

100

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 14, 1966

WWR:

To follow up your injunction against publicity on Macomber's trip, State has decided (a) that they will have to admit Macomber is there if the press spots him but (b) that they will not comment on any further questions.

Macomber is so well known in Jordan that it would be silly to deny his presence if the press sees him. However, we can't say it's a routine AID trip because he has three DOD fellows with him and State acknowledged several weeks ago that we have a military aid request from Jordan. It's better to say nothing than to say something that's obviously untrue.

"No comment" gives the press free rein to speculate irresponsibly, and the Middle East press may. However, the President's main concern is the responsible US press--particularly the NYT and Washington Post. It seems to me they'll be hard pressed to print big-headline stories if they can't confirm Mid-East stories here--whereas any official explanation immediately gives them something hard to go on.

State is preparing guidance along these lines tonight. Does this make sense to you?


Hal Saunders

Yes

No

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By CPH/ NARA, Date 6-30-10

~~SECRET~~

Jordan arms

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

By isb NLJ 11-59
NARA, Date 5-18-11

101

Jordan's Arms Request & U. S. Response

Description	Jordan Request	U. S. Proposal	Remarks
APC M-113 with radios	150 items	60 items	
Gun SP Twin 40mm AA, M42A1	42 "	36 "	
Howitzer 155mm	24 "	24 "	
Truck 5-ton prime mover	48 "	36 "	21 already funded in FY 66 MAP
Howitzer 105mm SP M52A1	24 "	18 "	18 already funded in FY 66 MAP
Truck 2-1/2 ton 6x6	200 "	50 "	
Rifle 106mm M40A1 w/truck 1/4 ton	180 "	27 "	
Machine Gun, cal 30 M1919A6 w/mount M2	1100 "	300 "	
Rifle M-1	5000 "	5000 "	
Machine Gun, cal 50 Browning M2 w/mount M3	400 "	200 "	
Rocket Launcher 3.5" M20A1B1	550 "	300 "	
Mortar 81mm	250 "	100 "	
Wrecker M543	30 "	8 "	Approved original FY 67 MAP
Truck (special purpose)	1400 "	15 "	Approved original FY 67 MAP
Truck 1/4-ton	0 "	10 "	Approved original FY 67 MAP
Tanks M-48 with 105mm Gun	100 "	0 "	
Tanks M48 with 90mm Gun	12 "	0 "	
Browning Automatic Rifles	1500 "	0 "	
Carbines	5000 3000 "	0 "	
Tank Recovery Vehicles	20 "	0 "	

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Helicopters, Assault	6 "	0 "
Fast Armed Boats	4 "	0 "
Plus Misc other items	--	--
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	Value \$107,606,200	\$6,741,600
Communications Equipment	2,996,300	165,000
Fortification Materials (barbed wire, etc.)	1,949,800	180,800
Selected engineer equipment (graders, cranes, scrapers, tractors, generators, concrete mixers, etc.)	9,400,000	150,000
Selected target acquisition equipment (flash ranging, survey sets, plotting boards, etc.)	3,800,000	70,000
Selected Ammunition	34,679,600	200,000
Spares for equipment	<u>37,715,700</u>	<u>Undetermined</u>
	\$198,147,600	\$7,507,400

~~SECRET~~

Jordan arms
x Israel arms
Pls. return to HHSaunders
Rm. 372-a EOB when signed.

103

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, December 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Arms for Jordan and Israel

The attached memos from Nick Katzenbach lay out the trickiest Mid-East arms decisions we face--Jordan and Israel.

We don't believe we can string King Hussein along much longer. A Soviet economic delegation with a few military members is in Jordan now. The King feels he has to give his army some assurance that US equipment will be available or consider Soviet offers.

Nick thinks we should do something before Christmas. He recommends a small package from pre-war programs (roughly \$6.5 in spares, automotive and commo gear, some anti-tank guns and ammo). He knows the Israelis won't like this, but says it won't affect the arms balance. He proposes letting the key members of Congress know what we plan to do and then informing King Hussein.

That would leave us with the problem of how to handle Israeli aircraft requests. As you know, they've asked for (a) 27 additional A-4 Skyhawks to be delivered in 1969 on top of the 48 that will be delivered in 1968 and (b) 50 F-4 Phantoms for delivery in 1969-70.

The questions with Israel are not so much "whether" but "when" and "how many."

In principle, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara believe we should go ahead with the 27 additional Skyhawks to replace Israel's war losses and provide a margin of safety. They do not believe we have to decide on the 50 Phantoms until later in 1968 since the Arab-Israeli military balance today is at least as favorable to Israel as it was on June 5.

Nick would prefer not to give the Israelis a definite answer now because he does not want to do anything to jeopardize Ambassador Jarring's peacemaking mission or trigger a new round of Arab demands on Moscow. He would like to hold off at least until Eshkol's visit in early February. To meet predictable Israeli pressures, he'd assure them that we can't decide for another month or two but we will take steps to be sure that this delay will not delay eventual delivery of the aircraft if we go ahead. He would also say that, if the military balance tips sharply against Israel, we would be prepared to divert aircraft from other contracts to meet Israel's needs quickly.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: FRUS, vol. XX, #19
By: obm, NARA, Date: 8-24-05

~~SECRET~~

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- 2 -

The alternative is to go ahead with 27 Skyhawks now to balance our move with Jordan. With the substantial Soviet resupply to the Arabs over the summer, no one could argue seriously that 27 aircraft to Israel would upset chances for peace. The Israeli pressure is beginning to build up here.

Therefore, the following decisions are before you:

1. Can we go ahead with a limited program for Jordan in the next week or two, after appropriate Congressional consultation?

Yes _____ No _____ Hold for discussion ✓

2. If so, which is the better way to handle the Israelis?

--Delay decision but assure Israelis our delay won't delay delivery? ✓

--Or tell the Israelis now we'll go ahead with the 27 additional Skyhawks and talk about the rest later? _____

This situation is complex enough that you may want to talk it over with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and Nick Katzenbach before you decide. However, this will give you a chance to consider the problem beforehand.

Hold for discussion ✓

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Jordan arms
x israel arms
Mr. Foster

104

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, December 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Israeli and Jordanian Arms Requests

Attached is Nick Katzenbach's recommendation for handling our pending decision on Jordan and Israeli arms requests. You will probably want more time to consider the substance of his proposals and may want to discuss them before deciding.

However, you should know that Luke Battle has been summoned to appear before Senator Symington's Mid-East subcommittee tomorrow and probably will be unable to avoid saying something about this problem. Luke would propose to take the following line, which Nick Katzenbach wants to be sure you approve:

Stop here No decisions have been made. However, we may have to move on both Jordanian and Israeli requests while the Senate is in recess.

We are fully aware of Israel's needs and will help provide for its basic security. We have not yet, however, determined precisely what are Israel's essential equipment needs. We believe there is no immediate threat to Israel--a belief which the Israelis also share. The problem is one of lead time, particularly in light of the uncertainty that other sources, e.g. France, will deliver aircraft already contracted for. We are now actively and sympathetically examining these questions with the Israelis.

On Jordan, the question of whether we move on supplying a small amount of equipment depends on whether we want to keep the Jordanians from accepting Soviet offers for a major arms supply program. A Soviet arms presence in Jordan would not make a Middle East settlement easier. If we do decide to give some arms to Jordan, we will do only enough to keep the Jordanians from turning to the East--not enough to give them an offensive capability, and certainly much less than they would get from the Soviets.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *clm/h*, NARA, Date 7-2-10

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Luke is fully aware of the importance of not creating substantial Jewish reaction on the Hill and will do his best to keep his answers within the above positive framework unless you would rather see him take some other line.

Related subject. I might report that I delivered your message to Congressman Farbstein and other Jewish Congressmen this afternoon and assured them that we're on top of the Mid-East arms situation. They got the point and asked me, in return, to let you know of their concern over the Arab-Israeli military balance and their thanks for all you've done for Israel this summer.

W. W. Rostow

Luke's line is OK

Call me _____

*just say no decision on
account Congressional
aid provisions etc.*

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104a

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, December 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Arms for Jordan and Israel

The attached memos from Nick Katzenbach lay out the trickiest Mid-East arms decisions we face--Jordan and Israel.

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DECLASSIFIED
 Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, #19
 By cbm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

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Therefore, the following decisions are before you:

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Yes _____ No _____ Hold for discussion _____

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Hold for discussion _____

W. W. Rostow

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7668
104b

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 11, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Arms for Jordan and Israel

The attached memorandum (concurred in by Rusk and McNamara) sets out alternative courses of action for dealing with the priority arms problem in the Middle East. We have deliberately given you these various options, although I am sure you will recognize that the choices on Jordan are narrow indeed.

It may be useful to you, in making this difficult decision, to have my views on how you might play it-- particularly in light of the potential domestic problems.

* * *

Israel has asked for 27 A-4 Skyhawk aircraft, to be delivered in 1969. (These are in addition to the 48 Skyhawks now scheduled for delivery in 1968). It has also asked for 50 F-4 Phantom jets, to be delivered in 1969-70.

The military balance is in Israel's favor and should remain so for at least a year. But I believe there is a legitimate Israeli concern about their continued air superiority beyond 1968.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, #15
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

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-2-

King Hussein is pressing hard for some arms deliveries--both as evidence of our continued support and to meet minimum equipment needs for his defeated army.

Hussein's position is threatened by his efforts in favor of a settlement, his association--in Arab eyes--with the West, and his resistance to attractive Soviet arms offers.

If it can be done without endangering Israel's security, it is in our national interest--as well as Israel's--to avoid further substantial US arms commitments until we know more about the chances for a negotiated settlement.

I therefore conclude that:

1. The US should tell Hussein before Christmas that we are willing to supply certain of Jordan's minimum requirements. But doing something for Jordan, no matter how little, will almost certainly be strenuously opposed by Israel. This will mean some political trouble for you on the domestic front.

2. We must give some indication now to the Israelis on how we propose to deal with their requests. We could:

- assure Israel that a delay in committing ourselves to sell them A-4s does not mean that the 1969-70 delivery date would slip (assuming we decide to go ahead with the sale);
- indicate that the US would be prepared to divert F-4s from other contracts in order to meet a clearly demonstrated Israeli need (i.e., French cancellation of Mirage deliveries; delivery of substantial


~~SECRET~~

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-3-

numbers of Mirages to the Arabs, escalation of Soviet aircraft supplies to Arabs.)

3. In terms of dealing with the domestic situation here, and the likely Israeli reaction to our moving on Jordan, I do not believe we should tell the Israelis more than the foregoing. By withholding firm word on our intentions until Eshkol's visit in February, we may be able to dampen Israeli opposition to Jordan sales.


Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Acting

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

9668
104c

December 11, 1967

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Arms for Jordan and Israel

The IRG for the Near East and South Asia, chaired by Luke Battle, and the SIG under my chairmanship have just completed a review of our arms supply policy for the Near East, with particular attention to pending arms requests from Jordan and Israel.

We have concluded that we should resume limited arms shipments to Jordan in the very near future, and that some increment of aircraft should be provided to Israel. We are recommending for Israel a good deal less at this time than it has asked for, but enough to assure its continued air superiority and to provide an extra margin of safety.

Discussion

The following have been key factors in our review:

- Israel's military superiority over the Arabs is assured at least through the end of next year. How long it will retain its superiority will be affected by the rate and nature of Soviet resupply and training of the Arabs and by Israel's ability to maintain adequately modern weapons in its own inventory.
- We continue to have a major interest not only in Israel's continued ability to defend itself, but also in maintaining influence in the Arab world. We need to retain friendly ties with the moderate Arab states, which have looked to us or other Western sources for their minimum requirements of weapons.

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cm/s, NARA, Date 7-2-10

SECRET

- 2 -

--The Soviets have made important inroads among the Arabs in recent years, and we are faced with the threat of further Soviet penetration via arms aid in the Near East.

For the short term at least, our hopes for progress towards some political accommodation between the Arabs and Israel--and, flowing from that, for some effective arms limitation in the area--ride on the success of Swedish Ambassador Jarring as U Thant's Special Representative under the Security Council's resolution of November 22. The Soviets voted for the Security Council resolution and even tabled their own draft resolution with a clause on arms control reminiscent of your proposal of June 19. They are continuing to ship arms to the Arab radicals, but they are probably not making decisions on shipments over the long term pending further developments.

Jordan

We led King Hussein to believe last August that we were sympathetic to his need to get some arms from the U. S., but we excluded Jordan from the partial lifting of our arms freeze in October. We put King Hussein off when he raised the issue in his visit here in November. Hussein stuck his neck out, played a helpful role in the Arab acceptance of the Security Council resolution, and has been working actively towards a settlement. He has staked his fate on working with the West and, particularly, the U. S.

