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01d	rpt	"Narrative and Guide to Documents" Dup. #4, NSF, NSC Histories, South Asia, Box 24 <i>open 7/13/17 per NLJ/RAC 12-413</i>	TS	8	undated	A
02	memo	Wriggins to Rostow	S	4	7/24/67	A
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*South Asia
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January 8, 1969

PRESIDENTIAL POLICY TOWARD SOUTH ASIA

1962 - 1966

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By *ctm/igp* NARA, Date *9-7-05*

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PREFACE

The documents which follow have been assembled from the working files of the staff of McGeorge Bundy. Additional material will be available in the Bundy files. However, this collection is complete enough for the purpose of these volumes.

Unlike the other documentary histories assembled by the Rostow staff in the closing months of President Johnson's Administration, the purpose of these volumes is to provide a broad survey of four years of US relations with the Indian subcontinent. Whereas the crisis histories provide a comprehensive record of a relatively brief period of decision, the purpose of these volumes is to plot the important milestones in a gradual shift of relationships.

The rationale behind this different approach is simple. We started to do a crisis history of the three weeks' war between India and Pakistan. Our first stab at the material persuaded us that this in itself did not involve Presidential decisions of the first magnitude. It was clear that the significant decisions which reshaped our posture toward this important part of the world were made on other issues over a much longer period. Therefore, Walt Rostow and I decided that we should take this study outside the project of intensive crisis histories and put together this more general survey.

Harold H. Saunders
Member, Senior Staff
National Security Council

January 8, 1969

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INTRODUCTION

Summary of Major Presidential Decisions during the
Change in South Asian Alignments

During President Johnson's Administration the major political development in South Asia was the breakdown in a contradictory system of alignments built up during the 1950's. In possibly oversimplified terms, in the late 1950's, the United States was closely allied with Pakistan, had acceptable relations with neutralist India, and opposed Communist influence on the sub-continent. Both Moscow and Peking had fairly good relations with New Delhi, but neither was close to Karachi. Although Indo-Pakistani relations were poor, there was no immediate prospect of a conflict.

In the early 1960's, the surfacing of Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet differences and a revival of the Indo-Pakistani rivalry resulted in a new system. By 1966, Pakistan and China had moved much closer together in mutual opposition to India. Although the USSR maintained its ties with India, it had begun efforts to improve relations with Pakistan. The American alliance with Pakistan no longer had any substance, and Washington, like Moscow, was moving towards more balanced relations with the two South Asian nations.

During this change, the United States with its strong position in Pakistan stood to lose the most of the outside powers. The United States was never in a position to determine the course of events, however, so many of the President's decisions could do no more than minimize the damage to American interests.

The major Presidential decisions during this period were:

1. President Kennedy's decision to go to India's aid against China in 1962. The decision was probably made shortly prior to his October 28 letter to Nehru but his policy had tended in this direction since the spring and further decisions implementing the basic decision would be made by him and President Johnson in the next three years. In deciding to give military aid to India, the President began the move away from the previous close alliance with Pakistan, and the move towards greater cooperation with India against China.

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2. A series of decisions by President Johnson in the spring and summer of 1965 designed to bring India and especially Pakistan into line with American policies. The most important were the cancellation of the Ayub and Shastri visits in April, the decision to withhold aid which led to the postponement of the Pakistan consortium, and the stalling on military aid.

It has been theorized that these decisions were an important factor in driving Ayub to war over Kashmir, that they would have been successful had Ayub realized his own best interests, or that nothing the President could have done would have changed the course of events in South Asia. The answer is to be found in New Delhi and Islamabad.

3. The President's meeting with Ayub in December 1965. The meeting--and decisions immediately preceding it--ended the US-Pakistan alliance, allowed a new understanding in both Washington and Rawalpindi and the development of a new relationship consistent with the new situation in South Asia.

4. President Johnson made a series of decisions on economic aid. This collection of documents deals with these decisions only in the context of political pressures for political ends. The President, however, also had economic and domestic political reasons for his decisions, and they led to important changes in the thrust of our aid program and our approach to the world food-population problem. This aspect of his South Asian policy is covered more fully in the background documents for another study--The President and the Indian Famine.

These documents were collected from the files of the National Security Council to show some of the thinking behind President Johnson's decisions. Because he inherited a fully developed problem and a basic policy from President Kennedy the collection begins with Kennedy's reaction to the events of 1962. The shifting of alignments had not completely worked itself out by the end of 1968, but the main elements of the new pattern were evident by the spring of 1966.

The following are short summaries of the documents contained in each tab. These summaries are intended to indicate the episode covered by each tab, to show the relationship among the documents, and, in some cases, to highlight significant points. In general, no attempt was made to treat individual documents separately.

