

~~SECRET~~

Monday, April 29, 1968

Mr. President:

Attached is Secretary Clifford's summary of where we stand on our Jordan arms program, which you requested.

The one point I might add is that Israel, Jordan and Jarring are all focussing seriously now on the chances for an Israel-Jordan political settlement without the UAR. If Hussein takes that route, he will need our support more than ever. We don't know yet exactly what that might involve, but the arms program must be seen today in that context as well as in the light of our more general support for Jordan.

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLT 97-283 (#38)
By cbw/ics, NARA, Date 8-28-05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, April 25, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Late Note Before You See John McCloy at 11:45 a. m.

When John McCloy saw King Hussein during his recent trip, Hussein was discouraged about our arms program. At that time, he had asked for certain items to be airlifted, and McCloy may raise this with you.

Paul Nitze has just agreed to a total of 13 flights to Jordan. The first 3 of these will simply be regular US military supply flights into Jordan which, among other material for our people, will also carry some communications and other such logistical equipment included in the Jordanian package. Then there will be 10 special flights, at Jordan's expense, beginning in 2-3 weeks and carrying such things as jeeps and recoilless rifles.

This action partly takes care of Hussein's complaint to McCloy. However, his main concern was discouragement over delays by Israel and Nasser in getting peace talks started. I'm sure he wishes we could lean harder on Israel.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (4335)

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By *cbm/rq*, NARA, Date 8-28-05

*Jordan Arms
x P.O. 3/*

~~SECRET~~

March 26, 1968

WWR:

NEA has asked me to make this check. If you call anyone with the President's response, could you call either me or Nick Katzenbach directly? Frankly, Nick was probably out of channels in telling Bill Handley to check directly with me rather than going through Ben Read, and I am just trying to avoid internal embarrassment over there.

Harold H. Saunders

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4(*342)
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *cbu/rq*, NARA, Date *8-28-05*

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, March 26, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Signing Jordan Arms Package

After weeks of negotiation, the Jordan Arms package is ready for signing. Nick Katzenbach would like to authorize Ambassador Symmes to sign tomorrow but does not want to go ahead without our OK. The plan is to do this without publicity for the moment.

As you know, this negotiation has gone on for some weeks. It just happens that all the details are now wrapped up. It may not be the best time in view of continuing terrorist attacks and last week's Israeli raid. However, there may not be any good time, and the main purpose of this exercise is to bolster Hussein. The equipment involved in this deal will not arrive in Jordan for some time.

For balance, Luke Battle has rescheduled the signing of the Israeli PL-480 agreement for this Friday morning. That will get some publicity.

My own feeling is that our public, especially the Jewish community, has accepted the resumption of military sales to Jordan. I doubt that the simple act of signing will cause much additional reaction, even if it leaks out. The press already writes as if the deal has long since been wrapped up.

Therefore, I recommend that we tell State to go ahead. But I do not wish to do so without informing you.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, #125
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

~~SECRET~~

Jordan Arms

4

March 13, 1968

~~SECRET~~

MEMO FOR MR. WILEY

The President has approved the attached. Will you kindly see that it gets to the proper person?

Hal Saunders

~~SECRET~~

Enc.: WWRostow Memo for the President,
3/12/68, Subj: Jordan Arms Package

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *cbm/4*, NARA, Date *7-2-10*

*Jordan Arms
x P.D. 5/*

~~SECRET~~

March 12, 1968

WWR:

I tried to avoid going back to the President on this, but Ed Hamilton agrees that we're better safe than sorry in building our Conte-Long record.

HHS

~~SECRET~~

Att: Memo for the President from WWRostow, 3/12/68,
Subj: Jordan Arms Package

50

ACTION

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, March 12, 1968 - 5:40 pm.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Jordan Arms Package

You will recall signing the Conte-Long waiver permitting us to go ahead with our Jordan arms package. The negotiations with King Hussein are just about wrapped up, and we believe we have a deal. State has just sent to Congress the required notice of your waiver with the rationale for it.

