FY'68 MAP.END FYI.

also

i. Macomber will/~~also~~ explore the possibilities of improving Jordan's frontier control capabilities. Defense/~~is considering sending~~ a technician to take a hard look at what can be done.

j. In short, we are prepared to be helpful to Jordan along the lines recommended by Secretary McNamara but understand that the GOJ will seek to maintain present force levels, continue the wise policies of restraint and measures previously adopted to enhance stability in the area, and will resist the stationing of non-Jordanian troops in Jordan.

purchase

k. We note that GOJ intends proceed with/~~purchase~~ of ground equipment and aircraft under U.S.-Jordan agreements of 1965 and 1966. U.S. is fully prepared to honor these agreements, provided GOJ can continue to meet payments on schedules from funds provided by sources external to Jordan. This is in accordance with terms of both agreements. In this connection, U.S. is prepared to give strong diplomatic support to Jordan's efforts to obtain necessary funds from sources such as the governments of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. We cannot contemplate a change in the terms of the contract.

l. Ambassador Macomber is authorized to indicate that, subject to Congressional appropriations, we are prepared to recede from all or part of our proposed cut of an additional five million dollars for the coming year in order to support in part the increase in pay for enlisted men of the Jordan armed force. (He will seek to hold

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

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FOR AMBASSADOR BURNS: While we prefer not become engaged in detailed discussion prior Macomber's presentation, you may draw on these as you deem necessary to hold line with GOJ pending Macomber arrival.

GP-3 END

ACTING

KATZENBACH

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

Jordan Arms 99

December 14, 1966

Mr. President:

Here are the draft instructions for Ambassador MacComber who leaves tonight for Amman to discuss the military package with King Hussein.

The specifics of the package have already been communicated through military channels to the embassy in Amman. These instructions for the Ambassador make the essential additional points necessary. They have been worked out jointly between State and Defense. I recommend that you approve them as they stand.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

See Me _____

Shorn + LBJ
12 noon, Dec. 14, 1966.

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
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82
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~~SECRET~~

FORM 8-65 DS-322

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By cbm/rq, NARA, Date 8-28-05

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