

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
007	list	of material sent to Mr. Arthur Dean <i>Sanitized 9.24.07</i>	S	1	10/15/65	A
008	report	Introductory Reading <i>open 9.24.07</i>	S	1	10/6/65	A
008a	list	of material in background file <i>open 9.24.07</i>	S	1	10/6/65	A
008d	list	of material in special India/Pak File <i>open 9.24.07</i>	PCI	1	10/4/65	A
008e	list	of material in special India/Pak file <i>open 9.24.07</i>	PCI	1	10/4/65	A
010	report	re Indian Army (duplicate of #67, NSF, Files of Komer, India-1965, box 23) <i>open 3/29/19 per RAC</i>	S	2	8/11/65	A
013	memo	RWK [Komer] to Mac [Bundy] <i>exempt 9/24/07</i> (duplicate of #162, NSF, Files of Komer, "Pakistan 1965-3/66" Box 46) <i>Dup. #50 papers of Komer, Chron Jan-June 65, Box 5</i>	S	1	6/16/65	A
018	letter	Komer to Mr. Cook [sanitized 2002] (dup. #93, NSF, Files of Komer, India-1965, box 23; #29a, NSF, NSC History, So. Asia, box 24; #22, NSF, NSC History, Indian Famine, Vol. 1, box 25) <i>Dup. #88, Papers of Komer, Chron, Jan-June 65, Box 5</i>	S	4	6/3/65	A
030	memo	RWK [Komer] to Mac [Bundy] <i>Dup. #398, Papers of Komer, Chron, Jan-June 65, Box 5</i>	S	1	2/8/65	A
032	memo	RWK [Komer] to Mac [Bundy] <i>Dup. #456, Paper of Komer, Box 4, Chron, July-Dec-64</i> <i>open 2/7/12 per NLJ/RAC 11-12</i>	S	1	7/22/64	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer
Folder Title "INDIA-PAK December 1963 - March 1966 (including Rann of Kutch)"
Box Number 26

Restriction Codes

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 13292 governing access to national security information.
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5/28/2004

JC
Initials

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037	memo	RWK [Komer] to Mac [Bundy] [exempted 1977] (duplicate #64, NSF, CF, Pakistan, Vol. 2, box 151) <i>Dup # 12, Papers of Komer, Chron, Jan-June 1964, Box 4</i> <i>Open 6/25/14 per RAC</i>	S	1	6/26/64	A
041	message	Komer to Bowles [sanitized 2002] (duplicate #43, NSF, CF, India, Exchanges with Bowles, box 134; also in FRUS, Vol. 25, #21) <i>Dup # 404, Papers of Komer, Chron, Jan-June 1964, Box 4</i>	S	1	2/27/64	A
047	letter	Komer to Bowles (duplicate #53, NSF, Files of Komer, Bowles 11/3/63-1965, box 13) <i>Dup # 72, Papers of Komer, Chron, 7/63-12/63, Box 3</i> <i>Open 7/16/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-3100</i>	S	1	12/7/63	A
048	memo	Komer to General Taylor <i>Dup # 75, Papers of Komer, Chron 7/63-12/63, Box 3</i>	S	1	12/7/63	A
050	memo	Handley to General Sibley, others <i>open 9.24.07</i>	S	1	[1965]	A
050a	memo	Robert Johnson to Mr. Handley <i>open 9.24.07</i>	S	2	12/9/65	A
050c	report	Introductory Note	S	2	[1965]	A
050d	charts	summary of plan	S	4	12/8/65	A
050e	report	Plan No. 1 - contingency plan	S	42	12/8/65	A

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050f	report	Annex A <i>exempt 9.24.07</i>	S	3	10/27/65	A
050g	report	Annex B	PCI	6	10/65	A
065	note	official routing slip <i>sanitized 9.24.07</i>	PCI	1	9/18/65	A
065a	report	intelligence report <i>open 9.24.07</i>	PCI	6	[9/65]	A
066	report	Research Memorandum INR 25.9 [sanitized 2000] (duplicate #213, NSF, CF, India, Vol. 5, box 129)	S	8	9/23/65	A
068	letter	Townsend Hoopes to Komer <i>open 9.24.07</i>	S	2	9/10/65	A
068a	memo	Townsend Hoopes to Mr. McNaughton <i>open 9.24.07</i>	S	6	9/9/65	A
074	memo	Raborn to Mac [Bundy] [sanitized 2000]	S	1	12/8/65	A
079a	memo	Raymond Hare to the Acting Secretary	C	4	11/15/65	A
080	cable	New Delhi 1211	TS	3	11/8/65	A

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082	memo	Handley to General Sibley, others [sanitized 2000]	S	1	11/5/65	A
083	memo	R.C. Bowman to Komer	TS	1	10/13/65	A
083a	memo	Earle G. Wheeler to the Secretary of Defense	S	2	10/12/65	A
086	memo	RWK [Komer] to Mac [Bundy]	S	1	10/5/65	A
086b	memo	W.W. Rostow to the President	S	4	10/1/65	A
086c	charts	re India and Pakistan [pp. 2-5 are duplicates of #88c, 88d, 88e, this file] <i>exempt 9.24.07</i>	S	5	[1965]	A
086d	report	What to Say to Shastri and Ayub	C	3	[10/1/65]	A
087	memcon	re Struggle Between India and Pakistan	S	5	9/28/65	A
088a	report	Indo-Pak War and US Policy in Asia	S	25	9/19/65	A
088c	chart	re India and Pakistan [duplicate of p. 3 of #86c, this file]	S	1	9/65	A

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088d	chart	re India and Pakistan [duplicate of p. 2 of #86c, this file]	S	1	9/65	A
088e	chart	re India and Pakistan [duplicate of pp. 4-5, #86c, this file]	S	2	[1965]	A
091	report	Research Memorandum INR 25.2 <i>Sanitized 7-25-08 NLJ 07-298</i>	S	9	9/15/65	A
092a	list	Chronology of Indo-Pakistan Conflict [sanitized 2000] (duplicate #15a, Files of Komer, Kashmir- Chron. Of Events 1965, box 38; #189, NSF, CF, India, Vol. 5, box 129)	S	7	9/11-12/6	A
093a	report	Memorandum for the Director <i>open 9-24-07</i>	S	6	8/18/65	A
094a	report	Aide Memoire <i>Dup #227, Files of Komer, Kashmir 12/63-3/66, Box 37</i>	C	6	8/17/65	A
096	report	Memorandum (duplicate #135, this file) <i>Sanitized 9-24-07</i>	S	4	4/26/65	A
101	report	Near East and South Asia	S	3	[1964]	A
102b	memo	Rostow to the Secretary	S	9	2/3/65	A
107	cable	Prime Minister Home to the President <i>OPEN 3/4/08 NLJ IRAC 07-17 (#55)</i>	S	4	7/22/64	A

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108	report	Near East and South Asia	S	4	[1964]	A
109	cable	Karachi 2365	C	6	6/10/65	A
126	airgram	A-967 from Bern	C	6	5/23/65	A
127	cable	New Delhi 3394	S	4	5/23/64	A
128	memo	A.A. Lakeland to Mr. Cameron	C	2	5/21/65	A
135	report	Memorandum (duplicate #96, this file)	S	4	4/26/65	A
141	report	Research Memorandum RNA-20 [sanitized 1978] (duplicate #136 and 136a, NSF, CF, Pakistan, Vol. 3, box 151)	S	7	5/13/65	A
146	cable	deptel 6988 to London	S	4	5/3/65	A
149	cable	New Delhi 3098	C	3	4/30/65	A
151	cable	New Delhi 3061 [sanitized 1976] (duplicate #123, NSF, CF, India, Vol. 4, box 129)	S	3	4/27/65	A

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152	cable	Karachi 2073 [sanitized 2001]	S	2	4/29/65	A
153	cable	deptel 62 to Rawalpindi	S	1	4/29/65	A
154	cable	Karachi 2056 [exempted 1978] (duplicate #44, NSF, CF, Pakistan, vol. 3, box 151) <i>OPEN w/25/14 per RAC</i>	S	4	4/28/65	A
156	cable	Karachi 2017	S	7	4/25/65	A
157	cable	Karachi 2016 [sanitized 2001]	C	2	4/25/65	A
159	cable	Karachi 2014 [sanitized 2001] (duplicate #49, NSF, CF, Pakistan, Vol. 3, box 151)	S	2	4/24/65	A
162	airgram	A-1111 from New Delhi	C	2	4/20/65	A

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5/28/2004

Initials

March 10, 1966

~~SECRET~~

March 10, 1966
Thursday, 5:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1
file
India - Pak

First readout from the India-Pak ministerial talks last week shows that the spirit of Tashkent is still alive but there's room for some gentle encouragement when you see Mrs. Gandhi. Both Indians and Paks pulled their troops back on schedule, and they've left the door open for future talks. But now that they're getting down to the gut issue--Kashmir--the going is even tougher than at Tashkent, and they don't have Kosygin cracking the whip over them.

The Indians came out of this round looking better than the Paks. They went prepared to take limited actions restoring normal communications broken by the war. The Paks insisted on talking Kashmir first, and the Indians heard them out for a change. As a result, nothing concrete got done, though Bhutto says now some of these things can be handled through regular diplomatic channels.

The generally cordial atmosphere despite Indian disappointment makes it clear that there's still strong desire on both sides to get over the Kashmir hurdle; though no one yet has figured out how. Mrs. Gandhi's recent interview with Warren Unna is further evidence, and other reports indicate this may be the one problem facing her that she's fully up on and feels a legacy from her father to solve.

But it's still India's lack of give that clogs the bottleneck. We couldn't expect more at this early stage in her administration. However, while we still don't want to get in the middle, we do want to persuade her that she as chief of the greater power and de facto winner is going to have to find some magnanimous way to let Ayub out gracefully. Our best bet may be to play this subtly as her way of finishing her father's work.

R. W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 89-07 (#38f)
By plisp. NARA. Date 5-18-09

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

BKS

Mon. Jan. 24, 1966
7:45 PM

India Pac 2

*orig. rat'd BKS
for file 4/18/66.*

MR. PRESIDENT

I just received your note asking me to list all the things we could announce for India and Pakistan. I will do so, but the attached which I had done earlier covers the one most dramatic item I could suggest. The remainder are mostly cats and dogs, many of which are not worth public announcement.

RWK

RWK
Please refer to me in film

JAN 25 1966

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~

WASHINGTON

January 24, 1966
Monday/7:00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

that you may want to

Possible Pak/Indian Package. The following is based on the possibility that you will send others than just Freeman to Delhi. If only Freeman goes, the \$1.5 million tons you're thinking of will amply serve to keep up momentum (though I'd see merit in choosing a somewhat higher figure than last time just to show that "1.5" is no magic figure, and that we recognize the crisis as now much worse). Even 2 million tons would still be small enough in relation to Indian needs that it wouldn't cost us an iota of leverage, while looking more handsome. But this is a minor point.

If you send someone else besides Freeman, you might consider other things than food. This is not essential. But the bigger the man you send, the bigger the impression you might want to give as a gesture of confidence in the new Indian cabinet. Since we probably did as much as the Soviets in getting Paks and Indians to compromise at Tashkent, it might pay to show we're responsive. So I have in mind giving Ayub and Mrs. Gandhi an interim aid loan big enough to whet their appetities, but still leaving us all our big cards.

India. One such option might be a \$100 million program loan. India's industry is badly running down because of lack of spare parts and raw materials. Dealing with this could wait till Mrs. Gandhi comes here (probably mid-March), but doing it now would be a confidence-building gesture, without depriving us of much leverage if we tied on some stiff conditions: (a) India must match the \$100 million; (b) it must only be to pump prime existing capacity; (c) we must be assured Indians won't siphon off their own foreign exchange for defense as a result, and that much of the loan will go to private sector; and (d) Indians will restart their dialogue with the World Bank, success of which will be essential to full-scale US aid resumption.

Pakistan. If only Freeman goes, he could get away with not going to Pakistan. But Ayub too faces, though to a lesser extent, similar problems of food shortage and running down of his economy. We also want to shore up his position against critics of his Tashkent policy by showing that his visit here is producing results. So, if you send someone else besides Freeman, I'd suggest a brief Pak stopover and (1) an interim PL 480 deal for about \$15-18 million; and (2) an interim \$50 million program loan on the same stiff terms as for India above.

Again, none of the above is vital. I've discussed it with nobody but Bundy, and am simply describing a larger interim package to use if you wanted to reward Paks and Indians for being sensible at Tashkent and to show your confidence that they're both moving in the right direction now.

Food is enough _____

Show me more details _____

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By JK, NARA, Date 5-8-04

India Pak

January 10, 1966

The President was ^{is} quite encouraged by the results of the Tashkent Conference between India and Pakistan under the aegis of Premier Kosygin.

The nine-point understanding reached was ^{is} an impressive demonstration of statesmanship on both sides. In particular, the United States ^{is} cannot help but be pleased when two friendly countries -- India and Pakistan -- agree to withdrawal of their armed ^(personnel) forces to the positions held before 5 August, ^{in accord with} as was called for in the UNSC Resolutions.

All Americans hope that this and the other measures agreed to by President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri ^{will lead to further} add up to a major step forward toward peaceful reconciliation between India and Pakistan, and the ultimate resolution of all their differences.

4

Indira Pahl file

December 17, 1965

Dear Professor Palmer:

The President appreciates your thoughts on South Asia. He is deeply interested in the problems of both India and Pakistan and has long looked forward to discussing them with President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri.

He recognizes fully the great importance of this area and welcomes the efforts of Americans like you to make this better understood by all our countrymen. I think you will agree that recent actions by our government are quite in consonance with many of the views you express.

Sincerely,

R. W. Komer
Deputy Special Assistant
to the President for
National Security Affairs

Mr. Norman D. Palmer
Professor of Political Science
Chairman, International Relations Graduate Program
Member South Asia Regional Studies Department
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania

~~SECRET~~

October 14, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ARTHUR DEAN

In case I miss you this morning, there have been no major new developments but Bundy and I thought it would be useful to keep you fully up to date.

Bundy would like to chat with you at 12:00.

I suggest you spend the morning reading some interesting new papers. There is one which State sent to Ball and which I regard as the best thing they've done yet. While the President himself would favor a rather tougher policy on aid, I think this represents genuine progress. It is now being considered by Rusk. Note also a very sensitive draft cable Bundy and I are trying out for size on SecState. Finally, you will be interested in AID's new strategy paper, since our aid decisions--both short and long-term--are probably more central to our future interests than are decisions on whether or how to push for a Kashmir settlement.

I've asked the IO people if they would like to brief you today.

Also, John Lewis (former member of CEA), the extremely able AID Mission Director from New Delhi and a very sober, sensible guy, is in town. I think it would be quite useful to chat with him. I'll be back this afternoon myself and hope you will be able to spare me a few minutes too.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

5
Ludwig P. W.
X Dean

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 5-18-04

- Attach. (1) Bundy Memo to SecState re instructions to Delhi and Karachi on emissaries and food and aid
(2) Memo Hare to Acting Secy, subj. Managing US Relations w/India and Pakistan over the Short Run 10/9/65
(3) Memo Macomber to Komer att. Assistance Strategy Paper for SOA
(4) Top cables frm Delhi/Karachi since last Dean Visit (Nelhi's 946, 942, Pindi 134, Delhi 933, Karachi 761, Delhi 924, Karachi 735, Deptel 621 to Karachi, Karachi 739, Delhi 895, Deptel 595 to Karachi, Deptel 619, 613 to Delhi,

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS.032.026.001/1

By JC, NARA, Date 5-17-04

Attachments to RWK letter to Donald Cook 6/3/65 (orig. ltr returned to Alice Boyce for file 7/26/65):

1. RWK Memo to President, 4/22/65, "The US and India" (4 pages). (Extra copy) Refiled 7/26/65.
2. Chester Bowles letter to President laying out the situation and stakes in India, 4/14/65 (To Alice Boyce for file 7/26/65 - cy-Shastri visit)
3. RWK reflections on India-Pak observations of Tom Hughes, 3/6/64. Refiled 7/26/65. IndiaxPak.
4. AID review of long-range assistance strategy, Oct. 1964 - India. (Refiled 7/26/65). Special India/Pak file for Arthur Dean, 10/4/65.
5. INR memo, "China and Pakistan in Indian Foreign Policy", 6/16/64. (Not used - refiled.)
6. HHS Memo for the Record (talk with Dick Gilbert), 4/10/65. Refiled 7/26/65.
7. John Lewis, "Betting on India" 1/14/65, (copy removed from "India Econ" but another copy in "India") Refiled 7/26/65.
8. RWK Memo for the President, "Our Pakistan Affairs", 4/22/65 (Extra copy) Refiled 7/26/65.
9. Long-term assistance strategy review - Pakistan, 10/15/64. Refiled 7/26/65. Special India/Pak file for Arthur Dean 10/4/65.
10. HHS memo, "Where do we go from here with Ayub?" 5/19/65. Refiled 7/26/65. Pakistan.
11. CIA Weekly special report, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy under Ayub and Bhutto" 4/16/65. Refiled 7/26/65. Special India/Pak file for Arthur Dean, 10/4/65.
12. CIA Weekly Special Report, "Shastri's First year" - taken from RWK's desk. Returned to RWK's desk - 7/26/65.
13. RWK- McGB memo on talk with Shoaib, 9/23/64. Refiled 7/26/65. PakxShoaib Visit.
14. Memcon, McGB-Shoaib talk, 9/24/64, Refiled 7/26/65.
15. INR, "Pakistan and Seato" 8/21/64. (Not used. refiled).
16. Karachi A-652, 3/24/65, "Pakistan's Disengagement! US Policy Alternatives" from Ayub visit file. Refiled 7/26/65. Special India/Pak file for Arthur Dean 10/4/65.

17. NPP's on India and Pakistan. Refiled 7/8/65. Special India/Pak file for Arthur Dean, 10/4/65.
18. NIE's on India and Pakistan. Refiled 7/8/65. Special India/Pak file for Arthur Dean, 10/4/65.

~~SECRET~~

October 15, 1965

Material sent to Mr. Arthur Dean, Sullivan and Cromwell, 48 Wall Street -
19th floor, New York, New York, [REDACTED] 25X1
~~Mr. McCafferty~~ or Gordon Chase. (All zerox copies - not
our file copies.)

1. Cy, Memo from Rostow, McNaughton and Komer to Rusk,
McNamara and Bundy, Subj: The Indo-Pak War and U.S. Policy in Asia
9/19/65.
2. Cy, proposed message to New Delhi, 10/13, re interim guidelines
on policy in South Asia
3. Cy, Draft paper, An Assistance Strategy for South Asia, 10/12/65
4. Cy, Ref. Slip from Schneider to Komer, 10/12/65, att. cy final
text of paper, Hare to Acting Secretary, 10/9/65, Subj:
Managing U.S. Relations with India and Pakistan Over the Short Run
att. statement on The Virtues and Limitations of the Closed Door
Policy, and Proposals for Action.
5. Cy, Mission Draft, 8/30/65, Subj: Country Assistance Strategy
Statement - India
6. Cy, paper - India - Economic Policies and Programs,
USAID Mission, New Delhi, India, 7/20/65

~~SECRET~~**SANITIZED**

Authority NLJ-032-026-1-2
By g/ctm, **NARA**, **Date** 8-16-07

DECLASSIFIED
Authoicity NLJ-032-026-8-3
By Ag/abm. NARA, Date 8-16-07

~~SECRET~~

October 6, 1965

INTRODUCTORY READING

Here is an introductory sampling of the material I think best suited to your purpose. We've set it up so you can get quickly the flavor of the real issues by running through the top folder. Then if you want to delve in greater depth, you can browse through some of the more basic studies in the second folder.