Our principal conclusions are:

- Unless we indicate in the very near future that we will make some supplies available, we run a serious risk--acceptance by Jordan of Soviet arms or erosion of the King's support by the Jordanian military, with a consequent threat to his very survival. We should tell the King of our decision before the end of the year.

- U. S. supply commitments should, for the present, be kept to the minimum necessary to preserve stability in Jordan. We should work on the basis of the minimum list of roughly \$6.5 million (including \$1.5 million in the MAP pipeline) recommended by Embassy Amman--spare parts, automotive and communication gear, some anti-tank guns and ammunition. The Israelis won't like it, but the supply of these items will not have a noticeable effect on the arms balance in the area.

SECRET

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- 3 -

- Except for drawing on acceptable items in the existing MAP pipeline (funded prior to this fiscal year), supplies should be provided on a cash sales basis.
- We should continue to encourage Jordan to find the major part of its needs in Western Europe.

Israel

The Israelis have given us a request for 27 A-4H Skyhawk aircraft (additional to the 48 to be delivered between now and the end of 1968) and 50 F-4 Phantom jets. The Israelis were able to prevail despite a 3 to 1 ratio against them in aircraft in June--they would have done so even without their preemptive strike--and they consider continued control of the air to be crucial for their future security. Israel lost about 40 out of an inventory of slightly under 200 tactical aircraft during the June war. It wants not only to make up its losses, but to modernize and expand its air force during the next few years.

Soviet supply to the Arab radicals is a major element in the equation. Arab aircraft inventories are edging back toward prewar levels. Soviet deliveries of jet fighters have brought the figure up to 60-80% of the prewar level in the UAR and about 90% in Syria. Arab bomber inventories are still only about half of prewar. Deliveries since June have been largely under contracts negotiated prior to the war and have consisted, by and large, of less advanced types of aircraft similar to those previously supplied. (The attached table shows the trend of Soviet deliveries since the war.) Our intelligence indicates that recent Arab pleas for large amounts of additional military equipment are still the subject of haggling and negotiation with the Soviets. We have no firm basis for predicting the volume and nature of Soviet deliveries over the months and years ahead.

French actions will also be of key importance. It now looks very uncertain whether France, which is the source of Israel's total current tactical air inventory, will actually deliver 50 Mirage V jets ordered in 1966 and scheduled for delivery in 1968.

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- 4 -

Our principal conclusions are:

- We should continue very carefully to study Israel's needs and assure its access to a supply of aircraft essential to preserve its security.
- We should take action in the near future to assure at least an option to supply 27 additional A-4s in 1969. These planes would provide an extra margin of safety in the light of present uncertainties in the equation. They could play a role in deterring future military action by the Arabs.
- We should not accede at this time to Israel's request for 50 F-4s. These planes are not justified by the threat Israel faces, and would tend to add unnecessarily to the arms race, not only in numbers but in sophistication of arms in the area.
- We should handle any action on the additional A-4s in such a way as to minimize possible damage to Jarring's peacemaking mission and the possibility of provoking an arms escalation by the Soviets.

We are now examining various alternatives for handling the request for additional A-4s. These include:

- (a) Deferring a commitment to the Israelis, perhaps for several months while the Jarring mission is under way, but taking measures on our own side for the procurement of components with a long lead time so as to protect the option to supply the aircraft in 1969. This would entail some obligation against our own funds.
- (b) Roughly the same as (a) above but getting the Israelis to stand the financial obligation of procurement of the long-lead items.

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- 5 -

- (c) Finding a formula to enter into an agreement to supply the planes under terms explicitly reserving our option to deliver them in the event we find they are not needed after all.
- (d) Agreeing to supply the additional planes and entering into an early agreement to that effect. The political visibility of our action would be reduced if we could simply amend the existing 1966 contract calling for 48 A-4s.
- (e) On any of the above, although we might find the funds to provide credit despite the current stringency, a straight cash sale is justified by Israel's current financial situation.

If the French actually renege on supplying the 50 Mirage Vs to Israel in 1968, we shall have to reconsider the impact on Israel's security and the implications for our arms supply policy. In that event we may have to come back to you with additional recommendations.

In any event, France's apparent decision to supply a substantial military package to Iraq--possibly including Mirage planes--and to lift its arms embargo for certain other Arab states will increase Israel's concern. It heightens the urgency of some action by us on Israel's pending request.

Scenario: We all agree that we should not take any action until we have consulted with the key people on the Hill. In view of the urgency on Jordan we should like to do so just as soon as Congressional action is completed on the foreign aid appropriation. We believe it will be desirable to inform the key people that we are considering sympathetically some additional commitment to Israel, at the same time as we inform them of our conclusion that it is essential to resume limited shipments to Jordan.

What we need now is authority from you to go ahead with consultations on the above basis. Subject to the satisfactory conclusion of those consultations, we would envisage informing King Hussein of our decision to supply him some arms. We would come back to you for a go-ahead on talking to the Israelis about additional A-4s, as soon as we have worked out more specific terms of a feasible approach to them.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 6 -

Dean Rusk and Bob McNamara agree with this memorandum.

Go ahead with consultations _____

No _____

See me before you do anything _____

Richard D. Hechtel
Under Secretary

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ESTIMATES OF SOVIET RESUPPLY OF FIGHTER AND BOMBER AIRCRAFT

(Inventories before, immediately following, and six months
after the Arab-Israeli war)

	<u>UAR</u>			<u>Syria</u>			<u>Iraq</u>			<u>Algeria</u>		
	<u>June</u> <u>5</u>	<u>June</u> <u>12</u>	<u>Dec</u> <u>5</u>	<u>June</u> <u>5</u>	<u>June</u> <u>12</u>	<u>Dec</u> <u>5</u>	<u>June</u> <u>5</u>	<u>June</u> <u>12</u>	<u>Dec</u> <u>5</u>	<u>June</u> <u>5</u>	<u>June</u> <u>12</u>	<u>Dec</u> <u>5</u>
Fighter aircraft	365	119	304	85	30	81	95	76	106	122	120	129
Bombers	69	13	43	4	2	2	22	21	29	33	33	21*

*Some bombers transferred to UAR during the war.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By dm/ly, NARA, Date 7-2-70

104d

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

WRIGGINS 105
102121

80
Origin
SS
Info

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE

DEC 13 9 34 PM '66

INFO: Amembassy LONDON PRIORITY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#74)
State Dept. Guidelines
By ebw/rg, NARA, Date 8-28-05

STATE 102121

EXDIS

03

Deliver to Ambassador Opening of Business December 14

1. Khammash had appointment with Secretary McNamara morning December 13.

We have sent to you by septel through Defense channels substance of response given Khammash at that meeting. Response presented to Khammash as package having SecDef approval but not yet cleared throughout USG. We anticipate King will receive message from Khammash early December 14 reporting discussion. Khammash was very disappointed/amount equipment under consideration and King may have similar reaction.

2. You should seek immediate audience with King and inform him President is sending Ambassador Macomber as his special emissary to give King full benefit USG views re GOJ request. President requests that King receive Ambassador Macomber, whom he has designated both as person favorably and personally known to King and as one who has been intimately involved in Washington deliberations this subject.

3. Macomber arrival now planned for Friday, December 16, and we prefer postpone discussions on force and equipment levels of JAA and economic and budgetary matters until he arrives Amman. Talking points for Ambassador Macomber

Drafted by: EA/ARN:ALatherton/MWWiley:es:12/13 Tel. Ext. 5617 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Acting Secretary

Clearances: NEA - Mr. Handley AID/NESA - Mr. Macomber DOD/ISA - Mr. Hoopes (subs)
S/S - Mr. Bruce White House - Mr. Wriggins (in subs.)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

will be sent septel.

4. It essential that King not take action inconsistent with existing relationship between US and Jordan as emotional reaction to report received from Khammash. If you have any reason believe that King will take steps toward establishment Military Directorate for West Bank or other action detrimental our objectives, you should advise him that we believe this would have very serious consequences for Jordan and might seriously complicate US-Jordan relations.

5. FYI. Package we are offering GOJ represents both painful and substantial effort on our part, including diversion from other country programs in present extremely tight MAP funding situation. We aware it falls far short of King's request, but hope Macomber mission with your help will forestall drastic reaction damaging to our own and GOJ interests while we endeavor persuade King of necessity adopting more realistic course. To this end, our approach is to offer prompt delivery of significant equipment package and our assent to pay raise while sending Macomber to discuss USG concern re longer term implications for aid levels and Jordan's economic future which larger program, particularly increased force levels, would involve. END FYI.

GP-1.

END

ACTING

KATZENBACH

~~SECRET~~

WR [unclear] 106

102122

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

SECRET/EXDIS

80

Origin
55
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE

DEC 13 9 35 PM '66

STATE 102122

EXDIS
PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR FROM ACTING SECRETARY

03

- needs for response written -
- pay raise

FYI 1. By separate telegram you will be receiving report on Khammash McNamara-~~KHAMMASH~~ meeting including McNamara's recommended response to GOJ's military request.

2. Since GOJ requests involve economic and budgetary implications of most serious nature, the President is asking Ambassador Macomber to make special visit to Jordan both to convey our formal response to King and discuss these implications as they affect basis of continuing US-Jordanian partnership. Macomber is, of course, anxious, as are we, that you accompany him in all discussions with King. He is hopeful that, in first key meeting, you can arrange for only Hussein, yourself and Macomber to be present. He also anxious that you delay first meeting with King until after he has adequate opportunity for careful consultation with you and key members your staff.

3. Macomber, probably accompanied by senior military

representative

Drafted by: NEA:WJHandley/WBMacomber	Tel. Ext.:	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: Acting Secretary
Clearances:		

White House - Mr. Wriggins S/S - Mr. Bruce

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4(*73)

State Dept. Guidelines

SECRET/EXDIS

By *cbm/rq*, NARA, Date *8-28-05*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

TNT
file only if not
Papers in duplicate
State recommended.
107

MEMORANDUM

December 12, 1966

TO: The Acting Secretary
THROUGH: S/S *& Pw*
FROM: NEA - William J. Handley *WJH*
SUBJECT: Jordanian Request for Military Assistance

** L B re*
Israel
- Mar - 67

There is attached for your approval a memorandum transmitting to the President the text of a proposed letter to King Hussein. As agreed in our meeting this morning, the enclosed letter has been prepared for the President's signature and replaces the draft letter from you to the King which was forwarded to the President with your earlier memorandum on this subject.

Recommendation:

That you sign the enclosed memorandum to the President.

Attachments:

1. Memorandum for the President
2. Proposed Letter to King Hussein

WJH
NEA/ARN:ALatherton:lab
12/12/66

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13282, Sec. 3.4
By *Cham/gy* NARA, Date 4-2-70

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

107a

SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM

December 12, 1966

TO: The Acting Secretary
THROUGH: S/S *& Pw*
FROM: NEA - William J. Handley *WJH*
SUBJECT: Jordanian Request for Military Assistance

There is attached for your approval a memorandum transmitting to the President the text of a proposed letter to King Hussein. As agreed in our meeting this morning, the enclosed letter has been prepared for the President's signature and replaces the draft letter from you to the King which was forwarded to the President with your earlier memorandum on this subject.

Recommendation:

That you sign the enclosed memorandum to the President.

Attachments:

1. Memorandum for the President
2. Proposed Letter to King Hussein

WJH
NEA/ARN:ALatherton:lab
12/12/66

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/ky* NARA, Date 7-2-10

SECRET/EXDIS



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

1076

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Response to Jordanian Request for
Additional Military Equipment

Recommendation:

That you sign the enclosed letter to King Hussein informing him that we have agreed to grant certain items of military equipment to Jordan.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Discussion:

In a meeting this morning with the Vice President, Bob McNamara and Walt Rostow, we agreed to recommend to you that our response to King Hussein's request for additional military assistance be conveyed in a letter from you to the King, rather than in a letter for my signature as suggested in my memorandum of December 10. We also agreed that the military package we offer Jordan should be augmented by 36 40 mm anti-aircraft guns and that a substantial portion of this package should be airlifted to Jordan for maximum psychological impact. We would also further accelerate the delivery of the F-104 aircraft we have agreed to sell to Jordan.

The package we now propose still falls substantially short of what King Hussein has asked us to provide. In order to derive maximum benefit from our response, we propose in the enclosed letter that you offer to send a high-ranking emissary to Amman to discuss the broader implications of Jordan's proposed military build-up. We have in mind Ambassador Macomber of AID, who as former Ambassador to Jordan is personally and favorably known to the King. Specifically we feel we must seek assurances that there will be no significant increase in the force levels of the Jordanian military establishment, that Jordan's moderate military policies, including efforts to control terrorism, will remain unchanged and that no

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#1046)
State Dept. Guidelines
By cbm/rq, NARA, Date 8-28-05

~~SECRET~~

2

non-Jordanian Arab military forces will be stationed on the West Bank of the Jordan River.