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NARRATIVE AND GUIDE TO THE DOCUMENTS

1962

A. The Kennedy Administration

1. These three memos indicate the views of the President and his staff on South Asia at the beginning of 1962. Pushtoonistan was of major concern, there was an inclination to side with Pakistan on Kashmir, and the problem of balancing relations with India and Pakistan was mentioned in connection with possible arms sales to India "if the Sino-Indian dispute gets worse," but it was not given major emphasis.

2. Indian defeats in the Himalayas in the fall of 1962 would bring a dramatic US involvement in military supply to India, but in May Indian plans to acquire MIG jet fighters from the USSR led to consideration of American aircraft sales to India. The primary aim was not to strengthen India against China, but to limit Soviet influence. On June 15, the President decided to support British jet fighter sales, but India decided to take the Soviet offer. The effect of American arms sales to India on our relations with Pakistan was considered throughout this episode, but it was hoped that Ayub could be mollified by pointing out that India would receive planes in any case.

3. The initial reaction in Washington to the Indian defeats in the Himalayas was mixed, with the three main elements being recognition of the possibility that the US would have to help India, hope that India would be forced out of its neutralist position, and some concern over the probable Pakistani reaction to US military support for India.

On October 28, President Kennedy sent letters to both Ayub and Nehru. To Nehru he offered "support as well as sympathy," To Ayub he wrote that we would "insure, of course, that whatever help we give will be used only against the Chinese." On November 5, Ayub replied pointing out that most of the Indian army remained deployed against Pakistan, citing a long list of broken Indian promises as evidence that US arms would be used against Pakistan, and informing the President that the Pakistanis believed Chinese military objectives were limited.

Despite Ayub's letter, there was considerable optimism that the US could achieve a basic reorientation in Indian foreign policy without undue damage to US-Pakistani relations. Nehru's letter of November 19, appeared to indicate that India was ready to abandon neutralism. Among

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other things Nehru asked for 12 all-weather fighter squadrons to be manned by Americans for operations over India and two B-47 squadrons to be manned by Indians. On November 27, with the Indian military situation still critical despite a cease-fire, the President decided the US should send transport aircraft and a mission to New Delhi to explore Indian needs. The Chinese withdrawal beginning December 1 removed some of the urgency from the arms aid for India, but the President decided to go ahead with the policy and at Nasseu arranged a joint US-UK effort.

1963

4. On May 9, the President approved going forward on Indian air defense arrangements. This was a confirmation of decisions made in November and December of 1962. In late April, the President had made it clear that we couldn't afford to let the Indians "get into a position where they feel that they can't cope with the Chicoms and Paks on top of their other problems."

5. In August, the President decided to send Under Secretary Ball to Pakistan to attempt to reach an understanding with Ayub. From his remarks at the August 12 meeting, President Kennedy apparently didn't expect Ball to achieve all his goals. After his trip Ball reported some success but it was obvious that Indo-Pakistani problems would continue to plague Washington's relations with Karachi. The tone of the analyses of Bundy's staff seems slightly more optimistic than Ball's remarks to the President.

6. In October, the President saw Ayub's two most prominent foreign policy advisors, pro-American Finance Minister Shoaib and anti-American Foreign Minister Bhutto. Although the Bundy staff recommended a somewhat tougher line, President Kennedy put the emphasis on reassuring the Pakistanis of our support.

7. On November 11, Nehru wrote to Kennedy outlining India's view of the situation in South Asia. The letter is interesting mainly as an indication of the degree to which India had returned to many of its former views in the year since Nehru's plea for American manned fighter squadrons.

1963

B. The Johnson Administration

1. In September 1965, Robert Komer prepared a list of President Johnson's major decisions on South Asia. His compilation is substantially accurate, but the "9 December 1963" letter to Ayub was sent a few days later, and the "30 January 1963" letter does not appear to have been sent. (See Tab B-4).

2. On November 29, President Johnson saw Bhutto and pointed out the dangers to mutual relations if Pakistan continued to make gestures toward the Chinese. On December 9, he wrote to Ayub along the same lines. Among other things, the President may have been trying to disabuse the Pakistanis of the notion that he was pro-Pakistani and would reverse Kennedy's "pro-Indian" policies.

3. General Taylor's mission to India and Pakistan had been planned during the Kennedy Administration. On his return, Taylor recommended a five-year military assistance for India and begin with an interim one-year program. He recommended a similar program for Pakistan. In commenting on Taylor's report, Komer recommended that the President establish a principle of parallelism in our relations with India and Pakistan. On February 8, 1964, the President approved exploratory approaches on MAP with both countries.