For Arthur New

A. Top folder: (1) White House memos. On the left (and most sensitive) are a few of my own in-house memos which try to sort out for the President and Mac Bundy what our big problems really are. I've included them because they will give you a quick feel for the kind of problems we confront, whether or not the policy prescriptions commend themselves. I've also included rundowns on how we might use economic aid leverage to bring Ayub back on the track. Last, but not least, are some reflections by Tom Hughes, State's intelligence chief, on a visit to the subcontinent a year ago and the planning paper Rostow, McNaughton and I did during the recent crisis.

(2) Bowles and McConaughy. On the right are recent analyses from the men on the scene--top cables and other communications which give the embassy's-eye-view on our basic position and problems in the subcontinent today. Some items are admittedly partisan, coming as they do from articulate spokesmen for Indian and Pak interests. But these, like the White House memos, cut close to the bone.

B. Second folder: Here are:

1. The standard policy background paper. The three National Policy Papers lay out the basic framework of our interests and our policy, while the two National Intelligence Estimates give some sense as to the prospects. Regard these as reference material. As inter-departmental committee products, they tend to be so general and even-handed as to obscure some of the important policy issues.

2. Papers on Aid Strategy. Since our chief policy tool in the subcontinent is economic aid, I've included last fall's AID strategy reviews, a paper by John Lewis (AID director, New Delhi) on the India program, and a memo of a recent conversation with Dick Gilbert, who heads the Harvard Advisory Group in Pakistan. We omitted the basic aid strategy papers themselves as too bulky and technical.

3. Interpretive Pieces: A recent Max Freedman article on India as the key to our Asian policy; two CIA studies on the key policy-makers (Ayub, Bhutto, Shastri) and the pressures that influence them; and a memo from McNamara to the President on why economic aid to India and Pakistan is strategically important.

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8a
October 6, 1965

LIST OF MATERIAL IN BACKGROUND FILE ON
INDIA/PAK for Mr. Arthur Dean

Second Folder

Left Side:

NIE No. 31-64, 12/10/64, The Prospects for India, Cy #13.

NIE No. 32-65, 3/24/65, The Prospects for Pakistan, Cy #13.

Right Side:

India Long-Term Review Meeting, 10/14/64

Pakistan Long-Term Review Meeting, 10/16/64.

Special Report, OCI No. 0285/65C, Pakistan's Foreign Policy Under Ayub and Bhutto, 4/16/65.

CIA Special Report, OCI No. 0291/65A, Shastri's First Year as India's Prime Minister.

Not Fastened in File:

National Policy Paper on India, Cy #27, 11/3/64.

National Policy Paper on Pakistan, Cy #133, 11/3/64.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLI-032-026-1-4
By sp/cbm, NARA, Date 8-18-07

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8b
October 6, 1965

LIST OF MATERIAL IN SPECIAL INDIA/PAK FILE
for Mr. Arthur Dean

Top Folder, Left Side

1. Memo from RWK to McGB, 3/6/64, re observations of Tom Hughes.
2. Memo from RWK to McGB, 9/23/64, re talk with Shoaib.
3. RWK Memorandum for Record, 9/24/64, re McGB's talks with Shoaib.
4. HHS Memorandum for Record, 4/10/65, re talk with Dick Gilbert.
5. RWK Memo for the President, 4/22/65, re the US and India.
6. RWK Memo for the President, 4/22/65, re Our Pakistan Affairs.
7. HHS Memo to RWK, 5/19/65, re Ayub.
8. RWK Memo for the President, 7/6/65, Postponement on Pak Consortium.
9. RWK Memorandum for Record, 7/16/65, Subj: President's Talk with Ambassador B. K. Nehru, July 13, 1965.
10. Statement, 7/28/65, on Strategy and Tactics of Dealing with Pakistan.
11. RWK Memo for Record, 9/2/65, Subj: Meeting with the President on Kashmir, 2 September 1965, 9:30 a. m.
12. Statement, 9/8/65, on US Policy at the Crossroads in the Subcontinent.
13. RWK Memo for the President, 9/9/65, Review of decisions and guidelines.
14. RWK Memo for Record, 9/9/65, re The President's Meeting with Indian Ambassador B. K. Nehru, 6 p. m., 9 September 1965 (off the record).
15. RWK Memo on "Where to on Kashmir?" for the President, 9/24/65.
16. Rostow/McNaughton/Komer memo to Rusk, McNamara, and Bundy, re "The Indo-Pak War and US Policy in Asia," 9/19/65.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 5-18-04

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8c
October 6, 1965

LIST OF MATERIAL IN SPECIAL INDIA/PAK FILE
for Mr. Arthur Dean

Top Folder - Right Side

1. John P. Lewis Memo for the Administrator, 1/14/65, re Betting on India.
2. Karachi A-652, 3/24/65, Subj: Pakistan's Disengagement: US Policy Alternatives.
3. Chester Bowles Letter to President, 4/14/65, re Ayub and Shastri visits.
4. Various telegrams.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 5-18-04

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8d

October 4, 1965

LIST OF MATERIAL IN SPECIAL INDIA/PAK FILE
for Mr. Arthur Dean

Top Folder,
Left Side

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By 19/abm NARA, Date 8-16-07

1. Memo from RWK to McGB, 3/6/64, re observations of Tom Hughes.
2. Memo from RWK to McGB, 9/23/64, re talk with Shoaib.
3. RWK Memorandum for Record, 9/24/64, re McGB's talks with Shoaib.
4. HHS Memorandum for Record, 4/10/65, re talk with Dick Gilbert.
5. RWK Memo for the President, 4/22/65, re the US and India.
6. RWK Memo for the President, 4/22/65, re Our Pakistan Affairs.
7. HHS Memo to RWK, 5/19/65, re Ayub.
- ~~8. RWK ltr to Mr. Cook, 6/3/65, re India/Pakistan project.~~
8. RWK Memo for the President, 7/6/65, Postponment on Pak Consortium.
- ~~10. RWK Memo to McGB, 7/8/65, re Major Pakistan Aid Decision Points, FY 66.~~
9. 11. RWK Memorandum for Record, 7/16/65, Subj: President's Talk with Ambassador B. K. Nehru, July 13, 1965.
10. 12. Statement, 7/28/65, on Strategy and Tactics of Dealing with Pakistan.
11. 13. RWK Memo for Record, 9/2/65, Subj: Meeting with the President on Kashmir, 2/September 1965, 9:30 a. m.
12. 14. Statement, 9/8/65, on US Policy at the Crossroads in the Subcontinent.
13. 15. RWK Memo for the President, 9/9/65, review of decisions and guidelines.
14. 16. RWK Memo for Record, 9/9/65, re The President's Meeting with Indian Ambassador B. K. Nehru, 6. p. m., 9 September 1965 (off the record).
- ~~17. RWK Memo for Messrs. Rostow and McNaughton, 9/13/65, re the Pak/Indian War and the US Position in Asia.~~
15. 18. RWK Memo on "Where to on Kashmir?" for the President, 9/24/65.
16. *Rostow/McNaughton/Komer "The Indo-Pak War and US Policy in Asia" 9/19/65*
Memos to RWK, McNaughton, Rostow, Komer 9/24/65 - Special File
- ~~19. *as indicated PM*~~

October 4, 1965

LIST OF MATERIAL IN SPECIAL INDIA/PAK FILE
for Mr. Arthur Dean

Second Folder

Right Side

- 1. India Long-Term Review Meeting, 10/14/64 RIGHT SIDE
- 2. Pakistan Long-Term Review Meeting, 10/16/64. RIGHT
- 3. NIE No. 31-64, 12/10/64, The Prospects for India, Cy #13. ← LEFT SIDE
- 4. John P. Lewis Memo for the Administrator, 1/14/65, re Betting on India.
- 5. Karachi A-652, 3/24/65, Subj: Pakistan's Disengagement: US Policy Alternatives.
- 6. NIE No. 32-65, 3/24/65, The Prospects for Pakistan, Cy #13. ← LEFT SIDE
- 7. Chester Bowles Letter to President, 4/14/65, re Ayub and Shastri visits.
- 8. Special Report, OCI No. 0285/65C, Pakistan's Foreign Policy Under Ayub and Bhutto, 4/16/65. RIGHT
- ~~9. National Policy Paper on India, Cy #27, 11/3/64. LOOSE~~
- ~~10. National Policy Paper on Pakistan, Cy #133, 11/3/64, LOOSE~~

Handwritten notes on the left side of the list:

- 1. [scribble]
- 2. [scribble]
- 3. [scribble]
- 4. To top folder, right side
- 5. [scribble]
- 6. To top folder, right side
- 7. [scribble]
- 8. [scribble]
- 9. Stat
- 10. [scribble]

CIA Special Report OCI # 0291/65A, "Shastri's First Year as India's Prime Minister."

CONFIDENTIAL

RWK:

359,000 tons timing.

September 14, 1965

*India-Pak
PL 480
9*

Pak PL 480 timing. Supplies will probably carry shipments through December if we resume shipments. So we're not close enough to the wire to be very precise about the lead time required to avoid interrupting shipments.

what if we don't! That's the problem

However, timing might be a little longer than for India. The Paks would need the same 4-6 weeks to book shipping. But instead of the bare 4 weeks we need for negotiation and administration on the Indian program, we'd normally have to allow more time for negotiation in Karachi. The big problem is how to handle Pak rice exports. The Paks say the stopgap arrangement we have during extension of the old agreement is no solution at all, so we might see some hard bargaining unless we let the agreement drift until the Paks are so desperate they'll sign anything.

*Then add in India timing
in a memo to Bandy*

HHS

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 5-19-04

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India (Pak)
India
Pak

10

August 11, 1965

INDIAN ARMY DEPLOYMENTS AGAINST PAKISTAN

April - May 1965

While Ayub exaggerated in saying that the "whole Indian army" had massed on his borders in the last three months (Karachi 147, 2 Aug.), it's easy to see how he could figure that something like two-thirds of it was pointed more at him than at China. It's not easy to square that statement with his more recent one that "30 divisions of troops" were involved on both sides, and that's probably more accurate by his mode of calculating. So it looks as if we should read these statements more as rhetorical flights than as serious order-of-battle reports.

Only about 183,000--8 divisions and 9 independent brigades-- of the 942,000-man Indian army actually moved closer to Pak borders in April and May. Ayub is probably also justified in counting another 3 divisions and independent brigades together totaling 100,000 at their regular stations on the Jammu-Kashmir border and cease-fire line. He may also count 1 division in Ladakh and 6 in Northeast India, which didn't move, as close enough to be a direct threat; but our evidence shows these remained on the line, not deployed against Pakistan. So even allowing him to count 3 independent infantry brigades as the equivalent of a division, the most he could say is that the equivalent of 22 Indian divisions were involved (of which we'd count about 15)--by no means the "whole Indian army."

Peak Indian strength in The Rann of Kutch was about 14,000 army and police, almost all moved into the area from outside. Chief forces were the 31st Infantry, 50th Parachute and 9th Mountain Artillery Brigades. The 50th came from Agra (south of Delhi) and the 31st and 9th moved from Ahmadabad and Aurangabad, both southeast of the Rann. Pak forces numbered about the same.

Just north of the Rann, the Indians moved the 67th Infantry Brigade (4,000 men) closer to the border from Jodhpur to block any Pak flanking movement.

But what really worried the Paks was the movement in the Punjab, where top Indian strength reached an estimated 123,000 (Paks never got much over 70,000). In the Punjab and bordering areas of neighboring states are normally stationed 4 regular divisions (4th, 7th, 11th, 15th), the 2nd (independent) Armored Brigade, and a corps headquarters with normal artillery support. All four of these divisions plus the 2nd Armored

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Authority RAC 032R-37-2.5-0
P. JDW 2/13/8

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- 2 -

Brigade moved closer to the border. The only units moved into this area from a distance were the 1st Armored Division (from Jhansi in central India) and 3 brigades (68th Infantry from Srinagar, 116th Infantry from Bangalore in Southern India, and elements of the 6th Division in Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh), a total of about 40,000 troops. So the actual buildup in the region was relatively small, though the deployment was substantial.

There was no change in the 100,000-man force along the border and cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir (19th, 25th, 26th Divisions plus 68th, 121st, 191st Brigades). But Ayub would reckon these as deployed against him, anyway, especially after the 121st seized Pak posts inside the cease-fire line near Kargil about 16 May.

The Indians moved about 42,000 men against the East Pak border. This included one mountain division (9th) and an infantry brigade (32nd) deployed between Calcutta and Jessore. Elements of another division (20th) in West Bengal near the corridor were turned around, and a brigade (59th) was deployed near Silchar against the eastern border. The Paks would also argue that the other 5 divisions in Northeast India (17th and 27th in the Sikkim corridor, 2nd and 5th in NEFA, 23rd in Assam) could have turned against East Pakistan. It's hard to draw a line here, but we have no evidence of actual movement.

In addition to these 5 divisions in the Northeast, the 3rd in Ladakh, the 8th in Nagaland, the 10th and 14th in Central and South India, and elements of the 6th in Uttar Pradesh remained on station.

So while Ayub is wrong in talking about the "whole Indian army" massing on his borders, the numbers highlight his basic worry. He argues that the Indian army before our aid ran about 450,000 and 10 plus divisions. Now with the increase to 20 plus divisions and 942,000 men, India can move 8 plus divisions against him and station 3 others on his borders without seriously reducing those on anti-China duty. Indian troops which actually moved toward his borders (not to mention the 100,000 stationed there in Jammu-Kashmir) just about equaled the 189,000 in his whole army. The Paks also judge rightly that their qualitative superiority is slipping as the Indians pull themselves out of their pre-1962 doldrums.

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DEPLOYMENT OF INDIAN ARMY
APRIL - MAY 1965

DIVISIONS

INDEPENDENT BRIGADES

Moved closer to Pak borders

* 4th Punjab	31st Infantry	Rann
7th "	** 50th Parachute	"
11th "	9th Mountain Artillery	"
15th "	67th Infantry	North of Rann
1st "	2nd Armored	Punjab
* 6th (minus elements) "	68th Infantry	"
9th West Bengal	116th Infantry	"
* 20th " "	59th Mountain Against E. Pakistan	"
	32nd Infantry	" " "

Did not move

19th Jammu-Kashmir	9 Infantry
25th " "	3 Anti-aircraft
26th " "	1 Armored
* 3rd Ladakh	4 Artillery
* 17th Sikkim	1 Parachute
* 27th "	
* 2nd NEFA	
* 5th NEFA	
* 23rd Reserve in Assam	
8th Nagaland	
10th South India	
14th Central India (Saugar)	

* Some MAP support

** Limited MAP support (about 500 parachutes) through last year.

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Authority NLJ.032.023.002/8

By jc/c NARA, Date 5-19-04

~~SECRET~~

RWK:

August 3, 1965

Peak Indian strength in Kutch was about 14,000 army and police. Chief forces were the 31st Infantry and 50th Paratroop Brigades and one artillery regiment. Pak forces numbered about the same.

The Paks were really worried about the Punjab, where top Indian strength ran an estimated 123,000 (Paks never got much over 70,000). However, that's customarily a cantonment area with 2 regular divisions (4th and 7th), 2 divisions in the process of being raised (11th and 15th) and an independent armored brigade plus housekeeping troops. The only units moved into the Punjab area were the 1st Division and 3 brigades, a total of 25,000 - 30,000 troops. So the actual buildup was relatively small.

There was also one division which could have moved quickly against East Pakistan.

So of 20 Indian divisions (15 infantry, 1 armored, 4 truncated) and 900,000 men, the strength of about 7 plus divisions and maybe 160,000 men were deployed against Pakistan early this summer.

Of course, Ayub's side of the argument is that the Indian army before our aid ran about 450,000 and 10 plus divisions. With the increase in size, India can deploy 7 divisions against Pakistan without pulling anyone off anti-China duty.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By je, NARA, Date 5-19-04

~~SECRET~~

11a

814/65

--How many divisions and other units were actually deployed against Pakistan, east and west? Identify. What is the total troop strength in this buildup?

--Which of these are MAP-supported?

--Which were moved from deployment against China?

--In addition to those units actually deployed, were any "turned around" to threaten East Pakistan? which and where?

--Which divisions remained in place clearly not deployed against Pakistan? Where and against whom deployed?

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By je, NARA, Date 5-19-04

Secret

1) ~~India/Pak~~
2) India/Pak
X Kashmir

7/15/65

18

Tom -

I've been mulling your remark to me that perhaps we should go for a Kashmir settlement as part of the price for our Pak/Indian aid. The more I reflect on this the more I think we'd be overloading the circuit just now.

As LBJ told McConaughy just one year ago he doubted that "ancient feuds" like Kashmir were going to be resolved, at any rate by us (you ought to read that 15 July Memcon).

To make this the price of our aid would be to risk tying it to the unachievable. Indeed, one of the major flaws in our past policy may have been precisely that we pushed Kashmir too hard, thus leading both parties to play us rather than haggle with each other.

I am all for making Pak/Indian rapprochement and eventual collaboration a major aim of our policy, and believe that over time we can make a mark. We also can and should use our aid to promote joint Pak/Indian enterprises to this end (e. g. exchange of Pak rice for Indian steel). But a Kashmir settlement would be the culmination of this process not the beginning.

Another aspect is that to go for settling Kashmir now would be regarded in both Pindi and Delhi as 100% pro-Pak. It would delight Ayub, who has for years sought to get us to use our aid to India as leverage for this purpose. Delhi would flatly balk and we'd lose all the capital built up by our help to India against the Chicom attack in 1962.

So here's one issue on which I'm inclined to along with the experts and make Kashmir tomorrow's business, not today's.

R. W. Komer

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 5-19-04

~~SECRET~~

June 12, 1965

Handwritten notes:
+ HHS
2/ London PMA

Mac -

Bill and Phil Talbot are all for an LBJ letter to Harold Wilson. I told them we'd try our hand at a text.

Bill suggests mentioning the UK proposal to try and sign on the Commonwealth members of the "17" to propose again a conference without preconditions. Amen, and since you know more about this than I, suggest you add it in.

Talbot worries about telling Wilson we might get tougher with India and Pakistan. Let's keep this in-house, he says, till we get it sorted out. I'm not impressed with his argument; given the way in which LBJ has already decided this one, let's use the British too.

RWK

Att. RWK 6/11/65-3 pm draft ltr to Wilson

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Authority NLS 89-05 (4269)

By plisp. NARA, Date 5-19-04

SECRET

14a
June 12, 1965 / 12 Noon

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

While I hesitate to horn in on your Commonwealth Conference, this captive audience provides a major opportunity for moving forward an important joint enterprise of ours. I speak of our common interest in preventing the Afro-Asian session in Algiers from becoming an anti-Western rally. From reports reaching us, I'm far from sanguine that our moderate friends who will be attending will put forth much effort to this end.

For that reason I would hope that you could express our hopes as well as yours to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers. At a time when the US is defending the interests of free Asia in Vietnam as it did in Korea, and when the UK is doing the same in Malaysia, it would be painful indeed of if none/these countries were permitted to participate at Algiers. Nor would the US Congress and public understand if our friends should be shy in at least preventing the Chinese Communists and Indonesians from passing resolutions which would tend to justify outright aggression.

Neither you nor we will be represented at Algiers, but I think we are entitled to ask those Commonwealth attendees for whom we've both done so much to act in our interest and theirs. I have particularly in mind Ayub and Shastri, who could each play a major role. If you see fit, you might mention that I told you the US would be watching closely the proceedings.

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Authority NSC 8-8 '80 letter
By felip. NARA. Date 5/9/04

~~SECRET~~

2.