One small legal point has cropped up, which the lawyers feel we should clarify for the record.

I believe you were quite aware when you signed the determination that we were urging the Jordanians to buy some equipment--specifically tanks and some 18 Hawker-Hunter aircraft--from the UK. Jordan had in fact already bought 10-12 Hawker-Hunters late last year and is negotiating for 6-8 more.

The documents accompanying the waiver you signed took for granted these purchases in the UK but did not specifically say that your waiver included these purchases as well as the purchases from the US that you were approving. Because the Conte-Long amendment requires us to take into account purchases from all sources, the lawyers believe we should be scrupulous in creating an unmistakably clear record (without prejudging the question of whether these weapons are "sophisticated" or not). I hate to bother you with this detail, but I agree that the record should be complete.

There is no question that Jordan's purchases in the UK are in our interest because they serve the same purpose of blocking Soviet military aid while minimizing the political burden on us.

Therefore, may I clarify the record by stating that your waiver was made taking into account Jordan's purchases in other Western countries?

Yes _____

No _____

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 96-252 (#23)
By cbm/rg, NARA, Date 8-28-05

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Jordan Arms

6/

March 4, 1968

MEMO FOR WALT ROSTOW
HARRY McPHERSON
BAREFOOT SANDERS
MIKE MANATOS

In case you missed the attached Reuters dispatch last week, you may find it handy for use with any Member of Congress or of the Jewish Community who says that our decision to resume military shipments to Jordan is a threat to Israel.

Our answer is that a limited number of American arms in Jordan is no threat. Echhol's principal assistant says so in the attached. An unlimited number of Soviet arms backed by Soviet advisers in Jordan would be. We have resumed shipments to Jordan to keep the Soviets out.

Harold H. Saunders

cc: Bob Hardesty

Att: Reuters item of Feb. 26 from Atlanta, Ga.

ATLANTA, GA., FEB. 26 (REUTERS) -- A U.S. DECISION TO RESUME ARMS SHIPMENTS TO JORDAN WILL NOT AFFECT THE BALANCE OF ARMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, YAACOB HERZOG, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER LEVI ESHKOL'S OFFICE, SAID HERE LAST NIGHT.

"MY GOVERNMENT IS NOT CONCERNED WITH THIS DECISION BY THE UNITED STATES," HERZOG SAID IN AN INTERVIEW. "WHAT WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT IS THE FLOW OF ARMS FROM RUSSIA TO THE ARAB WORLD."

HERZOG SAID RUSSIAN ARMS SHIPMENTS HAVE REBUILT THE ARAB ARMIES TO THEIR PRE-WAR STRENGTH.

THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCED THIS MONTH IT WILL BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS OF THE RESUMPTION OF ARMS SHIPMENTS TO JORDAN. WASHINGTON SOURCES HAVE SAID THE MOVE WAS NECESSARY TO PROTECT WESTERN INFLUENCE IN THAT COUNTRY.

THE SOURCES SAID JORDAN ASKED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FOR M-48 PATTON TANKS, ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS, SELF-PROPELLED WEAPONS AND SOME OF THE 36 F-104 JET INTERCEPTORS PROMISED TO JORDAN BEFORE THE JUNE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR.

HERZOG, HERE TO OPEN A JEWISH WELFARE FUND CAMPAIGN, SAID A 30-YEAR EMOTIONAL BLOCK BETWEEN ARABS AND JEWS IS THE MAJOR OBSTACLE TO PEACE TALKS TODAY.

"WE FEEL THAT IF WE CAN GET FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED, PEACE WILL COME SOON," HE SAID, ADDING THAT SO FAR THE ARAB STATES HAVE NOT SHOWN A READINESS FOR TALKS.