1964

4. On January 21, Ayub sent the President a long letter explaining why Pakistan was taking Kashmir to the Security Council again. Komer recommended against any reply, and especially the long reply State had prepared. The President agreed that State's version was unsuitable, and asked for a short, more personal letter. Because the Security Council was already meeting on Kashmir, State felt any reply should be delayed for a few days. There is no indication in NSC files that further action was taken.

5. This collection of documents from February, March and April show the effort to reevaluate US policy towards South Asia. The problem was how to improve relations with India without losing ground in Pakistan, with the subsidiary problem of limiting Chinese gains in Karachi. The thinking tended towards pressure on Ayub, especially to prevent his raising Indo-Pakistani tensions. There was, however, some realization that an Indo-Pakistani crisis was approaching.

6. Nehru's daughter, the future Prime Minister Gandhi, saw the President on April 27. He took the occasion to assure her of US support for India, and to refute her statement to the press that we favored Pakistan.

7. In May and early June, the White House staff detected an improvement in Indo-Pakistani relations, and still felt that US-Pakistani relations were not deteriorating. It was in this atmosphere that Indian Defense Minister Chavan arrived to negotiate our military assistance program. Although the Indians did not get all they wanted, they felt the visit was successful. On June 3, Komer planned to tell the President, "Nor will the Paks be too unhappy because we haven't given much yet."

8. By late June adverse reaction to the arms negotiations with India was increasing in Pakistan. On July 7, Pakistani Ambassador Ahmed called on the President to deliver a letter from Ayub. Ayub told the President that there was little possibility of a Sino-Indian conflict and that US arms aid would be used against Pakistan, and that help for India made it more difficult to achieve a Kashmir settlement. The President told the Ambassador that he was shocked by Ayub's silence on Vietnam, and much later in the meeting that we might be approaching the point at which we would have to reevaluate our relationship. The effect of Nehru's death on May 24 on Indo-Pakistani relations and consequently on US-Pakistani relations is outside the scope of this study, but it is possible that it was an important factor in Ayub's decision to protest arms shipments so strongly.

9. On July 15, the President saw Ambassador McConaughy. McConaughy recommended that the President invite Ayub to Washington to talk out US differences with Pakistan. The President rejected this suggestion, and told McConaughy to deliver an oral message to Ayub indicating the President's distress at Ayub's views on US aid to India and at Pakistan's attention to Peking. The President also observed that with the Pakistanis refusing to help in South East Asia we didn't seem to be getting much for our economic aid, an observation which brought aid more into the political. Previously the main aid question had been import liberalization. On July 29, more specific instructions were sent to McConaughy.

10. Shoaib ended a visit to Washington by talking with McGeorge Bundy on September 25. Bundy explained our position to the pro-American Shoaib, and Shoaib explained Pakistan's difficulties in accepting our actions. Komer's briefing memorandum for Bundy probably reflects accurately some of the frustration felt by those in Washington who dealt with Pakistan.

1965

11. In March studies began on an Indian request for six squadrons of F-5's. There were a number of difficulties in deciding on an answer--including the fighting in the Rann of Kutch--and later a decision to stall on MAP to both India and Pakistan. (See Komer to the President, June 21, Tab B-15.) The F-5 question was unresolved when all arms shipments ended in September.

12. Invitations for Ayub and Shastri had been under consideration for some time. (See Tabs B-7 and B-9) Komer's two memos of April 2, outline some of the difficulties expected in entertaining Ayub but indicate clearly that the visit was still expected. By April 5, the President was thinking of cancelling both visits, and he made the final decision on April 7.

Among the reasons for cancelling Ayub's invitation was the feeling that his defense of Pakistan's relations with China and his attitude on Vietnam would have an adverse effect on the AID bill. There was also the question of whether the visit would improve or worsen relations with Pakistan. Because the President would not meet Ayub it was necessary to cancel Shastri's visit as well. The 15 April cable to Bowles, however, indicates that the President felt neither he nor Shastri would be in a position to "talk turkey" and that Shastri's visit would focus unwelcome attention on South Asian bickering and the apparent lack of economic progress despite large amounts of US aid.

In assessing the cancellations on April 21, Komer thought that they might have been handled better because "we ended up hitting Shastri harder" than Ayub, but that the operation was a success on the whole, and "Ayub got the signal."

13. The British moved quickly to solve the Rann of Kutch crisis and their efforts were successful so there was never any need for great US involvement. There was also some reluctance to upset an apparently successful British effort by our own involvement, but the President did send Prime Minister Wilson a message that "he would be happy if Prime Minister chose to say President as eager as Prime Minister in devoutly hoping for early agreement."

Both Shastri and Ayub wrote to the President to present their side of the argument, and complain about US arms supplied to the other. The President's answer to Shastri is in Tab B-20.