I have watched with admiration your persistent effort to mediate the Rann of Kutch. We have made appropriate supporting noises in both Delhi and Rawalpindi and I would be happy if you chose to associate me with you in devoutly hoping for an early end to these non-productive disputes which so sap Pakistani and Indian resources and energies badly needed for their own development. In fact we are re-examining whether a period of more tough minded aid treatment on our part might not help bring home quietly to both that they risk dissipating not only their blood and treasure but our quite substantial contributions to their growth.

~~SECRET~~

John P. ...

15
file

Mac -

June 10, 1965

I see merit in a bull session with you (let's add Francis) on where we go from here on our Pak/Indian enterprise.

We now have a much clearer sense of where the President stands, but this is only the point of departure. Now the problems are: (a) how to revalidate our Pak/Indian policy to the President; (b) how to carry out the policy line he's laid down; and (c) how to prevent a painful and potentially serious deterioration in our Indian affairs. I have ideas on all of this I'd like to check out.

One immediate problem is whether to reargue one last time the case for committing \$140 million rather than asking for reappropriation. Even I hesitate to try, but I think the merits simply haven't been properly put before LBJ.

Second, the net effect of our current stance is to hit India a lot harder than Pakistan, even though one would think we ought to do the reverse. I don't think we've really gotten this across either.

Third, I see great risk of a messy situation developing, in which Indians as well as Paks are sore, resentful, and bewildered; as this comes out it will lead to lots of press play here with overtones of LBJ dismantling yet another policy. And if the Congress scents that LBJ isn't eager to spend so much on India/Pakistan, we may lose the option of doing so. Ergo, all this needs careful handling.

Finally, instead of all the defensive briefs which I fear will be written justifying present policy, we need to get a genuine new look which will give the President some sense we've been responsive. In fact, with skill we might even be able to argue the objectively strong case for more aid to India, if we could couple this with a clearer set of conditions precedent.

There's trouble ahead but also opportunity. And we all agree with McNamara that this is just as central as Southeast Asia. Can we talk?

RWK

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *je*, NARA, Date *5-19-04*

~~SECRET~~

16
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 5, 1965

Dear Don:

These are introductory materials on India and Pakistan picked out by my colleague, Bob Komer, who is the most knowledgeable man in the White House on this subject. After you have had a quick look, you may want to tell us whether this is more or less on the track, or whether you want other and preliminary papers.

I have reported to the President that we are making this introductory exploration and told him that you are interested if he really is serious about it. I will let you know what I get back from him.

Sincerely,

Mc

McGeorge Bundy

Mr. Donald C. Cook
c/o USUN

SECRET attachments

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May 19, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The British are still trying manfully to settle the Rann of Kutch dispute. But the de facto cease fire they achieved is so fragile that Harold Wilson wants to tape it down soonest. The reconnaissance flights of each side over the other may trigger a new incident at any time.

*Rann
x Pak*

Because a major Pak/Indian fracas is the last thing we want just now, and because Ayub just wrote you a long self-justifying letter (Tab B), we urge you seize the chance to back up our cousins by sending Ayub attached brief private reply. It avoids arguing with Ayub about the merits, but tells him that if he really wants peace all he has to do is buy Wilson's proposals. Pak stickiness on procedural details is the chief obstacle at this point.

We've checked with the British, who are eager to have you reinforce their pitch--"the sooner the better." This can't hurt and may do a lot of good, because Ayub is becoming nervous about US aid.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

Att. Rusk Memo to President 5/19/65, subj. BritEfforts to work out Cease-Fire w/Pak and India on Rann of Kutch

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *jc/jc* NARA, Date 5-19-04

India-Pak
Cook Study
HKS 18

~~SECRET~~

June 3, 1965

Dear Mr. Cook:

The job the President would like you to take on is as complex as it is important--so much so that one hardly knows where to begin. The sheer size and location of India/Pakistan--India alone has more people than Latin America and Africa combined--in itself makes the area of great importance to us. Beyond this, however, we have developed over the years an infinite variety of relationships with both India and Pakistan, which extend far beyond straight economic and military aid into alliance ties, side commitments, intelligence collaboration, and private investments.

The President's great interest in a quiet new look at our India/Pakistan policy stems initially from the simple fact that the Indian subcontinent is our largest aid client. It gets more in total USG aid--if PL 480 is included--than the Alliance (\$1.24 billion in 1965 as compared to \$1.1 billion for all Latin America). Of course, if we omit PL 480 (which is after all surplus disposal on our part) then the real out-of-pocket cost turns out to be less. If private investment is included, then the comparison is even more in Latin America's favor.

In asking whether we're getting enough return to justify this massive investment, the President has in mind the increasing (at least till last year) Congressional disenchantment with foreign aid. He clearly sees aid to India/Pakistan as bulking so large as to be potentially quite vulnerable, particularly at a time when neither India nor Pakistan is giving us much political support and when each accuses the other of using US military aid against it, rather than for the purposes for which intended (each also accuses us along these lines). I might add that others do not see our Indian/Pak aid as so much at risk, but the President's own sure instinct on hill matters puts the burden of proof very much on them.

Behind his overt worry over aid, moreover, I suspect a deeper concern as to whether we really know where we're going in the subcontinent. He seems to sense a sort of stagnation in US policy in this key area, and is reluctant to keep signing big checks until it's been sorted out. At any rate, he seems determined to force the government to rethink the matter.

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-140
By SJ NARA, Date 5-23-02

SECRET

2.

The job of rethinking our Pak/Indian policy must be an exercise in the art of the possible. Many of the frustrations inherent in our relations with the subcontinent stem in large part from factors beyond our control. India is India, to coin a phrase, and we aren't going to be able to change its peculiar Indian way of looking at itself and at the world. Pak and Indian nationalism, clearly on the rise, is another fact of life with which we'll have to live. Other aspects of the Pak/Indian scene may be more susceptible to outside influences, however, so as the starting point for your own preliminary look at the matter, here are some of these:

First is the question of what we're trying to accomplish with our massive aid program. Many regard it basically as a long term investment, and one in which we should not be unduly concerned about the limited short run returns. This has been our basic philosophy, especially with regard to India-- the only other population concentration comparable to China. Probably influenced greatly by the loss of China, we've embarked since 1952 on the building of a viable democratic Indian subcontinent, first to prevent it from going the way of China and second to make it eventually into a pro-Western counterweight to Peiping. And we've done so consistently despite the fact that India's particular brand of isolationism and Asian neutralism has often worked against our shorter term interests.

Essentially this rationale would argue for attempting to help meet the subcontinent's basic needs for growth without attempting to use our aid too much as political leverage. Resist using aid for political purposes, in other words. Without contesting the long term goal of our effort, I would still ask whether our day-to-day policies won't have much more effect on our ability to realize our longer term investment than some of my colleagues suggest.

Our second major dilemma is that, while from the standpoint of our global purposes we look on the subcontinent as a strategic unit, in fact it is not. Britain's 1947 partition of India into two mutually antagonistic parts may yet prove to be, as many Indians claim, a historic miscalculation. Perhaps the British, in seeking to forestall communal Hindu-Moslem strife, instead perpetuated it. If one accepts the long term objective I cited, then our interest is not in backing India against Pakistan or vice versa, but in using such leverage as we have to get them to pull together, both to achieve viability, more quickly and to present a common front to the external threat which we see as coming essentially from Peking and Moscow. But Pakistan's entire

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

3.

policy has been dominated by its fear of India. Its concern lest it be re-absorbed by India, its effort to recover such terra irredenta as Kashmir, the policies it has pursued to this end (and the Indian responses) are facts of life which immensely complicate our policy problem.

Owing largely to circumstances, our policy has in some respects helped accentuate Pak/Indian antagonism rather than the reverse. When Pakistan logically sought a powerful external ally to help counterbalance India, it found the US in its eagerness to complete a network of defensive pacts around the Soviet periphery, a natural ally. In return for Pakistan's joining SEATO and then CENTO we provided it with massive military and economic aid and tended to gear our Indian policy to Pakistan's concerns. While we made a massive economic investment in India too, our preferential support of Pakistan is apparent from the aid figures themselves.

A readjustment in this relationship was inevitable, and began as our fears of further overt Communist local aggression on the Korean model declined, and as we realized that Pakistan's overriding concern with India meant that Pak forces would not be made available to us in the Middle East or Southeast Asia (as had traditionally been the case with the Indian army up through World War II).

The Sino-Soviet split and the Chinese attack on India in late 1962 hastened this readjustment (and further highlighted the ambivalence of our policy). Since the USSR pursued a competitive policy of investment in India, Pakistan had no alternative source of external support against India than the US. When Red China split off and began leaning on India, it opened up a new option for the Paks. Then, in response to the Chinese attack the US began providing India with military aid (MAP). This outraged the Paks, who saw this aid eventually being used against them. So they began to move toward China as the power most likely to help them against India.

Thus we face today a paradoxical situation in which our de jure ally Pakistan is in fact moving closer to Red China, while we see a major common interest with neutralist India in meeting the Chicom threat.

What adjustments should we make to this new situation?

Put another way, can we arrest the trend toward alienation of Pakistan from us, without paying an unseemly price? To what extent must we inevitably

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~~SECRET~~

4.

fall short of satisfying either India or Pakistan in our effort to keep on good terms with both? Should we press anew for a Pak-Indian reconciliation, including a Kashmir settlement? Or if we see little hope of achieving this in the short run, and risk alienating both India and Pakistan in the attempt, should we disengage from trying to settle Pak/Indian differences? Yet is disengagement feasible, even if desirable?

In purely development terms are we (and our consortium partners) providing the right amount and kind of economic aid to achieve the desired result? Should we tie it more directly to self help? Pakistan is doing remarkably well with our aid, partly because we give so much, and partly because the Paks are listening to our economic advice. India isn't doing badly either, though its problems are even greater and our per capita aid much less. In fact one school of thought sees it in our interest to invest much more in India, to bring it more quickly to the self-sustaining stage.

Yet another issue is posed by the risk that Paks and Indians might use against each other the military equipment we provided one against the USSR and the other against China. Each has already complained to us about such misuse by the other in the Rann of Kutch. We've been slowing up MAP aid to both, at real expense to our bilateral relations. Bowles also keeps pointing out that we're driving India to the USSR as prime supplier.

Will India go nuclear as psychological reassurance against the Chicom bomb? Here is a special problem and every US anti-proliferation instinct leads us to anticipate the risk. But what price should we be prepared to pay?

3.4(b)(1)

The above are perhaps the biggest policy issues we currently confront, though by no means the only big ones. For example, I've deliberately omitted how to get India and Pakistan to back us more vigorously in Southeast Asia, where we're defending their interests at least as much as ours. Attached are some papers which expand on these and related issues. It's quite a smorgasbord, but assembled so that you can pick and choose as time permits. They will give you an even better sense of the magnitude and complexity of our Pak/Indi enterprise. Forewarned is forearmed.

Sincerely,

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ATTACHMENT

18^a

Here is an introductory sampling of the in-house material I think best suited to your purpose. Don't be intimidated by the apparent bulk, because they scan quickly, and we've set them up so you can pick and choose. You might start with the memos at the end, which will give you right off the flavor of the real issues to be faced:

A. The standard policy background papers. The three National Policy Papers lay out the basic framework of our interests and our policy, while the two National Intelligence Estimates give some sense as to the prospects. Regard these as reference material. As inter-departmental committee products, they tend to be so general and even-handed as to obscure some of the important policy issues.

B. Papers on Aid Strategy. Since our chief policy tool in the subcontinent is economic aid, I've included last fall's AID strategy reviews, a paper by John Lewis (AID director, New Delhi) on the India program, and a memo of a recent conversation with Dick Gilbert, who heads the Harvard Advisory Group in Pakistan. We omitted the basic aid strategy papers themselves as too bulky and technical.

C. Interpretive Pieces. This category cuts closer to the bone. Some items are admittedly partisan, coming as they do from those articulate spokesmen for Pak and Indian interests--our embassies in Karachi and New Delhi. They include a recent Karachi airgram laying out possible courses we might take with Ayub (written when his visit here was still on) and two recent letters from Bowles on how to achieve a closer relationship with India. We've also included several analytical papers: a recent Max Freedman article on India as the key to our Asian policy; two CIA studies on the key policy-makers (Ayub, Bhutto, Shastri) and the pressures that influence them; and a memo from McNamara to the President on why economic aid to India and Pakistan is strategically important.

D. White House Memos. Finally, and most sensitive, are a few of my own in-house memos which try to sort out for the President and Mac Bundy what our big problems really are. I've included them because they will probably give you more of a quick feel for the kind of problems we confront than the other papers, whether or not the policy prescriptions commend themselves. I've also included rundowns on how we might use economic aid leverage to bring Ayub back on the track. Last, but not least, are some reflections by Tom Hughes, State's intelligence chief, on a visit to the subcontinent a year ago.

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R. W. Komer

Authority NLS 01-140 (29a)
By jc/sj. NARA, Date 5-18-04

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

May 15, 1965

Mac -

As Bowles said in side-wire message, Ayub's letter to LBJ gives us an opening to cool him down, and thus help cut risk of the kind of Pak/Indian fracas which would really put us on the spot. With our plates so full already, I can't think of anything we need less right now.

It's hard to sort out cause and effect, but the finger of suspicion points more at the Paks. At any rate, they humiliated the Indians, who aren't very eager to accept any more humiliations--at least not from the Paks on top of the Chicoms and US. So I'm for preventive medicine.

Am pushing attached brief, cool response. It will be read loud and clear by Ayub, but it's hard for him to fault us on it. Am urging State to try it out informally on Brits, since we ought not to meddle in their show without asking.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 01-71 (*26b)

By jc/aj, NARA, Date 5-17-04

19
India Pak
Rown

~~SECRET~~

19a
May 15, 1965/12:15 pm

Dear Mr. President:

I have received and carefully studied your urgent letter of 11 May. Since I so fully agree with you as to the gravity of the situation, I am making an early reply.

In all candor, we find it difficult to attempt to judge the merits of the Pakistan and Indian positions on the Rann of Kutch. But there can be no question as to the terrible consequences of a war between your two countries. So the most important thing, as you say, is to move as quickly as possible toward defusing and settling this dangerous issue by the only sensible method available, i. e. by peaceful means.

Such a method is to hand, in the proposals of Prime Minister Wilson. Therefore, I urge you, as a friend and ally, to accept these as the most quick and sure road to the reduction of tensions which you seek.

Sincerely yours,

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Authority NSC 8-8-80 letter
By JLW/p. NARA. Date 5-19-04

SECRET

20
file
India-Pak
x India

McGB:

April 29, 1965

Bowles has endorsed L. K. Jha's suggestion (New Delhi 3082) that Lodge, when he sees Shastri Friday, bring a message from the President saying we'd press the Paks not to use MAP equipment in the Rann of Kutch.

In your absence, I've told State my tentative feeling is we shouldn't get the President involved now in this ticklish problem, especially since we're still not sure of the facts. State's initial reaction is the same. Besides, Lodge has important Vietnam business and we want to leave the India-Pak problem to Bowles. If Lodge gets across our points on the visit postponement, he will have done a good day's non-Vietnamese work.

Although we want to keep the President out of this now, this problem will raise a lot of noise unless we get a cease-fire. Bowles has already recommended we threaten to suspend Pak military aid. We've always told the Indians we'd keep the Paks from using MAP equipment against them, and now they're publicizing pictures of US-made tanks presumably in action in Kutch. The Paks claim they're within their MAP agreement rights--just deploying the tanks for defense. We're not sure to what extent the tanks have been used, but at least some small MAP equipment must have been used because we're the Paks' main supplier.

McConaughy is right (Karachi 2040) in fearing we might send Ayub off the deep end by cutting off his chief source of security. He's also right in admitting we're in a box with the Indians and with Congress if we don't try to control use of MAP equipment. We don't see any obvious way out yet, except to bet heavily on a cease-fire.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By clj, NARA, Date 5-19-04

SECRET

SECRET

April 28, 1965

Mac -

Wilson weighed in heavily on Pak/Indian flareup, and I think constructively (see London 5177 and Delhi 3059 attached). My hunch is he's given both a way out. A little wire from our leader to Childe Harold might be a useful gesture, if things prove out. I gather Wilson's doing well by us on Vietnam.

RWK

21
India Pak

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 5-19-04

~~SECRET~~

April 28, 1965 ~~SECRET~~

India - Pak
x Pak

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Bunker is gladly taking on lunch with B. K. Nehru to mollify him by explaining the hard reasons why Shastri postponement seemed wise. He'll urge that further recriminations couldn't be more unproductive. We've also given Lodge some good ammunition to calm down Shastri himself.

Our chief problem is with the Indians rather than the Paks. The latter, reading the signs quite skilfully, have decided it would be wiser not to make a public fuss, especially since the injured Indians are so unhappy that India was equated with Pakistan (you'll recall that disinviting Shastri too was Ayub's one request when our Ambassador urged postponement).

Given Pakistan's relatively careful behavior, the desirability of our being a little distant, and the fact that their cocky Ambassador here is one of those who's been misinforming Ayub about the Americans being patsies, it might be better to avoid special treatment for G. Ahmed. Rusk has already talked with him, so the White House might leave him in left field for a while. It would help ensure better Pak behavior, I think. Bundy reluctantly concurs.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NIJ 00-253 (410)
By JCBM NARA, Date 5-21-04

We're shooting for two goals in the subcontinent: (1) a solid bulwark against Chinese expansion and (2) a dramatic demonstration that the real road to economic success is ours, not the Communist. With Ayub gradually democratizing and Shastri running the biggest democracy in the world, we see a real opportunity to show the world that this is the way to the future. Ayub has done startlingly well economically, and we see a chance for a breakthrough in India if we play our cards right. Success in the subcontinent is as crucial to stopping the Chinese in the long run as success in Vietnam is in the short.

Our aid program in Pakistan (\$3 billion in economic and \$675 million in military) has become one of our real success stories. With the Pak decision a year ago to turn the private sector loose, ^{the} ~~its~~ growth rate is hitting 5% and the Paks are surpassing their own Plan targets by as much as 25%. Their new Plan beginning this year projects another 30% increase in GNP by 1970, and we think they have a good chance of making it.

A viable Pakistan is a vital part of the subcontinent block against the Chinese. Without the confidence that will come with economic strength, we'll never bring the Paks and Indians together in the unified defense effort we want. Ayub has been courting Peiping lately, largely because we took advantage of the Chicom invasion to move closer to India. We don't have any immediate solution to the Pak-Indian problem which distracts their attention from their important business, but we believe our substantial development support gives us the best possible ~~me~~ means to work on them.

India Pak

India's economic progress has been less spectacular, but the problems (\$5.9 billion ~~in~~ economic, \$80 million military) are greater there. Despite this, our aid/has helped the Indians achieve a good bit. Since 1951, industrial production has more than doubled, and agriculture has gained by ~~m~~ almost half. The unsolved problems are still formidable, but so are the opportunities. We see a chance this year to persuade the Indians to make a few policy changes that could push their growth rate from 4-7% over a very short period. No one claims this will take India off the economic critical list, but it could be the turnaround that begins another dramatic success story. And that kind of success is essential to holding India together politically.

We believe the kind of effort we've been making in both these countries is warranted by the fact that the subcontinent together with Japan forms the only potential counterweight ~~to~~ we see to the expansion of Chicom power in Asia. India's population alone is greater than that of Latin America and Africa combined. Its government is democratic, and it is deeply committed against Communist China. Even Ayub is anti-Communist and would stand firm against China if he could settle his India problem. While we must make our stand today in Vietnam against Chicom expansion, India, Pakistan and Japan are the ~~x~~ potentially far stronger bulwarks of tomorrow.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

file
India Pak
24

RWK:

April 27, 1965

From Carol Laise on Kutch: Telephone call from London confirms that Brits are jumping in with both feet. Wilson sending personal messages to Ayub and Shastri proposing cease-fire by Thursday, everybody stay where they are, Brits would make mediator available.