REUTERS MB/HAA



Department of State

Jordan Amman

TELEGRAM

7

~~SECRET~~ 178

PAGE 01 AMMAN 07689 021602Z

3

44
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

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R 021505Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6863

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 7689

EXDIS

SUBJ: KING'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT

REF: AMMAN 7684

1. IN HIS LETTER TO PRESIDENT, HUSSEIN PROPOSES GENL KHAMMASH PROCEED TO WASHINGTON FOR DISCUSSION. I HAVE FINALLY MANAGED TO ARRANGE MEETING WITH KHAMMASH AT NOON ON THIRD SPECIFICALLY TO DISCUSS INTERNAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. I ALSO INTEND, HOWEVER, TO RAISE SEVERAL OUTSTANDING MILITARY MATTERS WITH HIM.

2. IF POSSIBILITY OF KHAMMASH VISIT TO WASHINGTON IS RAISED, I WOULD PLAN TO RESPOND ALONG LINES OF RATIONALE IN PARA ONE OF STATE 258556 WHICH WAS PASSED ON TO KHAMMASH IN LONDON (LONDON 13640).

SYMMEE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cbm/4 NARA, Date 7-2-10

~~SECRET~~
25

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

Pls. return to HHSaunders
Room 372-a eob when signed.

Jordan Arms
8

SECRET

Monday, April 29, 1968

Mr. President:

Attached is Secretary Clifford's summary of where we stand on our Jordan arms program, which you requested.

The one point I might add is that Israel, Jordan and Jarring are all focussing seriously now on the chances for an Israel-Jordan political settlement without the UAR. If Hussein takes that route, he will need our support more than ever. We don't know yet exactly what that might involve, but the arms program must be seen today in that context as well as in the light of our more general support for Jordan.

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 97-283 (#38)
By abufic NARA, Date 8-28-08

SECRET


Jordan Ames

9

See WWR memo for
President 4/29/68

MEMORANDUM 27 April 68
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Mr Clifford desires that
this be routed
through Mr Walt
Rostow to the President


Robert G. Gard Jr.
Lieutenant Colonel, USA
Military Assistant to
the Secretary of Defense

~~SECRET~~

9a

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

27 APR 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: US Arms for Jordan

In response to your inquiry on the subject of arms for Jordan, I attach for your consideration at Tab A, what we agreed to, and the current status of our commitments at Tab B.

To summarize where we are, we have authorized the release of previously financed MAP grant aid in the amount of \$3.8 million and some residual ground force equipment previously sold to Jordan in 1965. In addition, we have agreed to sell F-104 aircraft and ground force equipment (except heavy artillery). Such sales amount to about \$73.3 million and include 18 F-104 aircraft; 100 M48 tanks; 43 Armored Personnel Carriers; 23 artillery pieces; 1,035 miscellaneous vehicles; communications and engineer equipment; ammunition and spare parts.

We have not yet made substantial deliveries of the materiel involved except some MAP grant aid which arrived in Amman this week. We have approved an airlift of some of the ground force equipment that Jordan is buying. This airlift will involve ten C-141 aircraft, cost to be borne by Jordan.

Clark M. Siggard

Attachments - 2

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NLJ97-278 (#386)
By conf/iss, NARA, Date 8-28-05

Sec Def Cont Nr. X-2623

~~SECRET~~

TAB A

US-JORDAN ARMS AGREEMENT

The Memorandum of Understanding and Protocol thereto was the basis of the US-GOJ negotiations consummated on 28 March 1968.

The Jordanian commitments which are in the Protocol relate to

- (1) Jordanian reaffirmation of its policy of procuring all of its defense needs from Western sources;
- (2) An annual review of Jordanian military requirements;
- (3) A financial ceiling on Jordan's indigenously financed budget during CY 1968 at no more than \$56.5 million;
- (4) Full secrecy on all matters concerning the United States offer;
- (5) Jordan's assurance that it will not purchase major items of military equipment from other than United States sources without U.S. approval.