14. On June 9, the President directed that no additional decisions be made on aid to India and Pakistan without his prior approval pending passage of the aid bill and asked for an early review of our aid relationship with the sub-continent. Basic to this decision was the President's feeling that the US was not getting enough for the money it spent. In late April, shortly after the cancellation of the Ayub and Shastri visits, he had directed that our pledge to the Indian consortium be made without obligation to specific levels and timing, and had limited aid authorizations to four minor loans.

Through May and June pressure mounted from the sub-continent and within the US government for action, but as Komer's May 30 memo shows there was also a feeling that we should move to using aid to gain political ends. Judging by Komer's memorandum for the June 9 meeting, the main purpose was not to decide on future aid levels, but to inform those responsible for our aid program of the President's misgivings, and of the need for greater political results.

15. Along with the aid decision, the President began a much broader effort to influence Indian and Pakistani policies. Among the tools the US government used were: economic aid (Tab B-16), military aid (Tab B-17), the US installation at Peshawar (Tab B-18), and a number of official and unofficial communications to both countries (Tabs B-19 and B-20).

16. The most important result of the June aid decision was the postponement of the Pakistan Consortium. The postponement was designed to show Ayub that American aid was far from automatic, and to be a forceful reminder that his relations with China and other US-Pakistani difficulties could endanger his nation's economy. Ayub took the news very hard, and instead of reacting as Washington hoped, made the postponement a major public issue. Subsequent efforts are covered in Tab 19.

Indian aid presented fewer problems, in part because much aid for India was already committed. The President did use his talk with Ambassador Nehru to point out that India's attitude on Vietnam made it more difficult for him to get aid bills through Congress.

17. The decision to stall on MAP is covered in part by documents in Tab B-15. These two documents merely indicate some of the problems involved in sticking to that decision.

18. Threatening to remove our installation at Peshawar was probably the most delicate means of getting at Ayub. Despite Bundy's memorandum outlining a course of action, little was done--there was no assurance that Ayub wouldn't welcome the removal of an installation which greatly complicated his relations with Peking and Moscow. In fact, in 1968, when the agreement was due for renegotiation, he chose not to renew it.

19. The major effort at communication was directed at Pakistan following the consortium postponement. Because of Ayub's reaction to the consortium the first efforts were at unofficial communication. The President wanted Ayub to be told that Pakistan couldn't run our India policy, and that we didn't want to dominate Pakistan, and he wanted a visit from Ayub soon. An oral message from Ayub through a non-government channel gave the President an opportunity to reply that Ayub had an open invitation to Washington, but that President Johnson wouldn't be bullied. Later in August another message offering an invitation was sent through the UN ambassadors.

20. Relations with India followed a much smoother course during the summer of 1965. Probably the most important message was the President's request in July for Indian help in Vietnam, which followed his explanation of US policy to Shastri in June. By August 20, the President had decided to invite Shastri in Washington.

21. These documents and those under Tabs B-22, B-23, and B-24 supplement the appendix--the State Department's "The Indo-Pakistan War and its Aftermath." Documents attached to the Department's study have not been included in these tabs, but several covering memos for these documents have.

Although done without the benefit of NSC files, State's study of US policy during the war is substantially correct. The major addition these documents make to State's study is to point out the emphasis placed by the President and his staff on taking an even-handed and balanced approach. The primary worry does not appear to have been ending the war, but preserving the US position in both India and Pakistan, although we did participate energetically in efforts to achieve a cease-fire.

These documents also add a letter from Shastri explaining India's invasion of Pakistan which Ambassador Nehru delivered directly to the President.

22. These documents provide considerable amplification to State's account of US policy in the immediate post-war period. For the Bundy staff the major issue remained keeping a good US position in both India and Pakistan, and this led to considerable sentiment that the US should stay out of the middle on a peace settlement. This did not preclude strong efforts to encourage India and Pakistan to settle their differences.

23. State's account of the Ayub visit may leave the impression that the major purpose was to urge a peaceful settlement. As can be seen from the documents leading up to the visit, peace was important but US-Pakistani relations were of more importance. Komer's December 12 memorandum to the President is the most thorough treatment of this theme.

24. Following the Tashkent agreement on January 10 and Shastri's death the next day the Indo-Pakistani problem underwent a new examination. The State study covers the resulting actions, the most important of which were decisions on military sales and economic aid. These documents give some of the thinking behind those decisions and indicate that the main consideration was still the enhancement of the US position in both India and Pakistan.