New Delhi 3053 underscores importance of quick action. Shastri says he may be forced to retaliate elsewhere or make room for somebody who will. So cease-fire by Thursday essential to keeping him from point of no return.

This doesn't change anything President might say at news conference but confirms we've moved further in direction which Rusk's briefing laid out.

HHS

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *5-19-04*

~~SECRET~~

April 26, 1965

25

Mac -

This Rann of Kutch business could build up to a real mess.

To oversimplify, the Paks found a good new place to lean on Indians--one where the terrain favored Pak side. The Indians reacted with their usual ineptitude, but at any rate both sides have built up to 6-7000 men and the Paks hold the forward positions in the disputed area.

What worries State is that Indians are building up to a binge. They are determined not to let the Paks of all people get away with a Ladakh-type humiliation. So there's a strong chance of Indian retaliation elsewhere, where the odds favor them more.

If this occurs, who knows what will happen. An Indian deputy foreign minister told the new UK High Commissioner, Freeman, that it might mean a major Pak/Indian war.

We're hesitant to weigh in too hard because neither Paks nor Indians are very friendly to us at the moment. Ergo, I'm plugging for UK, Commonwealth, and UN admonitory noises with us in a supporting role. If things take a turn for the worse, however, we may have to buy a share.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

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Authority ERUS 64-68, vol. 25, #110

By je NARA, Date 5-18-04

CONFIDENTIAL

April 15, 1965

India/Pak file
26

Mr. LeBovit:

Here's the memo I spoke to you
about. Please hold it in confidence.

Hal Saunders

Att: Cy, HHS Memo for Record, 4/10/65
re India and Pakistan

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 5-11-04

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 15, 1965

India/Pak file
27

Irv Lewis:

Thought you'd be interested in
this generally, as well as in its reference
to PL 480 policy.

Hal Saunders

Att: HHS Memo for Record, 4/10/65
re India and Pakistan

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *5-19-04*

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file
India/Pak
28

RWK:

April 13, 1965

There's a germ of an idea in this AID suggestion for pushing India and Pakistan together, though the argument isn't as compelling as Dick Gilbert's notion of forcing substantial trade between them. In fact, I should think this would more naturally follow a move on trade, which is more natural, would have bigger economic pay off and would also draw Indians and Paks together at least at the technical level.

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *5-19-04*

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file
India Pak
29

Mac -

April 13, 1965

I had just asked Hal to do up the Pak and Indian aid figures. Here they are (and how big they look).

RWK

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 5-19-04

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July 25, 1964

India - Pak
31

Mac -

Given our own timidity about growling back at Paks (except for Harriman), I'm glad that some of our UK friends are less inhibited. Note how Pickard (Chief CRO professional concerned) put it.

RWK

Attach: London 416

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 5-19-04

~~SECRET~~

July 22, 1964

32
India Pak
X India map

Mac -

Home's response to LBJ's note of July 4 on India-Pak matters is depressing. Home said he had a long talk with Ayub but I note that Pickard (an honest man) says Brits had no opportunity at any level for meaningful talks with Paks and that while Home briefly raised the subject with Ayub, their planned longer meeting never came off.

It would be natural for LBJ to focus on Home's comment wondering whether "we ought not to review the scale of aid to India's defense effort." Of course our MAP to India is political, not military, just as our MAP for Pakistan. Should LBJ react, however, you might assure him that we will review aid to both India and Pakistan right after the election as he suggested.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
By isl NLJ/RAC 11-12
NARA, Date 1-30-12

~~SECRET~~

July 7, 1964

33
India - Pak
map
x Pak

McGB -

For the President's 5:30 meeting with G. Ahmed.

HHS

Attach.

- (1) McGB Memo to President (HHS) dtd 7/7/64 w/
Talking Points
- (2) Read/Bundy Memo dtd 7/7/64 re President's
apptmt with Ahmed
- (3) Copy of Daily Mail Article (interview w/Ayub)

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 5-19-04

~~SECRET~~

July 7, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

Pakistani Ambassador Ahmed is coming in to deliver a letter from Ayub, probably protesting our military aid to India. Ayub is upset because we announced next year's MAP for India shortly after Nehru's death. He's arguing less about the aid than about tactics. He thinks we should have held up as means of pressing India into reconciliation with Pakistan. Our agreement was almost wrapped up here before Nehru died, and we felt we should go ahead quickly to cement ties with the new Indian government. The Paks should understand that our influence in New Delhi is as important to them as to us.

Ahmed is going straight to London to see Ayub at the Commonwealth Conference, so this is a good chance to let Ayub know he has gone too far in recent public remarks about our MAP for India. (See London Daily Mail article attached.) We don't want him to paint himself into a corner where we can't thrash out our differences quietly.

We want to balance this message with reassurance that our Pak policy hasn't changed and encouragement for Ayub's moderation toward India since Nehru's death. Shastri's illness postponed their efforts to get together in London but we hope they'll meet on the subcontinent later this summer.

One other point to raise. Ayub has never answered our request for help in Vietnam. You might send word you're disappointed and hope the Paks can give some help to an effort which directly affects their long-run security.

Talking points attached.

McGeorge Bundy

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By je, NARA, Date 5-19-04

~~SECRET~~

33 b

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 5-19-04

July 7, 1964

SECRET

TALKING POINTS FOR AHMED

1. Our policy toward Pakistan hasn't changed.

a. Our aid continues as usual. In fact, economic aid will rise slightly next year (FY64 \$198 million, FY65 \$233 million). We discussed the FY65 MAP with General Musa in April and even said we planned two additional F-104 squadrons in FY66 "if the political climate is right."

b. We continue to regard our alliance as directed at the Communists. This was the original purpose of CENTO and SEATO.

2. We understand Ayub's feelings about India.

a. In our military aid talks with the Indians we have taken account at each turn of Ayub's interests.

b. We have informed Paks fully.

3. On the other hand, we believe Ayub understands our joint interest in reconciliation between India and Pakistan to counter Chinese expansion.

a. We applaud Ayub's statesmanlike response to the situation in India following Nehru's death.

b. Our major disagreement with the Paks is tactical. We believe our increasing influence in India can benefit Pakistan in the long run. We don't think we should use our aid to press India into a Kashmir settlement; it wouldn't work.

4. So we are disturbed by Pakistan's sharp change in policy toward us.

a. Ayub in an interview with the London Daily Mail said, "Today American policy is based on opportunism and is devoid of moral quality. Pakistan has been let down by politicians she regarded as friends."

b. Foreign Minister Bhutto told his national assembly our aid to India amounted to "betrayal of allies" and called for "reappraisal of Pakistan's foreign policy."

5. Alliances are not a one-way street.

a. We feel we have done very well by Pakistan (\$3 billion in aid since 1946, nearly 3 times per capita what we've given India).

SECRET

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2.

b. Yet when we ask for help in a major Free World effort like the defense of South Vietnam, Paks offer nothing. We have waited 9 weeks for an answer to our request.

6. We hope Paks won't paint themselves into a corner by current re-
criminations.

a. Way to settle these problems is through quiet exchange of views. We welcome Ayub's letter in this vein.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

July 6, 1964

34

India Pak
Pak
X

McGB:

Attached accounts of Ayub's visits to Tehran and Ankara show Ayub less ready to scrap CENTO than last week's reports suggested but no less bitter over our Indian MAP. He even told the Turks we're giving arms to India specifically for use against the Paks.

Ayub is pursuing the idea of some sort of non-CENTO regional grouping of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and perhaps Afghanistan. We may hear more of this when the Shah, Ayub and Inonu meet in Ankara 19-20 July. This is an old idea which most regional leaders have talked of favorably for several years. It meets Ayub's current interests, but we can't attribute it solely to his anti-US tack.

The danger in Ayub's personal campaign against us is that he'll point himself into a corner. Previously he's kept out of the name-calling, so he never tied his own hands. The points we want to get across to G. Ahmed are that (1) there's no change in our policy or attitude toward Pakistan, (2) in every move toward India we've fully considered Pak worries, and (3) Ayub's intemperate statements could damage our relationship without good reason.

I'll send over a briefing memo for the President in the morning which you can use if you end up talking to Ahmed.

Attach. Tehran 7
Ankara 23

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 5-19-04

SECRET

35
July 1, 1964
Indro Pak
+ Pak

McGB:

Here's State's currently planned range of reactions to Ayub's increasingly bitter noises. He stops at Kabul, Tehran and Ankara on his way to London.

1. State told Holmes to brief the Shah on our Indian MAP so he'd understand its limits in case Ayub tries to snow him. State has also alerted Holmes to yesterday's report that Paks are considering scrapping CENTO and SEATO membership. Grant thinks the Shah, fresh from a successful visit here, will say the right things once he has the facts. Grant is afraid to make a more specific demarche lest we appear to be running scared.
2. Ankara has the same dope. With very successful CENTO meeting here under their belts, State thinks the Turks are unlikely to be receptive to Ayub's talk. Hare is aware of our problem.
3. Grant will give the Secretary a crack at the letter to Home on Ayub and will try to get it over Thursday. Since Commonwealth meeting isn't until 8 July, his idea is not to wire it to London until Monday.
4. We may soon have a letter from Ayub protesting Indian MAP, which will give us a chance for direct reply.
5. State has prepared nothing for the Secretary's press conference. Doubts anyone will ask about Pakistan since our press has given recent Pak noises very scant treatment.

Embassy Karachi views yesterday's report more as further indication of Pak bitterness or as another pressure play than as sure evidence of Pak decision. Embassy thinks SEATO might go first, with Paks simply refusing to attend meetings rather than junking the treaty.

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 5-19-04

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

June 27, 1964

36

*Indira Park
x Park*

Mac -

Attached strikes me as a most useful way to get word to Ayub. Talbot and Grant are interested, so I told them I'd give you my draft and they should send their comments to you. Such a message should go before Commonwealth leaders meet on 6 July.

Message serves a secondary purpose of showing Home we're still buddies, just in case we haven't been sending him a lot of messages lately.

Attach. RWK Draft Ltr to RWK
Home 6/27/64 11 am

June 29, 1964

McGB:

This would have to be recast if Shastri doesn't go to London, but today surfaces two additional arguments for such a message:

1. Embassy Karachi (2558) also recommends Home approach Ayub.
2. Pak press says Ayub will write LBJ to protest our Indian program (FBIS 25)

attached

HHS

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *5-19-04*

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 5-19-04

36a
June 29, 1964/11 am

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

As you approach what looks to be one of the most momentous Commonwealth Conferences in years, let me offer a few words of encouragement on bringing together India and Pakistan. Shaikh Abdullah's release, Nehru's death, and the recent conciliatory noises from both Ayub and Shastri seem to have created a situation in which movement toward settlement of Kashmir and other issues might be possible. So far this is a tender plant, which needs careful nurturing, but I recall that gardening is a major English talent. For our part, we would hesitate to intrude ourselves into Kashmir again unless it was well along toward settlement. But we might then be willing to do so, jointly or in parallel with you, should it appear that we could be of help.

I would also be grateful if you could find occasion to tell Ayub of our quite unfavorable impression of his and Bhutto's recent intemperate remarks about US policy. To talk about "betrayal" of alliances, as Bhutto did on 22 June before his National Assembly, or to criticize our present policy as opportunist and "devoid of moral quality" as Ayub did in that Daily Mail article, is going a bit too far. I realize that our Pak friends are using words as a safety valve for their frustrations but I do think that for us to have a continued healthy relationship they must understand that we cannot give them a veto on our Indian policy--neither can you for that matter. Since you were involved with us from the beginning on SEATO and CENTO, you are in as good a position as we are to remind Ayub that at no time were these alliances directed against

SECRET

2.

India, but rather the Communist threat. It is Pakistan which constantly seeks to extend the umbrella of our commitment to serve its own purposes in this way. Even so, we have tended to lean over backwards to take Pak views into account in our Indian enterprise. As a result we may well have lost a good opportunity to short-circuit Indian production of MIGs; I suspect that it is the long-range interest of Pakistan too which will suffer thereby, since a smaller and controlled number of Western high-performance aircraft would have created less of a threat to Pakistan than a much larger number of MIG-21s. So I'd appreciate it if you could gently hint to Ayub not to kill the goose that lays the golden egg.

RWK/jk

~~SECRET~~

June 26, 1964

37

India
+ Pak

Mac -

Shouldn't attached remarks of Ayub and Bhutto be called to attention of President? Of course this is partly the Paks getting it out of their systems but they are so excessive as to justify riposte on our part. Unless we react it only perpetuates their feeling they can take our help and kick us while doing so.

We'll never achieve a satisfactory relationship with Pakistan unless we make it realize that it can't have its cake and eat it too. It can't continue taking almost half a billion in aid from the US, while lambasting us about "betrayal" of our alliances or of having shifted to a policy "devoid of moral quality." So I see a little counter-punching as useful in this process.

I've jabbed Harriman and Talbot, but a growl from on high would do more to encourage the Secretary to call in the Pak Ambassador and object to such intemperate criticism.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

Attach. Karachi 2523, 2528

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MS.001R.151.001/28
By jc, NARA, Date 3-20-14

SECRET

June 23, 1964

38

*India Pak
X India Migs*

McGB:

It looks as though Mikoyan's surprise stop-over in Delhi (en route to Djakarta) may have clinched MIG deal. Our DCM was told (Delhi 3851) that it was "confirmed" by Mikoyan. DCM regards die as cast, but a few of us here still hope there may be some F-104 play left for us. In any case, we can keep plugging HF-24 engine, in hopes that if it pans out we'll have new case for limiting MIG purchases.

Meanwhile Paks seem to be whomping up another anti-US MAP for India campaign (note attached). To me, this is not yet the time to start being nice to Paks, but to growl back at them a while longer. Paks claim long-term US aid prevents India/Pak reconciliation, but in point of fact unless we keep them in suspense it is they who lose incentive for compromise with Shastri.

RWK

Attach. TDCS 5/584,363

DECLASSIFIED
Authority code 9-20-79 NSC 9-9-81
By selip, NARA, date 5/19/04

39

*Indo Pak
X Shastri
Visit*

SECRET

Mac -

June 12, 1964

You should be aware that Indo-Pak relations have entered new period of maneuver with release of Abdullah and Nehru's death. Both Ayub and now Shastri have made very conciliatory public noises. They'll get together at London Commonwealth Conference in July, and then may meet together with Abdullah in August.

We want to help nurse this along, but quietly for a while. If LBJ weighed in just now, Paks would promptly try to push us out in front again (in fact our "cool" treatment may have been a major factor in bringing Ayub around).

So I see as best holding our fire for a while (not inviting Shastri or Ayub). If and when situation warrants, then is time to jump in. But so far both sides are doing well without our help.

RWK

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *jc/c*, NARA, Date 5-15-04

~~SECRET~~

40
March 26, 1964
Lunde
+ Pak

Mac -

Phil Talbot's long cable (London 4705) strikes me as penetrating in its analysis but feeble in the responses it proposes.

Agreed that our stake in the subcontinent remains "very high." Agreed that "some Indo-Pak climax is slowly approaching." Phil's policy recipe for dealing with the matter is, characteristically, not to get too involved and to continue business as usual (i. e. aid).

There's much to be said for this recipe. But one major flaw is the assumption that we can stand aloof--if real trouble develops the very fact that our stake is so "high" will tend to drag us in. More active preventive diplomacy might at least minimize the likelihood of a galloping crisis in which our interests almost inevitably suffer. Cyprus is a case in point. And as in Cyprus, we face a double dilemma on the subcontinent--not only is a risky crisis likely but we are friends with both sides. So we're forced to carry water on both shoulders, to pursue a middle course, to satisfy neither of our suitors, while the Soviets and Chinese take the easy road of backing one side or the other.

For these reasons I favor a more active effort to turn aside a Kashmir crisis. Phil himself admits we can't avoid being involved, but his "ploy" of encouraging secret talks will only be accepted if we do a lot of arm-twisting and above all make clear to the "aggressor"--at this point Pakistan--that continued escalation might cost it dearly.

I also see compelling reasons for not returning to "a frank business as usual approach" to Ayub on such a slim basis as Shoiab's private assurance that the Paks are coming around. We'll remain trapped on the horns of the Pak/Indian dilemma until we get across to the Paks that they have only a limited partnership with us. We can subsidize their development, protect them against Indian aggression, continue to seek a Kashmir compromise, but we cannot back them in leaning on India.

Moreover, we've never had a better opportunity for the necessary readjustment of our Pak relations (to rectify the overcommitment we slid into in 1954-60). Mao's attack awakened the Indians, while Ayub's flirtation with the Chicoms has belatedly made all of us realize that Pakistan's overriding concern is to use us against India. This is wholly understandable, but hardly a mutual US/Pak interest. Moreover, Pakistan's utter--and irreplaceable--

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68 vol. 25 # 31

By ja, NARA, Date 5-18-04

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2.

dependence on us means we can, with skill, bring it around to accepting our terms, and still giving us the one thing we really want.

I feel that if we revert to "business as usual" with Ayub now it will simply convince him that he can have his cake and eat it too. It will embolden him more than deter him. Phil argues that the alternative of registering "our unhappiness with Paks by dragging our feet on aid projects and planning... has not worked." I flatly disagree. In the first place this hasn't been a consistent policy--we've wobbled all over the lot. Only in the last few weeks have we begun to growl (even here we had to get Harriman to say what Talbot didn't) and more important, to show by actions as well as words that we're unhappy (Kashmir SC postponement, not talking 5 year MAP).

So what's the risk in waiting at least a few more weeks to see if we've registered before starting to talk MAP. I want more to go on than Shoiab's siren song; I don't think we'll lose this turn in their thinking "by waiting (it may make them turn more). And I doubt that "we can drag feet later" if we're wrong--it's been all too difficult to get even the half-baked foot-dragging we're doing now.

In sum, I urge (1) holding off till we get a few more signals on five-year MAP approach to Paks; (2) developing a scenario for US/UK preventive action to forestall a major Kashmir crisis this year (let's at least get an option to look at); (3) developing some kind of package to forestall Soviet pre-emption of all aid to the Indian air force (we were hot on this in mid-1962 but no one even heeds Bowles' pleas today).

With these amendments, I'd buy Talbot policy lines (otherwise excellent) and see in Bowles' return a real opportunity to get top level focus on them.

RWK

40a

(note on 3rd to last para.)

I agree strongly and so does LBJ.

(note on last para)

I agree, except I'm less scared and so less
activist on Kashmir; I think Talbot's tamp-down
is fairly good.

mcg

file sent 20 Feb per Bundy OK

India - Pak

41

SECRET

February 27, 1964

25X1



For Bowles from KOMER

Bundy and I can't help but feel that Orpheus engine for HF-24 is our secret weapon for sidetracking Soviet MIG and possibly SAM deals. You yourself have pointed out how going ahead with HF-24 would also pander to Indian nationalism, while being the course least painful to the Paks. This track is also a lot easier than SAMs from here, which are out.

We understand that if UK would only get Bristol to put two of the test engines into flyable conditions, it should cost less than \$1 million. Bristol of course is holding out for commitment on full development and tooling up cost first but surely HMG could make them see the light. Why shouldn't this be top priority claim on UK military aid?

We've been touting this here, and have gotten DOD to raise in London. But it badly needs another big push from you and Gore Booth now, if we're not to shut the barn door just after the horse is gone.

