

SECRET

88  
Rusk:  
What happens next  
to this? Did it miss  
the boat or can we  
use it? mggB.

September 19, 1965

TO: Secretary Rusk  
Secretary McNamara  
Mr. McGeorge Bundy ✓

*Indo*

SUBJECT: The Indo-Pak War and U.S. Policy in Asia.

If the attached paper commends itself to you, we believe it may be useful to make it available to the President. It is a planning document which suggests the kind of problem we face in the Indo-Pak war and the choices open to us. Work goes forward in the Planning Community on the military, political, and economic dimensions of the approach suggested here, including a settlement of Kashmir and other Indo-Pak issues.

W. W. Rostow

John T. McNaughton

Robert W. Komer

*Copy to Bundy + show  
Rec'd to Rostow 10/20/65  
Copy to Bates  
9/28/65*

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *je*, NARA, Date 5-21-01

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By jc, NARA, Date 5-21-04

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APPENDIX A

Page 1

Comparative Economic Performance of Communist  
China, India, and Pakistan, 1952-64

These tables should be read with an awareness that:

1. Using totalitarian methods Communist China generated in 1953-58 an investment rate of over 20%. Under the impact of the failure of the Great Leap Forward and the withdrawal of Soviet aid in 1960, the rate has fallen to about 12%.

2. India and Pakistan are gradually increasing their investment rates, supported by U.S. and Western economic assistance. The Indian investment rate might reach a level over 20% in the mid-1970's; the Pakistan rate, in the mid-1980's.

3. U.S. economic assistance to India and Pakistan began seriously only in 1958. 80% of our assistance to the two countries was granted in the period 1958-1964. This is the period when per capita GNP surged ahead on the subcontinent, as it fell back in Communist China.

	<u>Per-Capita GNP</u> (in 1963 US\$)		
	<u>Communist China</u>	<u>India</u>	<u>Pakistan</u>
1952	82	75	77
1958	114	80	78
1964	95	89	93

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Komer

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1965 SEP 16 PM 3 08

15 September 1965

OCI No. 2320/65  
Copy No.

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

*[Handwritten signature]*

HINDU-MUSLIM ANTAGONISM IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE  
Office of Current Intelligence

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority CIA 12-23-75

By plw NARA, Date 5-18-04

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downgrading and  
declassification

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SEP 16 1965

FORM NO. 10-62

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OCI No. 2320/65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Office of Current Intelligence  
15 September 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Hindu-Muslim Antagonism in India and Pakistan

1. The outbreak of war between India and Pakistan raises the spectre of widespread and bloody Hindu-Muslim communal strife, affecting millions of people in both countries. This memorandum discusses the origins of Hindu-Muslim animosity and how a communal catastrophe could develop in the near future.

Historical Development

2. Hindu-Muslim friction in the subcontinent arises from the antipathy of a numerically superior indigenous Hindu population toward a much smaller number of foreign Muslim conquerors. It dates essentially from about 1000 A.D., when the expanding Muslim empires of the Near East and Central Asia first began to press heavily on the western border of Hindu India. During the 300 years after the prophet Muhammad fled from Mecca to Medina in 622 A.D., the doctrine of Islam was spread both westward and eastward by Muslim warriors, carrying a sword in one hand and a Koran in the other, who offered conquered peoples the simple choice of conversion to Islam or death. Kabul, in Afghanistan, was first reached by Muslim forces of the Omayyad Caliphate as early as 664 A.D.

3. However, it was not until the reign of Mahmud of Ghazni (south of Kabul) about 1000 A.D. that the Hindu-Muslim struggle in the Indian subcontinent became acute. Mahmud himself raided India on several occasions, reaching beyond Delhi into central India. By 1200 A.D. a Muslim dynasty had been established at Delhi, and Muslim conquest had extended as far east as the states of Bihar and Bengal. Shortly after 1300 A.D., Muslim conquests penetrated into the Deccan plateau in peninsular

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India, reaching what is now the state of Andhra Pradesh and establishing a pocket of Muslim power which did not disappear until the Nizam of Hyderabad was defeated by the troops of independent India in 1948. Between 1200 and 1500 A.D., northern India was ruled by a succession of Muslim dynasties whose sway intermittently extended from Afghanistan to Bengal and to the southern edge of the Deccan but whose influence was limited by constant conflict with Hindu and other Muslim rulers. During this time, in 1346 A.D., a Muslim dynasty which lasted 200 years was founded in Kashmir.

4. The peak of Muslim power, however, was reached between 1526 and 1761 A.D. during the era of the Moghul Empire. The Moghul dynasty was founded by the Emperor Babur, who conquered western India but preferred to reside in Kabul. Under Babur's successors--the five Great Moghuls Humayun, Akbar, Jahangir, Shah Jahan, and Aurangzeb--Muslim power again extended from the Afghan to the Burmese borders and down to the southern Deccan. The Moghuls, like their Aryan predecessors and all other Asian invaders, never were able to impose their rule in the far south, where India's early, dark-skinned Dravidian population managed to maintain its own local kingdoms. After Aurangzeb, the Moghul Empire fell apart, and the remnants of it gradually came under control of the British, who ruled most of India from about 1800 to 1947.

5. During the 500 years of Muslim domination, the numerically fewer Muslim invaders spread throughout India. They did not mingle with the majority Hindu population, however, and for the most part were not assimilated into it. They maintained themselves in power by almost constant warfare against opposing Hindu kingdoms, by brutal massacres of urban populations, and by occasional transplantations of large numbers of people over long distances. This type of relationship crystallized the dislike which any conquered people feels toward a recent conqueror and perpetuated it to the present day.

6. Under British rule, Hindu-Muslim friction was held in check by firm security measures, although according to some authorities the British successfully

used it in "divide and rule" tactics which pitted one portion of India's population against another and weakened both. When it became obvious in the 1930's that India was eventually going to achieve self-rule, however, the problem again came to the fore. Muhammad Ali Jinnah and other Muslim leaders, noting that Muslims could be outvoted in most states of India, began to agitate for the creation of a new Muslim nation to be formed from the regions of India where Muslims predominated. Jinnah finally got his wish on 15 August 1947, when India was partitioned and the new state of Pakistan came into being.

#### Post-independence frictions

7. Far from solving the Hindu-Muslim problem, the partition of India seems merely to have perpetuated it. In late 1947, immediately after partition, mass migrations of up to 10,000,000 people--Hindus leaving Pakistan and Muslims leaving India--were accompanied by massacres in which 1,000,000 or more persons were slaughtered. The peoples of India and Pakistan have never forgiven each other for this violence.

8. Subsequent political actions further intensified Indo-Pakistani illwill. In 1947 and 1948, India and Pakistan took over the 600-odd princely states on the subcontinent, whose destiny the British had left each ruler to decide. Most princes peaceably acceded either to India or Pakistan. In late 1947, however, the Hindu ruler of Kashmir was faced with a revolt among his Muslim subjects, who were aided by irregular forces from Pakistan, and he acceded to India. Subsequent intervention by Pakistani regular army troops contributed to the 18 years of Indo-Pakistani hostilities which have plagued the area. India also seized the small Muslim state of Junagadh, in what is now Gujarat state, though its ruler had opted to join Pakistan. In late 1948, Hyderabad, a predominantly Hindu state whose Muslim ruler had elected to remain independent, was conquered by Indian troops. More recent frictions between India and Pakistan need not be detailed here.

Position of minorities

9. This long history of Hindu-Muslim friction, of which the present warfare is only the latest phase, again leaves the Hindu and Muslim minorities in each country in a precarious position. In both India and Pakistan, these minorities are geographically diffused in many small villages. This makes coordination and joint action virtually impossible. The accompanying map shows the present distribution of Hindu and Muslim minorities in the various regions of the two countries.

10. Except on the local level, these minority groups are not sufficiently concentrated to have any significant effect on politics. In Kerala, the exception, the state's 3,000,000 Muslims have banded together to fight political battles, but even here they have achieved only a tenuous position as a balance of power. Elsewhere in India, the strongly secular outlook of Prime Minister Nehru and the officially secular policies of his government discouraged the formation of minority parties on communal lines. All parties cater to Muslim communities in selecting local candidates, but no religiously-based party except the Bharatiya Jana Sangh--a militant rightist Hindu group which officially rejects the communal label--has attained regional importance. The Dravida Munnetra Kazagham, in Madras state, is the only avowed Hindu communal party to have reached significant prominence even at the state level. This party reflects a political revolt by south India's dark-skinned aboriginal population--who were never really conquered by the Aryans or their Muslim successors--against domination by Brahmins and north Indians following the fall of British power. In East Pakistan, the minority Hindus have no political party of their own, and they tend to join Muslim-dominated opposition parties. Hindus in West Pakistan have no political force whatever.

11. Economically, religious minorities in both countries are at a disadvantage. Despite the Indian government's secular policies, Indian Muslims--with few exceptions--do not rise to high posts in government.

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Neither can they compete successfully with Hindu businessmen for coveted import licenses, scarce raw materials, or other favors which are controlled by the government. The scarcity of ordinary jobs also works against them. In East Pakistan, most Hindus are free-holding farmers. Those not engaged in agriculture are mostly common laborers in jute and cotton mills and on tea estates. Hindus control perhaps a third of East Pakistan's trade and there are a number in industry, but these face the same difficulties from Muslim competition that Muslims do in India. The government's openly Islamic character prevents Hindus from reaching high government or civil service positions. In West Pakistan, Hindus are economically unimportant.

#### Problems for the future

12. With neither political nor economic strength, the minority populations of India and Pakistan are obviously at the mercy of the majority group. When living conditions or hot weather become nearly unbearable and tempers tend to fray, communal riots are always a possibility. Under the shadow of wartime tension, they can occur for frivolous reasons, as in Poona in Maharashtra state, where riots broke out after a drunken Muslim desecrated a Hindu shrine on 1 September. In Adilabad, Andhra Pradesh, a communal riot also occurred on 10 September when Hindus were returning from a religious ceremony. The fact that such riots have not yet spread more widely in either India or Pakistan results mainly from the fact that the governments of both countries view them with alarm and take strenuous measures to prevent them. Furthermore, most of the population in both countries has not yet been directly affected by the fighting.

13. A much more serious situation could arise if Pakistan--seeing the prospect of losing Sialkot or Lahore to invading Indian forces--loosed the thousands of tough mountain tribesmen who have been moving during the past few days from Rawalpindi and Peshawar toward Lahore and the fighting fronts. These tribesmen, if sent into Kashmir or against

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
Indian troops, would show no mercy to military or civilian personnel, and word of their activities could spark bloody retaliation in India.

14. Even a continuation of the present warfare, with attendant shortages of supplies and restrictions on civilian movements, could spark violence born of frustrations. undefended minority populations could suffer badly in any communal outbreak which might occur in the near future. Although the percentages of minority populations in some areas are low, the actual numbers of persons involved could be high. Even the Hindus of West Pakistan, for instance, who constitute only 1.5 percent of that province's population, number about 500,000 persons.

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# Muslim and Hindu Minorities in India and Pakistan



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*India Pub* 90

INDIA AND PAKISTAN  
FUTURE U.S. DECISIONS

Subject

Estimated Timing of Decision in 1965

A. Pakistan

- |                                                                                                                                                                                                         |                                           |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| 1. Decisions whether to deliver FY 1965 and prior year MAP items                                                                                                                                        | Any time before shipment                  |
| 2. Open discussions between Paks and MAAG concerning FY 66 MAP                                                                                                                                          | July                                      |
| *3. Decision to notify Paks as to final approved program for FY 66 subsequent to Congressional passage of MAP appropriations and approval of re-programming made necessary by any Congressional action. | July - August                             |
| 4. Decision whether to supply additional F-104 A/Bs                                                                                                                                                     | August - September                        |
| 5. Admiral Khan's request for 3 submarines (made May 1965)                                                                                                                                              | Any time - ship loan legislation required |
| 6. Decision as to additional grant aid or credit sales items (President Ayub's request for submarines, aircraft and tanks made in June 1965)                                                            | Any time - ship loan legislation required |
| 7. Decision whether to proceed with ARFA Project                                                                                                                                                        | About October                             |
| 8. Decision as to mobility exercise scheduled for January - February 1966                                                                                                                               | Prior to 1 August                         |
| 9. Decision as to delivery of ammunition under cash sales contract made June 1965                                                                                                                       | From September on, depending on items     |

B. India

- |                                                                  |                          |
|------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Decisions whether to deliver FY 1965 and prior year MAP items | Any time before shipment |
|------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|

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By *je*, NARA, Date 5-21-09

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<u>Subject</u>	<u>Estimated Timing of Decision in 1965</u>
*2. Decision to notify Indians of content of FY 66 grant aid program subsequent to Congressional passage of MAP appropriations and approval of reprogramming made necessary by any Congressional action	July - August
3. Continue discussions as to content of FY 66 credit sales	July - August
4. Decision to notify Indians of content of FY 66 credit sales	August - September
5. U.S. decision whether to supply F-5 aircraft and support HF-24 aircraft (considered primarily as a credit sale item)	August - September
6. Decision whether to proceed with ARPA Project	About October

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\* It is normal policy not to notify countries of program level or content until line item funding is accomplished, except where firm commitments have been made.

~~SECRET~~

*Sanders*

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

*Research 91*  
*Memorandum*

INR-25.2, September 15, 1965

To : The Secretary  
Through: S/S  
From : LNR - Thomas L. Hughes *Thomas L. Hughes*  
Subject: Chronology of Indo-Pakistan Conflict

*File 14*  
*Indo-Pac*

INR is preparing, at the request of S/S, a daily chronology of events pertaining to the Indo-Pakistani conflict. The chronology covers cables, intelligence reports, press reports, meetings held by senior Department officials and significant telephone conversations. This Research Memorandum covers the period September 12-13, 1965, the sixth installment in a continuing series to be issued during the acute stage of the crisis.

\* \* \* \* \*

Circular 390, Sept. 12, ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Circular message contains information on conflict for use by posts abroad including background, UN role, US views and actions and third party postures.

Reuters 83, Karachi, Sept. 12, 1965 UNCLASSIFIED

The Indonesian Ambassador to Pakistan said in Karachi that his country is ready to send a million volunteers to fight for Pakistan against India.

FBIS 16, Sept. 12, 1965

NCNA reports that an article in Ta Kung Pao charges that the US "is behind the current UN moves to aid and abet the Indian aggressor" in the Indo-Pak conflict.

FBIS 100, Sept. 12, 1965

NCNA quotes from a Sept. 12 editorial in the Pakistan paper Dawn that "Pakistan's false friends are even helping and encouraging the perfidious Indians who have attacked Pakistan." According to NCNA the editorial said that "Pakistan's best friends in the world today are the fraternal government and people of Indonesia and Pakistan's great.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLI 07-298

By *isl*, NARA, Date *4-1-08*

SEP 16 1965

northern neighbor, the CPR; the next few days are decisive and those who do not pass this test of friendship must forever be regarded as hypocrites and perfidious."

3.3  
(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

The Government of India has taken delivery of six motor torpedo boats from the USSR, for use in the Calcutta area.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Pakistani advance in Wagah, Patti, Kasur areas thwarted as of morning September 11. Casualties on both sides continue high. Pakistanis are seriously concerned about their armor and at present pace will have critical problem maintaining armored force in several weeks. Thousands more tribals are being moved through Rawalpindi to Azad Kashmir.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Afghan Prime Minister: Pakistani Minister of Foreign Affairs should be informed that (1) Afghanistan had warm feelings for Pakistan, (2) Afghanistan regretted war with India, (3) Pakistan should not be concerned that Afghanistan will cause border difficulties. Prime Minister added that Afghan Government wants to discuss Pushtunistan question with GOP when present crisis is over.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Pakistan armed forces are applying pressure on Tripura and causing trouble in Nagaland State.

Reuters 86, Colombo, Sept. 13, UNCLASSIFIED

The Government of Ceylon announced that it had decided to refuse clearance to aircraft or vessels carrying military equipment or personnel to pass through Ceylon to either India or Pakistan.

Karachi 477, Sept. 13, LOU

ConGen Lahore reports conditions in city creating serious morale problem in private American community.

Reuters 24, Ahmedabad, Sept. 13, UNCLASSIFIED

A Pakistani plane made two bombing raids on Sept 12 on Jamnagar, Gujarat State, according to official sources.

-3-

Emb New Delhi Tel 588, Sept. 13, ~~SECRET~~

A high-ranking official of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs told Ambassador Bowles that the Indian Ambassador to Iran had a trying audience with the Shah, who argued that it was better for all concerned to have Iran assist Pakistan than to have Communist China do so exclusively.

USDAQ New Delhi, C-00108, Sept. 13, ~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

Parachute activities of the Pakistanis and the Indians, as reported to date, are summarized by ARMA.

FBIS 42, Delhi Domestic Service, Sept. 13, UNCLASSIFIED

According to the Press Trust of India, anti-aircraft guns were fired at two suspected Pakistani planes flying over Bombay.

Associated Press 5, New Delhi, Sept. 13, UNCLASSIFIED

India claimed today that its tanks scored a victory over Pakistani forces in a major battle near Lahore. Pakistan issued a counterclaim on the Lahore fighting, and added that 45 Indian tanks had been destroyed in fighting near Sialkot.

FBIS 38, Delhi Information Service, Sept. 13 UNCLASSIFIED

Text of a Government of India note delivered to the Chinese Communist Embassy in New Delhi on September 12 in response to Peking's note of September 8, rejecting Chinese charges.

Emb Karachi Tel 482, Sept. 13, ~~SECRET/LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

In a conversation between Ambassador McConaughy and the Iranian Ambassador to Pakistan, the latter recounted the highlights of a private conversation he had with Ayub and Bhutto on September 10. Ayub grateful over expressions of sympathy from Iran. The Pakistani President seemed preoccupied mainly with the state of US-Pakistan relations, and realized necessity of reaching renewed understanding with the US.

Associated Press 9, New Delhi, Sept. 13, UNCLASSIFIED

United Nations Secretary General U Thant met the Chargé d'Affaires of the USSR Embassy in New Delhi to discuss the possibility of returning to the United Nations in New York by way of Moscow.

September 13

At 9:23 a.m. there was a briefing of the Secretary by Assistant Secretary Talbot including discussion of Daily Telegraph article. At 9:30 Under-secretary Ball and Assistant Secretary Talbot discussed the article.

Reuters 16, Karachi, Sept. 13, UNCLASSIFIED

The Government of Pakistan claimed, in a radio broadcast, that an entire Indian armored division was wiped out near Sialkot and that two Indian infantry divisions were "routed."

Associated Press, New Delhi, Sept. 13, UNCLASSIFIED

The Deputy Home Minister of the Government of India said that some American-made tanks captured from Pakistani forces will be displayed in New Delhi and other Indian cities. Other tanks captured from Pakistan are now being used in combat by the Indian Army.

September 13

At 10:00 a.m. the Secretary met with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and a briefing session on PL 480 aid to India and Pakistan was held. This was followed by press statements including the Secretary's warning to China and that the US "has always felt that self-determination in the disputed state of Kashmir through a UN supervised plebiscite should be part of an Indian-Pakistani settlement."

New Delhi DAO C-00117, Sept. 13, ~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

3.3  
(b)(1) [REDACTED] reports Indian carrier Vikrant in Bombay basin for refitting.

Emb New Delhi 594, Sept. 13, ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Ambassador Bowles called on Defence Minister Y. B. Chavan September 13. Chavan indicated that (1) Pakistan's 1st Armored Division has been severely mauled; (2) Pakistan has not yet committed all of its units; (3) Indians do not want to occupy Lahore; (4) Indians hope to keep from spreading hostilities to East Pakistan; (5) Indians concerned about possible Chinese Communist attack and likely US response to such an eventuality.