Your letter to King Hussein will be transmitted telegraphically to Amman. The signed original will be handed to General Khamash tomorrow by Secretary McNamara.


Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Letter to King Hussein

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

107c

Your Majesty:

My Government and I continue to watch closely the events now unfolding in the Middle East. We have reviewed carefully the request carried to us by your distinguished Chief of Staff and have concluded that we should act quickly in providing additional military assistance. I have instructed Secretary McNamara to discuss the details of our response with General Khammash. While this response does not meet your request in full, it is, I believe, a substantial and significant one. In addition, and with a view to making this special support as helpful to you as possible, I have asked that every effort be made to ensure that the equipment reaches you with as little delay as possible. To accomplish this a substantial portion will be air lifted.

I understand that you will, of course, continue your wise policy of restraint and will continue the measures you have previously adopted to enhance stability in the

His Majesty
Hussein I,
King of the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (4-184c)
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By cbm/rg, NARA, Date 8-28-05

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~~SECRET~~

area. I trust, ~~also~~, ^{that + our assistance} that ~~this~~ will enable you to resist the stationing of non-Jordanian troops in Jordan.

We have not had time to consider adequately the full budgetary and economic implications of a build-up in Jordan's military establishment. While this has not prevented our acting promptly and affirmatively, I am seriously concerned over these implications; and I would like to send an emissary to discuss with you the force levels of Jordan's army and related economic problems of concern to both of us. The emissary would have my highest confidence and would be a person well known to you.

We understand the great concern which the Israeli action of November 13 has caused you and the difficulties you have faced as a result of it. We have sought to be helpful. I have great admiration for the manner in which you are facing these problems and for your policy of moderation. I know this to be the course of wisdom and I wish to assure you of continued United States friendship and support.

Sincerely yours,

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~SECRET~~

Wiggins
Jordan arms
108

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


Monday, December 12, 1966

Mr. President:

Herewith Nick's recommendations on Jordan. He asks for two approvals.

The top memorandum summarizes the defense package Bob McNamara and Nick recommend. Arthur Goldberg has concurred in it word for word. Bob hopes to hear from us early enough to be able to tell the Jordanian Chief of Staff at 11:00 A.M. Tuesday of your decision before Bob goes off to Paris shortly after noon.

The second is a letter from you to Hussein which would tell him of your concern and open the door for Bill Macomber to discuss with him our conditions for the package, and see if anything else may be necessary to keep him in business.


W.W. ROSTOW

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13202, Sec. 3.4
By chm/s, NARA, Date 7-2-10

1080

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 12, 1966

~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Military Assistance to Jordan

I have the following recommendations with respect to increased military assistance to Jordan. I have discussed these with Ambassador Goldberg and he is in agreement.

1. We should proceed with the recommendations in the attached memorandum which expedite current programmed MAP assistance and include an increment, primarily of defensive weapons, totalling \$6 to \$7 Million.
2. We should candidly inform the Israeli Government about this program. Based on my conversation with Foreign Minister Abba Eban, I believe that the Israeli Government will accept this program as necessary to support the regime of King Hussein. Eban quite candidly said that the Israelis had as much of a stake in preserving the King as we did.
3. Ambassador Goldberg believes that we are likely to have a sizable domestic problem with respect to the increment even if the Israeli Government quietly agrees to it. He believes, and I agree, that in presenting this to the Israelis (and to the Jewish community in this country) it would be helpful to give something to the Israeli side of the ledger: We recommend
 - a. We tell the Israelis that we will make every effort to speed up deliveries of Skyhawks (A4's). Bob McNamara has no objection to this

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, Vol. xviii, #365
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

~~SECRET~~

-2-

commitment and believes delivery probably can be speeded up somewhat to enable some delivery in advance of the scheduled date.

b. We tell the Israeli Government that we will attempt to assist them in working out static defense plans and, to the extent possible, help with hardware to make this effective. We should further state to them that while we cannot presently commit ourselves to any dollar-for-dollar offsetting through AID or otherwise of our increased commitments to Jordan, we will take this into account in giving sympathetic consideration to Israeli requests for assistance; for example, we might be able to subsidize some of their African operations which indirectly benefit us. (There is a good deal of opposition to any firm commitment in this respect and many Government officials believe that we should not really offer anything in this regard to Israel at this time. Ambassador Goldberg and I believe, however, that to meet the sensibilities of the Israelis (and their domestic supporters) that we should make this general commitment as an appropriate response. The amount is not large and such a commitment would help the Israelis and help us domestically. We believe this can be worked out to the satisfaction of all, particularly since it is not necessary to do this simultaneously with the Jordanian move and can be worked out at a later date.)

Ambassador Goldberg would be happy to take this up with Ambassador Harman, who could help us greatly here with the Jewish community.

Respectfully,

Walter D. Hight
Acting Secretary

attachment

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

1086

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM

December 12, 1966

TO: The Acting Secretary
THROUGH: S/S *x Pw*
FROM: NEA - William J. Handley *WJH*
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1. Memorandum for the President
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WJH
NEA/ARN:ALAtherton:lab
12/12/66

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/s*, NARA, Date 7-2-10

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

108c

SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM

December 12, 1966

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SECRET/EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/h* NARA, Date 7-2-10



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

108d

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Response to Jordanian Request for
Additional Military Equipment

Recommendation:

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Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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The package we now propose still falls substantially short of what King Hussein has asked us to provide. In order to derive maximum benefit from our response, we propose in the enclosed letter that you offer to send a high-ranking emissary to Amman to discuss the broader implications of Jordan's proposed military build-up. We have in mind Ambassador Macomber of AID, who as former Ambassador to Jordan is personally and favorably known to the King. Specifically we feel we must seek assurances that there will be no significant increase in the force levels of the Jordanian military establishment, that Jordan's moderate military policies, including efforts to control terrorism, will remain unchanged and that no

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GROUP 1

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
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By cbm/rg, NARA, Date 8-28-05

~~SECRET~~

2

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Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Letter to King Hussein

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

108e

Your Majesty:

My Government and I continue to watch closely the events now unfolding in the Middle East. We have reviewed carefully the request carried to us by your distinguished Chief of Staff and have concluded that we should act quickly in providing additional military assistance. I have instructed Secretary McNamara to discuss the details of our response with General Khammash. While this response does not meet your request in full, it is, I believe, a substantial and significant one. In addition, and with a view to making this special support as helpful to you as possible, I have asked that every effort be made to ensure that the equipment reaches you with as little delay as possible. To accomplish this a substantial portion will be air lifted.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
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By cbm/rq NARA, Date 8-28-05

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We understand the great concern which the Israeli action of November 13 has caused you and the difficulties you have faced as a result of it. We have sought to be helpful. I have great admiration for the manner in which you are facing these problems and for your policy of moderation. I know this to be the course of wisdom and I wish to assure you of continued United States friendship and support.

Sincerely yours,

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~SECRET~~

109

~~SECRET~~

Monday, December 12, 1966 -- 11:35 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: King Hussein's Problem

At this morning's breakfast with the Vice President, Bob McNamara, Nick Katzenbach, Bill Handley, Bill Macomber, Howard Wriggins, and Rodger Davies, the King's problem was thoroughly discussed. Sisco and Goldberg could not attend; but both have been brought in. Nick talked with Goldberg and, while not familiar with the details, Goldberg agrees this is broadly the right course. Sisco, who was committed to breakfast with Eban, is now going over the package. The conclusions were as follows.

1. The proposed package was insufficient to meet the King's essential political needs.

2. Movement on a larger package would be appropriate only as we pressed discussions with Israel on improving border surveillance-technology. These will be started by Nick with Eban today and would go forward at the UN and in the Middle East with Israel, and, hopefully, with the Arab countries as well.

3. Bob McNamara, Nick, and the others agreed that the package for Hussein should be expanded in the following ways: (a) delivery of the 12 F-104's presently in the Jordanian pipeline should be accelerated. Six should be drawn from the inventory within 30 days and delivered to Hussein even though the pilots and ground environment are not yet ready; (b) 18 self-propelled anti-aircraft units should be airlifted within 30 to 60 days; (c) the \$4.7 million package to improve mobility, firepower, and effectiveness -- which you have already seen -- should also be airlifted. *(H) so H. I. he will be approved, for 20 more to 1st month*

4. When he talks to General Khammash, Bob McNamara would make clear that, while this is less than the King asked for, it is a substantial and prompt response and that we have several parallel concerns: (a) the King should stress quality, rather than quantity, and we could only make this package available if he agrees to keep his manpower at present levels; (b) we assume he would continue his policy of moderation and restraint and his considerable efforts to prevent guerrillas from using Jordan as a

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Authority: *FRUS, vol. xviii, #363*
By *cbm* NARA, Date *8-24-05*

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-2-

base for operations against Israel and we will consider helping him to improve his border police (AID is reviewing this part of his problem); (c) no United Arab Command troops should be situated on the West bank area of Jordan.

5. Several present hoped that you could personally take ten minutes with Khammash before he sees Bob McNamara tomorrow at 11 o'clock to discuss: (a) our concern for Hussein's future; (b) our substantial and prompt response; and (c) our need to discuss the longer run financial implications of this assistance. However, Nick does not want to trouble you, knowing that, if you see Khammash even for five minutes, you will feel it necessary to see Eban. I believe you should keep out at this stage.

6. We will get flack from the Israelis no matter what we do, although Eban acknowledged to Goldberg the raid was a grave error. It was the consensus of all present, including the Vice President, that this sort of package is what is required and we'll have to use our discussions with Eban to insure Israel's friends here sit tight.

7. Unfortunately, time is short, because Khammash should see McNamara and McNamara leaves for European discussion tomorrow afternoon. Nevertheless, I see little alternative to helping Hussein in this way. And we will press hard on Israel the importance of border stabilization through the UN if possible and directly, if that is the only way.

8. I, therefore, recommend you accept the attached package, plus accelerated delivery of 6 F-104's within a month and 18 40mm AA guns within 60 days, under the conditions set out in paragraph 4.

9. Nick and Bob suggest Bill Macomber, an old Jordanian hand, shortly go out to talk, on your behalf, to his friend Hussein. His cover would be an examination of the AID implications of Hussein's defense problem.

10. A short letter from you to King Hussein will come up shortly for signature. It could be carried back by the King's emissary, General Khammash, who returns on Tuesday evening, Dec. 13, or Wednesday, Dec. 14.

W. W. Rostow

HWriggins:WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sanctus
Jordan
arms 110

December 10, 1966

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Response to King Hussein's Military Equipment Request

We can't come close to meeting Hussein's \$200 million request. We don't have the money, and that big a program would ruin Jordan's promising economic development.

So Secretary McNamara has designed a small package to tackle Hussein's main problem--his army's morale. It includes only \$4.7 million (reprogrammed from existing appropriations) on top of \$3.5 million already in Jordan's FY 1967 military aid program. Instead of enlarging his forces, it would help him improve pay, mobility and organization to tide him over the present crisis of confidence with the army.

This offer probably won't satisfy Hussein. We see it as the starting point for a tough series of negotiations over our whole aid program. We may have to give a little, but before we do we'd send former Ambassador Bill Macomber to try to talk Hussein back to reason.

If you approve this approach, Secretary McNamara will go over the package with Hussein's army commander at 11:00 a.m. Tuesday. Secretary Katzenbach also requests your approval of the attached message from him to Hussein explaining the rationale for the package. We feel the Secretaries should handle this initial response, since you've already sent the King one message and may have to step in again later.

No matter what we do, the Israelis and their friends will object. But we're just cleaning up the mess Israel's raid created and we've taken Israel's military concerns into account. Our JCS says this small package will not affect the military balance on Israel's borders. If you approve, State and Defense will brief key Members of Congress on the program, and we'll tell the Israelis what's involved as soon as we've told the Jordanians.

I recommend you approve.

W. Rostow
W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED
Authority ERUS, vol. xviii, #361
By *cbm*, NARA, Date 8-24-05

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

December 10, 1966

110a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Grant of Military Equipment to Jordan

Recommendation:

That you approve the sending of the enclosed letter from Acting Secretary Katzenbach to King Hussein which agrees to grant certain items of military equipment to Jordan.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Discussion:

The Israeli raid of November 13 on Samua village in Jordan damaged the nation's sense of security, jeopardized the morale of the Jordan Arab Army and weakened the King's prestige. In an attempt to restore his standing with the army and vindicate his policy of relying on the U.S. for support, King Hussein sent his Chief of Staff General Amir Khammash to Washington with a request for:

1. A grant of \$130 million worth of military equipment.
2. An agreement that the USG pay future installments on contracts previously signed with the USG for military jet aircraft and military ground equipment in the total amount of approximately \$70 million.
3. U.S. assent and support for an increase in the annual military budget of Jordan by \$28 million per year.