SANITIZED
NLJ-032-026-10410 &
Authority ERUS 64-68, vol. 25, #21
By JK **NARA, Date** 5-17-04

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR

January 2, 1964

MR. O'DONNELL

J. J. Singh is a very nice old man, but I see no need to burden the President with him. Mac saw him recently, Arthur saw him, so did I. But when we couldn't even get BKNehru an appointment, no need to ring in Singh--who has no constituency anyway.

Since Singh is going to India after the first week in January, a polite turndown next week (or even a delayed reply) would do the trick.

R. W. Komer

Att: Note, H. Colle to Smith, 12/26;
Memo, Connell to Jenkins, 12/20;
Ltr, Sen Hubert H. Humphrey to
the President, 12/20, with ltr
from J. J. Singh to Humphrey,
12/11/63

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *jc/jc*, NARA, Date 5-19-04

*India-Pak
X India*

file

42

~~SECRET~~

December 11, 1963

X India Pak
X Security

43

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached paper from Rusk, McNamara, and Bell recommends a major initiative toward India. Its genesis was a proposal by Bowles that since we were probably going to be giving India substantial military aid against the Chicomcs anyway, why not package it in such a way as to get the maximum from the Indians? So he suggested trading an informal indication of our longer-term MAP plans for Indian assurances that they would limit their own buildup, not divert too much from development to defense, and not lean too heavily on Soviet military aid. We fear Khrushchev may be coming to India shortly with some military goodies, so would like to start moving first.

The chief risk is a tough Pakistani reaction, unless we handle the transaction with skill. But we cannot afford to give the Pakistani a veto on our Indian policy, when we have a major opportunity to move India closer to us. Moreover, to mollify the Paks we would plan on a similar long-term MAP commitment to them, if they undertook to behave themselves vis-a-vis Peiping.

This thoughtful paper speaks for itself; we urge that you approve it. In fact, we'd go somewhat further than cautious State and DOD--perhaps to as high as \$65 million MAP a year including high performance aircraft, if needed as an added sweetener to get the Indian response Bowles hopes to get. We propose a meeting to discuss this enterprise with you at 11:00 Thursday.

McGeorge Bundy

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

Attach. Rusk Memo to President, subj. Next Steps on MilAid to India and Pak

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRVS 61-63, vol. 19, #342
By jc, NARA, Date 5-18-04

~~SECRET~~

December 10, 1963

*Full Pak
India of Pak
x India map*

McGB -

Here's draft India/Pak paper which I personally rewrote and is now being piloted through State-DOD top level. Am sending it over on the off-chance you may get calls from WPB or someone.

It's a longish paper but this is a tricky two-country problem. So I've included fair amount of explanation.

Yemen paper (including draft letter to Faysal) should also be ready by Wednesday. I urge we meet on both India/Pakistan and Yemen before end of week which means preferably Thursday. However, I am not sure Yemen meeting is necessary (perhaps just Rusk, Talbot, you and I could handle). Shall I lay on Thursday India meeting or will you? Should I send papers to LBJ Wednesday night even if you aren't here? Will he pay attention if they don't come from you? To cover this bet, what say I draft a covering notes for your signature? Pardon my confusion.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

Attach. Rusk Memo to President, subj.
Next Steps on MilAid to India and Pak
Copy No. 41

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *5-19-04*

44

~~SECRET~~

December 10, 1963

Judea Pak
x Judea Map
45

MAC -

Why not show Bowles' eloquent Delhi 1822 and McConaughy's Karachi III3 to President, saying these are good background for proposal we'll be bringing him this week. If you like, I'll do a covering chit.

I hope you could also say we lean in Bowles direction, seeing major opportunity to move India further our way and forestall Soviets (note Chet's concern lest Nikita suddenly make long-rumored trip to Delhi with goodies in his pack). Nikita may just have to travel to counter Chou's trip; we think he's going to Cairo, so why not Delhi.

We've modified Chet's blue sky ideas to protect our Pak flank, which limits force of Karachi III3 criticism: (1) on force goals we intend to hold India back more than it suggests; (2) contrary to Karachi III3, holding India's own military procurement abroad to far less than '\$170-190 million per year' is one of key features of Bowles proposal; (3) worst of all, idea of tying our military aid to some major move on Kashmir would not only be futile but put us back in same hopeless box out of which we've just climbed. We all share Karachi's fear of an adverse Pak reaction, but Walter's solution (e. g. give 104s to Pakistan now and not to India, concerted effort to break Kashmir deadlock) are just not real. Nonetheless, new proposals will cal for cautious tactics, avoiding premature showing of our cards, which he suggests.

R. W. KOMER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 5-19-04

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Ltr. 2-11-76, OSD 5-10-76

By JCL/hw NARA, Date 5-17-04

~~SECRET/DRAFT~~

December 9, 1963/4:00 pm

46

Indira P

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Next Steps on Military Aid to India and Pakistan

Proposal for India. Ambassador Bowles proposes that we make a five-year military assistance commitment to India in exchange for Indian decisions to limit their force levels, hold down procurement of military equipment from the Soviet Bloc, hold to a minimum diversion of foreign exchange from economic development, exercise restraint in relations with Pakistan, and cooperate with us in the containment of Communist China (see Enclosure 1).

The Departments of State and Defense and AID have studied these proposals and agree that if we could reach some such understanding with India, it would be well worthwhile. A steady long-term policy of military cooperation with India would do much to stabilize our relationship and thus serve the US political aim of pulling India closer to the US. Indian decisions to settle on moderate force levels would hold down Indo-Pak tensions. Excessive Soviet penetration of the Indian military would be prevented. Major diversions of foreign exchange from economic development, to which we are so heavily committed, would be avoided (over the past three years India has spent an average of \$95 million of its own foreign exchange for defense; estimates indicate this figure may go as high as \$160 million for Indian fiscal year 1964. This would put real pressure on the Indian development program). Since we are probably going to provide substantial MAP to India over the next several years anyway, we ought to maximize the leverage we get from it by proceeding

SECRET

2.

along the above lines.

We believe, however, that we should stop somewhere short of as explicit a commitment as Ambassador Bowles suggests, and should approach it more cautiously, rather than laying all our cards on the table at the outset. Such cautious tactics would leave us greater freedom of action to gauge the likely Pakistani reaction and to find out whether the Indians would indeed be sufficiently responsive before deciding how much of our own plans to divulge. Nonetheless, we would go ahead now with the preparation of a five-year MAP program for India in the \$50-60 million annual range, so that we would be prepared, if the timing were ripe and the Indian response to our initial probes satisfactory, to divulge our longer term plans.

Proposal for Pakistan. In the years since 1954, we have established a pattern of military assistance to Pakistan which is essentially the one which we are now suggesting for India. We have agreed to modernize and maintain five and a half divisions and to modernize the Pakistan air force. The latter has come to mean that eventually we will replace the obsolescent F-86 squadrons with supersonic aircraft. (Pakistan already has one squadron of F-104s which we delivered in 1961.) We have in a series of Aides-Memoire told the Pakistanis from time to time of the quantities of certain types of equipment we were planning to deliver to meet our commitments. By providing this level of support, we were able to persuade the Pakistanis to limit their overall force goals and the diversion of their foreign exchange to military expenditures.

SECRET

3.

One reason for caution about moving ahead too fast in revealing to India our longer term MAP plans is that these might leak prematurely to Pakistan and cause a violent reaction before we had laid the necessary groundwork. To mitigate the Pakistani reaction we had thought of providing them too, at roughly the same time, with an indication of our longer term MAP intentions, perhaps over the next three years. We've been planning on around \$40 million annually in continuing MAP. As with India, we would also attach conditions to this program, particularly that it is predicated upon our clear understanding that Pakistan will not go too far with China.

Unfortunately Chou En-lai's coming visit to Pakistan leads me to believe that now is the wrong time to talk with Ayub about longer term MAP, or any MAP at all. However, as we chart our course in the troubled waters of US-Pakistan relations during the months ahead I believe it important that we be prepared to give Ayub a clear signal of our continued willingness to support Pakistan unless its conduct impairs our ability to do so. To this end, we should also prepare a three/five year MAP program for Pakistan for use if and when the timing seems ripe.

SECRET

4.

Recommendations. In order to permit us to move ahead with both India and Pakistan, but with appropriate tactical flexibility, I recommend with the concurrence of Bob McNamara and Dave Bell that you make the following decisions:

1. That we develop an internal plan, not to be disclosed to the Indians as yet, for a program of military assistance in support of Indian forces to meet the Chinese threat to be accomplished over a period of five years.

The JCS determined on December 3 that India required 12 divisions and two independent brigades together with supporting units and three squadrons of night/all weather fighters to meet this threat. (We are now supporting the conversion of six divisions into effective mountain divisions and have told the Indians that we will convert two more if funds are available.)

2. That the above program include helping convert those Indian ground forces which are required to meet the threat from China into effective mountain divisions with supporting elements; that we continue to assist India develop its logistic capacity to support these forces along the China border; and that we continue to help India meet a part of its defensive needs against China through domestic production.

3. That the program include continued support to the Indian Air Force, including radar, communications and air transport. However, we would leave open the question of supersonics and postpone for the present a decision on supplying these to India or Pakistan.

SECRET

5.

4. That the above plans be developed within a range of \$50-60 million in MAP annually, leaving for subsequent decision the precise five-year program level.

5. That our willingness to extend and thereafter continue such long-range assistance will rest upon satisfactory understanding that the Government of India will: limit its overall forces to reasonable levels; limit procurement of arms from the Soviet Union, avoid excessive diversion of foreign exchange to defense expenditure and exercise restraint in its relations with Pakistan. Such United States action would also rest on continued United State-Indian agreement on the political and military implications of the Chinese threat.

6. That, as to the tactics of negotiation with India, we proceed on the following careful, step-by-step basis:

a. At this point, we would only authorize Ambassador Bowles to say that we were considering longer-term plans for military aid to India. Before we could firm these up we needed a better understanding of proposed Indian defense, plans, force ceilings, resource allocations, procurement from third countries, etc. over the next several years. We need tell the Pakistani nothing at this point.

b. General Taylor would reinforce this line during his visit to India (16-18 December) and probe Indian intentions.

c. Depending upon Indian responsiveness, we would be prepared at an appropriate time to divulge to India our longer term MAP intentions. The specificity of what we say at that time would depend on the extent

SECRET

6.

of the understandings the Indians were prepared to reach with us along the lines of para. 4 above, and the situation in Pakistan. We would in no case, of course, make a firm commitment but only state our intentions, the carrying out of which would be dependent on Indian performance and US appropriations. We would simultaneously inform Pakistan (since we are already planning to pick up a total of 10 Indian divisions by 1965, informing the Pakistani that we only intended to support 12 over five years should on balance reassure rather than frighten them).

7. Pakistan. That we similarly develop an internal US plan for a possible three-five year MAP package for Pakistan within the context of our present commitments. This plan should include the provision of two more squadrons of supersonic aircraft.

8. That we not divulge this, or even our FY 1965 annual MAP program, until we are further satisfied as to Pakistani intentions vis-a-vis their alliance obligations; but that we be prepared, if circumstances seem ripe, to divulge this program at such time as we divulge our long-term Indian program.

9. That any three/five-year Pakistan MAP program we predicated on clear understandings that Pakistan will place acceptable limits on the development of its relations with Communist China and will fulfill the basic requirements of its alliance relationship with us.

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~~SECRET~~

7.

Since we plan to move ahead with India in stages, I hope to be able to recommend to you that we move towards longer-range military delivery schedules for Pakistan before or when we disclose the full dimensions of our Indian package to Nehru. Max Taylor will drive home to Ayub the dangers of his present course with China when he is in Karachi on 19-20 December. Upon his return we shall take another look at the whole problem of containing Communist aggression on the subcontinent. Since Pakistan sees its so far limited relations with Communist China as serving its national interest just as India sees relations with the USSR as serving its national interests, it is perhaps too much to hope that we can develop unlimited security relationships with either country. Yet if we can move ahead, albeit somewhat jerkily in each country, I believe these proposals for military assistance to India and Pakistan will advance our strategic objective of resisting Communist pressure in the area without placing intolerable strains on our relations with either country. Moreover, the course we propose, though not ideal, seems best calculated to reduce the possibility that the Sino-Soviet dispute will be fought out in the subcontinent.

DEAN RUSK

47

file
India Pak
X India Map
X Bowles

December 7, 1963

~~SECRET~~

Dear Chet,

Just a note to say that your cable slugged for President and everyone else came at very good time. We're inching your proposal forward and I'm optimistic (I believe Mac is too) that we'll get something negotiable for you before Christmas. It won't be all you want, but it should be enough to give you a fighting chance.

At the same time, however, I want to tell you candidly that I regard raising the Navy proposal again (your 1800) as terribly counter productive. Let's keep our eye on the main chance. I might say that Mac and I fully share McNamara's strong view that naval requirements for most of these countries are very low priority, duplicate more precisely than anything else our own naval capabilities, and have very little to do with the Soviet or Chicom threat. The Indian Navy is a good case in point. It is of no value to our affairs in the north and raises a red flag to the Paks. They gave Paul Adams a real horror story on this when he was out there. As Ken Galbraith told me, he had a hypothyroid naval type on his staff who simply couldn't grasp the facts of life. Do you have the same guy?

On reading your cable a second time, I see that I shot from the hip a bit. If we can hold the line at a little advice and training, your case is valid, but I'll send this letter to you anyway as a generalized warning not to let any would-be Admirals start you down the slippery slope of naval MAP. In the larger sense, we want to encourage the Indians not to waste their own resources on Navy either, even if this is painful to the smallest and weakest of the Indian services.

All the best,

R. W. Komer

The Honorable Chester Bowles
U. S. Ambassador to India
New Delhi, India

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 12-360

NARA, Date 07-03-2014

By 4118

~~SECRET~~

49
File
India/Pak

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Two problem areas on which we shortly confront decisions are Yemen and the complex of India/Pakistan issues which bear on General Taylor's trip to India/Pakistan. Before we take these to the President I think it advisable that we have a preliminary meeting at the Under Secretary level on Friday, 6 December, at which we can thrash out any unresolved issues.

500

On Yemen the issues for discussion seem to be: (1) What action we should take prior to the likely end of UNYOM on 4 January; and (2) Should we withdraw our air squadron from Saudi Arabia.

The India/Pakistan issues include: (1) the modified Bowles proposal for longer term military aid to India; (2) the brief for General Taylor, particularly the nature of the reassurances he will be authorized to offer Pakistan.

I understand that State and Defense have prepared position papers and recommendations on each of the above; these should be the drafts for discussion.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By ja, NARA, Date 5-9-04

McGeorge Bundy

cc: Director, CIA
Administrator, AID

RWK drafts
12/3/63

SECRET

Rev & sent
Bundy & Stansbury
Group 12/3/63

N. B. We would issue separate oral invitations to:

DOD - Gilpatric or WPBundy
General Taylor

State - Ball (?)
Harriman
Talbot

AID - Bell

CIA - McCone

WH - Bundy

7-10 people seems to me maximum manageable

~~SECRET~~

Indira Pahl 50
PL

MEMORANDUM TO:

- | | |
|--------------------|-------------|
| 1. General Sibley | DOD/JCS |
| 2. Mr. Hoopes | DOD/JCS |
| 3. Mr. Hughes | State/INR |
| 4. Mr. Critchfield | CIA |
| 5. Mr. Komer | White House |
| 6. Mr. Wehmeyer | State/L |
| 7. Mr. Johnson | State/SP |

FROM: NEA - William J. Handley

Attached is a memorandum to me from Bob Johnson of the Policy Planning Council forwarding two contingency plans for perusal and comment by members of the Planning Group.

Attachment:

Memorandum on Contingency Planning.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification.


DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ-032-026-1-12
By sp/lon NARA, Date 8-16-07

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

50a

~~SECRET~~ / NOFORN

December 9, 1965

To: NEA - Mr. Handley
From: S/P - Robert H. Johnson 
Subject: Contingency Planning for Chinese Communist
Intervention in a Future Indo-Pak Conflict

Attached are two contingency plans prepared by a working group of the Planning Group of the South Asian Subcommittee of the National Security Council. This working group was created in late September by agreement between S/P and NEA and included, under the chairmanship of S/P, representatives of State (NEA, FE, G/PM, INR, and IO), AID, CIA, and Defense (ISA, JCS, and DIA).

These plans deal with two contingencies which were identified initially by S/P and NEA and subsequently accepted by the Working Group for such planning. Both deal with Chinese Communist intervention in a resumed war between India and Pakistan; both assume that Pakistan is primarily responsible for resumption of hostilities; and both assume some degree of Pak-Chinese collusion. The plans nonetheless would also generally cover other contingencies as suggested in the introductory note to the plans. The plans are preceded by a summary in chart form and are followed by two annexes which are relevant to both.

It is

~~SECRET~~ / NOFORN GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

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Authority NLT-032-026-1-13
By sg/cbm, NARA, Date 8-16-07

It is suggested that the plans be circulated to the Planning Group for review. If they are generally acceptable to the Planning Group, they should then be referred to the interdepartmental Contingency Coordinating Committee, chaired by G/PM, for handling in accordance with established procedures for the review of politico-military contingency plans. These procedures include referral to the field for comment and eventual discussion in a meeting of principals.

Attachment:

Contingency Plans

Copies to:

Members of the
Working Group

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

SUMMARY OF CONTINGENCY PLANS

(In Chart Form) pages (i)-(iv)

CONTINGENCY PLANS

Plan No. 1 - Contingency Plan for Low-Level Chinese Communist Intervention in an Indo-Pak Conflict page 1

Plan No. 2 - Contingency Plan for Higher Level Chinese Communist Intervention in an Indo-Pak Conflict page 22

ANNEX A

Likely Indicators of Pakistani and Chinese Communist Intentions and of the Extent of their Collaboration

ANNEX B

An Appraisal of the Strategic Military Importance of Kashmir to India

~~SECRET~~ / NOFORN
- GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 5-19-04

Pak-India

A Memorandum on the Kashmir Problem

A situation has now arisen in which it should be possible to find a solution of the Kashmir problem. This situation has arisen because of the shift that has taken place in the position of Soviet Russia in the Kashmir question. Until recently the U.S.S.R. position, like the position of India, was that there was no Kashmir problem and that it was finally and irrevocably settled long ago, and the Soviet Union vetoed any attempt to raise it in the U.N. Security Council. Today the U.S.S.R. is deeply concerned about the expansionism of Communist China and is anxious to prevent Communist China from subverting the Indian subcontinent any further. A year ago the Soviet thesis was that the United States did not want to see the end of the Kashmir problem; they believed that the unsolved problem of Kashmir was a very useful instrument for the purposes of U. S. diplomacy in South East Asia and the U. S. wanted to use this unsolved problem as a pawn in its diplomatic game. This is no longer the Soviet belief, according to the Yugoslav leaders. This is a significant change.

Soviet Russia says today that "something" has got to be done to get the Kashmir problem out of the way. The late President Kennedy offered mediation to India twice, before the invasion of India by the Chinese in October and November of 1962, and again in the summer of 1963. Each time the President was frustrated. The U.S.S.R. has however achieved a significant diplomatic triumph at Tashkent by acting as a mediator between India and Pakistan. Thus the U.S.S.R. has emerged in the new role of peacemaker in South East Asia. Everybody should wish the Soviet Prime Minister all success in his peacemaking. The progress made at Tashkent is good. But it is confined to the implementation of the U.N. Resolution on the India-Pakistan war of last September. It does not throw any light on the troublesome Kashmir problem.