25. Prime Minister Gandhi's visit was concerned primarily with economic matters and is covered more fully in The President and the Indian Famine, a study in the series of crisis histories done by the Rostow staff and available in the Johnson Library. The main political importance of the visit may have been its economic emphasis. As the President told Komer on March 27, the visit was "with the slate wiped clean of previous commitments and India coming to us asking for a new relationship." The letter to Ayub reporting on the visit also shows that the United States had ended the old commitments to Pakistan and begun building a new relationship with the slate wiped clean.

26. An analysis of the parallelism in US and Soviet policies towards South Asia.

May 29, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR WWR

SUBJECT: Regionalism in Southeast Asia -- be careful of the pace we set.

In all capitals I touched (K. L., Singapore, Indonesia, Manila) they hoped I would carry back the message that we must not hurry the growth. Regionalism is important and we are making good progress. But too much urgency from us will make it so obviously an American affair as to deter governments and discredit the whole in the eyes of opposition leaders who will tar it with an American brush.

Moreover, each country had its own particular reason for going slow, quite apart from standard reluctance to innovate.

K. L. fears that if too many institutions are focused on Singapore, the Chinese will come to dominate the regional economic institutions, as they have come to dominate local economies.

Singapore fears that we are using regionalism as an excuse for leaving the small countries (like Singapore) at the mercy of the large -- Japan or Indonesia.

Manila, particularly, is prone to worry about American sponsorship as a political liability in domestic politics, though this troubles Singapore and Indonesia, too.

Indonesia -- Marshall Green's clients have three problems with regionalism, as they fear we may press it. (a) Indonesia has a very few qualified chaps, and every meeting, every regional activity distracts these from the urgent problem of getting the Indonesian economy going again; this in itself is such a huge and urgent matter, that all hands are needed for that essential task, whereas some of the regional matters are really marginal, like SEAMES, for instance. (b) Most of the local initiative comes from Bangkok, yet to Djakarta, Bangkok is strongly aligned with us in the present confrontation and Indonesians want to keep their non-aligned standing, because they need Russian help on their huge debt, on spares for their army and to balance China on the mainland; (c) given Indonesia's size, Indonesians think they, not small and archaic Bangkok or conservative K. L., should take the lead, whereas ASA is a Bangkok and Tunku initiative. (d) They also wonder

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By clm/ly, NARA, Date 10-19-10

if we, the U. S., aren't pressing so hard in order to leave them all to the tender mercies of the Japanese. Marshall therefore urges caution. Specifically, he hopes we can call off the over-enthusiastic AID types out of Bangkok who want to set up a regional affairs office in Djakarta, when in Indonesia our policy -- quite rightly in Marshall's view -- calls for a low posture and minimum AID personnel in Djakarta.

Accordingly I would favor our leaning on the AID regional enthusiasts to ease up on Djakarta.

In Manila, the Asia Development Bank people also urged the same caution. For example, they had one hell of a time making acceptable the special fertilizer fund. This was not because Asians in the Bank were against the idea or the offer, but because the deadline we set was so short -- end of our fiscal year -- that we were virtually facing them with an ultimatum to accept our proposal with a very minimum of discussion or lose the money entirely, which would have adversely affected their relationship with Congress and the likelihood of getting their basic appropriation. Here the question was more one of manner and style than substance. Could we have managed our own internal accounting in a way to show sufficient respect to the autonomy and freedom of choice of the IDB? This is important to avoid the impression we are pushing them around.

Management question. Who is on top of these matters of style and pace for regionalism in SEA so that we do not seem to push them around while we nevertheless press them forward?

-- Who is in charge of the pace of regional initiatives? _____

-- Could I press them to ease up Bangkok's pressure on Djakarta till Indonesia's internal affairs are more nearly sorted out? _____

Howard Wriggins

*South
Asia*4~~SECRET~~

November 4, 1966

TO: W. W. Rostow
FROM: Howard Wriggins
SUBJECT: After the President's Trip: Some Reflections on
Policy toward Asia

No doubt you have come home with many new impressions and good ideas as to how we can back up the President's statements during his trip. These comments are from the side lines in Washington. As I see it from my perspective:

1. The President's trip dramatized several points:

(a) We are not alone in the fight in Vietnam. That source of criticism will no longer be persuasive at home.

(b) We are determined to see it through in Vietnam, not on Hanoi's terms, though we are not unreasonable and are ready to get out when order is restored and is likely to last.

(c) We have a constructive role in Asia. We stand ready to provide certain types of support to Asian countries threatened by Chinese or other Communist aggression, or who are ready to strive for development and collaborate with their neighbors. This support will be of several forms:

(i) military assistance to help regimes fight subversion

and/or aggression;

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By cbm/ico NARA, Date 9-7-05

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(ii) generous economic assistance to help defeat poverty, disease and cramped opportunity;

(iii) a nuclear deterrent umbrella of some kind to protect regimes from nuclear blackmail;

(iv) behind this defense "shield" and with these developmental hopes, the smaller Asian countries will have an opportunity to draw together regionally and to face their problems cooperatively.