Emb New Delhi 593, Sept. 13, ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

An official of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs told two Embassy representatives that Indian Ambassador to Turkey had learned Pakistanis asking Turks for 15-25 jet planes, 2-4 submarines, and a wide variety of other military supplies; two Pakistani generals are expected to arrive in Ankara on September 14 and Pakistani Ambassador to Turkey reportedly averred that Communist China would soon take "strong action."

-5-

Dept. Outgoing to Rawalpindi 59, Sept. 13, ~~SECRET~~

Ambassador McConaughy was instructed to make it clear to Foreign Minister Bhutto that the US Government is deeply concerned over the failure to date of the Government of Pakistan to grant clearance for the evacuation of US citizens from Dacca and Lahore.

Karachi 483, Sept. 13, ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Evacuation from Rawalpindi now planned by road to Kabul via Peshawar. Departure scheduled morning September 14.

September 13

At 11:00 a.m. Undersecretary Mann met with George Woods of IBRD to discuss the Pakistani consortium. This was followed by a talk with Mr. Gaud of AID. Mr. Woods also phoned to discuss the consortium with Undersecretary Mann for the September 24 meeting.

Dacca 67, Sept. 13, ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

If Dacca evacuation clearance not approved by GOP or is definitely delayed, ConGen suggests alternatives: use of Chittagong airport or evacuation by sea from Chittagong port.

United Press International 57, Washington, Sept. 13, UNCLASSIFIED

The US State Department denied a report that the US was involved in India's decision to attack Pakistan over the Kashmir issue. The London Daily Telegraph report was labelled "arrogant nonsense."

CHUSMSMI New Delhi TNND 3023, Sept. 13, ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Problem encountered regarding whether or not to unload MAP cargo in Bombay. Immediate action is requested to disseminate policy on military cargo shipments to all shipping lines.

Emb Karachi Tel 484, Sept. 13, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Additional Foreign Secretary Agha Shahi is scheduled to leave Karachi September 14 to proceed to New York to attend the next UN discussions of the India-Pakistan conflict.

Sept. 13, 1200, ~~SECRET~~

A joint INR/NEA memorandum was sent to the Undersecretary responding to the various allegations made in the London Daily Telegraph story of Sept. 12. No substance was found for any of the allegations. The memorandum was given to the White House at 12:30.

September 13.

At noon a cabinet meeting was held at the White House during which a status report on the Indo-Pakistani conflict was given.

September 13

The Secretary attended a meeting at 1 p.m. with the President and McGeorge Bundy during which they discussed PL 480 for India.

FBIS 60, Sept. 13

NCNA quotes a dispatch from London by the Daily Telegraph's Special Correspondent who had been in New Delhi that the war between Pakistan and India "is a direct result of information sent out from Pakistan by the US CIA staff."

FBIS 71, Karachi Domestic Service, Sept. 13, UNCLASSIFIED

Pakistan Air Force bombers conducted a strike against the Indian Air Force base at Jammu, destroying six transport planes and damaging two hangars.

USDAO New Delhi, C-00128, Sept. 13, ~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Highlights of information given US attache by a "reliable source": (1) Indians are deeply concerned over the intentions of the Chinese Communists; (2) Indian Army does not plan to attack East Pakistan; (3) official Indian statements about Pakistani losses in tanks and other equipment not exaggerated; (4) the principal effort of the Indian Army is along the Jammu-Sialkot line; (5) the Indian Army has not made a pre-meditated and coordinated attack in Barmer-Hyderabad sector, and no Indian troops are thought to be in Pakistan territory in that area.

USDAO New Delhi, C-00118, Sept. 13 ~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Highlights of a briefing of US and UK military attaches by the Indian Director of Military Intelligence on September 13: (1) stepup in Pakistanis' infiltration across Kashmir cease-fire line; (2) little doing in Chhamb sector; (3) Pakistani tank losses set at 255 destroyed, 27 captured; (4) no fighting at present on the Indian side of the Punjab boundary; (5) no Indian paratroopers have been dropped into Pakistan.

United Press International 103, Washington, Sept. 13, UNCLASSIFIED

The US is continuing to press Pakistan for permission to evacuate by air American citizens imperiled by the India-Pakistan conflict, a US State Department spokesman said.

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FBIS 79, Delhi Domestic Service, Sept. 13, UNCLASSIFIED

U Thant held talks with Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, after lunching with the President, the Vice President, the Prime Minister, and a number of cabinet members.

ConGen Dacca Tel 59, Sept. 13, ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ConGen anticipates serious trouble if the East Bengalis begin to think Pakistan may be losing in the conflict with India. Anti-US feeling is becoming apparent among the students, refugees, and West Pakistanis in Dacca.

FBIS 83, Delhi Domestic Service, Sept. 13, UNCLASSIFIED

A Foreign Office spokesman in Kathmandu denied a Radio Pakistan broadcast that Nepal had asked India not to use Gurkha soldiers in the fighting in Pakistan.

September 13

At 2:30 p.m. Ambassador Handley met with the Afghan Ambassador to discuss Afghan relations with Pakistan.

Emb London Tel 1101, Sept. 13, ~~SECRET~~

The British are seeking to convey reassurance to Pakistan President Ayub according to a Commonwealth Relations Office representative. He added that evacuation plans of the UK are proceeding reasonably well.

September 13

At 3:00 p.m. Assistant Secretary Talbot met with the Secretary and the Pakistani Ambassador.

September 13

At 5:00 p.m. a planning session for South Asian Subcommittee was chaired by Assistant Secretary Talbot; others present were Mr. Rostow, Mr. Hughes, Mr. Spain, Mr. Komer, Mr. Farr, Mr. Hoopes, Mr. Johnson of S/P, Miss Laise, Mr. Wriggins, Mr. Schneider, Elmore Jackson, Mr. Stoddard, DOD and Mr. Barnes, CIA.

Reuters 99, London, Sept. 13, UNCLASSIFIED

The US Embassy in London "categorically denied" a report appearing in a London newspaper that the US had informed India a coup in Pakistan was imminent or that President Ayub Khan would soon be deposed. (Text of Embassy statement included in Reuters item.)

Belgrade's 517, Sept. 13

Director, Africa Div. Yugoslav Foreign Office speculates that CPR may feel they have more to gain from exacerbation of the India-Pakistan conflict than from concentrating efforts on Bandung.

Moscow's 801, Sept. 13

Indian Amb. Kaul claimed Soviets had described latest CPR moves as paper tiger designed to frighten India. He also quoted highly placed Soviet as stating presumably in jest that it might be a good thing if the CPR did come in as this would bring on US bombing of CPR nuclear bases.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On Sept. 9 the first secretary of the CPR Embassy in Damascus personally called on Hijazi editor of the Arab World and said that the CPR is ready to provide arms and troops to Pakistan if and when requested. CENIO, he added, will not support Pakistan in the present crisis, thus Pakistan will leave CENIO and turn to the CPR for aid.

3.3  
(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

Unless some sort of military parity is maintained between the Pak and Indian forces, the Paks, in desperation, will turn to the Chicoms for assistance. The CPR could provide small arms and ammunition and assume the defense of a sector of the northern part of Kashmir.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] During early Sept. a Chinese cadre at Sakya, Tibet said that a communal system would be established immediately in the Sakya region because there were rebellions against the Chinese and because spies were coming into Tibet from other countries.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] movement of Afghan military units toward Pakistan border and preparations for additional such movements.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] statements of Congress Party President Kamaraj on conditions for cease-fire. [REDACTED] Pakistan's three-point proposal was completely unacceptable and that India would agree to cease-fire at present positions now held by both sides if Pakistan agreed to withdraw all troops and infiltrators from India and agree that accession of Kashmir to India is final. [REDACTED]



*Saunders*

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

*92*  
**Research Memorandum**

*File*

INR-25.1, September 14, 1965

*015*

To : The Secretary  
Through: S/S  
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *Thomas L. Hughes*  
Subject: Chronology of Indo-Pakistan Conflict

*Indo-Pakistan*

INR is preparing, at the request of S/S, a daily chronology of events pertaining to the Indo-Pakistani conflict. The chronology covers cables, intelligence reports, press reports, meetings held by senior Department officials and significant telephone conversations.

This Research Memorandum covers the period September 11-12, 1965, the fifth installment in a continuing series to be issued during the acute stage of the crisis. The previous four installments have been issued under cover of memoranda. The chronology of events from August 5 to September 6 pertaining to this conflict is covered in Research Memorandum RNA-46, September 4, 1965.

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Authority NLS-032.038.002/14  
By *J/jc* NARA, Date 5-18-04

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*9/15/65*

CHRONOLOGY OF INDO-PAKISTAN CONFLICT, SEPTEMBER 11-17, 1965

Emb Tokyo Tel 909, Sept 11, ~~SECRET~~

On September 7, Japanese Prime Minister Sato dispatched messages to Shastri and Ayub urging a cease-fire in accordance with Security Council appeals.

ConGen Dacca Tel 50, Sept 11, ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Foreigners in Dacca were ordered to stay within city limits by the Government of East Pakistan on September 10.

Rabat 242, Sept 11, ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Moroccan Foreign Officer makes ostensibly impartial declaration on conflict which actually supports Pakistan on Kashmir.

FBIS 66, Sept 11, UNCLASSIFIED

The following is included in INR/RFE's briefing item of September 14. A September 11 article by Nhan Dan's "Observer" is Hanoi's first comment on the intensified Sino-Indian hostilities. Observer attempts to put most of the blame for "complicated" issue on Anglo-American meddling. He questions ability of UN to solve the problems, calls the Indian stand "inappropriate" since Indians have "expanded hostilities" into Pakistan, expresses concern about effect of the conflict on Asian solidarity, and calls for peaceful settlement on basis of self-determination.

Emb Accra Tel 184, Sept 11 UNCLASSIFIED

Transmits text of President Nkrumah's message to Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub, dated September 7, appealing for acceptance of the Security Council's proposals for a cease-fire.

FBIS 79, Delhi Domestic Service, Sept 11 UNCLASSIFIED

Indian Prime Minister Shastri stated that not a single Indian paratrooper has been dropped in Pakistan, contrary to Pakistani reports.

Emb New Delhi Tel 57b, Sept 11 ~~SECRET~~

In a conversation between Ambassador Bowles and Indian President Radhakrishnan, the latter stated inter alia: (1) India is prepared to tell U Thant that it will comply with Security Council cease-fire resolution if Pakistan agrees to comply and pull out its infiltrators from Kashmir; (2) Pakistan Army morale apparently is lowering; (3) Indians and Pakistanis had already lost thousands of military personnel; (4) Government of India is fearful of possible Chinese Communist intervention; (5) Government of India also is concerned about Iran, Turkey, and Indonesia supporting

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Approved For Release 2002/03/10 : NLJ-032-038-2-14-1

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Authority NLJ-032-038-002/14

By JK NARA, Date 3-17-03

-2-

Pakistan; and (6) New Delhi had requested that the USSR stop flow of military supplies to Indonesia, with no response to date.

FBIS 88, Delhi Domestic Service, Sept 11, UNCLASSIFIED

In a broadcast to the nation, Indian President S. Radhakrishnan stated: "But we in India do not regard ourselves as at war with Pakistan."

Reuters 148, New Delhi Sept 11, UNCLASSIFIED

2,000 Indians demonstrated outside the Indonesian Embassy in New Delhi.

429 to New Delhi, Sept 11, ~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

Indian Ambassador Nehru called on Secretary with urgent request from Indian Foreign Minister that US issue public statement opposing outside intervention in conflict. Secretary noted US efforts regarding Turkey and Iran, but emphasized India should not make a statement that it has received assurances from US on this matter. Ambassador said Soviets want cease-fire but hold position that Kashmir belongs to India. Secretary said Indonesia is not likely to take significant actions such as attacking Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and that Chicoms are probably not planning major moves. Secretary also impressed on Nehru the "volcanic" mood of Congress.

Reuters 162, Srinagar, Sept 11, UNCLASSIFIED

Kashmir Chief Minister G. M. Sadiq declared that no foreign troops or a United Nations force would be allowed to be stationed anywhere in Kashmir.

FBIS 01, Delhi Domestic Service, Sept 11, UNCLASSIFIED

Indian forces completed a pincers movement linking Uri and Poonch. Since August 5, over 1500 Pakistanis and 250 Indians have been killed.

Reuters 173, Sialkot, Pakistan, Sept 11, UNCLASSIFIED

A single 1,000-pound bomb dropped on the center of Sialkot on September 10, virtually levelling the area and killing or maiming many civilians.

FBIS 06, Karachi Domestic Service, Sept 11, UNCLASSIFIED

Pakistan President Ayub Khan sent a personal message of thanks to President Sukarno of Indonesia for supporting Pakistan in its present conflict with India.

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FBIS 07, Karachi Domestic Service, Sept 11, UNCLASSIFIED

An official spokesman of the Government of Pakistan said that unless the Kashmir issue is resolved through the implementation of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolution, there can be no peace between India and Pakistan and in the region.

FBIS 17, Sept 11

NCNA reports all Peking papers today give frontpage prominence to Chinese Vice Premier Hsieh Fu-chih's statement condemning the Indian intrusions into China's border areas and Indian aggression against Pakistan. "Addressing a mass rally in Lhasa on Sept 9 the Vice Premier called on the Tibetan people and units of the Chinese People's Liberation Army in Tibet to maintain high vigilance against Indian provocations and safeguard the frontiers of the motherland."

FBIS 36, Sept 11

NCNA reports that India has used MIG's supplied by the Soviet Union in its current armed attack on Pakistan, according to a Rawalpindi report.

FBIS 10, Sept 11

NCNA reports that "the revisionist clique of Yugoslavia, eager to help the United States, has called for intervention in armed conflict between India and Pakistan by the United Nations under the thumb of Washington." "The current issue of the clique's monthly, Borba, in a commentary maligned China's support for the Pakistani people's just struggle as an attempt to 'stir up another conflict in Asia'."

25X1A



~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

As of September 8-9, Saudi Arabian Government did not plan to proffer material support to Pakistan, but intended to support it diplomatically.

25X1A



~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

25X1C


reports Indian AF and army are very satisfied with performance of Gnat aircraft.

25X1C



~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

25X1C



Chicom patrol activity in Tibet across from Mustang, Nepal.

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

25X1A

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

25X1C

[REDACTED]

Chinese troop movements in Tibet.

25X1A

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

25X1C

[REDACTED]

Indian fleet

is not engaging Pakistani fleet because of fear of Pakistani submarine.

FBIS 09, Sept 12

NCNA: An editorial in the People's Daily includes the following statements: "The current conflict between India and Pakistan is a struggle between an aggressor and its victim... Together with all other justice-loving countries and people of Asia and the rest of the world, we resolutely support Pakistan's just struggle against aggression and the Kashmir people's struggle for national self-determination."

FBIS 15, Karachi Domestic Service, Sept 12, UNCLASSIFIED

An official spokesman for the Government of Pakistan stated that Pakistan will shortly ask for material help from all countries, whether or not they are members of the United Nations.

294 to Tehran, Sept 12, ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Ambassador should urge Shah against supplying MAP equipment to Pakistan, stating US has authority over its use. Should Iran take this action without US authorization, there would be strongly detrimental consequences for US-Iranian relations.

FBIS 34, Karachi Domestic Service, Sept 12, UNCLASSIFIED

India has proposed to Pakistan an exchange of diplomatic personnel of the two countries.

FBIS 47, Karachi Domestic Service, Sept 12, UNCLASSIFIED

The Government of Pakistan issued an order providing for the price control and regulation of trade and commerce of 52 essential commodities. Control orders over cotton, yarn, cotton cloth, and newsprint were also issued.

Emb Kabul Tel 93, Sept 12, ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Ambassador Steeves expressed conviction that Afghans support Pakistan in its conflict with India.

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FBIS 35, Sept 12

Karachi broadcast states Turkish Foreign Minister is expected in Pakistan soon, possibly accompanied by Iranian Foreign Minister.

Emb New Delhi Tel 580, Sept 12 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In a conversation between Ambassador Bowles and Indian Minister of Food and Agriculture C. Subramaniam, the latter expressed anxiety over the continuance of PL-480 foodgrain shipments. The Food Minister estimated that India's rice crop may not equal last year's production.

Emb New Delhi Tel 579, Sept 12 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In a conversation between Indian Minister of Railways S. K. Patil and Ambassador Bowles, the former stated that the USSR Government is pushing its offer to mediate the India-Pakistan conflict should U Thant's efforts prove abortive. No members of the Indian Cabinet can be characterized as "hawk," although a few tend in that direction.

Chief MAAG Karachi JTFMP-3-9-448, Sept 12, ~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

Pakistani capability to continue conflict is assessed, and length of time is estimated about 2 months.

Emb Karachi 472, Sept 12 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Pakistan outlined a three-phase proposal to effect a cease-fire. During press questioning, spokesman made reference to the acceptability of the Rann of Kutch agreement as a precedent potentially applicable to the Kashmir problem.

Reuters 10, Rawalpindi, Sept 12, UNCLASSIFIED

Indian and Pakistani tank formations were locked in battle east and southeast of Sialkot. Pakistani sources said India had thrown an armored division and two infantry divisions into the battle. Also heavy fighting on the Lahore front.

DAO Karachi, STRJ2-C 8782, Sept 12, ~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN~~

USARMA in Karachi cannot provide evidence or information regarding possible Chinese Communist collusion with Pakistanis in East Pakistan.

Reuters 19, New Delhi, Sept 12, UNCLASSIFIED

U Thant began talks with Indian Prime Minister Shastri with a two-hour session.

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~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

-6-

FBIS 93, Karachi Domestic Service, Sept 12, UNCLASSIFIED

Pakistan authorities announced that no merchant ships should approach within 75 miles of Karachi and Chittagong during hours of darkness, and arrive at these ports only during daylight hours.

Karachi 459, Sept 12, ~~SECRET/LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

Ambassador McConaughy met with Pakistani Foreign Ministry Director General concerning attempts to avoid extension of fighting to Bengal area. Ambassador noted "some assurance" had been received from GOI, e.g., Defense Minister Chavan's statement. Director General promised to report discussion immediately to Rawalpindi.

Reuters 2, New Delhi, Sept 12, UNCLASSIFIED

United Nations Secretary General U Thant arrived in New Delhi to commence talks with Indian Government leaders. He was met by Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh and the United Nations Chief Military Observer, General Robert Nimmo.

Reuters 18, Cairo, Sept 12, UNCLASSIFIED

President Nasser and King Feisal of Saudi Arabia made a joint appeal to India and Pakistan to end military operations immediately and accept United Nations efforts toward a peaceful settlement.

FBIS 84, Sept 12

NCNA reports that the first session of Tibet's second committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in Lhasa passed a resolution calling on the people to "contribute to Tibet's socialist revolution and socialist construction and to the strengthening of the national defenses."

25X1A

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

25X1C

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~ GOI is not optimistic about chances of U Thant mission and that Defense Minister Chavan is very worried over Chicom involvement in conflict.

25X1C

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

25X1 ~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~ considerable number of Chicom trucks carrying soldiers in area of Tibet across from Mustang, Nepal.

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM~~  
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25X1A

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

25X1C [REDACTED] Chicom construction of new road in Jongkadzong area of Tibet and also reinforcement of garrison.

25X1A

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

25X1C [REDACTED] next Indian move, if necessary, will be across Punjab border at Fazilka, aimed at Pattoki.