The Memorandum of Understanding commits the United States

- (1) To resume shipment of undelivered FY 1966-67 MAP Grant Aid;
- (2) To resume shipment of suspended ground force equipment sold to Jordan under a 1965 agreement;
- (3) To replace the bulk of ground force equipment lost in the June hostilities by selling specified items on a reimbursable basis;
- (4) To deliver eighteen F-104 aircraft and related equipment at a cost of approximately \$30.5 million;
- (5) To sell ground control radar equipment at a cost of approximately \$2.8 million;
- (6) To consider at some future point up to eighteen additional aircraft of a type to be mutually agreed upon.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

Authority NLS 97-278 (#38c)
By Amfics, NARA, Date 8-28-05

STATUS OF JORDAN ARMS PACKAGEGRANT MAP (\$3.8 million)

First shipment (target drone system; aiming circles; mortar sights, radios and spare parts) arrived in Jordan on 24 April (via weekly Military Airlift Command weekly flight). Ammo (11,300 Rds 105mm; 5250 Rds 106mm; 200 Rds 155mm) scheduled for sealift to arrive in Jordan on 7 June. Other miscellaneous equipment amounting to less than \$1.0 million is scheduled to move to Jordan via sealift over next few months.

SUSPENDED GROUND FORCE EQUIPMENT SOLD TO JORDAN IN 1965 (\$7.0 million)

In March 1965 the US agreed to sell to Jordan ground force equipment in the amount of \$44 million of which \$15 million was on credit terms. The bulk of the equipment sold to Jordan was delivered prior to the June Arab-Israeli hostilities. Some 200-300 various radios and miscellaneous spare parts suspended during the June Arab-Israeli hostilities are now scheduled to arrive in Jordan during May-June.

SALE OF GROUND FORCE EQUIPMENT LOST IN THE JUNE HOSTILITIES (\$40 million)

The appropriate sales documents have been transmitted to Amman for signature and deposit of funds by the Jordanians. The US has requested a deposit of \$25 million to cover deliveries of the ground force equipment through CY 1968. The balance will be delivered by the end of 1970. Some of the key items are 100 tanks (M48A1), 43 Armored Personnel Carriers, 23 105mm self-propelled artillery pieces and 24 self-propelled 40mm AA guns. An airlift involving ten C141 aircraft has been agreed to at Jordanian expense.

SALE OF 18 F-104 AIRCRAFT AND RELATED EQUIPMENT (\$30.5 million)

The appropriate sales documents are in Amman for signature and deposit of necessary funds by the Jordanians. Jordan has previously deposited \$10.0 million on this transaction and is being asked to pay \$10 million in 1968 and \$10.5 million in 1969 on this transaction.

GROUND CONTROL RADAR EQUIPMENT (\$2.8 million)

The Jordanians are still studying the specific requirements.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLT 97-238 (p 38d)
By cbw/jis NARA, Date 8-28-05

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

*Jordan
Arms*

10

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, March 26, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Signing Jordan Arms Package

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Therefore, I recommend that we tell State to go ahead. But I do not wish to do so without informing you.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

Call me

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, #125
By ctm, NARA, Date 8-24-05

~~SECRET~~

Pls return to HHSaunders *Jordan Arms*
Room 372-a EOB when signed. *11*

ACTION

SECRET

Tuesday, March 12, 1968 -5:40 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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Therefore, may I clarify the record by stating that your waiver was made taking into account Jordan's purchases in other Western countries?

Yes _____
No _____

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *NLS 96-252 (#23)*
By *cbn/jg*, NARA, Date *8-28-05*

W. W. Rostow

SECRET

Mrs. Saunders

12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Jordan arms

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Justification for Determination under Section 119 of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1968

Sent to Congress

The purchase of certain defense articles by the Government of Jordan is vital to the national security of the United States. King Hussein, an activist by nature, is in an increasingly frustrated mood. His domestic situation is disturbing. Despite his efforts there is little progress towards a political settlement with Israel and his people are gradually losing hope that Jordan will be able to recover the West Bank. The Jordanian Army is the only army in the general area which has not been significantly reequipped since last June. The U.S. Government has been the principal supplier of military equipment to Jordan in the past and the King now needs the assurance of continued American support which our supply of major military items would imply.