2. Most of the talk at the meetings was about Vietnam. But the public statements evoked notions of a more serious U. S. commitment to Asia beyond Vietnam.

(a) In the first instance, the President underlined our commitments to the Six at Manila. These six Asian countries cannot hope to get along without substantial U. S. backing -- in the form of our direct physical presence, large economic assistance and/or some overall military umbrella, as yet only vaguely specified; and for the long run, they will require some kind of defense support.

(b) But secondly, his statements about the wider Asia suggested constructive involvement beyond the Six. Other major Asian countries are part of the total Asian enterprise -- Indonesia, Japan and India (with or without Pakistan) are the local giants. In the long run, only India and Japan can hope to add an independent counterweight to China. (In terms of population and GNP, the six who are with us in Vietnam represent 100, 000, 000 people and roughly \$39 billion GNP. By

comparison, the Big Three and Pakistan represent 720, 000, 000 people and \$127 billion GNP.)

3. Now remains the problem of making credible our commitment to the constructive enterprise in Asia for the longer run. It would be presumptuous for me to comment on what this will require, either with the Manila six or the Pacific Asian giants -- Japan and Indonesia. The giants of South Asia, however, are also relevant.

4. For the longer run, the South Asian giants are important to success in Pacific Asia.

Admittedly neither of these South Asian giants is likely to be an acquiescent ally of ours. Each will seek to underline its independence. India has a special interest in sustaining Soviet backing against China, and Pakistan has a need to spread its bets to reinsure itself against India. These countries, then, will not be the agreeable dependencies we can foresee in the Manila Six. They will annoy us; they will presume to criticize us; they will demand patience from us.

Nevertheless, so long as China is expansionist or active on behalf of wars of national liberation, a viable India is a substantial asset to us. Pakistan's relationship with China poses a problem, but if that is held within bounds, Pakistan's effective viability is preferable to a disintegration which could bring down both countries in turmoil and disorder.

Compared to the dramatic political instability of South Vietnam, Indonesia, or Korea until recently, India and Pakistan have been remarkably

orderly and effective as governments. We take their survival and viability for granted. If India or Pakistan unravel, or if they are at each other's throats, that part of the Chinese periphery becomes soft and tempting. India's possible role in the future economy of Southeast Asia will not evolve. Disintegration of either would risk bringing down the other and sharply increase uncertainty all across Asia from *Southeast* the Persian Gulf area and Arabia peninsula. What happens in the *Asia to* western flank of Southeast Asia will affect China's view of its opportunities and will considerably influence assessments by leaders in Southeast Asia of future power relations in the area.

5. Accordingly, South Asia remains important to our Asian enterprise.

(a) It remains a substantial U. S. interest that India succeed as a huge working democracy of over 400, 000, 000 people in Asia. Here something is already in-being; it does not need to be built from scratch, as in Vietnam. Nor has it just come to a promising but still untested beginning, as in South Korea. It is established, but it must be sustained. A growing economy and expanding opportunity for its people will ease the task of governance; shrinking opportunity and diminishing hopes will greatly increase the political risks. Failure here would open opportunities for Moscow and Peking-dominated Communist leadership.

(b) We retain substantial interest that Pakistan continue as an exemplar of successful economic development policy, with our assistance;

that we retain tolerable relations with Pakistan to ensure continued access to our facilities, and to minimize the chances of a move of desperation against India.

(c) These interests remain, regardless of the level of tensions between India and Pakistan, short of open conflict. Open conflict provides opportunity for the Chinese and Russians to make gains. Indo-Pakistan tension does absorb a proportion of resources otherwise available for civilian development. We should persist in efforts to moderate their conflict and reduce their defense expenditures directed against each other. But we should remember that defense costs run about 4% of GNP in the case of India and 5% for Pakistan, which is not out of line for most underdeveloped countries on the Sino-Soviet periphery. *

6. Present aid levels are insufficient to stimulate adequate economic momentum.

(a) John Lewis estimates that \$1.4 - \$1.6 billion per year is what is now required in India to generate real momentum, though they have agreed that \$1.2 is a figure to go for, as a rock bottom. This calls for roughly \$500 million from the U.S. For the first time we start the year without any carry-over, so that actual appropriations this year will be what is in fact available. Yet we are starting the budget process this

*Military expenditures as % of GNP, past five years averaged:

Turkey	5.2%
Iran	4.4%
Thailand	2.3%
Korea	4.4%

year with a figure of \$460 million and may end up with only \$400 million. This will not evoke sufficient help from the others, will mean an import lag and postpone the start of new projects.