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GROUP 1
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Authority NLS 98-500 (4/10/00)
By cbw/rj/les NARA, Date 8-28-05

The Secretary of Defense and I agree that we should meet the request by offering a modest additional amount of military equipment to Jordan by reprogramming approximately \$4.7 million in MAP funds from lower priority needs. These items will be in addition to an existing MAP of \$3.5 million to Jordan for this fiscal year. The additional equipment was selected so as to increase mobility, firepower and effectiveness of communications for the Jordan Arab Army while minimizing additional manpower requirements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that even a significantly larger amount of additional equipment would have no appreciable effect on the military balance in the area.

We may receive some reaction from the Government of Israel. We are dealing with this reaction by keeping the Israelis generally informed and explaining to them that this grant, by strengthening King Hussein, would be in their interest. We have also spoken to several Congressmen and will continue our congressional briefings.

We believe that this grant may fail to satisfy King Hussein. If it appears likely that Hussein will take drastic action inconsistent with our relationship with Jordan, we intend to send a team to Amman headed by a high ranking official to listen to the King's views. In any case, we expect to have a difficult series of negotiations with him soon on the future level of our aid programs to Jordan.

The letter to King Hussein would be sent telegraphically.


Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Letter to King Hussein from
the Acting Secretary



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

1106

~~SECRET~~

Your Majesty:

We continue to follow with admiration the way you and your government are dealing with the difficult situation confronting you. We have been grateful, too, for the presence here of your distinguished Chief of Staff. Through him we have been able to gain, at first hand, a fuller appreciation of the problems you are facing.

Let me say at the outset that we understand the great concern which the Israeli action of November 13 has caused you, both as to the adequacy of your defense and the wisdom of your policy of moderation. However, we continue to believe that the attack at Samua does not presage a change in Israel's previous policy. This is an element in our calculations which I believe it important to underscore. At the same time we can well appreciate the unfortunate effect which the raid of November 13th has had on your nation's sense of security and on the morale of the Jordan Arab Army. This is, I assure you, a matter of concern to us, as we fully recognize the important role the Jordan Arab Army plays today, and must play for some time to come, in the maintenance of Jordanian stability and security.

We recognize, too, the importance of that stability and security to the achievement of economic growth and self-sufficiency upon which, as you have often emphasized, so much in the long run depends. It is for this reason that in addition to our major and in many ways unique economic assistance program, we recognize the importance of a Jordan military assistance program.

As General Khammash will report to you, however, we are very seriously concerned by the long-term financial and economic implications of the current and projected force goals and of the indicated equipment requirements of the Jordan Arab Army. These concerns are strengthened by our understanding that some increase in the pay of all enlisted ranks is likely to be essential in the very near future.

We feel that action with respect to an increase in force levels requires more thorough and thoughtful consideration than it has been

possible

His Majesty
Hussein I,
King of the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan.

~~SECRET~~

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Authority NLS 91-110 (#105d)
By *cm/rq/ks* NARA, Date *P-28-05*

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-2-

possible to give in the short time available. Hopefully, a few weeks hence and in more tranquil circumstances, both of our governments will be in a better position to engage in a useful discussion respecting the longer-term implications of the problems now facing us in the Middle East. The United States would welcome at that time an opportunity to discuss the relationship of recent events to the limits on your budgetary expenditure as set forth in the several United States-Jordan agreements, the appropriate size of the Jordanian armed forces and the nature of their equipment, the levels of external assistance likely to be available from traditional sources, and what role the United States might usefully play in a Jordanian effort to develop supplementary financial support from other Arab states which have an important stake in the continued integrity and stability of Jordan.

Meanwhile we are very much aware that your attention and energies must for the present continue to be focused on the immediate problem of surmounting your internal difficulties. We on our part are most anxious, without waiting for the discussions I have mentioned, to take additional steps now to help you meet the immediate problems. With this in mind, Secretary McNamara has been pleased to respond quickly to part of the equipment needs which General Khammash has outlined. Details are being provided to General Khammash. This is a substantial response in which we have been guided both by what can be made available relatively promptly and by the need which the Jordan Arab Army feels for an upgrading of firepower and an improvement of its mobility and communications. When this equipment is in place (and delivery over the next few months is feasible), we believe it will have a significant effect in improving the defensive capabilities of the army. It is our hope, too, that knowledge of this prompt and substantial response on our part will have an immediate and beneficial effect on army morale.

Your Majesty, my government continues to watch closely events now unfolding in the Middle East. In reiterating our admiration for the manner in which you are facing the problems these events have created for Jordan, let me also renew our assurances of continued United States friendship and support.

Sincerely yours,



~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

December 6, 1966

THRU : NEA/ARN - Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.

NEA/ARN - Marshall W. Wiley

*Jordan
arn*

Study Paper: Government of Jordan Arms Request

Problem

We are now cognizant of the full amount of the GOJ request for U.S. assistance in building up Jordan's military establishment. The GOJ is asking for (1) military arms and equipment valued at approximately \$200 million and (2) U.S. assistance and support for an increase in the GOJ military budget of approximately 28 million dollars per year.

To grant this request in full would threaten to trigger another round in the Middle East arms race and would postpone indefinitely Jordan's chances of becoming economically viable.

On the other hand, some gesture of support for the JAA would help restore the King's prestige with the army and reduce the chances for a coup d'etat. In deciding how to deal with this request, we are faced with two basic questions:

(1) How much of this request is sincere and how much represents an inflation of the GOJ's own estimate of its real needs for bargaining purposes?

(2) If we do fail to meet the GOJ's estimate of its real needs what alternative actions are likely by the GOJ and what would be the consequences for U.S. interests?

We have no evidence that the GOJ is submitting an inflated estimate of what they consider to be the minimum needs of the JAA. General Khammash has so far refused to yield an inch and King Hussein's recent public statements have reduced his elbow room for bargaining. It appears we should now consider seriously possible alternative actions which the GOJ might take if they are not satisfied with our response.

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

GROUP 1

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downgrading and
declassification

PRESERVATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *Chm/ly* NARA, Date 7-2-10

Alternatives for GOJ

General Khammash has listed the following possible alternatives for the GOJ: (1) to attack Israel in order to restore the King's prestige, (2) to turn to the Soviets for arms and (3) to abdicate. Of these three, the most likely would be the negotiation of an arms deal with the USSR. Before taking this step, however, we believe that the King would attempt to work out an "Arab solution". An Arab solution could mean either (1) a military and economic alliance with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait or (2) a strengthening of the UAC type military arrangements. Any of these alternatives would involve an increase in risks for the Hashemite dynasty. We must determine if it is advisable for us to allow these risks to increase.

U.S. Interests

If the Hashemite dynasty were overthrown what would be the consequences for U.S. interests? (1) the U.S. prestige is committed to the regime in Jordan. We are publicly identified as the supporter of the regime and have invested more than one-half billion dollars in aid to Jordan during the last decade. If the regime were overthrown, it would adversely affect our image throughout the Middle East. (2) the Hashemite regime has followed a relatively responsible policy on the Arab-Israeli dispute. A successor regime might follow a less responsible policy, but it would be forced to face the same imperatives vis-a-vis Israel as those faced by the present regime. It can be argued that no successor regime could afford to behave towards Israel in a manner significantly different from that of the present regime. (3) the Government of Israel has repeatedly expressed a preference for the present regime in Jordan as an alternative to a Nasser dominated unified Arab state surrounding it on three sides. The failure of the Arab unity movement among the so-called "liberated Arab states" of Iraq, Syria and the UAR indicates that a unified Arab state surrounding Israel would probably not be the logical outcome of an overthrow of the present regime. It is more likely that a successor regime would continue to maintain Jordan as an independent national entity, probably under some form of military rule.

Disadvantages of a Substantial Increase in Support for Jordan

(1) A substantial increase in USG support for Jordan would commit U.S. prestige more deeply in the current ideological disputes within the Arab world. The USG action would be widely interpreted as unjustified interference in Arab political evolution. In the long run, the Arab world will determine its own political and ideological future and U.S. interference in this process will generate hostility towards the U.S.

(2) The USG should involve itself deeply in the quarrels of others only if it is clear that vital U.S. interests are involved.

In the case of Jordan, it is not clear that an overthrow of the regime would endanger vital U.S. interests. A successor regime would likely be more neutralist in foreign policy and further to the left in domestic economic policy than the existing regime. These changes, however, would not appear to endanger vital U.S. interests.

(3) If we accede to Jordan's request for a substantial military build-up, the day will be indefinitely postponed when Jordan could become economically independent. The country is already spending 80% of its internally generated revenues on its army and police. The U.S. commitment to support Jordan would be extended indefinitely.

(4) Any substantial increase in USG military assistance to Jordan would trigger a reaction from Israel for a further build-up of her armed forces. The USG would probably end up supporting the cost of additional arms for both sides with no significant change in the balance of power.

(5) From the domestic political point of view any substantial arms sales to Jordan would be difficult to explain to important elements.

(6) If the regime in Jordan is so fragile that it can only be saved by a massive, non-economic injection of military equipment, it may well not survive for long even if such assistance is provided.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended:

(1) That we turn down Jordan's request for massive aid and offer as an alternative an increase in the MAP program of 2 to 3 million dollars per year over the next few years. These funds should be obtained without increasing existing MAP overall planning levels.

(2) That our intended out in supporting assistance (budget support) to Jordan for Jordan fiscal year 1967 be reduced from 5 million dollars to 2 million dollars. This would go far in meeting the cost of the enlisted men's pay raise advocated by the GOJ.

(3) That we be prepared to undertake intensive diplomatic activity with King Hussein to prevent him from adopting unpalatable alternative courses of action. A high-level mission might be a useful means of communicating with the King. If he should persist in adopting alternative courses, however, which we do not believe to be desirable, we should remain relatively flexible in continuing our own existing economic and military aid programs unless such programs become totally incompatible with the then-existing situation in Jordan.

NEA/ARN:BNWiley:aa

S/S

115

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

December 2, 1966

Jordan arms

TO : The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM : NEA - William J. Handley
SUBJECT: Topic for Possible Discussion with the President -- Jordan's Request for Assistance

Jordan's Problem

King Hussein and his government believe that Israel's attack into Jordan November 13 indicates a new Israeli policy: the toppling of his regime to reduce U.S. support for the Arabs and, possibly, make easier an Israeli expansion into the West Bank. Thus, he seeks quickly to bolster Jordan's military strength both to restore morale in the Jordan armed forces and among his people as well as to make more difficult future Israeli attacks. We disagree with this assessment of a changed Israeli policy and believe major increases in equipment and force levels of the Jordanian Army would place an intolerable burden on Jordan's economy unless supported almost entirely by outside sources. Jordan's problem, as we see it, is psychological. Thus, a good case can be made for some additional military strength as a means of restoring confidence in the King and army leadership.

Size of Jordanian Request

Major General Amer Khamash, Chief of Staff, Jordanian Arab Army, has raised with you, Walt Rostow, and others in the Department and Defense, Jordan's request 1) for approximately \$130 million in equipment; 2) U.S. assent in and support for an increase in the annual defense budget of around \$28 million; and 3) U.S. assistance in "taking care of" around \$70 million in payments for aircraft and ground equipment contracted for with the U.S.G. The General believes these funds will not now be forthcoming from the United Arab Command because of the quarrel which has ensued as a result of current Arab rivalries.

Possible Consequences of Rejecting Request

The King says he has alternatives. These are: 1) to attack Israel; 2) to request arms from the U.S.S.R.; and 3) to abdicate. Of these,

we believe

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GROUP 3

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/ty*, NARA, Date 7-2-10

we believe it most likely that he would turn to the U.S.S.R. Before doing this, however, he would probably attempt an "Arab solution" which could involve either (a) a closer military and economic alliance with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, or, (b) a turning toward the more radical Arab states with a concomitant readjustment of Jordan's policies. Either of these "Arab solutions" might involve stationing foreign military troops and aircraft in Jordan. Any of these alternatives would involve a threat to the regime and our interests. Jordan is a key state insofar as area stability is concerned and in the interest of stability we have invested some half billion dollars in the country since 1957.