There is little doubt that Hussein would feel obliged to accept Soviet arms if we do not resume shipments of military equipment. The Soviets have made tempting offers and the army is becoming impatient over Hussein's refusal to accept their equipment.

In this situation, it is in the vital interest of the United States to resume shipments of military equipment to Jordan for the following reasons:

1. To strengthen Hussein so that he can carry out his role as principal proponent of a settlement with the State of Israel.

Starting with the Khartoum Conference in August, Hussein has been the leading Arab proponent of a political settlement with Israel as opposed to a "military solution." He has undertaken numerous trips to other capitals in the area to muster support for a reasonable political agreement. He believes that his regime will be seriously

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *clm/ly*, NARA, Date 7-2-10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

threatened if he does not succeed in obtaining the return of the West Bank. As a result he has taken positive action to stop terrorism which he feels is reducing the possibility of a political settlement. By strengthening Hussein we are increasing the possibility that he will be able to negotiate a settlement with Israel. We would also make it more likely that he will be able to retain control of the situation in Jordan after a settlement becomes public knowledge.

2. To avoid loss of U.S. credibility and prestige which would ensue if Jordan accepted Soviet equipment.

We have invested over one-half billion dollars in Jordan in economic and military assistance over the last decade. The existence of an independent stable and moderate Jordan has been a key element of our policy in the area. Failure of the United States to provide arms to Jordan and a subsequent turning to the Soviet Union by the Jordanian regime would have serious adverse effects on our relations with other moderate states in the area and would be generally considered a blow to our credibility and prestige.

3. To avoid further polarization towards a U.S.-supported Israel and a Soviet-supported Arab world.

If the USSR supplies arms to Jordan, Soviet influence would be extended into one more Arab state. This would be particularly serious because Jordan occupies a key geographic area on Israel's eastern border. Russian prestige would be further engaged with the Arabs and, in the event of another conflict, the Soviets would be more likely to feel obliged to take action to protect their prestige. A definite danger would then exist that an Arab-Israeli conflict would become a US-USSR confrontation.

In the light of these considerations, we believe we should agree to sell to Jordan a limited number of items of military equipment lost in the June hostilities, not including heavy artillery.* We should also agree to sell Jordan 18 F-104 aircraft pursuant to the sales agreement of March 1966. At the end of this fiscal year we should review all political and economic factors bearing upon this sales program and then determine the types and amounts of equipment to be sold in the subsequent fiscal year.

* After taking account of planned purchases of Hawker Hunters and other military equipment from the UK,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Recommendation:

That you determine that it is vital to the national security of the U.S. that Jordan receive certain items of military equipment, including 18 F-104 aircraft, from the United States.

NEA/ARN:MWiley:psw 3/5/68

Clearances: L
AID
G/PM
NEA - Mr. Davies
NEA/ARN - Mr. Houghton
NEA/RA - Mr. Sober

Pls. return to HHSaunders
Room 372-a EOB when signed.

Jordan Arms 13

*signed + sent
3/11/68*

Monday, March 4, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

More on the theme of responding to the concerns of Jewish audiences. I want to be sure the attached Reuters dispatch of last week was brought to your attention. Any Member of Congress or of the Jewish community who feels our resumption of military shipments to Jordan is a threat to Israel should ponder it.

Our answer is that a limited number of American arms in Jordan is no threat. Eshkol's principal assistant says so in the attached. An unlimited number of Soviet arms backed by Soviet advisors in Jordan would be. We have resumed shipments to Jordan to keep the Soviets out.

W. W. Rostow