25X1A

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

25X1C [REDACTED] mobilization of Afghan Army reserves.

25X1A

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

25X1C [REDACTED] as of September 10 no MIG-21 aircraft have been used in conflict and are to be kept in reserve.

25X1A

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

25X1C [REDACTED] Soviet troops movements on Afghan border, but there is no collateral information to substantiate this.

25X1A

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

25X1C [REDACTED] Chicom military activity in Tibet including patrols along northeast frontier of Sikkim during past two months.

25X1A

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM~~

25X1C [REDACTED] heavy attacks on Sialkot and that civilians have been evacuated. Movement of large numbers of Pathans toward the front is also reported.

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM~~  
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~~SECRET~~

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93  
*Red*

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
RECEIVED  
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

25 August 1965  
1965 AUG 25 PM 2 13

*India*

Dear Mac:

The attached paper was prepared in response to my request for a better understanding of the fundamental differences between India and Pakistan.

All of this is probably "old hat" to you, but I hope you will find this summary interesting.

Sincerely,

*Red*

W. F. Raborn

Attachment

Honorable McGeorge Bundy  
Special Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

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Authority WLS.032.026.002/8

By jc : NARA. Date 5-18-04

AUG 25 1965

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~~SECRET~~

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

18 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Indo-Pakistani Problems

1. Indo-Pakistani hostility. Hindu-Muslim antagonisms go back for centuries; they were seriously aggravated when India and Pakistan became separate countries in 1947. Since then the strongest motive force in Pakistani foreign policy has been the desire for security against the assumed threat of Indian domination. India, larger and stronger, has seen little need to improve relations, and has only rarely tried to do so. Pakistan's policies towards other countries have been heavily influenced by what such countries could and would do to help it against India; India's choice of friends has reflected its judgment as to who would support India against Pakistan, and, more recently, against Communist China.

2. Despite their antagonisms, India and Pakistan have been able -- or forced by the pressure of events -- to resolve some of their mutual problems. They were able, on their own, to divide up the fiscal assets as well as the administrative and military machinery of former British

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Authority NWJ-032-026-2-9  
By ag/klm, NARA, Date 8-16-07

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declassification

India. In 1960, after a long and difficult series of negotiations, they agreed on a satisfactory distribution of the Indus River valley waters. The prospects of very substantial benefits (large dams, canals, other engineering projects to be built by several Western powers) plus strong pressures by those powers led to the agreement.

3. However, the Kashmir dispute remains unsolved and virulent. Kashmir is predominantly Muslim, but its Hindu ruler opted to join India at the time of independence. Karachi claims (probably correctly) that the Kashmiris would vote to join Pakistan in a free election. It initially tried to seize the area, but failed. Since 1948 it has exerted numerous diplomatic efforts, in the UN and elsewhere, to make good its claims. The US, the UK, and other powers have exerted considerable effort and pressure on the two disputants in a series of futile efforts to get an agreement. Recently there has been considerable fighting on the cease fire line as well as new Pakistani efforts to start a guerrilla uprising there.

4. Pakistan's search for security: (1) CENTO and SEATO. Pakistan, fearing India, first turned to the West for protection. The US, seeking to implement its "containment" policy, was organizing a chain of alliances around the borders of the USSR. Pakistan seized upon this as a means of security. Military aid, provided by the US

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

for the purpose of resisting Communist aggression, was accepted by Pakistan primarily as a means of deterring any aggressive Indian designs. Pakistan signed an arms agreement pact with the US in 1953, and joined SEATO in 1954 and CENTO in 1955. From 1954 to 1964, it received nearly one billion dollars in military assistance from the US. It had, until 1962, generally close working relations with the West and hostile ones with the Communist powers.

5. India: 1962 and the search for security from China.

Though angered by Pakistan's Western alliances, India did not initially feel itself threatened by its smaller neighbor. However, in October 1962, the Chinese army inflicted a humiliating defeat on the Indians. India then embarked on a policy of major military expansion, enlarging its army from 550,000 to over 900,000. It began a program leading to self sufficiency in the production of large quantities of tanks, artillery, aircraft, etc. It received commitments of large amounts of military aid from both the US and the USSR. New Delhi describes its efforts as aimed solely at preventing Communist Chinese aggression. However, it clearly intends to have armed forces large enough to deal with both Pakistan and China.

- 3 -

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

6. Pakistan's search for security: (2) China. This Indian military buildup badly frightened Karachi. It believes that the strengthened Indian army is aimed not only against China, but against Pakistan as well. In fact, substantial elements of the Indian armed forces are deployed toward the borders of Pakistan rather than China. Since 1962, President Ayub has gone out of his way to establish good relations with China as a counter to increasing Indian strength. At the same time Pakistan's relations with the US have worsened. Nonetheless it still remains formally allied with the US, permits USA-60 in Peshawar to continue to operate, and continues to receive major US military and economic assistance.

7. Outlook: Indian-Pakistani hostility is likely to persist, and the Kashmir dispute will almost certainly continue to prove intractable. Indeed, tensions which have been aggravated by recent crises in the Rann of Kutch and in Kashmir are likely in the immediate future to continue at a heightened level. While a major war between the two countries is more likely than at any time since 1948, we believe that it will probably be averted. But the policy of the two nations will continue to be primarily determined by their fear of and hostility towards one another, and not by Cold War issues.

8. India is determined to acquire the military hardware it feels it needs. In 1964, it received a US commitment of \$100 million worth of aid for each of the next five years, and it will not wish to jeopardize this commitment by any falling-out with the US.

Indian hostility toward and fear of China, also make it desirous of maintaining friendly relations with the US. At the same time, India will seek to maintain good relations with the USSR which has already furnished SAMs, tanks, and the facilities for building Mig 21s, and which is considering furnishing four submarines. In addition, India looks to the USSR as a counterweight to Chinese pressures against Indian borders.

9. So long as Pakistan continues to estimate that it cannot count on US support and influence to restrain Indian hostility, so long will it continue to be friendly with China, which it will see as the only available force that can bring pressure against India. Pakistan almost certainly realizes that it has no real possibility of getting meaningful economic or military assistance from Peiping and only a small chance of receiving aid from Moscow. Moreover, Ayub Khan, though perhaps not certain of his advisers, would be reluctant to break Pakistan's ties with the West. But all Pakistanis regard the Indian problem as their paramount one.

10. In this situation, some US policy aims will certainly be frustrated. In particular, there is no chance whatever in the foreseeable future of getting Pakistan and India to cooperate in mutual efforts against the Communist bloc. It will even be difficult

for the US to remain friendly at the same time with two countries so hostile to each other. Each is capable of choosing to forego American aid rather than yield to direct pressure on matters it deems of vital national interest. Nevertheless, US aid, both military and economic, will continue to be highly desired by both countries. A continuing willingness to provide assistance would in all likelihood continue to give the US some leverage on the policy of the respective countries.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:



ABBOT SMITH  
Acting Chairman

With the compliments of : 94

PURNENDU KUMAR BANERJEE  
MINISTER, EMBASSY OF INDIA

WASHINGTON, D. C.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

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95  
*Research Memorandum*

RES-15, June 4, 1965

To : The Secretary  
Through: S/S  
From : INR - George C. Denney, Jr. *h.c.d.l.*  
Subject: The Status of the India - Pakistan Boundary

The India - Pakistan boundary has recently been the source of friction between the two nations. As a consequence of the Rann of Kutch engagement and the Indian occupation of the Pakistani exclave of Dahagram, the Office of the Legal Adviser has requested a review of the undemarcated sectors of the boundary which might lead to future difficulties.

ABSTRACT

India and Pakistan, excepting Jammu-Kashmir, share international boundaries measuring approximately 3,996 miles in length (the boundary between the United States (without Alaska) and Canada totals 3,987 miles). A total of 2,527 miles had been demarcated by April 1965. The entire West Pakistan - India boundary, with the exception of the 644-mile disputed Rann of Kutch sector, has been demarcated. A total of 1,695 miles of the 2,520-mile East Pakistan- India boundary has been demarcated.

At present, Jammu-Kashmir represents a territorial dispute rather than a boundary one.

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Because the Indian provinces are larger than the Pakistani districts and, as a result, are more identifiable, the sectors are keyed to them.

WEST PAKISTAN - INDIA

1. Jammu-Kashmir

The entire boundary is considered to be a provisional, military, cease-fire line. Both Pakistan and India claim the entire area of Jammu-Kashmir and any discussion of the boundary, at present, is academic.

2. Punjab

The British India state of Punjab was divided by the independence act and the Radcliffe Award. Subsequent disputes were ironed out in 1959 and 1960. The entire 318-mile long boundary has been demarcated, although a few pillars in the area of the Sutlej River have been washed away and need to be reconstituted. However, the original survey work is available; the problem is technical and will be subject to settlement on the technical level by the respective Surveys (of India and of Pakistan).

3. Rajasthan

The disputes over the precise alignment were all settled by the various tribunals and awards. The demarcation of the 514-mile long frontier was completed on September 28, 1963.

4. Gujarat (Rann of Kutch)

The entire 644-mile long boundary in the Rann is in dispute and has never been demarcated. The Pakistan Government has considered the stretch in dispute virtually since independence, while India has reluctantly recognized the dispute since 1960.

EAST PAKISTAN - INDIA

It is difficult to list precisely the problem areas in the East Pakistan area due to a number of factors. Among these are a) lack of agreement between India and Pakistan on what is disputed, b) certain of the disputes have been "settled" but final action has not been taken, and c) the states of West Bengal and Assam insist on doing their own boundary work to the exclusion of the Survey of India. However, to the best of our knowledge, the present situation is as follows:

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1. West Bengal

The West Bengal boundary with East Pakistan totals 1,350 miles. Of this sum, 1,079 miles had been demarcated by April 1965 according to Indian statements in the Lok Sabha. Of the remaining 271 miles, most appear to pertain to the Berubari Union (of West Bengal) which is to be transferred, at least in part, to Pakistan. However, the Indian Government has "stalled" on the enabling legislation, which involves a change in the constitution. In addition, a Writ has been filed in the West Bengal High Court blocking further action. (See comments on the enclaves below.) Additional areas are located along the following rivers: Mahananda, Borung, Karatoa, Hankar Khal, and Baikari Khal.

2. Assam

The Assam - East Pakistan boundary is broken in two sectors by the small state of Tripura. According to our latest figures, 432 miles of the 620-mile total have been demarcated.<sup>1</sup> A "working military boundary" has been agreed upon for the remainder but the final demarcation has not taken place. According to the parliamentary report, the following are still to be demarcated: 190 miles of the Mizo District, 1 mile near Umapati village and 6 miles near Lathitilla-Dumabari village.

3. Tripura

Only 184 miles of the total of 550 miles for Tripura have been demarcated. The major problem areas have always been a) the Feni River sector in the southeast and b) the Sylhet subsector in the extreme north. Generally, however, the Tripura boundary has not received much publicity, perhaps due to the work of the technical surveys of the countries in contrast to those of the states. The lack of progress probably reflects the generally low density of population, and hence lack of interest, rather than the intensity of the dispute.

4. Enclaves-Exclaves


According to our information, there are 197 enclaves in or associated with the district of Cooch Behar in West Bengal and neighboring parts of East Pakistan. Of these enclaves, 123 are Indian and 74 are Pakistani. An agreement was reached for their exchange five or more years ago. However, their transfer has become involved in the problem of Indian constitutional revision. The Indian occupation of a Pakistani Dahagram exclave recently occurred before the military moves in the Rann of Kutch.

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<sup>1</sup> The Lok Sabha debate listed 432 miles demarcated leaving 188 miles undemarcated. However, the breakdown shows 197 miles to be undemarcated.

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# INDIA AND PAKISTAN



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 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
 Office of Current Intelligence  
 26 April 1965

MEMORANDUM

India, Pakistan, and the Rann of Kutch

1. The confrontation between Indian and Pakistani forces in the remote salt marsh known as the Rann of Kutch has grown appreciably more ominous as a result of heavy fighting there during the past five days. Each side has committed something more than 5,000 troops to the "front," and engagements fought on 21 and 24 April involved substantial artillery exchanges and, reportedly, the use of US-supplied light tanks on the Pakistani side.

2. Clashes earlier this month had been confined initially to border security forces functioning as light infantry and lightly supported by some artillery. These are still engaged, but regular army units assumed operational control about two weeks ago and have been directly engaged in subsequent sporadic firefights.

3. Background: The Rann of Kutch (rann means marsh) is a large salt marsh/flat which constitutes a substantial portion of the old princely state of Kutch, now a part of India's Gujarat state. During much of the year--but not now or before mid-June--it is inundated by tidal waters from the nearby Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Kutch.

4. The Rann has no real value apart from its salt resources. Oil has been rumored in the area, but reserves remain to be proven. India for some time has been developing a port on the Gulf of Kutch aimed at relieving pressure on Bombay, but the port is unlikely to be a factor in this dispute. Mainly, the present situation appears to be a product of an accidental encounter on the ground which has quickly become a political engagement, useful to Pakistan as a pressure point against Hindu unreasonableness and Indian actions vis-a-vis the border between India and East Pakistan.

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APR 26 1965

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Authority NLJ-032-026-2-10  
 By lg/bm NARA, Date 5-16-07

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5. At the time of independence in 1947, the border was left undemarcated because it was of little value to either side, in comparison with interest in border demarcation in more sensitive areas. As recently as 1960, both governments acknowledged the existence of a dispute on the border alignment and pledged to move toward a peaceful resolution of the conflicting claims.


6. India contends the border lies along the northern edge of the Rann, the traditional boundary between the pre-independence entities of Kutch and Sind; Pakistan contends the border should run through the middle of the marsh, roughly along the 24th parallel; the difference is about 3,500 square miles. The scene of the fighting, at least until this past week, has been confined to a 10 to 20 square mile patch near an old fort site at Kanjarkot where the confrontation began last January when an Indian patrol came across a Pakistani patrol.

7. Development of the Crisis: A series of jockeying episodes followed until mid-March, while Indian diplomats attempted to smooth over the dispute with their Pakistani colleagues in Karachi and New Delhi. But Pakistan dug in its heels, especially as the general course of Indo-Pakistani relations continued its downward spiral. Tempers rose as developments in Kashmir became increasingly sour and Indian-inspired incidents on the border of East Pakistan became more heated and widespread. Soon both sides were hurling harsh charges, and clashes followed early this month.

8. The clashes prompted both sides to propose a ceasefire, and in fact, India accepted a Pakistani ceasefire proposal, only to have its acceptance undermined by tough talk by Indian ministers in parliament and by a subsequent hardening of terms, first by Pakistan, then by India. Each side feels its territorial claims are prejudiced by the terms proposed for a ceasefire by the other, and the Indians are now hopeful that an outside agent can be introduced through whose "good offices" a non-prejudicial ceasefire can be worked out.

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


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9. India has also resurrected the bogey of US MAP equipment in use by Pakistani forces, especially the M-24 "Chaffee" light tanks it alleges Pakistan used on the 21st and 24th. India's purpose is two-fold. First, the issue is a handy club with which to beat the Pakistanis and elicit US interest; Pakistan has used the same club for the same purpose since India began receiving MAP equipment in 1962. Each finds it useful to point out the dangers of military assistance to the other.

10. India's second purpose is to cover up its own weakness in the area. The terrain, hard and flat on the Pakistan side and soft and mucky on the Indian side, gives Pakistan considerable advantage in logistics and movement. In addition, a blossoming scandal within the Indian Army has revealed its armored corps to be in far worse position than previously indicated even to the army's leadership; age of the equipment and a cover-up by the army's engineering directorate are involved. The fact is, however, that the Indians quite literally do not have much of a tank force to bring to bear in Kutch without substantially weakening what good armor it has at other strategic locations.

11. Conclusion: A ceasefire will in time be arranged, although not without additional rancor and bloodshed. Although the scope and violence of the present encounter over the Rann of Kutch exceeds previous such conflicts between the two countries (excepting Kashmir), the pattern is fairly consistent and predictable. Neither country wants war with the other; both know that in an all-out conflict, India's 4-to-1 ground forces ratio and its even more substantial air power advantage would prove decisive. They are about at the position in this encounter when cooler heads begin to exercise a calming influence both inside the countries as well as from the outside. The danger, however, is that the Indian Army--under pressure from politicians facing an aroused parliament--might be directed at some other point along the border where India enjoys the advantage of terrain and equipment, and that this will occur before a meaningful ceasefire has been worked out.



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Order of Battle Annex

The units listed below have been specifically identified in the Rann of Kutch area or have been moved from other locations to close proximity:

India

31st Brigade Group (4 infantry bns plus one arty. regt.)

50th Indep. Parachute Brigade (3 inf. bns. + 1 arty regt.)

Pakistan

51st Brigade (3 or 4 infantry bns plus some arty support)

One armored regt. (36 medium tanks - M-48)


At least one unidentified arty regt., plus a strong hint of additional infantry deployed from the 8th infantry division in Quetta.

Some light tanks (if Indian allegations are true)

Plus, there are border security forces on both sides. Actual numbers of troops involve considerable guesswork, but it is fair to say that each side can call on no fewer than 6,000 to 7,000 troops in the area at large if necessary.

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2 April 1965

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SC No. 00664/65A

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# SPECIAL REPORT

INDIA AND PAKISTAN REMAIN AT AN IMPASSE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority MLJ. 032.026.002/11

By je NARA, Date 5-18-04

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**SECRET**

2 April 1965

**INDIA AND PAKISTAN REMAIN AT AN IMPASSE**

Relations between India and Pakistan, never good and usually fluctuating between bad and worse, are again deteriorating. In the past, tempers have flared most often over the reopening of some wound left over from the 1947 partition of British India or new abrasions produced by differing policies toward powers outside the South Asian area. In the present instance, however, long-standing Indo-Pakistani frustrations have been aggravated again by a number of frequently unrelated pinpricks.

These pinpricks have related primarily to India's policies toward both the international and "domestic" aspects of the Kashmir question. They have in recent weeks been aggravated by a series of border incidents, not along the normally troubled cease-fire line in Kashmir but rather along India's international boundaries with both East and West Pakistan. The countries now appear further away than ever from a productive dialogue which could mark the first step toward a durable accommodation.

Kashmir--International

While Nehru lived, prospects for a resolution of India's and Pakistan's conflicting claims to the state of Jammu and Kashmir rested almost exclusively in his hands. He was strong enough to have been able to sell his own countrymen a solution acceptable to Pakistan, but neither his mind nor his heart was willing. Not until 1958, when Ayub Khan came to power in Karachi with the solid backing of the army, was there anyone in Pakistan strong enough to carry off an equitable settlement. Ayub did make several efforts, but they all foundered

on the rock of Nehruvian obduracy.

During the last five months of his life, Nehru seemed to show some slight degree of flexibility regarding affairs inside Indian-ruled Kashmir. An easing of police state measures there brought some guarded hope in Pakistan. The principal result of Nehru's actions, however, was a mutual moratorium on invective for some months after his death, while Pakistan waited to see whether the moderate Shastri would pick up where Nehru seemed to leave off, and while Shastri offered conciliatory words but

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focused mainly on consolidating his own position as Nehru's heir.

Ten months have passed since Nehru's death, however, and there has been no movement toward a settlement. Indeed, Shastri's remarks during a brief stopover in Karachi last fall appear to have conveyed to Pakistanis only that the new Indian leader was well motivated but felt too weak politically to come to grips with the hard decisions necessary to resolve the dispute.

All the while, the instances of firing across the UN-supervised cease-fire line in Kashmir have continued, occasionally involving hundreds on each side. The rate of incidents for 1964 reached a new high.