In our negotiations with the King we must recognize that though we feel continuance of the status quo in Jordan is in our interest, the King also needs us if he is not to expose himself to what seems to us unacceptable risks. We must also recognize, however, that U.S.G. failure to be sufficiently forthcoming could lead the King to take reckless actions, the net result of which would probably be a move of Jordan toward the radical Arab states and a fundamental realignment of U.S.-Jordanian relations. Even so, we question whether the possible damage to U.S. interests justifies meeting the GOJ's exorbitant request for an arms buildup. In fact, if the situation is so desperate as to require a buildup of the dimensions Hussein suggests, it is doubtful that even such a buildup would salvage the Hashemite regime and our relationship with it for long.

Recommendations

Our thinking is still tentative, but is along the following lines:

1. A small increase in MAP (currently programmed for \$3.5 million) to provide increased mobility and better communications at existing force levels. We believe this should be no more than an increase of approximately \$1 to \$2 million.
2. Not to object to badly needed pay raises for enlisted personnel for the coming Jordanian fiscal year. Although we believe the policy of gradual reductions in grant aid should be maintained, we should be prepared to consider a somewhat smaller cut than the \$5 million you have authorized for the Jordan fiscal year of 1967. This would help cover additional costs of a pay raise for enlisted men of the Jordan Army which the King had felt necessary even before November 13.
3. Continue efforts to persuade King Hussein that Israel's policies and intentions have not changed, and that a buildup cannot be justified

on military

on military grounds. Discipline in the security forces has held during the recent demonstrations. Even if we support the requested buildup, Jordan could never engage Israel or its Arab enemies successfully in major hostilities. To convince the King that his proposals place Jordan's successful economic development program in jeopardy, we might send a mission headed by a high-level official known favorably to the King to talk to him.

4. Jordan should look to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to meet the shortfall if UAC funds are cut off. In this case the U.S.G. might consider supporting Jordanian requests to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, urging them to supply their UAC contributions directly to Jordan.

Clearances: NEA/ARN - Mr. Atherton DOD/ISA - Mr. Hoopes (draft)

AID/NEEA - Mr. Macomber (draft)

NEA:RPDavies:bw 12/2/66
NEA/ARN:MWiley

~~SECRET~~

A.D alternate
para. H
116a

H. On the question of annual recurring costs entailed by any build-up and projected pay increases for enlisted men, we should point out that Jordan is already spending a disproportionate share of its resources for defense purposes and we would be concerned with the effects of increased security costs on development activities. Presently Jordan is spending approximately 60% of its total budget resources for security, and security expenses represent approximately 80% of the budget resources coming from domestic revenues. If the GOJ increases security expenditures it will have to find indigenous resources to cover them. This would inevitably mean greater taxes for defense. There should be no suggestion that we would presently consider any revision of our earlier decision to cut budget support by \$5 million in JFY 1967. Any intimation of a readiness to consider restoration of the \$5 million in budget support would increase our difficulties in persuading Khamash that necessary defense tasks can be accomplished with little or no increases in personnel strength and the preferability of low cost systems related to border defense.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cbm/s, NARA, Date 7-2-10

29 NOV 1966

TO: The Secretary

INFO: S/S

FROM: NSA - William J. Handley

SUBJECT: Your Appointment with General Khawash Today at 5:00 p.m.--
Supplementary Briefing Memorandum

In a meeting held today with Deputy Assistant Secretary Davis and other officials of State and Defense, General Khawash reviewed the reasons for his urgent trip to Washington. He pointed out that King Hussein believes that the present situation in the Middle East is the most serious since 1936. He said that the King is faced with four alternatives: (1) obtain assistance from the US in building up his Army to the point required to assure its loyalty and to restore his prestige, (2) do fighting with his soldiers (i.e. against Israel) rather than fighting his own people in the streets, (3) become a hero like Kassar and other Arab leaders by sending his Chief of Staff to Moscow to negotiate for Russian arms or (4) abdicate.

Khawash said it is believed in Jordan that the US must share in the blame for the Israeli attack on Jordan since we did not succeed in controlling the Israelis. If this happens again, he and the King could not refrain from striking back. This would bring in the other Arab states and could easily spread into war involving the major powers. Jordan did not do so on November 13, but the Army now feels it was defeated. The Army needs more men and equipment so that it can meet the threat of the Israelis and is turning first to the United States. If its needs are met, "things will be all right".

Khawash said the fundamental question is "how much Jordan as it now stands is worth to the US". He said that it is up to us if we want a stable throne supported by a stable army in Jordan. Jordan needs the bare minimum for legitimate self-defense. This includes about 200 thousand more soldiers (bringing the regular army to 64,000), certain items of military equipment, additional financial support for the military build-up and a defense system for the West Bank border villages, including a village guard force of 4,500 in addition to the regular army.

GROUP 3

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not automatically declassified.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/hj*, NARA, Date *7-2-10*

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General Khammash did not have a price tag for this build-up. He made it clear, however, that he thought Saudi Arabia and Kuwait should pay part of the cost of the build-up. He said Jordan decided to come first to the U.S. because it would take too long to negotiate with the Saudis and Kuwaitis. He asked for a quick commitment for the full amount from the U.S. and expressed the hope that we would then approach the Kuwaitis and Saudis and urge them to share in the cost. He handed over a list of equipment items which is now being analyzed by the Department of Defense.

DEA/ARN:GWWilley:asa
11/29/66

2 copies

~~SECRET/EXCISE~~

NEA/ARN

116d

29 NOV 1966

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: NEA - William J. Handley

SUBJECT: Briefing Memorandum for Secretary Bush for an Appointment with General Khemash

Background

General Khemash will wish to discuss King Hussein's request for additional military assistance to Jordan. Following the November 13 Israeli raid, the King and his advisers have concluded that a military build-up is essential in order to strengthen Jordan's defense posture and to restore the King's prestige with (1) the Army and (2) the Palestinians.

The King has said that the November 13 raid shattered his previous assumption that Jordan could count on the USG for protection from the Israelis. He must now increase the size and efficiency of his defense establishment to protect his country against this threat. To this end he would first look to his friends in the USG for assistance in building up his Army but, if the USG was not forthcoming, he would then look elsewhere. The General will deliver to you a letter from the King (text attached). He is also carrying letters from the King to the President and to Secretary McNamara.

Discussion

The Israeli raid, by demonstrating the GOJ's inability to respond in kind, seriously eroded the King's popularity with the Army and brought to the surface the latent hostility of the Palestinian residents of the West Bank. We doubt that the King intends to bring his defense establishment to a parity with that of Israel, but he probably does believe that a significant increase in his military strength is essential to insure the support of the Army for the Hashemite regime and to reduce the antagonism of the Palestinians who feel that the King is not providing them with adequate strength vis-a-vis Israel.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cbm / h NARA, Date 7-2-10

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We have not yet seen the shopping list which Khamash is carrying, but the Embassy estimates it will total approximately \$20 million in equipment items and a 20% increase in Jordan's annual military budget (approximately \$15 to \$17 million dollars per year additional). The Embassy estimates that the minimum for which the GOJ would be willing to settle would be \$3.5 million in equipment and a 20% increase in the annual military budget. During the last fiscal year, the budget of the Armed Forces and the police totaled 80% of the GOJ's internally generated revenues.

If the USG is not sufficiently responsive to these requests--and we have yet to determine what would be "sufficient" in present circumstances--the GOJ will probably look to the other Arab states for additional arms. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait might provide Jordan with some of the funds required to finance the military build-up. Alternatively, the GOJ might feel obliged to take Soviet arms either directly or through the Unified Arab Command and pursue a policy of closer military arrangements with the UAR, Iraq and possibly Syria.

Recommendation

That you make the following points to General Khamash:

1. The USG expresses its deep sympathy for the loss of life and destruction of property caused by the Israeli raid.
2. Our policy of support for Jordan and King Hussein has not changed.
3. The USG has not changed its estimate of Israeli intentions towards Jordan. We have publicly deplored the raid on Saman but, despite its magnitude, we do not believe it signified Israeli intent to seize additional territory or to bring down the Hashemite regime.
4. We will continue with the GOJ their military requirements. In this examination, we would look into the possibility of improving the efficiency of the JAA by reorganization and the possibility of utilizing improved technical means of border control. We would not wish, however, to lose sight of the effect such a build-up would have on the economic development of Jordan and would wish to consider the military build-up in the appropriate economic and political context.

Attachment:

Text of Letter from King.

Conferences:

AID;NSA;NSAC;member
ROB;ISA;Col.A.A.Jordan

NSA/AEN;CWiley:acc

11/29/66

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Text of King's Letter to Secretary Rusk

I have, due to an extremely urgent and difficult situation in which I find myself, my government, my armed forces and my people, found it imperative to instruct the Chief of the General Staff in the Jordanian Armed Forces, General A. Khameesh to leave immediately for Washington to discuss at the highest possible levels there all aspects of the situation which it has been my privilege and pleasure to communicate on with the President. I hope that in your difficult schedule you will find time to meet General Khameesh and I hope that he will be able to bring me back in the shortest possible time, the answers I seek which will enable us to face once more and in the most difficult of hours, the responsibilities of overcoming them and serving what unites us, freedom and common ideals and aspirations as well as our joint interests.

With my very best wishes to you and regards.



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

December 1, 1966

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Jordan arms

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Jordan's Military Requirements

General Khammash has furnished us with an incredible shopping list for Jordan's defense buildup. Although not yet fully priced, the contents of the list (equipment for two field artillery battalions, 2 tank battalions, 2 engineer battalions, 2 anti-aircraft battalions, 200 armored personnel carriers, 3500 miles of barbed wire, 3000 radio sets, etc.) will total perhaps \$120 - 130 million, without spares and transportation costs.

Khammash has orally described the increased Jordanian forces to use this equipment as follows:

	<u>Nov</u> <u>1966</u>	<u>Jan</u> <u>1968</u>
<u>ARMY</u>		
Infantry brigade	9	9*
Armored brigade	2	2**
Royal Guards brigade	1	1
FA battalions (25 lb)	6	9
FA battalions (105)	1	2
FA battalions (155)	1	2
AAA battalions (40mm)	1	2
AAA battalions (50 cal)	0	1
Static Guard battalion	1	1
Engineer Regiments	1	3
Total Army strength	47,000	64,500

* Each brigade headquarters will add an armored infantry company (in armored personnel carriers), Tank company, anti-tank platoon, recon platoon and anti-aircraft platoon to serve as a mobile reserve against limited enemy raids. In addition, each infantry battalion will add a fourth rifle company.

** 100 M48 tanks are requested to replace a like number of Centurions and M47s.

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DECLASSIFIED (4/12a)
State Guidelines
Authority: DOD Directive 5200.30
By cbm/rq, NARA, Date 8-28-05

	<u>Nov</u> <u>1966</u>	<u>Jan</u> <u>1968</u>
<u>NAVY</u>		
Small patrol craft	12	12
Armored boats	0	4
Total Navy Strength	100	?
<u>AIR FORCE</u>		
Hawker-Hunter Squadrons	1	1
104 squadron	0	3
Transport/heli squadron*	1	1
Total Air Force Strength	1800	?

* Khammash has asked for 6 additional helicopters for this squadron.
Border Village National Guard

Total strength	0	4500
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In addition to all this good news, Khammash brings the word that the UAC has defaulted on its September maintenance payment to Jordan and that no further payments from that source are anticipated. Consequently, Jordan will have to ask the U. S. to pay the remaining \$65-70 million due on the large purchases in 1964 and 1965 for the ground forces and the F-104s (this sum assumes that Jordan will obtain all three of the F-104 squadrons which we agreed earlier to sell them). Khammash says that Hussein believes he can eventually get Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to pay these equipment costs so that the U. S. can ultimately be repaid from Saudi and Kuwaiti contributions.

The total one-time cost of the Jordanian buildup which the U. S. is being asked to supply, therefore, is of the order of magnitude of \$200 million. Khammash estimates that the increase in annual costs from the buildup will be about \$28 million, all of which Jordan expects to obtain from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait inasmuch as each of those countries has promised to pay directly to Jordan the roughly \$5 million which each formerly contributed to the UAC. This \$28 million increment represents about a 50 per cent increase in the current military budget.

The U. S. contribution to Jordan's defense establishment is now \$3.5 million of military assistance and \$30 million of budget support. In the coming year we had planned to phase both these grants down, MAP to \$1.9 million and budget support to \$25 million. It is possible to reprogram some low priority items out of prior and current year MAP to meet some of the high priority items on General Khammash's list, but such

reprogramming will probably be on the order of \$1 or \$1.5 million. Even if MAP were not cut next year but were continued at the current level, or even increased by a million or two, and even if we spread our aid to the buildup over a three year period, we would still be able to accommodate less than 10 per cent of Jordan's new total "requirement."