What is the "something" that Soviet Russia wants done in the Kashmir matter? The Yugoslav leaders also say the same thing; namely, that "something" has got to be done about Kashmir in order to prevent any further expansion of Chinese influence in the Indian subcontinent. The Chinese Communists are already there in East Pakistan and also in that part of Kashmir which is in the occupation of Pakistan, in the capacity of military instructors to train Vietcong-type of armed guerillas who infiltrated into the Kashmir Valley in thousands last August and September. It is dangerous to allow Chinese influence to go any farther. But the Yugoslav leaders too have not defined what is the "something" that should be done in the Kashmir matter. Recently, President Tito and President Radhakrishnan made a joint statement on the occasion of the latter's visit to Belgrade that "Kashmir is an internal affair of India". When asked to explain what was meant by this expression the Yugoslav leaders pointed out that their position was not that there was no Kashmir problem, which is yet to be settled, but that this settlement was primarily a matter between the Kashmiris and the Indians. It is nobody's case, not even Pakistan's, that Kashmir should necessarily belong to Pakistan because it is predominantly Muslim. The case is that India has denied Kashmir what is known as the right of self-determination. The Yugoslav position is that if India gave the world a reasonable demonstration that India did not keep Kashmir merely by the force of arms but on the basis of consent of the Kashmiris, as a result of a settlement between the acknowledged leaders of Kashmir i.e. Sheikh Abdullah and his

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By *jc* NARA, Dec 5-19-04

From Indian MP

associates and the leaders of India, then Pakistan should have no further grievance on this issue and the Pakistan part of the Kashmir problem would become much easier to solve.

Now what is the reasonable demonstration that India could make to satisfy world opinion that India has shown decent respect for the wishes of the Kashmiris about their future? Conceivably it could be a settlement as between the leaders of the Kashmiri Muslims and the Government of India that, in the internal administration of Kashmir, the territory will be as good as independent; Kashmir is not to be reduced to the status of a Province of India, but will maintain a constitutional link with India. (Kashmir's special status can be defined in the Indian Constitution). And India will be responsible only for the defense of Kashmir and its foreign affairs and communication; If a settlement on this basis is made as between Sheikh Abdullah and his Kashmiri colleagues on the one side and the Indian leaders on the other, and if this settlement is ratified in the coming General Election in January 1967 then that could be accepted by all honest men of peace and good will as a reasonable demonstration. Self-determination need not necessarily be a Plebiscite so-called. There are many different ways of respecting the wishes of a people. This is feasible and will be satisfactory to the U.S.S.R., to the non-aligned countries and it should be satisfactory to the United States also.

Will Pakistan be satisfied? At present Pakistan is in physical possession of about one-third of Kashmir and India about two-thirds. If the Kashmir matter is settled, as between the Kashmiris and the Indians, then there is no legal or any other basis on which Pakistan can claim a part of Kashmir. It is highly unlikely that Pakistan will give up one-third of the State which is in its possession. It is also unlikely that India will use military force to recover that territory. The present division of Kashmir, between Pakistan and India, i.e., the cease-fire line is arbitrary. It makes no sense from the point-of-view of military defense or political administration. The logical division would be as between the Punjabi Muslims and the Kashmiri Muslims of the State who are two very distinct racial, cultural, linguistic entities. The Punjabi Muslims are a racially assertive group and at heart do not wish to remain with India. The Kashmiri Muslims are a racially weak and vulnerable group, apprehensive about being absorbed by the Punjabi Muslims and losing their own distinct identity. They have a better chance of survival as an entity in a secular state and in a democracy like India than in a theocratic and authoritarian state like Pakistan. If a division takes place on this basis and the territory of the Punjabi Muslims (i.e., Poonch, Rajouria in the mountains) goes to Pakistan, and the territory of the Kashmiri Muslims i.e. the valley, remains with India, it will mean that Pakistan will not only keep the one-third of the State which she has already got but will get an additional large area inhabited by the Punjabi Muslims. As a quid pro quo Pakistan may be asked to fall back some miles up in the Kargil area where the present cease-fire line is too close to India's lifeline to Ladakh where India is confronted with the military power of the Chinese Communists. This will amount to some give-and-take. It means substantial concession in favor of Pakistan even if there is no case for it after the question is settled between the Kashmiris and the Indians. It will also provide a viable finalized international frontier which may be guaranteed by the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the rest of the United Nations.

The British Government will probably say that this is not satisfactory to them because it is not likely to satisfy Pakistan but that is neither here nor there. Back in 1946 and 1947 when Britain negotiated with India the withdrawal of her power from India Gandhi said to the British Government that the only peaceful way of transferring power would be for the British Government to hand over full power to the Indian majority (who are the rulers of India today) and to leave it to the majority to devise ways of satisfying the minority (who are the rulers of Pakistan today) and securing their cooperation in running a government. The British view was that they had a conscientious objection to handing over a minority to a majority and that they were going to satisfy themselves before they left India that the minority (who are now Pakistan) got what they considered their fair share of power. The British thus went against Gandhi's advice and the result was the partition of India. This partition was the original sin from which India and Pakistan are suffering today and will suffer for decades, perhaps centuries. The United States today appears to be making the same mistake as the British made in 1947 in their anxiety to satisfy a minority. In any event no government in India can survive if it creates a situation in which the Chinese Communists will find their way to the Kashmir Valley in the same way as they have already found their way to East Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied part of Kashmir in the capacity of helpers and military instructors. And there is no point in giving American arms to Pakistan to be used for the purposes of Communist China against India.

The late President Kennedy said to the Indian Ambassador in Washington in 1963, "I can understand Mr. Nehru's difficulty. Up there in the barren mountains of Ladakh he is confronted with the power of Communist China. To deal with that situation he wants ~~the~~ the United States to raise India's military power substantially. We are virtually saying that the United States will not do it until there is a Kashmir settlement. And, if a Kashmir settlement means that Mr. Nehru has to hand over the Kashmir Valley to Pakistan, then I would, as a politician, if I were in his shoes, give up those barren mountains and keep the lush valley. I would not give up the valley for the sake of those barren mountains." The President was very eager to find a solution of the Kashmir problem, but it was far from his intention that a Kashmir settlement should mean the loss of the Kashmir Valley on the part of India. Today Soviet Russia wants exactly what President Kennedy wanted, namely, a Kashmir settlement without the loss of the Kashmir Valley on the part of India.

This is the United States' opportunity to show constructive leadership. What has been said in the preceding paragraphs cannot be the beginning but can be the culmination of a long process of discussion. The whole process may take twelve months but a beginning can be made today. If the discussion is to end in success, it has to be conducted in complete secrecy, not in the glare of world publicity. This sort of effort should be made with the imprimatur of the United Nations but an open discussion in the Security Council would be useless because in the Security Council every party to the dispute plays up to the gallery back home. The Russians alone can not do it although they would like to have the credit of having done it alone. The United States alone cannot do it either. Only a joint U.S. - Soviet mediation, conducted in complete secrecy and in the name of the United Nations, is likely to succeed. Ambassador Bunker's mediation in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict over West Irian is a case in point. In the same sort of mediation by an

American like Mr. Bunker together with a Russian, someone like Mr. Fedorenko, Soviet Representative at the U.N., can perhaps jointly gather together an Indian official and a Pakistani official and live together perhaps for some weeks and months, allowing the Indian and the Pakistani to go back to their governments from time to time for instructions until they tumble on a mutually acceptable settlement. If as a result of private consultation there is an understanding between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the U.N. Secretary General could then make the formal appointment of the two mediators. But it is no use making such an effort for peace unless the U.S. President is mentally prepared to go along with the kind of settlement that has been envisaged. And it would be advisable to leave Britain out of it, because there is lack of confidence between Britain and India in this whole matter.

The ultimate objective of all who want peace in the Indian subcontinent should be a Confederation of Pakistan-Baluchistan-Tibet-Nepal-Bhutan-Sikkim-India; conceivably Burma and Ceylon may join some day; this would be the real answer to Chinese Communist aggression. Once this becomes the objective Kashmir assumes its legitimate place in the picture and not the grossly exaggerated importance it has now assumed due to inflamed feelings in the sub-continent.

CONFIDENTIAL

52

Ambassador Raymond A. Hare

February 23, 1966

NEA/SOA - Carol C. Laise

*India - Pak***Progress in Carrying out Tashkent**

Here is a summary of what has been accomplished so far in carrying out the letter and spirit of the Tashkent Declaration:

1. Withdrawal

The withdrawal of all forces to positions held prior to August 5, 1965 was to have been complete by February 25. We have no official confirmation that the process has in fact been completed but all evidence points this way.

U Thant has circularized UNSC members that it is his intention, provided withdrawals are complete by February 25, (a) to have UNIPOM (the observer force on the Indo-Pak international border) disband no later than March 22 and (b) to reduce gradually those personnel added to UNMOGIP (observer force on Kashmir CFL) after September 1965, taking account of the views of the GOI and GOP and the conditions along the cease-fire line.

Regular forces have also been withdrawn from the East Pak-Indian borders, leaving security in the hands of regular border police. These borders are described as "absolutely quiet". Eastern sector military commanders are to meet again in March in Dacca.

2. Reduction of Forces in Kashmir

Generals Nisa and Chaudhuri reached an "understanding" during their meeting in Lahore earlier this month that both countries reduce their forces in Kashmir to the 1949 level. We are still trying to determine what this could mean in terms of actual troop withdrawals and to what extent implementation will require any kind of further agreement at the governmental level. The agreed understanding spoke of "para-military forces and armed civilians who may be considered to constitute a military potential," as well as regular forces. The net effect appears to be that forces introduced into Kashmir in 1965 will be withdrawn, so that by April 1 forces in Kashmir will be at "traditional", i.e. pre-1965 levels. The understanding does not appear to apply to Indian forces in Ladakh, although this is not explicitly stated.

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-2-

3. - Ministerial Talks

Ministerial talks are to begin in Rawalpindi on March 1. The Indian delegation includes the Foreign, Commerce and Transport ministers. Agreement on some kind of agenda will probably be the first order of business, before tackling numerous pending problems, including contraband/seized cargoes. How to approach Kashmir in such talks remains as big a problem as ever.

4. Propaganda - Apparently still being kept under control by both sides.

5. Diplomatic Missions - High Commissioners returned and diplomatic missions returning to some kind of normalcy.

6. POW's - The large bulk of war prisoners has been exchanged, as well as civilian internees.

7. Overflights - PIA has resumed previous flights between West and East Pakistan over India. At a meeting in Peshawar, Air Force chiefs reportedly agreed on resumption of transit by military aircraft from March 1. They also reportedly agreed on measures to avoid air space violations and to hold a further meeting to discuss air transit routes.

8. Postal and Telecommunications links - these have apparently been largely, if not entirely, restored.

9. East Pak-Indian Border Demarcation - there is at least a show of renewed interest in expediting the demarcation process; the Indian press has reported that India has accepted a Pakistani invitation to hold a meeting in Dacca to resume the demarcation process.

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DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Intelligence
Note - 101
63/1
SUNDY SMITH
BATOR
BOWLER
BOWMAN
CHASE
COOPER
JESSUP
JOHNSON
KEENE M
KROMER
MOODY

February 17, 1966

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *TH*

India - Pak

Subject: Reported Indo-Pakistani Agreement to Reduce Forces in Kashmir

Pakistan and India have reportedly agreed to reduce the level of their forces in Kashmir to the level of 1949 (presumably January 1, 1949, the date of the cease-fire). The reduction is to affect regulars, para-military forces, and armed civilians "who may be considered to constitute a military potential." We have not yet received the text of the agreement which, according to Reuters, was arrived at by the Indian and the Pakistani Army chiefs. If fulfilled, this agreement will be of considerable importance as the first step that the two sides have initiated above and beyond the published requirements of the Tashkent agreement.

Potential Problems

There are a number of possible gaps in the Reuters version, however, and there could be difficulties in fulfilling the agreement. The two sides have never been able to agree on how many forces they had in Kashmir on January 1, 1949. Both inflated their claims -- India claimed 130,000, the Pakistanis 81,000 -- and it is not known whether the present agreement specifies the numbers involved. Our best estimate for the 1949 strength is 100,000 for India and 50,000 for Pakistan. We believe that present strengths are over 150,000 Indians and 35,000 Pakistanis (including Azad Kashmiris). Depending on what figures are accepted, it could be that the announced "reduction" is solely a psychological move, which will result in the removal of few, if any, troops.

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The reference to withdrawal of forces "in Kashmir" is ambiguous. Previous negotiations on force reduction have been concerned with forces confronting each other along the cease-fire line, and the figures cited above also do not include Indian forces that are committed against the Chinese in Ladakh. It seems unlikely that the Indians would be willing to include these latter forces in any reduction agreement.

It is not clear whether the agreement embraces the Azad Kashmiri forces. Pakistan maintains the fiction that Azad (i.e., Pakistan-held) Kashmir is autonomous, and except for the period of the recent hostilities has claimed that no Pakistani forces have been stationed in Azad Kashmir.

Finally, there is obviously much room for dispute over what constitutes armed forces (as opposed to heavily armed police) or an armed civilian "with military potential."

Hopeful Outlook

The problems of implementation would not be serious, however, if both sides are genuinely interested in reducing tensions in Kashmir. The very fact that an agreement was signed is an encouraging sign that genuine interest exists. Furthermore, since the Army chiefs were the negotiators, it is likely that both sides were very clear on the military specifics involved.

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Research
Memorandum

RNA-9, February 16, 1966

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *TLH*

India - Pak

Subject: A Chronology of Soviet Relations with India and Pakistan 1947-1966

The following chronology prepared at the request of the Policy Planning Staff, traces the development of Soviet political, economic, and cultural relations with India and Pakistan from the establishment of diplomatic ties through the period of the Tashkent meetings in January 1966.

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Part I. A Chronology of India - USSR Relations

1947

April 14, 1947

Agreement to establish relations between the Soviet Union and India

1950

June 22, 1950

Two delegations of Indian "cultural" workers arrived in Moscow.

1952

January 11, 1952

Soviet Pavilion opened at World Industrial Exhibition, Bombay.

March 8, 1952

Soviet Art exhibit opened in Delhi

November 13, 1952

Festival of Indian and Soviet culture opened in Hyderabad. Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, Indian Minister of Health, visited USSR on invitation of USSR Health Ministry.

December 1, 1952

UN accepted India's resolution on repatriation of Korean war prisoners.

1953

June 16, 1953

GOI announced acceptance of chairmanship of UN Repatriation Commission in Korea.

June-Sept. 1953

I. A. Benediktov served as Soviet Ambassador to India.

October 26, 1953

M. A. Menshikov, Soviet Ambassador to India, visited Prime Minister Nehru on behalf of USSR Red Cross Society, and delivered a check for 296,560 rupees for victims of the floods.

December 2, 1953

5-year trade agreement - to strengthen trade relations between USSR and India

1954

February 24, 1954

US-Pak military aid agreement announced. After this Soviet Union position solidified on Kashmir (use of veto for solid support of India).

August 11, 1954

An Indian delegation, led by M. Krishnappa, Deputy Minister of Food and Agriculture, arrived in Moscow at invitation of Ministry of Agriculture of the USSR.

August 26, 1954

Delegation of "cultural and artistic workers" led by Minister Chandrasekhar, Deputy Minister of Health, arrived in Moscow.

1955

February 21, 1955

USSR and India signed a \$135.9 million agreement for building a steel works at Bhilai; yearly output of 1,000,000 tons with an envisaged capacity increase.

May 7, 1955

India Parliamentary Delegation arrived in Moscow at invitation of USSR Supreme Soviet. It was headed by S.V.K. Rao, Deputy Chairman of the Council of States.

June 7, 1955

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru arrived in Moscow on an official visit.

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- June 21, 1955 Mass meeting at "Dynamo" Stadium in Moscow to honor Soviet-Indian Friendship. Nehru and Bulganin, Chairman of Council of Ministers of the USSR, spoke.
- July 3, 1955 Air Marshal S. Mukherjee, Chief of Indian Air Staff, was present at Aviation Day celebration in Moscow on the invitation of the Soviet Government.
- November 18-
December 13, 1955 Visit to India by Soviet Premier N.A. Bulganin and Communist Party of Soviet Union First Secretary Nikita S. Khrushchev. Prior to the termination of the trip the Soviet leaders and Prime Minister Nehru signed a joint communique (December 13) stating that the visit was a "significant event not only in bringing the two countries nearer to one another but also in the advancement of the cause of world peace."
- 1956
November 5, 1956-
January 5, 1957
(Variety of statements on Hungarian Revolution) Prime Minister Nehru's UNESCO speech in Delhi contained a brief reference to use of modern arms to suppress people in Egypt and Hungary. At that time he named no suppressing countries, but by January 1957 the tone had changed somewhat. In a speech to the Congress Party convention Prime Minister Nehru, for the first time, used the term "aggression" for Hungary. He had previously used the term "intervention."
- 1957
October 26, 1957 Soviet Union named P.K. Ponomarenko, former Ambassador to Poland, to be Ambassador to India. He will replace M.A. Menshikov, who had been Ambassador for many years.
- November 9, 1957 Industrial Projects Credits - \$125 millions
- November 9, 1957 Rajagopalachari (Indian elder statesman) letters to Khrushchev on stopping cold war. Series from November 9, 1957 to December 31, 1957
- November 27, 1957 Indian Foreign Ministry delivered to Soviet Embassy in India the text of Prime Minister Nehru's appeal to governments of Soviet Union and US concerning termination of nuclear weapon tests and the arms race.
- 1958
June 3, 1958 Prime Minister Nehru criticized the Communist Party of India for taking the lead on its anti-Yugoslav stand from Moscow. Soviet Premier Khrushchev protested the statement and made the veiled threat that India needed Soviet support on the Kashmir question.
- November 17, 1958 Khrushchev letter to Rajagopalachari on suspension of atomic tests -- letter was a defense of the USSR's resumption of nuclear tests.

1959

April 22, 1959

I.A. Benediktov, former Minister of Agriculture of the USSR, has been appointed Soviet Ambassador to India, replacing P.K. Ponomarenko.

May 29, 1959

Pharmaceutical Credit - \$20 million.

September 12, 1959

First Credit for Indian Third Plan - \$375 million.

October 14, 1959

Premier Khrushchev sent letter to Prime Minister Nehru on Sino-Indian Border Dispute - the letter expressed his desire that cordial Sino-Indian relations be maintained.

1960

February 11-16, 1960

At the invitation of the Government of India, Khrushchev paid a visit to India. He was accompanied by Foreign Minister Gromyko and a number of other officials.

1961

February 21, 1961

Barauni Oil Refinery credit - \$25 million.

February 11, 1961

Second Third Plan credit - \$125 million.

June, 1961

Subimal Dutt appointed to succeed K.P.S. Menon as Indian Ambassador to USSR

September 6-11, 1961

On the invitation of the Soviet Government, the Prime Minister of India Mr. Nehru, visited the USSR. Joint communique issued on September 11.

December 20, 1961

L. Brezhnev, the Soviet President, described Indian liberation of Goa, Damao and Diu from Portuguese rule as "a great event in the life of your motherland."

1962

July 26, 1962

Indian Minister of State, T.T. Krishnamachari and First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A. Mikoyan met in Moscow and talked over world affairs and Indian-Soviet relations. Spoke of the establishment and successful development of friendship and collaboration between India and the Soviets.

October 9, 1962

At the end of visit of Indian Parliamentary delegation to USSR a joint communique was signed which stressed the need for general disarmament.

October 1962

After a brief period of uncertainty when China first attacked India in force, the USSR adopted an official line critical of Communist China for the attack, but calling for a mutually acceptable settlement.

October 25, 1962

First Deputy Minister for Foreign Trade, Borisov, met in Delhi with Indian Minister of Mines and Fuel Malaviya - discussed future USSR-India trade.