#### Kashmir--"Domestic"

Policies pursued by each country within the portion of Kashmir it rules bring repercussions internationally insofar as they affirm or erode the "disputed status" which Kashmir enjoys under international law and United Nations resolutions.

On the Pakistani side, the fiction of a quasi-independent state of Azad (free) Kashmir is no longer as serious a factor in Pakistani policy and propaganda as it was in the early 1950s. Azad Kashmir is firmly controlled by Pakistan. Its continued existence serves to support the "disputed" status of the entire area, and it also provides the manpower to fill

out 18 locally recruited battalions manning the Pakistani side of the cease-fire line.

Whereas Pakistani policy toward Azad Kashmir has played no part in recent years in Indian attitudes and propaganda, New Delhi's administrative policy toward that portion of Kashmir under Indian jurisdiction has been the subject of bitter Pakistani recriminations. Pakistan holds that because Kashmir is a disputed territory, both countries are bound to preserve its separateness and to avoid acts aimed at absorption. Indian policy from 1953 on, however, has been gradually to make over the area into a fully integrated Indian state by progressive application of bits and pieces of the Indian



Ayub and Shastri meeting in Karachi in late 1964.

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constitution and by bringing the state's administrative and political practices into conformity with those in the other states in the Indian union.

Thus by now, most of the Indian constitution applies to the state, India's courts have been given jurisdiction there, the civil services have lost their separate identity, and, most recently, provision has been made for the imposition of direct rule from New Delhi should the administration of the state break down.

Even when New Delhi was observing a "special" status for Kashmir in the Indian union, Indian control in the coveted Vale of Kashmir rested on Kashmiri puppets and Indian bayonets. Over the years, however, Indian administrative actions have sought to improve on the legal and political basis for the power while keeping a tight lid on the explosive potential of Kashmir's predominantly Muslim population.

### Relaxation and Reaction

In a shift of policy early in 1964, India began to relax its police controls. Strong man Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad was given his walking papers after 10 years of despotic but reliable rule. Shastri, then an aide to Nehru, put the more compliant Ghulam Muhammad Sadiq into Bakshi's vacated chair, and directed a liberalization of controls. Even the charismatic Sheikh Abdullah, imprisoned for nearly 11 years, was released and began to breathe life into Kashmiri politics.

In many of these actions, the Pakistani Government had cause for rejoicing. Its official attitude was hopeful as it watched political life resume in the Vale and take up the causes of Muslims disenchanted with and hateful of Hindu Indian rule; it had everything to gain in offering to meet Abdullah, for though he had betrayed Muslim Pakistan once when he took Kashmir into India, he now offered only a marginal and long-range threat to Pakistani interest in ultimately ruling the state. His advocacy of self-determination reinforced Pakistan's immediate claims against Indian rule.

But the luster soon dimmed. By late 1964 it became apparent that Abdullah was getting nowhere in his pressure for Kashmiri self-determination. In New Delhi, the new Congress leadership seemed embarked on a campaign to cut him down to size, and thus to deny him the power to apply pressure on New Delhi. Emergency powers to run the state from Delhi were put on the books. The ruling National Conference was converted into a state branch of India's Congress Party. New Delhi is reported planning even to discard the uniquely Kashmiri titles for Kashmir's ceremonial chief of state and its effective head of government in favor of the titles "governor" and "chief minister" in use in the other Indian states.

In recent months the situation has become increasingly tense. Abdullah was granted permission to undertake a pilgrimage

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to Mecca in February and is still traveling. In his absence, more than 165 of his followers have been jailed for their efforts to organize Kashmiri dissidence and, especially, to prevent Muslims from joining the new Congress Party unit in the state. Abdullah's return could spark additional demonstrations and a reimposition of the even stiffer police controls of the Bakshi era. At some point, however, Indian "hard" policy will face the same bankruptcy which led Shastri and Nehru to gamble on a soft line just a year ago.

Pakistan's reaction to the re-emergence of this hard line has been predictably harsh, reflecting not only frustration with India's imperious handling of "internal" Kashmiri affairs and with India's further erosion of Kashmiri separateness, but also a sense of letdown that the tenuous signs of Indian flexibility during Nehru's last days and in Shastri's first months have brought no visible change to the situation. Ayub and his foreign minister have both publicly stressed sympathy with their oppressed Muslim brethren in Kashmir in recent weeks. They may in time be moved to provide direct and substantial assistance to Kashmir's disaffected population, with or without Abdullah's leadership or consent, as the only way to arrest further moves at integration and to bring effective international pressure on the Indians to seek a settlement.

### The Border Incidents


New border incidents have recently occurred in the swampy Rann of Kutch, at the point where the western Indian state of Gujarat abuts the Sind border of Pakistan, and to the east where Indian and Pakistani enclaves in each other's territories have long been a source of friction and bloodshed.

In the Rann of Kutch, the Pakistanis appear to be at fault, having deliberately moved across a portion of poorly marked border to occupy an abandoned fort site well inside Indian territory. The terrain is difficult and the Indian Army reckons it would take more than two battalions to dislodge the Pakistani force. Thus far the situation has generated more heat than fire.

More tension has been produced by recent events along the Bengal border, where Indians have moved to curtail access to a Pakistani enclave--Dahagram--separated from East Pakistan by less than 200 yards of Indian territory. The result has been indiscriminate firing into and around the enclave by armed police on both sides, coupled with Indian forays and communal violence inside it. Lesser incidents have occurred nearby.

Pakistan has blown up the bloodshed at Dahagram beyond all

# INDIA AND PAKISTAN



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relevance to the local situation or to the facts of the situation as reported by its own intelligence service. It seems clear, however, that Indians did fire first, and that is the point of departure in the Pakistani propaganda campaign. Moreover, Pakistan is using the incident in its argument against the West's provision of military aid to India, claiming--erroneously--that the Indian forces on the scene are equipped with Western arms and seeking to point up both the deviousness of the Hindu and the alleged hollowness of Western assurances that India's Western equipment will be used only against the Chinese.

The worst now appears to be over, and the enclave--one of nearly 200 such anomalies left over from prepartition jurisdictions of petty princes--will eventually be involved in an exchange for which a government-to-government agreement has existed for some years. Until the exchange finally takes place, however, each enclave poses the potential for Dahagram-type incidents.

#### The Nagas

Yet another pinprick in the northeast has been Pakistan's efforts to capitalize on Indian difficulties in bringing the decade-long rebellion by Naga tribesmen to an end.

In recent weeks, a band of Naga insurgents--which, like two smaller groups before it, was supplied and trained in

East Pakistan--has made its way back to Nagaland via Burma. The Indians, now negotiating with the Nagas under a tenuous truce, are particularly sensitive to this latest Pakistani provocation.

#### Conclusion

The mood in both capitals is uncompromising. The Shastri government, beset with abundant domestic problems, acts as though it wished that Pakistan would just go away. Its policies on the international aspects of the Kashmir question are essentially reactive, since it has what it wants and thus desires to prolong the status quo. Moreover, it remains to be seen to what extent Shastri is master of his own house. Whatever his private sentiments on the desirability for Indo-Pakistani amity--and it is widely assumed that he would make some move to achieve it if he could--he seems unable and unwilling to challenge those in his own party who have made a political career out of Indo-Pakistani enmity. These forces represent both the left and the right in the Congress Party, and most other parties, thus transcending ideological bias and reflecting the Hindu communal outlook of most Indians.

In Pakistan, President Ayub, the undisputed master of his domain, now is charting new foreign relationships aimed at giving Pakistan a greater sense of security vis-a-vis the Indian behemoth. He has been quite adept and successful thus far in improving his relationship

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with Afghanistan, in projecting his ideas of regional cooperation into the CENTO area, in asserting his "independence" from cold war alliances, and in making the appropriate noises and bows in Afro-Asian circles, especially among militants like Indonesia. Moreover, in his bitter reaction to Western military assistance to India, he has fashioned a new variant of nonalignment, virtually as selective and as mixed as India's has become. He has thus been able to reduce the scope of his ties with the United States to some basic essentials while at the same time courting favor with Peiping and the militant Afro-Asians as a counter to India's exploitation of its relationship with the USSR and with the West.

But his major foreign policy problem remains India, and the key element in that relationship is spelled Kashmir. Here he has little more than a string of frustrations to show for his efforts.

Neither country is disposed toward full-fledged military conflict to resolve its big problems with the other, or the parade of pinpricks in their

day-to-day dealings. The weight of military power rests with India and both sides know this, despite the bellicose threats that periodically fill the air. Rather, the prevailing sentiment in the two capitals is one of despair for any relief from Indian inflexibility and Pakistani harping.

Strong leaders come and go; weak leaders come and go; yet the impasse remains, and the passage of time seems to have had no effect. In fact, the younger generation, born after the advent of independence and the horrors of partition, seem just as fixed as their forebears have been for the simple yet complex reason that people on both sides of the border still regard nationals on the other side first as Muslims or Hindus, and only then as Pakistanis or Indians. The national entities of Pakistan and India still carry the communal connotation which gave them their birth, and neither the Muslims nor the Hindus have ever given the other sufficient reason to develop an atmosphere conducive to trust and good faith in which national issues can be discussed--and dealt with--purely as national issues. (~~SECRET~~  
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

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March 18, 1965

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To : The Secretary  
 Through: S/S  
 From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *TH*  
 Subject : Pak-Indian Dispute Over Dahagram Enclave

Pakistan has charged Indian aggression against the small (eight square miles) enclave of Dahagram in Assam and India has denied these charges; the exchange has the earmarks of more than just another Pak-Indian border clash. There is no firm information on what has actually happened, for the area is remote and communications are unreliable. Nevertheless, the diplomatic environment is unusual: the Pakistanis have asked whether the US and the UK are "prepared" to live up to assurances that they would protect Pakistan from Indian aggression. India has formally denied in more than usually specific language that there has been any Indian occupation of Dahagram.

A border clash is nothing new, for incidents between the Indians and Pakistanis occur almost daily along both their eastern and western boundaries as well as along the cease-fire line in Kashmir. The enclave is not unique, for there are several dozen similar Pakistani enclaves within Indian territory, and we know of no reason why the Indians should have moved in on Dahagram in particular. Moreover, Pakistani claims that 4,000 out of the 5,000 inhabitants were evicted are hardly likely; a few hundred evictions would be more credible.

If the incident occurred as alleged, it could represent Indian retaliation for alleged Pakistani territorial infringements a few weeks ago in Kutch, on

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 By *je*, NARA, Date *5-21-64*

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the other side of the country. It could also be the result of misunderstanding and poor communications. However, the circumstances suggest that the Pakistanis may have seized upon a fortuitous incident -- of a type which has caused no more than minor recriminations in the past -- to "lean" on the US. The GOP's representation to the British High Commissioner and the US Ambassador coupled with the implication that Indian Army troops equipped with weapons supplied by the US and the UK were involved, and an apparently carefully orchestrated press campaign, indicate a Pakistani ploy. This ploy could be designed not just to put pressure on the US, but to prepare a defense for past and future Pakistani relations with the Chinese Communists. If the US did, indeed, intervene in this and other easily contrived border incidents, US relations with India would be severely strained. If we failed to "honor our commitments," Pakistan could cite this as justification for its attempts to secure protection against a well armed and belligerent Indian through expanded relations with Communist China.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

3/16/65

THE WHITE HOUSE - Mr. Komer

For your information.

NEA/DSchneider

MAR 18 1965

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*India Pali*

MAR 13 1965

TO : The Under Secretary  
THROUGH: S/S  
FROM : ISA - Phillips Talbot

SUBJECT: Our Discussions with British about the Subcontinent,  
March 8-9. INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

During our talks early this week on the South Asian subcontinent both Cyril Pickard and I had very much in mind the planning we will have to do for the series of meetings the U.S. and the U.K. will be having over the next six months or so with the leaders of India and Pakistan. (We will have visits from Ayub and Shastri in April and June. The British have the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference in June, Prime Minister Wilson plans to visit the Subcontinent perhaps in August or September, and Ayub pays a state visit to the U.S. in October.) I was quite pleased to find that our analyses of the situation there and of our capacity to influence it were quite similar. Some of the conclusions which emerged from our talks were:

(1) Pakistan Foreign Policy. Ayub and Bhutto some time ago started out lining up Afro-Asian support as a means of bringing pressure on India for a settlement of Kashmir but Pakistan has become so taken by the means that they now seem to have become ends of Pak foreign policy. The Paks now seem to be trying to play the same Afro-Asian role that India did in the Krishna Menon era.

(2) U.K. Policy Toward Pakistan. Pickard seemed fairly relaxed about much of the noise of the Pak-Chicom relationship (e.g., the Pak-Chicom Communiqué) and said that the Pak's would have to go rather far before the U.K. Government would consider altering its assistance policy. Pak interference on behalf of Indonesia in the dispute with Malaysia could cause trouble for the British, however.

(3) Indo-Pak Problems. Pickard believes the Indian political fabric is so fragile today that Indian leaders must concentrate all efforts on keeping their internal political problems under control. They do not have the public support which would enable them to make the kind of foreign policy decisions which would make possible accommodation with Pakistan. It was Pickard's view that Ayub seems

uninterested

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By *jc*, NARA, Date *5-21-04*

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MAR 18 1965

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uninterested in anything less than full victory on Kashmir. Also Ayub is convinced India will never negotiate on Kashmir. Consequently there seems to be no current basis for a resolution of Indo-Pak problems. Furthermore, our influence over Indo-Pakistan developments is very limited. I agree with these views.

(4) Kashmir. We both saw the possibility of an Indo-Pak blow-up either along the cease-fire line or within Indian held Kashmir, where the Indian hold is weakening. Disturbances in Kashmir could cause more communal trouble elsewhere in India and in East Pakistan. We also noted, however, that Western economic assistance was building up vested interests in economic development in both India and Pakistan. Neither India nor Pakistan would deliberately take action against the other which would jeopardize what had been accomplished, or provoke an exchange of their minority populations.

(5) Nuclear Problem. Pickard and I agreed that the Indians want an assurance from both the U.S./U.K. and the Soviets against Chinese nuclear aggression and that it was best that we leave it to the Indians to use their influence with the Soviets to try to get such an assurance from them. The British have the question of a U.K. assurance under study but Pickard does not favor going beyond the traditional U.K. position of assuring a Commonwealth partner of support if it is attacked.

(6) Indian Defense Expenditure. We both agreed that the time is almost upon India when it will have to make the very difficult decision as to whether to take a calculated defense risk and devote the largest part of its resources to development or let development suffer and continue to build the Indian armed forces. We are agreed we should use our influence to keep India to the former course.

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LONDON 523 CALCUTTA 23 DACCA 965 CINCMEAFSA UNN RAWALPINDI  
316 LAHORE 384 FROM KARACHI MARCH 17, 5PM

CINCMEAFSA FOR POLAD

1. FONSEC AZIZ AHMED CALLED ME TODAY TO ACQUAINT USG WITH SITUATION HE TERMED SERIOUS AT DAHAGRAM, AN EIGHT SQUARE MILE ENCLAVE OF PAK TERRITORY IN COCH BEHAR SEPARATED FROM EAST PAKISTN PROPER BY 150 YARDS INDIAN TERRITORY.

2. AZIZ SAID THAT ON NIGHT OF MARCH 13 INDIANS HAD TAKEN AREA BY FORCE. IN GOP VIEW, THIS CONSTITUTED AN ACT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST PAKISTAN BECAUSE AREA IS NON-DISPUTED TERRITORY, WHICH HAS BEEN ADMINISTERED BY PAKISTAN SINCE 1947. AZIZ SAID THERE WERE MANY OTHER SUCH ENCLAVES BUT THAT THIS WAS FIRST TIME INDIA HAD TAKEN OVER ONE OF THEM. GOP COULD MOVE INTO INDIAN ENCLAVES IN EAST PAK, BUT HAD NOT DONE SO.  
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PAGE TWO RUSBKP 0951 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

3. GOP SAW ONLY TWO ALTERNATIVES -- EITHER INDIANS VACATED AREA PEACEFULLY OR GOP WOULD BE OBLIGED TO USE FORCE TO REMOVE THEM. THERE WERE SIX INDINA DIVISIONS IN ASSAM AREA, OSTENSIBLY FACING CHINA. THEY WERE ARMED TO LARGE EXTENT WITH WEAPONS SUPPLIED BY US PRIMARILY AND UK SECONDARILY. 202ND BRIGADE OF 20TH DIVISION HAD BEEN MOVED TO DAHAGRAM. THIS INDICATED THAT INDIANS INTENDED STAY IN DAHAGRAM AND HAD NO INTENTION OF GIVING IT BACK PEACEFULLY.

4. AZIZ SAID THAT OUTRIGHT AGGRESSION HAD BEEN COMMITTED BY

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-2- 1741, MARCH 17, 5 P.M. FROM KARACHI

INDIA AND NOW GOP WOULD LIKE TO KNOW IF US GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED TO LIVE UP TO ITS ASSURANCES TO COME TO AID OF PAKISTAN IN CASE OF INDIAN AGGRESSION. HE SAID THAT GOVERNOR HARRIMAN HAD SAID THAT HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE GOP DID NOT PLACE MORE RELIANCE ON US ASSURANCES TO THIS EFFECT. THOSE ASSURANCES HAD BEEN GIVEN REPEATEDLY, AND NOW GOP NEEDED TO KNOW WHAT US IS DISPOSED TO DO.

5. IN REPLY TO MY QUERY AS TO WHAT GOI POSITION WAS, AZIZ SAID THAT NOTHING HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM GOI. PRIME MINISTER SHASTRI HAD TOLD PAK HICOM IN NEW DELHI THAT HE WAS NOT AWARE OF FACTS.  
CFN 3. 202 20 4. 5.

PAGE THREE RUSBKP 0951 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

6 I TOLD AZIZ THAT I WOULD REFER HIS QUESTION TO WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY. I SAID THAT ONE MIGHT QUESTION WHETHER THIS CONSTITUTED DIRECT AGGRESSION IN USUAL SENSE, OR A LIMITED BORDER FLARE-UP SUCH AS HAS OCCURRED FREQUENTLY IN THE LATHITILLA AREA OF THE COMILLA DISTRICT. I ALSO QUESTIONED WHETHER DAHAGRAM MIGHT REPRESENT AN INDIAN REACTION TO RANN OF KUTCH DISPUTE IN WEST PAKISTAN.

7. AZIZ REPLIED THAT THE GOP COULD NOT REGARD OCCUPATION OF DAHAGRAM AS MINOR DISPUTE. DAHAGRAM WAS NOT DISPUTED TERRITORY, WHILE RANN OF KUTCH AREA WAS DISPUTED AND ITS BORDER NOT DEMARCATED. IF INDIANS HAD MOVED INTO THAT AREA, EXCUSES COULD BE MADE. IN RANN OF KUTCH GOI HAD ASKED FOR MEETINGS AT POLICE LEVEL, AND GOP HAD AGREED. AZIZ SAID THAT SAME SITUATION DID NOT APPLY IN DAHAGRAM, WHERE BORDER IS DELIMITED. ALL OF EAST PAK-INDIAN BORDER WAS DELIMITED EXCEPT FOR BERU BARI AND LATHITILLA FOREST AREAS. GOI HAD AGREED TO EXCHANGE BJ ENCLAVEE WHEN PART OF BERU BARI WAS TURNED OVER TO PAKISTAN. RELEASE OF BERU BARI TERRITORY TO PAKISTAN, HOWEVER, HAD BEEN FRUSTRATED WITH INDIAN COURTS USED AS EXCUSE. GOP ARE CERTAINLY NOT DELAYING. THIS WAS TYPICAL OF INDIANS. THEY MADE AGREEMENTS AND THEN FOUND WAYS NOT TO IMPLEMENT THEM.  
CFN 6. 7.