Khammash's list can be trimmed, for it is obviously bogus in some respects (the so-called requirement for mines and explosives, for instance, is a simply doubling of the quantities that have already been ordered from us); it has some items which are so outlandish that they can easily be knocked down (for example, the field artillery target acquisition battalion which is superfluous to their needs and high sophisticated and expensive -- about \$4 million); many items are just not available (for example, the 40mm anti-aircraft battalions and 20 tank recovery vehicles); and the quantities requested are in some cases obviously non-sensical (for instance, 1300 trucks and 200 searchlights). After these obvious cuts are made, however, there will still be a tremendous disparity between what Jordan wants and what we might be prepared to offer.

Since the Jordanian concept of adding firepower and mobility to their units and of creating combined arms teams is militarily sound, it will be difficult to argue Khammash out of the hard residual. We may be convinced that we are addressing a psychological rather than a military problem but we can hardly expect Khammash to agree with us. There is undoubtedly a large margin for bargaining in the total request and probably even in a request pared as indicated in the preceding paragraph. We have not, however, gotten far enough in our talks with Khammash to find the minimum improvement in organization, pay, and armaments which will help assure the loyalty of the Jordanian forces to the King and preserve a moderate, pro-Western Jordan.

Although we have not yet decided what kind of measures we would be prepared to support, it is clear we cannot make a merely token response. As a minimum, we should agree to help with a long overdue pay increase for enlisted men, perhaps some marginal increases in personnel strength, a small gain in mobility and firepower, and an augmentation in border and village defense, to include surveillance and warning systems, anti-tank measures, small arms and communications.

On November 23, prior to receipt of General Khammash's new list, Ambassador Burns and the Defense Attache in Amman sent in their estimate of minimum U. S. actions to satisfy immediate Jordanian needs. This comprised about \$4 million in MAP and \$16 million additional annual budget support to cover personnel increases and an enlisted man's pay raise.

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Somewhere between this estimate and General Khammash's list we will have to find the answer to his constantly reiterated question, "How much is Jordan worth to the United States?"

At this stage in the dialogue we are continuing to listen sympathetically but are pointing out the dangers of over-reacting to November 13th. Bill Macomber (at 1000 today) is stressing the economic pitfalls of the kind of buildup Jordan contemplates. You might underline and explicate this point for we have to deflate Khammash expectations a great deal before we can talk sense with him.



AMOS A. JORDAN, JR.
Colonel, USA
Director
Near East and South Asia Region

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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DATE: 11/29/56
CLASS: 10

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

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ACTION: -Ambassy AMMAN PRIORITY

INFO: Ambassy TEL AVIV
USUN NEW YORK

Jordan arms (subject file)

Nov 29 9 58 PM '56

STATE 93329
EXDIS

1. Following summary FYI only and NOFORN. Memcon is unclear and subject to amendment upon review.
2. In meeting with General Khamash afternoon Nov 29, Secretary expressed distress at situation which had brought Khamash to Washington, stated President and he have devoted much time to this problem and said he grateful for King's message, which Khamash delivered. USG well aware of details Nov 13 Israeli raid and had made known in both Israel and SC our view that Israeli action was wrong and misguided.
3. Khamash said as Chief of Staff it difficult be absent from Jordan at this time, but King Hussein felt it important convey/GOJ view of situation and corrective measures needed. Israeli raid, largest since 1936, had revealed Jordan defenses inadequate and adversely affected morale of Army. He had initially thought Israeli attack was beginning of invasion and had considered ordering return strike. If he had, area could have been plunged into war.
4. Khamash said while GOJ could cope with present demonstrations, they were

Drafted by: NEA/ARN ALAtherton, Jr:acs 11/29	Tel. Ext. 5617	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Rodger P. Davies
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Clearance:
S/S - RBRnce *db*

DECLASSIFIED
Authority ERUS, Vol. xviii, #352
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

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most serious Jordan had experienced and revealed depth of popular feeling. Jordan now subject propaganda attacks from Syria, UAR and PLO. Public opinion in Jordan was convinced Israel attacked Jordan because Syria, which Israel had earlier held responsible for terrorism, was strong militarily and protected by USSR. In this situation Jordan was turning to its friend the United States. Must be understood that Nov 13 incident unlike incidents in past and situation would not return to normal if nothing was done. If USG unable to help, King faced with choice of (a) dying in battle with Israel rather than at hands of own people, (b) becoming hero by turning to Soviets for military equipment or (c) abdicating. If Jordan received equipment requested and money to pay for enlarged Army, all would be well. This connection Khammash asserted Jordanian officers sufficiently sophisticated to tell difference between real and token help.

5. In response Secretary's question whether opinions differed between East and West Bank in this matter, Khammash replied sense of defeat equally strong among all Jordanians. Only difference was that East Bank less vulnerable to Syrian, UAR and PLO propaganda. Jordan had been subject to such propaganda before but situation created by Nov 13 attack had made elements of population more responsive than previously.

6. Secretary was enquired re King's personal safety. Khammash said King for present could depend on loyalty of armed forces. If nothing done, however, Nov 13 might in time become Jordan's new national day.

7. Secretary stressed he could not overstate gravity with which we viewed Israeli attack. Another such attack would have most serious consequences and there no doubt in Israel about this. At same time, he wanted emphasize two points: in our view attack (1) did not reflect Israeli scheme to seize West Bank and (2) was not aimed at King Hussein.

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He therefore could not comprehend how Israel failed to foresee consequences for King.

8. Secretary continued that US has strong fraternal feeling for His Majesty and interest in well being of Jordan. We would take urgent look at Jordan's request. While he could not comment in detail pending consultations with Defense colleagues, there was no question ^{about} of our policy ~~position~~ of support for Jordan.

9. Secretary said he now frankly more concerned about Syria and UAR than Israel. Did Khammash see any connection between recent Syrian-UAR security pact and current situation? Khammash said in his view it was USSR which brought those two countries together. Secretary commented that, while we had not discussed latest incident with Soviets, we had held discussions with them regarding Near East in UN context and he had discussed possibility of slow-down in arms race with Gromyko. We had, however, found no interest on Soviet side.

10. Secretary emphasized President deeply concerned re Israeli attack Nov 13 and had conveyed his views to Israel through more than one channel. Khammash responded that high GOJ officials do not doubt USG position but Jordan public disillusioned. It seemed to GOJ that only Jordan, which had longest frontier with Israel, was victim of "balance of strength" policy. Israel could get military equipment it wanted from various sources and UAR, Syria and Iraq ~~and~~ could get theirs from Soviets. USG must show it won't let its friends down. Having already invested over one-half billion dollars in Jordan, USG must now judge how much Jordan is worth to it.

11. Secretary expressed hope Jordan's ~~security~~ security problems could be met without interfering with GOJ development program. At this point he could only say we would have to see what can be done and would be as responsive as possible. Secretary

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noted that, just as Israel found it difficult guard against terrorism, Jordan undoubtedly realized that complete security not easy to guarantee. Khamash concurred, saying principal need was increased mobility and firepower to improve defense. Secretary said we were looking into possibility that techniques developed in Viet Nam might be applicable in detecting intrusions across Jordan-Israeli border. Khamash replied GOJ list included early warning system but equipment could not be too sophisticated in order permit rapid assimilation by Army.

12. Khamash noted GOJ had been subjected to repeated USG inquiries regarding stationing tanks on West Bank--a restriction not applicable to Israel. This had had unfortunate effect and he hoped subject would not be brought up again. Secretary said he appreciated problem and would give it further thought. In conclusion, Secretary assured Khamash we felt sense of solidarity with Jordan and would give GOJ request most serious attention.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

James L. Higgins 119
3-RT. D.H.S.

November 29, 1966

SECRET/EXDIS Enclosure

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
Ret'd BKS - 12/5/66
Jordan

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to the President from
King Hussain of Jordan

I enclose the signed original of a letter dated November 26 from King Hussain to the President. It was delivered to the Department today by General Khamash, the Jordanian Chief of Staff. The text of the letter was received from Embassy Amman (see Amman's 1269) on November 27, and a copy was transmitted to the White House on that date.

In this letter the King thanks the President for his recent message of sympathy. In view of our continuing discussions with the Jordanian Government on Jordan's security problems, we think that no reply is needed at present.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

- 1. Text of Letter.
- 2. Amman's 1269.

SECRET/EXDIS Enclosure



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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS02-59 (#4)
By MS/KS, NARA, Date 7-2-10

THE ROYAL PALACE,
Amman, Jordan,
November 26th, 1966.

Mr. President:

Your sorrow and concern, and that of your people, your warm and kind expression of sympathy when the lives of the innocent and the brave were so needlessly destroyed gave me great comfort.

Despite all my experience in the past long years, my grief was such that I would have wished for no more than to be amongst those innocent and brave who fell victims to unwarranted, naked aggression. Those towards whom and of whom I am personally responsible where there is eternal peace.

On behalf of my Government and people, I thank you, Mr. President, your Government, your Permanent Representative at the United Nations and your people for all you have done in the support of justice and right and the support of your brethren and friends who in freedom share with you all the same hopes, ideals and aspirations.

Our present conditions facing danger and facing the strongest attempts ever made to destroy us from without and within by irresponsibles, enemies and our common enemies the Marxists, the problems of morale amongst our military as well as our civilian population raised by the inadequacy of our present equipment to defend ourselves, our rights to live in peace in our homeland despite the highest degrees of courage and determination of our people, the exploitation of all this by our enemies, common and otherwise, is in all truth unprecedented.

In very few words, Mr. President this country, that became a symbol of freedom and progress, the showpiece of the revolutionaries in this part of the world, faces its most difficult hour.

Your orders for an urgent review of measures which the United States could take in support of its interests in this area as well as in the peace and security of Jordan and in the economic progress and well being of its people are most timely and welcome.

King
Hussein
to LBJ
11/26/66



-2-

So critical is the situation, in my opinion, that it has given me no option but to order the Jordanian Chief of General Staff, General A. Khammash to leave forthwith for Washington to discuss the situation with our good friends there. Particularly at the level of my good friends, Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defence McNamara and to bring me back in the shortest possible time what I hope will be reassuring news of the support of our friends with whom we have shared many joint interests and a common cause over the years. Such answers, I assure you, Mr. President, if forthcoming, will considerably help me in a struggle to which in my belief in freedom I have committed myself, my Government, my Armed Forces, my people, my whole Jordanian family in the face of the greatest odds. Such answers, Mr. President, would hopefully enable us to overcome the greatest of tests for after all, those who face us in our Arab homeland and their fellow travelers are at the end of their fight too, the determining factor being who can stand it longest.

With my renewed thanks, my very best wishes for your continued good health and continued success in executing your great and demanding responsibilities.

Your sincere friend,

The President of the United States of America,
President Lyndon B. Johnson,
The White House,
Washington D.C., USA.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

119b

~~SECRET~~

2

Action
55

Info

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26

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1269

EXDIS

REF AMMAN'S 1267

1. THE PALACE HAS JUST SENT US COPIES OF KING'S LETTERS TO PRESIDENT, SECRETARY RUSK, AND SECRETARY MCNAMARA. ALL ARE DATED NOVEMBER 26.

2. TEXT OF KING'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT AS FOLLOWS QUOTE:

A. YOUR SORROW AND CONCERN, AND THAT OF YOUR PEOPLE, YOUR WARM AND KIND EXPRESSION OF SYMPATHY WHEN THE LIVES OF THE INNOCENT AND THE BRAVE WERE SO NEEDLESSLY DESTROYED GAVE ME GREAT COMFORT.

B. DESPITE ALL MY EXPERIENCE IN THE PAST LONG YEARS, MY GRIEF WAS SUCH THAT I WOULD HAVE WISHED FOR NO MORE THAN TO BE AMONGST THOSE INNOCENT AND BRAVE WHO FELL VICTIMS TO UNWARRANTED, NAKED AGRSSION. THOSE TOWARDS WHOM AND OF WHOM I AM PERSONNALLY RESPONSIBLE WHERE THERE IS ETERNAL PEACE.

C. ON BEHALF OF MY GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE, I THANK YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, YOUR GOVERNMENT, YOUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND YOUR PEOPLE FOR ALL YOU HAVE DONE IN THE SUPPORT OF JUSTICE AND RIGHT AND THE SUPPORT OF YOUR BRETHREN AND FRIENDS WHO IN FREEDOM SHARE WITH YOU ALL THE SAME HOPES, IDEALS AND ASPIRATIONS.