(b) Economic aid levels for Pakistan are more nearly adequate, but may not be sufficient to permit a return to open imports.

(c) We have already demonstrated to both countries that they dare not take us or our aid for granted. I need not remind you of the economic advantages of predictability once certain disincentives have induced necessary policy changes.

7. Recommendation:

It is now time to stress reliability and predictability, rather than the uncertainty principle, which LBJ has seemed to prefer up till now.

Concretely, we should:

(a) Go ahead with PL 480 to Pakistan and India as firmly as our supply situation permits, with our usual and now well-understood caveats on agricultural production.

(b) Up our aid levels to at least \$500 million for India and \$230 million for Pakistan.

(c) We should consult on the Hill to permit a more forthcoming U. S. negotiating position in the India and Pakistan consortia.

(d) Mount a major effort, sponsored by LBJ, to obtain more economic resources for Asian development. (A "Herter Committee," a "Paul Hoffman Committee", a new Senate study on U. S. in Asia and the resources needed, etc.)

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(e) Sort out more concretely how to provide persuasive reassurance against Chicom nuclear blackmail. The President's speech in Kuala Lumpur is a public beginning.

- More specific private assurances may be necessary.
- Some actions on NSAM 355 may be speeded up.
- DoD's policy of running down MAP may have to be reversed.

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So. Asia
x India 5

November 4, 1966

Mrs. Ann Hamilton -

Mr. Saunders thought you
would be interested in the attached
in view of your discussion earlier.

Thelma M. Toles

Att: Cy, HHS Memo for Howard Wriggins, 11/3/66,
re South Asia and India

*South
Asia* 6

November 3, 1966

TO: W. W. Rostow

FROM: Howard Wriggins

SUBJECT: Perspective on Asia

As you can imagine, I am concerned that the very constructive and exciting Presidential activity in Southeast Asia and the Pacific may distract him from the now rather tiresome but nevertheless important tasks of sustaining our Indian and Pakistani enterprises.

These South Asian giants are important in themselves as well as ensuring our position in the rest of Asia. We have here a ready-made and huge Indian democracy sharing a 2,000-mile frontier with China and a large though troubled Pakistan. Together they represent over 500,000,000 people, five times the population of the six countries we met with at Manila.

During the President's trip a number of commitments to constructive action in Asia were made. It would be unfortunate if we neglected the potential weight of these already established though still incompletely polities. I do not begrudge the Vietnam investment of \$2 billion per month. But 1/24th of that annual cost would make a very substantial difference to the Asian giants of India and Pakistan. (In addition, Indonesia will also need economic and technical assistance attention, and Japan will require a continuing and politically tolerable security backup.)

Do you think now is the time to prepare the ground for moving the President from his wait-and-see posture on India? Before we can go far in South Asia, we must be sure the President sees India and Pakistan in the larger Asian perspective, of which his Pacific initiatives are an exciting part, but not the whole story by any means. If so, I'd like to chat with you on the best way to tackle this one.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.4
B. Chm/s, NARA, Date 10-29-10

*South
Asia* 8

November 2, 1966

TO: W. W. Rostow

FROM: Howard Wriggins

SUBJECT: Need to promote political support for LBJ's Asian initiative

The Economist this week rightly draws the parallel between Truman's effort in the late '40's and early 50's to rally European resistance to Communist penetration and to quicken hope in future development with LBJ's present efforts in Southeast Asia. But we must somehow strengthen political support for this grand enterprise.

In reading Cabell Phillips' book on Truman, I was impressed with the intensive preparations he and Acheson made to gain public acceptance of the unprecedented involvement in Europe following on the "Truman Doctrine" speech, the Marshall speech at Harvard, and the NATO commitment after that.

Our Asian involvement does not have the potential historic base for political acceptance which our European involvement then had. We have moved into Southeast Asia step by step, without the sustained and orderly Congressional debate which Vandenberg did so much to foster at that time. These steps have occasioned deep misgivings. The President's trip has led him to make a series of statements which seem to imply a still further, longer run and highly constructive involvement.

How do we now develop the supporting consensus behind such an involvement? If we do not develop such a consensus, how can we carry credibility for the longer haul?

We should attempt to organize public interest and approval among the following types of people in order to broaden public support:

- (a) Churchmen - who will no doubt deplore elements of present military policy, but who nevertheless would be likely to latch onto the long run constructive aspects of the President's implicit program.
- (b) Academics - to flesh out within the academic world a series of concepts and programs which would suggest, among other things,

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- (i) the interrelatedness of South and Southeast Asia;
 - (ii) alternative strategic postures -- mainland, island chain, etc.;
 - (iii) alternative economic and political modes of mutual association in the area which will serve the common interests of the non-Communist countries;
 - (iv) the need for resources and the way U. S. programs can be managed to minimize both inflation and balance of payments costs.
- (c) Businessmen interested in the Far East and South Asia, who would see advantage in a more sustained and constructive long run U. S. involvement.
- (d) Identification of key Congressmen and Senators who might oppose or support the enterprise and who would be susceptible to specific constituent influences -- party, church, business, academic or other -- which might be brought to bear.