PAGE FOUR RUSBKP 0951 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

8. AZIZ ADDED THAT DAHAGRAM SOME DAYS PRIOR TO MARCH 13 HAD BEEN CUT OFF FROM PAK TERRITORY AND NO SUPPLIES ALLOWED ENTER. GOP HAD BEEN CONSIDERING AN AIRDROP OF SUPPLIES.

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-3- 1741, MARCH 17, 5 P.M. FROM KARACHI

HOWEVER, FOUR THOUSAND OF THE FIVE THOUSAND INHABITANTS OF DAHAGRAM HAD BEEN EJECTED. TWELVE HAD BEEN KILLED. INDIAN TROOPS WERE BILLETED IN FORMER POLICE STATION INDIANS IN PAST HAD NOT OBJECTED TO STATIONING OF PAK POLICE IN THE ENCLAVE.

9. AZIZ REITERATED THAT INDIANS HAD TAKEN OVER PAK TERRITORY BY FORCE AND AGGRESSION HAD TO BE VACATED. INDIANS HAD TO LEAVE PEACEFULLY OR "WE PUSH THEM OUT." US GOVERNMENT, HE SAID, HAS OFTEN REMINDED US OF ITS ASSURANCES AND ASSERTED THAT PAK FEARS OF INDIAN AGGRESSION WERE EXAGGERATED. THIS IS AN EXAMPLE OF INDIAN AGGRESSION. "WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW TO WHAT EXTENT WE CAN RELY ON YOUR ASSURANCES."  
CFN 8. 13 9.

PAGEHKIVE RUSBKP 0951 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~  
10. I SAID THAT I APPRECIATED RESTRAINT WHICH GOP WAS SHOWING AND URGED FURTHER FORBEARANCE. I COULD HARDLY IMAGINE GOI TAKING UNRETRACTABLE POSITION ON THIS ISSUE, AND BELIEVED THAT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION COULD BE FOUND. US GOVERNMENT COULD NOT CONSIDER HAVING PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR SETTLEMENT OF THIS ISSUE BUT WE WANTED A PROMPT, JUST AND AMICABLE SETTLEMENT. I SAID I WOULD INFORM AMBASSADOR BOWLES OF THE SITUATION.

11. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION, AZIZ SAID THAT GOP COMMUNICATION WITH INDIAN HAD ONLY BEEN THROUGH PAK HICOM IN DELHI. INDIAN HICOM HERE HAD NOT BEEN APPROACHED. I STRESSED NEED FOR GOI-GOP COMMUNICATIONS, SAYING THAT POOR COMMUNICATIONS COULD MAKE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT MORE DIFFICULT. IN REPLY TO MY QUERY, AZIZ SAID THAT GOP WOULD WELCOME CONSULTATION BETWEEN AMBASSADOR BOWLES AND PAK HICOM IN NEW DELHI.

GP-3.  
MCCONAUGHY  
ET  
CFN 10.8.11. GP-3

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-0, 3/17/65, 4:40 P.M.  
NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, 3/17/65, 5:00 P.M.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
REFERENCE SLIP

DATE

2/3/65

102

TO:	NAME OR TITLE	ORGAN. SYMBOL	ROOM NO.	BLDG.	INITIALS	DATE
1.	Mr. Robert Komer	NSC	372	EOB		
2.						
3.						
4.						
5.						

APPROVAL	NOTE AND FORWARD
AS REQUESTED	NOTE AND RETURN
COMMENT	PER CONVERSATION
FOR YOUR INFORMATION	PREPARE REPLY
INITIAL FOR CLEARANCE	SEE ME
NECESSARY ACTION	SIGNATURE

REMARKS OR ADDITIONAL ROUTING GPO 939117

*Bob,*  
*The piece was mentioned*  
*to you. For your info only at*  
*this point. We may need*  
*your help later - & would*  
*welcome your comments now.*

*Howard*

*5 Part Program*

FROM (NAME AND ORGANIZATION)	ROOM NO. AND BLDG.
Howard Wriggins - S/P <i>HW</i>	7261 NS
SIGNATURE	PHONE NO.
FEB 4 1965	code 182, x 3226

102a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
(SECRET Attachment)

*James Baker*  
*Indo-Pak*

MEMORANDUM

February 3, 1965

TO : The Secretary  
THROUGH: S/S  
FROM : S/P - W. W. Rostow  
SUBJECT: S/P Regional Review: The Occasion for a Major  
New Initiative on the Subcontinent--Visits of  
President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri

The attached memorandum is part of S/P's regional review, and concerns South Asian problems. It suggests (a) the real possibility of deterioration in South Asia if present trends continue, and (b) that there may be a long shot possibility of influencing developments there if our diplomacy marshals various elements of US or US/UK economic and military policy for essentially political ends.

The critical occasion for this initiative would be the visits of President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri in April and May.

These preliminary ideas have not been staffed out in NEA. They have been shared with Phil Talbot and he acquiesced in their going forward to you. But neither he nor his colleagues have had the opportunity to consider them in detail as yet.

What both Phil and I want is a judgment from you as to whether you believe this track is worth exploring.

If

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State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date 5-21-04

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-2-

If you believe we should go forward, I will undertake to coordinate with NEA and obtain the reactions of AID and DOD and explore suggested alternatives if these are found to be insufficient. I suggest this role for S/P because Phil will be away in Jordan for the next two weeks.

Should we wish to field a special envoy prior to these two state visits, as the paper recommends, we will need to proceed with great urgency.

Attachment:

S/P Regional Review re  
South Asia, dtd 2/3/65,  
SECRET

S/P:HWriggins:kmt

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**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE**  
**Director of Intelligence**  
**and Research**

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*Research Memorandum*

103

RNA-27, September 18, 1964

To : The Secretary  
 Through: S/S  
 From : INR Thomas L. Hughes *Thomas L. Hughes*  
 Subject: Hindu-Muslim Tensions on the Indian Subcontinent

- ~~SMITH~~
- ~~ALEXANDER~~
- ~~BRUBECK~~
- ~~CHASE~~
- ~~DUNGAN~~
- ~~FORRESTAL~~
- ~~JESSUP~~
- ~~JOHNSON~~
- ~~KLEIN~~
- ~~LEWIS~~
- ~~SAUNDERS~~
- COL. W.Y. SMITH

Hindu-Muslim antipathy continues to be a major factor in the chronic discord between India and Pakistan. Although it is most visible on the international level in the dispute over Kashmir, this feeling has much deeper roots and has dangerous implications for the domestic affairs of the two countries -- particularly in India -- and their relationships to each other. In the following memorandum, we discuss some of the causes of Hindu-Muslim communalism, its present manifestations, and the problems it poses for the future of the subcontinent.

ABSTRACT

Hindu-Muslim tensions, rooted in traditional antipathies and aggravated by memories of brutalities at the time of partition and subsequent communal violence, pervade subcontinental politics. The level of violence had been low ever since 1950, but in early 1964, large-scale outbreaks took place that brought the communal problem again into sharp focus. Both the Indian and Pakistani governments want to protect minorities; New Delhi is firmly committed to a secular policy, and even Pakistan's Islamic state prescribes a broad attitude of tolerance. In both countries, however, there is much de facto discrimination and there is little commitment to tolerance among most of the population. Renewed violence could occur at almost any time -- particularly in India over the Kashmir issue -- and even though security

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By *jo*, NARA, Date *5-21-04*

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forces could no doubt contain them, they could lead to extensive bloodshed and increased communal bitterness. No quick solution to the centuries-old communal problem is possible; only time and a relatively undisturbed atmosphere can nurture the secularist attitudes that will enable the Muslim and Hindu communities to live together in peace on the subcontinent.

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E.O. 13526, Sec 1.4  
DATE 08/11/2014  
BY 60322/UC/STP

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I. Background of the Problem

Hindu-Muslim communal tension has existed on the subcontinent since the beginning of the Muslim invasions a millenium ago. The Muslims gradually established themselves as the rulers of most of India, adopting much of Hindu culture and utilizing the talents of the Hindus to the full, but maintaining a position of superiority in the government. Many erstwhile Hindus of low caste and economic status took on the ostensibly egalitarian religion of the new rulers, and even though they did not rise noticeably above their Hindu neighbors, within a few generations they came to consider themselves primarily as Muslims.

During the period of British rule in India, the Muslim rulers were generally maintained in their positions and were favorably disposed towards them. However, real power lay in British hands, and the upper level Muslims tended to isolate themselves from the cultural and economic innovations of the British rulers. Upper class Hindus, on the other hand, found it at least as attractive to work for the British as they had for the Muslims. As a result, in the course of British rule the formerly powerful Muslim elite continued to live in the glories of the past while the Hindu elite was busily preparing itself -- albeit unwittingly -- for the job of bringing India into the modern world as an independent state.

When Indian independence became a distinct possibility in the 1930s, the Muslim community came to realize that it would not only be badly outnumbered in an independent India, but it would also lack the skills required to compete with the Hindus for influence and prestige even if the Hindu majority did not stack the cards against them. (The Muslims assumed, with some reason, that the Hindus would in fact stack the cards against them, probably in regard to social and political advancement.) In order to ward off this undesirable future, the Muslim leaders developed the idea of a separate state on the subcontinent that would provide a homeland for Indian Muslims. As illusory as this idea seemed when it was first broached in the 1930s, Pakistan did, in fact, become a reality in 1947 when the Indian subcontinent became independent as two states and not as one.

Instead of allaying tensions, the creation of Pakistan gave rise to a whole new range of communal problems. Worst of all, the partition of the subcontinent, hastily conceived and executed, was attended by a mass migration of Hindus from Pakistan and Muslims from India and by a blood-bath of communal killing that will not be forgotten for generations. In addition, the break between the two communities was not a clean one: a large number of Hindus remained in East Pakistan, and Muslims still constitute about 10% of the Indian population.\* The very well-spring of

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\*Out of a total population (1963) in India, of 460 million, some 45-50 million, or about 10% were Muslims. In Pakistan (1961), slightly more than 10 million Hindus constituted 10.7% of the total population of 93.7 million. Of these Hindus, over 94% were in East Pakistan.

the Islamic movement on the subcontinent -- Aligarh University -- remained within India. Finally, the existence of Pakistan as an avowedly Islamic state was an affront to the concepts of unity and secularism on which the Indian National Congress had based its platform. Pakistan, in turn, never ceased to fear that the ultimate ambition in New Delhi was to reabsorb Pakistan into India.

## II. Muslims in India

Many Indians have never accepted intellectually the validity of the "two-nation theory" put forward by Muslim leaders. Indian leaders point with pride to the clauses in the constitution which guarantee the country's religious minorities equality before the law and which pledge special protection for religious minorities in cultural and educational matters and nondiscrimination in public employment. Unquestionably, though, minority elements in India do suffer disabilities, not because of the government's attitude, but because much of the majority community is unmoved by the idea of secularism. The Government of India has made an apparently genuine attempt, for example, to provide equal opportunities for the Muslims in government service. Nevertheless, in the bureaucracy Muslims are disproportionately outnumbered by Hindus. This disparity probably stems more from the Hindus' greater predilection for education than from deliberate discrimination. Moreover, the Government of India has frequently appointed Muslims to top positions, including cabinet posts, even when fully qualified Muslim candidates were not available. The charge that the Indian Government has appointed Muslims to office merely to serve as window dressing may be unfair, yet there appears to be a certain amount of catering to Muslims as a means of scoring political points internally and abroad.

India's western oriented leadership is firmly convinced of the correctness of a secular policy and is dedicated to its preservation even in the face of serious provocations on the part of the Pakistanis, and of influential Hindu elements opposed to the concept of secularism. At the same time, large numbers of Hindus lack the sophistication necessary to understand that communal differences must be resolved if India is to prosper politically and economically. Hindu suspicion of the minority Muslim community is too deep-seated to be washed away by a steady flow of lofty statements made by India's leaders. The process of overcoming Hindu-Muslim tensions in the subcontinent is one that can at best be accomplished only by the careful effort of opinion-molders over an extensive period of time.

## III. Hindus in Pakistan

Virtually all of the Hindus in Pakistan are located in East Bengal, and large numbers of them have fled, and continue to flee, to India.

Hindu-Muslim antagonism in East Bengal has an economic as well as a religious base, for prior to partition the Hindu minority controlled up to 90 percent of the business and owned large areas of land that were worked by Muslim peasants. After partition, most of the wealthy and educated Hindus fled to India, and their property was taken over by Muslim refugees from India. The lower caste Hindus who remained have found it difficult to find employment in Muslim establishments, and those Hindus who still own substantial land and other property are frequently discriminated against and find their land condemned for "public purposes." Those who emigrate to India are allowed to take very little of their worldly goods with them and confiscation of refugee property is a sore point in Indo-Pakistani relationships.

The official Pakistani government attitude towards the Hindu minority is one of considerable tolerance. The Ayub government has abolished separate Hindu electorates; the "Islamic" nature of the Pakistani constitution is sufficiently flexible to accommodate the Hindu minority adequately, and a few Hindus have been elected to minor public offices in East Pakistan. The Pakistani government occasionally appoints a Hindu to a prestigious position (e.g. ambassador), but there is no doubt that Pakistan is a nation of, by, and for the Muslims. At lower levels, there is anti-Hindu discrimination just as there is anti-Muslim discrimination in India; in most instances, it is doubtful that the Hindu in Islamic Pakistan is much worse off than the Muslim in secular India. In times of communal stress, however, Pakistani officials -- particularly at the lower level -- have tended to be less than assiduous in protecting the Hindu minority.

#### IV. The Role of Kashmir

The Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir is a symptom of the communal problem rather than its cause. It is, however, the most visible point of conflict. Moreover, a Kashmir settlement is necessary, if not in itself altogether sufficient, for an India-Pakistan rapprochement and the reduction of communal tensions on the subcontinent.\* The dispute not only poisons relations between India and Pakistan, but also has severe internal implications for each country. Thus, the rioting and killing in Eastern India and East Bengal during early 1964 was touched off by events in Kashmir, and further disturbances in the disputed state would almost certainly have communal repercussions in India and Pakistan.

Particularly important in this regard is the claim made by many Indians that a plebiscite will almost inevitably result in large-scale Hindu-Muslim disorders throughout India and jeopardize the lives of

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\*See RNA-16, "A Reconsideration of the Kashmiri Situation", CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM, 24 June 1964 for a discussion of the Kashmir problem.

Muslims resident in that country. Behind this contention lies India's fear that its secular orientation and unity might collapse under the weight of added Hindu-Muslim tension. Should India consent to the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir, it is argued, minority elements throughout the country, and in the border areas in particular, would be encouraged to call for plebiscites of their own and thus threaten to fragment the country. Should the Kashmiris decide in a plebiscite to join Pakistan, Hindu extremists could be expected to call for the ouster of the Muslim population from India or to direct a jihad in reverse against the outnumbered Muslims.

It is difficult to judge the soundness of India's basic contention that a plebiscite in Kashmir could result in a country-wide bloodbath. However, many observers of the Indian scene agree that in the present situation the very announcement of a plebiscite would be seized upon by Hindu militants as an excuse to direct attacks against the minority Muslim population. Rightly or wrongly, many Hindus would suspect that Pakistan was bent on fomenting communal trouble inside India in order to influence the Muslim majority in Kashmir to opt for Pakistan. The ability of the Indian security forces to cope with a nation-wide communal uprising is questionable, but it seems likely that with the help of the army, disorders could be contained. In any case, by reiterating the idea that concessions on Kashmir might unleash a bloodbath, the Indians are open to the charge of using the Indian Muslims as hostages and of preparing the way for a slaughter if such concessions are made.

#### V. The Record of Communal Violence

Hindu-Muslim violence has broken out sporadically in India and in Pakistan since partition. The Appendix lists the more significant incidents that have taken place. Some of these incidents were small by subcontinental standards but several were of major proportions. The worst -- aside from the violence accompanying partition itself -- took place in 1950, when hundreds, if not thousands, of Hindus and Muslims lost their lives. Arrangements reached between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan reduced tensions considerably and, although some communal clashes did occur, there was no widespread violence until early 1964.

Communal tension has reached a dangerously high pitch by the end of 1963. An incident in Kashmir in late 1963 involving the theft of a relic of the Prophet aroused Muslim sensibilities throughout the subcontinent. Clashes of an increasingly serious nature continued along the cease-fire line in Kashmir, involving both regular and irregular Indian and Pakistani forces. The Indian Government persisted in expelling Muslims charged with illegal migration from East Pakistan into the relatively thinly populated states of Assam and Tripura, while the Pakistani Government contended that many of these Muslims were citizens of India being forcibly evicted. Whatever the merits of the opposing claims, large numbers of Muslims streamed into overpopulated East Pakistan as a result of the expulsions. In January, a chain reaction of rioting occurred in East and West Bengal. Swarms of refugees--Muslims from India and Hindus from Pakistan -- fled their countries, bringing with them little beyond their

stories of suffering, thus adding more fuel to the flames. From January to August 1964 the reported total of refugees exceeded 600,000, and in August the daily rate was still running at about 3,000, although violence had long since ceased.

Actual communal violence within India and Pakistan was brought under control fairly soon after its inception. The Indian Government moved forcefully -- the Pakistanis somewhat less so -- and a wave of revulsion against the bloody incidents was felt in both countries. While the sub-continent has been free of major Hindu-Muslim violence since March, all of the factors contributing to communal tensions are still present. The two-way flow of refugees continues at a steady rate. There are extremist groups poised and eager to renew the violence. The forces morally outraged by communal violence, as well as those deploring it on political grounds, weakened quickly once violence had ceased. Bloody incidents along the cease-fire line in Kashmir have kept occurring. The expulsion of Muslims from Assam and Tripura shows few signs of abating. Times of maximum communal excitability, such as the Muslim month of fasting and major Hindu festivals, inevitably bring tension to a flashpoint. Finally, in societies where poverty is omnipresent and competition for basic human necessities is keen, and where criminal elements stand to gain from precipitating and exploiting communal violence, no period of calm can be regarded as more than a welcome lull.

Officially both governments oppose communalism; each proclaims its good faith on occasions of violence within its own borders and each lodges stern protests against violence occurring in the other's territory. India does not regard it as a feasible policy to get rid of the bulk of its 50 million Muslims nor does Pakistan regard elimination of its 10 million Hindus as practicable. Nevertheless, government policies have never been entirely clear; they appear to follow rather than to lead regional opinion -- to react to events rather than to head off their development. In some cases this is inevitable, as when violence flares in the wake of an isolated incident of assault. On the other hand, the Indian policy of evicting Muslims from Assam and Tripura since mid-1962 has been deliberate and systematic. It is believed to have stemmed in part from local pressures and in part from New Delhi's concern over security problems in this strategic area as a consequence of the deterioration in Sino-Indian relations. Recent Pakistani policy appears to have been an ad hoc reaction to Indian initiatives, bearing down on Hindus in East Pakistan in response to Indian moves in neighboring territories.

#### VI. Prospects

Both Ayub and Shastri spoke out strongly in opposition to communal violence at the time of the 1964 disturbances, and both are aware of the need for Pakistan and India to compromise their differences as a major means of reducing communal tensions. At the same time, however, both are limited by popular attitudes of prejudice and suspicion within their own

countries that inhibit compromise. The problem is thus circular in nature and neither side seems able to break the circle. Even a dramatic gesture, however, would not eliminate the communal problem; an element that has been part of a society for centuries cannot be disposed of so rapidly.