D. OUR PRESENT CONDITIONS FACING DANGER AND FACING THE STRONGEST ATTEMPTS EVER MADE TO DESTROY US FROM WITHOUT AND WITHIN BY IRRESPONSIBLES, ENEMIES AND OUR COMMON ENEMIES THE MARXISTS, THE PROBLEMS OF MORALE AMONGST OUR MILITARY AS WELL AS OUR CIVILIAN POPULATION RAISED BY THE INADEQUACY OF OUR PRESENT EQUIPMENT TO DEFEND OURSELVES, OUR RIGHTS TO LIVE IN PEACE IN

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLTJ 02-59 (4)
By clm/jes NARA, Date 8-11-05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- AMMAN 1269, 270930Z NOV 66

OUR HOMELAND DESPITE THE HIGHEST DEGREES OF COURAGE AND DETERMINATION OF OUR PEOPLE, THE EXPLOITATION OF ALL THIS BY OUR ENEMIES, COMMON AND OTHERWISE, IS IN ALL TRUTH UNPRECEDENTED.

E. IN VERY FEW WORDS, MR. PRESIDENT THIS COUNTRY, THAT BECAME A SYMBOL OF FREEDOM AND PROGRESS, THE SHOWPIECE OF THE EVOLUTIONARIES IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD, FACES ITS MOST DIFFICULT HOUR.

F. YOUR ORDERS FOR AN URGENT REVIEW OF MEASURES WHICH THE UNITED STATES COULD TAKE IN SUPPORT OF ITS INTERESTS IN THIS AREA AS WELL AS IN THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF JORDAN AND IN THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND WELL BEING OF ITS PEOPLE ARE MOST TIMELY AND WELCOME.

G. SO CRITICAL IS THE SITUATION, IN MY OPINION, THAT IT HAS GIVEN ME NO OPTION BUT TO ORDER THE JORDANIAN CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF, GENERAL A. KHAMMASH TO LEAVE FORTHWITH FOR WASHINGTON TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION WITH OUR GOOD FRIENDS THERE. PARTICULARLY AT THE LEVEL OF MY GOOD FRIENDS, SECRETARY OF STATE RUSK AND SECRETARY OF DEFENCE MCNAMARA AND TO BRING ME BACK IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME WHAT I HOPE WILL BE REASSURING NEWS OF THE SUPPORT OF OUR FRIENDS WITH WHOM WE HAVE SHARED MANY JOINT INTERESTS AND A COMMON CAUSE OVER THE YEARS. SUCH ANSWERS, I ASSURE YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, IF FORTHCOMING, WILL CONSIDERABLY HELP ME IN A STRUGGLE TO WHICH IN MY BELIEF IN FREEDOM I HAVE COMMITTED MYSELF, MY GOVERNMENT, MY ARMED FORCES, MY PEOPLE, MY WHOLE JORDANIAN FAMILY IN THE FACE OF THE GREATEST ODDS. SUCH ANSWERS, MR. PRESIDENT, WOULD HOPEFULLY ENABLE US TO OVERCOME THE GREATEST OF TESTS FOR AFTER ALL, THOSE WHO FACE US IN OUR ARAB HOMELAND AND THEIR FELLOW TRAVELERS ARE AT THE END OF THEIR FIGHT TOO, THE DETERMINING FACTOR BEING WHO CAN STAND IT LONGEST.

H. WITH MY RENEWED THANKS, MY VERY BEST WISHES FOR YOUR CONTINUED GOOD HEALTH AND CONTINUED SUCCESS IN EXECUTING YOUR GREAT AND DEMANDING RESPONSIBILITIES. UNQUOTE

3. TEXT OF KING'S LETTER TO SECRETARY RUSK AS FOLLOWS QUOTE:

A. I HAVE, DUE TO AN EXTREMELY URGENT AND DIFFICULT SITUATION IN WHICH I FIND MYSELF, MY GOVERNMENT, MY ARMED FORCES AND MY PEOPLE, FOUND IT IMPERATIVE TO INSTRUCT THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF IN THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES, GENERAL A. KHAMMASH TO LEAVE IMMEDIATELY FOR WASHINGTON TO DISCUSS AT THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE LEVELS THERE ALL ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION WHICH IT HAS BEEN MY PRIVILEGE AND PLEASURE TO COMMUNICATE ON WITH THE PRESIDENT. I HOPE THAT IN YOUR DIFFICULT SCHEDULE YOU WILL FIND TIME TO MEET GENERAL KHAMMASH AND I HOPE THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO BRING

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- AMMAN 1269, 270930Z NOV 66

ME BACK IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME, THE ANSWERS I SEEK WHICH WILL ENABLE ME TO FACE ONCE MORE AND IN THE MOST DIFFICULT OF TESTS, THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF OVERCOMING THEM AND SERVING WHAT UNITES US, FREEDOM AND COMMON IDEALS AND ASPIRATIONS AS WELL AS OUR JOINT INTERESTS.

B. WITH MY VERY BEST WISHES TO YOU AND REGARDS. UNQUOTE

A. TEXT OF KING'S LETTER TO SECRETARY MCNAMARA IS VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL TO THAT OF KING'S LETTER TO SECRETARY RUSK.

GP-1. BURNS

~~SECRET~~

Jordan Arms

*See message for
President from
Rostow - 11/29/66.*

120

38

U.S.-JORDAN

Rostow

WASHINGTON, (AP)-THE UNITED STATES IS SENDING 36 F104 STARFIGHTERS TO STRENGTHEN THE FORCES OF KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN, AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES REPORTED TODAY.

THE 1,500-MILE-AN-HOUR LOCKHEED JETS ARE EXPECTED TO BE DELIVERED QUICKLY. HUSSEIN'S REQUEST FOR MILITARY AID WAS RECEIVED HERE SHORTLY AFTER THE ISRAELI ATTACK NOV. 13 ON A VILLAGE IN JORDAN.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT ACKNOWLEDGED LAST WEEK THAT SUCH A REQUEST HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM HUSSEIN. EARLIER THIS YEAR A LIMITED NUMBER OF A4 JET FIGHTER-BOMBERS WERE SUPPLIED TO JORDAN, AND LAST YEAR THE TINY ARAB KINGDOM RECEIVED 50 M48 MEDIUM PATTON TANKS.

JK1045AES 11/29

UPI-84

(AYUB-DE GAULLE)

PARIS--PRESIDENT MOHAMMAD AYUB KHAN OF PAKISTAN CONFERRED TODAY WITH FRENCH PRESIDENT DE GAULLE IN A MAJOR REVIEW OF WORLD PROBLEMS. AYUB AND DE GAULLE TALKED IN THE FRENCH GENERAL'S OFFICE BEFORE A SCHEDULED WORKING LUNCH AT THE ELYSEE PALACE.

DIPLOMATIC QUARTERS PREDICTED THE TWO SOLDIER-STATESMEN WOULD REACH A "BROAD MEASURE OF AGREEMENT" ON VIET NAM AND CHINA.

11/29--TD1244PES

M. Saunders
Jardaw arms
File 121
with memo

see message for President from Rostow 11/29/66

UPI-85

(JORDAN)

WASHINGTON--THE UNITED STATES HAS AGREED TO SELL JORDAN 36 SUPERSONIC F104 JET INTERCEPTERS, STATE DEPARTMENT SOURCES REPORTED TODAY.

JORDAN'S KING HUSSEIN REQUESTED ADDITIONAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM THE U.S. FOLLOWING ISRAEL'S RETALITORY RAID AGAINST A JORDANIAN VILLAGE NOV. 13.

JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES IN AMMAN TODAY REPORTED CONTRACTS FOR SALE OF U.S. JETS HAD BEEN COMPLETED AND THE PLANES WERE TO BEGIN ARRIVING THERE SHORTLY. STATE DEPARTMENT SOURCES LATER CONFIRMED THAT THE TRANSACTION INVOLVED 36 F104 STARFIGHTER JETS, SAID TO COST IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF \$1 MILLION EACH.

THE U.S. HAS SUPPLIED JODAN WITH MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR MANY YEARS. KING HUSSEIN IS REGARDED IN WASHINGTON AS A RELATIVELY MODERATE FORCE IN THE EXPLOSIVE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION.

HUSSEIN REPORTEDLY HAS BEEN RESISTING PRESSURES FROM MORE MILITANT ARAB GROUPS TO ARM JORDAN WITH SVVIET EQUIPMENT.

11/29--TD1246PES

UPI-86

(SPONG)

WASHINGTON--SENATOR-ELECT WILLIAM B. SPONG, D-VA., BILLING HIMSELF AS VIRGINIA'S FIRST "TIDEWATER" SENATOR, SAID TODAY HE WOULD TAKE A SHARP LOOK AT DOMESTIC SPENDING PROPOSALS.

BUT SPONG, BOOSTED INTO OFFICE BY HIS STATE'S GROWING URBAN VOTER STRENGTH, DECLINED IN A MAIDEN CAPITOL NEWS CONFERENCE TO GET DOWN TO SPECIFICS.

"I SAID DURING THE CAMPAIGN I WAS GOING TO JUDGE EACH ONE (SPENDING PROPOSALS) ON ITS OWN BOTTOM," SPONG SAID WHEN ASKED HOW HE WILL VOTE ON GREAT SOCIETY MEASURES. HE SAID HE WILL DECIDE ABOUT ANY NEW CIVIL RIGHTS PROPOSALS IN THE SAME WAY.

SPONG SAID IF HE HAD TO SELECT A LABEL HE WOULD CALL HIMSELF A "MODERATE" BUT HE LIKES BEING CALLED A "REALIST" S ONE NEWSPAPER DID DURING THE CAMPAIGN.

IN THIS CONNECTION, HE SAID, HE HAS SUPPORTED THE ADMINISTRATION'S MILITARY POLICY IN VIET NAM BUT BELIEVES MILITARY SPENDING MUST BE EXAMINEC CLOSELY FOR POSSIBLE WASTE.

SPONG BELIEVES THAT BECAUSE OF RISING WAR COSTS NON MILITARY SPENDING MUST BE CUT.

"I WOULD LIKE TO BE SURE THIS US BEING DONE BEFORE I WO

"I WOULD LIKE TO BE SURE THIS IS BEING DONE BEFORE I WOULD SUPPORT A TAX INCREASE," SPONG SAID. HE ADDED, HOWEVER: "I RECOGNIZE THAT THE INFLATIONARY TREND MAY MAKE A TAX INCREASE NECESSARY."

11/29--TD1250PES

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

CLASSIFICATION
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

1. *unders*
2. *Ret.*

122

April 18, 1966
Date

FOR: Mr. Walt W. Rostow
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

*Ret'd BKS - 5/16/66
Jordan Arms
* Israeli Arms*

For your information and files.

Enclosures:

S/S 6334, CY 7

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS
CLASSIFICATION

APR 18 1966

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a).

BY ju ON 4-25-94

(Drafting Office and Officer)

0301

Approved in S/S:JPWalsh
4/15/66

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: April 6, 1966

SUBJECT: U.S. Aircraft Sales to Jordan and Israel

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Ephraim Evron, Minister, Israeli Embassy
NEA - Mr. Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary
NE - William D. Wolle, OIC, Arab-Israel AffairsCOPIES TO: NEA Embassy, AMMAN (1cc)
NE " TEL AVIV (1cc)
DOD/ISA INR
S/S WH
CIA
G
UDECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 02-58 (4144)
By ebm/leo NARA, Date 8-28-05U.S. Sale to Jordan

Mr. Evron said that from Israel's point of view, last Saturday's timing for the disclosure of the sale to Jordan had been good. He recalled that in Defense Secretary McNamara's talk with Foreign Minister Eban, the former had remarked that any U.S. aircraft sale to Jordan would be contingent on the Israeli Government's agreement to it, and that the U.S. would let Israel know about the sale when it was completed. He said the Embassy had now received certain questions to put to the Department and that the GOI hoped for our answers at the earliest convenience. He handed Mr. Davies a paper listing the following questions:

1. Types of aircraft. Does it include any two-seaters? What type?
2. Delivery schedules and quantities.
3. Will any modifications be made, and if so, what kind of modifications and for which purpose?
4. What type of engine will be installed?
5. What armament will be installed and ordnance ordered (guns, missiles, bombs, rockets, etc.)?

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-2-

6. What type of airborne radar will be installed?
7. Any information about the training programme regarding ground and air crews.
8. What is the cost of the aircraft and related equipment?

Mr. Davies responded that as Mr. Evron would recall from other conversations he had great personal distaste about passing to a third country security information stemming from U.S. arms arrangements with a friendly state. We certainly planned no such disclosure to the Jordanians about our sale to Israel. He said he could make a few comments about the sale to Jordan, in greatest secrecy and in the spirit of Secretary McNamara's statements to the Foreign Minister. The initial quantity supplied would be 12 aircraft. These and the 24 to follow would be delivered only against cash payment which, if forthcoming, would permit complete delivery by 1970. The Jordanians hope to be able to complete the necessary cash payments on schedule but we have considerable doubt about their ability to do so, since scheduled receipts from their outside source for this purpose would not permit acquisition on schedule unless they obtained advances of some type. Mr. Davies said he would consult with his superiors as to whether more information could be provided.