- November 4, 1962 Foreign Minister of USSR A. Gromyko received T.N. Kaul as new Indian Ambassador, succeeding S. Dutt.
- 1963
- January 19-26, 1963 R.K. Nehru, Secretary General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, visited the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Foreign Ministry to discuss on economy and trade cooperation.
- March 1, 1963 Mr. R.K. Nehru, Secretary General of the Indian Foreign Ministry, had a 90-minute talk with Mr. Khrushchev in Moscow. He was accompanied by Indian Ambassador T.N. Kaul. The Indian-Chinese situation was discussed, along with general Indian-Soviet relations.
- July 27, 1963 Mrs. Indira Gandhi, daughter of Prime Minister Nehru, called on Soviet Premier Khrushchev in Moscow. At this meeting Khrushchev spoke appreciatively of India's policy of non-alignment.
- September 17, 1963 The USSR stated that it stands firmly by its policy on Kashmir - i.e., of recognizing it as an integral part of India.
- September 1963 Numerous Pravda editorial attacks on Peking's Indian-Chinese border dispute policies.
- 1964
- March 4, 1964 T.N. Kaul, Indian Ambassador to the USSR, announced that Soviet Premier Khrushchev had accepted Indian Prime Minister's invitation to visit India later in the year.
- May 27, 1964 A. Kosygin, First Deputy Prime Minister of the USSR, to Delhi to take part in Nehru funeral.
- June 21-24, 1964 Brief visit of A. Mikoyan, First Deputy Prime Minister of USSR to review USSR-India relations. Mikoyan noted that the USSR was pleased to note that the new government (Lal Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister June 2, 1964) had pledged itself to carry forward the foreign policies of Pandit Nehru. New York Times (June 21, 1964) noted that plans for construction of MIG-21 fighters in India were discussed; preliminary studies in progress.
- August 17, 1964 Indian Government called for Soviet participation in the Afro-Asian conference (Bandung II) scheduled for spring 1965.
- August 28, 1964-
September 1, 1964 Visit of Indian Defense Minister Y.B. Chavan to USSR - visit intended to emphasize good state of India-USSR relations. Soviet Defense Minister Marshal R. Malinovskiy declared that Russia would give all possible aid to India - subject of military credits discussed.
- September 11-19,
1964 President S. Radhakrishnan visited the USSR.

- October 1964 News of Khrushchev's downfall received in Delhi with sense of unease and concern over its effect on Sino-Soviet relations as they bear on India's problem with Communist China and also general state of Indian-Soviet relations.
- October 17, 1964 Prime Minister Shastri sent message of Indian goodwill to new Soviet leadership (Brezhnev and Kosygin)
- October 20-
November 2, 1964 Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Minister of Information and Broadcasting, visited Soviet Union - indicated that Soviet Union would be happy if Sino-Indian dispute could soon be settled. Also indicated that she believed USSR would make excuses not to honor all its agreements to supply military equipment to India.
- 1965
January 25, 1965 Soviet credit of \$210 million for Bokaro steel plant, Bihar.
- March 1965 Beginning of hostilities between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch. The Soviet Union adopted a neutral position.
- May 11, 1965 Prime Minister Shastri and President Radhakrishnan met to discuss Prime Minister's trip to USSR - Shastri said that GOI must ask for more aid to develop heavy industries and must request expediting of the MIG project and supply of other Soviet defense equipment.
- May 12-20, 1965 Shastri visit to the USSR - "warm welcome" reaffirmed non-alignment and peaceful co-existence policies. Signed joint communique at end of visit.
- August 5, 1965 Beginning of Pakistan infiltration of Kashmir
- August 14, 1965 14-man Indian delegation left for Moscow to negotiate naval purchase from USSR. Agreement concluded in early September.
- August 21, 1965 Soviet First Deputy Premier Mazurov arrived in Delhi. India-Pakistan problems over status of Kashmir discussed -- Mazurov reiterated USSR position on same.
- September 4, 1965 Soviet offer to use "good offices" to settle India-Pakistan dispute
- September 6, 1965 Indian troops entered Punjab
- September 17, 1965 Soviet offer for a conference on India-Pakistan dispute (resulted in Tashkent meeting)
- September 29, 1965 Indian External Affairs Minister, Swaran Singh, left Moscow after talks with Soviet Acting Foreign Minister, V. Kuznetsov. Kuznetsov reportedly assured Singh that the USSR's position was to establish peace in the area without detriment to basic Indian interests.

- October 26, 1965 Agreement signed with USSR to supply India with a megawatt medium wave transmitter (2 x 500 kilowatt)
- November 17, 1965 USSR informed India that Pakistan President Ayub Khan was now willing to meet Indian Prime Minister L.B. Shastri on Soviet territory to discuss Kashmir dispute.
- December 23-26, 1965 External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh visited USSR - said genuine desires of Soviet leaders would positively contribute to success of Tashkent meeting.
- 1966
January 4-10, 1966 Tashkent Conference. Attended by Prime Minister Shastri, Defense Minister Chavan, Foreign Minister Swaran Singh and other officials. Ended with joint communique between Shastri and Ayub-troops to be withdrawn to positions of August 5, 1965 no later than February 25, 1966.
- January 11, 1966 Death (in Tashkent) of Indian Prime Minister Shastri.
- January 19, 1966 Mrs. Indira Gandhi elected leader of Congress Party - automatically becomes Prime Minister of India. Mrs. Gandhi was sworn in as Prime Minister on January 24, 1966.

Part II. A Chronology of Pakistan - USSR Relations

(For the Soviet role in matters concerning both India and Pakistan, see the preceding chronology)

- 1948
May 1, 1948 USSR-Pakistan established diplomatic relations; first Soviet Ambassador - Ivan N. Bakulin.
- 1950
January 5, 1950 New Pakistan Ambassador S. Quereshi presented credentials at Kremlin.
- 1952
September 16, 1952 Barter agreement signed between USSR and Pakistan
- 1953
July 1953 USSR contributed \$2,000 to Pakistan to aid refugee housing program.
- 1954
March 19, 1954 USSR protested Pakistan-Turkey Pact
- March 26, 1954
(several protests sent at this time) USSR protested establishment of US air bases in Pakistan and Pakistan participation in Middle Eastern "military bloc" via agreement with Turkey and concludes that subsequent "damage" to USSR-Pakistan relations will be responsibility of the Pakistan Government.
- May 5, 1954 Government of Pakistan rejected the Soviet protest of March 26.

1956

January 20, 1956

I.F. Shpedko appointed USSR Ambassador to Pakistan. He replaced A.G. Stetsenko (appointed 1953) as Soviet Ambassador.

March 23, 1956

Soviet Deputy Premier A. Mikoyan led 40-man delegation to Pakistan Republic Day.

May 22, 1956

Soviet Union offers and Pakistan accepts the gifts of 20,000 tons of wheat and 20,000 tons of rice to be delivered in three shipments.

May 31, 1956

Soviet trade delegation of eight, led by Deputy Minister of Trade M.R. Kuzmin, arrives in Karachi.

June 27, 1956

Soviet Union and Pakistan signed trade agreement

July 20-August 6,
1956

Pakistani parliamentary delegation of seven toured the USSR

1957

September 1957

President of the East Pakistan Federation of Labor, Aftab Ali, made a three-week tour of the USSR.

November 3, 1957

Pakistan delegation departed for Moscow to attend 40th anniversary of Soviet Revolution. First time Pakistan Government was officially represented at such celebrations.

1958

January 19, 1958

Soviet parliamentary delegation of ten, led by the Soviet Minister of Agriculture, I.A. Benediktov, visited Karachi and other Pakistani cities at the invitation of the National Assembly of Pakistan.

April 8, 1958

Soviet Ambassador handed the Pakistani Prime Minister a message from N. Khrushchev announcing the cessation of Soviet nuclear weapon tests.

April 14, 1958

Soviet note protesting US bases in Pakistan and Pakistani membership in "alliances which are hostile to the USSR, such as the Baghdad Pact and SEATO."

October, 1958

Field Marshal Mohammed Ayub Khan took over power in Pakistan -- becomes President

1959

March 2, 1959

Soviet Union warned Pakistan against signing a projected military agreement with the US. Soviets later objected to CENFRO meeting held in Karachi.

1960

February 8-11, 1960

SEATO meeting in Lahore -- USSR officials interpret this as indication Pakistan to take lead against Communism in Asia.

March, 1960

New Soviet Ambassador M.S. Kapitsa -- made short speech on Soviet-Pakistan friendship.

- March 22, 1960 Meeting of Pakistan Foreign Minister Manzur Qudir and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister M. Pushkin in Karachi. Discussions centered about disarmament, nuclear weapons, Berlin, Kashmir and Pushtunistan.
- May 1, 1960 U-2 shot down over USSR territory after having taken off from a base in Pakistan. This was followed by blistering diplomatic attacks from the USSR. Khrushchev made threats of reprisals against Pakistan. President Ayub, in a BBC interview, stated that Pakistan was not afraid of Russian threats. The US State Department declared that the US would support its allies. These events produced (during May and June) a number of severe Soviet editorials and comments with regard to the general state of Pakistan-Soviet relations.
- 1961
- January 1961 Visit of Bhutto, as Minister of Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, to USSR to conclude agreement to explore for oil and gas.
- March 4, 1961 Agreement signed between USSR and Pakistan to explore for oil and gas - USSR grant of \$30 million - marks first Soviet aid program in Pakistan.
- April 10, 1961 Pakistan Ambassador to Moscow, Agha Hilaly, instructed to raise question of recent Soviet propaganda on Pushtunistan issue and to impress on Soviets the futility of "backing a dead horse."
- August 30, 1961 Pakistan named Arshad Hussain as its new Ambassador to the USSR.
- October 21, 1961 Soviet press announced appointment of A.Y. Nesterenko as Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan to replace M.S. Kapitsa. (Presented credentials to President Ayub on December 15, 1961.)
- 1963
- January 17, 1963 External Affairs Minister Mohammed Ali discussed relations with Chinese Peoples Republic and USSR in Pakistan Foreign Ministry Report; said relations with CPR improved in past two years and that two countries had already reached agreement on border alignment. Also said USSR wanted to cooperate with Pakistan in economic field. Although it has not come forward with any concrete proposal for economic assistance, it has taken the first step by helping Pakistan in exploration of oil and gas (see entry of March 4, 1961).
- March 9, 1963 Soviet Ambassador A.Y. Nesterenko told Pakistan press agency that the USSR was "keen to improve relations with Pakistan."
- April 22, 1963 Pakistan Foreign Minister Bhutto in press conference stated that Pakistan was not hostile towards USSR and that memberships in SEATO and CENTO were purely defensive.

June 1963 Sir Zafarullah Khan, in his capacity as a United Nations official, visited the USSR. He said that Khrushchev "forcefully reiterated" Soviet desire to improve Soviet-Pakistan relations.

Barter Agreements:
August 1963 Pakistan and USSR signed agreement exchange of \$1 million of raw jute for railway equipment of equal value.

September 1963 Exchange of 100,000 tons of cement for Pakistan jute.

October 7, 1963 USSR-Pakistan signed Civil Air agreement. USSR received onward rights beyond Karachi. Pakistan Airlines got similar rights beyond Moscow.

October 12, 1963 New Pakistani Ambassador to USSR, Iqbal Athar, arrived in Moscow.
1964

March 21, 1964 Reply by President Mohammed Ayub Khan of Pakistan to Soviet Premier N.S. Khrushchev's letter of December 31, 1963 -- general Pakistan-USSR relations, Kashmir and world peace problems mentioned.

1964
September 1964 Visit of Pakistani parliamentary delegation to USSR

September 17, 1964 President Ayub accepted Soviet invitation to visit USSR (trip took place April 3-11, 1965).

October 1964 Overall Pakistan reaction to Khrushchev ouster one of cautious welcome to new Soviet leadership. Ayub stated that Pakistan looked for "continued improvement in the relations between our two countries leading to the achievement of cordial and good neighborly ties."

November 19-22, 1964 Visit of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Lapin to Pakistan. Lapin felt there were "signs of improvement in Pakistan-Soviet relations recently."

December 1964 Oil agreement of March 1961 extended for new five-year term.
1965

January 1965 Visit by Pakistan Foreign Minister Bhutto to USSR to prepare for visit by President Ayub in April.

April 3-11, 1965 President Ayub Khan is first Pakistan Head of State to visit USSR. Joint communique issued April 10.

April 7, 1965 During Ayub visit -- Pakistan-USSR Trade Agreement signed for 1965-67 period. Under this agreement Soviet-Pakistan trade is to be trebled for the 1965-67 period as compared with 1964. Agreement also provided a ten year \$30-50 million Soviet credit for purchase of machinery and other goods.

- June 3, 1965 Beginning of four day visit by S.K. Romanovsky, head of the Soviet State Committee on Cultural Relations with foreign countries.
- September 4, 1965 USSR offer of "good offices" to alleviate India-Pakistan tensions. Beginning of efforts leading to Tashkent.
- October 5, 1965 Soviet Ambassador Designate to Pakistan M.V. Degtyar presented his credentials to President Ayub.
- November 11, 1965 Foreign Minister Bhutto announced that Pakistan had accepted the Soviet invitation to attend the Tashkent talks.
- November 23-26, 1965 Foreign Minister Bhutto of Pakistan visit to USSR. He undertook trip for expressed purpose of reducing levels of Soviet military aid to India and of increasing Soviet economic aid to Pakistan. USSR apparently agreed to increase by \$20 million previous credit for Pakistan Third Five-Year Plan. (This would bring the level of Soviet aid to Pakistan -- since 1961 -- to about \$95 million.)
- 1966
January 4-10, 1966 Tashkent Conference (attended by Pakistan President Ayub, Foreign Minister Bhutto, Trade Minister Ghulam Faruque and other Pakistani officials).



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McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE
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February 4, 1966

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of 2/10/66 -

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Message to President Johnson
from President Ayub of Pakistan

Enclosed is a letter to the President from
President Ayub of Pakistan. The letter was
received in the Department February 4 under
cover a note from the Pakistani Ambassador
(copy enclosed). A recommended reply will be
forwarded to you shortly.

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Message to the
President from
President Ayub
2. Copy of Note from
the Pakistani
Ambassador

~~CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE~~

FEB 5 1966



AMBASSADOR OF PAKISTAN

55a
EMBASSY OF PAKISTAN
WASHINGTON, D. C.
February 4, 1966.

My dear Mr. Secretary,

I have received the enclosed letter from the
President of Pakistan for transmission to the President
of the United States.

I should be grateful if it is passed on to the
President.

Please accept, Mr. Secretary, the assurances
of my highest consideration.

(G. Ahmed)

The Honourable

Dean Rusk,

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.



PRESIDENT'S HOUSE,
RAWALPINDI.
(Pakistan)

55b

From: Field Marshal
Mohammad Ayub Khan, N.Pk., H.J.

22nd January, 1966.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *plc* NARA, Date 5-19-04

My dear Mr. President,

Your Ambassador in this country will undoubtedly have kept you informed of the reaction of the Pakistani people to the signing of the Tashkent Declaration. These have borne out my firm belief, which I reiterated when I had the pleasure of meeting you in December last, that the issue of Kashmir lies at the very heart of the troubled relations between this country and India and that early steps to settle it are essential in order to improve the climate of opinion and establish good neighbourly relations between the two countries. Those, in this country, who have welcomed the Tashkent Declaration see it as a first step on the road to a just and honourable settlement of the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir. They consider that, in spite of what has happened in the past, if India shows sincerity in continuing along the path which was chosen in Tashkent to settle her disputes with Pakistan, lasting peace could come to the Sub-continent.

On the other hand, there are many to whom the text of the Declaration has caused serious misgivings. As you may have learnt, despite the emergency measures taken to maintain law and order, demonstrations and protests have been held in many places in Pakistan against the Declaration. I am aware of the shortcomings of the Tashkent Declaration and understand the public concern that it holds out no firm hope for a just and honourable settlement of the dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir since it does not provide for a reliable independent machinery for its settlement.

However, in signing the Tashkent Declaration, I was guided by the hope that this declaration may show the way to resolving India-Pakistan differences and thus enable both countries to turn a new leaf in their relations to avert the possibility of

Ayub
to 288
1/22/66



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a renewed conflict and the attendant danger to peace in this region. In my talks with late Mr. Shastri I discerned in him a similar anxiety. While his sudden and tragic death has removed from the scene one of the protagonists of the understanding reached at Tashkent, it is my sincere hope that if his successor will act in the spirit in which the Tashkent Declaration was signed, the peace which has eluded the peoples of the Sub-continent for so long can at last be established on an enduring foundation.

I am aware of the keen anxiety that you, Mr. President, and your great country, which maintains close and friendly relations with both Pakistan and India, have always shown for the removal of causes which prevent establishment of good neighbourly relations between them. It is my sincere hope that the weight of the influence you wield in this part of the world would be thrown in favour of a just and honourable settlement of the Kashmir dispute so that lasting peace can be established in the Sub-continent.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration and warmest personal regards,

His Excellency
Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States of America,
WASHINGTON.



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: India and Pakistan;
Next Steps in U. S. Policy.

The Secretary today approved the enclosed scenarios outlining the general line of action we believe should be taken in our relations with India and Pakistan in the weeks ahead. A separate memorandum urging new decisions on PL-480 food for India was sent by the Secretary to the President on January 28.

See Rivik
memo to Pres. 2/9/66

John F. Walsh
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. SCENARIO FOR PAKISTAN
2. SCENARIO FOR INDIA

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By *plc*, NARA, Date 5-19-04

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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SCENARIO FOR PAKISTAN

NEXT STEPS IN OUR RELATIONS

I. Where we Stand

We have passed two major milestones in the process of determining our future relationship with Pakistan: the Ayub visit here and the Tashkent meeting. Each has given us important guide posts in the decision-making process of getting on with a more realistic U.S.-Pak relationship.

The Ayub Visit went a long way toward rebuilding confidence at the top in our respective policies and intentions. This is paramount in our relations with Pakistan and it is important in the months ahead that we use all opportunities, big and small, to maintain this confidence. Beyond that, although it resolved none of our basic problems, the visit injected an important element of realism as to our present relationship and established by implication at least the basic perimeters of a future relationship; namely:

- that both we and Ayub want to keep a close bilateral tie;
- that any serious Pak relationship with the Chicoms, specifically a military tie, would be incompatible with close U.S.-Pak relations (but we did not ask a rollback of Pakistan's present relations with China);
- that we are prepared to accept and, within limits, encourage a reasonable Pak-Soviet relationship;
- that our policy toward India is our business alone and that we cannot force a Kashmir settlement;
- but that we would not permit Pakistan's integrity to be jeopardized by India and that we would do all we can to further a peaceful Kashmir settlement;
- that any resumption of our economic and military aid programs in South Asia will be gradual and related to the prospects for peaceful conditions in the area;
- that we would welcome Pak support on Vietnam or at least greater public awareness of our problems and policies there;

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By plj, NARA, Date 5-19-01

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--and that we do not think a hostile press is consistent with a GOP desire to keep good U.S. relations.

In signing the Tashkent Declaration, Ayub in effect met our requirement that he opt for a path of negotiations with India. Although Ayub may have been given grounds for hope that there would be a more profitable Pak-Soviet relationship, including greater Soviet neutrality on Kashmir, the Agreement itself represented more give in the Pak position than in the Indian. This has resulted in considerable domestic criticism of Ayub (especially for the absence of any binding commitment from the Indians on Kashmir) and has weakened his political position. Indications are, however, that he will make a determined effort to carry out the Agreement, with a view to creating pressures on India to move on Kashmir.

II. Where we go From Here

So we are off to a fairly good start with Pakistan. We have made clear what we expect of each other, Ayub is performing well and we have signaled our willingness to start rebuilding our relations by our actions on the FY-65 project loans and C-130 spares.