As long as Ayub and Shastri remain in control of their respective countries, their governments will be firmly arrayed against communal violence, and the armed forces of both countries are probably capable of dealing with any outbreaks. Shastri has committed himself to continue the secular policies of Nehru. Potential successors, rightists within the Congress Party or from the right-wing communal parties, would be less likely to take a firm stand against communalism, and many of them would probably exploit it for domestic political purposes. Within Pakistan, forces promoting communal violence are not likely to achieve power on their own; nevertheless, opportunistic politicians might see profit in fanning hatred of Hindus, and even the least fanatical Pakistani leaders would find it difficult to restrain attacks on Hindus in retaliation for attacks on Muslims in India.

There are forces quietly at work in both Pakistan and India that encourage communal harmony. Perhaps the most notable example is an unofficial Indian group headed by Jayaprakash Narayan, an erratic but respected public figure. The great majority of Hindus and Muslims alike finds communal violence undesirable. Left to its own devices each community would, at most, engage in petty forms of discrimination. Most of the majority, however, lacks a commitment to tolerance that would render them impervious to extremist agitation. Moreover, each community fears domination by the other and thus tends to react emotionally, even irrationally, in the face of extremist provocation. Diminution of this fear and the development of a broadly accepted commitment to tolerance will take a long time.

MAJOR HINDU-MUSLIM CLASHES: CHRONOLOGY BEGINNING MID-1947

1. July 13, 1947  
An official announcement from New Delhi revealed that in the period June 3-July 12 a total of 220 persons had been killed and 910 seriously injured in Hindu-Muslim disturbances. The cities affected most seriously were Calcutta (63 killed, 369 injured), Lahore (52 killed, 220 injured), and Amritsar (15 killed, 61 injured).
2. August 15-September 30, 1947  
In the aftermath of partition, two-way mass migrations between East and West Punjab were accompanied by unprecedented bloodshed: total deaths have been conservatively set at 200,000, with unofficial estimates reaching as high as 1,000,000; several million were injured; and the total number of refugees, Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims were estimated to be between 10 and 15 million.
3. January 12, 1948  
An estimated 1,650 Hindus and Sikhs were murdered by a mob of Pathans at the Gujrat railroad station in West Punjab, Pakistan.
4. January-March, 1950  
A series of Hindu-Muslim riots, accompanied by arson and looting, occurred in East Pakistan (East Bengal), West Bengal, and Assam. Official totals of persons killed: West Bengal, 23, and East Bengal 229. Unofficial estimates set persons killed in the thousands. Several hundred persons reportedly were arrested.
5. August 1954  
Communal rioting took place in Nizamabad and Culbarga in former Hyderabad State (now in Andhra and Mysore, respectively) following the display of Pakistani flags. Approximately 35 reportedly were killed and upwards of 150 injured.
6. September 1956  
Indian authorities listed at least 18 dead, 100 injured, and 1,000 arrested in Hindu-Muslim riots that transpired during the spring and summer of 1956 in the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bhopal, West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh following Muslim objections to passages in a book originally published in the US 14 years earlier and published in India in 1955.
7. October 1956  
Muslim mobs attacked a Hindu procession in eastern Bihar resulting in 5 deaths and 10 hospitalized.

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Appendix: Page 2

8. May 1957 Hindu-Muslim clash in Belgaum, Mysore: 22 persons reported injured.
9. October 1958 Hindu-Muslim disturbance in Bagalkot, Mysore; particulars not available.
10. March 29-  
April 2, 1959 Rioting in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, resulted in three deaths, approximately 150 injuries, and about 1,500 arrests.
11. February 4-11,  
1961 Hindu-Muslim rioting occurred in Jabalpur, Sagar, and intermediate towns and villages in Madhya Pradesh following the report of a Hindu girl having committed suicide in shame over her alleged rape by a Muslim. An official government announcement set the total deaths at over 75, with unofficial estimates set at 150-300. Press estimates placed the number injured at 300-500 and those arrested at 2,000.
12. February 25, 1961 The Office of the Indian High Commission in Karachi, Pakistan, was extensively damaged and 12 members of its staff injured when a mob of 1,000 demonstrators stoned it in protest against the Jabalpur-Sagar rioting earlier in the month.
13. March 19, 1961 Muslim-Hindu rioting in Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh, resulted in two deaths and more than a score injured.
14. October 3-8,  
1961 At least 29 persons were killed and approximately 100 injured during Hindu-Muslim riots in four cities (Aligarh, Chandausi, Hapur, and Meerut) of Uttar Pradesh.
15. March-April,  
1962 Clashes in Malda and Murshidabad Districts, West Bengal: reliable data are not available (an article in the New York Times, citing dubious sources, placed the death total at 1,000). The Government of India disputed the Times article and stated that only four or five persons died in the Malda disorder.
16. May 1962 East Pakistan authorities stated that seven Hindus were killed and 13 others injured in communal clashes in Rajshahi District, East Bengal, in late April and early May. Other sources placed the number killed at 400-500, injured at 500-600. Additional communal disturbances reportedly took place in Rajshahi in June.

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Appendix: Page 3

17. January 1963

Hindu-Muslim rioting in Cachar District, Assam (adjoining East Pakistan); data not available.

18. January 1964

From a series of Hindu-Muslim clashes in East Bengal and West Bengal, the following data are available. 1) Khulna and Jessore, East Pakistan, January 3-6: killed, 29, according to the Government of Pakistan; arrested, 300 (press reports). 2) Calcutta and other localities in West Bengal, January 9-15: 161 killed (official total estimated by West Bengal), with unofficial estimates placing total at 400-500; injured, 636 (officially announced total); and 7,000 arrested. 3) Narayanganj-Dacca, East Pakistan, January 14-17: 1,000 killed, according to "reliable private sources", and an estimated 5,000 persons arrested. The total number of refugees on both sides of the border has been estimated in the hundreds of thousands.

19. March 1964

India's Home Minister stated in Parliament that 200 persons died in Hindu-Muslim clashes that occurred in the states of Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, and West Bengal during the period March 18-22. Focal points of the communal disturbances were the steel centers of Jamshedpur (Bihar) and Rourkela (Orissa). These disturbances reportedly were sparked by Hindu refugees going by train to rehabilitation camps in central India. Most of the victims were Muslims.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

NDY-SMITH | 6, 24 3

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ACTION: Amembassy KARACHI 108

Info: Amembassy NEW DELHI 221  
Amembassy LONDON 666

*Handwritten signatures and initials: "Bob", "J", "666"*

- ...TOR
- ...BELK
- ...BRUBECK
- ...CHASE
- ...FOURMONT
- ...JESSUP
- ...JOHNSON
- ...KELNY
- ...KLEIN
- ...KOMER
- ...MOODY
- ...REEDY
- ...SAUNDERS
- ...SAYRE
- ...SMITH, WM. Y.

Jul 29 11 57 AM '64

LIMDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR

1. Soon after your return you should see President Ayub to give him oral message from President and to review with him your conversations in Washington.
2. You should make following points in message from the President:
  - a. The President asked you to give his warm personal regards to Ayub. However, the
  - b. ~~The~~ President read President Ayub's letter of July 1 with ~~great~~ interest and considerable distress, as he had indicated to Ambassador G. Ahmed when the letter was presented July 7.
  - c. The President did not share Ayub's viewpoint that he was being disloyal to the Alliance by trying to work with India in what he considers to be our interest and also Ayub's. Moreover he was distressed that such an old and valued ally of ours as President Ayub should want to give the attention he has to Communist China. Ayub must know how strongly Americans feel about China; Communist China is now posing a grave threat to us in Southeast Asia.
  - d. As for inference in Ayub's letter that he might have to reappraise Pakistan's commitments to the Alliances, the President could not see that this would

*Handwritten note:* LHM TO AYUB (with 4) 7.29.64

Drafted by: NEA:SCA:WLSimmons/bk 7-23-64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

The Secretary  
NEA:JEDG/Pfalbot

Clearances:  
SCA - Miss Laibe  
SEA - Mr. Pickering  
FE - Mr. Moore  
SEATO - Mr. Krausse

White House - Mr. Komer  
S/S - Mr. Hilliker  
NEA - Amb McConaughy

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Authority DLJ 88-162 (\*22f)  
By J. L. NARA, Date 5-21-04

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would be in Pakistan's interest or in ours. US recognizes Pakistan's right as sovereign country to re-examine its policies. Regrettable as it might be, we would have to re-examine ours also, if Pakistan did so.

3. In addition to delivering President's message, suggest you take opportunity at your discretion to make following points:

a. USG pleased with indications GOP has taken some initiative to create climate conducive to solution its problems with GOI. As Ayub knows, we have always believed compromises necessary to resolve issues can only be made by two sovereign countries concerned and cannot be imposed from outside. We wish them well, and will continue to contribute in any way which might be useful. But we fail to understand how timing our June 6 announcement of military aid to India has set back cause of improved Indo-Pak relations and note reports that Home Ministers to meet also and/Ayub-Shastri ~~meeting~~

b. US recognizes last 20 months have been difficult period in US-Pak affairs.

For our part, we continue to place great value on our relations with Pakistan. We continue to be deeply interested in Pakistan's economic and political development. We have been and continue to be committed to Pakistan's security, a commitment formalized in bilateral agreements and in SEATO and through our association in CENTO. Recent highly successful consortium meeting demonstrate our support Pak economic development. US military aid continues to help make Pakistan's armed services among best equipped in Asia. In June you participated in turnover of submarine, making Pakistan one of few Asian countries possessing this type

naval

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naval weapon. Thus we assume Ayub is not complaining about our aid.

From GOP point of view we acknowledge our aid to India is bound to be cause of concern but we have hoped GOP would have confidence in our assurances and intentions. We are nonplussed by Ayub's contention that we have QUOTE doubled military UNQUOTE our/aid to India.

c. You found intense concern in Washington over Chicom ambitions, complete resolve to meet this threat, regardless of what steps may be necessary, and concern that actions of our allies should not lead Chicoms to consider their strategy is succeeding.

Ex However, an even more important factor disturbing US-Pak relations and the one with the most worrisome implications for the future of these relations is Pakistan's policy on Communist China. Free World and especially interests of Free countries of Asia now threatened by Chinese subversion and aggression in Southeast Asia in Laos and Viet Nam. As President told Ambassador Ahmed, USG expected Pakistan to join free world effort in Viet Nam and at least show flag there. We have given GOP list items that government needs and are hopeful GOP will give positive response shortly.

We regret GOP saw necessity of issuing public statements supporting 14 nation conference on Laos. Bhutto's July 20 press statement to NCNA gave particular offense in Washington since it comes dangerously close by implication if not explicitly to support Chicom objectives in Southeast Asia. Press leak on our confidential request for GOP to caution Chicoms on Laos and Chicom reply also regrettable.

d. Despite

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d. Despite our differences USG believes fundamentals our alliance relationship remain in national interest of both of us. It would be tragic to let this relationship be jeopardized by our drifting ~~in~~ too far apart.

FYI During foreign aid hearings before <sup>Senate</sup> Appropriations Committee July 24, primary criticism was directed at current Pakistan policies. Talbot was pressed to justify continued high level U.S. aid under present circumstances. END FYI

GP-3

END

PRUS 001/24  
1624Z 24 JUL 64  
FM THE PRESIDENT  
TO PRIME MINISTER HOME

105

*Indira Pahl  
x UK*

~~SECRET~~

CAPC4197



~~SECRET~~

DEAR FRIEND:

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR THOUGHTFUL LETTER OF JULY 22. IT IS A GREAT HELP TO HAVE THIS FULL AND CLEAR ACCOUNT OF YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH AYUB. AND IT IS ALSO GOOD TO HEAR THAT THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE WENT SO WELL.

I AM NOT SURPRISED THAT YOU FOUND THE PAKISTANI POSITION SO STIFF, AND IT IS CLEAR THAT WE WILL SIMPLY HAVE TO KEEP WORKING ON THEM. MEANWHILE, I DO AGREE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO KEEP THE LEVEL OF OUR ASSISTANCE TO INDIA AS WELL AS PAKISTAN UNDER CAREFUL REVIEW, AND I HAVE ASKED MY PEOPLE TO TAKE A FURTHER HARD LOOK. OUR EXPERIENCE OVER THE LAST YEAR AND A HALF SUGGESTS THAT THE MORE CLOSELY WE WORK WITH THE INDIANS, THE MORE THEIR OWN SENSE OF NEED CAN BE MODERATED. AS A MATTER OF FACT, WE BELIEVE THAT IN OUR RECENT MILITARY AID TALKS WE MANAGED TO GET THE INDIANS TO MODERATE THEIR APPETITES TO A LARGE EXTENT, AND I SEE EVERY ADVANTAGE IN TRYING TO MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS IN THIS DIRECTION IF POSSIBLE

WITH WARM REGARDS,

SINCERELY

*L.B. Johnson*

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Authority NLS 94-290 (#1216)  
By JLCB, NARA, Date 5/21/04

END MESSAGE

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CLASSIFICATION

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*orig. returned  
to BKS-7/27*

106

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

July 25, 1964

Date

- 1- *K*
- 2- *let BSA*

Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

*OK w.  
change on  
p. 2*

The enclosed is for White House  
clearance prior to transmission.

*John Paul*

*Benjamin H. Read*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

**Enclosure:**

Telegram to Amembassy Karachi and  
Amembassy New Delhi

~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFICATION

7/27

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY *ju* ON 2-17-93

## TELEGRAPH BRANCH

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Kon

Amembassy KARACHI  
Amembassy NEW DELHI

INFO: Amembassy LONDON

Deptel 105 to London info Karachi 14 Delhi 24.

EXDIS

There follows highlights which pertain to India and Pakistan from letter to President from Prime Minister Douglas-Home:

PM saw Ayub very soon after receiving President's letter and had lengthy conversation with him. Burden Ayub's ~~argument~~ argument which he repeated over and over again was that Indian military program far in excess of her needs to meet Chinese threat and in breaking herself economically she was pulling Pakistan down with her. PM stressed importance of India being prepared against Chinese and suggested possibility of <sup>quadripartite</sup> ~~quadrilateral~~ military talks to discuss defense needs of subcontinent. Neither Ayub nor Bhutto found this idea attractive.

Despite friendly statements by Ayub and TTK during meeting, reference to India and Pakistan in Commonwealth communique caused trouble, with Indians reacting badly. Situation shows little give or change. We have not yet succeeded in mitigating grave misunderstandings in Pakistan about our military aid policies towards India. Pakistan will not accept that she is underestimating danger from Chinese so deadlock remains and

Shastri

NEA:SOA:WLSimmons/cd 7-24-64

NEA:PTalbot

EUR - Mr. Jaeger (informed) S/S -  
SOA - Miss Laise White House -  
ENA - Mr. Judd (informed)

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 5-21-04

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Amembassy KARACHI

~~SECRET~~

Shastri will have to be very big man to break it.

PM subsequently suggested to Ayub that UK <sup>omit</sup> [should be] prepared offer Pakistan modest amount military aid. This not discussed in detail but when UK does do so UK will have another opportunity to try bring home to Ayub UK concern over misunderstandings and conviction that reasonable amount aid to India <sup>us</sup> enables/~~US~~ exercise moderating influence beneficial India and Pakistan. PM wondered whether US/UK ought not review scale of Indian defense aid in view difficulties of military operation across the Himalayas and probability that with good weapons and training Indians have enough to meet Chinese attack, if their troops were not tied up on Pak frontier.

GP-ZK 1

END

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED

PMUK 001/1

1630 ZULU JULY 22

1964 JUL 22 15 31

FROM PRIME MINISTER (Lard Home)

TO PRESIDENT

~~SECRET~~

I. 277/64

MESSAGE BEGINS

*India*  
*XUK*

~~SECRET~~

46865

MY DEAR FRIEND,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIMELY AND HELPFUL LETTER OF JULY 4 ABOUT RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN. I ALSO REGRET THAT MR. SHASTRI WAS PREVENTED FROM COMING TO LONDON FOR OUR MEETING: BUT THERE WAS A USEFUL MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT AYUB AND MR. KRISHNAMACHARI WHICH I BELIEVE MAY LEAD TO A MEETING BETWEEN AYUB AND SHASTRI IN THE AUTUMN.

AS IT HAPPENS I SAW PRESIDENT AYUB VERY SOON AFTER I HAD RECEIVED YOUR LETTER AND HAD A LONG TALK WITH HIM. THE BURDEN OF THE PRESIDENT'S SONG WHICH HE REPEATED TO ME OVER AND OVER AGAIN WAS THAT INDIA WAS ASSUMING A MILITARY PROGRAMME WHICH WAS FAR IN EXCESS OF HER NEEDS TO MEET A CHINESE THREAT, AND IN BREAKING HERSELF ECONOMICALLY SHE WAS PULLING DOWN PAKISTAN WITH HER. I STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE THAT BOTH YOU AND WE ATTACHED TO INDIA BEING EFFECTIVELY PREPARED AGAINST THE CHINESE CAPACITY TO ATTACK HER, AND SUGGESTED THE POSSIBILITY OF QUADRIPARTITE MILITARY TALKS TO DISCUSS THE DEFENCE NEEDS OF THE SUB-CONTINENT. NEITHER HE NOR BHUTTO, HOWEVER, FOUND THIS IDEA ATTRACTIVE.

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Authority NLS/RAC 07-17(455)  
By Sah, NARA, Date 3/4/08

DURING OUR FULL MEETINGS THERE WERE SEVERAL FRIENDLY REFERENCES TO THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN: YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THAT THERE WAS A REFERENCE IN THE COMMUNIQUE TO THE SATISFACTION WITH WHICH WE NOTED THE FRIENDLY PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY THE PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA AND TO OUR HOPES THAT THE PROBLEMS BETWEEN THEIR COUNTRIES WOULD BE SOLVED IN THE SAME FRIENDLY SPIRIT. EVEN THAT CAUSED TROUBLE AND THE INDIANS HAVE REACTED BADLY TO IT. THE SITUATION IN MY JUDGEMENT SHOWS LITTLE GIVE OR CHANGE. WE HAVE NOT YET SUCCEEDED IN MITIGATING THE GRAVE MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH EXIST IN PAKISTAN ABOUT THE REASONS FOR, AND THE EFFECTS OF, OUR MILITARY AID POLICIES TOWARDS INDIA. PAKISTAN WILL NOT ACCEPT THAT SHE IS UNDERESTIMATING THE DANGER FROM CHINA, SO THE DEADLOCK REMAINS AND SHASTRI WILL HAVE TO BE A VERY BIG MAN TO BREAK IT.

I SUBSEQUENTLY SUGGESTED TO THE PRESIDENT THAT WE SHOULD OURSELVES BE PREPARED TO OFFER PAKISTAN A MODEST AMOUNT OF MILITARY AID. WE DID NOT HAVE TIME TO DISCUSS THIS IN DETAIL: BUT WHEN WE DO SO WE SHALL HAVE ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY TO TRY TO BRING HOME TO THE PAKISTANIS NOT ONLY OUR CONCERN ABOUT THESE MISUNDERSTANDINGS BUT OUR CONVICTION THAT A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF MILITARY AID TO INDIA ENABLES US TO EXERCISE A MODERATING INFLUENCE WHICH CANNOT BUT BE BENEFICIAL TO BOTH PAKISTAN AND INDIA. I WONDER, HOWEVER, WHETHER WE OUGHT NOT TO REVIEW THE SCALE OF AID TO INDIA'S DEFENCE EFFORT. AN ATTACK ACROSS THE HIMALAYAS IS A VERY DIFFICULT MILITARY OPERATION, AND, IF INDIAN TROOPS WERE NOT TIED UP ON THE PAKISTAN FRONTIER, THEY PROBABLY HAVE ENOUGH, IF THEIR WEAPONS AND TRAINING ARE GOOD, TO MEET A CHINESE ATTACK.