Mr. Evron expressed particular interest to have answers to questions no. 5 and 8. Regarding no. 5, for example, there was pressure from the Israeli military for details in order that adequate defenses could be devised. Mr. Evron said that as the U.S. had been forthcoming up to now, Israel hoped we would be in the future. Mr. Davies commented that the initial 12 aircraft with related equipment were within the ceiling price which had been based on the cost of MIGs, namely \$18.5 million. He noted that only a U.S. aircraft could compete pricewise with MIGs. He reminded Mr. Evron that there was a certain reciprocity about the principle that a U.S. sale to Jordan would be contingent on GOI agreement. The sale to Israel had also been contingent on such agreement. The Jordanians were well aware that we had something in the works for Israel. Mr. Evron said he recognized this.

Mr. Evron remarked that news of the U.S. sale to Jordan had been carried in the Sunday New York Times, on page 1, in its later editions, though not in the early editions reaching Washington readers.

U.S. Sale to Israel

Mr. Evron said that as he had remarked on April 1, his government insisted on advancing the disclosure of the U.S. aircraft sale to Israel by a week from the Department's proposed May 1 date. This would still allow a gap of over three weeks between the two announcements. Initial

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-3-

reports from the Foreign Office indicated that the Department's proposed text for the announcement was fine. He would be back in a few days to show the brief draft announcement which the GOI would then make, in full coordination with the U.S.

Mr. Davies responded that he had spoken at length to Ambassador Hare on this matter. We were delighted that Israel found that a gap of four weeks between announcements would give no problem, contrary to Israel's initial feeling. The difference in our positions was now only one week. We consider that there are major risks to American lives and property in the Arab area that could flow from the disclosure of the sale to Israel. Our decisions to sell aircraft to Jordan and Israel had been very painful and we must be aware of the risks we run. Our concept all along has been to handle publicity on both sales in low key. The Jordanian Government had cooperated fully. We would find disclosure of the sale to Israel in association with Israeli independence day ceremonies completely inconsistent with this concept. Ambassador Hare wants very much to discuss the problem face to face with our Ambassadors in the region at the Chiefs of Mission conference scheduled April 27 to 29. We are also anxious not to have the news surfaced in such a way that President Nasser could use it as a device to reunify the Arabs in a violent anti-Israel, anti-U.S. campaign. Mr. Davies said United States interests require holding off as long as possible and that we hope the GOI can see our major problems. He asked Mr. Evron to impress on Jerusalem the very great concern we have. He remarked that certainly the inclusion of the newly acquired Patton tanks in the Haifa parade would be a significant indication of GOI ability to provide its security needs.

In response, Mr. Evron noted that, after all, we are talking about only a week's time since previous discussions had narrowed our differences to that period. His personal thought was that disclosure of the sale in connection with Independence Day events would enable it to be woven into a larger picture and might thus result in its getting less publicity. It would not in that case be an item in itself. Mr. Davies disagreed with this analysis. Mr. Evron commented that the GOI had tried to meet our requests up to now and had played the announcement on Jordan in very low key.

Mr. Davies said he would raise the point again with Ambassador Hare and would notify Ambassador Barbour in Tel Aviv so that he would be completely filled in.

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SECRET - EXDIS

Israel Amman
✓ 2. Jordan Amman
123

SALE OF AIRCRAFT TO JORDAN AND ISRAEL - PLANS FOR DISCLOSURE

1. JORDAN

a. Initial Announcement. Embassy Amman is being instructed by immediate telegram the afternoon of April 1 to ask Jordan's Prime Minister to have the specified text read over the Hashemite Broadcasting Service news summary at 6:00 p.m. Amman time on Saturday, April 2 (text at enclosure 1).

b. Confirmation by Department. When questioned here (we anticipate this will be about noon Washington time on April 2) regarding the Jordanian announcement, the Department will respond with the statement at enclosure 2. Neither we nor the Jordanians will comment as to numbers or type of aircraft.

c. Israeli Government Statement. The GOI anticipates that it will be questioned on the Jordanian announcement about 7:00 p.m. Jerusalem time on April 2. It plans to stall until about 10:00 p.m. and then respond by putting out the statement at enclosure 3. (The Israelis were given copies of enclosures 1 and 2 on March 31.)

d. Informing our Allies. We briefed the U.K. Embassy here on March 30 regarding details of our sale to Jordan. We plan to brief the Canadian, French, German and Italian Embassies here the morning of April 2. All are being asked to hold the information very closely.

2. ISRAEL

a. Our Proposed Timing. We hope to withhold news of the sale to Israel until May 1, Ambassador Hare informed Ambassador Harman of this plan at a March 31 meeting. We gave as our reasons: (1) protecting King Hussein from Arab criticism alleging that his purchase from the U.S. triggered the U.S. sale to Israel; (2) allowing as long a gap as possible between the March 14-17 Arab Prime Ministers' Conference and our disclosure so as to prevent it from looking like a slap in the face to the Arabs--whose assembled Prime Ministers severely and publicly criticized our previous arms sales to Israel and outlined a campaign to remonstrate against us; (3) belief that allowing some weeks to pass might lessen the possibility of demonstrations and violence against certain of our embassies in the area; and (4) the fact that we plan a conference of U.S. diplomatic chiefs of mission for Beirut April 27-29 and would not want the disclosure to be made just before or during that meeting. The Israelis were given on March 31 a copy of a draft press release we are considering in this regard, but it was emphasized that it was only a draft and not fully cleared out within the USG (enclosure 4).

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/ly* NARA, Date *7-2-10*

SECRET - EXDIS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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-2-

b. Israeli View of Timing. Ambassador Harman and Minister Evron argued strenuously March 31 that a gap of as long as a month would pose extreme difficulty for the GOI. They argued that the opposition would put on great pressure and that it would "surround the government" with charges that the Prime Minister is not looking to Israel's security and that he is allowing lags in Washington on PL 480 and development loan requests and on the desalting project. At noon on April 1, Minister Evron saw Mr. Davies and stated that the Embassy had received a reply to its report of the March 31 Harman-Hare meeting and that it is the Prime Minister's desire to announce the Israeli purchase on the eve of Independence Day, i.e., April 24. It was decided to discuss further next week the question of timing (and place) of disclosure. We anticipate the Israelis will argue for initial disclosure in Tel Aviv rather than Washington.

Attachments:

Four, as noted.

NEA:NE:WDWolle:rw
4/1/66 *WJ*

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~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

123a

PROPOSED JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT PRESS RELEASE

The Government of Jordan announces that an agreement has been reached for purchase from the United States of a number of military jet aircraft for service in the Royal Jordanian Air Force. Delivery will be spaced over a specified period. The training of pilots is underway in the United States and in other countries.

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cbm/ly, NARA, Date 7-2-10

1236

SECRET - EXDIS

Enclosure No. 2

PROPOSED STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT

As the Department stated on February 5, the USG has, over the years, provided Jordan with limited amounts of arms to meet its defense requirements. We can confirm that an agreement has recently been reached between the United States and Jordan providing for Jordanian purchase of a limited number of military jet aircraft for its air defense system to replace older models.

Just as we will continue to refrain from becoming a principal supplier of arms to the Near East, so does it remain our policy not to discuss the specifics of such arms transactions as occur. Therefore, we are not in a position to go into the details of the equipment sold in this case. Our sale to Jordan was made both in the light of Jordan's defense requirements and in accordance with our policy of preventing instability from developing in the Near East. It is consistent with our due regard for area security and our general restraint as to the equipment supplied. We do not believe that this sale will be a destabilizing factor or contribute to imbalance in the area. In this connection, we continue to regret the massive Soviet sales of arms to the Near East which have intensified the arms race in that area, and we will continue to strive for agreed limitations on arms buildups there.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/kj* NARA, Date 7-2-10

PRESERVATION COPY

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By ehm/ky, NARA, Date 7-2-90

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS


Enclosure No. 2

PROPOSED STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT

As the Department stated on February 5, the USG has, over the years, provided Jordan with limited amounts of arms to meet its defense requirements. We can confirm that an agreement has recently been reached between the United States and Jordan providing for Jordanian purchase of a limited number of military jet aircraft for its air defense system to replace older models.

Just as we will continue to refrain from becoming a principal supplier of arms to the Near East, so does it remain our policy not to discuss the specifics of such arms transactions as occur. Therefore, we are not in a position to go into the details of the equipment sold in this case.

~~The arrangements made are consistent with our due regard for area security and our general restraint as to the equipment supplied. We do not believe that this sale will be a destabilizing factor or contribute to an imbalance in the area.~~ ^{In this connection} We continue to regret the massive Soviet sales of arms to the Near East which have intensified the arms race in that area, and we will continue to strive for agreed limitations on arms buildups there.



Our sale to Jordan was made both in the light of Jordan's defense requirements and in accordance with our policy of preventing instability from developing in the Near East. It is consistent with our due regard for area security and our general restraint as to the equipment supplied.

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

We do not believe ~~that~~ that this sale will be a destabilizing factor or contribute to imbalance in the area.

123d

Mr. Saunders :

FYE, I understand that
Ambassador Hare intends to ask
the Israeli Embassy to delete
the first sentence of their proposed
statement. But as I write
this I am not sure that either
he or Mr. Davies has yet taken
the matter up with the Embassy.

Hare has told
Davies to tell
emb. we want
first sentence
deleted.

W.D. Will

April 1 -

3:45 p.m.

123e

~~SECRET~~

Enclosure No. 3

PROPOSED ISRAELI GOVERNMENT STATEMENT

{ The Government of Israel has expressed its views on several occasions on the need to correct any imbalances arising from the sale of arms to Arab states. } The Government of Israel notes the statements of the United States on February 5 and April 2, indicating its desire to avoid destabilizing factors or the creation of arms imbalance.

The Government of Israel will urgently pursue its efforts to maintain the balance and correct any imbalances that may arise. The Government of Israel is fully confident that it will be able to maintain an effective deterrent to aggression and cope with any related problems that may arise from the announced U.S. sale to Jordan.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13202, Sec. 3.4
By *dom/hy*, NARA, Date 7-2-10

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Enclosure No. 4

123f

DRAFT DEPARTMENT PRESS STATEMENT ON SALE TO ISRAEL

As the Department's press spokesman stated on February 5, it has been established United States policy to refrain from becoming a principal supplier of arms in the Near East while retaining the option of helping the countries of the area to meet their defensive requirements through occasional selective sales. We have had occasion over a number of months to study military aircraft requests from certain countries in the area, examining them in the light of our general policy to determine whether such sales would be necessary to meet the requirements of those states for their self-defense. In so doing we have been mindful of the need to avoid any such sales that would be a destabilizing factor in the area.

In accordance with this policy, we have agreed to extend present bilateral military sales arrangements with Israel to include some military aircraft. The number is limited and the purpose is to avoid a serious imbalance that would jeopardize area stability.

Our decision on this request reflects our due regard for area security and our general restraint as to the equipment supplied. We continue to regret the massive Soviet sales of arms to the area which have intensified the arms race, and we will continue our striving for agreed limitations on arms buildups in the area.

Just as we will continue to refrain from becoming a principal supplier of arms to the Near East, so does it remain our policy not to discuss the specifics of our sales. Accordingly, we are not in a position to go into the details of the equipment furnished in this case beyond stating that the delivery of aircraft will be spread over a period of a year or more.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cbn/s, NARA, Date 7-21

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

14375

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

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Origin
SS
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN

PRIORITY 404

FEB 26 3 57 PM '66

Jordan arms

Your 496 ~~and Dep State~~

EXDIS

1. Request you deliver following oral message to King from President:

QTE After full and careful consideration of the problems you face, I have decided we should make a special effort on a one time basis to meet your request for supersonic defensive aircraft. You are already aware of the many reasons for our reluctance to make this decision. These reasons still exist. Our decision to proceed despite them takes into account the special relationship between our two countries and the extreme pressures that you have felt. The proposals that I have authorized Ambassador Barnes to deliver to you represent a maximum stretching of ^{our} policy ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ and I therefore earnestly hope that you will find them acceptable. UNQTE

2. You will receive by separate message further instructions regarding proposal you should present to King.

3. If King should remark on absence any reference in President's oral messages to his complaints about aid program or other sections his letter, you may state you informed full letter under study and that appropriate responses will be forthcoming. Dept would welcome any comments you have in that connection.

GP-3.

End

RUSK

*L.B.J.
to King
2/24/66*

Drafted by: NEA: NE; HMSymmes: fah: 2/24/66	Tel. Ext. 2942	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Raymond A. Hare s/s - Mr. Rattray White House - Mr. Komer
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