My fear is that if some such effort is not made, the President will not have the backing such an Asian enterprise calls for and we will be able to back up his implicit promises in a niggardly way which will weaken confidence, rather than promote it.

What do you think?

So asia 9

October 4, 1966

TO: W. W. Rostow
FROM: Howard Wriggins
SUBJECT: Thoughts from the side-lines -- the Marcos Meeting

You asked for thoughts on the Marcos meeting.

As seen from the South Asian perspective, the Marcos meeting is likely to be understood largely as a U. S. show, unless steps are taken to counter this idea. The following might be helpful:

- (1) Encourage Marcos to send a letter to other Asian states who will not be attending (including India, Pakistan and Ceylon), explaining in low but serious key the genesis of the meetings and what he hopes will be achieved. If it were to be a highly classified letter to heads of state, it could be tailored to each one's biases and worries. If it had to be public, it probably wouldn't be worth it.
- (2) Could Bill Bundy and/or Bob Komer and/or Bill Jordan hold an advance briefing for South Asian journalists?
- (3) Could Bob Komer go to Manila for the meetings through Rawalpindi and New Delhi -- or perhaps return that way?
- (4) Any chance of inviting official observers to the meeting?

cc: Mr. Komer
Mr. Jordan
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Saunders ✓

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *clm/ly*, NARA, Date 10-29-10

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September 27, 1966

TO: W. W. R.

FROM: Howard Wriggins

SUBJECT: Improving relations with the Hill on Asian policy -- and
the upcoming Manila meetings

In considering our problem of long run policy toward Asia, it is critically important that we improve the understanding, realism and responsibility of Senator Fulbright. The upcoming Manila Conference gives us a unique opportunity.

I urge you to consider the following idea: Encourage the President to invite Senator Fulbright to join the U. S. Government's delegation to Manila. He could be asked to come as an advisor on Congressional attitudes.

If he were invited and turned the President down, we would be one-up when the results would come under his critical fire later on.

If the invitation were put carefully and he accepted, we could expect certain beneficial results:

(a) he would be immersed in Asian leaders, most of whom have been popularly elected, who feel strongly that we have a legitimate right and an urgent need to be there;

(b) that behind the shield our presence provides, they are making real progress toward developing their own long run interlocking mutual support.

Such an experience should help him to sense the unrealism and irresponsibility of his own view.

It has the disadvantages of:

(a) possibly cramping the President's style a little bit,

(b) might lessen the accomplishments of the conference itself.

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By Chm/ls, NARA, Date 10-29-10

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But in my view, these are small change compared to the possible gains.

What do you think?

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Responsibility for SOUTH ASIA

was transferred to

Mr. Edward Hamilton

July 15, 1967

and then returned to

Mr. Harold H. Saunders

September 9, 1968

Please return to HHSaunders
Rm. 372-a EOB when signed.

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So Asia
sent to Rostow
via wire

~~SECRET~~

December 21, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Scenario for South Asia Moves

When you're ready to make your Indian food decision, you may want to check this rundown of the related decisions on India and Pakistan you also have to work with.

1. At the top of the list is the \$25 million CARE special nutrition program in India for expectant mothers and children in the worst drought areas. This is a significant effort which could reach 5-7 million of the most vulnerable people, and you could well couple it with whatever announcement you make on the major feeding program. (I sent you a memo and draft press release Friday.)

2. PL 480 for Pakistan is the next priority since we ought to sign a new agreement next week to keep their pipeline going. I don't recommend specifically linking this to the Indian program. Ayub resents our linking his programs with India's and there's no need to rub in the fact that we have to think of them together. The Paks have already done a good job buying here and elsewhere to cover their own gaps and their agricultural performance has been good. But if we delay a substantial decision too long, they will feel impelled to use so much of their scarce foreign exchange that import liberalization and other desirable development policies will have to be sacrificed. Simply going ahead with the Pak program as soon after the Indian decision as you are ready ought to make your point that these are all parts of the worldwide food problem you are trying to dramatize.

3. The Pak \$70 million loan is the most flexible, though we don't want to wait too much longer. This is the other important part of Gene Locke's second-round steps to keep your relationship with Ayub developing.

W. W. Rostow

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By cbm, NARA, Date 9-7-05