AS TO THE MEETING ITSELF, IT WAS A FAIR-SIZED RISK CALLING ALL THESE PRIME MINISTERS TOGETHER, CHIEFLY BECAUSE OF THE DANGER OF AN EXPLOSION OVER SOUTHERN RHODESIA, BUT IT SEEMED ESSENTIAL TO ME TO RE-DEFINE THE PURPOSES OF THE COMMONWEALTH IN ITS NEW SHAPE AND SIZE, PARTICULARLY AFTER OUR RATHER UNHAPPY EXPERIENCES IN 1961 AND 1962. INDEED WE HAD SOME FAIRLY NERVE-RACKING MOMENTS. AS IT WAS, IN THE END IT TURNED OUT EVEN BETTER THAN I HAD HOPED AND FAR BETTER THAN I HAD FEARED. IT WAS PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGING TO FIND THAT WE ALL PLACED A HIGHER VALUE ON WHAT UNITED US THAN WHAT DIVIDED US. THE SUGGESTION OF A COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT CAME FROM NONE OTHER BUT NKRUMAH: NORMALLY INSTITUTIONS ARE FROWNED ON AS IMPLYING DOMINATION FROM LONDON.

---

I DO NOT CLAIM THAT ALL WILL NOW BE PLAIN SAILING: BUT I AM CONVINCED THAT THE NEW COMMONWEALTH HAS TAKEN SHAPE AND WILL HAVE A MAJOR ROLE TO PLAY IN THE FUTURE AS WE TURN OUR MINDS TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE NEXT DECADES: THE GAP BETWEEN THE RICH AND POOR NATIONS AND THE DIVISIONS OF RACE. I HOPE THAT HAVING SINCE THE WAR HELPED US IN THE TASK OF DE-COLONISATION, THE COMMONWEALTH MAY IN THE FUTURE HELP US TO TAKE THE STING OUT OF THE WORLD'S RACIAL PROBLEMS. FOR US THE KEY WILL BE SOUTHERN RHODESIA. THIS LAST MEETING WILL NOT HAVE HARMED, AND MAY WELL HAVE HELPED, OUR CHANCES OF FINDING THE RIGHT ANSWER HERE.

IN ADDITION WE ALL SUPPORTED THE TUNKU OVER MALAYSIA  
AND GAVE NO HOSTAGES TO FORTUNE IN CYPRUS. SO IN GENERAL  
AND IN DETAIL IT WAS A MOST USEFUL MEETING.

WITH WARM REGARD,

ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME

JUL 22 1964

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE ENDS

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*India Pak* 110  
1

NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

INDO-PAKISTAN MINISTERIAL TALKS REACH IMPASSE

The Indian and Pakistani Home Ministers, who met in New Delhi April 7-11 in an effort to arrest further communal disorders and migrations (see CFR No. 15, April 8), failed to reach any specific agreements but did arrange to continue discussions in Pakistan in the "near future." In press conferences after the New Delhi round, both Ministers discussed areas of difference while stressing that the talks had revealed "common ground."

Evictions Major Stumbling Block - The Indian Government went into the talks focussing on the question of restoring communal peace. The Pakistan Government, on the other hand, was principally concerned with ending or mitigating Indian eviction of Muslims from Assam and Tripura into East Pakistan, and this question was the major stumbling block. A number of proposals for promoting communal harmony, protection of minorities, and their rehabilitation, apparently were accepted by both parties although machinery to implement points of agreement was not considered. India maintains that 300,000 Pakistani Muslims have illegally entered Assam since partition and fears the political consequences of a Muslim majority in parts of Assam. While not wholly refuting the Indian charge, Pakistan claims that many Muslims evicted by India are Indian nationals and it fears the economic and social consequences of the additional population pressure on already over-populated East Pakistan.

Tripartite Tribunal Proposal Rejected - The Pakistanis stressed that current communal tensions were a direct product of the Indian eviction policy. They asked that evictions cease while a tripartite tribunal (one Indian, one Pakistani, one outsider) study the problem. The Indians refused to accede to this proposal on grounds that the determination of Indian nationality is an attribute of Indian sovereignty. However, Pakistan held the Indian refusal untenable and cited the World Court decision on the Tunisian-Moroccan nationality case to support the Pakistani position that the nationality of evictees was not merely a domestic Indian concern.

Despite the lack of accomplishments, the atmosphere remained cordial throughout the talks and each side credited the other with good faith in a desire to improve the communal situation.

--Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 16, 4/15/64

\*

DEVELOPMENTS IN ARAB STATES REVIEWED

Following a year of readjustment and realignment among the Arab States, the Cairo Summit meeting which President Nasser called in

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date *5/2/04*

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*Arab Nations*

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 5-21-04

~~SECRET~~

*Judo Bob* III

9

NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

INDO-PAKISTAN MINISTERIAL TALKS BEGIN

In an effort to arrest further communal disorders and migrations, India and Pakistan commenced Ministerial talks in New Delhi on April 7 (see CFR No. 3, January 15). Relations between the two countries have been close to their lowest ebb since 1950 and tension runs high on the subcontinent. There has been a constant stream of mutual defiance and provocation. The numerous border incidents, particularly on the Kashmir cease-fire line, have been played up, and communal strife with consequent population movements has continued.

Period of Good Feeling Brief - Indo-Pakistan relations since independence in 1947 have been generally characterized by suspicion, fear and hatred. With the assumption of power by President Ayub and Communist China's military action in Tibet and on India's borders, there was a brief period in 1959-1960 of relative good feeling between India and Pakistan which was characterized by such developments as Pakistan's offer of joint defense, the Indus Waters Agreement, some boundary demarcations, and Nehru's visit to Pakistan. For not altogether clear reasons, relations slowly began to deteriorate in late 1960. Communal troubles flared and the Kashmir issue moved to the forefront. In 1961 India seized Goa, which aroused Pakistan's latent fears of India; and, Pakistan, due to its concern that US policy was becoming favorably inclined toward India, maintained a steady drum-fire attack against India in press and public statements.

The decline in relations accelerated after the fall of 1962. The Chinese Communist humiliation of India in October 1962, which was not unwelcome to the Pakistanis, and the subsequent provision of US military assistance to India, introduced catalytic elements into the situation. Both India and Pakistan are still in the process of trying to adjust to the shifts in the inter-relationships of the nations of the subcontinent to the major outside powers.

Paks "Leaning on India" - Pakistan has consciously adopted a policy of "leaning on India" and of pressuring the United States and the United Kingdom to restrict arms aid to India. Pakistan has used all media and available opportunities to emphasize its fear that India will be aggressive. When the West refused to yield to these tactics and the Pakistan Government considered its special position was being eroded, the latter started searching for alternatives to its heavy reliance on the West. Pakistan has "normalized" its relations with the Chinese Communists and has made major efforts to improve its relations with the Afro-Asian world at the expense of India.

Indian Position Hardens - Following the Chinese attack and in response to US-UK urging, India showed a disposition to explore ways

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
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in which outstanding Indo-Pakistan disputes might be settled. However, with the recession of the immediate Chinese military threat, increasing Indian concern over Pakistan-Chinese relations, and India's conclusion that major compromises with Pakistan were not necessary in order to obtain arms aid from abroad, India reverted to a harder line.

New Ferment in Kashmir - Since December 1963, a new ferment has arisen within Kashmir which has demonstrated the bankruptcy of Indian policy there and has resulted in a further exacerbation of Indo-Pakistan relations. Major communal rioting in both Pakistan and India this year was set in train by the disturbances in Kashmir. India has reacted with a hard line toward Pakistan, but has taken steps to put its Kashmir house in order by changing the local administration, releasing Sheikh Abdullah (popular ex-Prime Minister who has espoused self-determination) from prison, and proclaiming the intention of pursuing its course of further integrating Kashmir into the Indian Union. Citing both the Kashmir disturbances and Indian steps toward further integration, Pakistan again raised the Kashmir issue in the Security Council in February. No action has been taken but the Council is expected to meet again on this issue on May 5. What will flow from the release of Abdullah, meanwhile, is unpredictable, but his liberation could create major new problems for India.

\*

--Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 15, 4/8/64

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*Rose*  
*Poll* 112

*India*

**SUMMARY**

FBIS 01

INDIAN-PAKISTANI TALKS

DELHI DOMESTIC SERVICE IN ENGLISH 1530 7 APR 64 B

(EXCERPTS) THE CONFERENCE OF HOME MINISTERS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN, WHICH BEGAN IN NEW DELHI TODAY, AGREED TO LIST THE ISSUES BEFORE IT UNDER THREE BROAD SUBJECTS: 1) RESTORING COMMUNAL HARMONLY AND A SENSE OF SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE AMONG MINORITIES; 2) THE MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES; AND 3) THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGAL INFILTRATORS INTO INDIA FROM EAST PAKISTAN. THE PAKISTANI DELEGATE PREFERRED TO CALL THE THIRD PROBLEM ONE OF THE EVICTION OF INDIAN MOSLEMS.

TWO COMMITTEES WILL BE SET UP. ONE WILL CONSIDER THE FIRST ISSUE AND THE SECOND WILL TAKE UP THE OTHER TWO. THE COMMITTEES WILL MEET TOMORROW. THE PLENARY SESSION WILL BE RESUMED 9 APRIL.

ALL-INDIA RADIO'S CORRESPONDENT UNDERSTANDS THAT THE CONFERENCE GOT OFF TO A GOOD START. THE MEETING BEGAN WITH SPEECHES BY NANDA AND HABIBULLAH KHAN, WHO ARE LEADING THEIR RESPECTIVE DELEGATIONS. EACH SPEECH WAS WELL RECEIVED BY THE OTHER AND STRUCK A GOOD NOTE, CREATING A FAVORABLE CLIMATE FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION.

OUR CORRESPONDENT UNDERSTANDS THAT THE INDIAN DELEGATES TO THE CONFERENCE ARE SATISFIED AT THE OUTCOME OF THE FIRST DAY'S PROCEEDING, THOUGH UNDERSTANDABLY THEY WOULD LIKE TO WAIT FOR THE COMMITTEE DISCUSSIONS BEFORE FORMING A FINAL OPINION. THE EMPHASIS THROUGHOUT WAS ON LOOKING TO THE FUTURE AND NOT DIGGING UP THE PAST OR INDULGING IN MUTUAL RECRIMINATION.

8 APR 1223A REB/GG

*KØMER*  
*Judha Pak*

FBIS 32 OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SINGAPORE REUTERS IN ENGLISH 1152 26 MAR 64 W

(TEXT) NEW DELHI, 26 MARCH--PRESIDENT AYUB KHAN OF PAKISTAN HAS ACCEPTED MR. NEHRU'S PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING OF THE INDIAN AND PAKISTANI HOME MINISTERS TO DISCUSS RECENT HINDU-MOSLEM DISTURBANCES, USUALLY WELL-INFORMED SOURCES SAID TODAY. THE INDIAN PRIME MINISTER HAS SUGGESTED THE MEETING BE HELD IN NEW DELHI.

26 MAR 900A CF/DP

114

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE DIRECTOR OF  
INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

March 13, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert W. Komer  
National Security Council  
Executive Office Building

Here is a copy of the material which  
Mr. Hughes sent to Mr. Manning this  
morning.

*Donald P. Black*

Donald P. Black  
Staff Assistant

MAR 13 1964

114 a  
*Judith Pak*

POSSIBLE THEMES ON INDIA AND PAKISTAN

(Note: Except for Kashmir, Nehru's illness, and Chou En-lai's visit to Pakistan, the Subcontinent has not been in the newspapers lately. The Indians have been going through a period of humiliation over their 1962 military setback, junking of previous dogmas, adjustment to new dangers, decline of Nehru, familiarization with new leadership, and bewilderment over how to budget for a new defense buildup while maintaining momentum on essential economic and social development programs. The Paks are progressing economically, protesting free world military aid to India, continuing a "controlled" courtship of Communist China, pursuing Security Council tactics on Kashmir which are causing the Indians to dig deeper, as well as broadening Pak interests and activities in the Afro-Asian world in advance of the second Bandung Conference.

(Therefore objectives of any comments made on South Asia should include: registering friendly interest and concern for the people of the area; support for the security, stability, and progress of the entire Subcontinent; unhappiness that local quarrels like Kashmir continue to fester and divert attention away from joint opportunities back to old arguments; and hope that historic lessons will be learned and historic opportunities taken.)

POSSIBLE LANGUAGE

Crises in Panama, Cyprus, and South Vietnam have understandably claimed the attention of American policy-makers and the American people this winter. But this by no means should cause us to ignore other critical areas where people and governments have been affected by and are responding to other earth-shaking events. The Asian Subcontinent of India and Pakistan is a good case in point. Here 15 months ago in the heart of non-Communist Asia the world's largest country attacked the world's next largest country with strategic and political results which we cannot yet begin to calculate. In October 1962, in

the very weeks of the Soviet-American missile crisis in Cuba, Indian soldiers in the Himalayan passes were confronted by the same aggressors whom American GI's had met in Korea a decade before. The Chinese Communists, violating their pledged word, attacked a neighbor which had consistently sought nothing but peaceful and friendly relations -- and the Indians, like others before them, bore the brunt of surprise attack, diplomatic deception, and temporary military defeat.

The Chinese Communist attack on India was one of the major events of our time. The forces it set in motion could be of major unfolding importance to us and to the whole world in the months and years ahead.

The new Indian awareness of the nature of the threat, the new possibilities for joint defense of the subcontinent by both India and Pakistan, the new strategic context for the protection of all of free Asia: all of these factors enhanced the historic stakes involved. The attention was on Chinese aggression, and the people of South Asia were closer than ever before to an understanding of what was needed strategically, militarily, and politically to meet the Communist threat.

When during 1963 the Sino-Indian fighting was followed by a worsening of the Sino-Soviet rift, and a lessening of the Soviet-U.S. tensions, whole new prospects for the future of freedom in Asia seemed to open up. ~~Today, however, it is clear that these prospects~~  
The shock of the Chinese attack awakened many to a sense of new possibility and purpose.

Unfortunately, to others it seems to have supplied a new and, hopefully, a temporary distraction for diversionary goals. The big strategic lessons have not been universally learned in the Subcontinent. The experience should have taught that those who think they can use the Chinese Communists instead of the Chinese Communists using them are mistaken. Some of our old friends in South Asia are ~~was~~ tempted to take advantage of the new situation for lesser interests than that situation demands, even to the extent of making overtures to the aggressors. Some are still rigidly pursuing objectives on Kashmir, for instance, which embitter relations between neighbors rather than exploring broader avenues of mutual and cooperative purpose. Refugee bitterness, communal strife, sporadic fighting, incidents, suspicions, rumors and counter-rumors are not the soil from which common interests, common purposes, or common defenses can grow.

Meanwhile the world is deprived of the leadership which we might otherwise have from South Asia, and the preservation and enlargement of freedom suffers for the 1/5th of mankind who live there.

This is why we regret so much the continuing antagonisms between two neighbors who share so much in history, geography and personal ties.

This is why we hope for an eventual settlement of Kashmir between the parties -- and for the creation of an atmosphere conducive to <sup>it</sup> ~~the~~.

This is why we hope for a new realization of the historic ties which have linked the Subcontinent, and why we look ahead to the far greater role which both India and Pakistan can jointly play for the future of freedom in Asia and in the world.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON



S/S 920

January 16, 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*India - Pak*

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Hindu-Muslim Rioting in India and Pakistan

Current Situation

The major scene of the Hindu-Muslim rioting has shifted to Pakistan where at Narayanganj, a few miles south of Dacca in East Pakistan, a minimum of 300 Hindus were killed on January 13-14. Calcutta is calming down under rigid army and police control. Deaths are estimated in the neighborhood of 175 in the city and surrounding areas but the total may be three times this number. We cannot discount the possibility of a resurgence of violence in the Calcutta area or new outbreaks elsewhere in India in reaction to the deaths near Dacca.

The principal danger to India and Pakistan from the riots is that they may start up again a massive flow of refugees between the two countries like those which took place in 1947 and 1950. President Ayub, in a strong letter sent to President Radhakrishnan January 13, said that already 20,000 Indian Muslims had crossed into East Pakistan since the Calcutta riots began. There are still 10 million Hindus in East Pakistan and over 44 million Muslims in India. The migration of even a small proportion of these would put enormous economic and political burdens on these two countries and do much to deepen the enmity which exists between them.

Background

The current cycle of religious and communal disturbances began in Indian Kashmir in late December when Kashmiri Muslims demonstrated over the theft of a relic of the Prophet. The Pakistan Government and press cited these events in Kashmir as evidence of Indian failure to protect the rights of Muslims in Kashmir. This led to protest demonstrations all over Pakistan. One such demonstration in Khulna, East Pakistan, deteriorated into anti-Hindu riots in which at least

27 persons

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

17 1964

**DECLASSIFIED**  
Authority FRUS 64-68, vol 25, #4  
By JP, NARA, Date 5-19-04

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27 persons died. A factor which undoubtedly contributed to the atmosphere in which these riots took place was the Indian policy of expulsion from Assam of Muslim immigrants from East Pakistan.

The press in Calcutta made much of the East Pakistan disturbances and Indian political leaders, particularly Krishna Menon, strongly attacked Pakistan on the issue of the Khulna riots at the Congress Party Conference in early January. Exaggerated reports by Hindu refugees from East Pakistan contributed to the inflammatory atmosphere in which the Calcutta riots broke out.

Clearly, resumption of large scale migration would present a great setback to economic development and political stability in both countries. They undoubtedly realize this. The history of their relations indicates that at a time such as this, when the interest of both countries is so deeply involved, they have frequently managed to get together and work out ways of dealing with mutual problems. For example, Nehru and Pakistan Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, met in 1950 and agreed upon a pact which stemmed the last major tide of migration. We believe some similar kind of joint Indo-Pak action may be necessary to end the present cycle of disturbances. It is unfortunate that Nehru's illness removes his restraining hand from the scene at this time.

#### What We Are Doing

We believe that the Governments of India and Pakistan will get together only when each is convinced that its interest requires joint action. Our influence to precipitate such a meeting is limited. We have proposed to the British that they use the Commonwealth framework to encourage joint Indo-Pak action. If the British take this initiative, as we hope they will, we will strongly support them. We feel that our action should be informal and behind the scenes. Prospects for effective joint action would be damaged if the governments and peoples of India and Pakistan considered that it was being taken in response to Western pressure rather than the compulsions of the communal situation itself. We have already instructed our posts in India and Pakistan to urge restraint on both governments and, in particular, to suggest that India and Pakistan take steps to limit inflammatory press reporting on the riots.

There is


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-3-

There is also a need for emergency relief, which will grow if the disturbances and migrations continue. U. S. voluntary agencies are already providing foodgrains and powdered milk in Calcutta, where our Consulate General reports there are no shortages of food for immediate relief work. We are studying what additional steps we might take to help. We believe we should be in a position to respond to governmental requests for emergency assistance, rather than take the initiative at this stage, since each country probably would prefer to handle this problem in its own way without having to call for help from foreign governments.

  
for Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1/10/64

Bob:

Here is our proposed memorandum  
to the President on military assistance  
to Pakistan and India.

Governor Harriman has cleared it,  
but it has not yet gone to the Secretary.

  
Turner C. Cameron, Jr.