But all this is obviously only a beginning. To ensure that the trend continues favorably we will need to continue to make it perfectly clear what we expect of Ayub but we will also need to be increasingly forthcoming to his needs as he becomes increasingly receptive to ours. We have reached a fairly good understanding with Ayub about the kind of future relationship we want and what we think is feasible. Our actions now should be carefully designed to get momentum in a graduated process of U.S. response against Pak performance.

This involves especially the economic aid field, which should be the principal focus of a demonstrated intent on our part to resume gradually a more normal relationship. But it cannot ignore the military area, since we cannot expect the Pakistanis to defer indefinitely the basic decisions on future military supply which presumably are still not

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answered by their essentially stopgap non-U.S. procurement efforts to date. And it involves also the area of personal contact and confidence, including the announcement of the appointment of the new Ambassador.

Our strategy therefore suggests a phased resumption of our economic, and, eventually, some kind of military, programs in both India and Pakistan; at a pace, in Pakistan, roughly comparable to the rate at which it moves to build peace with India, to improve its bilateral relations with us, to control its policy stance vis-a-vis China and to meet our requirements in effective self-help toward economic development. Consultations with Congressional leaders will of course be required at appropriate stages.

The foregoing strategy is based on the following assumptions:

- that, at worst, relations with India may remain difficult but will not deteriorate to a point where hostilities appear likely to erupt once more;
- that Ayub will stay in power and make a determined effort to implement Tashkent;
- that this will include a considerable Pak diplomatic offensive to press for creation of what Bhutto calls "appropriate machinery" to consider Kashmir, pursuant to both the Tashkent Declaration and para 4 of the September 20 UNSC Resolution;
- that Pakistan will expect sympathetic U.S. support for these efforts (beginning with the Dean Mission);
- that Pakistan will expand its military spending but attempt to do so without basic retrenchment in development;
- that Soviet acceptability and influence in Pakistan will grow, but within tolerable limits;
- and that Ayub will, at least for the short term future, curb the outward manifestations of his China policy, though not departing from it basically.

III. Next Steps: A Possible Scenario

A. Initial, short-range actions (next four-six weeks)

1. Pakistani actions

- a) Despite the critical domestic reaction, Ayub moves

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ahead to implement the Tashkent Declaration (e.g.; continues to curb anti-India propoganda, returns war prisoners and makes a determined effort to begin talks with the GOI on the lesser problems covered by the Declaration, including cargo seizures.

b) The GOP fully cooperates in UN supervised efforts to get troop withdrawal underway.

c) The GOP moves ahead with the actual release of USG-interest cargoes.

d) the Pak press continues to moderate its line on the U.S., especially vis-avis Vietnam.

2. U.S. Actions

a) We go ahead with the sale of a limited amount of C-130 spares for the PAF, pursuant to our commitment with Ayub;

b) Without lifting our military commercial sales ban, we adopt less strict administrative interpretations of existing policy; e.g. we approve the cash sale of two Hercules C-130 aircraft for PIA.

c) We begin negotiations on an arrangement to provide for Pakistan's essential needs of PL 480 (Title I) commodities for the balance of the fiscal year. This arrangement might provide for some 300,000 tons of wheat and 25,000 tons of vegetable oil.

d) We extend an interim program loan (\$50 million) for agreed, urgent import requirements from FY '66 funds. (We have already authorized action on outstanding FY '65 project loans amounting to \$39.2 million.)

e) The Hornig Mission gets underway

In connection with the above movement on economic and military items, we would indicate to the GOP that this relaxation reflects progress on withdrawal, among other things, and that further action on our part will be related to completion of the withdrawal process.

B. Intermediate

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B. Intermediate period (spring and early summer)

1. Pakistani actions

a) India and Pakistan withdraw their armed personnel to pre-August 5 positions. There is also progress in other areas covered by the Tashkent Declaration, including discussion at the highest and other levels "on matters of direct concern" to both and on setting up "joint bodies" to report to Governments what further steps should be taken.

b) Pakistan demonstrates its intention to restore its economic development program, in the direction and with the high priority of the period preceding the Indo-Pak conflict; e.g.

--it begins to restore its import liberalization program.

--it reaffirms its support of a vigorous agricultural development program, relying predominately on private initiative.

--it moves toward further decontrol and encouragement of the private sector.

--it gives enhanced priority to its population control program.

--and maintains a reasonable ceiling on defense spending.

c) Pak policy and attitudes toward the U.S. on our purely bilateral problems (press line, treatment of our personnel, APO, etc.) continue to reflect its desire for good U.S. relations.

d) The GOP also continues to demonstrate its awareness of U.S. sensitivity on the content of Pakistan's China policy.

2. U.S. Actions

a) We send out the Dean Mission as the President indicated to President Ayub that he would do.

b) At roughly the same time we begin consultations with the UN SYG and with SC members on how we proceed under Paragraph 4 of the September 20 resolution.

c)

c) Dependent on the level of Pakistani action of self-help, approve before the end of FY 1966 such additional program aid as may be requested to maintain a flow of U.S. commodities essential to the operation of the Pakistani economy; and approve loans for screened projects that will meet high-priority needs of the economy.

d) We lift our ban on military commercial sales to permit sales of selected items which are primarily defensive in nature (e.g., communications and transportation equipment and possibly spares for F-86s). At the same time we inform the Paks we are prepared to entertain requests for credit under our MAS program, for items of a similar nature.

e) We follow up on the Hornig Mission recommendations as required and feasible.

C. Subsequent, Longer Term Actions

The above outline of Pak performance and U.S. response is an illustrative one; both the individual steps within it and their timing will obviously be dependent on the entire trend of our relations with India and Pakistan. The totality of it, however, is probably the maximum we could here to accomplish in the time frame shown. Steps we might want to take of a more fundamental character in our aid programs can probably not be determined until we are well along in this spring-early summer testing period.

Assuming, however, that the trend is favorable, i.e., that India and Pakistan are engaged in a process to resolve their problems peacefully, that Pakistan sticks to a moderate course in Afro-Asia and that we and Pakistan get on to a more dignified and productive bilateral relationship, then our target should be to have reached the point where we could, fairly early in FY 1967:

- reach an aid level consistent with the requirements of sound economic growth and our new relationship;
- move ahead with the Consortium process;
- indicate our willingness to resume a military aid relationship (of a kind to be worked out through consultations with the GCP). This would be specifically contingent on limitation in over-all defense spending, the adoption of measures that provide a reasonable deterrent to resumption of Indo-Pak hostilities and a clear recognition that further arms procurement from China jeopardizes U.S. military assistance.

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SCENARIO FOR INDIA

NEXT STEPS IN OUR RELATIONS

I. Where We Stand

Shastri's death has not fundamentally changed our strategy for building a new and durable relationship with India. But it has demolished our tactical plan.

We had intended to use Shastri's visit here as the occasion for reaching an agreement at the Summit as to what we expected of India and what we were prepared to do for India in return. We had expected that the operational decisions on which our new relationship would be grounded would then follow naturally, depending on the kind of bargain struck at the Summit.

Now such a bargain may be difficult, Even if Mrs. Gandhi decides to visit Washington in the near future, she may be too new to the game, too uncertain of her political position, to commit her country to the kind of understanding we had hoped to win from Shastri. Rather, therefore, than proceeding from a broad general agreement at the top, we may have to feel our way, selecting our next moves pragmatically and judiciously, seeking insofar as possible to create the kinds of situations that will lead to the general type of relationship that we seek.

That we seek is an India that, while non-allied, is in fact closely tied to us by a strong shared interest in containing Communist China, an India that is increasingly aware of the relevance to its own problems of efforts to contain China elsewhere, and is increasingly sympathetic to our role in Southeast Asia; an India, furthermore, that is living at peace with neighboring Pakistan; an India that continues to forego an independent nuclear weapons capability; last but far from least, an India which remains committed to political democracy and which is taking the self-help measures that are necessary prerequisites to achieving economic self-sufficiency and military strength within a reasonable period.

II. Where We Go From Here

1. We should continue to explain to the Indians, through normal diplomatic channels, through high-level emissaries, and through any other means that can be usefully employed, what it is we seek from them.

In so

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines

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GROUP 3

By *[Signature]* NARA, Date 5-19-09

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

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In so doing we must take account of the temporary vacuum Shastri's death has left at the summit of India's decision-making apparatus. Temporary tactical shifts may be required in the range of desiderata we press for during at least the next few months. We should, that is, evaluate what we know or can find out about Mrs. Gandhi's views and latitude for action in the context of the new internal political situation created by her ascendancy before deciding just how hard and when to press each of our various desiderata.

2. We should adjust the pace at which we move to reinstate programs meeting India's needs to general Indian performance in areas that touch our national interest. During recent months we have successfully followed the policy of telling the Indians what we expect from them but reserving entirely to ourselves when and how we will do things for them. This policy should continue. Implicit in this policy, of course, is the assumption that we will in fact be increasingly forthcoming to Indian needs as they become increasingly receptive to ours. But we should exercise special care to avoid obvious political links, particularly public ones, between specific Indian actions and specific U.S. "responses." We have a new and sensitive Indian leader confronting us; more than ever, pride and dignity are important factors in the human equation.

This implies, most importantly, a phased resumption of our economic and, eventually, military supply programs, at a pace that is roughly comparable to the rate at which India progresses in tamping down its disputes with Pakistan, improving its self-help efforts, and meeting our other requirements. Consultations with Congressional leaders will of course be required at appropriate stages.

3. India's current food crisis is a category by itself, and will be only partially covered in the scenario described below. We have a humanitarian interest in fending off massive starvation in India which limits the extent to which we can directly use our relief operation to bring about Indian political accommodations. It is somewhat more feasible to use our relief as leverage to promote self-help, but to a considerable extent this has already been done and the bargain has already been struck. That is, we are morally committed, at least in Indian eyes, to provide very substantial relief during the coming year; and the Indians are morally committed to give agricultural development very high priority, and to adopt certain necessary self-help measures in related sectors, notably fertilizer production and distribution.

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4. The foregoing strategy is based on the following assumptions:

- That Sino-Indian hostility will continue.
- That India will remain non-aligned, and that the Soviet role in India will be held within acceptable limits.
- That, at the worst, relations with Pakistan may remain difficult but will not deteriorate to a point where hostilities appear likely to erupt once more.
- That Mrs. Gandhi is unlikely to follow Mr. Shastri's schedule and visit Washington in early February; a visit sometime next spring is more likely.

III. Next Steps: A Possible Scenario

A. Initial Short-range Actions (next four to six weeks)

1. Indian actions

(a) The new Indian Government moves ahead to implement the Tashkent Declaration (e.g., avoids anti-Pakistan propaganda, returns war prisoners and makes a determined effort to begin talks with the GOP on the lesser problems covered by the Declaration, including cargo seizures).

(b) The GOI fully cooperates in UN-supervised efforts to move ahead on withdrawals.

(c) The GOI carries on with Subramaniam's agricultural policies (including fertilizer production) and indicates willingness to receive the IBRD mission for discussions on India's economic performance and policies.

(d) The GOI continues to demonstrate the Indian interest in the containment of the Communist threat in Asia.

(e) The GOI moves ahead with the release of U.S. Government interest cargoes.

2. U.S. Actions

2. U.S. Actions

(a) We proceed with arrangements to keep PL 480 grain moving at the rate of about one million tons per month.

(b) We work out agreement with the Indians on an interim economic aid package with priority being given to \$100 million for commodities (from FY '66 funds), and possibly \$52 million for three projects authorized in FY 1965 for which loan agreements have been deferred.

(c) Without lifting our military commercial sales ban we adopt less strict administrative interpretations of existing policy. E.g., we approve U.S. private participation in a proposed Indo-US project to manufacture industrial explosives, and approve outstanding GOI requests for technical specifications and other data on items on the MC list (without commitment as to our future willingness to sell the GOI the actual items).

(d) We agree to sign the long term contract for fuel for the Tarapur Nuclear Power Plant.

In connection with this movement on economic and military items we would indicate to the GOI that this relaxation reflects progress on withdrawals, among other things, and further movement will be related to completion of withdrawals.

B. Intermediate Period (spring and early summer)

1. Indian Actions

(a) India and Pakistan withdraw their armed personnel to pre-August 5 positions. There is also progress in other areas covered by the Tashkent Declaration, including discussions at the highest and other levels "on matters of direct concern" to both, and on setting up "joint bodies" to report to the Governments what further steps need to be taken.

(b) Mrs. Gandhi visits Washington for talks with the President. The visit is successful in establishing a broad general understanding at the summit defining the most important elements of what we can do for India and what India can do for us.

(c) As part of the foregoing understanding, the new Indian Government gives a positive response to proposals advanced by the IBRD and ourselves for such self-help measures as:

- (i) Population control.
- (ii) Some kind of exchange rate adjustment.

(iii)

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- (iii) Economic liberalization, especially of imports.
- (iv) Encouragement of the private sector, including foreign and domestic private investment.
- (v) Mobilization of idle manpower, especially via rural public works.
- (vi) Policy actions to facilitate and greatly expand exports.
- (vii) Maintenance of a reasonable ceiling on military spending.

(d) The GOI gives full agreement to our proposal for establishment of a binational foundation.

2. U.S. Actions

(a) We provide a PL 480 program mix (Title I and Title II) to assure a continued flow of food at the rate required to meet India's needs.

(b) We consider sending the Dean Mission to India, depending on the timing of Mrs. Gandhi's visit.

(c) Dependent on the level of Indian action on self-help, we approve, before the end of FY '66, such additional program aid as may be required to maintain a flow of U.S. commodities essential to the operation of the Indian economy; and approve loans for screened projects that will meet high-priority needs of the economy.

(d) We eliminate our ban on military commercial and credit sales of selected items which are primarily defensive in nature. This would involve, among other things, moving ahead on the Ambajhari and Star Sapphire projects.

(e) We reopen exploration with the Indians of cooperation in military research and development not involving use of MAP funds.

(f) We announce our plans to establish the binational foundation during visit of Mrs. Gandhi to Washington.

Concurrent

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Concurrent with these developments, we would be using our regular diplomatic channels and perhaps other channels to make clear to Mrs. Gandhi and her new government our deep and continuing concern with non-proliferation; and with the Indian attitude toward Southeast Asia.

C. Subsequent Longer-Term Actions

The above outline of Indian performance and U.S. response is an illustrative one; both the individual steps within it and their timing will obviously be dependent on the entire trend of our relations with India and Pakistan. The totality of it, however, is probably the maximum we could hope to accomplish in the time frame shown. Steps we might want to take of a more fundamental character in our aid programs can probably not be determined until we are well along in the spring-early summer testing period.

Assuming, however, that the trend is favorable, i.e., that India and Pakistan are engaged in a process to resolve their problems peacefully, that India remains committed to a policy of non-proliferation and a posture of opposing Chinese expansion while maintaining a reasonable balance as between the US and the USSR, and that India shows by performance as well as promises that it is committed to vigorous agricultural and economic self-help measures, then our target should be to have reached the point where we could, fairly early in FY 1967:

- reach an economic aid level consistent with the requirements of sound economic growth and our overall interests in the subcontinent;
- move ahead with the Consortium process;
- indicate our willingness to resume a military aid relationship (of a kind to be worked out through consultations with the CCI). This would be specifically contingent on limitations on overall defense spending, and the adoption of measures that provide a reasonable deterrent to a resumption of Indo-Pak hostilities.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 10, 1966

59 NEA

India - Pak

TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM: NEA - Raymond A. Hare
SUBJECT: The Tashkent Meeting - BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 5-19-04

The Results:

The "Declaration" issued at the end of the Tashkent meeting clearly indicates that the conference was considerably more productive than had previously been expected.

Soviet Chairman Kosygin, who "witnessed" the concluding declaration, played a very active role as middleman during the six-day meeting, and he was successful in gaining Indian and Pakistani commitment to the following:

1. A "firm resolve to restore normal and peaceful relations", including commitment to repatriate POWs, restore normal diplomatic relations, consider measures aimed at restoring economic, trade, communications, and cultural relations, and "to discourage" propaganda directed against the other country;
2. A reaffirmation of India's and Pakistan's "obligation" under the United Nations Charter "not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means;" and a statement that it was against this background "that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed" - - a discussion in which each side "set forth its respective position;"
3. Agreement to complete withdrawal of "all armed personnel of the two countries...to positions they held prior to 5 August 1965" with a deadline of "25 February 1966;"
4. Agreement to continue discussion of "questions relating to problems of refugees and evictions"; and to continue "meeting, both at the highest and at other levels, on matters of direct concern to both countries." Both sides, moreover, recognized the need to set up joint Indo-Pakistani bodies to decide "what further steps will be taken;"

We believe that these commitments, if faithfully implemented, will go a long way toward restoring peace in the subcontinent along lines

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envisaged in the relevant UN Security Council resolutions of 20 September and 5 November, 1965.

Pakistani and Indian Concessions:

The conference results indicate that both India and Pakistan made significant concessions. India agreed to a specific mention, in the declaration, that Kashmir was discussed, and agreed to continue meetings "on matters of direct concern," presumably including Kashmir. India also agreed to troop withdrawal, which, if applied across the board to include the Uri-Poonch sector in Kashmir, is a major concession from India's pre-conference position.

Pakistan too made significant concessions in agreeing to a number of steps designed in sum to normalize Indo-Pakistan relations without extracting any commitments on the substance of the Kashmir question. In particular, agreement to settle disputes through peaceful means is a substantial departure from Pakistan's traditional reluctance to renounce the use of force in the absence of a Kashmir settlement.

An important gain for Pakistan is some degree of neutralization of the Soviet Union on Indo-Pakistani matters, a fact that is implicit in the declaration and, more importantly, in the manner in which the Soviet Union conducted the conference.

Soviet Balance Sheet:

For the Soviet Union, of course, there are many benefits involved in the Soviet image in both South Asian countries -- we will presumably hear much in the months to come of the "spirit of Tashkent" -- as well as the broader Soviet image in its first peacemaking venture throughout Asia and Africa generally. Moscow can therefore be expected to make much of its undoubted success and to use this as an entree for future participation in Indo-Pakistani discussions.

Assuming the agreements are carried out, the Soviets will have gained by stabilizing an explosive situation on the USSR's southern flank. They will also have limited the opportunities available to the Chinese Communists for mischief-making in South Asia and in particular will have undercut Chinese Communist political influence in Pakistan. By bringing about an agreement on a time limit for troop withdrawal, the Soviets have succeeded in making the point to both the Indians and Pakistanis that progress in solving their mutual problems depends heavily on Soviet goodwill, whether in the U.N. or bilaterally.

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3.

Of course, the whole story of Tashkent is not contained in the declaration. Up until the last, the Western reporters on the scene seemed convinced there would be no progress on any issues of substance. The Soviet effort to avoid such a failure must have been considerable and the pressures applied must have been strong. It remains to be seen what sorts of pressure and inducements the Russians used in the other two conferences that were underway in Tashkent, i.e. their bilateral talks with each party, and what impact these pressures/inducements will have in their future bilateral relationships with each party. They may, for instance, have offered a substantially better relationship to Pakistan.

U. S. Balance Sheet:

U.S. interests have been served well by the outcome in terms of some movement toward a more durable peace in the subcontinent along lines which we have already endorsed in the United Nations Security Council resolutions. The cost to us, in terms of an enhanced Russian image in South Asia, may be significant in the short run, but we believe the results, if implemented, will far outweigh this cost.

Attachment: Tashkent Declaration Text

NEA:SOA - H. Haggerty:cff

NEA - Mr. Hare

Clearances:

Sov - Mr. Toumaroff (draft)
IO - Mr. Popper

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