JAN 10 1964

~~SECRET~~

This document consists of 2 pages  
No. 4 of 5 Copies, Series B

116a

*India/Pak*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Military Assistance to India and Pakistan:  
General Taylor's Report

I have reviewed with General Taylor the results of his trip to India and Pakistan. He has come back with excellent ideas about future military assistance to those two countries. These supplement and refine the basic approach worked out by the Standing Group and embodied in my recommendations to you of December 11.

General Taylor would fix responsibility on the Indians for coming up with a satisfactory five-year defense plan which would limit their force goals, hold down procurement from the Soviets and hold to a minimum the diversion of their resources from economic development. Within such a plan it would be up to the Indians to set the priorities among the competing needs of their own services. He sees no great problem in our living with an Indian decision to include a limited number of supersonics in an acceptable plan. This course of action would permit us to follow the roughly parallel course with India and Pakistan on supersonics which we believe to be quite essential for political reasons.

I recommend that you authorize us to proceed along the lines of my proposal to you as refined by General Taylor's findings. To move this matter ahead, the following steps are in order:

1. Tell the Indians that:

- we are willing to provide longer run military assistance if they work out a satisfactory five-year defense plan;
- This plan would assume a mutually acceptable political framework (i.e., Indian policies towards Pakistan and China);
- for the purpose of preparing their plan they could count on \$50-\$60 million MAP annually from the United States;

- we look

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: Sec Exs 64-68, vol. 25, #3

By je NARA, Date 5-19-04

JAN 10 1964

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

- we look to them to make the decision on priorities among the competing needs of their services, bearing in mind that an acceptable plan must not excessively strain Indian resources;
- we intend to continue with an interim program in FY '65 at roughly current levels while they work out their plan.

*prebush*  
*limit drain*

2. Tell the Pakistanis that:

- we are willing to support a satisfactory five-year Pakistani military plan within a mutually acceptable political framework (i.e., fulfillment by Pakistan of its obligations to CENTO, SEATO and the United States);
- as a part of this plan we are willing to provide two additional squadrons of supersonics;
- for the purpose of devising their plan, the Pakistanis could figure on some \$40 million annually in MAP from the United States;
- we want to resume discussions looking towards the expansion of our facilities.

3. Keep both the Indians and Pakistanis generally informed of our assistance activities in each country. General Taylor has already done much of this job with Ayub, drawing a surprisingly mild reaction. However, a long-term military program for India, including possibly some supersonics, and the provision of additional supersonics to Pakistan will very possibly create an initial storm in each country about our policy in the other. We shall have to find ways of riding this out.

4. Keep the British fully informed regarding our military assistance planning for both India and Pakistan and encourage their continued cooperation and participation.

Dean Rusk

~~SECRET~~

117

ROBIN  
of  
KUTCH

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

TYPE OF DOCUMENT Cable \_\_\_\_\_

Letter \_\_\_\_\_

Memo   X  

Other \_\_\_\_\_

DATE   July 17, 1965  

FROM   Benjamin H. Read  

TO   McGeorge Bundy   NUMBER \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT   Prime Minister Wilson's Message to the President  
  Regarding the Rann of Kutch  

SEE   United Kingdom  

*PM Wilson  
252 257  
7/15/65*

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

SUMMARY 119

7-2

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

*Rann of Kutch*

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- THOMSON

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NSC CINCMEAFSA FOR POLAD

INR RANN OF KUTCH

NSA  
DOD UK HICOM INFORMED US ABOUT NOON, JUNE 30 THAT INDO-PAK AGREE-  
AID MENT ON RANN OF KUTCH SIGNED IN KARACHI BY FONSEC AZIZ AHMED  
AND INDIAN HICOM PARTHASARATHI.  
RSR MCCONAUGHY

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 4:48 AM JUNE 30  
PASSED WHITE HOUSE 4:51 AM JUNE 30

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R2  
AGREEMENT (SCHEDULED)

BY JOHN BUSH

NEW DELHI, INDIA, JUNE 30 (REUTERS)-INDIA AND PAKISTAN TODAY SIGNED A FORMAL CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT ENDING THE ARMED STRUGGLE IN THE DESOLATE RANN OF KUTCH BORDER AREA BETWEEN THEIR TWO COUNTRIES.

THE AGREEMENT SIGNED HERE AND IN KARACHI INCLUDES A FORMAL CEASEFIRE EFFECTIVE 6:30 A.M. THURSDAY, LOCAL TIME (0 P.M. TONIGHT, E.D.T.). AN INFORMAL CEASEFIRE HAS EXISTED FOR THE PAST TWO MONTHS.

A DRAFT OF THE THREE-CLAUSE AGREEMENT WAS APPROVED TUESDAY AFTER AN HOUR-LONG DISCUSSION BY THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT.

THE AGREEMENT FOLLOWED MEDIATION BY BRITAIN THROUGH ITS HIGH COMMISSIONS (EMBASSIES) IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN.

NEGOTIATIONS WERE STARTED BY BRITISH PRIME MINISTER HAROLD WILSON AFTER FIGHTING BROKE OUT LAST APRIL IN THE DESOLATE, OFTEN-FLOODED AREA OF MARSHES AND SAND DUNES ON THE INDI-WEST PAKISTAN BORDER.

PRESIDENT MOHAMMED AYUB KHAN OF PAKISTAN SAID IN KARACHI TUESDAY THAT THERE WOULD BE A GENERAL WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS AND ONLY POLICE POSTS THAT WERE IN THE 3,500-SQUARE-MILE WASTELAND BEFORE LAST JANUARY WOULD REMAIN.

HE TOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE THAT A MINISTERIAL MEETING WOULD DECIDE ON A BOUNDARY. IF THIS FAILED, THE ISSUE WOULD GO TO ARBITRATION.

(MORE) MM 4:22P

- BUNDY
- BATOR
- BOWLER
- BOWMAN
- CHASE
- COOPER
- HAYNES
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- KEENE
- KLEIN
- MOODY
- REEDY
- SAUNDERS
- THOMSON

R3

FIRST ADD NEW DELHI AGREEMENT X X X BORDER.

BOTH INDIA AND PAKISTAN IN APRIL MOVED REGULAR TROOPS INTO THE UNINHABITED AREA TO TAKE OVER FROM POLICE PATROLS ON THE BORDER.

IN SOMETIMES FIERCE FIGHTING SINCE THE FIRST BATTLE APRIL 9, EACH SIDE CLAIMED TO HAVE INFLICTED HEAVY CASUALTIES ON THE OTHER.

THE LAST CLASH WAS TWO WEEKS AGO, AFTER A THREE-WEEK LULL, AND INDIA SAID NINE PAKISTANI TROOPS WERE KILLED.

INDIA CLAIMS THE WHOLE OF THE RANN OF KUTCH. PAKISTAN CLAIMS THE NORTHERN AREA OF THE RANN, WHICH LIES BETWEEN THE WEST PAKISTAN AREA OF SIND AND THE FORMER INDIAN PRINCELY STATE OF KUTCH.

BRITISH MEDIATION ATTEMPTS FOLLOWED INDIAN PRIME MINISTER LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI'S WARNING THAT IF PAKISTAN CONTINUED THE DISPUTE IN THE RANN--WHERE PAKISTANI FORCES ON HIGHER GROUND WERE AT AN ADVANTAGE--INDIA WOULD CHOOSE ITS BATTLEGROUND ELSEWHERE.

AYUB RETORTED THAT THIS WOULD MEAN "GENERAL AND TOTAL WAR."

MM 4:25A

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INFO: Amembassy NEW DELHI 2674  
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*Rann of Kutch  
+ Cables*

JUN 30 4 27 PM '65

LBJ  
to  
Wilson  
6/30/65

Please transmit following message from President to  
Prime Minister Wilson:

QUOTE Congratulations on your success in working out  
a solution to the Rann of Kutch dispute. We all admire the  
great skill and patience shown by you and your people in  
helping bring about a peaceful settlement between the two  
great countries of the subcontinent. UNQUOTE

GP-3.

End

- BUNDY-SMITH
- BATOR
- BOWDLER
- BOWMAN
- CHASE
- COOPER
- HAYNES
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- KEENE X
- KLEIN
- KOMER
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- SAUNDERS
- THOMSON

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By je, NARA, Date 5-21-04

Drafted by:

NEA:SOA:FJCrawford:dmm 6/30/65

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - Phillips Talbot

Clearances:

s/s - Mr. Thompson      BNA - Mr. Meade  
White House - The President      SOA - Miss Laise

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Komer file

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JUN 16 3 20 AM '65

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR

President requests that you seek appointment with PM prior to Commonwealth Conference and, speaking on President's behalf cover following topics:

1. Afro-Asian Conference. President sees common US/UK interest in preventing Algiers confab from becoming an anti-Western rally. Since new Commonwealth members could play a major role to this end, President would be grateful if PM could express our hopes as well as those of UK to the Commonwealth conferees.

We are particularly concerned lest South Korea and South Viet-Nam as well as Malaysia, not be invited to Algiers. When US and UK are really defending interests of whole Free World in Viet-Nam and Malaysia, it would be difficult to understand if our friends should not support these beleaguered states. To achieve these objectives, it seems important that conference adopt UN procedures of one-nation, one-vote on at least attendance matters rather than Indonesian-proposed consensus approach. It is equally important, in

Drafted by: WH:RWKomer/ E/FA:JAMendenhall/NEA:CLaise:avm Clearance: FE - Mr. Bundy EUR - Mr. Leddy NEA - Mr. Talbot	Telegraphic transmission and Classification approved by: AF - Amb. Trimble S/AH - Mr. White	The Secretary S/S - Mr. Walsh White House Mr. Klein
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FORM 8-65 05-322

JUN 16 1965 By jc, NARA, Date 5-21-04

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines

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6/16/65

~~SECRET~~

in President's view, to forestall anti-Western resolutions tending to justify outright aggression.

President is especially hopeful that Shastri, Ayub and Nigerian delegation will play constructive role at Algiers. If PM sees fit, he of course free to indicate his understanding that President will be following Algiers proceedings closely.

2. Rann of Kutch. President has watched admiringly PM's patient but persistent effort to mediate dispute. He would be happy if PM chose to say President as eager as PM in devoutly hoping for early agreement on Rann of Kutch issue and avoidance by both sides of further inflammatory actions which could touch off a major clash. President especially disturbed by reports that Shastri feels India will have to take retaliatory action if Paks don't vacate "aggression" in Rann. US reading is that Paks are pressing their military advantage in Kutch too hard in order to improve their bargaining position in subsequent negotiations. A particularly troublesome aspect of this problem for us is the use of US equipment in Indo-Pak disputes. You should tell PM that President is increasingly concerned over justifying continued massive US economic and military investment in Pakistan and India, when both are dissipating their energies and resources in such self-defeating disputes.

GP-8,

END

RUSK

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*Kinner* 123

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EXDIS

FOR SECRETARY

DEPTEL 7920

PRIMIN PRESENTLY PERFORMING ON TELEVISION. I WILL SEE HIM AT SEVEN TONIGHT AND COMMUNICATE CONTENTS REFTEL.

GP-3. BRUCE  
BT

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *5-21-07*

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JUN 16 1965

# Research Memorandum

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

DECLASSIFIED RNA-28, June 9, 1965 03

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 5-21-04

To : The Secretary  
Through: S/S  
From : INR - George C. Denney, Jr. *h.c.d.jr.*  
Subject: The Rann of Kutch Incidents: An Interpretation

At the request of the Assistant Secretary, NEA, we have attempted an inquiry into the motives and objectives of India and Pakistan in the recent Rann of Kutch incidents. Because of the lack of clarity that surrounds some of the facts of the incidents and the absence of hard intelligence on the motivations of both parties, the analysis is somewhat speculative. We are limiting distribution to senior officers within the Department.

## ABSTRACT

The incidents in the Rann of Kutch were on a small scale militarily, and we have almost no verifiable information on the course of events. The entire affair may have been started inadvertently, but a case can be made for either side having provoked matters. Pakistan would have had more cogent reasons for provoking the incidents, and the few facts available could support a scenario along the following lines: The Pakistanis occupied Kanjarkot as part of its policy of "leaning" on India. The Indians reacted by establishing posts that threatened Kanjarkot, and Pakistani forces attacked one of these posts. Both sides then enlarged the scope of the fighting, and India assumed a threatening stance along the Punjab border. In sum, the Pakistanis would bear most of the blame for initiating the incidents and the Indians for escalating the conflict. Although this scenario is only one of several possibilities, it is the most plausible one. Numerous other factors -- some of them persistent problems of Indo-Pakistani relations -- would have to be taken into account to establish full responsibility for the Kutch crisis.

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

JUN 10 1965

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There is almost no verifiable information available on events in the Rann of Kutch. The reports of US military officers who visited the scene some time after the fighting do not give any positive evidence as to which side initiated the action or why it did so. In appraising developments and seeking to establish motivations, we are reduced to analyzing the claims made by the two sides and to extrapolating from their actual positions on the ground and in negotiations with the British for a cease fire.

Each side has made every effort to aid its own case in presentation of the facts to outsiders. Further, each side has viewed the facts in the light of its own attitudes formed by India-Pakistan animosity. Finally, the raw data available to both governments has probably been substantially distorted because views from the front -- probably slanted by excitement and confusion of observers -- were further adulterated by their respective intelligence and public relations organizations.

In considering the Rann of Kutch incident it should be kept in mind that available information indicates actual military activity in the Rann was limited. Escalation of the dispute took less the form of fighting on the ground than of a war of words and later massing of troops in other border areas, for the most part in defensive positions.

#### Possible Origins

The Rann of Kutch dispute may well have arisen inadvertently as a result of low level action. Minor harassing activity by one patrol may have been returned by another. Both might then have submitted exaggerated reports which caused escalation of the incident.

If we assume that either side intentionally instigated a major incident, Pakistan might have done so:

1) To set a precedent for the arbitration of Kashmir. The Pakistanis were aware that the US and UK would be likely to promote negotiation rather than let hostilities continue. They might well be willing to accept an adverse decision on the Rann of Kutch if it led to arbitration of Kashmir where they feel that they have a somewhat better case.

2) To show up India as a paper tiger by attacking in an area where Indian military forces are weak.

3) To test US assurances against an Indian attack on Pakistan using Indian military strength bolstered by US aid.

If India started the dispute, its motives might have been:

1) To further solidify the de facto frontier by interfering with Pakistani patrols coming down below it.

2) To test US assurances against a Pakistani attack on India using US MAP equipment.

Looking back over what has happened, the odds seem to point slightly toward Pakistan as the initiator of the affair. After the dispute was underway the Pakistanis concentrated on arbitration of the dispute, directly asked what the US would do if India attacked East Pakistan and gloated over India's humiliating defeat in the Rann of Kutch. This set of motives and subsequent actions does not necessarily indicate premeditated action in the Rann of Kutch, however, because they could have come into play as a result of events in the Rann as well.

#### Pertinent Background

Several facts concerning the Kutch affair seem fairly clear:

1. There was some element of dispute over the ownership of the Rann even in British times, although from the evidence we have seen so far, it appears at present that the bulk of the evidence would support the Indian claim.
2. Pakistanis did apparently occupy Chad Bet for some period of time before 1956, until they were dispossessed by the Indians. (We have very little information on this event, but the Indians have not denied it.)
3. In 1960 the entire Kutch matter was left to later discussions and the Indians admitted -- for a brief period -- that there was a dispute over the location of the boundary.
4. For some time immediately preceding the recent flare-up -- presumably for quite a long time -- there had been little activity in the Kanjarkot areas from the Indian side, and it is likely that the Pakistanis were not much more deeply involved.
5. The Pakistani occupation of Kanjarkot (as distinct from occasional passing through by patrols) was a new factor in the dispute and probably was the single most significant precipitating factor.
6. After the Pakistanis had occupied Kanjarkot, the Indians apparently took up positions that outflanked it, thereby greatly increasing the likelihood of hostilities.
7. The initial firing was probably by the Pakistanis when they attacked the Sardar post, (apparently one of those newly occupied by the Indians).

A number of other factors are considerably less clear:

1. We do not know whether the Pakistanis genuinely believe that they have a reasonable legal case for their territorial claims. Since, however, the dispute does go back at least to 1956, they probably do believe so.
2. We do not know much about what happened in Kanjarkot over the past several years. Given the fairly well structured ground rules in the area it would seem that both sides should have known who was permitted to do what in

Kanjarkot. It is not clear how far below Kanjarkot Pakistani patrols have gone but police units in the area apparently exchanged low level protests concerning crossing of each other's patrol tracks. The protest procedure apparently was followed in January 1965 and continued (at higher levels) as hostilities ensued.

3. We do now know how hostilities at Sardar were initiated (through direct Pakistani attack or Indian provocation); or who first committed large numbers of troops; or who first committed regular forces. It is likely that the Pakistanis were first on the latter count, but even this is not certain.

#### A Possible Scenario

There are many possible scenarios that can be deduced from the material at hand; we would propose the following as more likely than any other:

Pakistan believes that it has at least an arguable case in Kutch, although probably recognizing that it is probably far short of convincing. In addition, Pakistan enjoys a considerable military advantage there. Kutch thus presents at a minimum a useful pressure point against India, and the occupation of Kanjarkot was intended as part of the "leaning" procedure that Ayub has been following to force India to negotiate on Kashmir. Pakistan probably expected that the Indians would attempt to oust them from Kanjarkot, and the Pakistanis attempted to force the Indians into political negotiations over Kanjarkot and the Rann in general.

The Indians, because of the government's difficult domestic political position, felt compelled to reject political negotiations and to counterpressure the Pakistanis by provocatively manning new posts on the Kanjarkot flank. The Pakistanis retaliated by attacking one of these (Sardar) and hostilities broke out. Both sides built up their forces, probably a series of minor actions followed, and ultimately the Pakistanis moved in force against Biar Bet.

The crucial gap in this -- or any other scenario -- is the extent to which the Pakistanis planned the Kutch incident to grow into major proportions. On the one hand, it is possible that they intended only to score a minor point by occupying Kanjarkot. Alternatively, they may have intended all along to escalate the quarrel -- although probably not to the extent that it has now reached -- so as to force India to accept arbitration, and possibly to test US assurances on use of Indian MAP equipment against Pakistan.

The latter explanation fits very well with Pakistani behavior in the negotiations over a ceasefire. At the same time, however, there are no indications that Pakistan undertook to prepare for a major confrontation. Indeed a major confrontation is precisely what Pakistan cannot desire, since its overall military strength is so inferior to India's. Ayub is well aware of the Indian tendency to overreact militarily and should have anticipated that the situation would develop to near-crisis proportions. Other incidents have been contained however (Dahagram most recently), and perhaps he merely miscalculated.

If we assume that the Kutch conflict was instigated by Pakistan in the expectation that it would remain quite limited, then Pakistani negotiating positions were presumably improvised once the Indians had begun to build up the issue. This is not an unreasonable assumption, since the Pakistanis had sufficient time to develop their position between the occupation of Kanjarkot in January and the beginning of negotiations in April, and their position could have developed as the pace of action increased.

It must be reemphasized, however, that the scenario suggested above is only one of several possibilities; it does seem to be the most logical and in accord with the facts as we know them. It tends to blame Pakistan for the initiation of the difficulties (although, theoretically, blame could be put on the Indians for ousting Pakistan from Chaad Bet in 1956) and ascribes most of the escalation to the Indian side. The Kanjarkot incident could well have been just one more of the long series of incidents that plague the Indo-Pakistani border, in some of which the Indians are mainly to blame; in others the Pakistanis. Each one of these incidents has the potential of becoming a *causis belli*; the Kutch affair came closer to this than have most others.